סנהדרין נה

סנהדרין נה

הַבָּא עַל הַבְּהֵמָה, בֵּין כְּדַרְכָּהּ בֵּין שֶׁלֹּא כְּדַרְכָּהּ, וְהָאִשָּׁה הַמְּבִיאָה אֶת הַבְּהֵמָה עָלֶיהָ, בֵּין כְּדַרְכָּהּ בֵּין שֶׁלֹּא כְּדַרְכָּהּ – חַיָּיב.

or one who engages in intercourse with an animal, whether in a typical manner or in an atypical manner, i.e., anal intercourse, and similarly a woman who engages in intercourse with an animal, whether in a typical manner or in an atypical manner, is liable. This baraita sets the minimum age for the passive male at nine years and one day.

דָּרַשׁ רַב נַחְמָן בַּר רַב חִסְדָּא: בְּאִשָּׁה שְׁנֵי מִשְׁכָּבוֹת, וּבִבְהֵמָה מִשְׁכָּב אֶחָד.

Rav Naḥman bar Rav Ḥisda taught: With regard to a woman there are two manners of lying. A woman who engages in intercourse with an animal, whether it is vaginal or anal intercourse, is liable. But with regard to a man who engages in intercourse with an animal there is only one manner of lying, i.e., vaginal intercourse.

מַתְקֵיף לַהּ רַב פָּפָּא: אַדְּרַבָּה, אִשָּׁה דְּאוֹרְחַהּ הִיא אַמִּשְׁכָּב מִיחַיַּיב, אַמִּידַּעַם אַחֲרִינָא לָא מִיחַיַּיב. בְּהֵמָה דְּלָאו אוֹרְחָא הִיא, לִחַיַּיב עֲלַהּ עַל כׇּל נֶקֶב וָנֶקֶב.

Rav Pappa objects to this opinion: On the contrary, a woman, whose typical manner of intercourse is vaginal, is rendered liable for lying with an animal only in that manner; she is not rendered liable for something else, i.e., for engaging in anal intercourse with an animal. With regard to a man who engages in intercourse with an animal, by contrast, since it is not its typical conduct to engage in intercourse with a man, he should be rendered liable for engaging in intercourse with it through each and every orifice.

תַּנְיָא (דְּלָא כְּתַרְוַיְיהוּ): זָכָר בֶּן תֵּשַׁע שָׁנִים וְיוֹם אֶחָד הַבָּא עַל הַבְּהֵמָה, בֵּין כְּדַרְכָּהּ בֵּין שֶׁלֹּא כְּדַרְכָּהּ, וְהָאִשָּׁה הַמְּבִיאָה אֶת הַבְּהֵמָה עָלֶיהָ, בֵּין כְּדַרְכָּהּ בֵּין שֶׁלֹּא כְּדַרְכָּהּ – חַיָּיב.

It is taught in a baraita in accordance with neither of their opinions: One who engages in homosexual intercourse with a male aged nine years and one day, or one who engages in intercourse with an animal, whether in a typical manner, or in an atypical manner, i.e., anal intercourse, and similarly, a woman who engages in intercourse with an animal, whether in a typical manner or in an atypical manner, are liable. Evidently, there is no difference between the nature of the transgression of a woman who engages in bestiality and a man who engages in bestiality in this regard.

אֲמַר לֵיהּ רָבִינָא לְרָבָא: הַמְעָרֶה בִּזְכוּר, מַהוּ?

Ravina said to Rava: With regard to one who performs the initial stage of intercourse with another male, i.e., insertion of the penis, without completing the intercourse, what is the halakha? Is he liable for engaging in homosexual intercourse?

הַמְעָרֶה בִּזְכוּר – מִשְׁכְּבֵי אִשָּׁה כְּתִיב בֵּיהּ. אֶלָּא, הַמְעָרֶה בִּבְהֵמָה, מַהוּ?

The Gemara comments: With regard to one who performs the initial stage of intercourse with a male, what is the question? The expression “as with a woman” (Leviticus 18:22) is written with regard to him, which indicates that any act that is considered an act of intercourse with a woman is also considered an act of intercourse with a man. Rather, the question is as follows: With regard to one who performs the initial stage of intercourse with an animal, what is the halakha?

