Shevuot 34

כל אחת ואחת בפני בית דין ושלא בפני בית דין אינו מדבר אלא בתביעת ממון עדות שלא עשה בה נשים כאנשים קרובים כרחוקים פסולין ככשרים ואינו חייב אלא אחת בפני בית דין אינו דין שלא יהא מדבר אלא בתביעת ממון

each and every oath if the plaintiff administered several oaths to him and he denied having the deposit in his possession, whether he took the oath before a court or not before a court, and despite the broad application of the halakha, the verse is speaking of liability only in cases involving a monetary claim, then in the case of an oath of testimony with regard to which the Torah did not render the halakhic status of women like that of men, the status of relatives like that of non-relatives, and the status of unfit witnesses like that of those fit to testify, and he is liable to bring only one sliding-scale offering if the plaintiff administered several oaths to him and he falsely denied knowledge of the matter in the presence of a court, is it not right that the verse is speaking of liability only in cases involving a monetary claim?

מה לפקדון שכן לא עשה בו מושבע כנשבע ומזיד כשוגג תאמר בעדות שכן עשה בה מושבע כנשבע ומזיד כשוגג

The baraita rejects this inference: What is notable about the case of a deposit? It is notable in that with regard to a deposit the Torah did not render the halakhic status of one to whom an oath was administered by others like that of one who himself took an oath, as one to whom an oath was administered by others is exempt; and the Torah did not render the halakhic status of one who takes an intentional false oath like that of one who takes an unwitting false oath. Will you say that the same is true with regard to an oath of testimony, as in that case the Torah rendered the halakhic status of one to whom an oath was administered by others like that of one who himself took an oath; and it rendered the halakhic status of one who takes an intentional false oath like that of one who takes an unwitting false oath, and one is liable to bring an offering in both instances?

תלמוד לומר תחטא תחטא לגזירה שוה נאמר כאן תחטא ונאמר להלן תחטא מה להלן אינו מדבר אלא בתביעת ממון אף כאן אינו מדבר אלא בתביעת ממון

Therefore, the verse states the term “shall sin” with regard to an oath of testimony and states “shall sin” with regard to an oath on a deposit in order to derive a verbal analogy. Here, it is stated with regard to an oath of testimony: “Shall sin” (Leviticus 5:1), and there, it is stated with regard to an oath on a deposit: “Shall sin” (Leviticus 5:21). Just as there, concerning an oath on a deposit, the verse is speaking only with regard to a monetary claim, so too here, concerning an oath of testimony, the verse is speaking only with regard to a monetary claim.

מתקיף לה רבה בר עולא או או ביטוי יוכיחו שהן אואין ויש עמהן שבועה ואין עמהן כהן ומדברים שלא בתביעת ממון

§ After presenting the different proofs cited in the baraita, the Gemara proceeds to analyze the opinions cited therein, beginning with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer that one derives that one is liable for an oath of testimony only if it involves a monetary claim from the case of an oath on a deposit based on multiple instances of the term “or” that appear in both contexts, and there is an oath with those multiple instances of the term “or” and there is no priest in their context. Rabba bar Ulla objects to this: The multiple instances of the term “or” in the verse: “Or if any one shall take an oath to clearly express with his lips to do evil or to do good” (Leviticus 5:4), which is written with regard to an oath on an utterance, will prove that one is liable even without a monetary claim, as they are multiple instances of the term “or,” and there is an oath in their context, and there is no priest in their context, and they are not speaking with regard to a monetary claim.

מסתברא מפקדון הוה ליה למילף שכן תחטא מתחטא

The Gemara rejects this: It stands to reason that he should have derived the halakha with regard to an oath of testimony from an oath on a deposit and not from an oath on an utterance due to the verbal analogy between the terms “shall sin” and “shall sin.”

אדרבה מביטוי הוה ליה למילף שכן חטאת מחטאת

The Gemara rejects this: On the contrary, he should have derived the halakha with regard to an oath of testimony from the halakha with regard to an oath on an utterance, as it is a derivation of one case for which one is liable to bring a sin-offering for taking a false oath from another case for which one is liable to bring a sin-offering for taking a false oath. This is in contrast to an oath on a deposit, for which one is liable to bring a guilt-offering for taking a false oath.

אלא מסתברא מפקדון הוה ליה למילף שכן חטא במזיד תבעיה וכפריה ועבריה

Rather, it stands to reason that he should have derived the halakha with regard to an oath of testimony from the halakha with regard to an oath on a deposit, as there are many elements common to both oaths, represented by the mnemonic: Sin, intentionally, claimed from him, denied his claim, and his past. There is a verbal analogy between them, as the term “shall sin” appears in both contexts. In both cases one is liable for taking a false oath intentionally. Additionally, in both cases there is a claim presented by one of the parties and denial of that claim by the one taking the oath. And both oaths relate to events that transpired in the past.

אדרבה מביטוי הוה ליה למילף שכן חטאת שירדה לחומש הנך נפישן

The Gemara asks: On the contrary, he should have derived the halakha with regard to an oath of testimony from the halakha with regard to an oath on an utterance, as there are many elements common to both oaths, represented by the mnemonic: Sin–offering, that descended, to one-fifth. In both cases one is liable to bring a sin-offering for a false oath, as opposed to a guilt-offering for a false oath on a deposit. In each case the offering is a sliding-scale offering, as opposed to the fixed offering in the case of an oath on a deposit. In both cases there is no payment of an additional one-fifth for taking a false oath. And in the case of a false oath on a deposit, there is payment of an additional one-fifth. The Gemara answers: These elements common to an oath of testimony and an oath on a deposit are more numerous than the elements common to an oath of testimony and an oath on an utterance.

רבי עקיבא אומר והיה כי יאשם לאחת מאלה יש מאלה שהוא חייב ויש מאלה שהוא פטור הא כיצד תבעו ממון חייב תבעו דבר אחר פטור

§ Rabbi Akiva says that it is written with regard to an oath of testimony: “And it shall be when he will be guilty of one of these” (Leviticus 5:5). The term “of these” is a restrictive expression from which it is derived: There are some of these for which he is liable and there are some of these for which he is exempt. How so? If the plaintiff demanded testimony from the witness with regard to a monetary claim, the witness is liable for taking a false oath; if the plaintiff demanded testimony from the witness with regard to another matter, he is exempt.

איפוך אנא

The Gemara challenges: Since it is not clear from the verse for which claim one is liable and for which claim one is exempt, I will reverse it and say that one is liable only when the claim was with regard to another matter, not when it involves monetary matters.

רבי עקיבא אאואין דרבי אליעזר סמיך

The Gemara answers: Rabbi Akiva relies on the multiple instances of the term “or,” as cited by Rabbi Eliezer, to derive from an oath on a deposit that one is liable only for a false oath that involves a monetary claim. From the term “of these” Rabbi Akiva derives that there are some cases involving monetary claims for which one is not liable for taking a false oath of testimony.

מאי בינייהו בין רבי אליעזר ובין רבי עקיבא

The Gemara asks: What is the practical difference between the opinions of Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Akiva? With regard to which cases involving monetary claims does Rabbi Akiva hold that one is not liable for taking a false oath of testimony?

איכא בינייהו משביע עדי קרקע לרבי אליעזר חייבין לרבי עקיבא פטורין

The Gemara answers: The practical difference between their opinions is in the case of one who administers an oath to witnesses with regard to testimony involving land. According to Rabbi Eliezer, they are liable if they take a false oath. According to Rabbi Akiva they are exempt in that case, as it is excluded by the term “of these.”

ולרבי יוחנן דאמר התם משביע עדי קרקע אפילו לרבי אליעזר פטורין הכא מאי איכא בין רבי אליעזר לרבי עקיבא

The Gemara asks: And according to Rabbi Yoḥanan, who says there with regard to an oath on a deposit and an oath of testimony that in the case of one who administers an oath to witnesses with regard to testimony involving land, the witnesses are exempt even according to Rabbi Eliezer, what difference is there between the opinions of Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Akiva?

איכא בינייהו עדי קנס

The Gemara answers: The practical difference between their opinions is in the case where one administers an oath to witnesses with regard to testimony involving a fine. According to Rabbi Eliezer they are liable, and according to Rabbi Akiva they are exempt.

רבי יוסי הגלילי אומר והוא עד או ראה או ידע בעדות המתקיימת בראיה בלא ידיעה ובידיעה בלא ראיה הכתוב מדבר

§ Rabbi Yosei HaGelili cites a different proof and says: The verse states with regard to an oath of testimony: “And he is a witness or he saw or he knew” (Leviticus 5:1). It is with regard to testimony that is founded on sight without knowledge of the matter, or by means of knowledge without sight, that the verse is speaking. The reference is to testimony involving monetary matters, as all other testimony requires both knowledge and sight.

אמר ליה רב פפא לאביי לימא רבי יוסי הגלילי לית ליה דרבי אחא דתניא רבי אחא אומר גמל האוחר בין הגמלים ונמצא גמל הרוג בצידו בידוע שזה הרגו דאי אית ליה דרבי אחא בדיני נפשות נמי משכחת לה כרבי שמעון בן שטח

Rav Pappa said to Abaye: Shall we say that Rabbi Yosei HaGelili does not accept the opinion of Rabbi Aḥa? As it is taught in a baraita (Tosefta, Bava Kamma 3:6) that Rabbi Aḥa says: If there is a rutting male camel [gamal haoḥer] that is rampaging among other camels and then a camel was found killed at its side, it is evident that this rampaging camel killed it, and the owner must pay for the damage. Rabbi Aḥa rules that cases of monetary law can be decided based on circumstantial evidence. As, if he is of the opinion that the ruling is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Aḥa that witnesses may testify on the basis of circumstantial evidence, in cases of capital law too, you find a case of knowledge without sight, as in the case discussed by Rabbi Shimon ben Shataḥ.

דתניא אמר רבי שמעון בן שטח אראה בנחמה אם לא ראיתי אחד שרץ אחר חבירו לחורבה ורצתי אחריו ומצאתי סייף בידו ודם מטפטף והרוג מפרפר אמרתי לו רשע מי הרגו לזה או אני או אתה

As it is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Shimon ben Shataḥ said in the form of an oath: I will not see the consolation of Israel if I did not see one who was running after another into a ruin, and I ran after him and found a sword in his hand and blood dripping from the sword, and the slain person convulsing. I said to him: Wicked one, who killed this person? It was either me or you, as there is no one else here.

אבל מה אעשה שאין דמך מסור בידי שהרי אמרה תורה על פי שנים עדים או שלשה עדים יומת המת אלא המקום יפרע ממך אמרו לא זזו משם עד שנשכו נחש ומת

But what can I do, as your blood is not given to my control and I have no jurisdiction to execute you, as the Torah says: “On the basis of two witnesses or three witnesses shall he that is to die be put to death” (Deuteronomy 17:6), and there are no witnesses here. Rather, the Omnipresent will exact retribution from you. The Sages said: They did not move from there until a snake came and bit the pursuer and he died. Rabbi Aḥa would hold in that case that the pursuer could be executed by the court based on circumstantial evidence. Ostensibly, Rabbi Yosei HaGelili disagrees, as he says that testimony based on knowledge without sight exists only in cases of monetary law.

אפילו תימא אית ליה דרבי אחא בשלמא ידיעה בלא ראיה משכחת לה אלא ראיה בלא ידיעה היכי משכחת לה מי לא בעי מידע אם גוי הרג או ישראל הרג אם אדם טרפה הרג או שלם הרג

The Gemara answers: Even if you say that Rabbi Yosei HaGelili is of the opinion that the ruling is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Aḥa that one may rely on circumstantial evidence even in cases of capital law, one may nevertheless distinguish between cases of monetary law and cases of capital law. Granted, even in cases of capital law you find testimony based on knowledge without sight, but how can you find a case of sight without knowledge? Don’t the witnesses need to know if the one whom he witnessed killing another killed a gentile or he killed a Jew, if he killed one who has a wound that would have caused him to die within twelve months [tereifa] or he killed one whose body is intact?

שמע מינה קסבר רבי יוסי הגלילי משביע עדי קנס פטור דאי סלקא דעתך חייב נהי דידיעה בלא ראיה אשכחן לה ראיה בלא ידיעה מי לא בעי מידע גויה בעל בת ישראל בעל בתולה בעל בעולה בעל

The Gemara notes: Conclude from it that Rabbi Yosei HaGelili holds that in a case where one administers an oath to witnesses with regard to testimony involving a fine, the witnesses are exempt from liability for taking a false oath of testimony. As if it enters your mind to say that the witnesses are liable, although you find testimony with regard to fines based on knowledge without sight, and witnesses may testify based on circumstantial evidence, in cases of sight without knowledge, when it comes to fines, don’t the witnesses need to know if the rapist engaged in intercourse with a gentile woman or if he engaged in intercourse with a Jewish woman, if he engaged in intercourse with a virgin or if he engaged in intercourse with a non-virgin? Rabbi Yosei HaGelili holds that witnesses are liable for taking a false oath of testimony only in cases where both testimony based on sight alone and testimony based on knowledge alone are accepted, which is not the case concerning testimony involving fines.

יתיב רב המנונא קמיה דרב יהודה ויתיב רב יהודה וקא מיבעיא ליה מנה מניתיך בפני פלוני ופלוני

§ Apropos the matter of sight without knowledge in cases of monetary law, the Gemara relates: Rav Hamnuna was sitting before Rav Yehuda, and Rav Yehuda was sitting and he was raising a dilemma: If one demands payment from another and claims: I counted for you and gave you one hundred dinars in the presence of so-and-so and so-and-so,

ועדים רואין אותו מבחוץ מאי

and witnesses see him counting the money from outside, what is the halakha? Is their testimony accepted?

אמר ליה רב המנונא והלה מה טוען אי אמר לא היו דברים מעולם הוחזק כפרן אי אמר אין שקלי ודידי שקלי כי אתו עדים מאי הוי אמר ליה המנונא את עול תא

Rav Hamnuna said to Rav Yehuda: And what does the other person claim in response to the demand for repayment? If he says: These matters never happened, he assumes the presumptive status of a denier of the truth, as the witnesses testify that they saw the claimant counting the money and giving it to him. If he says: Yes, I took money from him, but it is my money that I took, then when the witnesses come and testify that they saw the claimant counting the money and giving it to him, what of it? The testimony of the witnesses does not contradict his claim, as the witnesses do not know the circumstances under which the money changed hands. Rav Yehuda said to him: Are you Hamnuna? Enter and come into the study hall, as you make your teacher wiser.

ההוא דאמר ליה לחבריה מנה מניתי לך בצד עמוד זה אמר ליה לא עברתי בצד עמוד זה אתו תרי סהדי אסהידו ביה דהשתין מים בצד עמוד זה אמר ריש לקיש הוחזק כפרן

The Gemara relates a similar incident: There was a certain individual who said to another: I counted for you and gave you one hundred dinars as a loan alongside this column. The other person said to him in response: I did not pass alongside this column. Two witnesses came and testified about him that they saw that he urinated alongside this column. Reish Lakish said: He assumes the presumptive status of a denier of the truth, as the testimony of witnesses proves that he passed alongside the column.

מתקיף לה רב נחמן האי דינא פרסאה הוא מי קאמר מעולם בעסק זה קאמר ליה

Rav Naḥman objects to this: That is a ruling characteristic of a Persian court, not a reasonable ruling characteristic of a Jewish court. Did the respondent say that he never passed alongside the column? It was that he did not pass alongside the column in the context of this matter that he said to him that he did not pass the column; therefore, the testimony of the witnesses does not contradict his statement.

איכא דאמרי ההוא דאמר ליה לחבריה מנה מניתי לך בצד עמוד זה אמר ליה לא עברתי בצד עמוד זה מעולם נפקו ביה סהדי דהשתין מים בצד עמוד זה אמר רב נחמן הוחזק כפרן

There are those who say that the incident transpired a bit differently. There was a certain individual who said to another: I counted for you and gave you one hundred dinars as a loan alongside this column. The other person said to him in response: I never passed alongside this column. Witnesses emerged and testified concerning him that he urinated alongside this column. Rav Naḥman said: He assumes the presumptive status of a denier of the truth, as the witnesses contradicted his claim.

אמר ליה רבא לרב נחמן כל מילתא דלא רמיא עליה דאיניש עביד לה ולאו אדעתיה

Rava said to Rav Naḥman: There is no proof from here that he assumes the presumptive status of a denier, as any matter that is not incumbent upon a person to remember, he performs it and it is not on his mind. Therefore, when he denied ever passing alongside the column, it was because there was never any reason for him to remember that he had been there.

רבי שמעון אומר חייב כאן וחייב בפקדון כו׳

§ The Gemara proceeds to cite the opinion cited last in the baraita explaining the source of the halakha that one is liable for taking a false oath of testimony only for a case involving monetary matters. Rabbi Shimon says: The Torah rendered one liable if he takes a false oath here, with regard to an oath of testimony, and the Torah rendered one liable if he takes a false oath with regard to an oath on a deposit; just as there, the verse is speaking of liability only in cases involving monetary claims, so too here, the verse is speaking of liability only in cases involving monetary claims.

מחכו עלה במערבא מאי חוכא

They mocked this proof in the West, i.e., Eretz Yisrael. The Gemara asked: What is worthy of mockery in the statement of Rabbi Shimon?

דקתני מה לפקדון שכן לא עשה בו מושבע כנשבע מזיד כשוגג

The Gemara explains that they mocked that which the baraita teaches in the continuation, rejecting the a fortiori inference suggested by Rabbi Shimon: What is notable about the case of a deposit? It is notable in that with regard to a deposit the Torah did not render the halakhic status of one to whom an oath was administered by others like that of one who himself took an oath, as one to whom an oath was administered by others is exempt; and the Torah did not render the halakhic status of one who takes an intentional false oath like that of one who takes an unwitting false oath.

מכדי מושבע מפי עצמו בעדות לרבי שמעון מנא ליה דגמר מפקדון פקדון נמי מושבע מפי אחרים נגמר מעדות

This rejection is difficult: Now, with regard to the fact that one who administered an oath to himself is liable in the case of an oath of testimony, from where is it derived according to Rabbi Shimon? Rabbi Shimon derives it by means of a verbal analogy from an oath on a deposit. If so, based on the same verbal analogy, in the case of an oath on a deposit too, let us derive from the case of an oath of testimony the fact that one is liable for a false oath that was administered by others.

ומאי חוכא דלמא רבי שמעון בקל וחומר מייתי לה מפי אחרים חייב מפי עצמו לא כל שכן

The Gemara rejects this: And what is worthy of mockery in that statement? Perhaps Rabbi Shimon does not derive that one who takes a false oath of testimony on his own is liable by means of a verbal analogy from an oath on a deposit; rather, he derives it by means of an a fortiori inference: If one is liable for a false oath of testimony administered by others, is it not all the more so that he is liable for an oath that he takes on his own?

אלא חוכא אמזיד כשוגג דקתני מה לפקדון שכן לא עשה בו מושבע כנשבע מזיד כשוגג

The Gemara answers: Rather, the mockery is with regard to the distinction between an oath on a deposit and an oath of testimony in the matter of whether the halakhic status of one who takes an intentional false oath is like that of one who takes an unwitting false oath, as it teaches in the baraita: What is notable about the case of a deposit? It is notable in that with regard to a deposit the Torah did not render the halakhic status of one to whom an oath was administered by others like that of one who himself took an oath, as one to whom an oath was administered by others is exempt; and the Torah did not render the halakhic status of one who takes an intentional false oath like that of one who takes an unwitting false oath.

מכדי מזיד גבי עדות מנא ליה דלא כתיב ביה ונעלם הכא נמי לא כתיב ביה ונעלם

Now, from where does he derive that one who takes an intentional false oath of testimony is liable? He derives it as it is not written in the context of an oath of testimony: And it is hidden. Here too, it is not written in the context of an oath on a deposit: And it is hidden. Therefore, there should be no distinction between intentional and unwitting with regard to an oath on a deposit either.

אמר להו רב הונא ומאי חוכא דלמא מזיד דלאו כשוגג בפקדון ממעילה רבי שמעון גמר לה

Rav Huna said to the Sages: And what is worthy of mockery in that statement? Perhaps the fact that the halakhic status of one who takes an intentional false oath is not like that of one who takes an unwitting false oath in the case of a deposit, and it is from the halakhot of misuse of consecrated property that Rabbi Shimon derived it. Just as one is liable to bring a guilt-offering for the misuse of consecrated property only if he did so unwittingly, one is liable to bring a guilt-offering for a false oath on a deposit only if he unwittingly took the false oath.

והיינו חוכא אדגמר לה ממעילה נגמר לה מעדות

The Gemara answers: And that is what is worthy of mockery. Instead of deriving the lack of liability for an intentional false oath of deposit from the case of misuse of consecrated property, let him derive liability for an intentional false oath on a deposit from the case of an oath of testimony.

מסתברא ממעילה הוה ליה למילף שכן מעילה ממעילה

The Gemara rejects this: It stands to reason that he should have derived it from the case of misuse of consecrated property, as that is a derivation of misuse written with regard to an oath on a deposit: “If any one shall sin and commits an act of misuse and dealt falsely with his colleague in a matter of deposit” (Leviticus 5:21), which is derived from misuse written with regard to misuse of consecrated property: “If any one commits an act of misuse and sinned unwittingly from items consecrated to the Lord” (Leviticus 5:15).

אדרבה מעדות הוה ליה למילף שכן תחטא מתחטא

The Gemara asks: On the contrary, he should have derived it from the case of an oath of testimony, as that is a derivation of “shall sin” written with regard to an oath on a deposit which is derived from “shall sin” written with regard to an oath of testimony: “And if any one shall sin and he hears the voice of an oath, and he is a witness” (Leviticus 5:1).

מסתברא ממעילה הוה ליה למילף שכן מעילה בכל נהנה בקבוע חומש ואשם

The Gemara rejects this: It stands to reason that it is from the case of misuse of consecrated property that he should have derived it, as there are many elements common to an oath on a deposit and misuse of consecrated property represented by the mnemonic: Misuse, with regard to all, derive benefit, with fixed, one-fifth, and guilt-offering. The term misuse is employed in both cases. Both cases are relevant with regard to all individuals and not only those fit to testify. Both involve one deriving benefit from property that is not his. In both cases, one is liable to bring a fixed guilt-offering, as opposed to one who takes a false oath of testimony, who is liable to bring a sliding-scale offering. In both cases, one adds one-fifth to the payment of the principal. In both cases, that is the offering with which one gains atonement.

אדרבה מעדות הוה ליה למילף שכן חטא הדיוט בשבועה תבעיה וכפריה ואואין הנך נפישין

The Gemara rejects this: On the contrary, he should have derived the halakha with regard to an oath on a deposit from the halakha of an oath of testimony, as there are many elements common to both oaths represented by the mnemonic: Sin, ordinary [hedyot], with an oath, claimed from him, denied his claim, and multiple instances of the term “or.” The term “shall sin” is written in both contexts. Both oaths relate to the property of ordinary individuals, not to consecrated property. In both cases there is a claim presented by one of the parties and denial of that claim by the one taking the oath. Multiple instances of the term “or” appear in both passages in the Torah. The Gemara responds: These elements common to an oath on a deposit and misuse of consecrated property are more numerous than the elements common to an oath on a deposit and an oath of testimony.

אלא מאי חוכא

Rather, after resolving all the difficulties that were raised against the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, the question remains: What did the Sages of Eretz Yisrael find that is worthy of mockery in that baraita?

כי אתא רב פפא ורב הונא בריה דרב יהושע מבי רב אמרי היינו חוכא מכדי רבי שמעון גזירה שוה גמיר למה ליה דפריך מה לפקדון שכן לא עשה בו מושבע כנשבע מזיד כשוגג

When Rav Pappa and Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, came from the study hall of their teacher, they said: This is what is worthy of mockery: Now, since ultimately Rabbi Shimon derives the halakha by means of a verbal analogy between the term “shall sin” written with regard to an oath on a deposit and the term “shall sin” written with regard to an oath of testimony, why is it that he refutes the parallel between them by saying: What is notable about the case of a deposit? It is notable in that with regard to a deposit the Torah did not render the halakhic status of one to whom an oath was administered by others like that of one who himself took an oath, as one to whom an oath was administered by others is exempt; and the Torah did not render the halakhic status of one who takes an intentional false oath like that of one who takes an unwitting false oath. Rabbi Shimon should have derived by means of the verbal analogy that all the halakhot of an oath of testimony and all the halakhot of an oath on a deposit are identical.

ומאי חוכא דלמא כי פריך מקמי דתיקום ליה גזירה שוה בתר דקמא ליה גזירה שוה לא פריך

The Gemara rejects this: And what is worthy of mockery in that statement? Perhaps when Rabbi Shimon refuted the parallel between the two oaths, it was prior to the verbal analogy being established for him, and the derivation was by means of a paradigm. After the verbal analogy was established for him, he does not refute the parallel and holds that in the case of an oath on a deposit one is liable to bring a guilt-offering for false oaths administered by others as well as for intentional false oaths.

ולא והאמר להו רבא בר איתי לרבנן מאן תנא שבועת הפקדון לא ניתן זדונה לכפרה רבי שמעון היא

The Gemara asks: And does Rabbi Shimon not refute the parallel between the two oaths? But didn’t Rava bar Ittai say to the Sages: Who is the tanna who taught with regard to an oath on a deposit that atonement by means of an offering is not possible for one who takes an intentional false oath? It is Rabbi Shimon. Apparently, Rabbi Shimon concludes that there remains a distinction between intentional and unwitting in the case of an oath on a deposit.

דלמא מזיד כשוגג פריך דגמר לה ממעילה דהנך נפישין אבל מושבע כנשבע לא פריך

The Gemara suggests: Perhaps with regard to the halakhic status of one who takes an intentional false oath being like that of one who takes an unwitting false oath, Rabbi Shimon refutes the parallel between the two oaths even after the verbal analogy is established for him, as he derives the halakha of an oath on a deposit from the halakha of misuse of consecrated property, where there is a distinction between intentional and unwitting, as those elements common to an oath on a deposit and the misuse of consecrated property are more numerous than the elements common to an oath on a deposit and an oath of testimony. But he does not refute the parallel between the two oaths with the claim that there is a distinction between them with regard to whether the halakhic status of one to whom an oath was administered by others is like that of one who himself took an oath. Once the verbal analogy was established for him, there is no longer a distinction between the two oaths in that regard.

ותהדר עדות ותגמר לה מפקדון מזיד דלאו כשוגג מה פקדון שוגג אין מזיד לא אף עדות שוגג אין מזיד לא כי היכי דיליף פקדון ממעילה

The Gemara asks: If, according to Rabbi Shimon, based on the derivation from the misuse of consecrated property, one who intentionally takes a false oath on a deposit does not bring a guilt-offering like one who took the false oath unwittingly, let the discussion of the case of an oath of testimony return to the verbal analogy and derive it from the case of an oath on a deposit that the halakhic status of one who takes an intentional false oath is not like that of one who takes an unwitting false oath. Just as in the case of an oath on a deposit, one who takes an unwitting false oath, yes, he is liable to bring a guilt-offering, and one who takes an intentional false oath, no, he is not liable, so too, in the case of an oath of testimony, one who takes an unwitting false oath, yes, he is liable to bring a sin-offering, and one who takes an intentional false oath, no, he is not liable, just as he derives the case of an oath on a deposit from the case of misuse of consecrated property.