נדרים טו

נדרים טו

כִּי לָא מִזְדְּהַיר — בִּתְנָאָה, אֲבָל בְּאִיסּוּרָא — מִזְדְּהַר.

Sleeping today is not prohibited for him. Rather, it causes sleeping to be prohibited for him tomorrow, because when one is not careful, it is only with regard to a condition. In the former case, sleeping on the second day merely fulfills the condition on which the prohibition was based, causing it to take effect retroactively. Therefore, there is concern that he will not be careful and retroactively cause a violation. However, one is careful with regard to a prohibition. In the latter case, sleeping on the second day is directly prohibited. Therefore, there is no concern that he will violate the prohibition.

תְּנַן: קֻוֽנָּם שֶׁאֲנִי יָשֵׁן, שֶׁאֲנִי מְהַלֵּךְ, שֶׁאֲנִי מְדַבֵּר וְכוּ׳. הֵיכִי דָמֵי? אִילֵּימָא כִּדְקָתָנֵי, ״שֶׁאֲנִי יָשֵׁן״ מִי הָוֵי נִדְרָא? וְהָתְנַן: חוֹמֶר בַּשְּׁבוּעוֹת, שֶׁהַשְּׁבוּעוֹת חָלוֹת עַל דָּבָר שֶׁיֵּשׁ בּוֹ מַמָּשׁ וְעַל דָּבָר שֶׁאֵין בּוֹ מַמָּשׁ, מַה שֶּׁאֵין כֵּן בַּנְּדָרִים. וְשֵׁינָה דָּבָר שֶׁאֵין בּוֹ מַמָּשׁ הוּא! אֶלָּא דְּאָמַר: ״קֻוֽנָּם עֵינַי בְּשֵׁינָה״.

The Gemara raises a difficulty with regard to the opinion of Rav Yehuda: We learned in the mishna that one who says: Sleeping is konam for me, or: Walking is konam for me, or: Speaking is konam for me, may not violate his vow. What are the circumstances? If we say that the wording of the vow is precisely as the mishna teaches, is the vow: Sleeping is konam for me, a valid vow? But didn’t we learn in a baraita: There is stringency with regard to oaths vis-à-vis vows, in that oaths apply to something that has actual substance and to something that does not have actual substance, which is not the case with regard to vows. And sleep is something that does not have actual substance, so how can a vow apply to sleep? Rather, the mishna must be referring to a case where he said: Sleeping is konam for my eyes.

וְאִי דְּלָא יָהֵיב שִׁיעוּרָא, מִי שָׁבְקִינַן לֵיהּ עַד דְּעָבַר אִיסּוּר ״בַּל יַחֵל״? וְהָאָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: ״שְׁבוּעָה שֶׁלֹּא אִישַׁן שְׁלֹשָׁה יָמִים״ — מַלְקִין אוֹתוֹ וְיָשֵׁן לְאַלְתַּר!

The Gemara questions this interpretation: And if he did not give a measurement to the prohibition created by the vow, but rather prohibited himself from sleeping for an unlimited period of time, do we let him be until he inevitably transgresses the prohibition: He shall not profane, by falling asleep? But didn’t Rabbi Yoḥanan say that if one says: I hereby take an oath that I will not sleep for three days, the court flogs him for taking an oath in vain, and he may sleep immediately, as he is incapable of fulfilling his oath? Here too, if the prohibition has no time frame, the vow should not take effect.

אֶלָּא דַּאֲמַר ״קֻוֽנָּם עֵינַי בְּשֵׁינָה לְמָחָר אִם אִישַׁן הַיּוֹם״. הָא אָמְרַתְּ כׇּל בְּאִסּוּרֵיהּ, מִזְדְּהַר?

Rather, the mishna must be referring to a case where one said: Sleeping is konam to my eyes tomorrow if I sleep today. The mishna rules that he may not sleep today, lest he transgress the prohibition of: He shall not profane, by sleeping tomorrow. However, didn’t you say that with regard to this vow it is agreed that he may sleep today, as one is careful with regard to any direct prohibition and will not violate the vow tomorrow? If so, why is it prohibited for him to sleep today?

אֶלָּא פְּשִׁיטָא דְּאָמַר ״קֻוֽנָּם עֵינַי בְּשֵׁינָה הַיּוֹם אִם אִישַׁן לְמָחָר״. וְאִי לָא נָיֵים הַיּוֹם, כִּי נָיֵים לְמָחָר מַאי ״בַּל יַחֵל דְּבָרוֹ״ אִיכָּא? אֶלָּא לָאו בִּדְנָיֵים. אַלְמָא אִיתֵיהּ דְּנָיֵים. וּתְיוּבְתָּא דְרַב יְהוּדָה!

