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לימוד השבוע מוקדש ע”י טינה לם לע”נ יצחק מאיר בן הרב צבי אריה ואסתר בתיה.
רוצים להקדיש למידה? התחל כאן:
לימוד השבוע מוקדש ע”י טינה לם לע”נ יצחק מאיר בן הרב צבי אריה ואסתר בתיה.
שבועות ל״ד
כׇּל אַחַת וְאַחַת, בִּפְנֵי בֵּית דִּין וְשֶׁלֹּא בִּפְנֵי בֵּית דִּין – אֵינוֹ מְדַבֵּר אֶלָּא בִּתְבִיעַת מָמוֹן; עֵדוּת שֶׁלֹּא עָשָׂה בָּהּ נָשִׁים כַּאֲנָשִׁים, קְרוֹבִים כִּרְחוֹקִים, פְּסוּלִין כִּכְשֵׁרִים; וְאֵינוֹ חַיָּיב אֶלָּא אַחַת בִּפְנֵי בֵּית דִּין – אֵינוֹ דִּין שֶׁלֹּא יְהֵא מְדַבֵּר אֶלָּא בִּתְבִיעַת מָמוֹן?!
each and every oath if the plaintiff administered several oaths to him and he denied having the deposit in his possession, whether he took the oath before a court or not before a court, and despite the broad application of the halakha, the verse is speaking of liability only in cases involving a monetary claim, then in the case of an oath of testimony with regard to which the Torah did not render the halakhic status of women like that of men, the status of relatives like that of non-relatives, and the status of unfit witnesses like that of those fit to testify, and he is liable to bring only one sliding-scale offering if the plaintiff administered several oaths to him and he falsely denied knowledge of the matter in the presence of a court, is it not right that the verse is speaking of liability only in cases involving a monetary claim?
מָה לְפִקָּדוֹן – שֶׁכֵּן לֹא עָשָׂה בּוֹ מוּשְׁבָּע כַּנִּשְׁבָּע וּמֵזִיד כַּשּׁוֹגֵג; תֹּאמַר בְּעֵדוּת – שֶׁכֵּן עָשָׂה בָּהּ מוּשְׁבָּע כַּנִּשְׁבָּע וּמֵזִיד כַּשּׁוֹגֵג?!
The baraita rejects this inference: What is notable about the case of a deposit? It is notable in that with regard to a deposit the Torah did not render the halakhic status of one to whom an oath was administered by others like that of one who himself took an oath, as one to whom an oath was administered by others is exempt; and the Torah did not render the halakhic status of one who takes an intentional false oath like that of one who takes an unwitting false oath. Will you say that the same is true with regard to an oath of testimony, as in that case the Torah rendered the halakhic status of one to whom an oath was administered by others like that of one who himself took an oath; and it rendered the halakhic status of one who takes an intentional false oath like that of one who takes an unwitting false oath, and one is liable to bring an offering in both instances?
תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״תֶּחֱטָא״–״תֶּחֱטָא״ לִגְזֵירָה שָׁוָה – נֶאֱמַר כָּאן ״תֶּחֱטָא״, וְנֶאֱמַר לְהַלָּן ״תֶּחֱטָא״; מָה לְהַלָּן אֵינוֹ מְדַבֵּר אֶלָּא בִּתְבִיעַת מָמוֹן, אַף כָּאן אֵינוֹ מְדַבֵּר אֶלָּא בִּתְבִיעַת מָמוֹן.
Therefore, the verse states the term “shall sin” with regard to an oath of testimony and states “shall sin” with regard to an oath on a deposit in order to derive a verbal analogy. Here, it is stated with regard to an oath of testimony: “Shall sin” (Leviticus 5:1), and there, it is stated with regard to an oath on a deposit: “Shall sin” (Leviticus 5:21). Just as there, concerning an oath on a deposit, the verse is speaking only with regard to a monetary claim, so too here, concerning an oath of testimony, the verse is speaking only with regard to a monetary claim.
מַתְקֵיף לַהּ רַבָּה בַּר עוּלָּא: ״אוֹ״ ״אוֹ״ בִּיטּוּי יוֹכִיחוּ – שֶׁהֵן ״אוֹאִין״, וְיֵשׁ עִמָּהֶן שְׁבוּעָה, וְאֵין עִמָּהֶן כֹּהֵן – וּמְדַבְּרִים שֶׁלֹּא בִּתְבִיעַת מָמוֹן!
§ After presenting the different proofs cited in the baraita, the Gemara proceeds to analyze the opinions cited therein, beginning with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer that one derives that one is liable for an oath of testimony only if it involves a monetary claim from the case of an oath on a deposit based on multiple instances of the term “or” that appear in both contexts, and there is an oath with those multiple instances of the term “or” and there is no priest in their context. Rabba bar Ulla objects to this: The multiple instances of the term “or” in the verse: “Or if any one shall take an oath to clearly express with his lips to do evil or to do good” (Leviticus 5:4), which is written with regard to an oath on an utterance, will prove that one is liable even without a monetary claim, as they are multiple instances of the term “or,” and there is an oath in their context, and there is no priest in their context, and they are not speaking with regard to a monetary claim.
מִסְתַּבְּרָא מִפִּקָּדוֹן הֲוָה לֵיהּ לְמֵילַף, שֶׁכֵּן ״תֶּחֱטָא״ מִ״תֶּחֱטָא״.
The Gemara rejects this: It stands to reason that he should have derived the halakha with regard to an oath of testimony from an oath on a deposit and not from an oath on an utterance due to the verbal analogy between the terms “shall sin” and “shall sin.”
אַדְּרַבָּה – מִבִּיטּוּי הֲוָה לֵיהּ לְמֵילַף, שֶׁכֵּן חַטָּאת מֵחַטָּאת!
The Gemara rejects this: On the contrary, he should have derived the halakha with regard to an oath of testimony from the halakha with regard to an oath on an utterance, as it is a derivation of one case for which one is liable to bring a sin-offering for taking a false oath from another case for which one is liable to bring a sin-offering for taking a false oath. This is in contrast to an oath on a deposit, for which one is liable to bring a guilt-offering for taking a false oath.
אֶלָּא מִסְתַּבְּרָא מִפִּקָּדוֹן הֲוָה לֵיהּ לְמֵילַף – שֶׁכֵּן חֵטְא; בְּמֵזִיד; תַּבְעֵיהּ וְכַפְרֵיהּ; וְעַבְרֵיהּ.
Rather, it stands to reason that he should have derived the halakha with regard to an oath of testimony from the halakha with regard to an oath on a deposit, as there are many elements common to both oaths, represented by the mnemonic: Sin, intentionally, claimed from him, denied his claim, and his past. There is a verbal analogy between them, as the term “shall sin” appears in both contexts. In both cases one is liable for taking a false oath intentionally. Additionally, in both cases there is a claim presented by one of the parties and denial of that claim by the one taking the oath. And both oaths relate to events that transpired in the past.
אַדְּרַבָּה, מִבִּיטּוּי הֲוָה לֵיהּ לְמֵילַף, שֶׁכֵּן חַטָּאת שֶׁיָּרְדָה לְחוֹמֶשׁ! הָנָךְ נְפִישָׁן.
The Gemara asks: On the contrary, he should have derived the halakha with regard to an oath of testimony from the halakha with regard to an oath on an utterance, as there are many elements common to both oaths, represented by the mnemonic: Sin–offering, that descended, to one-fifth. In both cases one is liable to bring a sin-offering for a false oath, as opposed to a guilt-offering for a false oath on a deposit. In each case the offering is a sliding-scale offering, as opposed to the fixed offering in the case of an oath on a deposit. In both cases there is no payment of an additional one-fifth for taking a false oath. And in the case of a false oath on a deposit, there is payment of an additional one-fifth. The Gemara answers: These elements common to an oath of testimony and an oath on a deposit are more numerous than the elements common to an oath of testimony and an oath on an utterance.
רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא אוֹמֵר: ״וְהָיָה כִי יֶאְשַׁם לְאַחַת מֵאֵלֶּה״ – יֵשׁ מֵאֵלֶּה שֶׁהוּא חַיָּיב, וְיֵשׁ מֵאֵלֶּה שֶׁהוּא פָּטוּר. הָא כֵּיצַד? תְּבָעוֹ מָמוֹן – חַיָּיב, תְּבָעוֹ דָּבָר אַחֵר – פָּטוּר.
§ Rabbi Akiva says that it is written with regard to an oath of testimony: “And it shall be when he will be guilty of one of these” (Leviticus 5:5). The term “of these” is a restrictive expression from which it is derived: There are some of these for which he is liable and there are some of these for which he is exempt. How so? If the plaintiff demanded testimony from the witness with regard to a monetary claim, the witness is liable for taking a false oath; if the plaintiff demanded testimony from the witness with regard to another matter, he is exempt.
אֵיפוֹךְ אֲנָא!
The Gemara challenges: Since it is not clear from the verse for which claim one is liable and for which claim one is exempt, I will reverse it and say that one is liable only when the claim was with regard to another matter, not when it involves monetary matters.
רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא אַ״אוֹאִין״ דְּרַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר סְמִיךְ.
The Gemara answers: Rabbi Akiva relies on the multiple instances of the term “or,” as cited by Rabbi Eliezer, to derive from an oath on a deposit that one is liable only for a false oath that involves a monetary claim. From the term “of these” Rabbi Akiva derives that there are some cases involving monetary claims for which one is not liable for taking a false oath of testimony.
מַאי בֵּינַיְיהוּ בֵּין רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר וּבֵין רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא?
The Gemara asks: What is the practical difference between the opinions of Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Akiva? With regard to which cases involving monetary claims does Rabbi Akiva hold that one is not liable for taking a false oath of testimony?
אִיכָּא בֵּינַיְיהוּ מַשְׁבִּיעַ עֵדֵי קַרְקַע – לְרַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר חַיָּיבִין, לְרַבִּי עֲקִיבָא פְּטוּרִין.
The Gemara answers: The practical difference between their opinions is in the case of one who administers an oath to witnesses with regard to testimony involving land. According to Rabbi Eliezer, they are liable if they take a false oath. According to Rabbi Akiva they are exempt in that case, as it is excluded by the term “of these.”
וּלְרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן, דְּאָמַר הָתָם: מַשְׁבִּיעַ עֵדֵי קַרְקַע אֲפִילּוּ לְרַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר פְּטוּרִין – הָכָא מַאי אִיכָּא בֵּין רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר לְרַבִּי עֲקִיבָא?
The Gemara asks: And according to Rabbi Yoḥanan, who says there with regard to an oath on a deposit and an oath of testimony that in the case of one who administers an oath to witnesses with regard to testimony involving land, the witnesses are exempt even according to Rabbi Eliezer, what difference is there between the opinions of Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Akiva?
אִיכָּא בֵּינַיְיהוּ עֵדֵי קְנָס.
The Gemara answers: The practical difference between their opinions is in the case where one administers an oath to witnesses with regard to testimony involving a fine. According to Rabbi Eliezer they are liable, and according to Rabbi Akiva they are exempt.
רַבִּי יוֹסֵי הַגְּלִילִי אוֹמֵר: ״וְהוּא עֵד אוֹ רָאָה אוֹ יָדָע״ – בְּעֵדוּת הַמִּתְקַיֶּימֶת בִּרְאִיָּה בְּלֹא יְדִיעָה וּבִידִיעָה בְּלֹא רְאִיָּה הַכָּתוּב מְדַבֵּר.
§ Rabbi Yosei HaGelili cites a different proof and says: The verse states with regard to an oath of testimony: “And he is a witness or he saw or he knew” (Leviticus 5:1). It is with regard to testimony that is founded on sight without knowledge of the matter, or by means of knowledge without sight, that the verse is speaking. The reference is to testimony involving monetary matters, as all other testimony requires both knowledge and sight.
אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַב פָּפָּא לְאַבָּיֵי: לֵימָא רַבִּי יוֹסֵי הַגְּלִילִי לֵית לֵיהּ דְּרַבִּי אַחָא? דְּתַנְיָא, רַבִּי אַחָא אוֹמֵר: גָּמָל הָאוֹחֵר בֵּין הַגְּמַלִּים וְנִמְצָא גָּמָל הָרוּג בְּצִידּוֹ – בְּיָדוּעַ שֶׁזֶּה הֲרָגוֹ. דְּאִי אִית לֵיהּ דְּרַבִּי אַחָא, בְּדִינֵי נְפָשׁוֹת נָמֵי מַשְׁכַּחַתְּ לַהּ – כְּרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן שָׁטַח!
Rav Pappa said to Abaye: Shall we say that Rabbi Yosei HaGelili does not accept the opinion of Rabbi Aḥa? As it is taught in a baraita (Tosefta, Bava Kamma 3:6) that Rabbi Aḥa says: If there is a rutting male camel [gamal haoḥer] that is rampaging among other camels and then a camel was found killed at its side, it is evident that this rampaging camel killed it, and the owner must pay for the damage. Rabbi Aḥa rules that cases of monetary law can be decided based on circumstantial evidence. As, if he is of the opinion that the ruling is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Aḥa that witnesses may testify on the basis of circumstantial evidence, in cases of capital law too, you find a case of knowledge without sight, as in the case discussed by Rabbi Shimon ben Shataḥ.
דְּתַנְיָא, אָמַר רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן שָׁטַח: אֶרְאֶה בְּנֶחָמָה אִם לֹא רָאִיתִי אֶחָד שֶׁרָץ אַחַר חֲבֵירוֹ לְחוּרְבָּה, וְרַצְתִּי אַחֲרָיו, וּמָצָאתִי סַיִיף בְּיָדוֹ וְדָם מְטַפְטֵף וְהָרוּג מְפַרְפֵּר; אָמַרְתִּי לוֹ: רָשָׁע! מִי הֲרָגוֹ לָזֶה? אוֹ אֲנִי, אוֹ אַתָּה!
As it is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Shimon ben Shataḥ said in the form of an oath: I will not see the consolation of Israel if I did not see one who was running after another into a ruin, and I ran after him and found a sword in his hand and blood dripping from the sword, and the slain person convulsing. I said to him: Wicked one, who killed this person? It was either me or you, as there is no one else here.
אֲבָל מָה אֶעֱשֶׂה, שֶׁאֵין דָּמְךָ מָסוּר בְּיָדִי, שֶׁהֲרֵי אָמְרָה תּוֹרָה: ״עַל פִּי שְׁנַיִם עֵדִים אוֹ שְׁלֹשָׁה עֵדִים יוּמַת הַמֵּת״. אֶלָּא הַמָּקוֹם יִפָּרַע מִמְּךָ. אָמְרוּ: לֹא זָזוּ מִשָּׁם עַד שֶׁנְּשָׁכוֹ נָחָשׁ וָמֵת.
But what can I do, as your blood is not given to my control and I have no jurisdiction to execute you, as the Torah says: “On the basis of two witnesses or three witnesses shall he that is to die be put to death” (Deuteronomy 17:6), and there are no witnesses here. Rather, the Omnipresent will exact retribution from you. The Sages said: They did not move from there until a snake came and bit the pursuer and he died. Rabbi Aḥa would hold in that case that the pursuer could be executed by the court based on circumstantial evidence. Ostensibly, Rabbi Yosei HaGelili disagrees, as he says that testimony based on knowledge without sight exists only in cases of monetary law.
אֲפִילּוּ תֵּימָא אִית לֵיהּ דְּרַבִּי אַחָא; בִּשְׁלָמָא יְדִיעָה בְּלֹא רְאִיָּה – מַשְׁכַּחַתְּ לַהּ; אֶלָּא רְאִיָּה בְּלֹא יְדִיעָה – הֵיכִי מַשְׁכַּחַתְּ לַהּ? מִי לָא בָּעֵי מִידָּע אִם גּוֹי הָרַג אוֹ יִשְׂרָאֵל הָרַג, אִם אָדָם טְרֵפָה הָרַג אוֹ שָׁלֵם הָרַג?
The Gemara answers: Even if you say that Rabbi Yosei HaGelili is of the opinion that the ruling is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Aḥa that one may rely on circumstantial evidence even in cases of capital law, one may nevertheless distinguish between cases of monetary law and cases of capital law. Granted, even in cases of capital law you find testimony based on knowledge without sight, but how can you find a case of sight without knowledge? Don’t the witnesses need to know if the one whom he witnessed killing another killed a gentile or he killed a Jew, if he killed one who has a wound that would have caused him to die within twelve months [tereifa] or he killed one whose body is intact?
שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ, קָסָבַר רַבִּי יוֹסֵי הַגְּלִילִי: מַשְׁבִּיעַ עֵדֵי קְנָס – פָּטוּר; דְּאִי סָלְקָא דַעְתָּךְ חַיָּיב, נְהִי דִּידִיעָה בְּלֹא רְאִיָּה – אַשְׁכְּחַן לַהּ; רְאִיָּה בְּלֹא יְדִיעָה – מִי לָא בָּעֵי מִידָּע גּוֹיָה בָּעַל בַּת יִשְׂרָאֵל בָּעַל, בְּתוּלָה בָּעַל בְּעוּלָה בָּעַל?
The Gemara notes: Conclude from it that Rabbi Yosei HaGelili holds that in a case where one administers an oath to witnesses with regard to testimony involving a fine, the witnesses are exempt from liability for taking a false oath of testimony. As if it enters your mind to say that the witnesses are liable, although you find testimony with regard to fines based on knowledge without sight, and witnesses may testify based on circumstantial evidence, in cases of sight without knowledge, when it comes to fines, don’t the witnesses need to know if the rapist engaged in intercourse with a gentile woman or if he engaged in intercourse with a Jewish woman, if he engaged in intercourse with a virgin or if he engaged in intercourse with a non-virgin? Rabbi Yosei HaGelili holds that witnesses are liable for taking a false oath of testimony only in cases where both testimony based on sight alone and testimony based on knowledge alone are accepted, which is not the case concerning testimony involving fines.
יָתֵיב רַב הַמְנוּנָא קַמֵּיהּ דְּרַב יְהוּדָה, וְיָתֵיב רַב יְהוּדָה וְקָא מִיבַּעְיָא לֵיהּ: ״מָנֶה מְנִיתִיךְ בִּפְנֵי פְּלוֹנִי וּפְלוֹנִי״,
§ Apropos the matter of sight without knowledge in cases of monetary law, the Gemara relates: Rav Hamnuna was sitting before Rav Yehuda, and Rav Yehuda was sitting and he was raising a dilemma: If one demands payment from another and claims: I counted for you and gave you one hundred dinars in the presence of so-and-so and so-and-so,
וְעֵדִים רוֹאִין אוֹתוֹ מִבַּחוּץ, מַאי?
and witnesses see him counting the money from outside, what is the halakha? Is their testimony accepted?
אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַב הַמְנוּנָא: וְהַלָּה מָה טוֹעֵן? אִי אָמַר: ״לֹא הָיוּ דְבָרִים מֵעוֹלָם״ – הוּחְזַק כַּפְרָן! אִי אָמַר: ״אִין, שְׁקַלִי – וְדִידִי שְׁקַלִי״ – כִּי אָתוּ עֵדִים מַאי הָוֵי? אֲמַר לֵיהּ: הַמְנוּנָא אַתְּ? עוּל תָּא.
Rav Hamnuna said to Rav Yehuda: And what does the other person claim in response to the demand for repayment? If he says: These matters never happened, he assumes the presumptive status of a denier of the truth, as the witnesses testify that they saw the claimant counting the money and giving it to him. If he says: Yes, I took money from him, but it is my money that I took, then when the witnesses come and testify that they saw the claimant counting the money and giving it to him, what of it? The testimony of the witnesses does not contradict his claim, as the witnesses do not know the circumstances under which the money changed hands. Rav Yehuda said to him: Are you Hamnuna? Enter and come into the study hall, as you make your teacher wiser.
הָהוּא דַּאֲמַר לֵיהּ לְחַבְרֵיהּ: ״מָנֶה מָנִיתִי לְךָ בְּצַד עַמּוּד זֶה״, אֲמַר לֵיהּ: ״לֹא עָבַרְתִּי בְּצַד עַמּוּד זֶה״. אֲתוֹ תְּרֵי סָהֲדִי, אַסְהִידוּ בֵּיהּ דְּהִשְׁתִּין מַיִם בְּצַד עַמּוּד זֶה. אָמַר רֵישׁ לָקִישׁ: הוּחְזַק כַּפְרָן.
The Gemara relates a similar incident: There was a certain individual who said to another: I counted for you and gave you one hundred dinars as a loan alongside this column. The other person said to him in response: I did not pass alongside this column. Two witnesses came and testified about him that they saw that he urinated alongside this column. Reish Lakish said: He assumes the presumptive status of a denier of the truth, as the testimony of witnesses proves that he passed alongside the column.
מַתְקֵיף לַהּ רַב נַחְמָן: הַאי דִּינָא פָּרְסָאָה הוּא! מִי קָאָמַר ״מֵעוֹלָם״?! בְּעֵסֶק זֶה קָאָמַר לֵיהּ!
