נדרים כד
״קֻוֽנָּם שֶׁאֵינִי נֶהֱנֶה לְךָ אִם אִי אַתָּה נוֹטֵל לְבִנְךָ כּוֹר שֶׁל חִיטִּין וּשְׁתֵּי חָבִיּוֹת שֶׁל יַיִן״, הֲרֵי זֶה יָכוֹל לְהַתִּיר אֶת נִדְרוֹ שֶׁלֹּא עַל פִּי חָכָם, שֶׁיָּכוֹל לוֹמַר לוֹ: כְּלוּם אָמַרְתָּ אֶלָּא בִּשְׁבִיל כְּבוֹדִי — זֶה הוּא כְּבוֹדִי.
Benefiting from you is konam for me if you do not take from me for your son a kor of wheat and two barrels of wine as a gift, this other individual can dissolve his vow without the involvement of a halakhic authority. This is because he can say to the one who vowed: Did you say your vow for any reason other than due to my honor, in order to convince me to accept a gift for my son? This is my honor, that I refrain from accepting the gift.
טַעְמָא דְּאָמַר ״זֶה הוּא כְּבוֹדִי״, הָא לָאו הָכִי — נֶדֶר הוּא. מַנִּי? אִי רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר בֶּן יַעֲקֹב — נִדְרֵי זֵירוּזִין הָוֵי. אֶלָּא שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ: פְּלִיגִי רַבָּנַן עֲלֵיהּ.
The Gemara infers: The reason that he may dissolve the vow without a halakhic authority is because the potential recipient said: This is my honor. But if he did not say so, then it is a vow. The Gemara clarifies: Whose opinion does this follow? If it is the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov, then it is included in the category of vows of exhortation and is not considered a vow, since the intention was solely to encourage the other individual to accept the gift. Rather, conclude from this mishna that the Rabbis disagree with him and hold that vows of exhortation are also vows.
לְעוֹלָם רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר בֶּן יַעֲקֹב הִיא, וּמוֹדֶה רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר בֶּן יַעֲקֹב בְּהַאי דְּנִדְרָא הָוֵי, דְּאָמַר לֵיהּ: לָא כַּלְבָּא אֲנָא, דְּמִיתְהֲנֵינָא מִינָּךְ וְלָא מִיתְהֲנֵית מִינַּאי.
The Gemara responds: Actually, it is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov, but Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov concedes in this case that it is a vow and not just a means of encouragement because the one who took the vow said to him: I am not a dog, that I benefit from you and you do not benefit from me. Therefore, one truly wants the vow to be valid so that the other will accept the gift, and it was not intended merely as a means of encouragement.
תָּא שְׁמַע: הָאוֹמֵר לַחֲבֵירוֹ ״קֻוֽנָּם שֶׁאַתָּה נֶהֱנֵית לִי אִם אִי אַתָּה נוֹתֵן לִבְנִי כּוֹר שֶׁל חִיטִּין וּשְׁתֵּי חָבִיּוֹת שֶׁל יַיִן״, רַבִּי מֵאִיר אוֹמֵר: עַד שֶׁיִּתֵּן. וַחֲכָמִים אוֹמְרִים: אַף זֶה יָכוֹל לְהַתִּיר אֶת נִדְרוֹ שֶׁלֹּא עַל פִּי חָכָם, שֶׁיָּכוֹל לוֹמַר: הֲרֵינִי כְּאִילּוּ הִתְקַבַּלְתִּי.
The Gemara suggests another proof: Come and hear the continuation of that mishna: So too, in the case of one who says to another: Benefiting from me is konam for you if you do not give my son a kor of wheat and two barrels of wine, Rabbi Meir says: The vow is valid, and he may not benefit from the one who took the vow until he gives the gift. And the Rabbis say: Even this individual who took the vow can dissolve his own vow without the involvement of a halakhic authority, as he can say: I hereby consider it as though I received the gift from you.
טַעְמָא דְּאָמַר ״הֲרֵינִי כְּאִילּוּ הִתְקַבַּלְתִּי״, הָא לָאו הָכִי — נֶדֶר הוּא. מַנִּי? אִי רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר בֶּן יַעֲקֹב — נִדְרֵי זֵירוּזִין הָוֵי, אֶלָּא לָאו: רַבָּנַן, וּפְלִיגִי!
The Gemara infers: The reason is because he said: I hereby consider it as though I received it from you. But if he did not say so, it would be a vow. The Gemara clarifies: Whose opinion does this statement reflect? If it reflects the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov, then it is included in the category of vows of exhortation. Rather, is it not the opinion of the Rabbis, and this demonstrates that the Rabbis disagree with him with regard to vows of exhortation?
לָא, לְעוֹלָם רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר בֶּן יַעֲקֹב, וּמוֹדֶה רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר בְּהַאי דְּנִדְרָא הָוֵי, מִשּׁוּם דְּאָמַר לֵיהּ: לָאו מַלְכָּא אֲנָא, דִּמְהַנֵּינָא לָךְ וְאַתְּ לָא מְהַנֵּית לִי.
The Gemara responds: No, actually it is possible that it is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov. And Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov concedes in this case that it is considered a vow because the one that took the vow says to him: I am not a king that I provide benefit to you and you do not provide benefit to me. Consequently, the intent is not simply to encourage him but rather, to actually take a vow.
אֲמַר לֵיהּ מָר קַשִּׁישָׁא בְּרֵיהּ דְּרַב חִסְדָּא לְרַב אָשֵׁי, תָּא שְׁמַע: נִדְרֵי אוֹנָסִין, הִדִּירוֹ חֲבֵירוֹ שֶׁיֹּאכַל אֶצְלוֹ, וְחָלָה הוּא אוֹ חָלָה בְּנוֹ אוֹ שֶׁעִכְּבוֹ נָהָר. הָא לָאו הָכִי — נֶדֶר הוּא. מַנִּי? אִי רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר בֶּן יַעֲקֹב — זֵירוּזִין הָוֵי. אֶלָּא לָאו: רַבָּנַן, וּפְלִיגִי!
Mar Kashisha, son of Rav Ḥisda, said to Rav Ashi: Come and hear a proof from a mishna (27a): What are examples of vows impeded by circumstances beyond one’s control, which do not require dissolution? If one’s friend took a vow with regard to him that he should eat with him, and then he became sick, or his son became sick, or a river that he was unable to cross barred him from coming, these are vows impeded by circumstances beyond one’s control. The Gemara infers: Such a vow does not require dissolution in cases like these, but if not for this unavoidable element, it would be a vow. The Gemara clarifies: Whose opinion does this follow? If it follows the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov, then they are vows of exhortation that he did not intend to be treated as vows at all. Rather, is it not the opinion of the Rabbis, and it is therefore clear that the Rabbis disagree with him?
לְעוֹלָם רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר בֶּן יַעֲקֹב, וּמִי סָבְרַתְּ דְּאַדְּרֵיהּ מְזַמְּנָא לִזְמִינָא? לָא, דִּזְמִינָא אַדְּרֵיהּ לִמְזַמְּנָא. דַּאֲמַר לֵיהּ מְזַמְּנַתְּ לִי לִסְעוֹדְתָּיךְ? אֲמַר לֵיהּ: אִין. נֶדֶר זֶה עָלֶיךָ? וְנָדַר. וְחָלָה הוּא אוֹ שֶׁחָלָה בְּנוֹ אוֹ שֶׁעִכְּבוֹ נָהָר — הֲרֵי אֵלּוּ נִדְרֵי אוֹנָסִין.
Rav Ashi responds: Actually, this follows the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov. But do you hold that in the case here the host took a vow with regard to the potential guest? No, the case here is where the potential guest caused a vow to be taken by the host and said to him: Do you invite me to your meal? The inviter said to him: Yes. The invitee then asked him: Is this vow upon you, i.e., do you vow to do so? The inviter agreed and he vowed, and then he became sick, or his son became sick, or a river barred him from coming; these are vows impeded by circumstances beyond one’s control. Because the vow was initiated by the potential guest rather than the host, it cannot qualify as a vow of exhortation. Consequently, dissolution is not allowed except when unavoidable situations like these occur.
תָּא שְׁמַע: יָתֵר עַל כֵּן, אָמַר רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר בֶּן יַעֲקֹב: הָאוֹמֵר לַחֲבֵירוֹ ״קֻוֽנָּם שֶׁאֲנִי נֶהֱנֶה לָךְ אִם אִי אַתָּה מִתְאָרֵחַ אֶצְלִי וְתֹאכַל עִמִּי פַּת חַמָּה וְתִשְׁתֶּה עִמִּי כּוֹס חַמִּין״, וְהַלָּה הִקְפִּיד כְּנֶגְדּוֹ — אַף אֵלּוּ נִדְרֵי זֵירוּזִין. וְלֹא הוֹדוּ לוֹ חֲכָמִים. מַאי ״לֹא הוֹדוּ לוֹ חֲכָמִים״? לָאו
Come and hear another proof: Further to the point of the mishna, Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov said: In the case of one who says to his friend: Benefiting from you is konam for me if you do not lodge with me, and eat hot bread with me, and drink a cup of hot water with me, and the other becomes irritated at him because he was forcing him to do so, these are also vows of exhortation. But the Rabbis did not concede to him on this issue, because the friend’s opposition implies that the vow must be a valid vow and not a vow of exhortation. The Gemara clarifies: What is the meaning of: The Rabbis did not concede to him? Does it not
דַּאֲפִילּוּ בְּקַמַּיְיתָא, וּשְׁמַע מִינַּהּ פְּלִיגִי רַבָּנַן עֲלֵיהּ. שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ.
mean that even in the earlier cases, where he did not become irritated, they disagree with regard to vows of exhortation and hold that these vows are indeed valid, and can one conclude from here that the Rabbis disagree with him? The Gemara concludes: Conclude from here that this is so.