אֲמַר לֵיהּ: אִם אֵינוֹ עִנְיָן לְהַעֲרָאָה דִּכְתִיבָא גַּבֵּי אֲחוֹת אָבִיו וַאֲחוֹת אִמּוֹ, דְּלָא צְרִיכָא, דְּהָא אִיתַּקַּשׁ לְהַעֲרָאָה דְּנִדָּה – תְּנֵיהוּ עִנְיָן לְהַעֲרָאָה דִבְהֵמָה.

Rava said to him: In the verse: “And you shall not uncover the nakedness of your mother’s sister nor of your father’s sister; for he has made naked [he’era] his relative” (Leviticus 20:19), the word he’era alludes to the initial stage of intercourse [ha’ara]. If the word he’era is not needed for the matter of the initial stage of intercourse in the context where it is written, i.e., for the prohibition of intercourse with one’s father’s sister and one’s mother’s sister, as it is not necessary in that context since the halakha of the initial stage of intercourse with regard to all forbidden sexual relations is compared by the Torah to the halakha of the initial stage of intercourse mentioned with regard to a menstruating woman, apply it instead to the matter of the initial stage of intercourse with an animal. The superfluous expression that appears in the verse concerning one’s aunt teaches that the initial stage of intercourse is considered intercourse even with regard to an animal.

מִכְּדֵי, בְּהֵמָה מֵחַיָּיבֵי מִיתוֹת בֵּית דִּין הִיא, לְמָה לִי דִּכְתִיב לְהַעֲרָאָה דִּידַהּ גַּבֵּי חַיָּיבֵי כָרֵיתוֹת? לִכְתְּבֵיהּ גַּבֵּי חַיָּיבֵי מִיתוֹת בֵּית דִּין, וְלִיגְמוֹר חַיָּיבֵי מִיתוֹת בֵּית דִּין מֵחַיָּיבֵי מִיתוֹת בֵּית דִּין!

The Gemara asks: Since one who engages in intercourse with an animal is among those who are liable to receive a court-imposed death penalty, why do I need the halakha of one who performs the initial stage of intercourse with an animal to be written in a verse concerning those who are liable to receive karet, i.e., the case of one who engages in intercourse with his aunt? Let the Torah write this halakha with regard to those who are liable to receive a court-imposed death penalty, and one would then derive this halakha concerning those who are liable to receive a court-imposed death penalty from the halakha of those who are liable to receive a court-imposed death penalty, and not from the less relevant halakha of one who engages in intercourse with his aunt, who is punished with karet.

הוֹאִיל וְכוּלֵּיהּ קְרָא לִדְרָשָׁא הוּא דְּאָתֵי, כְּתִיבָא נָמֵי מִילְּתָא דִּדְרָשָׁא.

The Gemara answers: Since the entire verse about the punishment of one who engages in intercourse with the sister of his father or mother is superfluous, and comes for the sake of exposition, as this halakha is already stated in other verses (see Leviticus 18:12–13), this matter, i.e., the fact that the initial stage of intercourse is halakhically defined as intercourse, is also written in this verse for the purpose of an exposition, i.e., in order to indicate that this principle holds true with regard to bestiality as well.

בְּעָא מִינֵּיהּ רַב אַחָדְבוּי בַּר אַמֵּי מֵרַב שֵׁשֶׁת: הַמְעָרֶה בְּעַצְמוֹ, מַהוּ? אֲמַר לֵיהּ: קְבַסְתַּן!

Rav Aḥadevoi bar Ami asked Rav Sheshet: With regard to one who performs the initial stage of homosexual intercourse on himself, what is the halakha? Is he liable for homosexual intercourse? Rav Sheshet said to him: You disgust me with your question; such an act is not possible.

אָמַר רַב אָשֵׁי: מַאי תִּיבְּעֵי לָךְ? בְּקוֹשִׁי לָא מַשְׁכַּחַתְּ לַהּ, כִּי מַשְׁכַּחַתְּ לַהּ בִּמְשַׁמֵּשׁ מֵת. לְמַאן דְּאָמַר מְשַׁמֵּשׁ מֵת בַּעֲרָיוֹת פָּטוּר, הָכָא פָּטוּר. וּלְמַאן דְּאָמַר חַיָּיב, הָכָא מִיחַיַּיב תַּרְתֵּי: מִיחַיַּיב אַשּׁוֹכֵב, וּמִיחַיַּיב אַנִּשְׁכָּב.

