סנהדרין לו

סנהדרין לו

מָה יוֹם טוֹב שֶׁנִּדְחֶה מִפְּנֵי קׇרְבַּן יָחִיד, אֵין רְצִיחָה דּוֹחָה אוֹתוֹ. קׇרְבַּן יָחִיד שֶׁהוּא דּוֹחֶה אֶת יוֹם טוֹב, אֵינוֹ דִּין שֶׁלֹּא תְּהֵא רְצִיחָה דּוֹחָה אוֹתוֹ?

Just as with regard to a Festival, which is overridden due to an offering of an individual, as voluntary offerings of individuals are sacrificed on Festivals, and nevertheless murder does not override it, as the court does not execute one liable to receive court-imposed capital punishment on a Festival, with regard to an offering of an individual, which overrides a Festival, is it not logical that murder should not override it? Therefore, unlike the explanation of Abaye, the court should not take a priest to execute him in the event he is liable to receive capital punishment if this will result in the offering of an individual not being sacrificed.

הָנִיחָא לְמַאן דְּאָמַר אֵין נְדָרִים וּנְדָבוֹת קְרֵיבִין בְּיוֹם טוֹב, אֶלָּא לְמַאן דְּאָמַר נְדָרִים וּנְדָבוֹת קְרֵיבִין בְּיוֹם טוֹב – מַאי אִיכָּא לְמֵימַר?

Rava clarifies: This works out well according to the one who says that vow offerings and gift offerings of individuals are not sacrificed on a Festival. Since the offerings of an individual do not override a Festival, there is no place for this a fortiori inference. But according to the one who says that vow offerings and gift offerings of individuals are sacrificed on a Festival, what is there to say? Why would one not make the above a fortiori inference?

אֶלָּא אָמַר רָבָא: לָא מִיבַּעְיָא לְמַאן דְּאָמַר נְדָרִים וּנְדָבוֹת קְרֵיבִין בְּיוֹם טוֹב, דְּהָא לָא מִתְקַיֵּים ״מֵעִם מִזְבְּחִי״ כְּלָל.

Rather, Rava says that Abaye’s explanation of the verse is incorrect according to all opinions. It is not necessary to say that the inference is incorrect according to the one who says that vow offerings and gift offerings of individuals are sacrificed on a Festival, as according to that opinion one cannot justify the verse of “from My altar” at all, as there is no distinction between the offering of an individual and a communal offering, as both override a Festival. Accordingly, court-imposed capital punishment should not override either type of offering.

אֶלָּא אֲפִילּוּ לְמַאן דְּאָמַר: נְדָרִים וּנְדָבוֹת אֵין קְרֵיבִין בְּיוֹם טוֹב, הָכְתִיב ״מֵעִם מִזְבְּחִי״ – מִזְבְּחִי הַמְיוּחָד לִי, וּמַאי נִינְהוּ? תָּמִיד. וְאָמַר רַחֲמָנָא: ״מֵעִם מִזְבְּחִי תִּקָּחֶנּוּ לָמוּת״.

But even according to the one who says that vow offerings and gift offerings of individuals are not sacrificed on a Festival, in which case Abaye’s explanation is possible, this is difficult. But isn’t it written: “From My altar”? The term “My altar” indicates: My altar, the offering that is designated to Me. And what offering is this? It is the daily offering. And yet, the Merciful One states: “You shall take him from My altar, that he may die.” Accordingly, the verse is not stated specifically with regard to an offering of an individual.

דִּינֵי מָמוֹנוֹת, הַטְּמָאוֹת וְהַטְּהָרוֹת כּוּ׳. אָמַר רַב: אֲנָא הֲוַאי בְּמִנְיָנָא דְּבֵי רַבִּי, וּמִינַּאי דִּידִי הֲווֹ מַתְחֲלִי בְּרֵישָׁא. וְהָא אֲנַן ״מַתְחִילִין מִן הַגָּדוֹל״ תְּנַן!

§ The mishna teaches that in cases of monetary law, and likewise in the cases of ritual impurity and purity, the judges commence expressing their opinions from the greatest of the judges. Rav says: I was among the quorum of judges in the school of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, and they would commence from me, i.e., I was first when ascertaining the opinions of the judges. The Gemara questions this statement: But we learned in the mishna that the judges commence expressing their opinions from the greatest of the judges, and Rav was one of the junior judges of that court.

אָמַר רַבָּה בְּרֵיהּ דְּרָבָא, וְאִיתֵּימָא רַבִּי הִלֵּל בְּרֵיהּ דְּרַבִּי וָולֶס: שָׁאנֵי מִנְיָינָא דְּבֵי רַבִּי, דְּכוּלְּהוּ מִנְיָנַיְיהוּ מִן הַצַּד הֲווֹ מַתְחֲלִי.

Rabba, son of Rava, says, and some say that it was Rabbi Hillel, son of Rabbi Valles, who says: The counting of the vote in the court in the school of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi is different, as all of their deliberations and the counting of the vote would commence from the side benches, where the least significant judges sit. This was because Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi was held in such high esteem that once he expressed his opinion, no one would be so brazen as to contradict him.

וְאָמַר רַבָּה בְּרֵיהּ דְּרָבָא, וְאִיתֵּימָא רַבִּי הִלֵּל בְּרֵיהּ דְּרַבִּי וָולֶס: מִימוֹת מֹשֶׁה וְעַד רַבִּי לֹא מָצִינוּ תּוֹרָה וּגְדוּלָּה בְּמָקוֹם אֶחָד.

And with regard to the greatness of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, Rabba, son of Rava, says, and some say that it was Rabbi Hillel, son of Rabbi Valles, who says: From the days of Moses and until the days of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi we do not find unparalleled greatness in Torah knowledge and unparalleled greatness in secular matters, including wealth and high political office, combined in one place, i.e., in a single individual.

וְלָא? הָא הֲוָה יְהוֹשֻׁעַ! הֲוָה אֶלְעָזָר. וְהָא הֲוָה פִּנְחָס! הֲווֹ זְקֵנִים.

The Gemara asks: But was there not such a person? Wasn’t there Joshua, who was unparalleled in both domains? The Gemara answers: During his time there was Elazar, who was Joshua’s equal in Torah knowledge. The Gemara asks: But wasn’t there Pinehas, who outlived Elazar? The Gemara answers: There were the Elders, who were equal to Pinehas in Torah knowledge.

וְהָא הֲוָה שָׁאוּל! הֲוָה שְׁמוּאֵל. וְהָא נָח נַפְשֵׁיהּ! כּוּלְּהוּ שְׁנֵיהּ קָאָמְרִינַן.

The Gemara further objects: But wasn’t there Saul, who was unparalleled in both domains? The Gemara answers: There was Samuel, who was Saul’s equal in Torah knowledge. The Gemara asks: But didn’t Samuel die in Saul’s lifetime, leaving Saul the leading figure in both domains? The Gemara answers: We meant to say that from the days of Moses until the days of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi there was no other single individual who reigned supreme in Torah and greatness for all the years that he was the leader of the Jewish people.

וְהָא הֲוָה דָּוִד! הֲוָה עִירָא הַיָּאִירִי. וְהָא נָח נַפְשֵׁיהּ! כּוּלְּהוּ שְׁנֵיהּ קָאָמְרִינַן.

The Gemara asks: But wasn’t there David, who was both the greatest Torah authority and the most powerful temporal authority of his day? The Gemara answers: There was Ira the Yairite, who was David’s equal in Torah knowledge. The Gemara objects: But didn’t Ira the Yairite die in David’s lifetime? The Gemara answers: We meant to say that there was no other single individual who reigned supreme in Torah and greatness for all the years that he was the leader of the Jewish people.

וְהָא הֲוָה שְׁלֹמֹה! הֲוָה שִׁמְעִי בֶּן גֵּרָא. וְהָא קַטְלֵיהּ! כּוּלֵּיהּ שְׁנֵיהּ קָאָמְרִינַן.

The Gemara asks: But wasn’t there Solomon, who was unparalleled in both domains? The Gemara answers: During his day there was Shimi ben Gera, who was Solomon’s master in Torah knowledge. The Gemara objects: But didn’t Solomon kill him at the beginning of his reign (see I Kings, chapter 2)? The Gemara answers: We meant to say that there was no other single individual who reigned supreme in Torah and greatness for all the years that he was the leader of the Jewish people.

הָא הֲוָה חִזְקִיָּה! הֲוָה שֶׁבְנָא. וְהָא אִיקְּטִיל! כּוּלְּהוּ שְׁנֵיהּ קָאָמְרִינַן. וְהָא הֲוָה עֶזְרָא! הֲוָה נְחֶמְיָה בֶּן חֲכַלְיָה.

The Gemara further objects: Wasn’t there Hezekiah, who was both the leading Torah scholar of his age and also the king of his people? The Gemara answers: There was Shebnah in that generation, who was Hezekiah’s equal in Torah knowledge. The Gemara asks: But wasn’t he killed in the war against Sennacherib? The Gemara answers: We meant to say that there was no other single individual who reigned supreme in Torah and greatness for all the years that he was the leader of the Jewish people. The Gemara asks: But wasn’t there Ezra, who was the greatest Torah Sage of his day and the leader of the Jewish people? The Gemara answers: There was Nehemiah, son of Hacaliah, who was his equal.

אָמַר רַב אַדָּא בַּר אַהֲבָה: אַף אֲנִי אוֹמֵר, מִימוֹת רַבִּי עַד רַב אָשֵׁי לֹא מָצִינוּ תּוֹרָה וּגְדוּלָּה בְּמָקוֹם אֶחָד. וְלָא? וְהָא הֲוָה הוּנָא בַּר נָתָן! הוּנָא בַּר נָתָן מִיכָּף הֲוָה כַּיִיף לֵיהּ לְרַב אָשֵׁי.

Rav Adda bar Ahava says: I also say a similar statement, that from the days of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi and until the days of Rav Ashi we do not find unparalleled greatness in Torah knowledge and unparalleled greatness in secular matters, including wealth and high political office, combined in one place, i.e., in a single individual. The Gemara asks: But was there not such a person? But wasn’t there Huna bar Natan, who lived during the time of Rav Ashi and enjoyed both great Torah scholarship and great wealth? The Gemara answers: Huna bar Natan was subordinate to Rav Ashi, who was his superior in both domains.

דִּינֵי נְפָשׁוֹת מַתְחִילִין מִן הַצַּד. מְנָא הָנֵי מִילֵּי? אָמַר רַב אַחָא בַּר פָּפָּא: אָמַר קְרָא, ״לֹא תַעֲנֶה עַל רִב״. לֹא תַעֲנֶה עַל רַב.

§ The mishna teaches that in cases of capital law, the judges commence issuing their opinions from the side benches, where the least significant judges sit. The Gemara asks: From where are these matters derived? Rav Aḥa bar Pappa says: The verse states: “Neither shall you answer in a cause [al riv]” (Exodus 23:2), and the Sages interpret: Neither shall you answer after the Master [al rav], i.e., do not dispute the opinion of the greatest among the judges. Therefore, were the judges to commence issuing their opinions from the greatest of them, and he would say that the accused is liable, no judge would acquit him.

רַבָּה בַּר בַּר חָנָה אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן, מֵהָכָא: ״וַיֹּאמֶר דָּוִד לַאֲנָשָׁיו חִגְרוּ אִישׁ [אֶת] חַרְבּוֹ וַיַּחְגְּרוּ אִישׁ [אֶת] חַרְבּוֹ וַיַּחְגֹּר גַּם דָּוִד אֶת חַרְבּוֹ״.

Rabba bar bar Ḥana says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: The source of this practice is from here: When David decided to punish Nabal the Carmelite, the verse states: “And David said to his men: Every man gird his sword. And every man girded his sword, and David also girded his sword” (I Samuel 25:13). That was a case of capital law, and David, the greatest among them, was last.

אָמַר רַב: שׁוֹנֶה אָדָם לְתַלְמִידוֹ, וְדָן עִמּוֹ בְּדִינֵי נְפָשׁוֹת. מֵיתִיבִי: הַטְּהָרוֹת וְהַטְּמָאוֹת, הָאָב וּבְנוֹ, הָרַב וְתַלְמִידוֹ – מוֹנִין לָהֶם שְׁנַיִם. דִּינֵי מָמוֹנוֹת וְדִינֵי נְפָשׁוֹת וְדִינֵי מַכּוֹת, קִידּוּשׁ הַחֹדֶשׁ וְעִיבּוּר שָׁנָה – אָב וּבְנוֹ, הָרַב וְתַלְמִידוֹ, אֵין מוֹנִין לָהֶן אֶלָּא אֶחָד.

Rav says: A person may teach his student the relevant material and then judge cases of capital law with him, and this student can participate in the deliberations and serve as one of the judges. The Gemara raises an objection from a baraita (Tosefta 7:2): In cases of ritual purity and impurity, if two of the judges are a father and his son, or a teacher and his student, the court counts them as two opinions. By inference, in cases of monetary law and cases of capital law, and cases of laws involving the punishment of lashes, as well as court proceedings concerning sanctification of the month and the intercalation of the year, if two of the judges are a father and his son, or a teacher and his student, the court counts them as only one opinion, as it is assumed the son or student will merely echo the opinion of his father or teacher. This contradicts the ruling of Rav.

כִּי קָאָמַר רַב, כְּגוֹן רַב כָּהֲנָא וְרַב אַסִּי, דְּלִגְמָרֵיהּ דְּרַב הֲווֹ צְרִיכִי, וְלִסְבָרֵיהּ דְּרַב לָא הֲווֹ צְרִיכִי.

The Gemara answers: When Rav says his statement, he is referring to not every student, but only those such as Rav Kahana and Rav Asi, who needed to learn the halakhic traditions of Rav, but they did not need to learn the reasoning of Rav, as they were capable of conducting their own analysis.

אָמַר רַבִּי אֲבָהוּ: עֲשָׂרָה דְּבָרִים יֵשׁ בֵּין דִּינֵי מָמוֹנוֹת לְדִינֵי נְפָשׁוֹת, וְכוּלָּן אֵין נוֹהֲגִין בְּשׁוֹר הַנִּסְקָל, חוּץ מֵעֶשְׂרִים וּשְׁלֹשָׁה.

Rabbi Abbahu says: There are ten ways in which cases of monetary law are different from cases of capital law, as was taught in the beginning of the chapter, and none of them is practiced with regard to a court hearing concerning an ox that is to be stoned, as it is treated as a case of monetary law, except for the requirement that the animal be judged by twenty-three judges, like in cases of capital law.

מְנָא הָנֵי מִילֵּי? אָמַר רַב אַחָא בַּר פָּפָּא: דְּאָמַר קְרָא ״לֹא תַטֶּה מִשְׁפַּט אֶבְיֹנְךָ בְּרִיבוֹ״. מִשְׁפַּט אֶבְיוֹנְךָ אִי אַתָּה מַטֶּה, אֲבָל אַתָּה מַטֶּה מִשְׁפָּט שֶׁל שׁוֹר הַנִּסְקָל.

The Gemara asks: From where are these matters derived? Rav Aḥa bar Pappa says: As the verse states: “You shall not incline the judgment of your poor in his cause” (Exodus 23:6). He explains: You may not incline the judgment of, i.e., exert effort to find liable, your poor, but you may incline the judgment of an ox that is to be stoned. The reason for the procedural differences between cases of monetary law and cases of capital law is to render it more likely that one accused of a capital transgression will be acquitted. This is not a factor when judging the ox.

עֲשָׂרָה? הָא תִּשְׁעָה הָווּ! הָא עֲשָׂרָה קָתָנֵי! מִשּׁוּם דְּאֵין הַכֹּל כְּשֵׁרִין, וְעֶשְׂרִים וּשְׁלֹשָׁה – חֲדָא הִיא.

The Gemara asks: Are there really ten ways in which cases of monetary law are different from cases of capital law? There are only nine differences recorded in the mishna. The Gemara questions this: But the mishna teaches ten differences, not nine. The Gemara clarifies: Although there appear to be ten, there are in fact nine, because the halakha that not all are fit to judge cases of capital law and the halakha that twenty-three judges are required for cases of capital law are one. The reason not all are fit to judge cases of capital law is that the court of twenty-three is derived from the command to Moses: “And they shall bear the burden of the people with you” (Numbers 11:17), which indicates that only those “with you,” i.e., similar in lineage to Moses, can serve on that court (see 17a).

הָא אִיכָּא אַחֲרִיתִי, דְּתַנְיָא: אֵין מוֹשִׁיבִין בְּסַנְהֶדְרִין זָקֵן וְסָרִיס וּמִי שֶׁאֵין לוֹ בָּנִים. רַבִּי יְהוּדָה מוֹסִיף: אַף אַכְזָרִי. וְחִילּוּפֵיהֶן בְּמֵסִית, דְּרַחֲמָנָא אָמַר: ״לֹא תַחְמֹל וְלֹא תְכַסֶּה עָלָיו״.

The Gemara answers: But there is another difference, as it is taught in a baraita (Tosefta 7:5): The court does not seat on the Sanhedrin a very old person or one who is castrated or one who has no children, as those who did not recently raise children may lack compassion. Rabbi Yehuda adds: Even a cruel person is not eligible. The Gemara comments: And the opposite of this is the halakha with regard to one who entices others to engage in idol worship, as the Merciful One states concerning him: “Neither shall you spare, neither shall you conceal him” (Deuteronomy 13:9).

הַכֹּל כְּשֵׁרִין לָדוּן דִּינֵי מָמוֹנוֹת. הַכֹּל לְאֵתוֹיֵי מַאי? אָמַר רַב יְהוּדָה: לְאֵתוֹיֵי מַמְזֵר.

§ The mishna teaches that all are fit to judge cases of monetary law. The Gemara asks: What is added by the mishna’s employing the expansive term all? Rav Yehuda says: It serves to include a child born from an incestuous or adulterous relationship [mamzer] in the category of those qualified to judge cases of monetary law.

הָא תְּנֵינָא חֲדָא זִימְנָא: כׇּל הָרָאוּי לָדוּן דִּינֵי נְפָשׁוֹת רָאוּי לָדוּן דִּינֵי מָמוֹנוֹת, וְיֵשׁ רָאוּי לָדוּן דִּינֵי מָמוֹנוֹת וְאֵין רָאוּי לָדוּן דִּינֵי נְפָשׁוֹת. וְהָוֵינַן בַּהּ: לְאֵתוֹיֵי מַאי? וְאָמַר רַב יְהוּדָה: לְאֵתוֹיֵי מַמְזֵר. חֲדָא לְאֵתוֹיֵי גֵּר, וַחֲדָא לְאֵתוֹיֵי מַמְזֵר.

The Gemara questions this explanation: But we already learn this halakha one time, as it is taught in a baraita: All who are fit to judge cases of capital law are fit to judge cases of monetary law, but there are those who are fit to judge cases of monetary law and are not fit to judge cases of capital law. And we discussed it: What is included in the expansive term all employed by the baraita? And Rav Yehuda says: It serves to include a mamzer. The Gemara responds: One of the two sources serves to include a convert, who is qualified to judge only in cases of monetary law, and one of the two sources serves to include a mamzer.

וּצְרִיכָא, דְּאִי אַשְׁמְעִינַן גֵּר – דְּרָאוּי לָבֹא בַּקָּהָל, אֲבָל מַמְזֵר אֵימָא לָא. וְאִי אַשְׁמְעִינַן מַמְזֵר – דְּבָא מִטִּיפָּה כְּשֵׁרָה, אֲבָל גֵּר דְּלֹא בָּא מִטִּיפָּה כְּשֵׁרָה אֵימָא לָא. צְרִיכָא.

The Gemara comments: And both the mishna and baraita are necessary, as the halakha taught by one source cannot be derived from the halakha taught by the other source. As, if the tanna taught us the fitness to judge cases of monetary law only with regard to a convert, one could say that a convert is like a born Jew concerning this, since he is fit to enter into the congregation, i.e., marry a Jew of fit lineage, but with regard to a mamzer, who is not fit to enter into the congregation, say that he cannot serve as a judge. And if the tanna taught us the fitness to judge cases of monetary law only with regard to a mamzer, one could say that a mamzer is fit to judge, as he came from seed of unflawed lineage, but with regard to a convert, who does not come from seed of unflawed lineage, say that he cannot serve as a judge. Therefore, both sources are necessary.

וְאֵין הַכֹּל כְּשֵׁרִין לָדוּן דִּינֵי נְפָשׁוֹת. מַאי טַעְמָא? דְּתָנֵי רַב יוֹסֵף: כְּשֵׁם שֶׁבֵּית דִּין מְנוּקִּין בְּצֶדֶק, כָּךְ מְנוּקִּין מִכׇּל מוּם. אָמַר אַמֵּימָר, מַאי קְרָא: ״כֻּלָּךְ יָפָה רַעְיָתִי וּמוּם אֵין בָּךְ״.

§ The mishna teaches: But not all are fit to judge cases of capital law; the judges may be only priests, Levites, or Israelites who are of sufficiently fit lineage to marry their daughters to members of the priesthood. The Gemara asks: What is the reason for this? The Gemara explains: As Rav Yosef taught: Just as the court is clean in justice, so too, it is clean of any blemish, i.e., it does not include anyone of flawed lineage. Ameimar says: What is the verse from which it is derived? It states: “You are all fair, my love; and there is no blemish in you” (Song of Songs 4:7).

וְדִילְמָא מוּם מַמָּשׁ? אָמַר רַב אַחָא בַּר יַעֲקֹב: אָמַר קְרָא, ״וְהִתְיַצְּבוּ שָׁם עִמָּךְ״ – עִמָּךְ בְּדוֹמִין לָךְ.

The Gemara asks: But perhaps you should say that this is referring to an actual blemish, and is teaching that one who has a physical blemish cannot be appointed to the Sanhedrin. Rav Aḥa bar Ya’akov says: It is not necessary to learn from this verse the halakha that one who has a physical blemish cannot be appointed to the Sanhedrin, as the verse states in connection with the transfer of the Divine Spirit from Moses to the Elders: “That they may stand there with you” (Numbers 11:16). The term “with you” is explained to mean: With similarity to you, teaching that the members of the Sanhedrin must be whole in body, like Moses.

וְדִילְמָא הָתָם מִשּׁוּם שְׁכִינָה? אֶלָּא, אָמַר רַב נַחְמָן בַּר יִצְחָק: אָמַר קְרָא ״וְנָשְׂאוּ אִתָּךְ״ – אִתָּךְ בְּדוֹמִין לָךְ לֶיהֱוֵי.

The Gemara rejects this proof: But perhaps there, those who were with Moses had to be free of any blemish due to the Divine Presence, which was going to rest upon them, but this is not a requirement for judges to serve on the Sanhedrin. Rather, Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak says: The verse states: “So shall they make it easier for you and bear the burden with you” (Exodus 18:22). The term “with you” is explained to mean: They shall be similar to you, without blemish. This verse is referring to the appointment of regular judges, upon whom the Divine Presence does not rest, and teaches that all members of the Sanhedrin must be whole in body, and the verse from Song of Songs teaches that they must have unflawed lineage as well.

מַתְנִי׳ סַנְהֶדְרִין הָיְתָה כַּחֲצִי גּוֹרֶן עֲגוּלָּה, כְּדֵי שֶׁיְּהוּ רוֹאִין זֶה אֶת זֶה. וּשְׁנֵי סוֹפְרֵי הַדַּיָּינִין עוֹמְדִים לִפְנֵיהֶם, אֶחָד מִיָּמִין וְאֶחָד מִשְּׂמֹאל, וְכוֹתְבִין דִּבְרֵי מְחַיְּיבִין וְדִבְרֵי מְזַכִּין. רַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר: שְׁלֹשָׁה, אֶחָד כּוֹתֵב דִּבְרֵי הַמְזַכִּין, וְאֶחָד כּוֹתֵב דִּבְרֵי הַמְחַיְּיבִין, וְהַשְּׁלִישִׁי כּוֹתֵב דִּבְרֵי הַמְזַכִּין וְדִבְרֵי הַמְחַיְּיבִין.

MISHNA: A Sanhedrin of twenty-three was arranged in the same layout as half of a circular threshing floor, in order that all the judges will see one another and the witnesses. And two judges’ scribes stand before the court, one on the right and one on the left, and they write the statements of those who find the accused liable and the statements of those who acquit the accused. Rabbi Yehuda says: There were three scribes. One writes only the statements of those who acquit the accused, one writes only the statements of those who find him liable, and the third writes both the statements of those who acquit the accused and the statements of those who find him liable, so that if there is uncertainty concerning the precise wording that one of the scribes writes, it can be compared to the words of the third scribe.