Rav Naḥman objects to this: That is a ruling characteristic of a Persian court, not a reasonable ruling characteristic of a Jewish court. Did the respondent say that he never passed alongside the column? It was that he did not pass alongside the column in the context of this matter that he said to him that he did not pass the column; therefore, the testimony of the witnesses does not contradict his statement.
אִיכָּא דְּאָמְרִי, הָהוּא דַּאֲמַר לֵיהּ לְחַבְרֵיהּ: ״מָנֶה מָנִיתִי לְךָ בְּצַד עַמּוּד זֶה״, אֲמַר לֵיהּ: ״לֹא עָבַרְתִּי בְּצַד עַמּוּד זֶה מֵעוֹלָם״. נְפַקוּ בֵּיהּ סָהֲדִי דְּהִשְׁתִּין מַיִם בְּצַד עַמּוּד זֶה. אָמַר רַב נַחְמָן: הוּחְזַק כַּפְרָן.
There are those who say that the incident transpired a bit differently. There was a certain individual who said to another: I counted for you and gave you one hundred dinars as a loan alongside this column. The other person said to him in response: I never passed alongside this column. Witnesses emerged and testified concerning him that he urinated alongside this column. Rav Naḥman said: He assumes the presumptive status of a denier of the truth, as the witnesses contradicted his claim.
אֲמַר לֵיהּ רָבָא לְרַב נַחְמָן: כֹּל מִילְּתָא דְּלָא רַמְיָא עֲלֵיהּ דְּאִינִישׁ, עָבֵיד לַהּ וְלָאו אַדַּעְתֵּיהּ.
Rava said to Rav Naḥman: There is no proof from here that he assumes the presumptive status of a denier, as any matter that is not incumbent upon a person to remember, he performs it and it is not on his mind. Therefore, when he denied ever passing alongside the column, it was because there was never any reason for him to remember that he had been there.
רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן אוֹמֵר: חִיֵּיב כָּאן וְחִיֵּיב בְּפִקָּדוֹן כּוּ׳.
§ The Gemara proceeds to cite the opinion cited last in the baraita explaining the source of the halakha that one is liable for taking a false oath of testimony only for a case involving monetary matters. Rabbi Shimon says: The Torah rendered one liable if he takes a false oath here, with regard to an oath of testimony, and the Torah rendered one liable if he takes a false oath with regard to an oath on a deposit; just as there, the verse is speaking of liability only in cases involving monetary claims, so too here, the verse is speaking of liability only in cases involving monetary claims.
מַחֲכוּ עֲלַהּ בְּמַעְרְבָא. מַאי חוּכָא?
They mocked this proof in the West, i.e., Eretz Yisrael. The Gemara asked: What is worthy of mockery in the statement of Rabbi Shimon?
דְּקָתָנֵי: מָה לְפִקָּדוֹן, שֶׁכֵּן לֹא עָשָׂה בּוֹ מוּשְׁבָּע כַּנִּשְׁבָּע, מֵזִיד כַּשּׁוֹגֵג.
The Gemara explains that they mocked that which the baraita teaches in the continuation, rejecting the a fortiori inference suggested by Rabbi Shimon: What is notable about the case of a deposit? It is notable in that with regard to a deposit the Torah did not render the halakhic status of one to whom an oath was administered by others like that of one who himself took an oath, as one to whom an oath was administered by others is exempt; and the Torah did not render the halakhic status of one who takes an intentional false oath like that of one who takes an unwitting false oath.
מִכְּדֵי מוּשְׁבָּע מִפִּי עַצְמוֹ בְּעֵדוּת, לְרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן מְנָא לֵיהּ – דִּגְמַר מִפִּקָּדוֹן; פִּקָּדוֹן נָמֵי – מוּשְׁבָּע מִפִּי אֲחֵרִים, נִגְמַר מֵעֵדוּת!
This rejection is difficult: Now, with regard to the fact that one who administered an oath to himself is liable in the case of an oath of testimony, from where is it derived according to Rabbi Shimon? Rabbi Shimon derives it by means of a verbal analogy from an oath on a deposit. If so, based on the same verbal analogy, in the case of an oath on a deposit too, let us derive from the case of an oath of testimony the fact that one is liable for a false oath that was administered by others.
וּמַאי חוּכָא? דִּלְמָא רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בְּקַל וָחוֹמֶר מַיְיתֵי לַהּ: מִפִּי אֲחֵרִים חַיָּיב – מִפִּי עַצְמוֹ לֹא כׇּל שֶׁכֵּן?!
The Gemara rejects this: And what is worthy of mockery in that statement? Perhaps Rabbi Shimon does not derive that one who takes a false oath of testimony on his own is liable by means of a verbal analogy from an oath on a deposit; rather, he derives it by means of an a fortiori inference: If one is liable for a false oath of testimony administered by others, is it not all the more so that he is liable for an oath that he takes on his own?
אֶלָּא חוּכָא אַמֵּזִיד כַּשּׁוֹגֵג – דְּקָתָנֵי: מָה לְפִקָּדוֹן – שֶׁכֵּן לֹא עָשָׂה בּוֹ מוּשְׁבָּע כַּנִּשְׁבָּע, מֵזִיד כַּשּׁוֹגֵג.
The Gemara answers: Rather, the mockery is with regard to the distinction between an oath on a deposit and an oath of testimony in the matter of whether the halakhic status of one who takes an intentional false oath is like that of one who takes an unwitting false oath, as it teaches in the baraita: What is notable about the case of a deposit? It is notable in that with regard to a deposit the Torah did not render the halakhic status of one to whom an oath was administered by others like that of one who himself took an oath, as one to whom an oath was administered by others is exempt; and the Torah did not render the halakhic status of one who takes an intentional false oath like that of one who takes an unwitting false oath.
מִכְּדֵי מֵזִיד גַּבֵּי עֵדוּת מְנָא לֵיהּ – דְּלָא כְּתִיב בֵּיהּ ״וְנֶעֱלַם״; הָכָא נָמֵי לָא כְּתִיב בֵּיהּ ״וְנֶעֱלַם״!
Now, from where does he derive that one who takes an intentional false oath of testimony is liable? He derives it as it is not written in the context of an oath of testimony: And it is hidden. Here too, it is not written in the context of an oath on a deposit: And it is hidden. Therefore, there should be no distinction between intentional and unwitting with regard to an oath on a deposit either.
אֲמַר לְהוּ רַב הוּנָא: וּמַאי חוּכָא? דִּלְמָא מֵזִיד דְּלָאו כַּשּׁוֹגֵג בְּפִקָּדוֹן, מִמְּעִילָה רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן גָּמַר לַהּ!
Rav Huna said to the Sages: And what is worthy of mockery in that statement? Perhaps the fact that the halakhic status of one who takes an intentional false oath is not like that of one who takes an unwitting false oath in the case of a deposit, and it is from the halakhot of misuse of consecrated property that Rabbi Shimon derived it. Just as one is liable to bring a guilt-offering for the misuse of consecrated property only if he did so unwittingly, one is liable to bring a guilt-offering for a false oath on a deposit only if he unwittingly took the false oath.
וְהַיְינוּ חוּכָא – אַדְּגָמַר לַהּ מִמְּעִילָה, נִגְמַר לַהּ מֵעֵדוּת!
The Gemara answers: And that is what is worthy of mockery. Instead of deriving the lack of liability for an intentional false oath of deposit from the case of misuse of consecrated property, let him derive liability for an intentional false oath on a deposit from the case of an oath of testimony.
מִסְתַּבְּרָא מִמְּעִילָה הֲוָה לֵיהּ לְמֵילַף, שֶׁכֵּן מְעִילָה מִמְּעִילָה.
The Gemara rejects this: It stands to reason that he should have derived it from the case of misuse of consecrated property, as that is a derivation of misuse written with regard to an oath on a deposit: “If any one shall sin and commits an act of misuse and dealt falsely with his colleague in a matter of deposit” (Leviticus 5:21), which is derived from misuse written with regard to misuse of consecrated property: “If any one commits an act of misuse and sinned unwittingly from items consecrated to the Lord” (Leviticus 5:15).
אַדְּרַבָּה – מֵעֵדוּת הֲוָה לֵיהּ לְמֵילַף, שֶׁכֵּן ״תֶּחֱטָא״ מִ״תֶּחֱטָא״!
The Gemara asks: On the contrary, he should have derived it from the case of an oath of testimony, as that is a derivation of “shall sin” written with regard to an oath on a deposit which is derived from “shall sin” written with regard to an oath of testimony: “And if any one shall sin and he hears the voice of an oath, and he is a witness” (Leviticus 5:1).
מִסְתַּבְּרָא מִמְּעִילָה הֲוָה לֵיהּ לְמֵילַף, שֶׁכֵּן מְעִילָה; בַּכֹּל; נֶהֱנֶה; בְּקָבוּעַ; חוֹמֶשׁ; וְאָשָׁם.
The Gemara rejects this: It stands to reason that it is from the case of misuse of consecrated property that he should have derived it, as there are many elements common to an oath on a deposit and misuse of consecrated property represented by the mnemonic: Misuse, with regard to all, derive benefit, with fixed, one-fifth, and guilt-offering. The term misuse is employed in both cases. Both cases are relevant with regard to all individuals and not only those fit to testify. Both involve one deriving benefit from property that is not his. In both cases, one is liable to bring a fixed guilt-offering, as opposed to one who takes a false oath of testimony, who is liable to bring a sliding-scale offering. In both cases, one adds one-fifth to the payment of the principal. In both cases, that is the offering with which one gains atonement.
אַדְּרַבָּה – מֵעֵדוּת הֲוָה לֵיהּ לְמֵילַף, שֶׁכֵּן חֵטְא; הֶדְיוֹט; בִּשְׁבוּעָה; תַּבְעֵיהּ וְכַפְרֵיהּ; וְ״אוֹאִין״! הָנָךְ נְפִישִׁין.
The Gemara rejects this: On the contrary, he should have derived the halakha with regard to an oath on a deposit from the halakha of an oath of testimony, as there are many elements common to both oaths represented by the mnemonic: Sin, ordinary [hedyot], with an oath, claimed from him, denied his claim, and multiple instances of the term “or.” The term “shall sin” is written in both contexts. Both oaths relate to the property of ordinary individuals, not to consecrated property. In both cases there is a claim presented by one of the parties and denial of that claim by the one taking the oath. Multiple instances of the term “or” appear in both passages in the Torah. The Gemara responds: These elements common to an oath on a deposit and misuse of consecrated property are more numerous than the elements common to an oath on a deposit and an oath of testimony.
אֶלָּא מַאי חוּכָא?
Rather, after resolving all the difficulties that were raised against the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, the question remains: What did the Sages of Eretz Yisrael find that is worthy of mockery in that baraita?
כִּי אֲתָא רַב פָּפָּא וְרַב הוּנָא בְּרֵיהּ דְּרַב יְהוֹשֻׁעַ מִבֵּי רַב, אָמְרִי: הַיְינוּ חוּכָא – מִכְּדֵי רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן גְּזֵירָה שָׁוָה גְּמִיר, לְמָה לֵיהּ דְּפָרֵיךְ: מָה לְפִקָּדוֹן שֶׁכֵּן לֹא עָשָׂה בּוֹ מוּשְׁבָּע כַּנִּשְׁבָּע, מֵזִיד כַּשּׁוֹגֵג?
When Rav Pappa and Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, came from the study hall of their teacher, they said: This is what is worthy of mockery: Now, since ultimately Rabbi Shimon derives the halakha by means of a verbal analogy between the term “shall sin” written with regard to an oath on a deposit and the term “shall sin” written with regard to an oath of testimony, why is it that he refutes the parallel between them by saying: What is notable about the case of a deposit? It is notable in that with regard to a deposit the Torah did not render the halakhic status of one to whom an oath was administered by others like that of one who himself took an oath, as one to whom an oath was administered by others is exempt; and the Torah did not render the halakhic status of one who takes an intentional false oath like that of one who takes an unwitting false oath. Rabbi Shimon should have derived by means of the verbal analogy that all the halakhot of an oath of testimony and all the halakhot of an oath on a deposit are identical.
וּמַאי חוּכָא? דִּלְמָא כִּי פָּרֵיךְ – מִקַּמֵּי דְּתֵיקוּם לֵיהּ גְּזֵירָה שָׁוָה; בָּתַר דְּקָמָא לֵיהּ גְּזֵירָה שָׁוָה לָא פָּרֵיךְ!
The Gemara rejects this: And what is worthy of mockery in that statement? Perhaps when Rabbi Shimon refuted the parallel between the two oaths, it was prior to the verbal analogy being established for him, and the derivation was by means of a paradigm. After the verbal analogy was established for him, he does not refute the parallel and holds that in the case of an oath on a deposit one is liable to bring a guilt-offering for false oaths administered by others as well as for intentional false oaths.
וְלָא?! וְהָאָמַר לְהוּ רָבָא בַּר אִיתַּי לְרַבָּנַן: מַאן תָּנָא שְׁבוּעַת הַפִּקָּדוֹן לֹא נִיתַּן זְדוֹנָהּ לְכַפָּרָה – רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן הִיא!
The Gemara asks: And does Rabbi Shimon not refute the parallel between the two oaths? But didn’t Rava bar Ittai say to the Sages: Who is the tanna who taught with regard to an oath on a deposit that atonement by means of an offering is not possible for one who takes an intentional false oath? It is Rabbi Shimon. Apparently, Rabbi Shimon concludes that there remains a distinction between intentional and unwitting in the case of an oath on a deposit.
דִּלְמָא מֵזִיד כַּשּׁוֹגֵג פָּרֵיךְ, דְּגָמַר לַהּ מִמְּעִילָה, דְּהָנָךְ נְפִישִׁין; אֲבָל מוּשְׁבָּע כַּנִּשְׁבָּע לָא פָּרֵיךְ.
The Gemara suggests: Perhaps with regard to the halakhic status of one who takes an intentional false oath being like that of one who takes an unwitting false oath, Rabbi Shimon refutes the parallel between the two oaths even after the verbal analogy is established for him, as he derives the halakha of an oath on a deposit from the halakha of misuse of consecrated property, where there is a distinction between intentional and unwitting, as those elements common to an oath on a deposit and the misuse of consecrated property are more numerous than the elements common to an oath on a deposit and an oath of testimony. But he does not refute the parallel between the two oaths with the claim that there is a distinction between them with regard to whether the halakhic status of one to whom an oath was administered by others is like that of one who himself took an oath. Once the verbal analogy was established for him, there is no longer a distinction between the two oaths in that regard.
וְתֶהְדַּר עֵדוּת וְתִגְמֵר לַהּ מִפִּקָּדוֹן, מֵזִיד דְּלָאו כַּשּׁוֹגֵג – מָה פִּקָּדוֹן, שׁוֹגֵג אִין מֵזִיד לָא; אַף עֵדוּת, שׁוֹגֵג אִין מֵזִיד לָא – כִּי הֵיכִי דְּיָלֵיף פִּקָּדוֹן מִמְּעִילָה!
The Gemara asks: If, according to Rabbi Shimon, based on the derivation from the misuse of consecrated property, one who intentionally takes a false oath on a deposit does not bring a guilt-offering like one who took the false oath unwittingly, let the discussion of the case of an oath of testimony return to the verbal analogy and derive it from the case of an oath on a deposit that the halakhic status of one who takes an intentional false oath is not like that of one who takes an unwitting false oath. Just as in the case of an oath on a deposit, one who takes an unwitting false oath, yes, he is liable to bring a guilt-offering, and one who takes an intentional false oath, no, he is not liable, so too, in the case of an oath of testimony, one who takes an unwitting false oath, yes, he is liable to bring a sin-offering, and one who takes an intentional false oath, no, he is not liable, just as he derives the case of an oath on a deposit from the case of misuse of consecrated property.
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A Daf Of Their Own – Intro To Kodashim
הרבנית שירה מירוויס מרילי והרבנית חמוטל שובל
14.09.2025 | כ״א באלול תשפ״ה
חדשה בלימוד הגמרא?
זה הדף הראשון שלך? איזו התרגשות עצומה! יש לנו בדיוק את התכנים והכלים שיעזרו לך לעשות את הצעדים הראשונים ללמידה בקצב וברמה שלך, כך תוכלי להרגיש בנוח גם בתוך הסוגיות המורכבות ומאתגרות.
פסיפס הלומדות שלנו
גלי את קהילת הלומדות שלנו, מגוון נשים, רקעים וסיפורים. כולן חלק מתנועה ומסע מרגש ועוצמתי.
התחלתי לפני 8 שנים במדרשה. לאחרונה סיימתי מסכת תענית בלמידה עצמית ועכשיו לקראת סיום מסכת מגילה.
דניאלה ברוכים
רעננה, ישראל
. לא תמיד נהניתי מלימוד גמרא כילדה.,בל כהתבגרתי התחלתי לאהוב את זה שוב. התחלתי ללמוד מסכת סוטה בדף היומי לפני כחמש עשרה שנה ואז הפסקתי.הגעתי לסיום הגדול של הדרן לפני שנתיים וזה נתן לי השראה. והתחלתי ללמוד למשך כמה ימים ואז היתה לי פריצת דיסק והפסקתי…עד אלול השנה. אז התחלתי עם מסכת ביצה וב”ה אני מצליחה לעמוד בקצב. המשפחה מאוד תומכת בי ויש כמה שגם לומדים את זה במקביל. אני אוהבת שיש עוגן כל יום.
רבקה דרשן
בית שמש, ישראל
התחלתי מעט לפני תחילת הסבב הנוכחי. אני נהנית מהאתגר של להמשיך להתמיד, מרגעים של "אהה, מפה זה הגיע!” ומהאתגר האינטלקטואלי
אילת-חן ודלר
לוד, ישראל
התחלתי ללמוד דף יומי כאשר קיבלתי במייל ממכון שטיינזלץ את הדפים הראשונים של מסכת ברכות במייל. קודם לא ידעתי איך לקרוא אותם עד שנתתי להם להדריך אותי. הסביבה שלי לא מודעת לעניין כי אני לא מדברת על כך בפומבי. למדתי מהדפים דברים חדשים, כמו הקשר בין המבנה של בית המקדש והמשכן לגופו של האדם (יומא מה, ע”א) והקשר שלו למשפט מפורסם שמופיע בספר ההינדי "בהגוד-גיתא”. מתברר שזה רעיון כלל עולמי ולא רק יהודי
אלנה ארנבורג
נשר, ישראל
בתחילת הסבב הנוכחי הצטברו אצלי תחושות שאני לא מבינה מספיק מהי ההלכה אותה אני מקיימת בכל יום. כמו כן, כאמא לבנות רציתי לתת להן מודל נשי של לימוד תורה
שתי הסיבות האלו הובילו אותי להתחיל ללמוד. נתקלתי בתגובות מפרגנות וסקרניות איך אישה לומדת גמרא..
כמו שרואים בתמונה אני ממשיכה ללמוד גם היום ואפילו במחלקת יולדות אחרי לידת ביתי השלישית.
נועה שילה
רבבה, ישראל
רציתי לקבל ידע בתחום שהרגשתי שהוא גדול וחשוב אך נעלם ממני. הלימוד מעניק אתגר וסיפוק ומעמיק את תחושת השייכות שלי לתורה וליהדות
רות עגיב
עלי זהב – לשם, ישראל
התחלתי ללמוד בשנת המדרשה במגדל עוז, בינתיים נהנית מאוד מהלימוד ומהגמרא, מעניין ומשמח מאוד!
משתדלת להצליח לעקוב כל יום, לפעמים משלימה קצת בהמשך השבוע.. מרגישה שיש עוגן מקובע ביום שלי והוא משמח מאוד!
אוריה קסנר
חיפה , ישראל
A life-changing journey started with a Chanukah family tiyul to Zippori, home of the Sanhedrin 2 years ago and continued with the Syum in Binanei Hauma where I was awed by the energy of 3000 women dedicated to learning daf Yomi. Opening my morning daily with a fresh daf, I am excited with the new insights I find enriching my life and opening new and deeper horizons for me.
בקי גולדשטיין
Elazar gush etzion, Israel
התחלתי להשתתף בשיעור נשים פעם בשבוע, תכננתי ללמוד רק דפים בודדים, לא האמנתי שאצליח יותר מכך.
לאט לאט נשאבתי פנימה לעולם הלימוד .משתדלת ללמוד כל בוקר ומתחילה את היום בתחושה של מלאות ומתוך התכווננות נכונה יותר.
הלימוד של הדף היומי ממלא אותי בתחושה של חיבור עמוק לעם היהודי ולכל הלומדים בעבר ובהווה.
נילי חיון
אפרת, ישראל
ראיתי את הסיום הגדול בבנייני האומה וכל כך התרשמתי ורציתי לקחת חלק.. אבל לקח לי עוד כשנה וחצי )באמצע מסיכת שבת להצטרף..
הלימוד חשוב לי מאוד.. אני תמיד במרדף אחרי הדף וגונבת כל פעם חצי דף כשהילדים עסוקים ומשלימה אח”כ אחרי שכולם הלכו לישון..
אולגה מזרחי
ירושלים, ישראל
בתחילת הסבב הנוכחי הצטברו אצלי תחושות שאני לא מבינה מספיק מהי ההלכה אותה אני מקיימת בכל יום. כמו כן, כאמא לבנות רציתי לתת להן מודל נשי של לימוד תורה
שתי הסיבות האלו הובילו אותי להתחיל ללמוד. נתקלתי בתגובות מפרגנות וסקרניות איך אישה לומדת גמרא..
כמו שרואים בתמונה אני ממשיכה ללמוד גם היום ואפילו במחלקת יולדות אחרי לידת ביתי השלישית.
נועה שילה
רבבה, ישראל
. לא תמיד נהניתי מלימוד גמרא כילדה.,בל כהתבגרתי התחלתי לאהוב את זה שוב. התחלתי ללמוד מסכת סוטה בדף היומי לפני כחמש עשרה שנה ואז הפסקתי.הגעתי לסיום הגדול של הדרן לפני שנתיים וזה נתן לי השראה. והתחלתי ללמוד למשך כמה ימים ואז היתה לי פריצת דיסק והפסקתי…עד אלול השנה. אז התחלתי עם מסכת ביצה וב”ה אני מצליחה לעמוד בקצב. המשפחה מאוד תומכת בי ויש כמה שגם לומדים את זה במקביל. אני אוהבת שיש עוגן כל יום.
רבקה דרשן
בית שמש, ישראל
התחלתי לפני כמה שנים אבל רק בסבב הזה זכיתי ללמוד יום יום ולסיים מסכתות
סיגל טל
רעננה, ישראל
התחלתי ללמוד בשנת המדרשה במגדל עוז, בינתיים נהנית מאוד מהלימוד ומהגמרא, מעניין ומשמח מאוד!
משתדלת להצליח לעקוב כל יום, לפעמים משלימה קצת בהמשך השבוע.. מרגישה שיש עוגן מקובע ביום שלי והוא משמח מאוד!
אוריה קסנר
חיפה , ישראל
למדתי גמרא מכיתה ז- ט ב Maimonides School ואחרי העליה שלי בגיל 14 לימוד הגמרא, שלא היה כל כך מקובל בימים אלה, היה די ספוראדי. אחרי "ההתגלות” בבנייני האומה התחלתי ללמוד בעיקר בדרך הביתה למדתי מפוקקטסים שונים. לאט לאט ראיתי שאני תמיד חוזרת לרבנית מישל פרבר. באיזה שהוא שלב התחלתי ללמוד בזום בשעה 7:10 .
היום "אין מצב” שאני אתחיל את היום שלי ללא לימוד עם הרבנית מישל עם כוס הקפה שלי!!
דבי גביר
חשמונאים, ישראל
לפני 15 שנה, אחרי עשרות שנים של "ג’ינגול” בין משפחה לקריירה תובענית בהייטק, הצטרפתי לשיעורי גמרא במתן רעננה. הלימוד המעמיק והייחודי של הרבנית אושרה קורן יחד עם קבוצת הנשים המגוונת הייתה חוויה מאלפת ומעשירה. לפני כשמונה שנים כאשר מחזור הדף היומי הגיע למסכת תענית הצטרפתי כ”חברותא” לבעלי. זו השעה היומית שלנו ביחד כאשר דפי הגמרא משתלבים בחיי היום יום, משפיעים ומושפעים, וכשלא מספיקים תמיד משלימים בשבת
יודי אסקוף
רעננה, ישראל
רציתי לקבל ידע בתחום שהרגשתי שהוא גדול וחשוב אך נעלם ממני. הלימוד מעניק אתגר וסיפוק ומעמיק את תחושת השייכות שלי לתורה וליהדות
רות עגיב
עלי זהב – לשם, ישראל
בתחילת הסבב הנוכחי של לימוד הדף היומי, נחשפתי לחגיגות המרגשות באירועי הסיום ברחבי העולם. והבטחתי לעצמי שבקרוב אצטרף גם למעגל הלומדות. הסבב התחיל כאשר הייתי בתחילת דרכי בתוכנית קרן אריאל להכשרת יועצות הלכה של נשמ”ת. לא הצלחתי להוסיף את ההתחייבות לדף היומי על הלימוד האינטנסיבי של תוכנית היועצות. בבוקר למחרת המבחן הסופי בנשמ”ת, התחלתי את לימוד הדף במסכת סוכה ומאז לא הפסקתי.
חנה שחם-רוזבי (ד”ר)
קרית גת, ישראל
התחלתי ללמוד בסבב הנוכחי לפני כשנתיים .הסביבה מתפעלת ותומכת מאוד. אני משתדלת ללמוד מכל ההסכתים הנוספים שיש באתר הדרן. אני עורכת כל סיום מסכת שיעור בביתי לכ20 נשים שמחכות בקוצר רוח למפגשים האלו.
יעל אשר
יהוד, ישראל
לצערי גדלתי בדור שבו לימוד גמרא לנשים לא היה דבר שבשגרה ושנים שאני חולמת להשלים את הפער הזה.. עד שלפני מספר שבועות, כמעט במקרה, נתקלתי במודעת פרסומת הקוראת להצטרף ללימוד מסכת תענית. כשקראתי את המודעה הרגשתי שהיא כאילו נכתבה עבורי – "תמיד חלמת ללמוד גמרא ולא ידעת איך להתחיל”, "בואי להתנסות במסכת קצרה וקלה” (רק היה חסר שהמודעה תיפתח במילים "מיכי שלום”..). קפצתי למים ו- ב”ה אני בדרך להגשמת החלום:)
מיכי קדוש
מורשת, ישראל
שבועות ל״ד
כׇּל אַחַת וְאַחַת, בִּפְנֵי בֵּית דִּין וְשֶׁלֹּא בִּפְנֵי בֵּית דִּין – אֵינוֹ מְדַבֵּר אֶלָּא בִּתְבִיעַת מָמוֹן; עֵדוּת שֶׁלֹּא עָשָׂה בָּהּ נָשִׁים כַּאֲנָשִׁים, קְרוֹבִים כִּרְחוֹקִים, פְּסוּלִין כִּכְשֵׁרִים; וְאֵינוֹ חַיָּיב אֶלָּא אַחַת בִּפְנֵי בֵּית דִּין – אֵינוֹ דִּין שֶׁלֹּא יְהֵא מְדַבֵּר אֶלָּא בִּתְבִיעַת מָמוֹן?!
each and every oath if the plaintiff administered several oaths to him and he denied having the deposit in his possession, whether he took the oath before a court or not before a court, and despite the broad application of the halakha, the verse is speaking of liability only in cases involving a monetary claim, then in the case of an oath of testimony with regard to which the Torah did not render the halakhic status of women like that of men, the status of relatives like that of non-relatives, and the status of unfit witnesses like that of those fit to testify, and he is liable to bring only one sliding-scale offering if the plaintiff administered several oaths to him and he falsely denied knowledge of the matter in the presence of a court, is it not right that the verse is speaking of liability only in cases involving a monetary claim?
מָה לְפִקָּדוֹן – שֶׁכֵּן לֹא עָשָׂה בּוֹ מוּשְׁבָּע כַּנִּשְׁבָּע וּמֵזִיד כַּשּׁוֹגֵג; תֹּאמַר בְּעֵדוּת – שֶׁכֵּן עָשָׂה בָּהּ מוּשְׁבָּע כַּנִּשְׁבָּע וּמֵזִיד כַּשּׁוֹגֵג?!
The baraita rejects this inference: What is notable about the case of a deposit? It is notable in that with regard to a deposit the Torah did not render the halakhic status of one to whom an oath was administered by others like that of one who himself took an oath, as one to whom an oath was administered by others is exempt; and the Torah did not render the halakhic status of one who takes an intentional false oath like that of one who takes an unwitting false oath. Will you say that the same is true with regard to an oath of testimony, as in that case the Torah rendered the halakhic status of one to whom an oath was administered by others like that of one who himself took an oath; and it rendered the halakhic status of one who takes an intentional false oath like that of one who takes an unwitting false oath, and one is liable to bring an offering in both instances?
תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״תֶּחֱטָא״–״תֶּחֱטָא״ לִגְזֵירָה שָׁוָה – נֶאֱמַר כָּאן ״תֶּחֱטָא״, וְנֶאֱמַר לְהַלָּן ״תֶּחֱטָא״; מָה לְהַלָּן אֵינוֹ מְדַבֵּר אֶלָּא בִּתְבִיעַת מָמוֹן, אַף כָּאן אֵינוֹ מְדַבֵּר אֶלָּא בִּתְבִיעַת מָמוֹן.
Therefore, the verse states the term “shall sin” with regard to an oath of testimony and states “shall sin” with regard to an oath on a deposit in order to derive a verbal analogy. Here, it is stated with regard to an oath of testimony: “Shall sin” (Leviticus 5:1), and there, it is stated with regard to an oath on a deposit: “Shall sin” (Leviticus 5:21). Just as there, concerning an oath on a deposit, the verse is speaking only with regard to a monetary claim, so too here, concerning an oath of testimony, the verse is speaking only with regard to a monetary claim.
מַתְקֵיף לַהּ רַבָּה בַּר עוּלָּא: ״אוֹ״ ״אוֹ״ בִּיטּוּי יוֹכִיחוּ – שֶׁהֵן ״אוֹאִין״, וְיֵשׁ עִמָּהֶן שְׁבוּעָה, וְאֵין עִמָּהֶן כֹּהֵן – וּמְדַבְּרִים שֶׁלֹּא בִּתְבִיעַת מָמוֹן!
§ After presenting the different proofs cited in the baraita, the Gemara proceeds to analyze the opinions cited therein, beginning with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer that one derives that one is liable for an oath of testimony only if it involves a monetary claim from the case of an oath on a deposit based on multiple instances of the term “or” that appear in both contexts, and there is an oath with those multiple instances of the term “or” and there is no priest in their context. Rabba bar Ulla objects to this: The multiple instances of the term “or” in the verse: “Or if any one shall take an oath to clearly express with his lips to do evil or to do good” (Leviticus 5:4), which is written with regard to an oath on an utterance, will prove that one is liable even without a monetary claim, as they are multiple instances of the term “or,” and there is an oath in their context, and there is no priest in their context, and they are not speaking with regard to a monetary claim.
מִסְתַּבְּרָא מִפִּקָּדוֹן הֲוָה לֵיהּ לְמֵילַף, שֶׁכֵּן ״תֶּחֱטָא״ מִ״תֶּחֱטָא״.
The Gemara rejects this: It stands to reason that he should have derived the halakha with regard to an oath of testimony from an oath on a deposit and not from an oath on an utterance due to the verbal analogy between the terms “shall sin” and “shall sin.”
אַדְּרַבָּה – מִבִּיטּוּי הֲוָה לֵיהּ לְמֵילַף, שֶׁכֵּן חַטָּאת מֵחַטָּאת!
The Gemara rejects this: On the contrary, he should have derived the halakha with regard to an oath of testimony from the halakha with regard to an oath on an utterance, as it is a derivation of one case for which one is liable to bring a sin-offering for taking a false oath from another case for which one is liable to bring a sin-offering for taking a false oath. This is in contrast to an oath on a deposit, for which one is liable to bring a guilt-offering for taking a false oath.
אֶלָּא מִסְתַּבְּרָא מִפִּקָּדוֹן הֲוָה לֵיהּ לְמֵילַף – שֶׁכֵּן חֵטְא; בְּמֵזִיד; תַּבְעֵיהּ וְכַפְרֵיהּ; וְעַבְרֵיהּ.
Rather, it stands to reason that he should have derived the halakha with regard to an oath of testimony from the halakha with regard to an oath on a deposit, as there are many elements common to both oaths, represented by the mnemonic: Sin, intentionally, claimed from him, denied his claim, and his past. There is a verbal analogy between them, as the term “shall sin” appears in both contexts. In both cases one is liable for taking a false oath intentionally. Additionally, in both cases there is a claim presented by one of the parties and denial of that claim by the one taking the oath. And both oaths relate to events that transpired in the past.
אַדְּרַבָּה, מִבִּיטּוּי הֲוָה לֵיהּ לְמֵילַף, שֶׁכֵּן חַטָּאת שֶׁיָּרְדָה לְחוֹמֶשׁ! הָנָךְ נְפִישָׁן.
The Gemara asks: On the contrary, he should have derived the halakha with regard to an oath of testimony from the halakha with regard to an oath on an utterance, as there are many elements common to both oaths, represented by the mnemonic: Sin–offering, that descended, to one-fifth. In both cases one is liable to bring a sin-offering for a false oath, as opposed to a guilt-offering for a false oath on a deposit. In each case the offering is a sliding-scale offering, as opposed to the fixed offering in the case of an oath on a deposit. In both cases there is no payment of an additional one-fifth for taking a false oath. And in the case of a false oath on a deposit, there is payment of an additional one-fifth. The Gemara answers: These elements common to an oath of testimony and an oath on a deposit are more numerous than the elements common to an oath of testimony and an oath on an utterance.
רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא אוֹמֵר: ״וְהָיָה כִי יֶאְשַׁם לְאַחַת מֵאֵלֶּה״ – יֵשׁ מֵאֵלֶּה שֶׁהוּא חַיָּיב, וְיֵשׁ מֵאֵלֶּה שֶׁהוּא פָּטוּר. הָא כֵּיצַד? תְּבָעוֹ מָמוֹן – חַיָּיב, תְּבָעוֹ דָּבָר אַחֵר – פָּטוּר.
§ Rabbi Akiva says that it is written with regard to an oath of testimony: “And it shall be when he will be guilty of one of these” (Leviticus 5:5). The term “of these” is a restrictive expression from which it is derived: There are some of these for which he is liable and there are some of these for which he is exempt. How so? If the plaintiff demanded testimony from the witness with regard to a monetary claim, the witness is liable for taking a false oath; if the plaintiff demanded testimony from the witness with regard to another matter, he is exempt.
אֵיפוֹךְ אֲנָא!
The Gemara challenges: Since it is not clear from the verse for which claim one is liable and for which claim one is exempt, I will reverse it and say that one is liable only when the claim was with regard to another matter, not when it involves monetary matters.
רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא אַ״אוֹאִין״ דְּרַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר סְמִיךְ.
The Gemara answers: Rabbi Akiva relies on the multiple instances of the term “or,” as cited by Rabbi Eliezer, to derive from an oath on a deposit that one is liable only for a false oath that involves a monetary claim. From the term “of these” Rabbi Akiva derives that there are some cases involving monetary claims for which one is not liable for taking a false oath of testimony.
מַאי בֵּינַיְיהוּ בֵּין רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר וּבֵין רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא?
The Gemara asks: What is the practical difference between the opinions of Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Akiva? With regard to which cases involving monetary claims does Rabbi Akiva hold that one is not liable for taking a false oath of testimony?
אִיכָּא בֵּינַיְיהוּ מַשְׁבִּיעַ עֵדֵי קַרְקַע – לְרַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר חַיָּיבִין, לְרַבִּי עֲקִיבָא פְּטוּרִין.
The Gemara answers: The practical difference between their opinions is in the case of one who administers an oath to witnesses with regard to testimony involving land. According to Rabbi Eliezer, they are liable if they take a false oath. According to Rabbi Akiva they are exempt in that case, as it is excluded by the term “of these.”
וּלְרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן, דְּאָמַר הָתָם: מַשְׁבִּיעַ עֵדֵי קַרְקַע אֲפִילּוּ לְרַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר פְּטוּרִין – הָכָא מַאי אִיכָּא בֵּין רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר לְרַבִּי עֲקִיבָא?
The Gemara asks: And according to Rabbi Yoḥanan, who says there with regard to an oath on a deposit and an oath of testimony that in the case of one who administers an oath to witnesses with regard to testimony involving land, the witnesses are exempt even according to Rabbi Eliezer, what difference is there between the opinions of Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Akiva?
אִיכָּא בֵּינַיְיהוּ עֵדֵי קְנָס.
The Gemara answers: The practical difference between their opinions is in the case where one administers an oath to witnesses with regard to testimony involving a fine. According to Rabbi Eliezer they are liable, and according to Rabbi Akiva they are exempt.
רַבִּי יוֹסֵי הַגְּלִילִי אוֹמֵר: ״וְהוּא עֵד אוֹ רָאָה אוֹ יָדָע״ – בְּעֵדוּת הַמִּתְקַיֶּימֶת בִּרְאִיָּה בְּלֹא יְדִיעָה וּבִידִיעָה בְּלֹא רְאִיָּה הַכָּתוּב מְדַבֵּר.
§ Rabbi Yosei HaGelili cites a different proof and says: The verse states with regard to an oath of testimony: “And he is a witness or he saw or he knew” (Leviticus 5:1). It is with regard to testimony that is founded on sight without knowledge of the matter, or by means of knowledge without sight, that the verse is speaking. The reference is to testimony involving monetary matters, as all other testimony requires both knowledge and sight.
אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַב פָּפָּא לְאַבָּיֵי: לֵימָא רַבִּי יוֹסֵי הַגְּלִילִי לֵית לֵיהּ דְּרַבִּי אַחָא? דְּתַנְיָא, רַבִּי אַחָא אוֹמֵר: גָּמָל הָאוֹחֵר בֵּין הַגְּמַלִּים וְנִמְצָא גָּמָל הָרוּג בְּצִידּוֹ – בְּיָדוּעַ שֶׁזֶּה הֲרָגוֹ. דְּאִי אִית לֵיהּ דְּרַבִּי אַחָא, בְּדִינֵי נְפָשׁוֹת נָמֵי מַשְׁכַּחַתְּ לַהּ – כְּרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן שָׁטַח!
Rav Pappa said to Abaye: Shall we say that Rabbi Yosei HaGelili does not accept the opinion of Rabbi Aḥa? As it is taught in a baraita (Tosefta, Bava Kamma 3:6) that Rabbi Aḥa says: If there is a rutting male camel [gamal haoḥer] that is rampaging among other camels and then a camel was found killed at its side, it is evident that this rampaging camel killed it, and the owner must pay for the damage. Rabbi Aḥa rules that cases of monetary law can be decided based on circumstantial evidence. As, if he is of the opinion that the ruling is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Aḥa that witnesses may testify on the basis of circumstantial evidence, in cases of capital law too, you find a case of knowledge without sight, as in the case discussed by Rabbi Shimon ben Shataḥ.
דְּתַנְיָא, אָמַר רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן שָׁטַח: אֶרְאֶה בְּנֶחָמָה אִם לֹא רָאִיתִי אֶחָד שֶׁרָץ אַחַר חֲבֵירוֹ לְחוּרְבָּה, וְרַצְתִּי אַחֲרָיו, וּמָצָאתִי סַיִיף בְּיָדוֹ וְדָם מְטַפְטֵף וְהָרוּג מְפַרְפֵּר; אָמַרְתִּי לוֹ: רָשָׁע! מִי הֲרָגוֹ לָזֶה? אוֹ אֲנִי, אוֹ אַתָּה!
As it is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Shimon ben Shataḥ said in the form of an oath: I will not see the consolation of Israel if I did not see one who was running after another into a ruin, and I ran after him and found a sword in his hand and blood dripping from the sword, and the slain person convulsing. I said to him: Wicked one, who killed this person? It was either me or you, as there is no one else here.
אֲבָל מָה אֶעֱשֶׂה, שֶׁאֵין דָּמְךָ מָסוּר בְּיָדִי, שֶׁהֲרֵי אָמְרָה תּוֹרָה: ״עַל פִּי שְׁנַיִם עֵדִים אוֹ שְׁלֹשָׁה עֵדִים יוּמַת הַמֵּת״. אֶלָּא הַמָּקוֹם יִפָּרַע מִמְּךָ. אָמְרוּ: לֹא זָזוּ מִשָּׁם עַד שֶׁנְּשָׁכוֹ נָחָשׁ וָמֵת.
But what can I do, as your blood is not given to my control and I have no jurisdiction to execute you, as the Torah says: “On the basis of two witnesses or three witnesses shall he that is to die be put to death” (Deuteronomy 17:6), and there are no witnesses here. Rather, the Omnipresent will exact retribution from you. The Sages said: They did not move from there until a snake came and bit the pursuer and he died. Rabbi Aḥa would hold in that case that the pursuer could be executed by the court based on circumstantial evidence. Ostensibly, Rabbi Yosei HaGelili disagrees, as he says that testimony based on knowledge without sight exists only in cases of monetary law.
אֲפִילּוּ תֵּימָא אִית לֵיהּ דְּרַבִּי אַחָא; בִּשְׁלָמָא יְדִיעָה בְּלֹא רְאִיָּה – מַשְׁכַּחַתְּ לַהּ; אֶלָּא רְאִיָּה בְּלֹא יְדִיעָה – הֵיכִי מַשְׁכַּחַתְּ לַהּ? מִי לָא בָּעֵי מִידָּע אִם גּוֹי הָרַג אוֹ יִשְׂרָאֵל הָרַג, אִם אָדָם טְרֵפָה הָרַג אוֹ שָׁלֵם הָרַג?
The Gemara answers: Even if you say that Rabbi Yosei HaGelili is of the opinion that the ruling is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Aḥa that one may rely on circumstantial evidence even in cases of capital law, one may nevertheless distinguish between cases of monetary law and cases of capital law. Granted, even in cases of capital law you find testimony based on knowledge without sight, but how can you find a case of sight without knowledge? Don’t the witnesses need to know if the one whom he witnessed killing another killed a gentile or he killed a Jew, if he killed one who has a wound that would have caused him to die within twelve months [tereifa] or he killed one whose body is intact?
שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ, קָסָבַר רַבִּי יוֹסֵי הַגְּלִילִי: מַשְׁבִּיעַ עֵדֵי קְנָס – פָּטוּר; דְּאִי סָלְקָא דַעְתָּךְ חַיָּיב, נְהִי דִּידִיעָה בְּלֹא רְאִיָּה – אַשְׁכְּחַן לַהּ; רְאִיָּה בְּלֹא יְדִיעָה – מִי לָא בָּעֵי מִידָּע גּוֹיָה בָּעַל בַּת יִשְׂרָאֵל בָּעַל, בְּתוּלָה בָּעַל בְּעוּלָה בָּעַל?
The Gemara notes: Conclude from it that Rabbi Yosei HaGelili holds that in a case where one administers an oath to witnesses with regard to testimony involving a fine, the witnesses are exempt from liability for taking a false oath of testimony. As if it enters your mind to say that the witnesses are liable, although you find testimony with regard to fines based on knowledge without sight, and witnesses may testify based on circumstantial evidence, in cases of sight without knowledge, when it comes to fines, don’t the witnesses need to know if the rapist engaged in intercourse with a gentile woman or if he engaged in intercourse with a Jewish woman, if he engaged in intercourse with a virgin or if he engaged in intercourse with a non-virgin? Rabbi Yosei HaGelili holds that witnesses are liable for taking a false oath of testimony only in cases where both testimony based on sight alone and testimony based on knowledge alone are accepted, which is not the case concerning testimony involving fines.
יָתֵיב רַב הַמְנוּנָא קַמֵּיהּ דְּרַב יְהוּדָה, וְיָתֵיב רַב יְהוּדָה וְקָא מִיבַּעְיָא לֵיהּ: ״מָנֶה מְנִיתִיךְ בִּפְנֵי פְּלוֹנִי וּפְלוֹנִי״,
§ Apropos the matter of sight without knowledge in cases of monetary law, the Gemara relates: Rav Hamnuna was sitting before Rav Yehuda, and Rav Yehuda was sitting and he was raising a dilemma: If one demands payment from another and claims: I counted for you and gave you one hundred dinars in the presence of so-and-so and so-and-so,
וְעֵדִים רוֹאִין אוֹתוֹ מִבַּחוּץ, מַאי?
and witnesses see him counting the money from outside, what is the halakha? Is their testimony accepted?
אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַב הַמְנוּנָא: וְהַלָּה מָה טוֹעֵן? אִי אָמַר: ״לֹא הָיוּ דְבָרִים מֵעוֹלָם״ – הוּחְזַק כַּפְרָן! אִי אָמַר: ״אִין, שְׁקַלִי – וְדִידִי שְׁקַלִי״ – כִּי אָתוּ עֵדִים מַאי הָוֵי? אֲמַר לֵיהּ: הַמְנוּנָא אַתְּ? עוּל תָּא.
Rav Hamnuna said to Rav Yehuda: And what does the other person claim in response to the demand for repayment? If he says: These matters never happened, he assumes the presumptive status of a denier of the truth, as the witnesses testify that they saw the claimant counting the money and giving it to him. If he says: Yes, I took money from him, but it is my money that I took, then when the witnesses come and testify that they saw the claimant counting the money and giving it to him, what of it? The testimony of the witnesses does not contradict his claim, as the witnesses do not know the circumstances under which the money changed hands. Rav Yehuda said to him: Are you Hamnuna? Enter and come into the study hall, as you make your teacher wiser.
הָהוּא דַּאֲמַר לֵיהּ לְחַבְרֵיהּ: ״מָנֶה מָנִיתִי לְךָ בְּצַד עַמּוּד זֶה״, אֲמַר לֵיהּ: ״לֹא עָבַרְתִּי בְּצַד עַמּוּד זֶה״. אֲתוֹ תְּרֵי סָהֲדִי, אַסְהִידוּ בֵּיהּ דְּהִשְׁתִּין מַיִם בְּצַד עַמּוּד זֶה. אָמַר רֵישׁ לָקִישׁ: הוּחְזַק כַּפְרָן.
The Gemara relates a similar incident: There was a certain individual who said to another: I counted for you and gave you one hundred dinars as a loan alongside this column. The other person said to him in response: I did not pass alongside this column. Two witnesses came and testified about him that they saw that he urinated alongside this column. Reish Lakish said: He assumes the presumptive status of a denier of the truth, as the testimony of witnesses proves that he passed alongside the column.
מַתְקֵיף לַהּ רַב נַחְמָן: הַאי דִּינָא פָּרְסָאָה הוּא! מִי קָאָמַר ״מֵעוֹלָם״?! בְּעֵסֶק זֶה קָאָמַר לֵיהּ!
Rav Naḥman objects to this: That is a ruling characteristic of a Persian court, not a reasonable ruling characteristic of a Jewish court. Did the respondent say that he never passed alongside the column? It was that he did not pass alongside the column in the context of this matter that he said to him that he did not pass the column; therefore, the testimony of the witnesses does not contradict his statement.
אִיכָּא דְּאָמְרִי, הָהוּא דַּאֲמַר לֵיהּ לְחַבְרֵיהּ: ״מָנֶה מָנִיתִי לְךָ בְּצַד עַמּוּד זֶה״, אֲמַר לֵיהּ: ״לֹא עָבַרְתִּי בְּצַד עַמּוּד זֶה מֵעוֹלָם״. נְפַקוּ בֵּיהּ סָהֲדִי דְּהִשְׁתִּין מַיִם בְּצַד עַמּוּד זֶה. אָמַר רַב נַחְמָן: הוּחְזַק כַּפְרָן.
There are those who say that the incident transpired a bit differently. There was a certain individual who said to another: I counted for you and gave you one hundred dinars as a loan alongside this column. The other person said to him in response: I never passed alongside this column. Witnesses emerged and testified concerning him that he urinated alongside this column. Rav Naḥman said: He assumes the presumptive status of a denier of the truth, as the witnesses contradicted his claim.
אֲמַר לֵיהּ רָבָא לְרַב נַחְמָן: כֹּל מִילְּתָא דְּלָא רַמְיָא עֲלֵיהּ דְּאִינִישׁ, עָבֵיד לַהּ וְלָאו אַדַּעְתֵּיהּ.
Rava said to Rav Naḥman: There is no proof from here that he assumes the presumptive status of a denier, as any matter that is not incumbent upon a person to remember, he performs it and it is not on his mind. Therefore, when he denied ever passing alongside the column, it was because there was never any reason for him to remember that he had been there.
רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן אוֹמֵר: חִיֵּיב כָּאן וְחִיֵּיב בְּפִקָּדוֹן כּוּ׳.
§ The Gemara proceeds to cite the opinion cited last in the baraita explaining the source of the halakha that one is liable for taking a false oath of testimony only for a case involving monetary matters. Rabbi Shimon says: The Torah rendered one liable if he takes a false oath here, with regard to an oath of testimony, and the Torah rendered one liable if he takes a false oath with regard to an oath on a deposit; just as there, the verse is speaking of liability only in cases involving monetary claims, so too here, the verse is speaking of liability only in cases involving monetary claims.
מַחֲכוּ עֲלַהּ בְּמַעְרְבָא. מַאי חוּכָא?
They mocked this proof in the West, i.e., Eretz Yisrael. The Gemara asked: What is worthy of mockery in the statement of Rabbi Shimon?
דְּקָתָנֵי: מָה לְפִקָּדוֹן, שֶׁכֵּן לֹא עָשָׂה בּוֹ מוּשְׁבָּע כַּנִּשְׁבָּע, מֵזִיד כַּשּׁוֹגֵג.
The Gemara explains that they mocked that which the baraita teaches in the continuation, rejecting the a fortiori inference suggested by Rabbi Shimon: What is notable about the case of a deposit? It is notable in that with regard to a deposit the Torah did not render the halakhic status of one to whom an oath was administered by others like that of one who himself took an oath, as one to whom an oath was administered by others is exempt; and the Torah did not render the halakhic status of one who takes an intentional false oath like that of one who takes an unwitting false oath.
מִכְּדֵי מוּשְׁבָּע מִפִּי עַצְמוֹ בְּעֵדוּת, לְרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן מְנָא לֵיהּ – דִּגְמַר מִפִּקָּדוֹן; פִּקָּדוֹן נָמֵי – מוּשְׁבָּע מִפִּי אֲחֵרִים, נִגְמַר מֵעֵדוּת!
This rejection is difficult: Now, with regard to the fact that one who administered an oath to himself is liable in the case of an oath of testimony, from where is it derived according to Rabbi Shimon? Rabbi Shimon derives it by means of a verbal analogy from an oath on a deposit. If so, based on the same verbal analogy, in the case of an oath on a deposit too, let us derive from the case of an oath of testimony the fact that one is liable for a false oath that was administered by others.
וּמַאי חוּכָא? דִּלְמָא רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בְּקַל וָחוֹמֶר מַיְיתֵי לַהּ: מִפִּי אֲחֵרִים חַיָּיב – מִפִּי עַצְמוֹ לֹא כׇּל שֶׁכֵּן?!
The Gemara rejects this: And what is worthy of mockery in that statement? Perhaps Rabbi Shimon does not derive that one who takes a false oath of testimony on his own is liable by means of a verbal analogy from an oath on a deposit; rather, he derives it by means of an a fortiori inference: If one is liable for a false oath of testimony administered by others, is it not all the more so that he is liable for an oath that he takes on his own?
אֶלָּא חוּכָא אַמֵּזִיד כַּשּׁוֹגֵג – דְּקָתָנֵי: מָה לְפִקָּדוֹן – שֶׁכֵּן לֹא עָשָׂה בּוֹ מוּשְׁבָּע כַּנִּשְׁבָּע, מֵזִיד כַּשּׁוֹגֵג.
The Gemara answers: Rather, the mockery is with regard to the distinction between an oath on a deposit and an oath of testimony in the matter of whether the halakhic status of one who takes an intentional false oath is like that of one who takes an unwitting false oath, as it teaches in the baraita: What is notable about the case of a deposit? It is notable in that with regard to a deposit the Torah did not render the halakhic status of one to whom an oath was administered by others like that of one who himself took an oath, as one to whom an oath was administered by others is exempt; and the Torah did not render the halakhic status of one who takes an intentional false oath like that of one who takes an unwitting false oath.
מִכְּדֵי מֵזִיד גַּבֵּי עֵדוּת מְנָא לֵיהּ – דְּלָא כְּתִיב בֵּיהּ ״וְנֶעֱלַם״; הָכָא נָמֵי לָא כְּתִיב בֵּיהּ ״וְנֶעֱלַם״!
Now, from where does he derive that one who takes an intentional false oath of testimony is liable? He derives it as it is not written in the context of an oath of testimony: And it is hidden. Here too, it is not written in the context of an oath on a deposit: And it is hidden. Therefore, there should be no distinction between intentional and unwitting with regard to an oath on a deposit either.
אֲמַר לְהוּ רַב הוּנָא: וּמַאי חוּכָא? דִּלְמָא מֵזִיד דְּלָאו כַּשּׁוֹגֵג בְּפִקָּדוֹן, מִמְּעִילָה רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן גָּמַר לַהּ!
Rav Huna said to the Sages: And what is worthy of mockery in that statement? Perhaps the fact that the halakhic status of one who takes an intentional false oath is not like that of one who takes an unwitting false oath in the case of a deposit, and it is from the halakhot of misuse of consecrated property that Rabbi Shimon derived it. Just as one is liable to bring a guilt-offering for the misuse of consecrated property only if he did so unwittingly, one is liable to bring a guilt-offering for a false oath on a deposit only if he unwittingly took the false oath.
וְהַיְינוּ חוּכָא – אַדְּגָמַר לַהּ מִמְּעִילָה, נִגְמַר לַהּ מֵעֵדוּת!
The Gemara answers: And that is what is worthy of mockery. Instead of deriving the lack of liability for an intentional false oath of deposit from the case of misuse of consecrated property, let him derive liability for an intentional false oath on a deposit from the case of an oath of testimony.
מִסְתַּבְּרָא מִמְּעִילָה הֲוָה לֵיהּ לְמֵילַף, שֶׁכֵּן מְעִילָה מִמְּעִילָה.
The Gemara rejects this: It stands to reason that he should have derived it from the case of misuse of consecrated property, as that is a derivation of misuse written with regard to an oath on a deposit: “If any one shall sin and commits an act of misuse and dealt falsely with his colleague in a matter of deposit” (Leviticus 5:21), which is derived from misuse written with regard to misuse of consecrated property: “If any one commits an act of misuse and sinned unwittingly from items consecrated to the Lord” (Leviticus 5:15).
אַדְּרַבָּה – מֵעֵדוּת הֲוָה לֵיהּ לְמֵילַף, שֶׁכֵּן ״תֶּחֱטָא״ מִ״תֶּחֱטָא״!
The Gemara asks: On the contrary, he should have derived it from the case of an oath of testimony, as that is a derivation of “shall sin” written with regard to an oath on a deposit which is derived from “shall sin” written with regard to an oath of testimony: “And if any one shall sin and he hears the voice of an oath, and he is a witness” (Leviticus 5:1).
מִסְתַּבְּרָא מִמְּעִילָה הֲוָה לֵיהּ לְמֵילַף, שֶׁכֵּן מְעִילָה; בַּכֹּל; נֶהֱנֶה; בְּקָבוּעַ; חוֹמֶשׁ; וְאָשָׁם.
The Gemara rejects this: It stands to reason that it is from the case of misuse of consecrated property that he should have derived it, as there are many elements common to an oath on a deposit and misuse of consecrated property represented by the mnemonic: Misuse, with regard to all, derive benefit, with fixed, one-fifth, and guilt-offering. The term misuse is employed in both cases. Both cases are relevant with regard to all individuals and not only those fit to testify. Both involve one deriving benefit from property that is not his. In both cases, one is liable to bring a fixed guilt-offering, as opposed to one who takes a false oath of testimony, who is liable to bring a sliding-scale offering. In both cases, one adds one-fifth to the payment of the principal. In both cases, that is the offering with which one gains atonement.
אַדְּרַבָּה – מֵעֵדוּת הֲוָה לֵיהּ לְמֵילַף, שֶׁכֵּן חֵטְא; הֶדְיוֹט; בִּשְׁבוּעָה; תַּבְעֵיהּ וְכַפְרֵיהּ; וְ״אוֹאִין״! הָנָךְ נְפִישִׁין.
The Gemara rejects this: On the contrary, he should have derived the halakha with regard to an oath on a deposit from the halakha of an oath of testimony, as there are many elements common to both oaths represented by the mnemonic: Sin, ordinary [hedyot], with an oath, claimed from him, denied his claim, and multiple instances of the term “or.” The term “shall sin” is written in both contexts. Both oaths relate to the property of ordinary individuals, not to consecrated property. In both cases there is a claim presented by one of the parties and denial of that claim by the one taking the oath. Multiple instances of the term “or” appear in both passages in the Torah. The Gemara responds: These elements common to an oath on a deposit and misuse of consecrated property are more numerous than the elements common to an oath on a deposit and an oath of testimony.
אֶלָּא מַאי חוּכָא?
Rather, after resolving all the difficulties that were raised against the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, the question remains: What did the Sages of Eretz Yisrael find that is worthy of mockery in that baraita?
כִּי אֲתָא רַב פָּפָּא וְרַב הוּנָא בְּרֵיהּ דְּרַב יְהוֹשֻׁעַ מִבֵּי רַב, אָמְרִי: הַיְינוּ חוּכָא – מִכְּדֵי רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן גְּזֵירָה שָׁוָה גְּמִיר, לְמָה לֵיהּ דְּפָרֵיךְ: מָה לְפִקָּדוֹן שֶׁכֵּן לֹא עָשָׂה בּוֹ מוּשְׁבָּע כַּנִּשְׁבָּע, מֵזִיד כַּשּׁוֹגֵג?
When Rav Pappa and Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, came from the study hall of their teacher, they said: This is what is worthy of mockery: Now, since ultimately Rabbi Shimon derives the halakha by means of a verbal analogy between the term “shall sin” written with regard to an oath on a deposit and the term “shall sin” written with regard to an oath of testimony, why is it that he refutes the parallel between them by saying: What is notable about the case of a deposit? It is notable in that with regard to a deposit the Torah did not render the halakhic status of one to whom an oath was administered by others like that of one who himself took an oath, as one to whom an oath was administered by others is exempt; and the Torah did not render the halakhic status of one who takes an intentional false oath like that of one who takes an unwitting false oath. Rabbi Shimon should have derived by means of the verbal analogy that all the halakhot of an oath of testimony and all the halakhot of an oath on a deposit are identical.
וּמַאי חוּכָא? דִּלְמָא כִּי פָּרֵיךְ – מִקַּמֵּי דְּתֵיקוּם לֵיהּ גְּזֵירָה שָׁוָה; בָּתַר דְּקָמָא לֵיהּ גְּזֵירָה שָׁוָה לָא פָּרֵיךְ!
The Gemara rejects this: And what is worthy of mockery in that statement? Perhaps when Rabbi Shimon refuted the parallel between the two oaths, it was prior to the verbal analogy being established for him, and the derivation was by means of a paradigm. After the verbal analogy was established for him, he does not refute the parallel and holds that in the case of an oath on a deposit one is liable to bring a guilt-offering for false oaths administered by others as well as for intentional false oaths.
וְלָא?! וְהָאָמַר לְהוּ רָבָא בַּר אִיתַּי לְרַבָּנַן: מַאן תָּנָא שְׁבוּעַת הַפִּקָּדוֹן לֹא נִיתַּן זְדוֹנָהּ לְכַפָּרָה – רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן הִיא!
The Gemara asks: And does Rabbi Shimon not refute the parallel between the two oaths? But didn’t Rava bar Ittai say to the Sages: Who is the tanna who taught with regard to an oath on a deposit that atonement by means of an offering is not possible for one who takes an intentional false oath? It is Rabbi Shimon. Apparently, Rabbi Shimon concludes that there remains a distinction between intentional and unwitting in the case of an oath on a deposit.
דִּלְמָא מֵזִיד כַּשּׁוֹגֵג פָּרֵיךְ, דְּגָמַר לַהּ מִמְּעִילָה, דְּהָנָךְ נְפִישִׁין; אֲבָל מוּשְׁבָּע כַּנִּשְׁבָּע לָא פָּרֵיךְ.
The Gemara suggests: Perhaps with regard to the halakhic status of one who takes an intentional false oath being like that of one who takes an unwitting false oath, Rabbi Shimon refutes the parallel between the two oaths even after the verbal analogy is established for him, as he derives the halakha of an oath on a deposit from the halakha of misuse of consecrated property, where there is a distinction between intentional and unwitting, as those elements common to an oath on a deposit and the misuse of consecrated property are more numerous than the elements common to an oath on a deposit and an oath of testimony. But he does not refute the parallel between the two oaths with the claim that there is a distinction between them with regard to whether the halakhic status of one to whom an oath was administered by others is like that of one who himself took an oath. Once the verbal analogy was established for him, there is no longer a distinction between the two oaths in that regard.
וְתֶהְדַּר עֵדוּת וְתִגְמֵר לַהּ מִפִּקָּדוֹן, מֵזִיד דְּלָאו כַּשּׁוֹגֵג – מָה פִּקָּדוֹן, שׁוֹגֵג אִין מֵזִיד לָא; אַף עֵדוּת, שׁוֹגֵג אִין מֵזִיד לָא – כִּי הֵיכִי דְּיָלֵיף פִּקָּדוֹן מִמְּעִילָה!
The Gemara asks: If, according to Rabbi Shimon, based on the derivation from the misuse of consecrated property, one who intentionally takes a false oath on a deposit does not bring a guilt-offering like one who took the false oath unwittingly, let the discussion of the case of an oath of testimony return to the verbal analogy and derive it from the case of an oath on a deposit that the halakhic status of one who takes an intentional false oath is not like that of one who takes an unwitting false oath. Just as in the case of an oath on a deposit, one who takes an unwitting false oath, yes, he is liable to bring a guilt-offering, and one who takes an intentional false oath, no, he is not liable, so too, in the case of an oath of testimony, one who takes an unwitting false oath, yes, he is liable to bring a sin-offering, and one who takes an intentional false oath, no, he is not liable, just as he derives the case of an oath on a deposit from the case of misuse of consecrated property.
לעקוב