Rav Ashi said: What is your dilemma? With regard to doing so with an erect penis, you cannot find such a case. You can find it only when one performs this act of intercourse with a flaccid penis. And the halakha is subject to a dispute: According to the one who says that a man who engages in intercourse with a flaccid penis, with one of those with whom relations are forbidden, is exempt, as that is not considered intercourse, here too, when one does so to himself, he is exempt. And according to the one who says that he is liable, he is rendered liable here for transgressing two prohibitions according to Rabbi Yishmael; he is rendered liable for engaging in homosexual intercourse actively, and he is rendered liable for engaging in homosexual intercourse passively.

בְּעוֹ מִינֵּיהּ מֵרַב שֵׁשֶׁת: גּוֹי הַבָּא עַל הַבְּהֵמָה מַהוּ? תַּקָּלָה וְקָלוֹן בָּעֵינַן, וְהָכָא תַּקָּלָה אִיכָּא, קָלוֹן לֵיכָּא? אוֹ דִילְמָא תַּקָּלָה, אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁאֵין קָלוֹן?

The students asked Rav Sheshet: With regard to a gentile who engages in intercourse with an animal, what is the halakha? Must the animal be killed? The Gemara elaborates: Do we need two reasons to kill the animal, namely that it caused a calamity and that it caused shame, and therefore here the animal is not killed, as while there is a calamity, as it caused a person to sin and be executed, there is no shame, as the Jewish court is not responsible for the shame of a gentile? Or perhaps one reason is enough, and an animal is killed because of the calamity it caused even if there is no shame?

אָמַר רַב שֵׁשֶׁת: תְּנֵיתוּהָ, מָה אִילָנוֹת שֶׁאֵין אוֹכְלִין וְאֵין שׁוֹתִין וְאֵין מְרִיחִין, אָמְרָה תּוֹרָה: הַשְׁחֵת, שְׂרוֹף וְכַלֵּה, הוֹאִיל וּבָאת לְאָדָם תַּקָּלָה עַל יָדָן. הַמַּתְעֶה אֶת חֲבֵירוֹ מִדַּרְכֵי חַיִּים לְדַרְכֵי מִיתָה – עַל אַחַת כַּמָּה וְכַמָּה.

Rav Sheshet said: You learned the answer to this question in a baraita: If with regard to trees, which neither eat nor drink nor smell, and nevertheless, if they are used in idolatrous rites, the Torah says: Destroy, burn, and demolish them (see Deuteronomy, chapters 7, 12), and the reason is since a calamity was caused to people by them, then with regard to one who leads another astray from the ways of life to the ways of death, all the more so he is liable to be destroyed. It can be derived from here that any item used for a transgression that renders one liable to be executed should be destroyed.

אֶלָּא מֵעַתָּה, גּוֹי הַמִּשְׁתַּחֲוֶה לִבְהֶמְתּוֹ תִּיתְּסַר וּמִקַּטְלָא? מִי אִיכָּא מִידֵּי דִּלְיִשְׂרָאֵל לָא אָסַר וּלְגוֹי אָסַר?

The Gemara challenges this ruling: If that is so, in the case of a gentile who bows down to his animal, the animal should be forbidden, i.e., it should be prohibited to derive benefit from it, and it should be killed. The Gemara answers: Is there anything that is not forbidden to a Jew, but is forbidden to a gentile? Since a Jew who bows down to an animal does not render it forbidden (see Temura 29b), a gentile who does so does not render it forbidden either.

יִשְׂרָאֵל גּוּפֵיהּ לִיתְּסַר, מִידֵּי דְּהָוֵה אַרְבִיעָה? אָמַר אַבָּיֵי: זֶה קְלוֹנוֹ מְרוּבֶּה, וְזֶה קְלוֹנוֹ מוּעָט.

The Gemara challenges that assumption: With regard to a Jew himself who bows down to his animal, let the animal be forbidden, just as it is in a case of bestiality, when the animal is forbidden and is killed. Abaye says: The cases are not the same. In this case, where one commits bestiality, his shame is great; but in that case, where one worships an animal, his shame is slight, and he will not be so disgraced if the animal is left alive.

וַהֲרֵי אִילָנוֹת, דְּאֵין קְלוֹנָן מְרוּבֶּה, וְאָמְרָה תּוֹרָה: הַשְׁחֵת, שְׂרוֹף וְכַלֵּה! בְּבַעֲלֵי חַיִּים קָאָמְרִינַן, דְּחָס רַחֲמָנָא עֲלַיְיהוּ.

The Gemara asks: But with regard to trees that are used in idolatrous rites, in which case the shame of the idol worshippers is not great, the Torah nevertheless says: Destroy, burn, and demolish them. The Gemara answers: We are speaking of living animals. The halakha is different there, as the Merciful One has pity on them. Therefore, if the shame of the person is not great, the animal is not killed.

רָבָא אָמַר: אָמְרָה תּוֹרָה, בְּהֵמָה נֶהֱנֵית מֵעֲבֵירָה – תֵּיהָרֵג.

Rava says that there is a different reason for the distinction between an animal that was worshipped and an animal with which one committed bestiality: The Torah states that because the animal enjoyed the transgression, it must be killed. This cannot be said about an animal that was worshipped.

וַהֲרֵי אִילָנוֹת, דְּאֵין נֶהֱנִין מֵעֲבֵירָה, וְאָמְרָה תּוֹרָה: הַשְׁחֵת, שְׂרוֹף וְכַלֵּה! בְּבַעֲלֵי חַיִּים קָאָמְרִינַן, דְּחָס רַחֲמָנָא עֲלַיְיהוּ.

The Gemara asks: But with regard to trees that are used in idolatrous rites, which do not enjoy the transgression, nevertheless the Torah says: Destroy, burn, and demolish. The Gemara answers: We are speaking of living animals. The halakha is different there, as the Merciful One has pity on them. Therefore, an animal is killed only if it enjoyed the transgression.

תָּא שְׁמַע: דָּבָר אַחֵר, שֶׁלֹּא תְּהֵא בְּהֵמָה עוֹבֶרֶת בַּשּׁוּק וְיֹאמְרוּ: ״זוֹ הִיא שֶׁנִּסְקַל פְּלוֹנִי עַל יָדָהּ.״ מַאי לָאו,

The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a resolution from the mishna to the dilemma concerning an animal with which a gentile committed bestiality: Alternatively, it is so that this animal will not pass through the marketplace, and those who see it will say: This is the animal because of which so-and-so was stoned, and its existence would shame his memory. What, is it not

מִדְּסֵיפָא תַּקָּלָה וְקָלוֹן, רֵישָׁא תַּקָּלָה בְּלֹא קָלוֹן. וְהֵיכִי דָּמֵי? גּוֹי הַבָּא עַל הַבְּהֵמָה.

evident from the fact that the latter clause of the mishna includes two reasons for the killing of the animal, namely both the calamity and the shame caused by the animal, that the first clause, the first reason stated in the mishna, is referring to a case of a calamity without shame? And what are the circumstances of a calamity without shame? It is the case of a gentile who engages in intercourse with an animal. In that case there is a calamity, as the gentile is executed, but his shame is not the concern of the Jewish court.

לָא, סֵיפָא תַּקָּלָה וְקָלוֹן. רֵישָׁא הָא קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן: דַּאֲפִילּוּ קָלוֹן בְּלֹא תַּקָּלָה נָמֵי מִחַיְּיבִי. וְהֵיכִי דָּמֵי? יִשְׂרָאֵל הַבָּא עַל הַבְּהֵמָה בְּשׁוֹגֵג, וְכִדְבָעֵי רַב הַמְנוּנָא.

The Gemara rejects this proof: No. The latter clause is referring to a case of both a calamity and shame, but this first clause teaches us that even in a case where there is a circumstance of shame alone without the calamity of execution, the court is obligated to kill the animal. Although the mishna employs the term: Calamity, it is possible that this is referring to the calamity of the transgression, not the execution of the transgressor. And what are the circumstances of this case? It is a case of a Jew who unwittingly engages in intercourse with an animal, and this is just like the case about which Rav Hamnuna raises a dilemma.

דְּבָעֵי רַב הַמְנוּנָא: יִשְׂרָאֵל הַבָּא עַל הַבְּהֵמָה בְּשׁוֹגֵג, מַהוּ? תַּקָּלָה וְקָלוֹן בָּעֵינַן, וְהָכָא קָלוֹן אִיכָּא, תַּקָּלָה לֵיכָּא? אוֹ דִילְמָא קָלוֹן, אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁאֵין תַּקָּלָה?

As Rav Hamnuna raises a dilemma: With regard to a Jew who unwittingly engages in intercourse with an animal, what is the halakha? Is the animal stoned to death? Do we need both a calamity and shame in order to put it to death, and therefore here the animal is not killed, as there is shame, but there is no calamity of execution, or perhaps shame is enough, even if there is no calamity?

אָמַר רַב יוֹסֵף: תָּא שְׁמַע, בַּת שָׁלֹשׁ שָׁנִים וְיוֹם אֶחָד מִתְקַדֶּשֶׁת בְּבִיאָה, וְאִם בָּא עָלֶיהָ יָבָם קְנָאָהּ, וְחַיָּיבִין עָלֶיהָ מִשּׁוּם אֵשֶׁת אִישׁ.

Rav Yosef says: Come and hear a resolution from a mishna (Nidda 44b): A girl who is three years and one day old whose father arranged her betrothal is betrothed with intercourse, as the legal status of intercourse with her is that of full-fledged intercourse. And in a case where the childless husband of a girl who is three years and one day old dies, if his brother, the yavam, engages in intercourse with her, he acquires her as his wife; and if she is married, a man other than her husband is liable for engaging in intercourse with her due to the prohibition of intercourse with a married woman.

וּמְטַמְּאָה אֶת בּוֹעֲלָהּ, לְטַמֵּא מִשְׁכָּב תַּחְתּוֹן כְּעֶלְיוֹן. נִיסֵּת לְכֹהֵן – אוֹכֶלֶת בִּתְרוּמָה. בָּא עָלֶיהָ אֶחָד מִן הַפְּסוּלִים – פְּסָלָהּ מִן הַכְּהוּנָּה.

The mishna continues: And if she is impure due to menstruation, she transmits impurity to one who engages in intercourse with her, who then renders all the items designated for lying beneath him impure like the items designated for lying above him. If she marries a priest, she may partake of teruma like any other wife of a priest. If she is unmarried and one of the men who are unfit for the priesthood, e.g., a mamzer or ḥalal, engages in intercourse with her, he has disqualified her from marrying into the priesthood, and if she is the daughter of a priest, she is disqualified from partaking of teruma.

וְאִם בָּא עָלֶיהָ אֶחָד מִכׇּל הָעֲרָיוֹת הָאֲמוּרוֹת בְּתוֹרָה, מוּמָתִין עַל יָדָהּ, וְהִיא פְּטוּרָה.

The mishna continues: And if one of any of those with whom relations are forbidden, who are stated in the Torah, engaged in intercourse with her, e.g., her father or father-in-law, they are executed by the court for engaging in intercourse with her, and she is exempt because she is a minor.

אֶחָד מִכׇּל עֲרָיוֹת, וַאֲפִילּוּ בְּהֵמָה. וְהָא הָכָא דְּקָלוֹן אִיכָּא, תַּקָּלָה לֵיכָּא, וְקָתָנֵי: מוּמָתִין עַל יָדָהּ.

The Gemara infers: One of any of those with whom relations are forbidden apparently includes even an animal. And here, there is shame but there is no calamity, as she is not executed due to her status as a minor, and yet the mishna teaches: They are executed for engaging in intercourse with her. Evidently, the animal is killed.

כֵּיוָן דִּמְזִידָה הִיא, תַּקָּלָה נָמֵי אִיכָּא, וְרַחֲמָנָא הוּא דְּחָס עֲלַהּ. עֲלַהּ דִּידַהּ חָס, אַבְּהֵמָה לָא חָס.

The Gemara rejects this proof: Since she committed this transgression intentionally, there is a calamity as well, and it is the Merciful One who has pity on her due to her young age, and exempts her from punishment. And although the Merciful One has pity on her, He does not have pity on the animal. Therefore, it cannot be proven from here that shame without a calamity is sufficient cause for the animal to be put to death, because calamity is present in this case.

אָמַר רָבָא: תָּא שְׁמַע, בֶּן תֵּשַׁע שָׁנִים וְיוֹם אֶחָד הַבָּא עַל יְבִמְתּוֹ – קְנָאָהּ, וְאֵינוֹ נוֹתֵן גֵּט עַד שֶׁיַּגְדִּיל. וּמְטַמֵּא כְּנִדָּה לְטַמֵּא מִשְׁכָּב תַּחְתּוֹן כְּעֶלְיוֹן.

Rava says: Come and hear a proof from the subsequent mishna (Nidda 45a): With regard to a boy who is nine years and one day old, whose brother died childless, and who engaged in intercourse with his yevama, his brother’s widow, the status of the intercourse is that of full-fledged intercourse and he has acquired her as his wife, but if he chooses to end the marriage, he cannot give her a bill of divorce until he reaches majority. And he becomes ritually impure like a menstruating woman after engaging in intercourse with her, and then renders all the items designated for lying beneath him impure like the items designated for lying above him.

פּוֹסֵל וְאֵינוֹ מַאֲכִיל, וּפוֹסֵל אֶת הַבְּהֵמָה מֵעַל גַּבֵּי הַמִּזְבֵּחַ, וְנִסְקֶלֶת עַל יָדוֹ. וְאִם בָּא עַל אַחַת מִכׇּל הָעֲרָיוֹת הָאֲמוּרוֹת בְּתוֹרָה, מוּמָתִים עַל יָדוֹ.

The mishna continues: If he is disqualified from the priesthood and engages in intercourse with the daughter of a priest, he disqualifies her from partaking of teruma; but if he is a priest who marries an Israelite woman, he does not enable her to partake of teruma. And if he engages in intercourse with an animal, he disqualifies the animal from being sacrificed upon the altar, and the animal is stoned on the basis of intercourse with him. And if he engaged in intercourse with one of any of those with whom relations are forbidden, who are stated in the Torah, they are executed by the court on the basis of intercourse with him, but he is exempt.

וְהָא הָכָא קָלוֹן אִיכָּא, תַּקָּלָה לֵיכָּא, וְקָתָנֵי: נִסְקֶלֶת עַל יָדוֹ.

The Gemara infers: And here, in a case where he engages in intercourse with an animal, there is shame, but there is no calamity, and yet the mishna teaches that the animal is stoned on the basis of intercourse with him, indicating that shame is sufficient for the animal to be killed.

כֵּיוָן דְּמֵזִיד הוּא, תַּקָּלָה נָמֵי אִיכָּא, וְרַחֲמָנָא הוּא דְּחָס עִילָּוֵיהּ. עֲלֵיהּ דִּידֵיהּ חָס רַחֲמָנָא, אַבְּהֵמָה לָא חָס רַחֲמָנָא.

The Gemara rejects this proof: Since he committed this transgression intentionally, there is a calamity as well, and it is the Merciful One who has pity on him due to his minority. Although the Merciful One has pity on him, the Merciful One does not have pity on the animal. Therefore, it cannot be proven from here that shame without a calamity is sufficient cause for the animal to be put to death, because calamity is present in this case.

תָּא שְׁמַע: דָּבָר אַחֵר, שֶׁלֹּא תְּהֵא בְּהֵמָה עוֹבֶרֶת בַּשּׁוּק וְיֹאמְרוּ: ״זוֹ הִיא שֶׁנִּסְקַל פְּלוֹנִי עַל יָדָהּ״. מַאי לָאו, מִדְּסֵיפָא תַּקָּלָה וְקָלוֹן, רֵישָׁא קָלוֹן בְּלֹא תַּקָּלָה? וְהֵיכִי דָּמֵי? יִשְׂרָאֵל הַבָּא עַל הַבְּהֵמָה בְּשׁוֹגֵג.

The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a resolution from the mishna (54a): Alternatively, it is so that this animal will not pass through the marketplace, and those who see it will say: This is the animal because of which so-and-so was stoned. What, is it not evident from the fact that the latter clause of the mishna includes two reasons for the killing of the animal, namely both the calamity and the shame caused by the animal, that the first clause, the first reason stated in the mishna, is referring to a case of shame without a calamity? And what are the circumstances of shame without a calamity? It is the case of a Jew who unwittingly engages in intercourse with an animal.

לָא, סֵיפָא תַּקָּלָה וְקָלוֹן, רֵישָׁא תַּקָּלָה בְּלֹא קָלוֹן. וְהֵיכִי דָּמֵי? גּוֹי הַבָּא עַל הַבְּהֵמָה, וּכְדִבְעוֹ מִינֵּיהּ מֵרַב שֵׁשֶׁת.

The Gemara rejects this proof: No, perhaps the latter clause is referring to a case where there is both a calamity and shame, while the first clause is referring to a case where there is a calamity without shame. And what are the circumstances of a calamity without shame? It is the case of a gentile who engages in intercourse with an animal, as the students asked Rav Sheshet. The dilemma is left unresolved. No conclusive answer can be inferred from the mishna for either this dilemma or for the dilemma raised by the students of Rav Sheshet.

מַתְנִי׳ הַמְגַדֵּף אֵינוֹ חַיָּיב עַד שֶׁיְּפָרֵשׁ הַשֵּׁם. אָמַר רַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ בֶּן קׇרְחָה:

MISHNA: One who blasphemes, i.e., one who curses God, is not liable unless he utters the name of God and curses it. Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korḥa said: