פסחים עב

פסחים עב

גְּמָ׳ בְּמַאי עָסְקִינַן? אִילֵימָא בְּטוֹעֶה — שָׁמְעַתְּ מִינַּהּ עֲקִירָה בְּטָעוּת הָוְיָא עֲקִירָה. אֶלָּא בְּעוֹקֵר.

GEMARA: When the mishna speaks of one who slaughtered a Paschal lamb on Shabbat for a different purpose, with what precisely are we dealing? If you say we are dealing with one who erred in that he actually thought this was a different offering and not a Paschal offering, learn from it, i.e., from the fact that the offering is disqualified and he is therefore liable to bring a sin-offering, that the erroneous uprooting of the status of an offering constitutes uprooting, even though he had no intention to do so. It would, however, be surprising to find the mishna taking a stand on this issue, as we find elsewhere that it is the subject of an amoraic dispute (Tosafot). Rather, the mishna must certainly be referring to one who intentionally uprooted the animal’s designation as a Paschal lamb and offered it as a different offering.

אֵימָא סֵיפָא: וּשְׁאָר כׇּל הַזְּבָחִים שֶׁשְּׁחָטָן לְשׁוּם הַפֶּסַח, אִם אֵינָן רְאוּיִין — חַיָּיב, אִם רְאוּיִין הֵן — רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר מְחַיֵּיב חַטָּאת, וְרַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ פּוֹטֵר. וְאִי בְּעוֹקֵר, מָה לִי רְאוּיִין, מָה לִי שֶׁאֵינָן רְאוּיִין?

If so, say the latter clause of the mishna: As for all other offerings that one unwittingly slaughtered on Shabbat for the purpose of a Paschal offering, if they were not fit for the Paschal offering, he is liable to bring a sin-offering. And if they are fit, Rabbi Eliezer deems him liable to bring a sin-offering, whereas Rabbi Yehoshua exempts him. Now if the mishna is referring to one who intentionally uprooted the original designation of the animal, which he knew was not a Paschal offering, what does it matter to me whether the animal was fit or unfit? He certainly does not think that he is performing a mitzva; why then does Rabbi Yehoshua exempt him from bringing a sin-offering?

אֶלָּא פְּשִׁיטָא בְּטוֹעֶה. רֵישָׁא בְּעוֹקֵר וְסֵיפָא בְּטוֹעֶה! אָמַר רַבִּי אָבִין: אִין, רֵישָׁא בְּעוֹקֵר וְסֵיפָא בְּטוֹעֶה.

Rather, it is obvious that we must be dealing with one who erred. But if so, we have a contradiction in the mishna, as the first clause is referring to one who intentionally uprooted the animal’s designation, whereas the latter clause is referring to one who erred about it. Rabbi Avin said: Yes, we must accept this conclusion even though it is unusual: The first clause deals with one who uprooted the animal’s designation, whereas the latter clause deals with one who erred about it.

אַשְׁכְּחֵיהּ רַב יִצְחָק בַּר יוֹסֵף לְרַבִּי אֲבָהוּ דַּהֲוָה קָאֵי בְּאוּכְלוּסָא דְאִינָשֵׁי, אֲמַר לֵיהּ: מַתְנִיתִין מַאי? אֲמַר לֵיהּ: רֵישָׁא בְּעוֹקֵר וְסֵיפָא בְּטוֹעֶה. תְּנָא מִינֵּיהּ אַרְבְּעִין זִימְנִין וְדָמֵי לֵיהּ כְּמַאן דְּמַנְּחָא בְּכִיסֵיהּ.

The Gemara relates that Rav Yitzḥak bar Yosef once found Rabbi Abbahu standing among a multitude [okhlosa] of people, and he said to him: What is the meaning of our mishna? Rabbi Abbahu said to him: The first clause is referring to one who intentionally uprooted the animal’s status, whereas the latter clause is referring to one who erred about it. Rav Yitzḥak bar Yosef learned this statement from him forty times, and it seemed to him as though it were resting in his pouch; i.e., he repeated it many times until the mishna became crystal clear to him and etched in his memory.

תְּנַן אָמַר רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר: מָה אִם פֶּסַח שֶׁמּוּתָּר לִשְׁמוֹ, כְּשֶׁשִּׁינָּה אֶת שְׁמוֹ — חַיָּיב, זְבָחִים שֶׁהֵן אֲסוּרִין לִשְׁמָן, כְּשֶׁשִּׁינָּה אֶת שְׁמָן אֵינוֹ דִּין שֶׁיְּהֵא חַיָּיב! וְאִם אִיתָא, הָא לָא דָּמֵי, דְּרֵישָׁא בְּעוֹקֵר, וְסֵיפָא בְּטוֹעֶה!

The Gemara raises a difficulty with this understanding of the mishna: We learned in the continuation of the mishna that Rabbi Eliezer said to Rabbi Yehoshua: If with regard to the Paschal lamb, which is permitted to be slaughtered on Shabbat for its own purpose, when one changed its purpose he is nevertheless liable, then with regard to other offerings that are forbidden to be slaughtered on Shabbat even for their own purpose, when he changed their purpose is it not right that he should be liable? And if it is so that the two parts of the mishna are not talking about the same case, surely they are not similar and cannot be compared; as the first clause is referring to one who intentionally uprooted the animal’s status, whereas the latter clause is referring to one who erred about it.

לְרַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר לָא שָׁנֵי לֵיהּ. לְרַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ דְּשָׁנֵי לֵיהּ, לִישַׁנֵּי לֵיהּ הָכִי!

The Gemara answers: According to Rabbi Eliezer, who put forward this a fortiori argument, there is no difference, for in his opinion someone who erred while intending to perform a mitzva is liable to bring a sin-offering, even if he made a reasonable mistake. Thus, he does not differentiate between the deliberate uprooting of the animal’s status and the erroneous sacrificing of the offering for a different purpose. The Gemara asks: But according to Rabbi Yehoshua, for whom there is a difference between the two cases, let him answer Rabbi Eliezer in this way, that the first clause of the mishna is referring to one who intentionally uprooted the status of an offering, while the latter clause is referring to one who erred about it. Why does he introduce another factor, that in the first clause he changed the animal’s purpose for something forbidden, whereas in the latter clause he changed it for something permitted?

הָכִי קָאָמַר לֵיהּ: לְדִידִי לָא דָּמֵי, רֵישָׁא בְּעוֹקֵר וְסֵיפָא בְּטוֹעֶה. לְדִידָךְ: לֹא אִם אָמַרְתָּ בְּפֶסַח שֶׁשִּׁינָּה אֶת שְׁמוֹ לְדָבָר הָאָסוּר, תֹּאמַר בִּזְבָחִים שֶׁשִּׁינָּה אֶת שְׁמָן לְדָבָר הַמּוּתָּר.

The Gemara explains that this is what Rabbi Yehoshua said to Rabbi Eliezer: According to me, these cases are not comparable, because the first clause deals with one who intentionally uprooted the animal’s designation, whereas the latter clause deals with one who erred about it. However, even according to you, who do not differentiate in this manner, I can still answer as follows: No, if you say that one is liable if he slaughtered a Paschal lamb for a different purpose, it is because he changed its purpose for something prohibited. But can you say the same thing about other offerings that he slaughtered for the purpose of a Paschal offering and thus changed their purpose for something permitted?

אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר: אֵימוּרֵי צִיבּוּר יוֹכִיחוּ שֶׁהֵן מוּתָּרִין לִשְׁמָן, וְהַשּׁוֹחֵט לִשְׁמָן — חַיָּיב, אָמַר לוֹ רַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ: לֹא אִם אָמַרְתָּ בְּאֵימוּרֵי צִיבּוּר שֶׁכֵּן יֵשׁ לָהֶן קִצְבָה, תֹּאמַר בְּפֶסַח שֶׁאֵין לוֹ קִצְבָה.

The mishna continues with what Rabbi Eliezer said to Rabbi Yehoshua: Let the communal offerings prove the matter, for they are permitted for slaughter on Shabbat for their own purpose, and nevertheless, one who unnecessarily slaughters different offerings for their purpose is liable. Rabbi Yehoshua said to him: No, if you said this halakha with regard to communal offerings, it is because they have a limit. But can you necessarily say the same thing with regard to the Paschal lamb, which does not have a limit?

לְמֵימְרָא דְּכֹל הֵיכָא דְּאִית לֵיהּ קִצְבָה מְחַיֵּיב רַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ? וַהֲרֵי תִּינוֹקוֹת, דְּיֵשׁ לָהֶן קִצְבָה, וּתְנַן: מִי שֶׁהָיוּ לוֹ שְׁנֵי תִינוֹקוֹת, אֶחָד לְמוּלוֹ אַחַר הַשַּׁבָּת וְאֶחָד לְמוּלוֹ בַּשַּׁבָּת, וְשָׁכַח וּמָל אֶת שֶׁל אַחַר הַשַּׁבָּת בַּשַּׁבָּת — חַיָּיב.

The Gemara asks: Is that to say that wherever there is a limit, Rabbi Yehoshua deems liable one who erred while intending to perform a mitzva? But with regard to the circumcision of babies on Shabbat, which has a limit, we nevertheless learned in a mishna that with regard to one who had two babies to circumcise, one of whom he needed to circumcise after Shabbat and one of whom he needed to circumcise on Shabbat, and he forgot and circumcised the one that should have been circumcised after Shabbat on Shabbat, he is liable to bring a sin-offering. This is because he performed the prohibited labor of causing a wound not in the framework of performing a mitzva, as no obligation yet existed to circumcise the child.

אֶחָד לְמוּלוֹ בְּעֶרֶב שַׁבָּת, וְאֶחָד לָמוּל בַּשַּׁבָּת, וְשָׁכַח וּמָל אֶת שֶׁל עֶרֶב שַׁבָּת בַּשַּׁבָּת — רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר מְחַיֵּיב חַטָּאת, וְרַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ פּוֹטֵר!

If, however, there were two babies, one of whom he needed to circumcise on Shabbat eve, and one of whom he needed to circumcise on Shabbat, and he forgot and circumcised the one that he should have circumcised on Shabbat eve on Shabbat, Rabbi Eliezer deems him liable to bring a sin-offering. As circumcision after its appointed time does not override Shabbat, he has therefore unwittingly violated Shabbat. And Rabbi Yehoshua exempts him. Since he intended to perform a mitzva, and despite his error in fact performed a mitzva, he is exempt from bringing a sin-offering. Thus, we see that even though there is a limit in the case of the babies, Rabbi Yehoshua nevertheless exempts one who errs while intending to perform a mitzva.

אָמַר רַבִּי אַמֵּי: הָכָא בְּמַאי עָסְקִינַן? כְּגוֹן שֶׁקָּדַם וּמָל אֶת שֶׁל עֶרֶב שַׁבָּת בַּשַּׁבָּת, דְּאִיכָּא הָךְ דְּשַׁבָּת דִּטְרִיד בֵּיהּ. הָכָא, כְּגוֹן שֶׁקָּדַם וְשַׁחְטִינְהוּ לְאֵימוּרֵי צִיבּוּר בְּרֵישָׁא.

Rabbi Ami said: With what are we dealing here? We are dealing with a case where the circumciser first unwittingly circumcised the baby who should have been circumcised on Shabbat eve on Shabbat, when there is still this other baby who should be circumcised on Shabbat with whom he is preoccupied. Since he was legitimately preoccupied with a mitzva, as he knew that there was a baby that needed to be circumcised, he is exempt from bringing a sin-offering. Here, however, with regard to offerings, we are dealing with a case where he first slaughtered the required communal offerings at the beginning, so that there was no need to slaughter any more offerings, as communal offerings have a limit. Since he had no reason to make a mistake, he is liable to bring a sin-offering for having unnecessarily slaughtered an animal on Shabbat.

אִי הָכִי? רַבִּי מֵאִיר אוֹמֵר: אַף הַשּׁוֹחֵט לְשֵׁם אֵימוּרֵי צִיבּוּר פָּטוּר, אַף עַל גַּב דִּקְדֵים וְשַׁחְטִינְהוּ לְאֵימוּרֵי צִיבּוּר בְּרֵישָׁא, וְהַתַּנְיָא, רַבִּי חִיָּיא [מֵאָבֵל עֲרָב] אָמַר רַבִּי מֵאִיר: לֹא נֶחְלְקוּ רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר וְרַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ עַל שֶׁהָיוּ לוֹ שְׁנֵי תִינוֹקוֹת, אֶחָד לָמוּל עֶרֶב שַׁבָּת וְאֶחָד לָמוּל בַּשַּׁבָּת, וְשָׁכַח וּמָל אֶת שֶׁל עֶרֶב שַׁבָּת בַּשַּׁבָּת — דְּחַיָּיב.

The Gemara asks: If so, how do we understand the continuation of the mishna, where Rabbi Meir says that according to Rabbi Yehoshua, even one who unwittingly slaughters other offerings for the purpose of communal offerings beyond their daily limit is exempt? According to our explanation, this must be true even though he first slaughtered the required communal offerings at the beginning. But didn’t Rabbi Ḥiyya from the village of Avel Arav teach in a baraita another version of the dispute, according to which Rabbi Meir said: Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Yehoshua did not disagree over one who had two babies to circumcise, one to circumcise on Shabbat eve and one to circumcise on Shabbat, and he forgot and circumcised the one who should have been circumcised on Shabbat eve on Shabbat; in that case, everyone agrees that he is liable to bring a sin-offering.

עַל מָה נֶחְלְקוּ — עַל שֶׁהָיוּ לוֹ שְׁנֵי תִינוֹקוֹת, אֶחָד לָמוּל אַחַר הַשַּׁבָּת וְאֶחָד לָמוּל בַּשַּׁבָּת, וְשָׁכַח וּמָל אֶת שֶׁל אַחַר הַשַּׁבָּת בַּשַּׁבָּת, דְּרַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר מְחַיֵּיב חַטָּאת, וְרַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ פּוֹטֵר.

With regard to what did they disagree? With regard to one who had two babies to circumcise, one to circumcise after Shabbat and one to circumcise on Shabbat, and he forgot and circumcised the baby who should have been circumcised after Shabbat on Shabbat, as Rabbi Eliezer deems him liable to bring a sin-offering, and Rabbi Yehoshua exempts him.

וְתִסְבְּרָא: מָה הָתָם דְּלָא עָבֵיד מִצְוָה — פָּטַר רַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ, הֵיכָא דְּקָא עָבֵיד מִצְוָה — מְחַיֵּיב?!

The Gemara expresses surprise: And how can you understand this baraita in its current formulation? If there, in the latter clause, where he circumcised the baby who should have been circumcised after Shabbat on Shabbat, so that he did not perform a mitzva because the baby was not yet eight days old and the mitzva did not yet apply, Rabbi Yehoshua nevertheless exempted him because he erred while intending to perform a mitzva. Then where he did perform a mitzva, i.e., where he circumcised a baby on Shabbat who was already eight days old before Shabbat and to whom the mitzva of circumcision applied, would Rabbi Yehoshua deem him liable?

אָמְרִי דְּבֵי רַבִּי יַנַּאי: רֵישָׁא — כְּגוֹן שֶׁקָּדַם וּמָל שֶׁל שַׁבָּת בְּעֶרֶב שַׁבָּת,

The Rabbis of the school of Rabbi Yannai said: The first clause of the baraita is referring to a unique situation, where the circumciser first unwittingly circumcised on Shabbat eve the baby who should have been circumcised on Shabbat.

שֶׁלֹּא נִתְּנָה שַׁבָּת לִדָּחוֹת. [וְסֵיפָא — נִתְּנָה שַׁבָּת לִדָּחוֹת אֶצְלוֹ].

In that case, Shabbat does not stand to be overridden at all. Since the baby who should have been circumcised on Shabbat was already circumcised, and the only one left is the baby who should have been circumcised on Friday, the circumciser should have known that he has no circumcisions to perform on Shabbat, because a circumcision that was delayed beyond the eighth day does not override Shabbat. Therefore, he is liable if he performed the circumcision on Shabbat. In the latter clause, however, the circumcision was performed in a situation where Shabbat stands to be overridden for him, as the baby who should have been circumcised on Shabbat was not yet circumcised.

הָכָא — הֲרֵי נִתְּנָה שַׁבָּת לִדָּחוֹת אֵצֶל קׇרְבַּן צִיבּוּר.

Based on the understanding that everything depends on whether or not Shabbat stands to be overridden, it may be argued that here too, Shabbat stands to be overridden with regard to a communal offering. Therefore, one who on Shabbat unwittingly slaughters other offerings for the purpose of communal offerings is exempt from bringing a sin-offering, because he knows that communal offerings must be brought on Shabbat, and consequently there is some justification for his error.

אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַב אָשֵׁי לְרַב כָּהֲנָא: הָכָא נָמֵי, הֲרֵי נִתְּנָה שַׁבָּת לִדָּחוֹת אֵצֶל תִּינוֹקוֹת דְּעָלְמָא! אֲמַר לֵיהּ: לְגַבֵּי דְּהַאי גַּבְרָא מִיהַת לָא אִיתְיְהִיב.

Rav Ashi said to Rav Kahana that this explanation is difficult: Here too, it may be argued that Shabbat stands to be overridden with regard to babies in general, as it is permitted to circumcise a baby whose eighth day occurs on Shabbat, and so there is some minimal justification for his mistake. Rav Kahana said to him: That is indeed so. However, with regard to this person, Shabbat does not stand to be overridden, as there is no longer any child who is supposed to be circumcised on Shabbat. Therefore, if he unwittingly performed a circumcision on Shabbat, it is not considered as if he performed a transgression while preoccupied with the performance of a mitzva.

וּשְׁאָר כׇּל הַזְּבָחִים שֶׁשְּׁחָטָן לְשׁוּם פֶּסַח, אִם אֵינָן רְאוּיִין — חַיָּיב, וְאִם רְאוּיִין — רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר מְחַיֵּיב חַטָּאת, וְרַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ פּוֹטֵר. מַאן תַּנָּא דְּשָׁנֵי לֵיהּ בֵּין רְאוּיִין לְשֶׁאֵינָן רְאוּיִין?

We learned in the mishna with regard to all other offerings that one unwittingly slaughtered on Shabbat for the purpose of a Paschal offering, that if they were not fit for the Paschal offering, he is liable to bring a sin-offering, and if they were fit, Rabbi Eliezer deems him liable to bring a sin-offering, and Rabbi Yehoshua exempts him. The Gemara asks: Who is the tanna that distinguishes between offerings that are fit for the Paschal lamb and those that are not fit?

רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן הִיא. דְּתַנְיָא: אֶחָד הַזְּבָחִים הָרְאוּיִין וְאֶחָד זְבָחִים שֶׁאֵינָן רְאוּיִין, וְכֵן הַשּׁוֹחֵט לְשֵׁם אֵימוּרֵי צִיבּוּר — פָּטוּר, דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי מֵאִיר. אָמַר רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן: לֹא נֶחְלְקוּ רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר וְרַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ עַל שֶׁאֵינָן רְאוּיִין שֶׁחַיָּיב, עַל מָה נֶחְלְקוּ — עַל הָרְאוּיִין, שֶׁרַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר מְחַיֵּיב חַטָּאת, וְרַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ פּוֹטֵר.

The Gemara explains: It is Rabbi Shimon, as it was taught in a baraita: If one unwittingly slaughters other offerings on Shabbat for the purpose of a Paschal offering, whether they are offerings that are fit for the Paschal lamb or they are offerings that are not fit, and similarly, if he unwittingly slaughters other offerings for the purpose of communal offerings on Shabbat, he is exempt from bringing a sin-offering; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Shimon said: Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Yehoshua did not disagree about one who slaughtered offerings that are not fit, for in that case all agree that he is liable. With regard to what did they disagree? With regard to one who slaughtered offerings that are fit, for Rabbi Eliezer deems him liable to bring a sin-offering and Rabbi Yehoshua exempts him. This indicates that the unattributed ruling of our mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon.

אָמַר רַב בִּיבִי אָמַר רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר: פּוֹטֵר הָיָה רַבִּי מֵאִיר אֲפִילּוּ עֵגֶל שֶׁל זִבְחֵי שְׁלָמִים שֶׁשְּׁחָטוֹ לְשׁוּם הַפֶּסַח. אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַבִּי זֵירָא לְרַב בִּיבִי: וְהָאָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: מוֹדֶה הָיָה רַבִּי מֵאִיר בְּבַעֲלֵי מוּמִין! אֲמַר לֵיהּ: בְּבַעֲלֵי מוּמִין לָא טְרִיד בְּהוּ, וְהַאי טְרִיד בֵּיהּ.

Rav Beivai said that Rabbi Elazar said: Rabbi Meir would exempt him even in the case of a calf of a peace-offering that he slaughtered for the purpose of the Paschal offering, even though one does not ordinarily mistake a calf for a lamb. Rabbi Zeira said to Rav Beivai: But didn’t Rabbi Yoḥanan say that Rabbi Meir conceded that if one slaughtered blemished animals on Shabbat he is liable to bring a sin-offering? He said to him: With regard to blemished animals, he is not at all preoccupied with them, because he knows that they are ineligible to be offered as sacrifices. But as for this calf, he is preoccupied with sacrificing it as an offering, and he may therefore make a mistake.

בְּעָא מִינֵּיהּ רָבָא מֵרַב נַחְמָן: חוּלִּין לְשׁוּם פֶּסַח, מַאי לִי אָמַר רַבִּי מֵאִיר? אֲמַר לֵיהּ: פּוֹטֵר הָיָה רַבִּי מֵאִיר אֲפִילּוּ חוּלִּין לְשׁוּם פֶּסַח.

Rava raised a dilemma before Rav Naḥman: If one unwittingly slaughtered an unconsecrated animal for the purpose of a Paschal offering, what would Rabbi Meir say? Would he exempt him in this case as well? Rav Naḥman said to him: Rabbi Meir would exempt him even if he slaughtered an unconsecrated animal for the purpose of a Paschal offering.

וְהָאָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: מוֹדֶה הָיָה רַבִּי מֵאִיר בְּבַעֲלֵי מוּמִין! בַּעֲלֵי מוּמִין לָא מִיחַלְּפִי, הָנֵי מִיחַלְּפִי.

Rava asked him: But didn’t Rabbi Yoḥanan say that Rabbi Meir concedes that if one slaughtered blemished animals on Shabbat he is liable to bring a sin-offering, as they are never sacrificed as offerings, and similarly, unconsecrated animals are never sacrificed as offerings? Rav Naḥman responded: There is room for a distinction. Blemished animals cannot be confused with unblemished ones, and so there is no legitimate reason for error; but these, i.e., unconsecrated animals, can easily be confused with consecrated animals, as they are externally indistinguishable from one another, and therefore one who confuses them is exempt.

וְטַעְמָא דְּרַבִּי מֵאִיר מִשּׁוּם אִיחַלּוֹפֵי וְלָא אִיחַלּוֹפֵי? וְהָאָמַר רַב בִּיבִי אָמַר רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר: פּוֹטֵר הָיָה רַבִּי מֵאִיר אֲפִילּוּ עֵגֶל שֶׁל זִבְחֵי שְׁלָמִים שֶׁשְּׁחָטוֹ לְשׁוּם הַפֶּסַח! אַלְמָא, טַעְמָא דְּרַבִּי מֵאִיר מִשּׁוּם דִּטְרִיד!

Rava asked further: And is Rabbi Meir’s reason really that these can be confused and these cannot be confused with a legitimate offering? But didn’t Rav Beivai say that Rabbi Elazar said that Rabbi Meir would exempt him even in the case of a calf of a peace-offering that he slaughtered for the purpose of the Paschal offering, even though there is no way to mistake a calf for an animal that can be brought for the Paschal offering? Therefore, it is apparent that Rabbi Meir’s reason is that he is preoccupied with sacrificing the calf as an offering, and consequently he is exempt if he erred and slaughtered it for the purpose of a Paschal lamb. But why should one be exempt if he brought an unconsecrated animal for the purpose of a Paschal offering? He is not preoccupied with bringing it as an offering.

אֲמַר לֵיהּ: טְרִיד — אַף עַל גַּב דְּלָא מִחַלַּף, מִחַלַּף — אַף עַל גַּב דְּלָא טְרִיד, לְאַפּוֹקֵי בַּעֲלֵי מוּמִין, דְּלָא אִיחַלּוֹפֵי מִחַלַּף וְלָא מִטְרִיד טְרִיד.

Rav Naḥman said to him: Both reasons apply according to Rabbi Meir. If one is preoccupied with bringing the animal as an offering, he is exempt even though the animal cannot easily be confused with the one he was supposed to sacrifice. And when the animal can easily be confused with the one set aside as an offering, he is exempt, even though he is not preoccupied with bringing it as an offering. This comes to exclude blemished animals, which cannot be confused with unblemished animals and with whose sacrifice he is not preoccupied.

יָתֵיב רַבִּי זֵירָא וְרַבִּי שְׁמוּאֵל בַּר רַב יִצְחָק אַקִּילְעָא דְּרַבִּי שְׁמוּאֵל בַּר רַב יִצְחָק, וְיָתְבִי וְקָא אָמְרִי, אָמַר רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן לָקִישׁ: נִתְחַלֵּף לוֹ שַׁפּוּד שֶׁל נוֹתָר בְּשַׁפּוּד שֶׁל צָלִי, וַאֲכָלוֹ — חַיָּיב.

The Gemara relates that Rabbi Zeira and Rabbi Shmuel bar Rav Yitzḥak were sitting on the porch of Rabbi Shmuel bar Rav Yitzḥak, and they sat and said: Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish said: If one unwittingly confused a spit of leftover sacrificial meat, which it is prohibited to eat and which makes one liable to receive the punishment of karet when one eats it intentionally, with a spit of roasted sacrificial meat, which is a mitzva to eat, and he ate it, he is liable to bring a sin-offering. Although he intended to do a mitzva, since he unwittingly transgressed the prohibition against eating leftover sacrificial meat, he must bring a sin-offering.

וְרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן אָמַר: אִשְׁתּוֹ נִדָּה בָּעַל — חַיָּיב. יְבִמְתּוֹ נִדָּה בָּעַל — פָּטוּר.

And they further reported that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: If one unwittingly engaged in sexual intercourse with his wife while she was menstruating, he is liable to bring a sin-offering. But if he unwittingly engaged in sexual intercourse with his sister-in-law who was waiting to become his wife through levirate marriage while she was menstruating, he is exempt, because the act of intercourse itself is a mitzva. A man whose brother died without children is obliged by Torah law to marry his deceased brother’s widow and “come to her” (Deuteronomy 25:5), so that even if he mistakenly transgressed while attempting to fulfill the mitzva, he is exempt from bringing a sin-offering.

אִיכָּא דְאָמְרִי: כׇּל שֶׁכֵּן בְּהָהִיא דְּמִחַיַּיב, דְּלֹא עָשָׂה מִצְוָה.

The Gemara attempts to determine whether Rabbi Yoḥanan agrees or disagrees with Reish Lakish’s ruling: Some say that all the more so in the first case, where one unwittingly ate a spit of leftover sacrificial meat, Rabbi Yoḥanan would deem him liable to bring a sin-offering, for he did not actually perform a mitzva when he ate the meat, even though he intended to do so. This stands in contrast to the second case, where the person unwittingly engaged in sexual intercourse with his wife while she was menstruating, where he at least performed a small mitzva, as will be explained shortly.

אִית דְּאָמְרִי, בְּהַהִיא — פָּטוּר. מַאי טַעְמָא? הָתָם הוּא דַּהֲוָה לֵיהּ לְשַׁיּוֹלֵי. אֲבָל הָכָא, דְּלָא הֲוָה לֵיהּ לְשַׁיּוֹלֵי — לָא.

Others say that according to Rabbi Yoḥanan in that case where one ate leftover sacrificial meat, he is exempt from bringing a sin-offering. What is the reason? There, where he had sexual intercourse with his wife while she was menstruating, he is liable, for he should have asked her if she was menstruating, and because he failed to do so he is liable to bring a sin-offering. But here, where he ate a spit of leftover sacrificial meat, he did not have anyone to ask, and so he is not liable to bring a sin-offering.

וְרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן, מַאי שְׁנָא יְבִמְתּוֹ, דְּקָא עָבֵיד מִצְוָה? אִשְׁתּוֹ נָמֵי קָא עָבֵיד מִצְוָה! בְּאִשְׁתּוֹ מְעוּבֶּרֶת.

The Gemara asks: And according to Rabbi Yoḥanan, what is different about one who unwittingly engaged in sexual intercourse with his sister-in-law, in that he is exempt from bringing a sin-offering? Is it that he performed a mitzva, i.e., the mitzva of levirate marriage? If so, then also in the case where he unwittingly engaged in sexual intercourse with his wife while she was menstruating, he performed a mitzva, for he occupied himself in the fulfillment of the mitzva of procreation. The Gemara answers that we are dealing here with a case where his wife is pregnant, such that intercourse cannot lead to procreation.

וְהָא אִיכָּא שִׂמְחַת עוֹנָה! שֶׁלֹּא בִּשְׁעַת עוֹנָתָהּ.

The Gemara raises another question: Nevertheless, there is the mitzva of the enjoyment of conjugal rights. One of a husband’s marital obligations is to engage in sexual intercourse with his wife at regular intervals (see Exodus 21:10), and this is considered a mitzva. The Gemara answers that we are talking about a case where it is not the time of her conjugal rights.

וְהָאָמַר רָבָא: חַיָּיב אָדָם לְשַׂמֵּחַ אִשְׁתּוֹ בִּדְבַר מִצְוָה! סָמוּךְ לְוִוסְתָּהּ.

The Gemara asks further: Even so, didn’t Rava say that a man is obligated to please his wife through a mitzva? That is to say, he must engage in sexual intercourse with her when she so desires, even if it is not the time of her conjugal rights. The Gemara answers that we are dealing with a case where it was near her expected date of menstruation, when sexual relations are prohibited due to a concern that the woman may already be menstruating or that she may begin to menstruate during the sexual act.

אִי הָכִי, אֲפִילּוּ יְבִמְתּוֹ נָמֵי! יְבִמְתּוֹ בְּזִיז מִינַּהּ, אִשְׁתּוֹ לָא בְּזִיז מִינַּהּ.

The Gemara asks: If so, i.e., if they engaged in sexual intercourse near the woman’s expected date of menstruation when he should have refrained from doing so, then even in the case where he had sexual intercourse with his sister-in-law and she turned out to be menstruating, he should also be liable, as the mitzva of levirate marriage does not apply at that time. The Gemara explains that with regard to his sister-in-law, he is still shy [bazeiz] in front of her and uncomfortable asking her whether she is close to her expected menstruation date, whereas with regard to his wife, he is not shy in front of her, and so he should have asked her.

וְרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן כְּמַאן? אִילֵּימָא כְּרַבִּי יוֹסֵי. דִּתְנַן, רַבִּי יוֹסֵי אוֹמֵר: יוֹם טוֹב הָרִאשׁוֹן שֶׁל חַג שֶׁחָל לִהְיוֹת בַּשַּׁבָּת, וְשָׁכַח וְהוֹצִיא אֶת הַלּוּלָב לִרְשׁוּת הָרַבִּים — פָּטוּר, מִפְּנֵי שֶׁהוֹצִיא בִּרְשׁוּת.

The Gemara asks: And Rabbi Yoḥanan, in accordance with whose opinion did he rule with regard to one who erred while engaged in a mitzva? If you say he ruled in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, as we learned in a mishna: Rabbi Yosei says: If the first Festival day of the festival of Sukkot occurs on Shabbat, and he forgot and carried his lulav out into the public domain and continued to transport it there, unwittingly performing a prohibited labor, he is exempt from bringing a sin-offering. That is because he carried it out with permission, that is to say, he was acting with the intention of fulfilling a mitzva.

דִּילְמָא שָׁאנֵי הָתָם, דִּזְמַנּוֹ בָּהוּל.

There is room to differentiate between Rabbi Yosei’s ruling and that of Rabbi Yoḥanan: Perhaps it is different there, as he is pressed for time. Since by Torah law the mitzva of lulav applies only one day a year, he is anxious to fulfill the mitzva and therefore does not realize that he is violating a Torah prohibition. This is unlike the case of levirate marriage, which need not be performed at any specific time and about which he is less pressured.

וְאֶלָּא רַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ דִּזְבָחִים. דִּילְמָא הָתָם נָמֵי זְמַנּוֹ בָּהוּל.

Rather, one might say that Rabbi Yoḥanan issued his ruling in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehoshua in our mishna with regard to offerings, for according to Rabbi Yehoshua, one who unwittingly slaughtered another offering on Shabbat for the purpose of a Paschal offering, and the animal was fit to be brought as a Paschal offering, is exempt from bringing a sin-offering. Here too, however, there is room to differentiate. Perhaps there also we can say that Rabbi Yehoshua exempts him because he is pressed for time.

וְאֶלָּא כְּרַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ דְּתִינוֹקוֹת. הָתָם נָמֵי זְמַנּוֹ בָּהוּל.

Rather, one might say that Rabbi Yoḥanan’s ruling is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehoshua with regard to babies, one that should have been circumcised on Shabbat eve and the other on Shabbat, and the circumciser forgot and circumcised the one that should have been circumcised on Shabbat eve on Shabbat. In that case the circumciser is exempt from bringing a sin-offering. But once again there is room to differentiate: Perhaps there too, Rabbi Yehoshua exempts him because he is pressed for time.

וְאֶלָּא כְּרַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ דִּתְרוּמָה, דִּתְנַן: הָיָה אוֹכֵל בִּתְרוּמָה וְנוֹדַע שֶׁהוּא בֶּן גְּרוּשָׁה אוֹ בֶּן חֲלוּצָה — רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר מְחַיֵּיב קֶרֶן וָחוֹמֶשׁ, רַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ פּוֹטֵר.

Rather, we should say that Rabbi Yoḥanan’s ruling is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehoshua with regard to teruma, as we learned in a mishna: If a priest was eating teruma, and it became known that he was the son of a divorced woman or a woman who underwent ḥalitza and he is therefore disqualified from the priesthood and may not eat teruma, Rabbi Eliezer deems him liable to pay the value of the principal and an additional fifth, like any non-priest who unwittingly ate teruma, whereas Rabbi Yehoshua exempts him. In this case, one who thought he was a priest and therefore fulfilling a mitzva when he ate the teruma was actually committing a transgression, but nevertheless, Rabbi Yehoshua exempts him from the ordinary penalty. On the face of it, this is similar to Rabbi Yoḥanan’s ruling.

דִּילְמָא כִּדְרַב בִּיבִי בַּר אַבָּיֵי, דְּאָמַר רַב בִּיבִי בַּר אַבָּיֵי: בִּתְרוּמָה בְּעֶרֶב הַפֶּסַח, דִּזְמַנָּהּ בָּהוּל.

This comparison can, however, be rejected, for perhaps that case should be explained in accordance with the opinion of Rav Beivai bar Abaye. For Rav Beivai bar Abaye said: The mishna is talking about a disqualified priest who ate teruma which is leaven on the eve of Passover, whose time is pressing, because if he does not eat it quickly he will have to burn it.

אִי נָמֵי: שָׁאנֵי תְּרוּמָה דְּאִיקְּרִי עֲבוֹדָה, וַעֲבוֹדָה רַחֲמָנָא אַכְשַׁר.

Alternatively, there may be another reason to differentiate: Eating teruma is different, because it is called sacred service, and the Merciful One validates service performed by someone of priestly descent even if he is not fit for the priesthood.

דִּתְנַן: הָיָה עוֹמֵד וּמַקְרִיב, וְנוֹדַע שֶׁהוּא בֶּן גְּרוּשָׁה אוֹ בֶּן חֲלוּצָה — כׇּל הַקָּרְבָּנוֹת כּוּלָּן שֶׁהִקְרִיב עַל גַּבֵּי הַמִּזְבֵּחַ פְּסוּלִין, וְרַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ מַכְשִׁיר. וְאָמְרִינַן, מַאי טַעְמָא דְּרַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ — דִּכְתִיב: ״בָּרֵךְ ה׳ חֵילוֹ וּפֹעַל יָדָיו תִּרְצֶה״.

As we learned in a mishna: If a priest was standing and sacrificing offerings on the altar, and it became known that he was the son of a divorced woman or the son of a woman who underwent ḥalitza, all the offerings that he offered on the altar until that time are disqualified, because only service performed by a priest deemed fit is acceptable. And Rabbi Yehoshua validates them. And we said: What is the reason of Rabbi Yehoshua? As it is written with regard to the tribe of Levi: “Bless, Lord, his substance and accept the work of his hands” (Deuteronomy 33:11), which teaches that after the fact, God accepts the work of a priest’s hands, even if it becomes clear that he was actually disqualified at the time he performed the service.

וּתְרוּמָה הֵיכָא אִיקְּרִי עֲבוֹדָה? דְּתַנְיָא, מַעֲשֶׂה בְּרַבִּי טַרְפוֹן שֶׁלֹּא בָּא אֶמֶשׁ לְבֵית הַמִּדְרָשׁ. לְשַׁחֲרִית מְצָאוֹ רַבָּן גַּמְלִיאֵל, אָמַר לוֹ: מִפְּנֵי מָה לֹא בָּאתָ אֶמֶשׁ לְבֵית הַמִּדְרָשׁ? אָמַר לוֹ: עֲבוֹדָה עָבַדְתִּי. אָמַר לוֹ: כׇּל דְּבָרֶיךָ אֵינָן אֶלָּא דִּבְרֵי תֵימָה, וְכִי עֲבוֹדָה בַּזְּמַן הַזֶּה מִנַּיִן? אָמַר לוֹ, הֲרֵי הוּא אוֹמֵר:

The Gemara questions what was stated above: And where is teruma called service? The Gemara explains: As it was taught in a baraita: There was an incident involving Rabbi Tarfon, who did not come in the evening to the study hall. In the morning, Rabban Gamliel found him and said to him: For what reason did you not come in the evening to the study hall? He said to him: I was performing sacred service. He said to him: All your words are astonishing; from where do we have service in this time after the destruction of the Temple? He said to him: It says in Scripture: