סנהדרין עז

סנהדרין עז

נְזָקִין, שֶׁעָשָׂה בָּהֶן שׁוֹגֵג כְּמֵזִיד וְאוֹנֶס כְּרָצוֹן – אֵינוֹ דִּין שֶׁחִיֵּיב בָּהֶן אֶת הַמְצַמְצֵם?

with regard to damage, where the Torah rendered the legal status of one who causes damage unwittingly like that of one who causes damage intentionally, and the status of one who causes damage due to circumstances beyond his control like that of one who causes damage with intent, as one is always responsible for damage that he caused (see Bava Kamma 26a), is it not logical that the Torah rendered one who confines an animal in a place where it cannot survive liable to pay restitution even though he did not perform an action?

רַב אַחָא בַּר רַב פּוֹטֵר. אָמַר רַב מְשַׁרְשְׁיָא: מַאי טַעְמָא דַּאֲבוּהּ דְּאַבָּא דְּפוֹטֵר? אָמַר קְרָא: ״מוֹת יוּמַת הַמַּכֶּה רֹצֵחַ הוּא״. בְּרוֹצֵחַ הוּא דְּחַיֵּיב לַן מְצַמְצֵם, בִּנְזָקִין לָא חַיֵּיב לַן מְצַמְצֵם.

The Gemara explains the conflicting opinion. Rav Aḥa bar Rav exempts the one who confined the animal in the sun from recompensing the owner. Rav Mesharshiyya said: What is the reason for the opinion of Rav Aḥa, the father of my father, who exempts him from payment? The reason is that the verse states: “Or in enmity he struck him with his hand and he died, the assailant shall be put to death; he is a murderer” (Numbers 35:21). The phrase “he is a murderer” restricts the liability of one who confines another. It is in the case of a murderer that the Torah renders for us one who confines another liable to be executed. But in the case of damage the Torah does not render for us one who confines the animal of another liable to recompense the owner, as it was not his action that caused the damage.

אָמַר רָבָא: כְּפָתוֹ וּמֵת בָּרָעָב – פָּטוּר. וְאָמַר רָבָא: כְּפָתוֹ בַּחַמָּה וָמֵת, בְּצִינָּה וָמֵת – חַיָּיב. סוֹף חַמָּה לָבֹא, סוֹף צִינָּה לָבֹא – פָּטוּר.

§ Rava says: If one bound another and he died of starvation, he is exempt from the liability to receive a court-imposed death penalty, as it was not his action that caused the death of the victim. Even if the victim was hungry when he was bound, the starvation that caused his death ensued at a later stage. The one who bound him is liable to be punished by the heavenly court. And Rava says: If one bound another in the sun and he died of the heat, or in a cold place and he died of exposure, he is liable to be executed, as from the moment that he bound him, the victim began dying. But if one bound another in a place that at the time was not exposed to the sun or the cold, even though ultimately the sun would arrive at that place, or ultimately the cold would reach that place, he is exempt from execution, as when he bound the victim, the future cause of death was not present.

וְאָמַר רָבָא: כְּפָתוֹ לִפְנֵי אֲרִי – פָּטוּר, לִפְנֵי יַתּוּשִׁין – חַיָּיב. רַב אָשֵׁי אָמַר: אֲפִילּוּ לִפְנֵי יַתּוּשִׁין נָמֵי פָּטוּר, הָנֵי אָזְלִי וְהָנֵי אָתוּ.

And Rava says: If one bound another before a lion, he is exempt from execution. Since perhaps the lion will choose not to prey on the victim it was not his action that caused the damage. If he bound another before mosquitoes he is liable to be executed, as inevitably, the mosquitoes will bite him until he dies. Rav Ashi says: Even if he bound an individual before mosquitoes he is exempt from execution, as the mosquitoes who were there when he bound the individual are not the ones who killed him. Rather, those mosquitoes went and these other mosquitoes came. Therefore, this case is comparable to the case where one bound another in a place where the sun or the cold would ultimately arrive.

