סנהדרין סו

סנהדרין סו

״אַל תַּתְחִיל בִּי״, ״שַׁחֲרִית הוּא״, ״רֹאשׁ חוֹדֶשׁ הוּא״, ״מוֹצָאֵי שַׁבָּת הוּא״.

The term is also referring to one who says to a collector of charity: Do not collect from me first, as that is a bad sign for me; or: Do not collect from me now because it is morning, and it is a bad sign to begin the day with a loss; or: Do not collect from me now because it is the New Moon, and it is a bad sign to begin the month with a loss; or: It is the conclusion of Shabbat and I do not want to begin the week with a loss.

תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: ״לֹא תְנַחֲשׁוּ וְלֹא תְעוֹנֵנוּ״ – כְּגוֹן אֵלּוּ הַמְנַחֲשִׁים בְּחוּלְדָּה, בְּעוֹפוֹת, וּבְדָגִים.

The Sages taught that the verse: “Nor shall you practice divination nor soothsaying” (Leviticus 19:26), is referring, for example, to those who divine and receive guidance according to what happens to a weasel, to birds, or to fish.

מַתְנִי׳ הַמְחַלֵּל אֶת הַשַּׁבָּת בְּדָבָר שֶׁחַיָּיבִין עַל זְדוֹנוֹ כָּרֵת, וְעַל שִׁגְגָתוֹ חַטָּאת.

MISHNA: Also liable to be executed by stoning is one who desecrates Shabbat by performing a matter that for its intentional performance one is liable to receive karet and for its unwitting performance one is obligated to bring a sin-offering.

גְּמָ׳ מִכְּלָל דְּאִיכָּא מִידֵּי דְּחִילּוּל שַׁבָּת הָוֵי, וְאֵין חַיָּיבִין לֹא עַל שִׁגְגָתוֹ חַטָּאת וְלֹא עַל זְדוֹנוֹ כָּרֵת.

GEMARA: By inference, there is another matter that is a desecration of Shabbat, and it is prohibited by the Torah, but for its unwitting performance one is not obligated to bring a sin-offering, nor does one receive karet for its intentional performance. Otherwise, the statement in the mishna that one is liable for desecrating Shabbat for performing an act for which one receives karet or is obligated to bring a sin-offering would have been superfluous.

מַאי הִיא? תְּחוּמִין, וְאַלִּיבָּא דְּרַבִּי עֲקִיבָא. הַבְעָרָה, וְאַלִּיבָּא דְּרַבִּי יוֹסֵי.

The Gemara asks: What is the labor activity that desecrates Shabbat but whose punishment is not so severe? The Gemara answers: It is the prohibition against going outside the Shabbat boundaries, which are two thousand cubits beyond a person’s location at the beginning of Shabbat, and it is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, who holds that although it is a Torah prohibition one is neither obligated to bring a sin-offering for violating it unwittingly nor liable to be executed for violating it intentionally. Alternatively, it may be referring to the prohibition against kindling a fire on Shabbat in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, who holds that contrary to other labors prohibited on Shabbat, this act is not punishable by stoning but by lashes.

מַתְנִי׳ הַמְקַלֵּל אָבִיו וְאִמּוֹ אֵינוֹ חַיָּיב עַד שֶׁיְּקַלְּלֵם בַּשֵּׁם. קִלְּלָם בְּכִנּוּי, רַבִּי מֵאִיר מְחַיֵּיב וַחֲכָמִים פּוֹטְרִין.

MISHNA: One who curses his father or his mother is not liable to be executed by stoning unless he curses them with the name of God. If he cursed them with an appellation of the name of God, Rabbi Meir deems him liable, and the Rabbis deem him exempt.

גְּמָ׳ מַאן חֲכָמִים? רַבִּי מְנַחֵם בְּרַבִּי יוֹסֵי הוּא. דְּתַנְיָא: רַבִּי מְנַחֵם בְּרַבִּי יוֹסֵי אוֹמֵר, ״בְּנׇקְבוֹ שֵׁם יוּמָת״ – מָה תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר ״שֵׁם״? לִימֵּד עַל מְקַלֵּל אָבִיו וְאִמּוֹ שֶׁאֵינוֹ חַיָּיב עַד שֶׁיְּקַלְּלֵם בַּשֵּׁם.

GEMARA: Who are the Rabbis mentioned here? It is Rabbi Menaḥem, son of Rabbi Yosei. As it is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Menaḥem, son of Rabbi Yosei, says: The verse states: “And he who blasphemes the name of the Lord shall be put to death; all the congregation shall stone him; the convert as well as the homeborn, when he blasphemes the name he shall be put to death” (Leviticus 24:16). Why must the verse state “the name” a second time, which appears to be a superfluous repetition? This term taught concerning one who transgresses other prohibitions of cursing, e.g., one who curses his father or his mother, that he is not liable to be executed by stoning unless he curses them with the name of God. If he merely uses an appellation, he is exempt.

תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: ״אִישׁ״ – מָה תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר ״אִישׁ אִישׁ״? לְרַבּוֹת בַּת, טוּמְטוּם, וְאַנְדְּרוֹגִינוֹס.

The Sages taught: The verse (Leviticus 20:9) could have stated merely: For a man [ish] that curses his father and his mother shall be put to death; he has cursed his father and his mother; his blood shall be upon him. Why must the verse state: “For any man [ish ish],” repeating the term ish? It is to include not only a son, but also a daughter, one whose sexual organs are indeterminate [tumtum], and a hermaphrodite [ve’androginos].

״אֲשֶׁר יְקַלֵּל אֶת אָבִיו וְאֶת אִמּוֹ״ – אֵין לִי אֶלָּא אָבִיו וְאִמּוֹ. אָבִיו שֶׁלֹּא אִמּוֹ, אִמּוֹ שֶׁלֹּא אָבִיו – מִנַּיִין? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״אָבִיו וְאִמּוֹ קִלֵּל דָּמָיו בּוֹ״ – אָבִיו קִילֵּל, אִמּוֹ קִילֵּל. דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי יֹאשִׁיָּה.

When the verse states: “That curses his father and his mother,” I have derived only his liability for cursing both his father and his mother. From where do I derive that if one curses his father but not his mother, or his mother but not his father, that he is liable? The continuation of the verse states: “His father and his mother he has cursed; his blood is upon him.” In the first part of the verse, the word “curses” is in proximity to “his father,” and in the last part of the verse, it is in proximity to “his mother.” This teaches that the verse is referring both to a case where he cursed only his father and to a case where he cursed only his mother; this is the statement of Rabbi Yoshiya.

רַבִּי יוֹנָתָן אוֹמֵר: מַשְׁמָע שְׁנֵיהֶן כְּאֶחָד, וּמַשְׁמָע אֶחָד בִּפְנֵי עַצְמוֹ, עַד שֶׁיִּפְרוֹט לְךָ הַכָּתוּב ״יַחְדָּו״.

Rabbi Yonatan says: There is no need for this derivation, because the phrase “his father and his mother” teaches that one is liable if he curses both of them together, and it also teaches that he is liable if he curses either one of them on their own, unless the verse specifies that one is liable only when he curses both together, which it does not do in this case.

״מוֹת יוּמָת״ – בִּסְקִילָה. אַתָּה אוֹמֵר בִּסְקִילָה, אוֹ אֵינוֹ אֶלָּא בְּאַחַת מִכׇּל מִיתוֹת הָאֲמוּרוֹת בַּתּוֹרָה? נֶאֱמַר כָּאן ״דָּמָיו בּוֹ״, וְנֶאֱמַר לְהַלָּן ״דְּמֵיהֶם בָּם״. מָה לְהַלָּן בִּסְקִילָה, אַף כָּאן בִּסְקִילָה.

From the phrase “shall be put to death” it is derived that his punishment is execution by stoning. The baraita asks: Do you say that that they are executed by stoning, or is it rather by one of all the other types of death penalty stated in the Torah? The baraita answers: It is stated here: “His blood shall be upon him,” and it is stated below, with regard to a necromancer and a sorcerer: “They shall be put to death; they shall stone them with stones; their blood shall be upon them” (Leviticus 20:27). Just as there the verse states that a necromancer and a sorcerer are executed by stoning, so too here, with regard to one who curses his father or mother, he is executed by stoning.

