נדרים ה

נדרים ה

אֲבָל אָמַר ״מוּדְּרַנִי הֵימָךְ״ לְחוֹדֵיהּ — שְׁנֵיהֶן אֲסוּרִין. כִּי הָא דְּאָמַר רַבִּי יוֹסֵי בְּרַבִּי חֲנִינָא: ״מוּדְּרַנִי הֵימָךְ״ — שְׁנֵיהֶן אֲסוּרִין.

However, if he said only: I am avowed from you, they are both prohibited from deriving benefit from one another. This is like that which Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Ḥanina, said: If one says: I am avowed from you, they are both prohibited.

תְּנַן: ״הֲרֵינִי עָלֶיךָ חֵרֶם״ — הַמּוּדָּר אָסוּר, אֲבָל מַדִּיר לָא. כְּגוֹן דְּפָרֵישׁ: ״וְאַתְּ עֲלַי לָא״.

The Gemara asks: We learned in a mishna (47b) that if one says to another: I am hereby to you like an item dedicated to the Temple, the one to whom the vow was said is prohibited from deriving benefit from the one who made the vow, but the one who made the vow is not prohibited from deriving benefit from the one with regard to whom the vow was said. However, according to Shmuel, both should be prohibited. The Gemara answers: It is referring to a case where he specified this by saying: And you are not like an item dedicated to the Temple for me.

״אַתְּ עָלַי חֵרֶם״ — הַנּוֹדֵר אָסוּר, אֲבָל מוּדָּר לָא. כְּגוֹן דְּפָרֵישׁ: ״וַאֲנָא עֲלָךְ לָא״.

The Gemara asks: That mishna also taught that if one says: You are to me like an item dedicated to the Temple, the one who makes the vow is prohibited to derive benefit from the other, but the one to whom the vow was said is not prohibited from deriving benefit from the one who makes the vow. However, according to Shmuel, both should be prohibited. The Gemara answers: Here too, it is referring to a case where he specified this by saying: And I am not like an item dedicated to the Temple for you.

אֲבָל סְתָמָא מַאי? שְׁנֵיהֶן אֲסוּרִים. הָא מִדְּקָתָנֵי סֵיפָא: ״הֲרֵינִי עָלֶיךָ וְאַתְּ עָלַי״, שְׁנֵיהֶן אֲסוּרִים, הָדֵין הוּא דִּשְׁנֵיהֶם אֲסוּרִין, הָא סְתָמָא — הוּא אָסוּר וַחֲבֵרוֹ מוּתָּר!

The Gemara asks: But if he stated his vow in an unspecified manner, what, are they both prohibited from deriving benefit from each other? From the fact that it teaches in the latter clause that if one says to another: I am hereby to you, and you are to me, like an item dedicated to the Temple, they are both prohibited from deriving benefit from each other, it can be derived that it is in this case both are prohibited, but if one stated his vow in an unspecified manner, he is prohibited from deriving benefit from the other individual and the other is permitted to derive benefit from him. This is not in accordance with the opinion of Shmuel.

אֶלָּא הָכִי אִתְּמַר דְּרַבִּי יוֹסֵי בְּרַבִּי חֲנִינָא: ״מוּדָּר אֲנִי לָךְ״ — שְׁנֵיהֶם אֲסוּרִין, ״מוּדְּרַנִי הֵימָךְ״ — הוּא אָסוּר וַחֲבֵרוֹ מוּתָּר.

Rather, this is how the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Ḥanina, was stated: If one said to another: I am avowed to you, they are both prohibited from deriving benefit from one another. However, if he says: I am avowed from you, he is prohibited from deriving benefit from the other person and the other is permitted to derive benefit from him.

וְהָא מַתְנִיתִין דְּקָתָנֵי ״הֵימָךְ״, וְאוֹקִימְנָא לְמַתְנִיתִין לִשְׁמוּאֵל: בְּכוּלָּן עַד שֶׁיֹּאמַר ״שֶׁאֲנִי טוֹעֵם לָךְ״ וְ״שֶׁאֲנִי אוֹכֵל לָךְ״, הוּא דְּאָסוּר וַחֲבֵרוֹ מוּתָּר, אֲבָל בְּ״מוּדְּרַנִי הֵימָךְ״, שְׁנֵיהֶם אֲסוּרִין.

The Gemara asks: But didn’t the mishna teach a case of one who declared: I am avowed from you, and yet we established the mishna, according to Shmuel, as teaching that in all these cases it is only if he says: That which I taste of yours, or: That which I eat of yours, that he is prohibited from deriving benefit from the other person, and the other is permitted? However, if he merely says: I am avowed from you, they are both prohibited. Consequently, Shmuel does not distinguish between the expressions: I am avowed from you, and: I am avowed to you.

אֶלָּא מֵעִיקָּרָא דִּשְׁמוּאֵל הָכִי אִיתְּמַר: טַעְמָא דְּאָמַר ״שֶׁאֲנִי אוֹכֵל לָךְ״ וְ״שֶׁאֲנִי טוֹעֵם לָךְ״ הוּא דְּאֵין הוּא אָסוּר אֶלָּא בַּאֲכִילָה. הָא ״מוּדְּרַנִי מִמְּךָ״ — אָסוּר אֲפִילּוּ בַּהֲנָאָה.

Rather, this is how the opinion of Shmuel was originally stated: The reason is that he said: That which I eat of yours, or: That which I taste of yours. It is for this reason that he is prohibited only from eating anything belonging to the other person. However, if he said: I am avowed from you, without further specification, he is prohibited even from deriving any form of benefit from the other.

אִי הָכִי, לֵימָא שְׁמוּאֵל הָכִי: וְאִם לָא אָמַר אֶלָּא ״שֶׁאֲנִי אוֹכֵל לָךְ״ וְ״שֶׁאֲנִי טוֹעֵם לָךְ״, אֵין אָסוּר אֶלָּא בַּאֲכִילָה.

The Gemara asks: If so, let Shmuel say as follows: And if he said only: That which I eat of yours, or: That which I taste of yours, he is prohibited only from eating an item belonging to his fellow, but he is permitted to derive benefit from it.

אֶלָּא הָכִי אִיתְּמַר: טַעְמָא דְּאָמַר ״שֶׁאֲנִי אוֹכֵל לָךְ״ וְ״שֶׁאֲנִי טוֹעֵם לָךְ״, הוּא דְּאָסוּר. אֲבָל אָמַר ״מוּדְּרַנִי הֵימָךְ״ — לָא מַשְׁמַע דְּאָמַר אָסוּר. מַאי טַעְמָא: ״מוּדָּר אֲנִי מִמָּךְ״ — לָא מִשְׁתַּעֵינָא בַּהֲדָךְ מַשְׁמַע. ״מוּפְרְשַׁנִי מִמָּךְ״ — דְּלָא עָבֵידְנָא עִמָּךְ מַשָּׂא וּמַתָּן מַשְׁמַע. ״מְרוּחֲקַנִי מִמָּךְ״ — דְּלָא קָאֵימְנָא בְּאַרְבַּע אַמּוֹת דִּילָךְ מַשְׁמַע.

Rather, this is how Shmuel’s opinion was stated: The reason is that he said: That which I eat of yours, or: That which I taste of yours; it is in these cases that he is prohibited from eating any item belonging to his fellow. However, if he said simply: I am avowed from you, that statement does not indicate that he said he is prohibited from eating an item belonging to his fellow. What is the reason for this? The statement: I am avowed from you, indicates: I am not speaking with you. Similarly, the statement: I am separated from you, indicates: I am not doing business with you. The statement: I am distanced from you, indicates that I will not stand within four cubits of you.

לֵימָא קָסָבַר שְׁמוּאֵל יָדַיִם שֶׁאֵין מוֹכִיחוֹת לָא הָוְויָין יָדַיִם? אִין, שְׁמוּאֵל מוֹקֵים לַהּ לְמַתְנִיתִין כְּרַבִּי יְהוּדָה, דְּאָמַר: יָדַיִם שֶׁאֵין מוֹכִיחוֹת לָא הָוְויָין יָדַיִם.

The Gemara asks: If so, shall we say that Shmuel holds that ambiguous intimations are not intimations, i.e., if one employs an incomplete expression to declare a vow and the expression does not state clearly what his intention is, it does not produce a vow? The Gemara answers: Yes, Shmuel establishes the mishna in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, who said: Ambiguous intimations are not intimations.

דִּתְנַן, גּוּפוֹ שֶׁל גֵּט: ״הֲרֵי אַתְּ מוּתֶּרֶת לְכׇל אָדָם״. רַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר: ״וְדֵין דְּיֶהֱוֵי לִיכִי מִינַּאי סֵפֶר תֵּירוּכִין וְאִיגֶּרֶת שִׁבּוּקִין״.

As we learned in a mishna (Gittin 85a–b): The essence of a bill of divorce is the sentence: You are hereby permitted to marry any man. Rabbi Yehuda says there is an additional statement that is an essential part of the divorce document: And this shall be to you from me a document of divorce [teirukhin] and a letter of dismissal. This demonstrates that according to Rabbi Yehuda, the wording of the bill of divorce itself must clarify that the husband is divorcing his wife through the bill of divorce.

אַמַּאי דָּחֵיק שְׁמוּאֵל לְאוֹקוֹמַהּ לְמַתְנִיתִין כְּרַבִּי יְהוּדָה? לוֹקְמַהּ כְּרַבָּנַן אַף עַל גַּב דְּאֵין יָדַיִם מוֹכִיחוֹת?

The Gemara asks: Why does Shmuel strain to establish the mishna as being in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, which is a minority opinion? Let him establish it as being in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis that although there are no obvious intimations in one’s statements, they are still considered vows. Consequently, if one said: I am avowed to you, even if he did not add: With regard to that which I eat, the vow takes effect.

אָמַר רָבָא: מַתְנִיתִין קְשִׁיתֵיהּ; אַמַּאי תָּאנֵי ״שֶׁאֲנִי אוֹכֵל לָךְ״ ״שֶׁאֲנִי טוֹעֵם לָךְ״? לִיתְנֵי ״שֶׁאֲנִי אוֹכֵל״ ״שֶׁאֲנִי טוֹעֵם״! שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ בָּעִינַן יָדַיִם מוֹכִיחוֹת.

Rava said: The mishna was difficult for him. Why does it teach the cases where one adds: That which I eat of yours, and: That which I taste of yours? Let it teach: That which I eat, and: That which I taste, without the additional phrase: Of yours. Since the one taking the vow is addressing another individual, it is clear to whom he is referring even without this phrase. Conclude from this that we require obvious intimations, i.e., the intent of the individual taking the vow must be indicated by his verbal statement and not merely by the context of his statement.

אִיתְּמַר, יָדַיִם שֶׁאֵין מוֹכִיחוֹת. אַבָּיֵי אָמַר: הָוְויָין יָדַיִם, וְרָבָא אָמַר: לָא הָוְויָין יָדַיִם. אָמַר רָבָא: רַבִּי אִידִי אַסְבְּרָא לִי: אָמַר קְרָא ״נָזִיר לְהַזִּיר לַה׳״, מַקִּישׁ יְדוֹת נְזִירוּת לִנְזִירוּת. מָה נְזִירוּת בְּהַפְלָאָה — אַף יְדוֹת נְזִירוּת בְּהַפְלָאָה.

§ The Gemara addresses more fully the issue mentioned in passing in the previous discussion. It was stated that the amora’im disagreed with regard to ambiguous intimations. Abaye said: They are valid intimations, and Rava said: They are not valid intimations. Rava said: Rabbi Idi explained to me the source of this ruling. The verse states: “The vow of a nazirite, to consecrate himself [nazir lehazir] to the Lord” (Numbers 6:2). The verse juxtaposes intimations of naziriteship, derived earlier (3a) from the doubled term “nazir lehazir,” to naziriteship. This indicates that just as accepting naziriteship must be expressed with a distinct articulation, so too, intimations of naziriteship must be expressed with a distinct articulation as opposed to ambiguous intimations.

לֵימָא בִּפְלוּגְתָּא דְּרַבִּי יְהוּדָה וְרַבָּנַן קָמִיפַּלְגִי? דִּתְנַן: גּוּפוֹ שֶׁל גֵּט ״הֲרֵי אַתְּ מוּתֶּרֶת לְכׇל אָדָם״, רַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר: ״וְדֵין דְּיֶהֱוֵי לִיכִי מִינַּאי סֵפֶר תֵּירוּכִין וְגֵט פִּטּוּרִין וְאִיגֶּרֶת שִׁבּוּקִין״. אַבָּיֵי דְּאָמַר כְּרַבָּנַן, וְרָבָא דְּאָמַר כְּרַבִּי יְהוּדָה?

The Gemara proposes: Let us say that these amora’im disagree with regard to the tannaitic dispute between Rabbi Yehuda and the Rabbis. As we learned in a mishna (Gittin 85a–b): The essence of a bill of divorce is the sentence: You are hereby permitted to marry any man. Rabbi Yehuda says that there is an additional statement that is an essential part of the divorce document: And this shall be to you from me a document of divorce, a bill of release, and a letter of dismissal. One could suggest that Abaye, who holds that ambiguous intimations are valid intimations, said his statement in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, and Rava, who holds that ambiguous intimations are not valid intimations, said his statement in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda.

אָמַר לָךְ אַבָּיֵי: אֲנָא דַּאֲמַרִי אֲפִילּוּ לְרַבִּי יְהוּדָה. עַד כָּאן לָא קָאָמַר רַבִּי יְהוּדָה בָּעִינַן יָדַיִם מוֹכִיחוֹת אֶלָּא גַּבֵּי גֵּט, דְּבָעִינַן כְּרִיתוּת, וְלֵיכָּא. אֲבָל בְּעָלְמָא — מִי שָׁמְעַתְּ לֵיהּ?

The Gemara responds: Abaye could have said to you: I say my statement even in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda. Rabbi Yehuda says that we require obvious intimations only with regard to a bill of divorce, as we require full severance of the relationship, and there is not full severance unless the bill of divorce clearly states that the husband is divorcing his wife through that document. However, did you hear him state generally that ambiguous intimations are not valid intimations?

וְרָבָא אָמַר: אֲנָא דַּאֲמַרִי אֲפִילּוּ לְרַבָּנַן. עַד כָּאן לָא קָאָמְרִי רַבָּנַן דְּלָא בָּעִינַן יָדַיִם מוֹכִיחוֹת אֶלָּא גַּבֵּי גֵּט,

And Rava could have said: I say my statement even in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis. The Rabbis say that we do not require obvious intimations only with regard to a bill of divorce,