אִיתְּמַר: כָּפָה עָלָיו גִּיגִית, וּפָרַע עָלָיו מַעֲזִיבָה – רָבָא וְרַבִּי זֵירָא, חַד אָמַר: חַיָּיב, וְחַד אָמַר: פָּטוּר.

It was stated that there is an amoraic dispute with regard to one who overturned a vat upon another and he died of suffocation, or breached plaster covering the roof and the lack of a ceiling caused another to die of exposure. Rava and Rabbi Zeira disagree. One says that he is liable to be executed, and one says that he is exempt from execution.

תִּסְתַּיַּים דְּרָבָא הוּא דְּאָמַר פָּטוּר, דְּאָמַר רָבָא: כְּפָתוֹ וּמֵת בָּרָעָב – פָּטוּר.

The Gemara suggests: Conclude that Rava is the one who says that the perpetrator is exempt from execution, as Rava says: If one bound another and he died of starvation, he is exempt from execution, as it was not his action that caused the death of the victim.

אַדְּרַבָּה, תִּסְתַּיֵּים דְּרַבִּי זֵירָא הוּא דְּאָמַר פָּטוּר, דְּאָמַר רַבִּי זֵירָא: הַאי מַאן דְּעַיְּילֵיהּ לְחַבְרֵיהּ בְּבֵיתָא דְשֵׁישָׁא וְאַדְלֵיק לֵיהּ שְׁרָגָא וָמֵת – חַיָּיב. טַעְמָא דְּאַדְלֵיק לֵיהּ שְׁרָגָא, הָא לָא אַדְלֵיק לֵיהּ שְׁרָגָא – לָא.

The Gemara rejects that suggestion: On the contrary, conclude that it is Rabbi Zeira who says that the perpetrator is exempt, as Rabbi Zeira says: With regard to this individual who took another into a hermetically sealed house of marble and he kindled a lamp [sheraga] for him, and he died of the fumes, the perpetrator is liable to be executed. One may infer that the reason he is liable is because he kindled a lamp for him, but if he did not kindle a lamp for him, no, he is not liable, although the victim would have ultimately died even without the lamp. Apparently, Rabbi Zeira also maintains that the perpetrator is liable only if the perpetrator’s action caused the death, or at least caused the process of dying to begin. This case is identical to the case of the overturned vat.

אָמְרִי: הָתָם, בְּלָא שְׁרָגָא, לָא מַתְחֵיל הַבְלָא

The Sages say: In the case there, where one confines another in a house of marble, without a kindled lamp, the atmosphere does not begin to cause suffocation

בְּשַׁעְתֵּיהּ. הָכָא, בְּלָא שְׁרָגָא נָמֵי מַתְחֵיל הַבְלָא בְּשַׁעְתֵּיהּ.

at the time of the perpetrator’s action, as the room is sufficiently large to enable the individual to breathe. Here, in the case where one overturns a vat upon another, even without a kindled lamp the atmosphere begins to cause suffocation at the time of the perpetrator’s actions. Therefore, the two cases are not comparable, and it is Rava who exempts the one who overturned a vat upon another.

(סִימָן: סוּלָּם, תְּרִיס, סַמָּנִין, בַּכּוֹתֶל).

§ The Gemara cited a mnemonic for the halakhot that follow with regard to causing the death of another: Ladder, shield, herbs, in a wall.

אָמַר רָבָא: דְּחָפוֹ לְבוֹר, וְסוּלָּם בַּבּוֹר, וּבָא אַחֵר וְסִילְּקוֹ, וַאֲפִילּוּ הוּא קָדַם וְסִילְּקוֹ – פָּטוּר, דִּבְעִידָּנָא דְּשַׁדְיֵיהּ יָכוֹל לַעֲלוֹת הוּא.

Rava says: In a case where one pushed another into the pit and there was a ladder in the pit that would enable him to emerge from it, and another individual came and removed the ladder, or even if the perpetrator himself removed the ladder before the one whom he pushed could emerge, causing him to die of starvation, the perpetrator is exempt from execution. The reason is that at the time that he cast him into the pit, the victim was able to ascend and emerge from the pit. Pushing him into the pit did not cause his death, and the removal of the ladder merely prevented the victim from emerging, but was not an action that directly caused his death.

וְאָמַר רָבָא: זָרַק חֵץ, וּתְרִיס בְּיָדוֹ, וּבָא אַחֵר וּנְטָלוֹ, וַאֲפִילּוּ הוּא קָדַם וּנְטָלוֹ – פָּטוּר, דִּבְעִידָּנָא דְּשַׁדְיֵיהּ בֵּיהּ מִיפְסָק פְּסִיקִי גִּירֵיהּ.

And Rava says: In the case of one who shot an arrow at another, and there was a shield [teris] in the victim’s hand, if another individual came and took the shield from him, or even if the one who shot the arrow took the shield before the arrow reached the victim, the attacker is exempt from execution. The reason is that at the time that he shot the arrow at the victim, his arrows were blocked from the one being attacked by the shield, and they could not harm him. The victim’s death was caused indirectly, by removal of the shield.

וְאָמַר רָבָא: זָרַק בּוֹ חֵץ, וְסַמָּנִין בְּיָדוֹ, וּבָא אַחֵר וּפִיזְּרָן, וַאֲפִילּוּ הוּא קָדַם וּפִיזְּרָן – פָּטוּר, דִּבְעִידָּנָא דִּשְׁדָא בֵּיהּ יָכוֹל לְהִתְרַפְּאוֹת הֲוָה.

And Rava says: In the case of one who shot an arrow at another and the victim had herbs in his possession capable of healing the wound from the arrow before it became fatal, if another individual came and scattered the herbs, or even if the one who shot the arrow scattered them before the victim could heal his wound with the herbs, the attacker is exempt from execution. The reason is that at the time that he shot the arrow at him, the victim was able to be cured. The arrow caused injury, but the victim died due to the unavailability of a cure.

אָמַר רַב אָשֵׁי: הִלְכָּךְ, אֲפִילּוּ סַמָּנִין בַּשּׁוּק. אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַב אַחָא בְּרֵיהּ דְּרָבָא לְרַב אָשֵׁי: נִזְדַּמְּנוּ לוֹ סַמָּנִין, מַהוּ? אֲמַר לֵיהּ: הֲרֵי יָצָא מִבֵּית דִּין זַכַּאי.

Rav Ashi says: It is established that one who shoots an arrow at another is exempt when herbs that could facilitate his recovery are available; therefore, even if there are herbs available in the marketplace, the attacker is exempt from execution, as in that case, too, the herbs are available. Rav Aḥa, son of Rava, said to Rav Ashi: If the herbs were not available in the marketplace, and herbs capable of healing the wound happened to enter into the victim’s possession, yet he neglected to use them and died, what is the halakha? Rav Ashi said to Rav Aḥa: He emerged from the court innocent. As long as there was a possibility that the victim could heal his wound with the herbs, the one who shot the arrow is not a murderer; rather, he is merely one who caused death indirectly.

וְאָמַר רָבָא: זָרַק צְרוֹר בַּכּוֹתֶל, וְחָזְרָה לַאֲחוֹרֶיהָ וְהָרְגָה – חַיָּיב. וְתַנָּא תּוּנָא: כְּגוֹן אֵלּוּ הַמְשַׂחֲקִין בְּכַדּוּר שֶׁהָרְגוּ, בְּמֵזִיד – נֶהֱרָגִין, בְּשׁוֹגֵג – גּוֹלִין.