Rather, it is obvious that the mishna is referring to a case where one said: Sleeping is konam to my eyes today if I sleep tomorrow. The Gemara asks: And if he does not sleep today, when he sleeps tomorrow, what transgression of: He shall not profane his word, is there? Rather, is it not with regard to a case where he slept on the first day, and therefore the mishna warns him not to sleep on the second day lest he transgress the prohibition retroactively? Apparently, there is a situation in which he sleeps on the first day. And this is a refutation of the opinion of Rav Yehuda that he may not sleep today lest he sleep tomorrow as well, thereby violating the prohibition.

כִּי קָתָנֵי, דְּאִי נָיֵים.

The Gemara answers: When the mishna teaches that he may not sleep tomorrow, it does not mean that today he may sleep ab initio. Rather, it means that if he did sleep today he must be careful not to sleep tomorrow.

רָבִינָא אָמַר: לְעוֹלָם כִּדְקָתָנֵי וּמַאי ״בַּל יַחֵל״ — מִדְּרַבָּנַן.

Ravina said a different answer: Actually, the mishna may be interpreted as it teaches, i.e., sleeping is konam for me. The vow does not take effect, as sleep does not have actual substance. And if so, what is the reason the mishna states that if he sleeps he is in violation of the prohibition: He shall not profane? He transgresses the prohibition by rabbinic law. Although the vow does not take effect by Torah law, the Sages prohibited him from breaking his word.

וּמִי אִיכָּא ״בַּל יַחֵל״ מִדְּרַבָּנַן? אִין, וְהָתַנְיָא: דְּבָרִים הַמּוּתָּרִין וַאֲחֵרִים נָהֲגוּ בָּהֶן אִיסּוּר — אִי אַתָּה רַשַּׁאי לְהַתִּירָן בִּפְנֵיהֶם, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר: ״לֹא יַחֵל דְּבָרוֹ״.

The Gemara asks: But is there a prohibition of: He shall not profane, by rabbinic law? The Gemara answers: Yes, and it is taught in a baraita: With regard to matters that are permitted, but others are accustomed to observe a prohibition with regard to them, you may not permit these matters before those people, as it is stated: “He shall not profane his word” (Numbers 30:3). If they contravene their custom they are in violation of the prohibition: He shall not profane his word, by rabbinic law, as that is similar to violating a vow.

תְּנַן: ״שֶׁאַתְּ נֶהֱנֵית לִי עַד הַפֶּסַח אִם תֵּלְכִי לְבֵית אָבִיךְ עַד הֶחָג״, הָלְכָה לִפְנֵי הַפֶּסַח — אֲסוּרָה בַּהֲנָאָתוֹ עַד הַפֶּסַח.

The Gemara attempts again to raise a difficulty with regard to Rav Yehuda’s opinion. We learned in a mishna (57a) that if a man said to his wife: Deriving benefit from me until Passover is konam for you if you go to your father’s house until the following festival of Sukkot, then, if she went to her father’s house before Passover, she is prohibited from deriving benefit from him until Passover, as she violated the condition, thereby enabling the vow to take effect.

הָלְכָה לִפְנֵי הַפֶּסַח — אֲסוּרָה, לֹא הָלְכָה — לָא!

The Gemara infers: Only if she went before Passover is it prohibited for her to derive benefit from him. However, if she did not go, she is not prohibited from deriving benefit from him. Apparently, even though she can transgress the condition retroactively until Sukkot by going to her father’s house, there is no concern that she will do so. This is difficult according to Rav Yehuda, who prohibits transgression of a conditional vow that may take effect retroactively.

אָמַר רַבִּי אַבָּא: הָלְכָה לִפְנֵי הַפֶּסַח — אֲסוּרָה, וְלוֹקָה. לֹא הָלְכָה — אֲסוּרָה בְּעָלְמָא.

Rabbi Abba said that the baraita can be interpreted as follows: If she went before Passover, she is prohibited from deriving benefit from him, and if she does so she is flogged. If she did not go before Passover, it is merely prohibited for her to derive benefit from him, lest she violate the condition and cause the vow to take effect retroactively. However, she is not liable to be flogged for it, as the vow has not yet taken effect.

אֵימָא סֵיפָא: אַחַר הַפֶּסַח בְּ״בַל יַחֵל דְּבָרוֹ״. וְאִי דְּלָא אִיתְהֲנִי לִפְנֵי הַפֶּסַח, מִי אִיכָּא ״בַּל יַחֵל״? אֶלָּא פְּשִׁיטָא דְּאִיתְהֲנִי. אַלְמָא מִיתְהֲנֵי,

The Gemara counters: Say the latter clause of that mishna, which states that if she goes to her father’s house after Passover she is in violation of: He shall not profane his word. And if the mishna is referring to a case where she did not derive benefit from him before Passover, is there a transgression of: He shall not profane? Clearly the vow was not violated. Rather, it is obvious that she derived benefit from him before Passover, and therefore if she goes to her father’s house between Passover and Sukkot she violates the vow retroactively. Apparently, she may derive benefit from him, even though she can subsequently violate the vow by transgressing the condition.

וּתְיוּבְתָּא דְרַב יְהוּדָה!

And this is a conclusive refutation of the opinion of Rav Yehuda.

כִּי קָתָנֵי, דְּאִי אִיתְהֲנִי הֲרֵי זֶה בְּ״בַל יַחֵל דְּבָרוֹ״.

The Gemara answers: When the mishna teaches this, it does not mean that before she went she was permitted to derive benefit from him ab initio. Rather, it means that if she derived benefit from him after the fact, she is in violation of: He shall not profane his word.

תְּנַן: ״שֶׁאַתְּ נֶהֱנֵית לִי עַד הֶחָג אִם תֵּלְכִי לְבֵית אָבִיךְ עַד הַפֶּסַח״, הָלְכָה לִפְנֵי הַפֶּסַח — אֲסוּרָה בַּהֲנָאָתוֹ עַד הֶחָג, וּמוּתֶּרֶת לֵילֵךְ אַחַר הַפֶּסַח.

We learn further on (57b) that if the husband said to his wife: Deriving benefit from me until the festival of Sukkot is konam for you if you go to your father’s house until Passover, then, if she went before Passover, she is prohibited from deriving benefit from him until the festival of Sukkot, as the vow took effect, and she is permitted to go to her father’s house after Passover.

הָלְכָה — אֲסוּרָה, לֹא הָלְכָה — לָא.

The Gemara infers: Only if she went before Passover is it prohibited for her to derive benefit from him. However, if she did not go it is not prohibited for her to do so. She may derive benefit from him, and there is no concern that she will subsequently go to her father’s house, transgressing the prohibition. This is difficult according to the opinion of Rav Yehuda that one may not perform an action that will be rendered retroactively a violation of a vow if the condition is met.

אָמַר רָבָא: הוּא הַדִּין דַּאֲפִילּוּ לֹא הָלְכָה אֲסוּרָה. הָלְכָה — אֲסוּרָה וְלוֹקָה, לֹא הָלְכָה — אֲסוּרָה בְּעָלְמָא.

Rava said: The same is true, that even if she did not go, she is prohibited from deriving benefit from him. The difference is that if she went it is not only prohibited for her to derive benefit from him, but if she does so she is flogged; whereas if she did not go, it is merely prohibited for her to derive benefit from him, lest she violate the vow by going to her father’s house before Passover.

מֵיתִיבִי: ״כִּכָּר זוֹ עָלַי הַיּוֹם אִם אֵלֵךְ לְמָקוֹם פְּלוֹנִי לְמָחָר״, אָכַל — הֲרֵי זֶה בְּ״בַל יֵלֵךְ״!

The Gemara raises an objection to the opinion of Rav Yehuda: It is taught in a baraita that if one said: This loaf is forbidden to me today if I go to such and such a place tomorrow, then if he ate the loaf today, he is subject to the prohibition that he shall not go tomorrow. Apparently, he may eat it today, as there is no concern that he will go tomorrow.

מִי קָתָנֵי ״אוֹכֵל״? ״אָכַל״ קָתָנֵי, דְּכִי אֲכַל הֲרֵי זֶה בְּ״בַל יֵלֵךְ״.

The Gemara answers: Where is the contradiction? Does the baraita teach that he may eat the loaf ab initio? It teaches only that he ate, i.e., that once he ate, he is subject to the prohibition that he shall not go.

הָלַךְ — הֲרֵי זֶה בְּ״בַל יַחֵל״ דְּבָרוֹ. מְהַלֵּךְ — לָא. וְקַשְׁיָא לְרַב יְהוּדָה!

It is further taught in the baraita: If he went the next day, he is in violation of: He shall not profane his word. The Gemara infers from the fact that the baraita is referring only to a case in which he went after the fact, that he may not go ab initio. This indicates that he is permitted to eat the loaf, thereby prohibiting himself from going the next day. This accords with the opinion of Rav Naḥman that one may cause a vow to take effect by fulfilling its condition, and it poses a difficulty to the opinion of Rav Yehuda.

אָמַר לָךְ רַב יְהוּדָה: הוּא הַדִּין דְּלִיתְנֵי ״מְהַלֵּךְ״. אַיְּידֵי דְּקָתָנֵי רֵישָׁא ״אָכַל״, דְּלָא מִיתְנֵי לֵיהּ ״אוֹכֵל״ — תָּנֵי סֵיפָא ״הָלַךְ״.

The Gemara answers: Rav Yehuda could have said to you that the same is true, that the baraita could have taught that he may go. However, since the first clause teaches the halakha where he ate the loaf after the fact, as it cannot teach that he may eat it according to Rav Yehuda, who holds that it is prohibited for him to eat it ab initio, the latter clause also teaches the halakha in the case where he went, and does not teach that he may go, to maintain a uniform style. In conclusion, neither opinion is refuted.

הָאוֹמֵר לְאִשָּׁה ״קֻוֽנָּם שֶׁאֲנִי מְשַׁמְּשֵׁךְ״, הֲרֵי זֶה בְּ״בַל יַחֵל דְּבָרוֹ״. וְהָא מִשְׁתַּעְבַּד לָהּ מִדְּאוֹרָיְיתָא, דִּכְתִיב: ״שְׁאֵרָהּ כְּסוּתָהּ וְעֹנָתָהּ לֹא יִגְרָע״!

§ It is taught in the mishna that with regard to one who says to his wife: Engaging in sexual intercourse with you is konam for me, if he violates the vow he is in violation of the prohibition: He shall not profane his word. The Gemara asks: How can one render prohibited engaging in sexual intercourse with his wife? But isn’t he duty bound by Torah law to engage in sexual intercourse with her, as it is written: “Her food, her clothing, and her conjugal rights he may not diminish” (Exodus 21:10)?

בְּאוֹמֵר ״הֲנָאַת תַּשְׁמִישֵׁךְ עָלַי״, וְהָא לָא קָא נִיחָא לֵיהּ בְּתַשְׁמִישׁ.

The Gemara answers: The vow does not take effect if it is formulated as cited. Rather, the mishna is referring to a case where he says: The pleasure I derive from engaging in sexual intercourse with you is forbidden to me, and sexual intercourse is therefore not amenable to him. Since he is not obligated to experience the pleasure he derives from sexual intercourse with her, he can prohibit himself from experiencing this pleasure. In this manner he can render their sexual intercourse forbidden by means of a vow.

דְּאָמַר רַב כָּהֲנָא: ״תַּשְׁמִישִׁי עָלֶיךָ״ — כּוֹפִין אוֹתָהּ וּמְשַׁמַּשְׁתּוֹ, דְּשַׁעְבּוֹדֵי מְשׁוּעְבֶּדֶת לֵיהּ. ״הֲנָאַת תַּשְׁמִישְׁךָ עָלַי״ — אָסוּר, שֶׁאֵין מַאֲכִילִין לוֹ לְאָדָם דָּבָר הָאָסוּר לוֹ.

As Rav Kahana said: If a woman vows: Sexual intercourse with me is forbidden to you, the court coerces her to engage in sexual intercourse with him, as she is duty bound to engage in sexual intercourse with him due to his conjugal rights. However, if she vows: The pleasure I derive from engaging in sexual intercourse with you is forbidden to me, it is prohibited for them to engage in sexual intercourse, as she derives pleasure from the sexual intercourse and one may not feed a person that which is forbidden to him.

מַתְנִי׳ שְׁבוּעָה שֶׁאֵינִי יָשֵׁן, שֶׁאֵינִי מְדַבֵּר, שֶׁאֵינִי מְהַלֵּךְ — אָסוּר. קׇרְבָּן לֹא אוֹכַל לָךְ, הָא קׇרְבָּן שֶׁאוֹכַל לָךְ, לֹא קׇרְבָּן לֹא אוֹכַל לָךְ — מוּתָּר.

MISHNA: If one says: I take an oath that I will not sleep, or: That I will not speak, or: That I will not walk, this activity is prohibited to him. As taught earlier (10a), one of the primary methods of taking a vow is by invoking an offering. The mishna provides several examples where invoking the term korban is not effective. If one says: An offering [korban] that I will not eat of yours, or: This offering [ha korban] that I will eat of yours, or: That which I will not eat of yours is not an offering [la korban], the food is permitted.