נדרים י

נדרים י

אֲפִילּוּ תֵּימָא רַבִּי יְהוּדָה, כִּי אָמַר רַבִּי יְהוּדָה — בִּנְדָבָה, בְּנֶדֶר לָא אָמַר.

Even if you say that the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, it can be argued that when Rabbi Yehuda said that it is good to take a vow and fulfill it, he said it with regard to a gift offering, but he did not say it with regard to vows.

וְהָקָתָנֵי: ״טוֹב מִזֶּה וּמִזֶּה נוֹדֵר וּמְקַיֵּים״! תְּנִי: ״נוֹדֵב וּמְקַיֵּים״.

The Gemara asks: But isn’t the mishna teaching that according to Rabbi Yehuda, better than both this and that is one who vows [noder] and pays, which indicates that he says this even about vows? The Gemara answers: Teach the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda with the following, emended formulation: Better than both this and that is one who volunteers [nodev] a gift offering and pays it.

מַאי שְׁנָא נוֹדֵר דְּלָא, דִילְמָא אָתֵי בָּהּ לִידֵי תַקָּלָה? נְדָבָה נָמֵי, דִּילְמָא אָתֵי בָּהּ לִידֵי תַקָּלָה!

The Gemara asks: What is different about one who vows, i.e., one who says: It is incumbent upon me to bring an offering, which is not proper to do due to the concern that perhaps he will encounter a stumbling block and not bring it promptly, thereby violating the prohibition against delaying? One should also not designate a particular animal as a gift offering, due to the concern that perhaps he will encounter a stumbling block with it.

רַבִּי יְהוּדָה לְטַעְמֵיהּ, דְּאָמַר: אָדָם מֵבִיא כִּבְשָׂתוֹ לָעֲזָרָה, וּמַקְדִּישָׁה, וְסוֹמֵךְ עָלֶיהָ, וְשׁוֹחֲטָהּ.

The Gemara answers: Rabbi Yehuda conforms to his standard line of reasoning, as he said explicitly in a baraita: A person brings his lamb to the Temple courtyard and consecrates it there, and immediately leans on it and slaughters it. Consequently, there is no concern that he will encounter a stumbling block.

תִּינַח נְדָבָה דְקׇרְבָּנוֹת, נְדָבָה דִנְזִירוּת מַאי אִיכָּא לְמֵימַר?

The Gemara asks: That works out well with regard to voluntary gifts in the context of offerings, but with regard to the voluntary acceptance of naziriteship, what is there to say? There is still room for concern that one will not fulfill the obligations incumbent upon him as a nazirite.

רַבִּי יְהוּדָה לְטַעְמֵיהּ. דְּתַנְיָא, רַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר: חֲסִידִים הָרִאשׁוֹנִים הָיוּ מִתְאַוִּין לְהָבִיא קׇרְבַּן חַטָּאת. לְפִי שֶׁאֵין הַקָּדוֹשׁ בָּרוּךְ הוּא מֵבִיא תַּקָּלָה עַל יְדֵיהֶם, מָה הָיוּ עוֹשִׂין? עוֹמְדִים וּמִתְנַדְּבִין נְזִירוּת לַמָּקוֹם, כְּדֵי שֶׁיִּתְחַיֵּיב קׇרְבַּן חַטָּאת לַמָּקוֹם.

The Gemara answers: Here, too, Rabbi Yehuda conforms to his standard line of reasoning, as it is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Yehuda says: The early generations of pious men would desire to bring a sin-offering but did not have the opportunity to do so because the Holy One, Blessed be He, does not bring about a stumbling block through them, and they would not sin even unwittingly. What would they do? They would rise and volunteer naziriteship to the Omnipresent in order to be liable to bring a sin-offering of a nazirite to the Omnipresent.

רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן אוֹמֵר: לֹא נָדְרוּ בְּנָזִיר, אֶלָּא: הָרוֹצֶה לְהָבִיא עוֹלָה — מִתְנַדֵּב וּמֵבִיא, שְׁלָמִים — מִתְנַדֵּב וּמֵבִיא, תּוֹדָה וְאַרְבָּעָה מִינֵי לַחְמָהּ — מִתְנַדֵּב וּמֵבִיא. אֲבָל בִּנְזִירוּת לֹא הִתְנַדְּבוּ, כְּדֵי שֶׁלֹּא יִקָּרְאוּ חוֹטְאִין. שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר ״וְכִפֶּר עָלָיו מֵאֲשֶׁר חָטָא עַל הַנָּפֶשׁ״.

Rabbi Shimon says: They did not take a vow of naziriteship. Rather, one who would want to bring a burnt-offering would volunteer and bring it; one who would want to bring a peace-offering would volunteer and bring it; and one who would want to bring a thanks-offering and its four types of bread would volunteer and bring them. However, they did not volunteer naziriteship in order that they not be called sinners. According to Rabbi Shimon, naziriteship involves some element of sin, as it is stated: “And he shall make atonement for him, for that he sinned against the soul” (Numbers 6:11).

אָמַר אַבָּיֵי: שִׁמְעוֹן הַצַּדִּיק וְרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן וְרַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר הַקַּפָּר כּוּלָּן שִׁיטָה אַחַת הֵן, דְּנָזִיר חוֹטֵא הָוֵי: שִׁמְעוֹן הַצַּדִּיק וְרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן הָא דַּאֲמַרַן.

§ Abaye said: Shimon HaTzaddik, Rabbi Shimon, and Rabbi Elazar HaKappar are all of the same opinion, that a nazirite is a sinner. The statements of Shimon HaTzaddik and Rabbi Shimon in this regard are that which we already said.

וְרַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר הַקַּפָּר בְּרַבִּי, דְּתַנְיָא, רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר הַקַּפָּר בְּרַבִּי אוֹמֵר: ״וְכִפֶּר עָלָיו מֵאֲשֶׁר חָטָא עַל הַנָּפֶשׁ״. וְכִי בְּאֵיזוֹ נֶפֶשׁ חָטָא זֶה? אֶלָּא: שֶׁצִּיעֵר עַצְמוֹ מִן הַיַּיִן. וַהֲלֹא דְּבָרִים קַל וָחוֹמֶר: וּמָה זֶה שֶׁלֹּא צִיעֵר עַצְמוֹ אֶלָּא מִן הַיַּיִן נִקְרָא חוֹטֵא, הַמְצַעֵר עַצְמוֹ מִכׇּל דָּבָר עַל אַחַת כַּמָּה וְכַמָּה. מִכָּאן כׇּל הַיּוֹשֵׁב בְּתַעֲנִית נִקְרָא חוֹטֵא.

And Rabbi Elazar HaKappar the Distinguished agrees, as it is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Elazar HaKappar the Distinguished says: It is written with regard to the priest who sacrificed the offering of a nazirite: “And he shall make atonement for him, for that he sinned against the soul.” Against which soul did the nazirite sin? Rather, his sin is that he caused himself suffering by refraining from wine. Are these matters not inferred a fortiori: Just as this nazirite, who causes himself suffering only by refraining from wine, is called a sinner, one who causes himself suffering by refraining from everything is all the more so to be considered a sinner. From here it can be derived that whoever fasts unnecessarily is called a sinner.

וְהָדֵין קְרָא בְּנָזִיר טָמֵא כְּתִיב! מִשּׁוּם דְּשָׁנָה בְּחֵטְא הוּא.

The Gemara raises a question with regard to the opinion of Rabbi Elazar HaKappar. Isn’t this verse written with regard to a ritually impure nazirite? Consequently, only a nazirite who becomes impure shall be considered a sinner. The Gemara answers: Rabbi Elazar HaKappar holds that the verse uses this terminology with regard to a ritually impure nazirite because he repeated his sin. However, becoming a nazirite is itself considered a sin.