§ And Rava says: In the case of one who threw a stone with the intent to kill another, and the stone caromed off the wall and rebounded back and killed a different individual, the attacker is liable. And the tanna taught a similar halakha in a baraita: In a case where those who were playing with a ball killed another by hitting him with the rebounding ball, if they did so intentionally, they are executed by beheading; if they did so unwittingly, they are exiled.

בְּשׁוֹגֵג גּוֹלִין, פְּשִׁיטָא! בְּמֵזִיד נֶהֱרָגִין אִיצְטְרִיךְ לֵיהּ. מַהוּ דְּתֵימָא: הַתְרָאַת סָפֵק הִיא, מִי יֵימַר דְּהָדְרָה? קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן.

The Gemara asks: If they did so unwittingly, they are exiled; isn’t this obvious? All unwitting murderers are exiled. The Gemara answers: The novel element in this baraita is not that the unwit-ting murderer is exiled; rather, it was necessary for the tanna to teach that if they did so intentionally, they are executed. This halakha needed to be taught lest you say that they cannot be executed because the death penalty requires certain forewarning, i.e., forewarning of an action that will certainly lead to the death penalty, and in this case the forewarning is uncertain, as who is to say that the ball will rebound and cause death? Therefore, the tanna teaches us that those who play ball are trained in throwing it and the ball will certainly rebound; therefore, there is no uncertainty.

תָּנֵי רַב תַּחְלִיפָא בַּר מַעְרְבָא קַמֵּיהּ דְּרַבִּי אֲבָהוּ: כְּגוֹן אֵלּוּ הַמְשַׂחֲקִין בְּכַדּוּר שֶׁהָרְגוּ, תּוֹךְ אַרְבַּע אַמּוֹת – פָּטוּר, חוּץ לְאַרְבַּע אַמּוֹת – חַיָּיב.

Rav Taḥlifa, from the West, Eretz Yisrael, taught this baraita before Rabbi Abbahu: In a case where those who were playing with a ball killed an individual by hitting him with the ball, if the ball struck the individual within four cubits of the one who threw the ball, he is exempt from being exiled, as it was certainly not his intent to throw the ball so short a distance; beyond four cubits, he is liable to be exiled.

אֲמַר לֵיהּ רָבִינָא לְרַב אָשֵׁי: הֵיכִי דָמֵי? אִי דְּקָא נִיחָא לֵיהּ, אֲפִילּוּ פּוּרְתָּא נָמֵי. אִי דְּלָא נִיחָא לֵיהּ, אֲפִילּוּ טוּבָא נָמֵי לָא. אֲמַר לֵיהּ: סְתָם מְשַׂחֲקִין בְּכַדּוּר, כַּמָּה דְּעָיְילִי טְפֵי – מֵינָח נִיחָא לֵיהּ.

Ravina said to Rav Ashi, questioning this halakha: What are the circumstances? If he was amenable to having the ball travel a short distance, then he should be liable even for a throw less than four cubits. And if he was not amenable to having the ball travel the distance that it traveled, but he wanted it to travel farther, then he should not be liable even for a throw greater than four cubits. In what case is the measure of four cubits significant? Rabbi Abbahu said to him: With regard to ordinary people who play with a ball, the farther they enter and approach the wall, the more amenable they are to the result, as the ball caroms off the wall and rebounds farther. Therefore, presumably their intent was that the ball would travel a distance greater than four cubits.

לְמֵימְרָא דִּכְהַאי גַּוְונָא כֹּחוֹ הוּא? וּרְמִינְהוּ: הַמְקַדֵּשׁ, וְנָפַל קִידּוּשׁ עַל יָדוֹ אוֹ עַל הַצַּד, וְאַחַר כָּךְ נָפַל לְשׁוֹקֶת – פָּסוּל.

The Gemara questions the principle underlying this halakha. Is that to say that in a case like this, when an item caroms off the wall, the action is considered the result of his force? And the Gemara raises a contradiction from a mishna (Para 6:1): In the case of one who sanctifies the waters of purification by placing the ashes of the red heifer into the water, in order to sprinkle on one impure with impurity imparted by a corpse, and the sacred ashes fell on his hand or on the side of the vessel and only thereafter it fell into the water in the trough, the purification waters are unfit, since there is a requirement that the ashes must be placed in the water by the force of his action. Likewise, when an item caroms off a wall, the action is not generated by the force of his action; therefore, he should not be liable.

הָכָא בְּמַאי עָסְקִינַן? בְּשׁוֹתֵת.

The Gemara answers: With what are we dealing here? We are dealing with a case where the ashes trickle from his hand or from the sides of the vessel into the water, a slow movement that is not generated by the force of his action. This is in contrast to the case where he throws a ball off the wall.

תָּא שְׁמַע: מַחַט שֶׁהָיָה נְתוּנָה עַל הַחֶרֶס, וְהִזָּה עָלֶיהָ – סָפֵק עַל הַמַּחַט הִזָּה, סָפֵק עַל הַחֶרֶס הִזָּה וּמִיצָּה עָלֶיהָ – הַזָּאָתוֹ פָּסוּל.

The Gemara suggests: Come and hear proof that only an action that one generates directly is considered the force of his action, as it is taught in a mishna (Para 12:2): Concerning a needle that was impure with impurity imparted by a corpse and was placed on an earthenware shard, and one sprinkled water of purification; if there is uncertainty whether he actually sprinkled the purification water on the needle or whether he sprinkled it on the earthenware shard and the water inadvertently sprayed upon the needle, his sprinkling is unfit. Apparently, an action performed indirectly is not considered to have been generated by his force.

אָמַר רַב חִינָּנָא בַּר יְהוּדָה מִשְּׁמֵיהּ דְּרַב: ״מָצָא״ אִיתְּמַר.

Rav Ḥinnana bar Yehuda said in the name of Rav: Emend the mishna: Sprayed [mitza] was not stated in the mishna; found [matza] was stated. That is, it was found that the needle was wet, and it is not clear whether it was wet from purification water sprinkled directly upon it or from water that dripped from the earthenware onto the needle. This case is not comparable to the case of one who throws a ball off a wall.

אָמַר רַב פָּפָּא: הַאי מַאן דְּכַפְתֵיהּ לְחַבְרֵיהּ, וְאַשְׁקֵיל עֲלֵיהּ בִּידְקָא דְמַיָּא – גִּירֵי דִידֵיהּ הוּא, וּמִיחַיַּיב. הָנֵי מִילֵּי בְּכֹחַ רִאשׁוֹן, אֲבָל בְּכֹחַ שֵׁנִי – גְּרָמָא בְּעָלְמָא הוּא.

Rav Pappa says: With regard to this one who bound another and diverted a flow of water upon him and he died, the water is tantamount to his arrows that were effective in committing the murder, and he is liable. And this matter applies only in a case where he killed the other individual by primary force, as the individual was near to him and was directly drowned by the water. But if the individual was further away and was killed by secondary force after the water flowed on its own, it is not his action; rather, it is merely an indirect action, and he is exempt.

וְאָמַר רַב פָּפָּא: זָרַק צְרוֹר לְמַעְלָה וְהָלְכָה לִצְדָדִין וְהָרְגָה – חַיָּיב. אֲמַר לֵיהּ מָר בַּר רַב אָשֵׁי לְרַב פָּפָּא: מַאי טַעְמָא? מִשּׁוּם דְּכֹחוֹ הוּא? אִי כֹּחוֹ – תֵּיזִיל לְעֵיל,

And Rav Pappa says: In a case where one threw a stone upward and it went to the side, and killed an individual, he is liable. Mar, son of Rav Ashi, said to Rav Pappa: What is the reason that you say he is liable? Is it due to the fact that the result is generated by the force of his action? That cannot be, as if it is generated by the force of his action, the stone should go directly upward where he threw it, and not to the side.