עוֹנֶשׁ שָׁמַעְנוּ, אַזְהָרָה מִנַּיִין? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״אֱלֹהִים לֹא תְקַלֵּל וְגוֹ׳״. אִם הָיָה אָבִיו דַּיָּין – הֲרֵי הוּא בִּכְלַל ״אֱלֹהִים לֹא תְקַלֵּל״, וְאִם הָיָה אָבִיו נָשִׂיא – הֲרֵי הוּא בִּכְלַל ״וְנָשִׂיא בְעַמְּךָ לֹא תָאֹר״.

The baraita asks: We have learned the punishment of one who curses his parent; from where is the prohibition against doing so derived? The verse states: “You shall not blaspheme judges [elohim], nor curse a king of your people” (Exodus 22:27). If his father was a judge, cursing him is included in the prohibition of: “You shall not blaspheme judges,” as it is prohibited for all people to curse a judge. And if his father was a king, cursing him is included in the prohibition of: “Nor curse a king of your people.”

אֵינוֹ לֹא דַּיָּין וְלֹא נָשִׂיא, מִנַּיִין? אָמְרַתְּ: הֲרֵי אַתָּה דָּן בִּנְיַן אָב מִשְּׁנֵיהֶן. לֹא רְאִי נְשִׂיא כִּרְאִי דַּיָּין, וְלֹא רְאִי דַּיָּין כִּרְאִי נָשִׂיא.

If he is neither a judge nor a king, from where is it derived that it is prohibited to curse him? One can say: You derive it through a paradigm arrived at from both of them as follows: The defining characteristic of a king is not like the defining characteristic of a judge, and the defining characteristic of a judge is not like the defining characteristic of a king. The two cases are dissimilar.

לֹא רְאִי דַּיָּין כִּרְאִי נָשִׂיא, שֶׁהֲרֵי דַּיָּין – אַתָּה מְצֻוֶּוה עַל הוֹרָאָתוֹ, כִּרְאִי נָשִׂיא – שֶׁאִי אַתָּה מְצֻוֶּוה עַל הוֹרָאָתוֹ. וְלֹא רְאִי נָשִׂיא כִּרְאִי דַּיָּין, שֶׁהַנָּשִׂיא – אַתָּה מְצֻוֶּוה עַל הַמְרָאָתוֹ, כִּרְאִי דַּיָּין – שֶׁאִי אַתָּה מְצֻוֶּוה עַל הַמְרָאָתוֹ.

The baraita elaborates: The defining characteristic of a judge is not like the defining characteristic of a king, as with regard to a judge, you are commanded with regard to obeying his halakhic ruling. This is not like the defining characteristic of a king, with regard to whose halakhic ruling you are not commanded to obey. And the defining characteristic of a king is not like the defining characteristic of a judge, as with regard to the king, you are commanded with regard to rebelling against him, i.e., refusing to obey his order. This is not like the defining characteristic of a judge, as you are not commanded with regard to rebelling against him.

הַצַּד הַשָּׁוֶה שֶׁבָּהֶם שֶׁהֵן בְּעַמְּךָ, וְאַתָּה מוּזְהָר עַל קִלְלָתָן. אַף אֲנִי אָבִיא אָבִיךָ, שֶׁבְּעַמְּךָ, וְאַתָּה מוּזְהָר עַל קִלְלָתוֹ.

Their common denominator is that they are “of your people,” i.e., they are members of the Jewish people, and you are prohibited from cursing them. I too will include the case of your father, as he is “of your people,” and therefore you are prohibited from cursing him.

מָה לְהַצַּד הַשָּׁוֶה שֶׁבָּהֶן, שֶׁכֵּן גְּדוּלָּתָן גָּרְמָה לָהֶן?

This derivation is insufficient, as what is notable about their common denominator, i.e., another element that they share in common? It is notable in that their prominence has caused them to be entitled to an exceptional degree of respect; they are not merely “of your people.” Therefore, perhaps the prohibition against cursing applies only to such prominent figures.

תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״לֹא תְקַלֵּל חֵרֵשׁ״ – בְּאוּמְלָלִים שֶׁבְּעַמְּךָ הַכָּתוּב מְדַבֵּר.

The baraita continues: Consequently, a third case is necessary to arrive at the required paradigm. The verse states: “You shall not curse the deaf, nor put a stumbling block before the blind” (Leviticus 19:14). The verse speaks of the wretched of your people. From the fact that it is prohibited to curse even those people, it can be derived that it is prohibited to curse anyone.

מָה לְחֵרֵשׁ, שֶׁכֵּן חֲרִישָׁתוֹ גָּרְמָה לוֹ?

Deriving this halakha from the case of a deaf person is also insufficient, as what is notable about the case of a deaf person? It is notable in that his deafness has caused cursing him to be prohibited. Perhaps the only reason it is prohibited to curse him is that he is deaf, just as it is prohibited to mislead the blind.

נָשִׂיא וְדַיָּין יוֹכִיחוּ. מָה לְנָשִׂיא וְדַיָּין שֶׁכֵּן גְּדוּלָּתָן גָּרְמָה לָהֶן? חֵרֵשׁ יוֹכִיחַ.

One can respond: The prohibition against cursing a king and a judge can prove that it is prohibited to curse anyone, as it is prohibited to curse them even though they are not wretched. And if the proof from these cases is rejected, as one can claim that what is notable about a king and a judge is that their prominence has caused them to be entitled to this respect, then the prohibition against cursing the deaf can prove that prominence is not a determining factor.

וְחָזַר הַדִּין. לֹא רְאִי זֶה כִרְאִי זֶה, וְלֹא רְאִי זֶה כִּרְאִי זֶה. הַצַּד הַשָּׁוֶה שֶׁבָּהֶן: שֶׁהֵן בְּעַמְּךָ, וְאַתָּה מוּזְהָר עַל קִלְלָתָן. אַף אֲנִי אָבִיא אָבִיךָ, שֶׁבְּעַמְּךָ וְאַתָּה מוּזְהָר עַל קִלְלָתוֹ.

And the inference has reverted to its starting point. At this point the halakha is derived from a combination of the three cases: The defining characteristic of this case, i.e., that of a ruler and a judge, is not like the defining characteristic of that case, i.e., that of a deaf person, and the defining characteristic of that case is not like the defining characteristic of this case; their common denominator is that they are “of your people,” and you are prohibited from cursing them. I too will include the case of your father, who is “of your people,” and therefore you are prohibited from cursing him.

מָה לְצַד הַשָּׁוֶה שֶׁבָּהֶן, שֶׁכֵּן מְשׁוּנִּין?

The baraita refutes this derivation: What is notable about their common dominator? It is notable in that they are unusual, i.e., they are not common people, but they are in some way different from others. Perhaps there is no prohibition against cursing an ordinary person.

אֶלָּא, אִם כֵּן נִכְתּוֹב קְרָא: אוֹ ״אֱלֹהִים וְחֵרֵשׁ״, אוֹ ״נָשִׂיא וְחֵרֵשׁ״. ״אֱלֹהִים״ לְמָה לִי? אִם אֵינוֹ עִנְיָן לְגוּפוֹ, תְּנֵהוּ עִנְיָן לְאָבִיו.

Rather, this proof is insufficient, and the baraita states a different explanation: If it is so that it is prohibited to curse only unusual people, let the verse write either that it is prohibited to curse judges and the deaf, or that it is prohibited to curse a king and the deaf, and it would have been derived from these two cases that the prohibition applies to all unusual people. Why do I need the verse to state a special prohibition with regard to judges? It is superfluous, as judges are also extraordinary people. Rather, if the verse is not needed for its own matter, i.e., the prohibition against cursing judges, apply it to the matter of cursing one’s father.

הָנִיחָא לְמַאן דְּאָמַר ״אֱלֹהִים״ חוֹל, אֶלָּא לְמַאן דְּאָמַר קוֹדֶשׁ, מַאי אִיכָּא לְמֵימַר?

The Gemara asks: This works out well according to the one who says that in the verse: “You shall not blaspheme elohim” (Exodus 22:27), the word “elohim” is non-sacred, as it is referring to judges. But according to the one who says that the word is sacred, as it is referring to God, what can be said? If the verse is not superfluous, as it is needed to state a special prohibition with regard to God, how is the prohibition against cursing one’s parents derived from it?

דְּתַנְיָא: ״אֱלֹהִים״ – חוֹל, דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל. רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא אוֹמֵר: ״אֱלֹהִים״ – קוֹדֶשׁ. וְתַנְיָא: רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר בֶּן יַעֲקֹב אוֹמֵר: אַזְהָרָה לִמְבָרֵךְ אֶת הַשֵּׁם מִנַּיִין? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״אֱלֹהִים לֹא תְקַלֵּל״.

As it is taught in a baraita: The word “elohim” in this verse is non-sacred; this is the statement of Rabbi Yishmael. Rabbi Akiva says: The word “Elohim” is sacred. And it is taught in a different baraita that Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov says: From where is the prohibition against one who blesses, i.e., curses, the name of God, derived? The verse states: “You shall not blaspheme God [Elohim].”

לְמַאן דְּאָמַר ״אֱלֹהִים״ חוֹל – גָּמַר קוֹדֶשׁ מֵחוֹל, לְמַאן דְּאָמַר ״אֱלֹהִים״ קוֹדֶשׁ – גָּמְרִינַן חוֹל מִקּוֹדֶשׁ.

The Gemara answers: According to the one who says that “elohim” is non-sacred, he derives the prohibition according to the sacred meaning of the word from the non-sacred meaning, i.e., he derives the prohibition against cursing God from the prohibition against cursing judges. According to the one who says that “Elohim” is sacred, we derive the prohibition according to the non-sacred meaning of the word from the sacred meaning, i.e., he derives the prohibition against cursing judges from the prohibition against cursing God.

בִּשְׁלָמָא לְמַאן דְּאָמַר ״אֱלֹהִים״ חוֹל, גָּמַר קוֹדֶשׁ מֵחוֹל. אֶלָּא לְמַאן דְּאָמַר ״אֱלֹהִים״ קוֹדֶשׁ, גָּמַר חוֹל מִקּוֹדֶשׁ? דִּילְמָא אַקּוֹדֶשׁ אַזְהַר, אַחוֹל לָא אַזְהַר?

The Gemara asks: Granted, according to the one who says that “elohim” is non-sacred, he can derive the prohibition according to the sacred meaning of the word from the non-sacred meaning through an a fortiori inference. But according to the one who says that “Elohim” is sacred, can he derive the prohibition according to the non-sacred meaning from the sacred meaning? Perhaps the Torah renders it prohibited to curse God, in accordance with the sacred meaning of the word, but it does not render it prohibited to curse elohim, judges, in accordance with the non-sacred meaning.

אִם כֵּן, לִכְתּוֹב קְרָא: ״לֹא תָקֵל״!

The Gemara answers: If so, if it is prohibited to curse God but not judges, let the verse write: You shall not treat lightly [takel], instead of: “You shall not blaspheme [tekallel]”; it would have been derived from this wording that is prohibited to demean or curse God.

מַאי ״לֹא תְקַלֵּל״? שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ תַּרְתֵּי.

What halakha can be derived from the seemingly superfluous second letter lamed, which renders the expression: “You shall not curse [tekallel]”? Conclude from it that this expression includes two prohibitions: A prohibition against cursing God and a prohibition against cursing a judge.

מַתְנִי׳ הַבָּא עַל נַעֲרָה הַמְאוֹרָסָה אֵינוֹ חַיָּיב, עַד שֶׁתְּהֵא נַעֲרָה, בְּתוּלָה, מְאוֹרָסָה, וְהִיא בְּבֵית אָבִיהָ. בָּאוּ עָלֶיהָ שְׁנַיִם, הָרִאשׁוֹן בִּסְקִילָה וְהַשֵּׁנִי בְּחֶנֶק.

MISHNA: One who engages in intercourse with a betrothed young woman is not liable to be executed by stoning unless she is a young woman, i.e., neither a minor nor an adult; a virgin; betrothed but not yet married; and she lives in her father’s home, having yet to move in with her husband. If two men engaged in intercourse with her, the first is liable to be executed by stoning, and the second is liable to be executed by strangulation. The second man is executed in this manner in accordance with the halakha of one who engages in intercourse with a married or non-virgin betrothed woman, as she was no longer a virgin when he engaged in intercourse with her.

גְּמָ׳ תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: ״נַעֲרָה״ – וְלֹא בּוֹגֶרֶת, ״בְּתוּלָה״ – וְלֹא בְּעוּלָה, ״מְאוֹרָסָה״ – וְלֹא נְשׂוּאָה, ״בְּבֵית אָבִיהָ״ – פְּרָט לְשֶׁמָּסַר הָאָב לִשְׁלוּחֵי הַבַּעַל.

GEMARA: The Sages taught with regard to the conditions stated in the mishna: The punishment of stoning applies only if the woman is a young woman, a category that applies until she is approximately twelve-and-a-half years of age, but not a grown woman. She must be a virgin but not a non-virgin. She must be betrothed but not married. She must be living in her father’s home, excluding a case where the father transferred his daughter to the husband’s agents to bring her to her husband’s home for the purpose of marriage; in such a case, even though she has not arrived there yet, she is already considered a married woman according to halakha.

אָמַר רַב יְהוּדָה אָמַר רַב: זוֹ דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי מֵאִיר, אֲבָל חֲכָמִים אוֹמְרִים: נַעֲרָה הַמְאוֹרָסָה – אֲפִילּוּ קְטַנָּה בַּמַּשְׁמָע.

Rav Yehuda says that Rav says: This mishna is the statement of Rabbi Meir, who holds that the halakha of a betrothed young woman applies to a young woman of the intermediate age between minority and adulthood. But the Rabbis say: Even a minor is included in the term: A betrothed young woman; only a grown woman is excluded.

אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַב אַחָא מִדִּפְתִּי לְרָבִינָא: מִמַּאי דְּמַתְנִיתִין רַבִּי מֵאִיר הִיא, וּלְמַעוֹטֵי קְטַנָּה נָמֵי? דִּילְמָא רַבָּנַן הִיא, וּלְמַעוֹטֵי בּוֹגֶרֶת וְתוּ לָא?

Rav Aḥa of Difti said to Ravina: From where is it indicated that the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, and the specification that she must be a young woman is not only to the exclusion of a grown woman but also to the exclusion of a minor girl? Perhaps the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, and the condition that she must be a young woman is to the exclusion of a grown woman and nothing more. Accordingly, one who engages in intercourse with an engaged minor girl is liable to be executed by stoning.

אֲמַר לֵיהּ: הַאי ״אֵינוֹ חַיָּיב עַד שֶׁתְּהֵא נַעֲרָה בְּתוּלָה מְאוֹרָסָה״ – אֵינוֹ חַיָּיב אֶלָּא עַל נַעֲרָה בְּתוּלָה מְאוֹרָסָה מִיבְּעֵי לֵיהּ! וְתוּ לָא מִידִּי.

Ravina said to him: This expression in the mishna: Is not liable unless she is [ad shetehe] a young woman, a virgin, betrothed, does not suit your suggested explanation. If the mishna is merely excluding a grown woman, it should have stated: Is liable only for engaging in intercourse with a young woman who is a virgin and betrothed. The expression ad shetehe indicates: Until she becomes, i.e., this halakha does not apply until she reaches the age of a young woman. And there is nothing more to be said on the matter, as this is clearly the intention of the mishna.

בְּעָא מִינֵּיהּ רַבִּי יַעֲקֹב בַּר אַדָּא מֵרַב: בָּא עַל הַקְּטַנָּה מְאוֹרָסָה לְרַבִּי מֵאִיר, מַהוּ? לְגַמְרֵי מְמַעֵיט לֵיהּ, אוֹ מִסְּקִילָה מְמַעֵיט לֵיהּ? אֲמַר לֵיהּ: מִסְתַּבְּרָא מִסְּקִילָה מְמַעֵט לֵיהּ.

Rabbi Ya’akov bar Adda asked Rav: In the case of a man who engaged in intercourse with a betrothed minor girl, what is the halakha according to the opinion of Rabbi Meir? Does Rabbi Meir exclude him from punishment entirely, or does he exclude him merely from stoning but he is executed by strangulation, like one who engages in intercourse with any other married woman? Rav said to him: It stands to reason that Rabbi Meir excludes him from stoning alone, but he is liable to be executed by strangulation.

וְהָכְתִיב: ״וּמֵתוּ גַּם שְׁנֵיהֶם״, עַד שֶׁיְּהוּ שְׁנֵיהֶן שָׁוִין? שְׁתֵיק רַב.

Rabbi Ya’akov bar Adda raised an objection to this answer: But isn’t it written: “If a man is found lying with a woman married to a husband, then they shall both die, the man who lies with the woman, and the woman” (Deuteronomy 22:22), indicating that this punishment does not apply unless they are both equally subject to punishment? If so, one who engages in intercourse with a betrothed minor girl is exempt, as she is not halakhically competent. Rav remained silent and did not answer him.

אָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל: מַאי טַעְמָא שְׁתֵיק רַב? וְנֵימָא לֵיהּ: ״וּמֵת הָאִישׁ אֲשֶׁר שָׁכַב עִמָּהּ לְבַדּוֹ״!

Shmuel says: What is the reason that Rav remained silent? Why not say to Rabbi Ya’akov that his premise is repudiated by the verse: “But if the man finds the betrothed young woman in the field, and the man takes hold of her, and lies with her, then the man who lay with her alone shall die” (Deuteronomy 22:25)? This verse proves that the punishment of stoning applies to the man even if the woman is exempt. The halakha of a man who engages in intercourse with a betrothed minor should be the same.

כְּתַנָּאֵי: ״וּמֵתוּ גַּם שְׁנֵיהֶם״ – עַד שֶׁיְּהוּ שְׁנֵיהֶן שָׁוִין, דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי יֹאשִׁיָּה. רַבִּי יוֹנָתָן אוֹמֵר: ״וּמֵת הָאִישׁ אֲשֶׁר שָׁכַב עִמָּהּ לְבַדּוֹ״.

The Gemara answers that this matter is subject to a dispute between tanna’im, as is taught in a baraita: The verse states: “Then they shall both die” (Deuteronomy 22:22), indicating that this halakha does not apply unless they are both equally subject to punishment. If one of them cannot be punished, e.g., because he or she is a minor, the other is not executed either. This is the statement of Rabbi Yoshiya. Rabbi Yonatan says that the phrase from the verse “then the man who lay with her alone shall die” indicates that in some cases only one of them is liable to receive the death penalty.

וְאִידָּךְ, הָהִיא ״וּמֵתוּ גַּם שְׁנֵיהֶם״ מַאי דָּרֵישׁ בֵּיהּ? אָמַר רָבָא: לְמַעוֹטֵי מַעֲשֵׂה חִידּוּדִים. וְאִידַּךְ? מַעֲשֵׂה חִידּוּדִים לָאו כְּלוּם הִיא.

The Gemara asks: And what does the other tanna, Rabbi Yonatan, who holds that this punishment applies even if only one party is subject to punishment, derive from the verse: “Then they shall both die”? Rava says: That verse is stated to exclude an act of sharpening, i.e., engaging in sexual contact with a woman without penetration. Since the man and woman do not equally receive pleasure from such an act, it is not considered sexual intercourse, and they are exempt. And the other tanna, Rabbi Yoshiya, holds that an act of sharpening is nothing; there is clearly no liability for such an act, and it is unnecessary to derive this halakha from the verse.

וְאִידָּךְ, הַאי ״לְבַדּוֹ״ מַאי דָּרֵישׁ בֵּיהּ?

The Gemara asks: And what does the other tanna, Rabbi Yoshiya, who holds that they must be equally subject to punishment, derive from the verse “Then the man who lay with her alone shall die”?

כִּדְתַנְיָא: בָּאוּ עָלֶיהָ עֲשָׂרָה בְּנֵי אָדָם, וַעֲדַיִין הִיא בְּתוּלָה – כּוּלָּם בִּסְקִילָה. רַבִּי אוֹמֵר: הָרִאשׁוֹן בִּסְקִילָה, וְכוּלָּן בְּחֶנֶק.

The Gemara answers: He derives another halakha, as it is taught in a baraita: If ten men engaged in intercourse with a betrothed young woman, and she is still a virgin, as they engaged in anal intercourse with her, they are all liable to be executed by stoning. Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: The first of them is executed by stoning, and all the rest of them are executed by strangulation. Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi derives from the phrase in the verse “Then the man who lay with her alone shall die” that although the woman is still a virgin, only one man can be executed by stoning for engaging in intercourse with her. The others are executed by strangulation, in accordance with the halakha of one who engages in intercourse with a married woman or a betrothed non-virgin.

תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: ״וּבַת אִישׁ כֹּהֵן כִּי תֵחֵל לִזְנוֹת״, רַבִּי אוֹמֵר: תְּחִילָּה, וְכֵן הוּא אוֹמֵר: ״וּמֵת הָאִישׁ אֲשֶׁר שָׁכַב עִמָּהּ לְבַדּוֹ״.

§ The Sages taught: The verse states: “And the daughter of any priest, if she profanes [teḥel] herself by playing the harlot, she profanes her father; she shall be burned with fire” (Leviticus 21:9). Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: The word teḥel means first [teḥila]; and likewise it says: “Then the man who lay with her alone shall die” (Deuteronomy 22:25).

מַאי קָאָמַר? אָמַר רַב הוּנָא בְּרֵיהּ דְּרַב יְהוֹשֻׁעַ: רַבִּי כְּרַבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל סְבִירָא לֵיהּ, דְּאָמַר אֲרוּסָה יָצְאָה לִשְׂרֵיפָה וְלֹא נְשׂוּאָה. וְהָכִי קָאָמַר: אִם תְּחִילַּת בִּיאָה בִּזְנוּת – בִּשְׂרֵיפָה, אִידַּךְ – בְּחֶנֶק.

The Gemara asks: What is Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi saying? Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, says: Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yishmael, who says that only the betrothed daughter of a priest is singled out for execution by burning, but not one who is married; a married daughter of a priest who commits adultery is executed in the same manner as other women who commit adultery. And this is what Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi is saying: If a woman’s first act of sexual intercourse occurs when she commits adultery, as she is still betrothed, she is executed by burning; in another case, i.e., if she is already married and this is not the first time she engages in sexual intercourse, she is executed by strangulation.

מַאי ״וְכֵן״? כִּי הָתָם: מָה הָתָם בִּתְחִילַּת בִּיאָה קָמִשְׁתַּעֵי קְרָא, הָכָא נָמֵי בִּתְחִילַּת בִּיאָה קָמִשְׁתַּעֵי קְרָא.

The Gemara asks: What is the meaning of the end of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi’s statement: And likewise it says: “Then the man who lay with her alone shall die”? What is the relevance of that verse to this issue? The Gemara answers: Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi means to say that the halakha here, in the case of a betrothed young woman who is the daughter of a priest, is like there. Just as there, with regard to a betrothed young woman who is not the daughter of a priest, the verse speaks of her first intercourse, here too, the verse speaks of her first intercourse.

אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַב בִּיבִי בַּר אַבָּיֵי: מָר לָא הָכִי אֲמַר. וּמַנּוּ? רַב יוֹסֵף.

Rav Beivai bar Abaye said to Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua: My Master does not say, i.e., does not explain the statement of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, like that. The Gemara comments: And who is his Master? Rav Yosef.

רַבִּי, כְּרַבִּי מֵאִיר סְבִירָא לֵיהּ, דְּאָמַר: נִשֵּׂאת לְאֶחָד מִן הַפְּסוּלִין – מִיתָתָהּ בְּחֶנֶק.

Rather, he explains the statement of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi as follows: Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, who says: In the case of the daughter of a priest who married one of the men unfit for her, e.g., a mamzer, and committed adultery while married to him, her death sentence is administered by strangulation and not by burning.

וְהָכִי קָאָמַר: אִם תְּחִילַּת אַחָלָתָהּ בִּזְנוּת – בִּשְׂרֵיפָה, וְאִידַּךְ – בְּחֶנֶק. וּמַאי ״וְכֵן״?

And this is what Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi is saying: If she first profanes herself, i.e., disqualifies herself from the priesthood, by committing adultery, she is executed by burning, but in another case, where she was already disqualified from the priesthood by marrying a man unfit for her, she is executed by strangulation. And what is the meaning of the end of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi’s statement: And likewise it says: “Then the man who lay with her alone shall die”?