נדרים פג

נדרים פג

הֲרֵי זוֹ סוֹפֶגֶת אֶת הָאַרְבָּעִים. הֵפֵר לָהּ בַּעְלָהּ וְהִיא לֹא יָדְעָה שֶׁהֵפֵר לָהּ, וְהָיְתָה שׁוֹתָה יַיִן וּמִיטַּמְּאָהּ לְמֵתִים — אֵינָהּ סוֹפֶגֶת אֶת הָאַרְבָּעִים.

she incurs [sofeget] the forty lashes, the penalty for one who transgresses a Torah prohibition, as she violated the terms of her nazirite vow. If her husband nullified the vow for her, but she did not know that he nullified it for her, and she drank wine or became impure through contact with the dead, she does not incur the forty lashes. She did not commit a transgression, as her nazirite vow was nullified.

וְאִי אָמְרַתְּ מֵפֵר לַמִּתְעַנָּה וְאֵין מֵפֵר לְשֶׁאֵין מִתְעַנָּה, דִּלְמָא מִן יַיִן דְּאִית לַהּ צַעֲרָא — הֵפֵר לָהּ, מִן חַרְצָן וּמִן זַג — לֹא הֵפֵר לָהּ, דְּהָא לָא אִית לַהּ צַעֲרָא. וְתִסְפּוֹג אֶת הָאַרְבָּעִים!

And if you say that the husband can nullify the vow with regard to the loaf that would cause her to deprive herself, but he cannot nullify the vow with regard to the loaf that would not cause her to deprive herself, the same reasoning should apply to a nazirite vow: Perhaps the husband nullified for her the vow that rendered wine forbidden to her, as she suffers pain when she refrains from drinking it. But as for her vow that rendered grape seeds and grape skins forbidden to her, he did not nullify it for her, as she suffers no pain when she abstains from them. And since even grape seeds and grape skins are forbidden to a nazirite, if the woman ate of them, she should receive the forty lashes, even if her husband nullified her vow.

אָמַר רַב יוֹסֵף: אֵין נְזִירוּת לַחֲצָאִין.

Rav Yosef said: Here it is different, as naziriteship cannot take effect partially. Since one cannot be a nazirite and accept only some of the prohibitions of naziriteship, the husband’s nullification cancels the entire vow. In the case of an ordinary vow, on the other hand, the husband can nullify only the part that causes his wife suffering.

אֲמַר לֵיהּ אַבָּיֵי: הָא קׇרְבָּן לַחֲצִי נְזִירוּת אִיכָּא?! אֶלָּא אָמַר אַבָּיֵי: אֵין נְזִירוּת לַחֲצָאִין, וְאֵין קׇרְבָּן לַחֲצָאִין.

Abaye said to him: The wording of your statement suggests that naziriteship cannot take effect partially, but that an offering is brought for partial observance of naziriteship. Rather, Abaye said that one should say as follows: Naziriteship cannot take effect partially, and no offering is brought for partial observance of naziriteship.

מֵיתִיבִי: הָאִשָּׁה שֶׁנָּדְרָה בְּנָזִיר וְהִפְרִישָׁה בְּהֶמְתָּהּ וְאַחַר כָּךְ הֵפֵר לָהּ בַּעְלָהּ — מְבִיאָה חַטַּאת הָעוֹף, וְאֵינָהּ מְבִיאָה עוֹלַת הָעוֹף. וְאִי אָמְרַתְּ אֵין קׇרְבָּן לַחֲצִי נְזִירוּת, אַמַּאי מְבִיאָה חַטָּאת הָעוֹף?

The Gemara raises an objection from the following statement: With regard to a woman who vowed to be a nazirite and she designated her animal for her nazirite offering, and afterward her husband nullified her vow for her, she must bring a bird sin-offering but she does not bring a bird burnt-offering. And if you say that no offering is brought for partial observance of naziriteship, why must she bring a bird sin-offering?

וְאֶלָּא מַאי — יֵשׁ קׇרְבָּן לַחֲצִי נְזִירוּת? שָׁלֹשׁ בְּהֵמוֹת בָּעֵי לְאֵתוֹיֵי: חַטָּאת, עוֹלָה, וּשְׁלָמִים! אֶלָּא, לְעוֹלָם אֵין קׇרְבָּן לַחֲצִי נְזִירוּת. וְחַטַּאת הָעוֹף דְּמַתְיָא — מִשּׁוּם דְּחַטָּאת עַל הַסָּפֵק.