מַתְנִי׳ הָאוֹמֵר (לַחֲבֵירוֹ) ״קֻוֽנָּם״ ״קוּנָּח״ ״קוּנָּס״ — הֲרֵי אֵלּוּ כִּינּוּיִין לַקׇּרְבָּן. ״חֶרֶק״ ״חֶרֶךְ״ ״חֶרֶף״ — הֲרֵי אֵלּוּ כִּינּוּיִין לַחֵרֶם. ״נָזִיק״ ״נָזִיחַ״ ״פָּזִיחַ״ — הֲרֵי אֵלּוּ כִּינּוּיִין לִנְזִירוּת. ״שְׁבוּתָה״ ״שְׁקוּקָה״, נוֹדֵר בְּ״מוֹהִי״ — הֲרֵי אֵלּוּ כִּינּוּיִין לַשְּׁבוּעָה.

MISHNA: In the case of one who says to another that a certain object is konam, konaḥ, or konas, these expressions are substitutes for the term offering [korban], and the vow takes effect. Ḥerek, ḥerekh and ḥeref; these are substitutes for the term indicating a dedication [ḥerem] to the Temple treasury. Nazik, naziaḥ, and paziaḥ; these are substitutes for the term naziriteship [nazir]. Shevuta, shekuka, or one who vows with the term mohi, these are substitutes for the term oath [shevua].

גְּמָ׳ אִיתְּמַר כִּינּוּיִין, רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן אָמַר: לְשׁוֹן אוּמּוֹת הֵן. רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן לָקִישׁ אָמַר: לָשׁוֹן שֶׁבָּדוּ לָהֶם חֲכָמִים לִהְיוֹת נוֹדֵר בּוֹ. וְכֵן הוּא אוֹמֵר: ״בַּחֹדֶשׁ אֲשֶׁר בָּדָא מִלִּבּוֹ״.

GEMARA: It was stated that amora’im disagreed about substitutes for the language of vows. Rabbi Yoḥanan said: They are terms from a language of other nations that mean offering, dedication, naziriteship, or oath. Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish said: These terms employ language that the Sages devised [badu] with which one can take a vow. In order to explain the word badu, he adds: And so it states with regard to Jeroboam: “In the month that he had devised [bada] in his own heart” (I Kings 12:33).

וְטַעְמָא מַאי תַּקִּינוּ רַבָּנַן כִּינּוּיִין? דְּלָא לֵימָא ״קׇרְבָּן״. וְלֵימָא ״קׇרְבָּן״? דִּילְמָא אָמַר ״קׇרְבָּן לַה׳״. וְלֵימָא ״קׇרְבָּן לַה׳״? דִּילְמָא אָמַר ״לַה׳״ וְלָא אָמַר ״קׇרְבָּן״, וְקָא מַפֵּיק שֵׁם שָׁמַיִם לְבַטָּלָה.

And according to the opinion of Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish, what is the reason that the Sages established substitutes for the language of vows? The Gemara answers: It is so that one not explicitly say the term offering. The Gemara asks: And let him say the term offering; what is wrong with that? The Gemara answers: Perhaps he will say: An offering to the Lord. The Gemara asks: And let him say: An offering to the Lord. The Gemara answers: Perhaps he will say: To the Lord, and he will then change his mind and not say: An offering, and he will thereby express the name of Heaven in vain.

וְתַנְיָא, רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן אוֹמֵר:

And similarly, it is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Shimon says:

מִנַּיִן שֶׁלֹּא יֹאמַר אָדָם ״לַה׳ עוֹלָה״, ״לַה׳ מִנְחָה״, ״לַה׳ תּוֹדָה״, ״לַה׳ שְׁלָמִים״ — תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״קׇרְבָּן לַה׳״.

From where is it derived that a person should not say: To the Lord a burnt-offering, or: To the Lord a meal-offering, or: To the Lord a thanks-offering, or: To the Lord a peace-offering, but should mention the offering first and then state that it is for the Lord? The verse states: “An offering to the Lord” (Leviticus 1:2). The reason for this is that if one first says: To the Lord, perhaps he will change his mind and not complete the sentence in order to avoid consecrating the offering, and he will have uttered the name of God in vain.

וְקַל וָחוֹמֶר: וּמָה זֶה שֶׁלֹּא נִתְכַּוֵּון אֶלָּא לְהַזְכִּיר שֵׁם שָׁמַיִם עַל הַקׇּרְבָּן — אָמְרָה תּוֹרָה ״קׇרְבָּן לַה׳״, לְבַטָּלָה — עַל אַחַת כַּמָּה וְכַמָּה.

And it is an a fortiori inference: Just as with regard to this individual discussed in the baraita, who intended to mention the name of Heaven only upon an offering, the Torah said that he should say: An offering to the Lord, in order to avoid possibly mentioning the name of God in vain, with regard to one who actually mentions the Divine Name in vain, all the more so it is clear that he has committed a severe transgression.

לֵימָא כְּתַנָּאֵי, בֵּית שַׁמַּאי אוֹמְרִים: כִּינּוּיֵי כִינּוּיִין — אֲסוּרִין. וּבֵית הִלֵּל אוֹמְרִים: כִּינּוּיֵי כִינּוּיִין — מוּתָּרִין.

The Gemara suggests: Let us say that this dispute between Rabbi Yoḥanan and Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish is parallel to a dispute between tanna’im, as it was taught in a baraita that Beit Shammai say: If one expresses a vow with substitutes for the substitute terms mentioned in the mishna, the vow takes effect and the items are forbidden. And Beit Hillel say: If one expresses a vow with substitutes for the substitute terms mentioned in the mishna, the vow does not take effect and the items are permitted.

מַאי לָאו: מַאן דְּאָמַר כִּינּוּיֵי כִינּוּיִין אֲסוּרִין, קָסָבַר (כִּינּוּיֵי) כִינּוּיִין לְשׁוֹן אוּמּוֹת הֵן. וּלְמַאן דְּאָמַר מוּתָּרִים, קָסָבַר לָשׁוֹן שֶׁבָּדוּ לָהֶן חֲכָמִים?

What, is it not correct that the one who says that a vow expressed with substitutes for the substitute terms mentioned in the mishna takes effect and that the item is consequently forbidden likewise holds that substitutes for the language of vows are terms from the language of other nations, and therefore substitutes for those terms, which are also from foreign languages, should be equally acceptable? And similarly, according to the one who says that the vow does not take effect and the item is permitted, it must be that he holds that these terms are language that the Sages devised. Consequently, substitutes for those terms, which the Sages did not declare to be acceptable terms for expressing a vow, do not cause a vow to take effect.

לָא, דְּכוּלֵּי עָלְמָא כִּינּוּיִין לְשׁוֹן אוּמּוֹת הֵן, וּבֵית שַׁמַּאי סָבְרִי: בְּהָנֵי נָמֵי מִשְׁתַּעִי אוּמּוֹת, וּבֵית הִלֵּל סָבְרִי: בְּהָנֵי לָא מִשְׁתַּעִי אוּמּוֹת.

The Gemara responds: No, it is possible that everyone holds that substitutes for the language of vows are terms from the language of other nations, and Beit Shammai hold that the nations speak using these substitutes for the terms mentioned in the mishna also, and Beit Hillel hold that the nations do not speak using these terms.

וְאִיבָּעֵית אֵימָא, בֵּית שַׁמַּאי סָבְרִי: גָּזְרִינַן כִּינּוּיֵי כִינּוּיִין מִשּׁוּם כִּינּוּיִין, וּבֵית הִלֵּל סָבְרִי: לָא גָּזְרִינַן כִּינּוּיֵי כִינּוּיִין מִשּׁוּם כִּינּוּיִין.

And if you wish, say an alternate response: Substitute terms themselves are terms from a foreign language. Beit Shammai hold that we issue a decree with regard to substitutes for the substitute terms mentioned in the mishna, despite the fact that these terms themselves are not valid terms even in a foreign language, due to a concern that if they are not considered to express a vow, one will come to act leniently with regard to a vow expressed with the substitute terms mentioned in the mishna. And Beit Hillel hold: We do not issue a decree with regard to substitutes for the substitute terms mentioned in the mishna due to a concern that one will come to act leniently with regard to a vow expressed with the substitute terms themselves.

הֵיכִי דָּמֵי כִּינּוּיֵי כִינּוּיִין דִּנְדָרִים? תָּנֵי רַב יוֹסֵף: ״מַקְנֵמְנָא״ ״מַקְנַחְנָא״ ״מַקְנֵסְנָא״. הֵיכִי דָּמֵי כִּינּוּיֵי כִינּוּיִין דְּחֵרֶם? תָּנֵי מַפְשָׁאָה: ״חֲרָקִים״ ״חֲרָכִים״ ״חֲרָפִים״. כִּינּוּיֵי כִינּוּיִין דִּנְזִירוּת? תָּנֵי רַב יוֹסֵף: ״מַחְזֵקְנָא״ ״מַנְזַחְנָא״ ״מַפִּיחְנָא״.

The Gemara asks: What are the circumstances of substitutes for substitute terms for vows? Rav Yosef teaches that they include the following terms: Mekanamna, mekanaḥna, and mekanasna. These are verb forms of the terms konam, konaḥ, and konas respectively, mentioned in the mishna. The Gemara asks: What are the circumstances of substitutes for substitute terms for dedication [ḥerem]? The Sage Mafsha’a teaches: Ḥarakim, ḥarakhim, and ḥarafim. The Gemara continues: What are the substitutes for substitute terms for naziriteship [nezirut]? Rav Yosef teaches: Meḥazakna, menazaḥna, and mafiḥna.

אִיבַּעְיָא לְהוּ: ״מִיפְּחַזְנָא״ מַאי? ״מִיתְּחַזְנָא״ מַאי? ״מִיתְּעַזְנָא״ מַאי? אֲמַר לֵיהּ רָבִינָא לְרַב אָשֵׁי: ״קִינְּמָא״ (קינמא) מַאי? ״קֻוֽנָּם״ קָאָמַר, אוֹ דִלְמָא ״קִנְּמָן בֶּשֶׂם״ קָאָמַר?

A dilemma was raised before the Sages: If one uses the term mifḥazna, what is the halakha? If one uses the term mitḥazna, what is the halakha? If one uses the term mitazna, what is the halakha? Ravina said to Rav Ashi: If one uses the term kinma, what is the halakha? Is he saying that the item should be like a konam, in which case the vow takes effect, or perhaps he is saying sweet cinnamon [kineman besem] (see Exodus 30:23) and does not intend to express a vow with the word konam?

אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַב אַחָא בְּרֵיהּ דְּרַב חִיָּיא לְרַב אָשֵׁי: ״קִינָּה״ מַאי? קִינָּה שֶׁל תַּרְנְגוֹלִין קָאָמַר, אוֹ דִילְמָא לָשׁוֹן דְּקֻוֽנָּם? תִּיבְּעֵי.

Rav Aḥa, son of Rav Ḥiyya, said to Rav Ashi: If one uses the term kina, what is the halakha? Is he saying this term in reference to a chicken coop, which is also called a kina, or perhaps it is a term for konam and expresses a vow? With regard to these cases, the Gemara says: The dilemma remains unresolved.

כִּינּוּיֵי כִינּוּיִין דִּשְׁבוּעָה הֵיכִי דָּמֵי? ״שְׁבוּאֵל״ ״שְׁבוּתִיאֵל״ ״שְׁקוּקָאֵל״. שְׁבוּאֵל? שְׁבוּאֵל בֶּן גֵּרְשׁוֹם מַשְׁמַע! אֶלָּא: ״שְׁבוּבָאֵל״ ״שְׁבוּתִיאֵל״ ״שְׁקוּקָאֵל״ מַהוּ? אָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל: אָמַר ״אַשִּׁיבְתָּא״ — לֹא אָמַר כְּלוּם, ״אַשְׁקִיקָא״ — לֹא אָמַר כְּלוּם, ״קָרִינְשָׂא״ — לֹא אָמַר כְּלוּם.

The Gemara asks: What are the circumstances of substitutes for substitute terms of oaths [shevua]? The Gemara answers that this category includes the terms shevuel, shevutiel, and shekukael. The Gemara asks: Why is the term shevuel included? This word indicates Shevuel, son of Gershom, the proper name of an individual (see I Chronicles 26:24), and therefore it should not be considered a substitute term for an oath. Rather, the list of terms includes shevuvael, shevutiel, and shekukael. What is the halakha? Shmuel said: If he said ashivta he has not said anything, despite the fact that there is some similarity between this term and the word oath [shevua]. Similarly, if he said ashkika he has not said anything. If he said karinsha he has not said anything, although it is somewhat similar to konam.

״נָדַר בְּמוֹהִי הֲרֵי אֵלּוּ כִינּוּיִין״. תַּנְיָא, רַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל אוֹמֵר: הָאוֹמֵר ״בְּמוֹהִי״ — לֹא אָמַר כְּלוּם, ״בְּמוֹמָתָא דַּאֲמַר מוֹהִי״ — הֲרֵי אֵלּוּ כִּינּוּיִין לַשְּׁבוּעָה.

§ It is taught in the mishna: If one used the terms shevuta or shekuka, or took a vow with the term mohi, these are substitute terms for an oath. It is taught in a baraita that Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: One who says that he is taking an oath by mohi has not said anything. However, if he says: By an oath [bemomata] that Mohi said, these are valid substitute terms for an oath.

מַתְנִי׳ הָאוֹמֵר ״לַחוּלִּין שֶׁאוֹכַל לָךְ״, ״לָא כָּשַׁר״ וְ״לָא דְּכֵי״, ״טָהוֹר״ וְ״טָמֵא״, ״נוֹתָר״ וּ״פִיגּוּל״ — אָסוּר.

MISHNA: If one says to another: That which I eat of yours shall be considered laḥullin, it is interpreted as though he said: La ḥullin, not non-sacred, and the food is thereby forbidden to him. Similarly, if he said that food shall be considered not valid or not dekhi, i.e., not ritually pure, or if he said the food shall be considered an offering that has become ritually impure, left over [notar], or piggul, i.e., an offering that was sacrificed with the intent to consume it after its appointed time, it is forbidden.

כְּאִימְּרָא, כְּדִירִים, כָּעֵצִים, כָּאִשִּׁים, כַּמִּזְבֵּחַ, כַּהֵיכָל, כִּירוּשָׁלַיִם. נָדַר בְּאֶחָד מִכׇּל מְשַׁמְּשֵׁי הַמִּזְבֵּחַ, אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁלֹּא הִזְכִּיר קׇרְבָּן — הֲרֵי זֶה נָדַר בְּקׇרְבָּן. רַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר: הָאוֹמֵר ״יְרוּשָׁלַיִם״ — לֹא אָמַר כְּלוּם.

If one says that food shall be considered like the lamb of the daily offering, like the animals designated as offerings and kept in special enclosures, like the wood of the altar, like the fires on the altar, like the altar, like the Sanctuary, or like Jerusalem, or if he took a vow with any of the accessories of the altar, although he did not explicitly mention that the food should be like an offering, it is considered a vow that associates a different item with an offering. Rabbi Yehuda says: One who says that an item shall be considered Jerusalem, instead of saying that it shall be considered like Jerusalem, has not said anything.