נדרים כג

נדרים כג

וַהֲווֹ מִצְטַעֲרִי רַבָּנַן מִשִּׁימְשָׁא לְטוּלָּא וּמִטּוּלָּא לְשִׁימְשָׁא.

and the Sages were troubled by the fact that they could not dissolve the vow. They spent an extended period of time attempting to do so. During this time, they moved from a location with light from the sun to one with shade, and then moved again from the shade back to the sun.

(לִישָּׁנָא אַחֲרָא: אַדַּעְתָּא דְּהָכִי? אִין. כַּמָּה זִימְנִין, וַהֲווֹ מִצְטַעֲרִי רַבָּנַן מִשִּׁימְשָׁא לְטוּלָּא וּמִטּוּלָּא לְשִׁימְשָׁא.)

The Gemara cites another version of the incident: They asked him: Did you vow with knowledge of this particular fact when you vowed? He said to them: Yes. This occurred several times and the Sages were troubled with this problem for an extended period of time, during which they moved from the sun to the shade and from the shade to the sun, but they did not find a solution.

אֲמַר לֵיהּ בָּטְנִית בְּרֵיהּ דְּאַבָּא שָׁאוּל בֶּן בָּטְנִית: מִי נְדַרְתְּ אַדַּעְתָּא דְּמִצְטַעֲרִי רַבָּנַן מִטּוּלָּא לְשִׁימְשָׁא וּמִשִּׁימְשָׁא לְטוּלָּא? אֲמַר: לָא, וְשַׁרְיוּהּ.

Botnit, son of Abba Shaul ben Botnit, said to him: Would you have vowed with the knowledge that the Sages would be troubled even to the point of going from shade to sun and from sun to shade? He said: No, and they dissolved it.

רַבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל בַּר רַבִּי יוֹסֵי הֲוָה לֵיהּ נִדְרָא לְמִישְׁרֵא. אֲתָא לְקַמַּיְיהוּ דְּרַבָּנַן, אָמְרוּ לֵיהּ: נְדַרְתְּ אַדַּעְתָּא דְּהָכִי? אֲמַר לְהוּ: אִין. נְדַרְתָּא אַדַּעְתָּא דְּהָכִי? אֲמַר לְהוּ: אִין. כַּמָּה זִימְנִין. כֵּיוָן דַּחֲזָא הָהוּא קַצָּרָא דְּמִצְטַעֲרִי רַבָּנַן, מַחְיֵיהּ בְּאוּכְלָא דְקַצָּרֵי. אֲמַר: אַדַּעְתָּא דְּמָחֵי לִי קַצָּרָא לָא נְדַרִי, וְשַׁרְיֵהּ לְנַפְשֵׁיהּ.

The Gemara relates another incident: Rabbi Yishmael bar Rabbi Yosei had a vow to dissolve. He came before the Sages. They said to him: Did you vow with knowledge of this particular fact? He said to them: Yes. They asked again: Did you vow with knowledge of this other fact? He said to them: Yes. This occurred several times. When a certain launderer saw that the Sages were troubled because Rabbi Yishmael caused them difficulty in successfully dissolving his vow, he hit Rabbi Yishmael with a launderer’s tool that he had in his hand. Rabbi Yishmael said: Had I known that the launderer would hit me due to my vow I would not have vowed, and he dissolved it.

אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַב אַחָא מִדִּיפְתִּי לְרָבִינָא: הַאי נוֹלָד הוּא, דְּלָא מַסֵּיק אַדַּעְתָּא דְּמָחֵי לֵיהּ קַצָּרָא. וּתְנֵינָא: אֵין פּוֹתְחִין לוֹ בַּנּוֹלָד! אֲמַר לֵיהּ: הַאי לָאו נוֹלָד הוּא, דִּשְׁכִיחִי אַפִּיקוֹרֵי דִּמְצַעֲרִי רַבָּנַן.

Rav Aḥa of Difti said to Ravina: This is a case of a new situation, which is not included among those matters that he could have considered at the time of the vow, because it would not enter his mind that the launderer would hit him. And we already learned: We do not broach dissolution with a person using a new situation that did not exist at the time of the vow. Ravina said to him: This is not a new situation that he could not have thought of previously, since it is common to find heretics [appikurei] who deny fundamental Torah principles and who trouble the Sages. Although he would not have considered the possibility that this launderer would attack him, he may have considered the possibility that some heretic would. Therefore, it was permitted to broach dissolution in this manner.

דְּבֵיתְהוּ דְּאַבָּיֵי הֲוָה לַהּ הָהִיא בְּרַתָּא. הוּא אָמַר: לְקָרִיבַאי. הִיא אָמְרָה: לְקָרִיבַהּ. אֲמַר לַהּ: תִּיתְּסַר הֲנָאָתִי עֲלָךְ אִי עָבְרַתְּ אַדַּעְתַּאי וּמַינְסְּבַת לַהּ לְקָרִיבָךְ. אֲזַלַת וַעֲבַרַת עַל דַּעְתֵּיהּ וְאִינַּסְבָא לְקָרִיבַהּ. אֲתָא לְקַמֵּיהּ דְּרַב יוֹסֵף. אֲמַר לֵיהּ: אִילּוּ הֲוָה יָדְעַתְּ דַּעֲבַרַת עַל דַּעְתָּךְ וּמַנְסְבָא לַהּ לְקָרִיבַהּ מִי אַדַּרְתַּהּ? אֲמַר: לָא. וְשַׁרְיֵיהּ רַב יוֹסֵף.

§ The wife of Abaye had a certain daughter. Abaye said: She should get married to my relative. His wife said that she should get married to her relative. He said to his wife: Benefit from me should be forbidden to you, if you defy my will and marry her to your relative. She went and defied his will and married her to her relative. Abaye came before Rav Yosef. Rav Yosef said to him: If you had known that she would ultimately defy your will and marry her to her relative, would you have made the vow? He said: No. And Rav Yosef dissolved the vow for him because Abaye did not think that his wife would actually defy him, and he intended the vow only to serve as a threat.

וּמִי שְׁרֵי כִּי הַאי גַּוְונָא? אִין, וְהָתַנְיָא: מַעֲשֶׂה בְּאָדָם אֶחָד שֶׁהִדִּיר אֶת אִשְׁתּוֹ מִלַּעֲלוֹת לָרֶגֶל, וְעָבְרָה עַל דַּעְתּוֹ וְעָלְתָה לָרֶגֶל, וּבָא לִפְנֵי רַבִּי יוֹסֵי. אָמַר לוֹ: וְאִילּוּ הָיִיתָ יוֹדֵעַ שֶׁעוֹבֶרֶת עַל דַּעְתְּךָ וְעוֹלָה לָרֶגֶל כְּלוּם הִדַּרְתָּהּ? אָמַר לוֹ: לֹא, וְהִתִּירוֹ רַבִּי יוֹסֵי.

The Gemara asks: And is it dissolved in a case like this, where the vow was dependent on the daughter not marrying the wife’s relative? The Gemara answers: Yes, and it is taught in the Tosefta (5:1): There was an incident involving one man who vowed, prohibiting his wife from benefiting from him if she were to ascend to Jerusalem for the pilgrimage Festival, and she defied his will and ascended to Jerusalem for the pilgrimage Festival. And when he came before Rabbi Yosei to request dissolution, Rabbi Yosei said to him: And had you known that she would defy your will and ascend to Jerusalem on the pilgrimage Festival, would you have vowed at all? He said to him: No, and Rabbi Yosei dissolved it. This incident indicates that it is permitted to dissolve a vow with such an opening.

מַתְנִי׳ רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר בֶּן יַעֲקֹב אוֹמֵר: אַף הָרוֹצֶה לְהַדִּיר אֶת חֲבֵירוֹ שֶׁיֹּאכַל אֶצְלוֹ, יֹאמַר לוֹ: ״כׇּל נֶדֶר שֶׁאֲנִי עָתִיד לִידּוֹר הוּא בָּטֵל״, וּבִלְבַד שֶׁיְּהֵא זָכוּר בִּשְׁעַת הַנֶּדֶר.

MISHNA: Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov says: Even one who wants to take a vow prohibiting another from benefiting from him, but only in order that he should eat with him, not intending to take an actual vow, should say to him at the outset: Any vow that I take in the future is void. And this statement is effective, provided that he remembers at the time of the vow that his intent at the beginning of the year was to render it void.

גְּמָ׳ וְכֵיוָן דְּאָמַר ״כׇּל נֶדֶר שֶׁאֲנִי עָתִיד לִידּוֹר יְהֵא בָּטֵל״, לָא שָׁמַע לֵיהּ וְלָא אָתֵי בַּהֲדֵיהּ?

GEMARA: With regard to Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov’s proposal, the Gemara asks: And since he said: Any vow that I take in the future should be void, the one being invited will not listen to him and will not come to eat with him, since he already knows that the vow is not valid. That being the case, why would the first individual take a vow at all?

חַסּוֹרֵי מִיחַסְּרָא וְהָכִי קָתָנֵי: הָרוֹצֶה שֶׁיֹּאכַל אֶצְלוֹ חֲבֵירוֹ וּמְסָרֵב בּוֹ וּמַדִּירוֹ — נִדְרֵי זֵירוּזִין הוּא. וְהָרוֹצֶה שֶׁלֹּא יִתְקַיְּימוּ נְדָרָיו כׇּל הַשָּׁנָה, יַעֲמוֹד בְּרֹאשׁ הַשָּׁנָה וְיֹאמַר: כׇּל נֶדֶר שֶׁאֲנִי עָתִיד לִידּוֹר יְהֵא בָּטֵל, וּבִלְבַד שֶׁיְּהֵא זָכוּר בִּשְׁעַת הַנֶּדֶר.

The Gemara answers: The mishna is incomplete and is teaching like this: In the case of one who wants another to eat with him, and he urges him to do so and makes a vow with regard to him, this vow is included in the category of vows of exhortation, which do not require dissolution. And in addition, one who desires that his vows not be upheld for the entire year should stand up on Rosh HaShana and say: Any vow that I take in the future should be void. And this statement is effective, provided that he remembers at the time of the vow that his intent at the beginning of the year was to render it void.

אִי זָכוּר, עַקְרֵיהּ לִתְנָאֵיהּ, וְקַיֵּים לֵיהּ לְנִדְרֵיהּ! אָמַר אַבָּיֵי, תָּנֵי: וּבִלְבַד שֶׁלֹּא יְהֵא זָכוּר בִּשְׁעַת הַנֶּדֶר.

The Gemara asks: If he remembers at the time of the vow that his intent at the beginning of the year was to render it void but still makes the vow, then he has uprooted his stipulation that all his vows are void and has upheld his vow. Why, then, does it state that the vows are void in this case? Abaye said: Teach: And this statement is effective, provided that he does not remember at the time of the vow that his intention at the beginning of the year was to render it void.

רָבָא אָמַר: לְעוֹלָם כִּדְאָמְרִינַן מֵעִיקָּרָא. הָכָא בְּמַאי עָסְקִינַן — כְּגוֹן שֶׁהִתְנָה בְּרֹאשׁ הַשָּׁנָה, וְלֹא יָדַע בַּמֶּה הִתְנָה. וְהַשְׁתָּא קָא נָדַר. אִי זָכוּר בִּשְׁעַת הַנֶּדֶר, וְאָמַר ״עַל דַּעַת הָרִאשׁוֹנָה אֲנִי נוֹדֵר״ — נִדְרֵיהּ לֵית בֵּיהּ מַמָּשָׁא. לֹא אָמַר ״עַל דַּעַת הָרִאשׁוֹנָה אֲנִי נוֹדֵר״ — עַקְרֵיהּ לִתְנָאֵיהּ וְקַיֵּים לְנִדְרֵיהּ.

Rava said: Actually, say as we said initially, that he does remember his stipulation at the time of the vow. With what are we dealing here? It is a case where he stipulated a condition on Rosh HaShana rendering void vows that he would make later in the year, but he did not know with regard to which vows he made the stipulation, and now he makes a vow. If he remembers at the time of the vow and says: I am vowing in accordance with the initial intention, when I stipulated that all vows should be void, his vow has no substance. However, if he did not say: I am vowing in accordance with the initial intention, then he has uprooted his stipulation and upheld his vow.

רַב הוּנָא בַּר חִינָּנָא סָבַר לְמִידְרְשֵׁיהּ בְּפִירְקָא. אֲמַר לֵיהּ רָבָא: תַּנָּא קָא מְסַתֵּים לַהּ סַתּוֹמֵי כְּדֵי שֶׁלֹּא יִנְהֲגוּ קַלּוּת רֹאשׁ בִּנְדָרִים, וְאַתְּ דָּרְשַׁתְּ לֵיהּ בְּפִירְקָא?!

The Gemara relates that Rav Huna bar Ḥinnana intended to teach this topic at the Festival lecture, so that everyone would learn this manner of rendering vows void on Rosh HaShana. Rava said to him: The tanna of the mishna conceals it and does not say it explicitly, despite the fact that it is studied by Torah scholars, in order that the public not treat vows lightly, and you teach it publicly at the Festival lecture?

אִיבַּעְיָא לְהוּ: פְּלִיגִי רַבָּנַן עֲלֵיהּ דְּרַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר בֶּן יַעֲקֹב, אוֹ לָא? וְאִם תִּמְצָא לוֹמַר פְּלִיגִי, הִלְכְתָא כְּוָתֵיהּ, אוֹ לָא? תָּא שְׁמַע, דִּתְנַן: הָאוֹמֵר לַחֲבֵירוֹ

§ A dilemma was raised before the scholars: Do the Rabbis disagree with Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov in the mishna or not? And if you say that they disagree with him, is the halakha in accordance with his opinion or not? The Gemara suggests a proof: Come and hear, as we learned in a mishna (63b): One who says to another: