סנהדרין כט

סנהדרין כט

קְרוֹבִים וְנִתְרַחֲקוּ הֲווֹ. אֲתוֹ לְקַמֵּיהּ לְדִינָא. אֲמַר לְהוּ: פְּסִילְנָא לְכוּ לְדִינָא.

were relatives of his and became not related to him, as Mar Ukva’s wife, who was their sister, died. They came before him for judgment. Mar Ukva said to them: I am disqualified from adjudicating for you.

אֲמַרוּ לֵיהּ: מַאי דַּעְתָּיךְ? כְּרַבִּי יְהוּדָה? אֲנַן מַיְיתִינַן אִיגַּרְתָּא מִמַּעְרְבָא דְּאֵין הֲלָכָה כְּרַבִּי יְהוּדָה.

They said to Mar Ukva: What is your opinion according to which you disqualify yourself? Do you rule in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, that since you have children we are still relatives? We shall bring a letter from the West, Eretz Yisrael, that the halakha is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda.

אֲמַר לְהוּ: אַטּוּ בְּקַבָּא דְקִירָא אִידְּבַקְנָא בְּכוּ? דְּלָא קָאָמֵינָא פְּסִילְנָא לְכוּ לְדִינָא, אֶלָּא מִשּׁוּם דְּלָא צָיְיתִיתוּ דִּינָא.

Mar Ukva said to them: Is that to say that I am stuck to you with a kav of wax [kira]? I agree that we are not considered relatives; I am saying that I am disqualified from adjudicating for you only because you will not obey the verdict, and I do not wish to participate in such judgment.

אוֹהֵב זֶה שׁוֹשְׁבִינוֹ וְכוּ׳.

§ The mishna teaches that according to Rabbi Yehuda, one who loves or one who hates one of the litigants is disqualified from bearing witness. One who loves one of the litigants; this is referring to his groomsman.

וְכַמָּה? אָמַר רַבִּי אַבָּא אָמַר רַבִּי יִרְמְיָה אָמַר רַב: כׇּל שִׁבְעַת יְמֵי הַמִּשְׁתֶּה. וְרַבָּנַן מִשְּׁמֵיהּ דְּרָבָא אָמְרִי: אֲפִילּוּ מִיּוֹם רִאשׁוֹן וְאֵילָךְ.

The Gemara asks: And for how long is the groomsman disqualified? Rabbi Abba says that Rabbi Yirmeya says that Rav says: Throughout all of the seven days of feasting. And the Rabbis say in the name of Rava: Even from the first day after the wedding and onward he is no longer disqualified; he is disqualified only on the wedding day itself.

הַשּׂוֹנֵא כֹּל שֶׁלֹּא דִּבֵּר כּוּ׳. תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: ״וְהוּא לֹא אוֹיֵב לוֹ״ – יְעִידֶנּוּ, ״וְלֹא מְבַקֵּשׁ רָעָתוֹ״ – יְדִינֶנּוּ.

§ The mishna teaches: One who hates the litigant is referring to anyone who, out of enmity, did not speak with the litigant for three days. The Sages taught in a baraita: This halakha is derived from the verse: “And he was not his enemy, neither sought his harm” (Numbers 35:23), that one about whom it can be stated: “And he was not his enemy,” can testify about him. And one who “neither sought his harm” can judge him.

אַשְׁכְּחַן שׂוֹנֵא, אוֹהֵב מְנָלַן?

The Gemara asks: We found a source for the disqualification of one who hates; from where do we derive that one who loves is disqualified?

קָרֵי בֵּיהּ הָכִי: וְהוּא לֹא אוֹיֵב לוֹ וְלֹא אוֹהֵב לוֹ – יְעִידֶנּוּ, וְלֹא מְבַקֵּשׁ רָעָתוֹ וְלֹא טוֹבָתוֹ – יְדִינֶנּוּ.

The Gemara answers that one should read into the verse like this: One about whom it can be stated: And he who was not his enemy nor one who loves him, can testify about him; and one who neither sought his harm nor his favor can judge him.

מִידֵּי ״אוֹהֵב״ כְּתִיב? אֶלָּא סְבָרָא הוּא. אוֹיֵב – מַאי טַעְמָא? מִשּׁוּם דִּמְרַחֲקָא דַּעְתֵּיהּ. אוֹהֵב נָמֵי – מְקָרְבָא דַּעְתֵּיהּ.

The Gemara asks: Is: One who loves, written in the verse? How can the verse be read in this manner? Rather, the extension of the disqualification to one who loves him as well is based on logical reasoning: What is the reason an enemy is disqualified from bearing witness? It is because he feels a sense of aversion toward that individual and might testify falsely against him. A similar logic can be employed with regard to one who loves, as well: He feels a sense of affinity toward that individual, and might testify falsely on his behalf.

וְרַבָּנַן, הַאי ״לֹא אוֹיֵב לוֹ וְלֹא מְבַקֵּשׁ רָעָתוֹ״ מַאי דָּרְשִׁי בֵּיהּ?

The Gemara asks: And what do the Rabbis, who do not agree with Rabbi Yehuda, derive from this verse: “And he was not his enemy, neither sought his harm”?

חַד לְדַיָּין.

The Gemara answers: One part of the verse is necessary for the halakha that a judge who loves or hates one of the litigants is disqualified. The Rabbis agree with this halakha, as such a judge is naturally inclined to favor one of the litigants.

אִידַּךְ, כִּדְתַנְיָא: אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹסֵי בְּרַבִּי יְהוּדָה, ״וְהוּא לֹא אוֹיֵב לוֹ וְלֹא מְבַקֵּשׁ רָעָתוֹ״ – מִכָּאן לִשְׁנֵי תַּלְמִידֵי חֲכָמִים שֶׁשּׂוֹנְאִין זֶה אֶת זֶה, שֶׁאֵין יוֹשְׁבִין בַּדִּין כְּאֶחָד.

The other part of the verse is interpreted in accordance with that which is taught in a baraita: Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, says: With regard to the verse “And he was not his enemy, neither sought his harm,” it is derived from here that two Torah scholars who hate each other cannot sit in judgment together as one. Because of their hatred they will come to contradict each other’s rulings unjustly.

מַתְנִי׳ כֵּיצַד בּוֹדְקִים אֶת הָעֵדִים? הָיוּ מַכְנִיסִין אוֹתָן לַחֶדֶר, וּמְאַיְּימִין עֲלֵיהֶן, וּמוֹצִיאִין אֶת כׇּל הָאָדָם לַחוּץ, וּמְשַׁיְּירִין אֶת הַגָּדוֹל שֶׁבָּהֶן.

MISHNA: How do the judges examine the witnesses? They bring them into a room in the courthouse and intimidate them so that they will speak only the truth. And they take all the people, other than the judges, outside so that they should not tell the other witnesses the questions the judges ask and the answers the first witness gives, and they leave only the eldest of the witnesses to testify first.

וְאוֹמְרִים לוֹ: אֱמוֹר הֵיאַךְ אַתָּה יוֹדֵעַ שֶׁזֶּה חַיָּיב לָזֶה? אִם אָמַר: ״הוּא אָמַר לִי שֶׁאֲנִי חַיָּיב לוֹ״, ״אִישׁ פְּלוֹנִי אָמַר לִי שֶׁהוּא חַיָּיב לוֹ״ – לֹא אָמַר כְּלוּם, עַד שֶׁיֹּאמַר: ״בְּפָנֵינוּ הוֹדָה לוֹ שֶׁהוּא חַיָּיב לוֹ מָאתַיִם זוּז״.

And they say to him: Say how exactly you know that this litigant owes money to that litigant, as the plaintiff claims. If he said: The defendant said to me: It is true that I owe the plaintiff, or if he says: So-and-so said to me that the defendant owes the plaintiff, the witness has said nothing and his testimony is disregarded. It is not valid testimony unless he says: The defendant admitted in our presence to the plaintiff that he owes him, e.g., two hundred dinars. By admitting to the debt in the presence of witnesses he renders himself liable to pay the amount that he mentioned.

וְאַחַר כָּךְ מַכְנִיסִין אֶת הַשֵּׁנִי, וּבוֹדְקִין אוֹתוֹ. אִם נִמְצְאוּ דִּבְרֵיהֶן מְכוּוָּנִין, נוֹשְׂאִין וְנוֹתְנִין בַּדָּבָר.

And afterward they bring in the second witness and examine him in the same manner. If their statements are found to be congruent the judges then discuss the matter.

שְׁנַיִם אוֹמְרִים: זַכַּאי, וְאֶחָד אוֹמֵר: חַיָּיב – זַכַּאי. שְׁנַיִם אוֹמְרִים: חַיָּיב, וְאֶחָד אוֹמֵר: זַכַּאי – חַיָּיב. אֶחָד אוֹמֵר: חַיָּיב, וְאֶחָד אוֹמֵר: זַכַּאי, אֲפִילּוּ שְׁנַיִם מְזַכִּין אוֹ שְׁנַיִם מְחַיְּיבִין וְאֶחָד אוֹמֵר: אֵינִי יוֹדֵעַ – יוֹסִיפוּ הַדַּיָּינִין.

If the opinions of the judges are divided, as two judges say that the defendant is exempt from payment and one says he is liable to pay, he is exempt. If two say he is liable and one says he is exempt, he is liable. If one says he is liable and one says he is exempt, or even if two of the judges deem him exempt or two of them deem him liable, and the other one says: I do not know, the court must add more judges and then rule in accordance with the majority opinion. This is because the one who abstains is considered as though he is not a member of the court.

גָּמְרוּ אֶת הַדָּבָר, הָיוּ מַכְנִיסִין אוֹתָן. הַגָּדוֹל שֶׁבַּדַּיָּינִין אוֹמֵר: אִישׁ פְּלוֹנִי, אַתָּה זַכַּאי. אִישׁ פְּלוֹנִי, אַתָּה חַיָּיב.

After the judges finish the matter and reach a decision, they bring in the litigants. The greatest of the judges says: So-and-so, you are exempt from paying; or: So-and-so, you are liable to pay.

וּמִנַּיִין לִכְשֶׁיֵּצֵא, לֹא יֹאמַר: אֲנִי מְזַכֶּה וַחֲבֵירַיי מְחַיְּיבִים, אֲבָל מָה אֶעֱשֶׂה שֶׁחֲבֵירַיי רַבּוּ עָלַי? עַל זֶה נֶאֱמַר: ״לֹא תֵלֵךְ רָכִיל בְּעַמֶּיךָ״, וְאוֹמֵר: ״הוֹלֵךְ רָכִיל מְגַלֶּה סּוֹד״.

And from where is it derived that when the judge leaves the courtroom he may not say: I deemed you exempt and my colleagues deemed you liable, but what can I do, as my colleagues outnumbered me and consequently you were deemed liable? About this it is stated: “You shall not go as a talebearer among your people” (Leviticus 19:16), and it says: “One who goes about as a talebearer reveals secrets, but one who is of a faithful spirit conceals a matter” (Proverbs 11:13).

גְּמָ׳ הֵיכִי אָמְרִינַן לְהוּ? אָמַר רַב יְהוּדָה: הָכִי אָמְרִינַן לְהוּ, ״נְשִׂיאִים וְרוּחַ וְגֶשֶׁם אָיִן אִישׁ מִתְהַלֵּל בְּמַתַּת שָׁקֶר״.

GEMARA: The mishna teaches that the judges intimidate the witnesses. The Gemara asks: What do we say to them? Rav Yehuda says that this is what we say to them: It is stated: “As clouds and wind without rain, so is he who boasts himself of a false gift” (Proverbs 25:14). In other words, there will be no rain and no blessing from your deeds if you lie.

אֲמַר לֵיהּ רָבָא, יָכְלִי לְמֵימַר: שַׁב שְׁנֵי הֲוָה כַּפְנָא, וְאַבָּבָא אוּמָּנָא לָא חֲלֵיף.

Rava said to him: If so, false witnesses can say to themselves that they do not have to worry about this punishment, according to the folk saying: Seven years there was a famine, but over the craftsman’s door it did not pass. If the witnesses are not farmers, they do not need to worry over lack of rain. Consequently, they will disregard this concern.

אֶלָּא אָמַר רָבָא, אָמְרִינַן לְהוּ: ״מֵפִיץ וְחֶרֶב וְחֵץ שָׁנוּן אִישׁ עֹנֶה בְרֵעֵהוּ עֵד שָׁקֶר״.

Rather, Rava said that we say this verse to them: “As a hammer, and a sword, and a sharp arrow, so is a man who bears false witness against his neighbor” (Proverbs 25:18), meaning that a false witness will die prematurely.

אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַב אָשֵׁי, יָכְלִי לְמֵימַר: שַׁב שְׁנֵי הֲוָה מוֹתָנָא, וְאִינִישׁ בְּלָא שְׁנֵיהּ לָא שְׁכֵיב.

Rav Ashi said to him: Here too, false witnesses can say to themselves a folk saying: Seven years there was a pestilence, but a man who has not reached his years did not die; everyone dies at his predestined time. Therefore, they will disregard this concern as well.

אֶלָּא אָמַר רַב אָשֵׁי: אָמַר לִי נָתָן בַּר מָר זוּטְרָא, אָמְרִינַן לְהוּ: סָהֲדֵי שַׁקָּרֵי אַאוֹגְרַיְיהוּ זִילִי, דִּכְתִיב: ״וְהוֹשִׁיבוּ שְׁנַיִם אֲנָשִׁים בְּנֵי בְלִיַּעַל נֶגְדּוֹ וִיעִדֻהוּ לֵאמֹר בֵּרַכְתָּ אֱלֹהִים וָמֶלֶךְ״.

The Gemara presents another suggestion: Rather, Rav Ashi said: Natan bar Mar Zutra said to me that we say to them that false witnesses are belittled even by those who hire them, and all the more so by others; as it is written that Jezebel said when she ordered witnesses to be hired to testify against Naboth: “And set two men, base fellows, before him, and let them bear witness against him, saying: You cursed God and the king” (I Kings 21:10). Even Jezebel, who gave the orders to hire them, called them “base fellows.”

אִם אָמַר ״הוּא אָמַר לִי כּוּ׳״. עַד שֶׁיֹּאמְרוּ: ״בְּפָנֵינוּ הוֹדָה לוֹ שֶׁהוּא חַיָּיב לוֹ מָאתַיִם זוּז״.

§ The mishna teaches that if the witness said: The defendant said to me: It is true that I owe him, his testimony is disregarded unless he says: The defendant admitted in our presence to the plaintiff that he owes him two hundred dinars.

מְסַיַּיע לֵיהּ לְרַב יְהוּדָה, דְּאָמַר רַב יְהוּדָה אָמַר רַב: צָרִיךְ שֶׁיֹּאמַר ״אַתֶּם עֵדַיי״.

The Gemara comments: This supports the opinion of Rav Yehuda, as Rav Yehuda says that Rav says: The debtor needs to say to the witnesses to the loan or in his admission that he owes the creditor: You are my witnesses. Otherwise, their testimony is not valid.

אִיתְּמַר נָמֵי: אָמַר רַבִּי חִיָּיא בַּר אַבָּא אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: ״מָנֶה לִי בְּיָדֶךָ״, אָמַר לוֹ: ״הֵן״. לְמָחָר אָמַר לוֹ: ״תְּנֵהוּ לִי״, אָמַר: ״מְשַׁטֶּה אֲנִי בָּךְ״ – פָּטוּר.

It was also stated that Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: If one said to another: I have one hundred dinars in your possession, i.e., you owe me one hundred dinars, and the other said to him: Yes, and the next day the claimant said to him: Give it to me, if the other then said to him: I was teasing you, i.e., I did not mean it seriously when I said that I owed it to you, the respondent is exempt.

תַּנְיָא נָמֵי הָכִי: ״מָנֶה לִי בְּיָדֶךָ״, אָמַר לוֹ ״הֵן״. לְמָחָר אָמַר לוֹ ״תְּנֵהוּ לִי״, אָמַר לוֹ ״מְשַׁטֶּה אֲנִי בָּךְ״ – פָּטוּר.

This is also taught in a baraita: If one said to another: I have one hundred dinars in your possession, and the other said to him: Yes, and the next day the claimant said to him: Give it to me, if the other then said to him: I was teasing you, the respondent is exempt.

וְלֹא עוֹד, אֶלָּא אֲפִילּוּ הִכְמִין לוֹ עֵדִים אֲחוֹרֵי גָּדֵר, וְאָמַר לוֹ: ״מָנֶה לִי בְּיָדֶךָ״, אָמַר לוֹ: ״הֵן״. ״רְצוֹנְךָ שֶׁתּוֹדֶה בִּפְנֵי פְּלוֹנִי וּפְלוֹנִי?״ אָמַר לוֹ: ״מִתְיָירֵא אֲנִי שֶׁמָּא תִּכְפֵּינִי לְדִין״. לְמָחָר אָמַר לוֹ: ״תְּנֵיהוּ לִי״, אָמַר לוֹ: ״מְשַׁטֶּה אֲנִי בָּךְ״ – פָּטוּר.

And moreover, the respondent is exempt even in a case where the claimant hid witnesses for the respondent behind a fence so that the respondent would not see them, and said to him: I have one hundred dinars in your possession, and the respondent said to him: Yes, and the claimant then said to him: Do you wish to admit the debt in the presence of so-and-so and so-and-so? And the respondent said to him: I am afraid to do so, lest you compel me to go to judgment, where, based on their testimony, you will be given the right to forcibly take the money from me whenever you want. But between you and me, I admit that I owe you. And the next day the claimant said to him: Give me the one hundred dinars that you admitted to owing me, and the respondent said to him: I was teasing you. The respondent is exempt because he can claim that he stated his admission only to appease the claimant temporarily, and did not mean to actually admit to owing the money, as he did not know that there were witnesses present.

וְאֵין טוֹעֲנִין לַמֵּסִית.

But the judges do not advance a claim on behalf of an inciter, i.e., one who is accused of inciting others to idol worship.

מֵסִית? מַאן דְּכַר שְׁמֵיהּ! חַסּוֹרֵי מִיחַסְּרָא וְהָכִי קָתָנֵי: אִם לֹא טָעַן, אֵין טוֹעֲנִין לוֹ. וּבְדִינֵי נְפָשׁוֹת, אַף עַל גַּב דְּלָא טָעַן, טוֹעֲנִין לוֹ. וְאֵין טוֹעֲנִין לַמֵּסִית.

The Gemara asks: An inciter? Who mentioned anything about it? This matter was not discussed in the baraita. The Gemara answers: The baraita is incomplete, and this is what it is teaching: If the defendant did not advance a claim that he was teasing the plaintiff, the judges do not advance this claim for him. Apparently, he stated his admission seriously. But in cases of capital law, even if the defendant did not advance any claim on his own behalf, the judges advance a claim on his behalf. But the judges do not advance claims on behalf of an inciter.

מַאי שְׁנָא מֵסִית? אָמַר רַבִּי חָמָא בַּר חֲנִינָא: מִפִּירְקֵיהּ דְּרַבִּי חִיָּיא בַּר אַבָּא שְׁמִיעַ לִי, שָׁאנֵי מֵסִית דְּרַחֲמָנָא אָמַר: ״לֹא תַחְמֹל וְלֹא תְכַסֶּה עָלָיו״.

The Gemara asks: What is different about an inciter, that the court does not seek to deem him innocent? Rabbi Ḥama bar Ḥanina says: I heard at the lecture of Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba that an inciter is different, as the Merciful One states concerning him: “Neither shall you spare, neither shall you conceal him” (Deuteronomy 13:9). In this unique case, the court is not required to try to deem him innocent.

אָמַר רַבִּי שְׁמוּאֵל בַּר נַחְמָן אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹנָתָן: מִנַּיִין שֶׁאֵין טוֹעֲנִין לַמֵּסִית? מִנָּחָשׁ הַקַּדְמוֹנִי. דְּאָמַר רַבִּי שִׂמְלַאי: הַרְבֵּה טְעָנוֹת הָיָה לוֹ לַנָּחָשׁ לִטְעוֹן, וְלֹא טָעַן. וּמִפְּנֵי מָה לֹא טָעַן לוֹ הַקָּדוֹשׁ בָּרוּךְ הוּא? לְפִי שֶׁלֹּא טָעַן הוּא.

Rabbi Shmuel bar Naḥman says that Rabbi Yonatan says: From where is it derived that the judges do not advance a claim on behalf of an inciter? It is derived from the incident of the primordial snake who tempted Eve; he was the first inciter. As Rabbi Simlai says: The snake could have advanced many claims on its own behalf, but it did not claim them. And for what reason did the Holy One, Blessed be He, not advance these claims for it, deeming the snake exempt from punishment? Because the snake did not advance these claims itself.

מַאי הֲוָה לֵיהּ לְמֵימַר? דִּבְרֵי הָרַב וְדִבְרֵי תַּלְמִיד – דִּבְרֵי מִי שׁוֹמְעִין? דִּבְרֵי הָרַב שׁוֹמְעִין.

The Gemara asks: What could he have said? The Gemara answers: The snake could have said that it is not to blame, as when there is a contradiction between the statement of the teacher and the statement of the student, whose statement should one listen to? One should listen to the statement of the teacher. Since God instructed Adam and Eve not to eat from the fruit of the Tree of Knowledge, Adam and Eve should have heeded God’s words and not those of the snake.

אָמַר חִזְקִיָּה: מִנַּיִין שֶׁכׇּל הַמּוֹסִיף גּוֹרֵעַ? שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר: ״אָמַר אֱלֹהִים לֹא תֹאכְלוּ מִמֶּנּוּ וְלֹא תִגְּעוּ בּוֹ״.

Ḥizkiyya says: From where is it derived that anyone who adds, subtracts? It is derived from a verse, as it is stated that Eve said: “God has said: You shall not eat of it, neither shall you touch it” (Genesis 3:3), whereas God had actually rendered prohibited only eating from the tree but not touching it, as it is stated: “But of the Tree of Knowledge of good and evil, you shall not eat of it” (Genesis 2:17). Because Eve added that there was a prohibition against touching the tree, the snake showed her that touching it does not cause her to die, and she consequently sinned by eating from it as well.

רַב מְשַׁרְשְׁיָא אָמַר, מֵהָכָא: ״אַמָּתַיִם וָחֵצִי אׇרְכּוֹ״.

Rav Mesharshiyya says that the idea that one who adds, subtracts can also be proven from here: “Two cubits [amatayim] and a half shall be its length” (Exodus 25:10). Without the letter alef at the beginning of the word amatayim, it would be read matayim, which would mean two hundred cubits. The addition of the alef therefore reduces this term to only two cubits.

רַב אָשֵׁי אָמַר: ״עַשְׁתֵּי עֶשְׂרֵה יְרִיעֹת״.

Rav Ashi says another example: In the verse: “Eleven [ashtei esrei] curtains” (Exodus 26:7), without the letter ayin at the beginning of the phrase it would read shtei esrei, twelve. Therefore, the additional letter ayin reduces the amount from twelve to eleven.

אָמַר אַבָּיֵי: לֹא שָׁנוּ אֶלָּא דְּאָמַר ״מְשַׁטֶּה אֲנִי בָּךְ״, אֲבָל אָמַר

Abaye says: With regard to the case of one who denies a debt to which he admitted in the presence of hidden witnesses, the Sages taught that he is exempt only in a case where he says: I was teasing you. But if he says:

״לֹא הָיוּ דְבָרִים מֵעוֹלָם״ – הוּחְזַק כַּפְרָן.

These matters never occurred, i.e., I never admitted to this, the defendant assumes the presumptive status of one who falsely denies his debts, as the witnesses heard his admission. Consequently, he is not trusted to take an oath that he is exempt.

אָמַר רַב פָּפָּא בְּרֵיהּ דְּרַב אַחָא בַּר אַדָּא, הָכִי אָמְרִינַן מִשְּׁמֵיהּ דְּרָבָא: כֹּל מִילֵּי דִּכְדִי לָא דְּכִירִי אִינָשֵׁי.

Rav Pappa, son of Rav Aḥa bar Adda, says: This is what we say in the name of Rava: The defendant is not rendered a liar, because people do not remember all frivolous matters. Since the admission was not made seriously, perhaps the defendant forgot the incident. Therefore, his denial of its having occurred was not necessarily an outright lie.

הָהוּא דְּאַכְמֵין לֵיהּ עֵדִים לְחַבְרֵיהּ בְּכִילְּתֵיהּ. אֲמַר לֵיהּ: ״מָנֶה לִי בִּידָךְ״. אָמַר לֵיהּ: ״הֵן״. אָמַר: ״עֵירֵי וְשָׁכְבֵי לֶיהֱווֹ עֲלָךְ סָהֲדֵי״. אֲמַר לֵיהּ: ״לָא״. אֲמַר רַב כָּהֲנָא: הָא אֲמַר לֵיהּ ״לָא״.

The Gemara relates: There was a certain man who hid witnesses in the canopy above his bed to hear the statement of another. That certain man said to him: I have one hundred dinars in your possession. The latter said to him: Yes. The claimant then said: Let those awake and those asleep bear witness about you, hoping to induce him to agree to this testimony, as the respondent might assume that everyone was asleep. The latter said to him: No. When the matter came to court Rav Kahana said: Since he said no to him, his admission did not render him liable.

הָהוּא דְּאַכְמֵין עֵדִים בְּקִיבְרָא לְחַבְרֵיהּ, אֲמַר לֵיהּ: ״מָנֶה לִי בִּידָךְ״. אָמַר לֵיהּ: ״הֵן״. חַיֵּי וּמִיתֵי לֶיהֱווֹ עֲלָךְ סָהֲדִי, אָמַר לֵיהּ: ״לָא״. אֲמַר רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן [בֶּן לָקִישׁ]: הָא אֲמַר לֵיהּ ״לָא״.

The Gemara relates another incident: There was a certain man who hid witnesses in a grave to hear the statement of another. That certain man said to him: I have one hundred dinars in your possession. The latter said to him: Yes. The claimant then said: Let the living and the dead bear witness about you. The respondent said to him: No. Rabbi Shimon said: Since he said no to him, his admission did not render him liable.

אָמַר רָבִינָא, וְאִיתֵּימָא רַב פָּפָּא: שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ מֵהָא, הָא דְּאָמַר רַב יְהוּדָה אָמַר רַב: צָרִיךְ שֶׁיֹּאמַר ״אַתֶּם עֵדַיי״, לָא שְׁנָא כִּי אָמַר לֹוֶה, וְלָא שְׁנָא כִּי אָמַר מַלְוֶה וְשָׁתֵיק לֹוֶה. טַעְמָא דְּאָמַר לֹוֶה ״לָא״, אֲבָל אִי שָׁתֵיק – הָכִי נָמֵי.

Ravina said, and some say Rav Pappa said it: Conclude from it that with regard to that which Rav Yehuda says that Rav says, that one needs to say to the witnesses of the admission: You are my witnesses, there is no difference whether the debtor said it, and there is no difference whether the creditor said it and the debtor remained silent. The inference is that the reason the Sages deemed the purported debtor exempt in the above cases is that the debtor explicitly said no, i.e., that he does not accept the witnesses, but had he remained silent his admission would have indeed rendered him liable.

הָהוּא דַּהֲוָה קָרוּ לֵיהּ ״קַב רָשׁוּ״, אֲמַר: מַאן מַסֵּיק בִּי אֶלָּא פְּלוֹנִי וּפְלוֹנִי? אֲתוֹ, תַּבְעוּהּו לְדִינָא קַמֵּיהּ דְּרַב נַחְמָן.

The Gemara relates: There was a certain man whom people called: A kav of debts, as everyone claimed debts from him, who once said: Who can claim debts from me, other than so-and-so and so-and-so? I do not owe money to as many as assumed. Those whom he admitted that he owed came and took him to judgment before Rav Naḥman to claim what he owed them, and he responded in court that his admittance was in jest.

אָמַר רַב נַחְמָן: אָדָם עָשׂוּי שֶׁלֹּא לְהַשְׂבִּיעַ אֶת עַצְמוֹ.

Rav Naḥman said: A person is prone to make false statements so as not to make himself appear sated, i.e., it is possible that he might say falsely in public that he owes money in order that he should not be considered wealthy. Therefore, as long as he has not made a proper admission that he owes a specific sum to a specific individual, he is not liable.

הָהוּא דַּהֲווֹ קָרוּ לֵיהּ ״עַכְבְּרָא דְּשָׁכֵיב אַדִּינָרֵי״. כִּי קָא שָׁכֵיב, אֲמַר: ״פְּלָנְיָא וּפְלָנְיָא מַסְּקוּ בִּי זוּזֵי״. בָּתַר דִּשְׁכֵיב, אֲתוֹ תַּבְעִינְהוּ לְיוֹרְשִׁין.

The Gemara relates: There was a certain man whom people called: A mouse that lies on dinars, as he was a miser who did not benefit from his money, like a mouse that sits and safeguards gold dinars. This man said on his deathbed: So-and-so and so-and-so claim dinars from me. After he died, they came and sued the heirs.

אֲתוֹ לְקַמֵּיהּ דְּרַבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל בְּרַבִּי יוֹסֵי. אֲמַר לְהוּ: כִּי אָמְרִינַן ״אָדָם עָשׂוּי שֶׁלֹּא לְהַשְׂבִּיעַ אֶת עַצְמוֹ״, הָנֵי מִילֵּי מֵחַיִּים, אֲבָל לְאַחַר מִיתָה – לָא.

They came to judgment before Rabbi Yishmael, son of Rabbi Yosei. He said to them: When we say a person is prone to make false statements so as not to make himself appear sated, this statement applies to an admission during his lifetime. But after death, i.e., on his deathbed, this does not apply; rather, we presume he told the truth.

פְּרַעוּ פַּלְגָא, תַּבְעִינְהוּ לְדִינָא לְאִידַּךְ פַּלְגָא. אֲתוֹ לְקַמֵּיהּ דְּרַבִּי חִיָּיא. אֲמַר לְהוּ: כְּשֵׁם שֶׁאָדָם עָשׂוּי שֶׁלֹּא לְהַשְׂבִּיעַ אֶת עַצְמוֹ, כָּךְ אָדָם עָשׂוּי שֶׁלֹּא לְהַשְׂבִּיעַ אֶת בָּנָיו. אֲמַרוּ לֵיהּ: נֵיזִיל וְנַיהְדַּר? אֲמַר לְהוּ: כְּבָר הוֹרָה זָקֵן.

The heirs paid half the amount of the claim. The claimants then sued them for the other half. They came to judgment before Rabbi Ḥiyya. Rabbi Ḥiyya said to them: Just as a person is prone to make false statements so as not to make himself appear sated, so too, a person is prone to make false statements so as not to make his sons appear sated. One might claim falsely on his deathbed that he owes money so that his children will not be considered wealthy. Therefore, there is no room for a claim against the heirs. The heirs then said to him: If so, let us go and overturn the former verdict, and retrieve the amount we paid the claimants. Rabbi Ḥiyya said to them: The elder, i.e., Rabbi Yishmael, son of Rabbi Yosei, has already issued a ruling in this case, and it is not in my power to overturn his ruling.

הוֹדָה בִּפְנֵי שְׁנַיִם, וְקָנוּ מִיָּדוֹ – כּוֹתְבִין, וְאִם לָאו – אֵין כּוֹתְבִין.

§ If one made an admission in the presence of two witnesses that he owes money and they performed a formal act of acquisition with him to verify the admission, the witnesses can write a record of the admission in a document and sign it, thereby granting the creditor more rights. But if they did not perform a formal act of acquisition they may not write a record of the admission in a document, as the debtor presumably wants the loan to retain its status as a loan by oral agreement, which grants fewer rights to the creditor than a loan with a promissory note.

בִּפְנֵי שְׁלֹשָׁה, וְלֹא קָנוּ מִיָּדוֹ. רַב אַמֵּי אָמַר: כּוֹתְבִין, וְרַב אַסִּי אָמַר: אֵין כּוֹתְבִין. הֲוָה עוֹבָדָא, וְחַשׁ לַהּ רַב לְהָא דְּרַב אַסִּי.

If he made an admission in the presence of three witnesses and they did not perform a formal act of acquisition with him, Rav Ami says: They can write a record of the admission in a document. Since the admission was made in the presence of three individuals, who are considered a court, it is permitted for a court to write its verdicts. And Rav Asi says: They may not write it in a document; perhaps the debtor intended for them to serve only as witnesses, not as a court. There was an incident in which a person admitted his debt before three witnesses, and Rav was concerned for this opinion of Rav Asi, and ruled that they may not write a record of the admission.

אָמַר רַב אַדָּא בַּר אַהֲבָה: הָא אוֹדִיתָא, זִימְנִין כָּתְבִינַן וְזִימְנִין לָא כָּתְבִינַן. כְּנִיפִי וְיָתְבִי – לָא כָּתְבִינַן, כַּנְפִינְהוּ אִיהוּ – כָּתְבִינַן.

Rav Adda bar Ahava says: With regard to this document of admission, sometimes we write it and sometimes we do not write it. If the three witnesses were gathered and sitting when the debtor made his admission before them, we do not write it, as perhaps he did not intend for them to serve as a court. But if the debtor gathered them, we write the document of admission, as the fact that he took care to bring three people and not just two proves that he intended for them to serve as a court.

רָבָא אָמַר: אֲפִילּוּ כַּנְפִינְהוּ אִיהוּ – לָא כָּתְבִינַן, עַד דְּאָמַר לְהוּ: ״הֱווֹ עֲלַי דַּיָּינֵי״.

Rava says: Even if he gathered them we do not write it, unless he says to them: Be my judges.

מָר בַּר רַב אָשֵׁי אָמַר: אֲפִילּוּ אָמַר ״הֱווֹ עֲלַי דַּיָּינֵי״, לָא כָּתְבִינַן עַד דְּקָבְעִי דּוּכְתָּא, וְשָׁלְחִי, וּמַזְמְנִי לֵיהּ לְבֵי דִינָא.

Mar bar Rav Ashi says: Even if he says: Be my judges, we do not write it unless they establish a place for judgment and send messengers and summon him to court. Unless the entire procedure of an admission in court is implemented, the debtor may not have intended that they serve as a court with regard to this matter.

הוֹדָה בְּמִטַּלְטְלֵי, וְקָנוּ מִיָּדוֹ – כּוֹתְבִין, וְאִם לָאו – אֵין כּוֹתְבִין. בִּמְקַרְקְעֵי, וְלֹא קָנוּ מִיָּדוֹ, מַאי? אַמֵּימָר אָמַר: אֵין כּוֹתְבִין. מָר זוּטְרָא אָמַר: כּוֹתְבִין. וְהִלְכְתָא: כּוֹתְבִין.

If he made an admission with regard to movable property that he owes, and the witnesses performed a formal act of acquisition with him, they can write a record of the admission in a document; but if they did not perform a formal act of acquisition they may not write a record of the admission. But if he made an admission with regard to land, and they did not perform a formal act of acquisition with him, what is the halakha? Is it considered as though an act of acquisition was performed, as land is always available for collection? Ameimar says: They may not write it. Mar Zutra says: They may write it. And the halakha is that they may write it.

רָבִינָא אִיקְּלַע לְדִמְהַרְיָא. אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַב דִּימִי בַּר רַב הוּנָא מִדִּמְהַרְיָא לְרָבִינָא: מִטַּלְטְלִי וְאִיתַנְהוּ בְּעֵינַיְיהוּ, מַאי? אֲמַר לֵיהּ: כִּמְקַרְקְעֵי דָּמוּ. רַב אָשֵׁי אָמַר: כֵּיוָן דִּמְחַסְּרִי גּוּבְיָינָא, לָא.

Ravina happened to come to Damharya. Rav Dimi bar Rav Huna of Damharya said to Ravina: If one makes an admission that he owes movable property that is extant, i.e., it is available to be taken immediately, what is the halakha? Should it be considered like land, as it is similarly available for collection, and therefore the witnesses can write a record of the admission? Ravina said to him: It is considered like land. Rav Ashi says: Since it still lacks collection, i.e., it has not been physically transferred from one party to the other, it is not considered like land, and the witnesses may not write a record of the admission unless the debtor asks them to write it.

הָהִיא אוֹדִיתָא דְּלָא הֲוָה כְּתִב בַּהּ ״אֲמַר לַנָא, כְּתֻבוּ וַחֲתֻמוּ וְהַבוּ לֵיהּ״, אַבָּיֵי וְרָבָא דְּאָמְרִי תַּרְוַיְיהוּ: הַיְינוּ דְּרֵישׁ לָקִישׁ.

§ With regard to a certain document of admission in which the following statement was not written: He, the one making the admission, said to us: Write a deed, and sign it, and give it to the creditor, Abaye and Rava both say that this is a case in which the principle of Reish Lakish is applicable.

דְּאָמַר רֵישׁ לָקִישׁ: חֲזָקָה אֵין הָעֵדִים חוֹתְמִין עַל הַשְּׁטָר, אֶלָּא אִם כֵּן נַעֲשָׂה גָּדוֹל.

As Reish Lakish says: There is a presumption that witnesses do not sign on the document unless the deal was transacted with each party being an adult, even if it is not mentioned explicitly in the document that the witnesses verified this. This reflects the principle that a document is not written by a scribe and signed by witnesses unless they know that the action to which it attests was performed appropriately. In light of this, the fact that a certain detail is missing from the wording of the document does not prove that the detail did not take place, as the action was presumably performed properly. Consequently, a document of admission lacking the sentence: He said to us: Write a deed, and sign it, and give it to the creditor, is valid.

מַתְקֵיף לַהּ רַב פַּפֵּי, וְאִיתֵּימָא רַב הוּנָא בְּרֵיהּ דְּרַב יְהוֹשֻׁעַ: מִי אִיכָּא מִידֵּי דַּאֲנַן לָא יָדְעִינַן, וְסָפְרֵי דְּבֵי דִינָא יָדְעִי?

Rav Pappi objects to this, and some say it is Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, who raises this objection: Is there anything that we, the Sages, do not know, and the scribes of the court do know? Since not all of the Sages are aware that the witnesses of an admission cannot write a deed of admission unless the one making the admission asks them to, the scribes certainly cannot be expected to ensure that this condition is fulfilled.

שְׁאֵילִינְהוּ לְסָפְרֵי דְאַבָּיֵי, וְיָדְעִי. לְסָפְרֵי דְרָבָא, וְיָדְעִי.

The Gemara relates that Abaye’s scribes were asked whether they were aware of this halakha, and they answered that they were aware of it. Rava’s scribes were also asked, and they were also aware of it. Apparently, since writing documents is their profession, scribes are aware of the relevant halakhot.

הָהִיא אוֹדִיתָא דַּהֲוָה כְּתִב בַּיהּ ״דּוּכְרַן פִּיתְגָמֵי״,

The Gemara recounts: There was a certain document of admission in which it was written that it was a record of the proceedings that took place in the presence of the witnesses,