מַאי הָוֵי עֲלַהּ? תָּא שְׁמַע, דְּאָמַר רַב הוּנָא: הֲלָכָה כְּרַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר בֶּן יַעֲקֹב, וְכֵן אָמַר רַב אַדָּא בַּר אַהֲבָה: הֲלָכָה כְּרַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר בֶּן יַעֲקֹב.
With regard to the practical conclusion of this dispute, the Gemara asks: What halakhic conclusion was reached about this matter? Does the halakha follow the opinion of the Rabbis or that of Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov? The Gemara answers: Come and hear that which Rav Huna said: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov. And so said Rav Adda bar Ahava: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov.
מַתְנִי׳ נִדְרֵי הֲבַאי, אָמַר: ״קֻוֽנָּם אִם לֹא רָאִיתִי בַּדֶּרֶךְ הַזֶּה כְּעוֹלֵי מִצְרַיִם״, ״אִם לֹא רָאִיתִי נָחָשׁ כְּקוֹרַת בֵּית הַבַּד״.
MISHNA: Vows of exaggeration that the Sages dissolved without a request to a halakhic authority, as described in the first mishna in the chapter, include the following examples. If one said concerning a certain item: It is konam for me if I did not see on this road as many people as those who ascended from Egypt, or if he said: It is konam for me if I did not see a snake as large as the beam of an olive press, in these cases the speaker did not intend to vow but used hyperbole to demonstrate a point, and it is understood by others that the expression is not to be taken literally.
גְּמָ׳ תָּנָא: נִדְרֵי הֲבַאי — מוּתָּרִין, שָׁבוּעוֹת הֲבַאי — אֲסוּרִין.
GEMARA: A Sage taught: Items rendered forbidden through vows of exaggeration [havai] are permitted; items rendered forbidden through oaths of exaggeration are forbidden. Since oaths are very severe, one does not take an oath unless he intends it seriously. Therefore, it is not viewed as an oath of exaggeration.
הֵיכִי דָּמֵי שָׁבוּעוֹת הֲבַאי? אִילֵימָא דְּאָמַר ״שְׁבוּעָה אִם לֹא רָאִיתִי בַּדֶּרֶךְ הַזֶּה״ — מִידַּעַם קָאָמַר?!
The Gemara clarifies the details: What are the circumstances of the case of oaths of exaggeration? If we say that it is when one said: I take an oath if I did not see on this road as many people as those who ascended from Egypt, is he saying anything? This statement is not formulated in the form of an oath and therefore has no validity at all, even if he was serious.
אָמַר אַבָּיֵי: דְּאָמַר ״שְׁבוּעָה שֶׁרָאִיתִי״. אֲמַר לֵיהּ רָבָא: אִם כֵּן לְמָה לִי לְמֵימַר? וְעוֹד: דּוּמְיָא דְּנֶדֶר קָתָנֵי! אֶלָּא אָמַר רָבָא, בְּאוֹמֵר: ״יֵאָסְרוּ פֵּירוֹת הָעוֹלָם עָלַי בִּשְׁבוּעָה אִם לֹא רָאִיתִי בַּדֶּרֶךְ הַזֶּה כְּעוֹלֵי מִצְרַיִם״.
The Gemara answers: Abaye said that in a case where one says: I take an oath that I saw on this road as many people as those who ascended from Egypt, the oath is valid. If he did not see that many people, he has taken a false oath. Rava said to him: If so, why do I need to say this; it is not a novelty? And furthermore, it teaches that the case of an oath is similar to that of a vow: Just as in the case of a vow he speaks of not seeing, so too with regard to an oath he must be speaking of not seeing. Rather, Rava said: An oath of exaggeration is where he says: All the produce of the world shall be forbidden to me by an oath if I did not see on this road as many people as those who ascended from Egypt.
אֲמַר לֵיהּ רָבִינָא לְרַב אָשֵׁי: וְדִלְמָא הַאי גַּבְרָא קִינָּא דְשׁוּמְשְׁמָנֵי חֲזָא וְאַסֵּיק לְהוֹן שְׁמָא ״עוֹלֵי מִצְרַיִם״, וְשַׁפִּיר מִשְׁתְּבַע?
Ravina said to Rav Ashi: And perhaps this man saw an anthill and called them: Those who ascended from Egypt, because the quantity of ants was so numerous, and he took an oath properly. Why, then, do we say that this is an oath taken in vain?