The Gemara rejects this argument: But rather, what will you say? That an offering is brought for partial observance of naziriteship? If so, she should be required to bring three animals as offerings, a sin-offering, a burnt-offering, and a peace-offering, in accordance with the halakha governing a nazirite who has completed the period of his vow. Rather, say as follows: Actually, no offering is brought for partial observance of naziriteship, and as for the bird sin-offering that she must bring, this is because a bird sin-offering can be brought in a case of uncertainty. She must therefore bring a sin-offering for the partial naziriteship that she observed.

אֵיתִיבֵיהּ: הָאִשָּׁה שֶׁנָּדְרָה בְּנָזִיר וְנִטְמֵאת, וְאַחַר כָּךְ הֵפֵר לָהּ בַּעְלָהּ — מְבִיאָה חַטַּאת הָעוֹף, וְאֵין מְבִיאָה עוֹלַת הָעוֹף. וְאִי אָמְרַתְּ מֵפֵר לַמִּתְעַנָּה וְאֵין מֵפֵר לְשֶׁאֵין מִתְעַנָּה,

Rav Asi raised an objection against the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan from the following baraita: With regard to a woman who vowed to be a nazirite and she became ritually impure through contact with the dead, and afterward her husband nullified her vow for her, she must bring a bird sin-offering but does not bring a bird burnt-offering. And if you say that the husband can nullify the vow with regard to the loaf that would cause her to deprive herself, but he cannot nullify the vow with regard to the loaf that would not cause her to deprive herself, the same reasoning should apply here:

דִּלְמָא מִיַּיִן דְּאִית לַהּ צַעֲרָא — הֵפֵר לָהּ, מִטּוּמְאַת מֵת, דְּלֵית לַהּ צַעֲרָא — לֹא הֵפֵר לָהּ?

Perhaps the husband nullified for her the vow that rendered wine forbidden to her, as she suffers pain when she refrains from drinking it. But as for her vow that impurity imparted by the dead is forbidden to her, he did not nullify it for her, as she suffers no pain by not becoming impure through contact with the dead. Why, then, does she not bring the offerings that must be brought by a nazirite who became ritually impure through contact with the dead? This implies that since the husband can nullify a vow with regard to a matter that would cause her to deprive herself, he can also nullify a vow with regard to a matter that would not cause her to deprive herself.

אָמְרִי: מִטּוּמְאַת מֵת נָמֵי אִית לַהּ צַעֲרָא — דִּכְתִיב: ״וְהַחַי יִתֵּן אֶל לִבּוֹ״, וְתַנְיָא, הָיָה רַבִּי מֵאִיר אוֹמֵר: מַאי דִּכְתִיב ״וְהַחַי יִתֵּן אֶל לִבּוֹ״, דְּיִסְפּוֹד — יִסְפְּדוּן לֵיהּ, דְּיִבְכּוּן — יִבְכּוּן לֵיהּ, דְּיִקְבַּר — יִקְבְּרוּנֵיהּ.

The Gemara rejects this argument: The Sages say in response that a woman who vows that impurity imparted by the dead is forbidden to her also suffers pain as a result. How so? As it is written: “And the living shall lay it to his heart” (Ecclesiastes 7:2), and it is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Meir would say: What is the meaning of that which is written: “And the living shall lay it to his heart”? This means that one who eulogizes others when they die will in turn be eulogized when he himself dies; one who weeps for others will be wept for when he himself passes away; and one who buries others will himself be buried upon his passing. A woman who cannot participate in the funerals of others because she is barred from contracting impurity through contact with a corpse is distressed by the thought that she will receive similar treatment when she dies. Therefore, her vow involves affliction and can be nullified by her husband. The conclusion is that this case does not present a difficulty for Rabbi Yoḥanan.

מַתְנִי׳ ״קֻוֽנָּם שֶׁאֲנִי נֶהֱנֶה לַבְּרִיּוֹת״ — אֵינוֹ יָכוֹל לְהָפֵר, וִיכוֹלָה הִיא לֵיהָנוֹת בְּלֶקֶט, שִׁכְחָה, וּבְפֵאָה.

MISHNA: If a woman vowed: The property of other people is konam for me, and for that reason I will not benefit from it, her husband cannot nullify her vow, but nevertheless, if she is poor, she may benefit from the agricultural gifts that must be left for the poor: Gleanings, i.e., isolated stalks that fell during the harvest; forgotten sheaves; and produce of the corners [pe’a] of the field that the owner is obligated to leave for the poor. Enjoyment of these gifts is not considered as benefit derived from people, as these gifts are not given voluntarily out of the kindness of the donors, but in the performance of a mitzva.

״קֻוֽנָּם כֹּהֲנִים לְוִיִּם נֶהֱנִים לִי״ — יִטְּלוּ עַל כׇּרְחוֹ. ״כֹּהֲנִים אֵלּוּ וּלְוִיִּם אֵלּוּ נֶהֱנִים לִי״ — יִטְּלוּ אֲחֵרִים.

If one said: I will not let priests and Levites benefit from me, as that is konam for me, they can take the priestly and Levitical gifts from him against his will. If, however, he said: I will not let these specific priests and these specific Levites benefit from me, as that is konam for me, they are taken by others.

גְּמָ׳ אַלְמָא אֶפְשָׁר דְּמִתַּזְנָה מִדִּילֵיהּ, מִכְּלָל דְּבַעַל לָאו בִּכְלַל ״בְּרִיּוֹת״ הוּא. אֵימָא סֵיפָא: יְכוֹלָה לֵיהָנוֹת בְּלֶקֶט שִׁכְחָה וּפֵאָה, אֲבָל מִדְּבַעַל לָא אָכְלָה, אַלְמָא בַּעַל בִּכְלַל ״בְּרִיּוֹת״ הוּא!

GEMARA: The mishna teaches that if a woman vowed not to derive benefit from people, her husband cannot nullify her vow. The Gemara infers from this halakha: Apparently, this is because the woman can be sustained from his, i.e., her husband’s, property, without having to take from others. This proves by inference that in this context a husband is not included in her reference to people, as, although she mentioned people in her vow, she did not mean to prohibit herself from deriving benefit from her husband. The Gemara asks: But say the latter clause of that same part of the mishna, which states: But she may benefit from gleanings, forgotten sheaves, and pe’a. This implies that she may derive benefit from the gifts given to the poor, but she may not eat from property belonging to her husband. Apparently, a husband is in fact included in her reference to people, and she may not benefit from him either.

אָמַר עוּלָּא: לְעוֹלָם לָאו בִּכְלַל ״בְּרִיּוֹת״ הוּא, וְעוֹד: אֵין יָכוֹל לְהָפֵר — מִפְּנֵי שֶׁיְּכוֹלָה לֵיהָנוֹת בְּלֶקֶט שִׁכְחָה וּפֵאָה.

Ulla said: Actually, a husband is not included in her reference to people, and there is no contradiction. Rather, the mishna provides two reasons why he cannot nullify his wife’s vow. The first reason, which is merely implied by the mishna, is that she can be sustained by her husband. And furthermore there is the stated reason, that he cannot nullify the vow because she may benefit from gleanings, forgotten sheaves, and pe’a.

רָבָא אָמַר: לְעוֹלָם בַּעַל בִּכְלַל ״בְּרִיּוֹת״ הוּא, וּ״מָה טַעַם״ קָאָמַר: מָה טַעַם אֵין יָכוֹל לְהָפֵר? מִפְּנֵי שֶׁיְּכוֹלָה לֵיהָנוֹת בְּלֶקֶט שִׁכְחָה וּפֵאָה.

Rava said the opposite: Actually, a husband is included in her reference to people, and therefore his wife may not benefit from him. And when the mishna states the halakha, it employs the style known as: What is the reason, and it should be understood as follows: What is the reason that the husband cannot nullify his wife’s vow? Because she may benefit from gleanings, forgotten sheaves, and pe’a.

רַב נַחְמָן אָמַר: לְעוֹלָם בַּעַל לָאו בִּכְלַל ״בְּרִיּוֹת״ הוּא. וְהָכִי קָתָנֵי: נִתְגָּרְשָׁה, יְכוֹלָה לֵיהָנוֹת בְּלֶקֶט שִׁכְחָה וּפֵאָה.

Rav Naḥman said: Actually, a husband is not included in her reference to people, and her vow not to derive benefit from all people does not include him, which is why he cannot nullify it. And this is what the mishna is teaching: The husband cannot nullify his wife’s vow, because even if she becomes divorced and can no longer derive benefit from her husband, as he is now included in her reference to people, she may still benefit from gleanings, forgotten sheaves, and pe’a.