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Today's Daf Yomi

January 1, 2018 | 讬状讚 讘讟讘转 转砖注状讞

  • This month's learning is sponsored by Joanna Rom and Steven Goldberg in loving memory of Steve's mother Shirley "Nana" Goldberg (Sura Tema bat Chaim v'Hanka)

Shevuot 34

Study Guide Shevuot 34. Four different聽opinions are brought to explain why an oath of testimony is only for monetary cases. Questions are raised about each one of the four opinions.

讻诇 讗讞转 讜讗讞转 讘驻谞讬 讘讬转 讚讬谉 讜砖诇讗 讘驻谞讬 讘讬转 讚讬谉 讗讬谞讜 诪讚讘专 讗诇讗 讘转讘讬注转 诪诪讜谉 注讚讜转 砖诇讗 注砖讛 讘讛 谞砖讬诐 讻讗谞砖讬诐 拽专讜讘讬诐 讻专讞讜拽讬诐 驻住讜诇讬谉 讻讻砖专讬诐 讜讗讬谞讜 讞讬讬讘 讗诇讗 讗讞转 讘驻谞讬 讘讬转 讚讬谉 讗讬谞讜 讚讬谉 砖诇讗 讬讛讗 诪讚讘专 讗诇讗 讘转讘讬注转 诪诪讜谉

each and every oath if the plaintiff administered several oaths to him and he denied having the deposit in his possession, whether he took the oath before a court or not before a court, and despite the broad application of the halakha, the verse is speaking of liability only in cases involving a monetary claim, then in the case of an oath of testimony with regard to which the Torah did not render the halakhic status of women like that of men, the status of relatives like that of non-relatives, and the status of unfit witnesses like that of those fit to testify, and he is liable to bring only one sliding-scale offering if the plaintiff administered several oaths to him and he falsely denied knowledge of the matter in the presence of a court, is it not right that the verse is speaking of liability only in cases involving a monetary claim?

诪讛 诇驻拽讚讜谉 砖讻谉 诇讗 注砖讛 讘讜 诪讜砖讘注 讻谞砖讘注 讜诪讝讬讚 讻砖讜讙讙 转讗诪专 讘注讚讜转 砖讻谉 注砖讛 讘讛 诪讜砖讘注 讻谞砖讘注 讜诪讝讬讚 讻砖讜讙讙

The baraita rejects this inference: What is notable about the case of a deposit? It is notable in that with regard to a deposit the Torah did not render the halakhic status of one to whom an oath was administered by others like that of one who himself took an oath, as one to whom an oath was administered by others is exempt; and the Torah did not render the halakhic status of one who takes an intentional false oath like that of one who takes an unwitting false oath. Will you say that the same is true with regard to an oath of testimony, as in that case the Torah rendered the halakhic status of one to whom an oath was administered by others like that of one who himself took an oath; and it rendered the halakhic status of one who takes an intentional false oath like that of one who takes an unwitting false oath, and one is liable to bring an offering in both instances?

转诇诪讜讚 诇讜诪专 转讞讟讗 转讞讟讗 诇讙讝讬专讛 砖讜讛 谞讗诪专 讻讗谉 转讞讟讗 讜谞讗诪专 诇讛诇谉 转讞讟讗 诪讛 诇讛诇谉 讗讬谞讜 诪讚讘专 讗诇讗 讘转讘讬注转 诪诪讜谉 讗祝 讻讗谉 讗讬谞讜 诪讚讘专 讗诇讗 讘转讘讬注转 诪诪讜谉

Therefore, the verse states the term 鈥渟hall sin鈥 with regard to an oath of testimony and states 鈥渟hall sin鈥 with regard to an oath on a deposit in order to derive a verbal analogy. Here, it is stated with regard to an oath of testimony: 鈥淪hall sin鈥 (Leviticus 5:1), and there, it is stated with regard to an oath on a deposit: 鈥淪hall sin鈥 (Leviticus 5:21). Just as there, concerning an oath on a deposit, the verse is speaking only with regard to a monetary claim, so too here, concerning an oath of testimony, the verse is speaking only with regard to a monetary claim.

诪转拽讬祝 诇讛 专讘讛 讘专 注讜诇讗 讗讜 讗讜 讘讬讟讜讬 讬讜讻讬讞讜 砖讛谉 讗讜讗讬谉 讜讬砖 注诪讛谉 砖讘讜注讛 讜讗讬谉 注诪讛谉 讻讛谉 讜诪讚讘专讬诐 砖诇讗 讘转讘讬注转 诪诪讜谉

搂 After presenting the different proofs cited in the baraita, the Gemara proceeds to analyze the opinions cited therein, beginning with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer that one derives that one is liable for an oath of testimony only if it involves a monetary claim from the case of an oath on a deposit based on multiple instances of the term 鈥渙r鈥 that appear in both contexts, and there is an oath with those multiple instances of the term 鈥渙r鈥 and there is no priest in their context. Rabba bar Ulla objects to this: The multiple instances of the term 鈥渙r鈥 in the verse: 鈥淥r if any one shall take an oath to clearly express with his lips to do evil or to do good鈥 (Leviticus 5:4), which is written with regard to an oath on an utterance, will prove that one is liable even without a monetary claim, as they are multiple instances of the term 鈥渙r,鈥 and there is an oath in their context, and there is no priest in their context, and they are not speaking with regard to a monetary claim.

诪住转讘专讗 诪驻拽讚讜谉 讛讜讛 诇讬讛 诇诪讬诇祝 砖讻谉 转讞讟讗 诪转讞讟讗

The Gemara rejects this: It stands to reason that he should have derived the halakha with regard to an oath of testimony from an oath on a deposit and not from an oath on an utterance due to the verbal analogy between the terms 鈥渟hall sin鈥 and 鈥渟hall sin.鈥

讗讚专讘讛 诪讘讬讟讜讬 讛讜讛 诇讬讛 诇诪讬诇祝 砖讻谉 讞讟讗转 诪讞讟讗转

The Gemara rejects this: On the contrary, he should have derived the halakha with regard to an oath of testimony from the halakha with regard to an oath on an utterance, as it is a derivation of one case for which one is liable to bring a sin-offering for taking a false oath from another case for which one is liable to bring a sin-offering for taking a false oath. This is in contrast to an oath on a deposit, for which one is liable to bring a guilt-offering for taking a false oath.

讗诇讗 诪住转讘专讗 诪驻拽讚讜谉 讛讜讛 诇讬讛 诇诪讬诇祝 砖讻谉 讞讟讗 讘诪讝讬讚 转讘注讬讛 讜讻驻专讬讛 讜注讘专讬讛

Rather, it stands to reason that he should have derived the halakha with regard to an oath of testimony from the halakha with regard to an oath on a deposit, as there are many elements common to both oaths, represented by the mnemonic: Sin, intentionally, claimed from him, denied his claim, and his past. There is a verbal analogy between them, as the term 鈥渟hall sin鈥 appears in both contexts. In both cases one is liable for taking a false oath intentionally. Additionally, in both cases there is a claim presented by one of the parties and denial of that claim by the one taking the oath. And both oaths relate to events that transpired in the past.

讗讚专讘讛 诪讘讬讟讜讬 讛讜讛 诇讬讛 诇诪讬诇祝 砖讻谉 讞讟讗转 砖讬专讚讛 诇讞讜诪砖 讛谞讱 谞驻讬砖谉

The Gemara asks: On the contrary, he should have derived the halakha with regard to an oath of testimony from the halakha with regard to an oath on an utterance, as there are many elements common to both oaths, represented by the mnemonic: Sinoffering, that descended, to one-fifth. In both cases one is liable to bring a sin-offering for a false oath, as opposed to a guilt-offering for a false oath on a deposit. In each case the offering is a sliding-scale offering, as opposed to the fixed offering in the case of an oath on a deposit. In both cases there is no payment of an additional one-fifth for taking a false oath. And in the case of a false oath on a deposit, there is payment of an additional one-fifth. The Gemara answers: These elements common to an oath of testimony and an oath on a deposit are more numerous than the elements common to an oath of testimony and an oath on an utterance.

专讘讬 注拽讬讘讗 讗讜诪专 讜讛讬讛 讻讬 讬讗砖诐 诇讗讞转 诪讗诇讛 讬砖 诪讗诇讛 砖讛讜讗 讞讬讬讘 讜讬砖 诪讗诇讛 砖讛讜讗 驻讟讜专 讛讗 讻讬爪讚 转讘注讜 诪诪讜谉 讞讬讬讘 转讘注讜 讚讘专 讗讞专 驻讟讜专

Rabbi Akiva says that it is written with regard to an oath of testimony: 鈥淎nd it shall be when he will be guilty of one of these鈥 (Leviticus 5:5). The term 鈥渙f these鈥 is a restrictive expression from which it is derived: There are some of these for which he is liable and there are some of these for which he is exempt. How so? If the plaintiff demanded testimony from the witness with regard to a monetary claim, the witness is liable for taking a false oath; if the plaintiff demanded testimony from the witness with regard to another matter, he is exempt.

讗讬驻讜讱 讗谞讗

The Gemara challenges: Since it is not clear from the verse for which claim one is liable and for which claim one is exempt, I will reverse it and say that one is liable only when the claim was with regard to another matter, not when it involves monetary matters.

专讘讬 注拽讬讘讗 讗讗讜讗讬谉 讚专讘讬 讗诇讬注讝专 住诪讬讱

The Gemara answers: Rabbi Akiva relies on the multiple instances of the term 鈥渙r,鈥 as cited by Rabbi Eliezer, to derive from an oath on a deposit that one is liable only for a false oath that involves a monetary claim. From the term 鈥渙f these鈥 Rabbi Akiva derives that there are some cases involving monetary claims for which one is not liable for taking a false oath of testimony.

诪讗讬 讘讬谞讬讬讛讜 讘讬谉 专讘讬 讗诇讬注讝专 讜讘讬谉 专讘讬 注拽讬讘讗

The Gemara asks: What is the practical difference between the opinions of Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Akiva? With regard to which cases involving monetary claims does Rabbi Akiva hold that one is not liable for taking a false oath of testimony?

讗讬讻讗 讘讬谞讬讬讛讜 诪砖讘讬注 注讚讬 拽专拽注 诇专讘讬 讗诇讬注讝专 讞讬讬讘讬谉 诇专讘讬 注拽讬讘讗 驻讟讜专讬谉

The Gemara answers: The practical difference between their opinions is in the case of one who administers an oath to witnesses with regard to testimony involving land. According to Rabbi Eliezer, they are liable if they take a false oath. According to Rabbi Akiva they are exempt in that case, as it is excluded by the term 鈥渙f these.鈥

讜诇专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讚讗诪专 讛转诐 诪砖讘讬注 注讚讬 拽专拽注 讗驻讬诇讜 诇专讘讬 讗诇讬注讝专 驻讟讜专讬谉 讛讻讗 诪讗讬 讗讬讻讗 讘讬谉 专讘讬 讗诇讬注讝专 诇专讘讬 注拽讬讘讗

The Gemara asks: And according to Rabbi Yo岣nan, who says there with regard to an oath on a deposit and an oath of testimony that in the case of one who administers an oath to witnesses with regard to testimony involving land, the witnesses are exempt even according to Rabbi Eliezer, what difference is there between the opinions of Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Akiva?

讗讬讻讗 讘讬谞讬讬讛讜 注讚讬 拽谞住

The Gemara answers: The practical difference between their opinions is in the case where one administers an oath to witnesses with regard to testimony involving a fine. According to Rabbi Eliezer they are liable, and according to Rabbi Akiva they are exempt.

专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讛讙诇讬诇讬 讗讜诪专 讜讛讜讗 注讚 讗讜 专讗讛 讗讜 讬讚注 讘注讚讜转 讛诪转拽讬讬诪转 讘专讗讬讛 讘诇讗 讬讚讬注讛 讜讘讬讚讬注讛 讘诇讗 专讗讬讛 讛讻转讜讘 诪讚讘专

Rabbi Yosei HaGelili cites a different proof and says: The verse states with regard to an oath of testimony: 鈥淎nd he is a witness or he saw or he knew鈥 (Leviticus 5:1). It is with regard to testimony that is founded on sight without knowledge of the matter, or by means of knowledge without sight, that the verse is speaking. The reference is to testimony involving monetary matters, as all other testimony requires both knowledge and sight.

讗诪专 诇讬讛 专讘 驻驻讗 诇讗讘讬讬 诇讬诪讗 专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讛讙诇讬诇讬 诇讬转 诇讬讛 讚专讘讬 讗讞讗 讚转谞讬讗 专讘讬 讗讞讗 讗讜诪专 讙诪诇 讛讗讜讞专 讘讬谉 讛讙诪诇讬诐 讜谞诪爪讗 讙诪诇 讛专讜讙 讘爪讬讚讜 讘讬讚讜注 砖讝讛 讛专讙讜 讚讗讬 讗讬转 诇讬讛 讚专讘讬 讗讞讗 讘讚讬谞讬 谞驻砖讜转 谞诪讬 诪砖讻讞转 诇讛 讻专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 讘谉 砖讟讞

Rav Pappa said to Abaye: Shall we say that Rabbi Yosei HaGelili does not accept the opinion of Rabbi A岣? As it is taught in a baraita (Tosefta, Bava Kamma 3:6) that Rabbi A岣 says: If there is a rutting male camel [gamal hao岣r] that is rampaging among other camels and then a camel was found killed at its side, it is evident that this rampaging camel killed it, and the owner must pay for the damage. Rabbi A岣 rules that cases of monetary law can be decided based on circumstantial evidence. As, if he is of the opinion that the ruling is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi A岣 that witnesses may testify on the basis of circumstantial evidence, in cases of capital law too, you find a case of knowledge without sight, as in the case discussed by Rabbi Shimon ben Shata岣.

讚转谞讬讗 讗诪专 专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 讘谉 砖讟讞 讗专讗讛 讘谞讞诪讛 讗诐 诇讗 专讗讬转讬 讗讞讚 砖专抓 讗讞专 讞讘讬专讜 诇讞讜专讘讛 讜专爪转讬 讗讞专讬讜 讜诪爪讗转讬 住讬讬祝 讘讬讚讜 讜讚诐 诪讟驻讟祝 讜讛专讜讙 诪驻专驻专 讗诪专转讬 诇讜 专砖注 诪讬 讛专讙讜 诇讝讛 讗讜 讗谞讬 讗讜 讗转讛

As it is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Shimon ben Shata岣 said in the form of an oath: I will not see the consolation of Israel if I did not see one who was running after another into a ruin, and I ran after him and found a sword in his hand and blood dripping from the sword, and the slain person convulsing. I said to him: Wicked one, who killed this person? It was either me or you, as there is no one else here.

讗讘诇 诪讛 讗注砖讛 砖讗讬谉 讚诪讱 诪住讜专 讘讬讚讬 砖讛专讬 讗诪专讛 转讜专讛 注诇 驻讬 砖谞讬诐 注讚讬诐 讗讜 砖诇砖讛 注讚讬诐 讬讜诪转 讛诪转 讗诇讗 讛诪拽讜诐 讬驻专注 诪诪讱 讗诪专讜 诇讗 讝讝讜 诪砖诐 注讚 砖谞砖讻讜 谞讞砖 讜诪转

But what can I do, as your blood is not given to my control and I have no jurisdiction to execute you, as the Torah says: 鈥淥n the basis of two witnesses or three witnesses shall he that is to die be put to death鈥 (Deuteronomy 17:6), and there are no witnesses here. Rather, the Omnipresent will exact retribution from you. The Sages said: They did not move from there until a snake came and bit the pursuer and he died. Rabbi A岣 would hold in that case that the pursuer could be executed by the court based on circumstantial evidence. Ostensibly, Rabbi Yosei HaGelili disagrees, as he says that testimony based on knowledge without sight exists only in cases of monetary law.

讗驻讬诇讜 转讬诪讗 讗讬转 诇讬讛 讚专讘讬 讗讞讗 讘砖诇诪讗 讬讚讬注讛 讘诇讗 专讗讬讛 诪砖讻讞转 诇讛 讗诇讗 专讗讬讛 讘诇讗 讬讚讬注讛 讛讬讻讬 诪砖讻讞转 诇讛 诪讬 诇讗 讘注讬 诪讬讚注 讗诐 讙讜讬 讛专讙 讗讜 讬砖专讗诇 讛专讙 讗诐 讗讚诐 讟专驻讛 讛专讙 讗讜 砖诇诐 讛专讙

The Gemara answers: Even if you say that Rabbi Yosei HaGelili is of the opinion that the ruling is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi A岣 that one may rely on circumstantial evidence even in cases of capital law, one may nevertheless distinguish between cases of monetary law and cases of capital law. Granted, even in cases of capital law you find testimony based on knowledge without sight, but how can you find a case of sight without knowledge? Don鈥檛 the witnesses need to know if the one whom he witnessed killing another killed a gentile or he killed a Jew, if he killed one who has a wound that would have caused him to die within twelve months [tereifa] or he killed one whose body is intact?

砖诪注 诪讬谞讛 拽住讘专 专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讛讙诇讬诇讬 诪砖讘讬注 注讚讬 拽谞住 驻讟讜专 讚讗讬 住诇拽讗 讚注转讱 讞讬讬讘 谞讛讬 讚讬讚讬注讛 讘诇讗 专讗讬讛 讗砖讻讞谉 诇讛 专讗讬讛 讘诇讗 讬讚讬注讛 诪讬 诇讗 讘注讬 诪讬讚注 讙讜讬讛 讘注诇 讘转 讬砖专讗诇 讘注诇 讘转讜诇讛 讘注诇 讘注讜诇讛 讘注诇

The Gemara notes: Conclude from it that Rabbi Yosei HaGelili holds that in a case where one administers an oath to witnesses with regard to testimony involving a fine, the witnesses are exempt from liability for taking a false oath of testimony. As if it enters your mind to say that the witnesses are liable, although you find testimony with regard to fines based on knowledge without sight, and witnesses may testify based on circumstantial evidence, in cases of sight without knowledge, when it comes to fines, don鈥檛 the witnesses need to know if the rapist engaged in intercourse with a gentile woman or if he engaged in intercourse with a Jewish woman, if he engaged in intercourse with a virgin or if he engaged in intercourse with a non-virgin? Rabbi Yosei HaGelili holds that witnesses are liable for taking a false oath of testimony only in cases where both testimony based on sight alone and testimony based on knowledge alone are accepted, which is not the case concerning testimony involving fines.

讬转讬讘 专讘 讛诪谞讜谞讗 拽诪讬讛 讚专讘 讬讛讜讚讛 讜讬转讬讘 专讘 讬讛讜讚讛 讜拽讗 诪讬讘注讬讗 诇讬讛 诪谞讛 诪谞讬转讬讱 讘驻谞讬 驻诇讜谞讬 讜驻诇讜谞讬

搂 Apropos the matter of sight without knowledge in cases of monetary law, the Gemara relates: Rav Hamnuna was sitting before Rav Yehuda, and Rav Yehuda was sitting and he was raising a dilemma: If one demands payment from another and claims: I counted for you and gave you one hundred dinars in the presence of so-and-so and so-and-so,

讜注讚讬诐 专讜讗讬谉 讗讜转讜 诪讘讞讜抓 诪讗讬

and witnesses see him counting the money from outside, what is the halakha? Is their testimony accepted?

讗诪专 诇讬讛 专讘 讛诪谞讜谞讗 讜讛诇讛 诪讛 讟讜注谉 讗讬 讗诪专 诇讗 讛讬讜 讚讘专讬诐 诪注讜诇诐 讛讜讞讝拽 讻驻专谉 讗讬 讗诪专 讗讬谉 砖拽诇讬 讜讚讬讚讬 砖拽诇讬 讻讬 讗转讜 注讚讬诐 诪讗讬 讛讜讬 讗诪专 诇讬讛 讛诪谞讜谞讗 讗转 注讜诇 转讗

Rav Hamnuna said to Rav Yehuda: And what does the other person claim in response to the demand for repayment? If he says: These matters never happened, he assumes the presumptive status of a denier of the truth, as the witnesses testify that they saw the claimant counting the money and giving it to him. If he says: Yes, I took money from him, but it is my money that I took, then when the witnesses come and testify that they saw the claimant counting the money and giving it to him, what of it? The testimony of the witnesses does not contradict his claim, as the witnesses do not know the circumstances under which the money changed hands. Rav Yehuda said to him: Are you Hamnuna? Enter and come into the study hall, as you make your teacher wiser.

讛讛讜讗 讚讗诪专 诇讬讛 诇讞讘专讬讛 诪谞讛 诪谞讬转讬 诇讱 讘爪讚 注诪讜讚 讝讛 讗诪专 诇讬讛 诇讗 注讘专转讬 讘爪讚 注诪讜讚 讝讛 讗转讜 转专讬 住讛讚讬 讗住讛讬讚讜 讘讬讛 讚讛砖转讬谉 诪讬诐 讘爪讚 注诪讜讚 讝讛 讗诪专 专讬砖 诇拽讬砖 讛讜讞讝拽 讻驻专谉

The Gemara relates a similar incident: There was a certain individual who said to another: I counted for you and gave you one hundred dinars as a loan alongside this column. The other person said to him in response: I did not pass alongside this column. Two witnesses came and testified about him that they saw that he urinated alongside this column. Reish Lakish said: He assumes the presumptive status of a denier of the truth, as the testimony of witnesses proves that he passed alongside the column.

诪转拽讬祝 诇讛 专讘 谞讞诪谉 讛讗讬 讚讬谞讗 驻专住讗讛 讛讜讗 诪讬 拽讗诪专 诪注讜诇诐 讘注住拽 讝讛 拽讗诪专 诇讬讛

Rav Na岣an objects to this: That is a ruling characteristic of a Persian court, not a reasonable ruling characteristic of a Jewish court. Did the respondent say that he never passed alongside the column? It was that he did not pass alongside the column in the context of this matter that he said to him that he did not pass the column; therefore, the testimony of the witnesses does not contradict his statement.

讗讬讻讗 讚讗诪专讬 讛讛讜讗 讚讗诪专 诇讬讛 诇讞讘专讬讛 诪谞讛 诪谞讬转讬 诇讱 讘爪讚 注诪讜讚 讝讛 讗诪专 诇讬讛 诇讗 注讘专转讬 讘爪讚 注诪讜讚 讝讛 诪注讜诇诐 谞驻拽讜 讘讬讛 住讛讚讬 讚讛砖转讬谉 诪讬诐 讘爪讚 注诪讜讚 讝讛 讗诪专 专讘 谞讞诪谉 讛讜讞讝拽 讻驻专谉

There are those who say that the incident transpired a bit differently. There was a certain individual who said to another: I counted for you and gave you one hundred dinars as a loan alongside this column. The other person said to him in response: I never passed alongside this column. Witnesses emerged and testified concerning him that he urinated alongside this column. Rav Na岣an said: He assumes the presumptive status of a denier of the truth, as the witnesses contradicted his claim.

讗诪专 诇讬讛 专讘讗 诇专讘 谞讞诪谉 讻诇 诪讬诇转讗 讚诇讗 专诪讬讗 注诇讬讛 讚讗讬谞讬砖 注讘讬讚 诇讛 讜诇讗讜 讗讚注转讬讛

Rava said to Rav Na岣an: There is no proof from here that he assumes the presumptive status of a denier, as any matter that is not incumbent upon a person to remember, he performs it and it is not on his mind. Therefore, when he denied ever passing alongside the column, it was because there was never any reason for him to remember that he had been there.

专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 讗讜诪专 讞讬讬讘 讻讗谉 讜讞讬讬讘 讘驻拽讚讜谉 讻讜壮

搂 The Gemara proceeds to cite the opinion cited last in the baraita explaining the source of the halakha that one is liable for taking a false oath of testimony only for a case involving monetary matters. Rabbi Shimon says: The Torah rendered one liable if he takes a false oath here, with regard to an oath of testimony, and the Torah rendered one liable if he takes a false oath with regard to an oath on a deposit; just as there, the verse is speaking of liability only in cases involving monetary claims, so too here, the verse is speaking of liability only in cases involving monetary claims.

诪讞讻讜 注诇讛 讘诪注专讘讗 诪讗讬 讞讜讻讗

They mocked this proof in the West, i.e., Eretz Yisrael. The Gemara asked: What is worthy of mockery in the statement of Rabbi Shimon?

讚拽转谞讬 诪讛 诇驻拽讚讜谉 砖讻谉 诇讗 注砖讛 讘讜 诪讜砖讘注 讻谞砖讘注 诪讝讬讚 讻砖讜讙讙

The Gemara explains that they mocked that which the baraita teaches in the continuation, rejecting the a fortiori inference suggested by Rabbi Shimon: What is notable about the case of a deposit? It is notable in that with regard to a deposit the Torah did not render the halakhic status of one to whom an oath was administered by others like that of one who himself took an oath, as one to whom an oath was administered by others is exempt; and the Torah did not render the halakhic status of one who takes an intentional false oath like that of one who takes an unwitting false oath.

诪讻讚讬 诪讜砖讘注 诪驻讬 注爪诪讜 讘注讚讜转 诇专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 诪谞讗 诇讬讛 讚讙诪专 诪驻拽讚讜谉 驻拽讚讜谉 谞诪讬 诪讜砖讘注 诪驻讬 讗讞专讬诐 谞讙诪专 诪注讚讜转

This rejection is difficult: Now, with regard to the fact that one who administered an oath to himself is liable in the case of an oath of testimony, from where is it derived according to Rabbi Shimon? Rabbi Shimon derives it by means of a verbal analogy from an oath on a deposit. If so, based on the same verbal analogy, in the case of an oath on a deposit too, let us derive from the case of an oath of testimony the fact that one is liable for a false oath that was administered by others.

讜诪讗讬 讞讜讻讗 讚诇诪讗 专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 讘拽诇 讜讞讜诪专 诪讬讬转讬 诇讛 诪驻讬 讗讞专讬诐 讞讬讬讘 诪驻讬 注爪诪讜 诇讗 讻诇 砖讻谉

The Gemara rejects this: And what is worthy of mockery in that statement? Perhaps Rabbi Shimon does not derive that one who takes a false oath of testimony on his own is liable by means of a verbal analogy from an oath on a deposit; rather, he derives it by means of an a fortiori inference: If one is liable for a false oath of testimony administered by others, is it not all the more so that he is liable for an oath that he takes on his own?

讗诇讗 讞讜讻讗 讗诪讝讬讚 讻砖讜讙讙 讚拽转谞讬 诪讛 诇驻拽讚讜谉 砖讻谉 诇讗 注砖讛 讘讜 诪讜砖讘注 讻谞砖讘注 诪讝讬讚 讻砖讜讙讙

The Gemara answers: Rather, the mockery is with regard to the distinction between an oath on a deposit and an oath of testimony in the matter of whether the halakhic status of one who takes an intentional false oath is like that of one who takes an unwitting false oath, as it teaches in the baraita: What is notable about the case of a deposit? It is notable in that with regard to a deposit the Torah did not render the halakhic status of one to whom an oath was administered by others like that of one who himself took an oath, as one to whom an oath was administered by others is exempt; and the Torah did not render the halakhic status of one who takes an intentional false oath like that of one who takes an unwitting false oath.

诪讻讚讬 诪讝讬讚 讙讘讬 注讚讜转 诪谞讗 诇讬讛 讚诇讗 讻转讬讘 讘讬讛 讜谞注诇诐 讛讻讗 谞诪讬 诇讗 讻转讬讘 讘讬讛 讜谞注诇诐

Now, from where does he derive that one who takes an intentional false oath of testimony is liable? He derives it as it is not written in the context of an oath of testimony: And it is hidden. Here too, it is not written in the context of an oath on a deposit: And it is hidden. Therefore, there should be no distinction between intentional and unwitting with regard to an oath on a deposit either.

讗诪专 诇讛讜 专讘 讛讜谞讗 讜诪讗讬 讞讜讻讗 讚诇诪讗 诪讝讬讚 讚诇讗讜 讻砖讜讙讙 讘驻拽讚讜谉 诪诪注讬诇讛 专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 讙诪专 诇讛

Rav Huna said to the Sages: And what is worthy of mockery in that statement? Perhaps the fact that the halakhic status of one who takes an intentional false oath is not like that of one who takes an unwitting false oath in the case of a deposit, and it is from the halakhot of misuse of consecrated property that Rabbi Shimon derived it. Just as one is liable to bring a guilt-offering for the misuse of consecrated property only if he did so unwittingly, one is liable to bring a guilt-offering for a false oath on a deposit only if he unwittingly took the false oath.

讜讛讬讬谞讜 讞讜讻讗 讗讚讙诪专 诇讛 诪诪注讬诇讛 谞讙诪专 诇讛 诪注讚讜转

The Gemara answers: And that is what is worthy of mockery. Instead of deriving the lack of liability for an intentional false oath of deposit from the case of misuse of consecrated property, let him derive liability for an intentional false oath on a deposit from the case of an oath of testimony.

诪住转讘专讗 诪诪注讬诇讛 讛讜讛 诇讬讛 诇诪讬诇祝 砖讻谉 诪注讬诇讛 诪诪注讬诇讛

The Gemara rejects this: It stands to reason that he should have derived it from the case of misuse of consecrated property, as that is a derivation of misuse written with regard to an oath on a deposit: 鈥淚f any one shall sin and commits an act of misuse and dealt falsely with his colleague in a matter of deposit鈥 (Leviticus 5:21), which is derived from misuse written with regard to misuse of consecrated property: 鈥淚f any one commits an act of misuse and sinned unwittingly from items consecrated to the Lord鈥 (Leviticus 5:15).

讗讚专讘讛 诪注讚讜转 讛讜讛 诇讬讛 诇诪讬诇祝 砖讻谉 转讞讟讗 诪转讞讟讗

The Gemara asks: On the contrary, he should have derived it from the case of an oath of testimony, as that is a derivation of 鈥渟hall sin鈥 written with regard to an oath on a deposit which is derived from 鈥渟hall sin鈥 written with regard to an oath of testimony: 鈥淎nd if any one shall sin and he hears the voice of an oath, and he is a witness鈥 (Leviticus 5:1).

诪住转讘专讗 诪诪注讬诇讛 讛讜讛 诇讬讛 诇诪讬诇祝 砖讻谉 诪注讬诇讛 讘讻诇 谞讛谞讛 讘拽讘讜注 讞讜诪砖 讜讗砖诐

The Gemara rejects this: It stands to reason that it is from the case of misuse of consecrated property that he should have derived it, as there are many elements common to an oath on a deposit and misuse of consecrated property represented by the mnemonic: Misuse, with regard to all, derive benefit, with fixed, one-fifth, and guilt-offering. The term misuse is employed in both cases. Both cases are relevant with regard to all individuals and not only those fit to testify. Both involve one deriving benefit from property that is not his. In both cases, one is liable to bring a fixed guilt-offering, as opposed to one who takes a false oath of testimony, who is liable to bring a sliding-scale offering. In both cases, one adds one-fifth to the payment of the principal. In both cases, that is the offering with which one gains atonement.

讗讚专讘讛 诪注讚讜转 讛讜讛 诇讬讛 诇诪讬诇祝 砖讻谉 讞讟讗 讛讚讬讜讟 讘砖讘讜注讛 转讘注讬讛 讜讻驻专讬讛 讜讗讜讗讬谉 讛谞讱 谞驻讬砖讬谉

The Gemara rejects this: On the contrary, he should have derived the halakha with regard to an oath on a deposit from the halakha of an oath of testimony, as there are many elements common to both oaths represented by the mnemonic: Sin, ordinary [hedyot], with an oath, claimed from him, denied his claim, and multiple instances of the term 鈥渙r.鈥 The term 鈥渟hall sin鈥 is written in both contexts. Both oaths relate to the property of ordinary individuals, not to consecrated property. In both cases there is a claim presented by one of the parties and denial of that claim by the one taking the oath. Multiple instances of the term 鈥渙r鈥 appear in both passages in the Torah. The Gemara responds: These elements common to an oath on a deposit and misuse of consecrated property are more numerous than the elements common to an oath on a deposit and an oath of testimony.

讗诇讗 诪讗讬 讞讜讻讗

Rather, after resolving all the difficulties that were raised against the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, the question remains: What did the Sages of Eretz Yisrael find that is worthy of mockery in that baraita?

讻讬 讗转讗 专讘 驻驻讗 讜专讘 讛讜谞讗 讘专讬讛 讚专讘 讬讛讜砖注 诪讘讬 专讘 讗诪专讬 讛讬讬谞讜 讞讜讻讗 诪讻讚讬 专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 讙讝讬专讛 砖讜讛 讙诪讬专 诇诪讛 诇讬讛 讚驻专讬讱 诪讛 诇驻拽讚讜谉 砖讻谉 诇讗 注砖讛 讘讜 诪讜砖讘注 讻谞砖讘注 诪讝讬讚 讻砖讜讙讙

When Rav Pappa and Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, came from the study hall of their teacher, they said: This is what is worthy of mockery: Now, since ultimately Rabbi Shimon derives the halakha by means of a verbal analogy between the term 鈥渟hall sin鈥 written with regard to an oath on a deposit and the term 鈥渟hall sin鈥 written with regard to an oath of testimony, why is it that he refutes the parallel between them by saying: What is notable about the case of a deposit? It is notable in that with regard to a deposit the Torah did not render the halakhic status of one to whom an oath was administered by others like that of one who himself took an oath, as one to whom an oath was administered by others is exempt; and the Torah did not render the halakhic status of one who takes an intentional false oath like that of one who takes an unwitting false oath. Rabbi Shimon should have derived by means of the verbal analogy that all the halakhot of an oath of testimony and all the halakhot of an oath on a deposit are identical.

讜诪讗讬 讞讜讻讗 讚诇诪讗 讻讬 驻专讬讱 诪拽诪讬 讚转讬拽讜诐 诇讬讛 讙讝讬专讛 砖讜讛 讘转专 讚拽诪讗 诇讬讛 讙讝讬专讛 砖讜讛 诇讗 驻专讬讱

The Gemara rejects this: And what is worthy of mockery in that statement? Perhaps when Rabbi Shimon refuted the parallel between the two oaths, it was prior to the verbal analogy being established for him, and the derivation was by means of a paradigm. After the verbal analogy was established for him, he does not refute the parallel and holds that in the case of an oath on a deposit one is liable to bring a guilt-offering for false oaths administered by others as well as for intentional false oaths.

讜诇讗 讜讛讗诪专 诇讛讜 专讘讗 讘专 讗讬转讬 诇专讘谞谉 诪讗谉 转谞讗 砖讘讜注转 讛驻拽讚讜谉 诇讗 谞讬转谉 讝讚讜谞讛 诇讻驻专讛 专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 讛讬讗

The Gemara asks: And does Rabbi Shimon not refute the parallel between the two oaths? But didn鈥檛 Rava bar Ittai say to the Sages: Who is the tanna who taught with regard to an oath on a deposit that atonement by means of an offering is not possible for one who takes an intentional false oath? It is Rabbi Shimon. Apparently, Rabbi Shimon concludes that there remains a distinction between intentional and unwitting in the case of an oath on a deposit.

讚诇诪讗 诪讝讬讚 讻砖讜讙讙 驻专讬讱 讚讙诪专 诇讛 诪诪注讬诇讛 讚讛谞讱 谞驻讬砖讬谉 讗讘诇 诪讜砖讘注 讻谞砖讘注 诇讗 驻专讬讱

The Gemara suggests: Perhaps with regard to the halakhic status of one who takes an intentional false oath being like that of one who takes an unwitting false oath, Rabbi Shimon refutes the parallel between the two oaths even after the verbal analogy is established for him, as he derives the halakha of an oath on a deposit from the halakha of misuse of consecrated property, where there is a distinction between intentional and unwitting, as those elements common to an oath on a deposit and the misuse of consecrated property are more numerous than the elements common to an oath on a deposit and an oath of testimony. But he does not refute the parallel between the two oaths with the claim that there is a distinction between them with regard to whether the halakhic status of one to whom an oath was administered by others is like that of one who himself took an oath. Once the verbal analogy was established for him, there is no longer a distinction between the two oaths in that regard.

讜转讛讚专 注讚讜转 讜转讙诪专 诇讛 诪驻拽讚讜谉 诪讝讬讚 讚诇讗讜 讻砖讜讙讙 诪讛 驻拽讚讜谉 砖讜讙讙 讗讬谉 诪讝讬讚 诇讗 讗祝 注讚讜转 砖讜讙讙 讗讬谉 诪讝讬讚 诇讗 讻讬 讛讬讻讬 讚讬诇讬祝 驻拽讚讜谉 诪诪注讬诇讛

The Gemara asks: If, according to Rabbi Shimon, based on the derivation from the misuse of consecrated property, one who intentionally takes a false oath on a deposit does not bring a guilt-offering like one who took the false oath unwittingly, let the discussion of the case of an oath of testimony return to the verbal analogy and derive it from the case of an oath on a deposit that the halakhic status of one who takes an intentional false oath is not like that of one who takes an unwitting false oath. Just as in the case of an oath on a deposit, one who takes an unwitting false oath, yes, he is liable to bring a guilt-offering, and one who takes an intentional false oath, no, he is not liable, so too, in the case of an oath of testimony, one who takes an unwitting false oath, yes, he is liable to bring a sin-offering, and one who takes an intentional false oath, no, he is not liable, just as he derives the case of an oath on a deposit from the case of misuse of consecrated property.

  • This month's learning is sponsored by Joanna Rom and Steven Goldberg in loving memory of Steve's mother Shirley "Nana" Goldberg (Sura Tema bat Chaim v'Hanka)

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Shevuot 34

The William Davidson Talmud | Powered by Sefaria

Shevuot 34

讻诇 讗讞转 讜讗讞转 讘驻谞讬 讘讬转 讚讬谉 讜砖诇讗 讘驻谞讬 讘讬转 讚讬谉 讗讬谞讜 诪讚讘专 讗诇讗 讘转讘讬注转 诪诪讜谉 注讚讜转 砖诇讗 注砖讛 讘讛 谞砖讬诐 讻讗谞砖讬诐 拽专讜讘讬诐 讻专讞讜拽讬诐 驻住讜诇讬谉 讻讻砖专讬诐 讜讗讬谞讜 讞讬讬讘 讗诇讗 讗讞转 讘驻谞讬 讘讬转 讚讬谉 讗讬谞讜 讚讬谉 砖诇讗 讬讛讗 诪讚讘专 讗诇讗 讘转讘讬注转 诪诪讜谉

each and every oath if the plaintiff administered several oaths to him and he denied having the deposit in his possession, whether he took the oath before a court or not before a court, and despite the broad application of the halakha, the verse is speaking of liability only in cases involving a monetary claim, then in the case of an oath of testimony with regard to which the Torah did not render the halakhic status of women like that of men, the status of relatives like that of non-relatives, and the status of unfit witnesses like that of those fit to testify, and he is liable to bring only one sliding-scale offering if the plaintiff administered several oaths to him and he falsely denied knowledge of the matter in the presence of a court, is it not right that the verse is speaking of liability only in cases involving a monetary claim?

诪讛 诇驻拽讚讜谉 砖讻谉 诇讗 注砖讛 讘讜 诪讜砖讘注 讻谞砖讘注 讜诪讝讬讚 讻砖讜讙讙 转讗诪专 讘注讚讜转 砖讻谉 注砖讛 讘讛 诪讜砖讘注 讻谞砖讘注 讜诪讝讬讚 讻砖讜讙讙

The baraita rejects this inference: What is notable about the case of a deposit? It is notable in that with regard to a deposit the Torah did not render the halakhic status of one to whom an oath was administered by others like that of one who himself took an oath, as one to whom an oath was administered by others is exempt; and the Torah did not render the halakhic status of one who takes an intentional false oath like that of one who takes an unwitting false oath. Will you say that the same is true with regard to an oath of testimony, as in that case the Torah rendered the halakhic status of one to whom an oath was administered by others like that of one who himself took an oath; and it rendered the halakhic status of one who takes an intentional false oath like that of one who takes an unwitting false oath, and one is liable to bring an offering in both instances?

转诇诪讜讚 诇讜诪专 转讞讟讗 转讞讟讗 诇讙讝讬专讛 砖讜讛 谞讗诪专 讻讗谉 转讞讟讗 讜谞讗诪专 诇讛诇谉 转讞讟讗 诪讛 诇讛诇谉 讗讬谞讜 诪讚讘专 讗诇讗 讘转讘讬注转 诪诪讜谉 讗祝 讻讗谉 讗讬谞讜 诪讚讘专 讗诇讗 讘转讘讬注转 诪诪讜谉

Therefore, the verse states the term 鈥渟hall sin鈥 with regard to an oath of testimony and states 鈥渟hall sin鈥 with regard to an oath on a deposit in order to derive a verbal analogy. Here, it is stated with regard to an oath of testimony: 鈥淪hall sin鈥 (Leviticus 5:1), and there, it is stated with regard to an oath on a deposit: 鈥淪hall sin鈥 (Leviticus 5:21). Just as there, concerning an oath on a deposit, the verse is speaking only with regard to a monetary claim, so too here, concerning an oath of testimony, the verse is speaking only with regard to a monetary claim.

诪转拽讬祝 诇讛 专讘讛 讘专 注讜诇讗 讗讜 讗讜 讘讬讟讜讬 讬讜讻讬讞讜 砖讛谉 讗讜讗讬谉 讜讬砖 注诪讛谉 砖讘讜注讛 讜讗讬谉 注诪讛谉 讻讛谉 讜诪讚讘专讬诐 砖诇讗 讘转讘讬注转 诪诪讜谉

搂 After presenting the different proofs cited in the baraita, the Gemara proceeds to analyze the opinions cited therein, beginning with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer that one derives that one is liable for an oath of testimony only if it involves a monetary claim from the case of an oath on a deposit based on multiple instances of the term 鈥渙r鈥 that appear in both contexts, and there is an oath with those multiple instances of the term 鈥渙r鈥 and there is no priest in their context. Rabba bar Ulla objects to this: The multiple instances of the term 鈥渙r鈥 in the verse: 鈥淥r if any one shall take an oath to clearly express with his lips to do evil or to do good鈥 (Leviticus 5:4), which is written with regard to an oath on an utterance, will prove that one is liable even without a monetary claim, as they are multiple instances of the term 鈥渙r,鈥 and there is an oath in their context, and there is no priest in their context, and they are not speaking with regard to a monetary claim.

诪住转讘专讗 诪驻拽讚讜谉 讛讜讛 诇讬讛 诇诪讬诇祝 砖讻谉 转讞讟讗 诪转讞讟讗

The Gemara rejects this: It stands to reason that he should have derived the halakha with regard to an oath of testimony from an oath on a deposit and not from an oath on an utterance due to the verbal analogy between the terms 鈥渟hall sin鈥 and 鈥渟hall sin.鈥

讗讚专讘讛 诪讘讬讟讜讬 讛讜讛 诇讬讛 诇诪讬诇祝 砖讻谉 讞讟讗转 诪讞讟讗转

The Gemara rejects this: On the contrary, he should have derived the halakha with regard to an oath of testimony from the halakha with regard to an oath on an utterance, as it is a derivation of one case for which one is liable to bring a sin-offering for taking a false oath from another case for which one is liable to bring a sin-offering for taking a false oath. This is in contrast to an oath on a deposit, for which one is liable to bring a guilt-offering for taking a false oath.

讗诇讗 诪住转讘专讗 诪驻拽讚讜谉 讛讜讛 诇讬讛 诇诪讬诇祝 砖讻谉 讞讟讗 讘诪讝讬讚 转讘注讬讛 讜讻驻专讬讛 讜注讘专讬讛

Rather, it stands to reason that he should have derived the halakha with regard to an oath of testimony from the halakha with regard to an oath on a deposit, as there are many elements common to both oaths, represented by the mnemonic: Sin, intentionally, claimed from him, denied his claim, and his past. There is a verbal analogy between them, as the term 鈥渟hall sin鈥 appears in both contexts. In both cases one is liable for taking a false oath intentionally. Additionally, in both cases there is a claim presented by one of the parties and denial of that claim by the one taking the oath. And both oaths relate to events that transpired in the past.

讗讚专讘讛 诪讘讬讟讜讬 讛讜讛 诇讬讛 诇诪讬诇祝 砖讻谉 讞讟讗转 砖讬专讚讛 诇讞讜诪砖 讛谞讱 谞驻讬砖谉

The Gemara asks: On the contrary, he should have derived the halakha with regard to an oath of testimony from the halakha with regard to an oath on an utterance, as there are many elements common to both oaths, represented by the mnemonic: Sinoffering, that descended, to one-fifth. In both cases one is liable to bring a sin-offering for a false oath, as opposed to a guilt-offering for a false oath on a deposit. In each case the offering is a sliding-scale offering, as opposed to the fixed offering in the case of an oath on a deposit. In both cases there is no payment of an additional one-fifth for taking a false oath. And in the case of a false oath on a deposit, there is payment of an additional one-fifth. The Gemara answers: These elements common to an oath of testimony and an oath on a deposit are more numerous than the elements common to an oath of testimony and an oath on an utterance.

专讘讬 注拽讬讘讗 讗讜诪专 讜讛讬讛 讻讬 讬讗砖诐 诇讗讞转 诪讗诇讛 讬砖 诪讗诇讛 砖讛讜讗 讞讬讬讘 讜讬砖 诪讗诇讛 砖讛讜讗 驻讟讜专 讛讗 讻讬爪讚 转讘注讜 诪诪讜谉 讞讬讬讘 转讘注讜 讚讘专 讗讞专 驻讟讜专

Rabbi Akiva says that it is written with regard to an oath of testimony: 鈥淎nd it shall be when he will be guilty of one of these鈥 (Leviticus 5:5). The term 鈥渙f these鈥 is a restrictive expression from which it is derived: There are some of these for which he is liable and there are some of these for which he is exempt. How so? If the plaintiff demanded testimony from the witness with regard to a monetary claim, the witness is liable for taking a false oath; if the plaintiff demanded testimony from the witness with regard to another matter, he is exempt.

讗讬驻讜讱 讗谞讗

The Gemara challenges: Since it is not clear from the verse for which claim one is liable and for which claim one is exempt, I will reverse it and say that one is liable only when the claim was with regard to another matter, not when it involves monetary matters.

专讘讬 注拽讬讘讗 讗讗讜讗讬谉 讚专讘讬 讗诇讬注讝专 住诪讬讱

The Gemara answers: Rabbi Akiva relies on the multiple instances of the term 鈥渙r,鈥 as cited by Rabbi Eliezer, to derive from an oath on a deposit that one is liable only for a false oath that involves a monetary claim. From the term 鈥渙f these鈥 Rabbi Akiva derives that there are some cases involving monetary claims for which one is not liable for taking a false oath of testimony.

诪讗讬 讘讬谞讬讬讛讜 讘讬谉 专讘讬 讗诇讬注讝专 讜讘讬谉 专讘讬 注拽讬讘讗

The Gemara asks: What is the practical difference between the opinions of Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Akiva? With regard to which cases involving monetary claims does Rabbi Akiva hold that one is not liable for taking a false oath of testimony?

讗讬讻讗 讘讬谞讬讬讛讜 诪砖讘讬注 注讚讬 拽专拽注 诇专讘讬 讗诇讬注讝专 讞讬讬讘讬谉 诇专讘讬 注拽讬讘讗 驻讟讜专讬谉

The Gemara answers: The practical difference between their opinions is in the case of one who administers an oath to witnesses with regard to testimony involving land. According to Rabbi Eliezer, they are liable if they take a false oath. According to Rabbi Akiva they are exempt in that case, as it is excluded by the term 鈥渙f these.鈥

讜诇专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讚讗诪专 讛转诐 诪砖讘讬注 注讚讬 拽专拽注 讗驻讬诇讜 诇专讘讬 讗诇讬注讝专 驻讟讜专讬谉 讛讻讗 诪讗讬 讗讬讻讗 讘讬谉 专讘讬 讗诇讬注讝专 诇专讘讬 注拽讬讘讗

The Gemara asks: And according to Rabbi Yo岣nan, who says there with regard to an oath on a deposit and an oath of testimony that in the case of one who administers an oath to witnesses with regard to testimony involving land, the witnesses are exempt even according to Rabbi Eliezer, what difference is there between the opinions of Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Akiva?

讗讬讻讗 讘讬谞讬讬讛讜 注讚讬 拽谞住

The Gemara answers: The practical difference between their opinions is in the case where one administers an oath to witnesses with regard to testimony involving a fine. According to Rabbi Eliezer they are liable, and according to Rabbi Akiva they are exempt.

专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讛讙诇讬诇讬 讗讜诪专 讜讛讜讗 注讚 讗讜 专讗讛 讗讜 讬讚注 讘注讚讜转 讛诪转拽讬讬诪转 讘专讗讬讛 讘诇讗 讬讚讬注讛 讜讘讬讚讬注讛 讘诇讗 专讗讬讛 讛讻转讜讘 诪讚讘专

Rabbi Yosei HaGelili cites a different proof and says: The verse states with regard to an oath of testimony: 鈥淎nd he is a witness or he saw or he knew鈥 (Leviticus 5:1). It is with regard to testimony that is founded on sight without knowledge of the matter, or by means of knowledge without sight, that the verse is speaking. The reference is to testimony involving monetary matters, as all other testimony requires both knowledge and sight.

讗诪专 诇讬讛 专讘 驻驻讗 诇讗讘讬讬 诇讬诪讗 专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讛讙诇讬诇讬 诇讬转 诇讬讛 讚专讘讬 讗讞讗 讚转谞讬讗 专讘讬 讗讞讗 讗讜诪专 讙诪诇 讛讗讜讞专 讘讬谉 讛讙诪诇讬诐 讜谞诪爪讗 讙诪诇 讛专讜讙 讘爪讬讚讜 讘讬讚讜注 砖讝讛 讛专讙讜 讚讗讬 讗讬转 诇讬讛 讚专讘讬 讗讞讗 讘讚讬谞讬 谞驻砖讜转 谞诪讬 诪砖讻讞转 诇讛 讻专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 讘谉 砖讟讞

Rav Pappa said to Abaye: Shall we say that Rabbi Yosei HaGelili does not accept the opinion of Rabbi A岣? As it is taught in a baraita (Tosefta, Bava Kamma 3:6) that Rabbi A岣 says: If there is a rutting male camel [gamal hao岣r] that is rampaging among other camels and then a camel was found killed at its side, it is evident that this rampaging camel killed it, and the owner must pay for the damage. Rabbi A岣 rules that cases of monetary law can be decided based on circumstantial evidence. As, if he is of the opinion that the ruling is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi A岣 that witnesses may testify on the basis of circumstantial evidence, in cases of capital law too, you find a case of knowledge without sight, as in the case discussed by Rabbi Shimon ben Shata岣.

讚转谞讬讗 讗诪专 专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 讘谉 砖讟讞 讗专讗讛 讘谞讞诪讛 讗诐 诇讗 专讗讬转讬 讗讞讚 砖专抓 讗讞专 讞讘讬专讜 诇讞讜专讘讛 讜专爪转讬 讗讞专讬讜 讜诪爪讗转讬 住讬讬祝 讘讬讚讜 讜讚诐 诪讟驻讟祝 讜讛专讜讙 诪驻专驻专 讗诪专转讬 诇讜 专砖注 诪讬 讛专讙讜 诇讝讛 讗讜 讗谞讬 讗讜 讗转讛

As it is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Shimon ben Shata岣 said in the form of an oath: I will not see the consolation of Israel if I did not see one who was running after another into a ruin, and I ran after him and found a sword in his hand and blood dripping from the sword, and the slain person convulsing. I said to him: Wicked one, who killed this person? It was either me or you, as there is no one else here.

讗讘诇 诪讛 讗注砖讛 砖讗讬谉 讚诪讱 诪住讜专 讘讬讚讬 砖讛专讬 讗诪专讛 转讜专讛 注诇 驻讬 砖谞讬诐 注讚讬诐 讗讜 砖诇砖讛 注讚讬诐 讬讜诪转 讛诪转 讗诇讗 讛诪拽讜诐 讬驻专注 诪诪讱 讗诪专讜 诇讗 讝讝讜 诪砖诐 注讚 砖谞砖讻讜 谞讞砖 讜诪转

But what can I do, as your blood is not given to my control and I have no jurisdiction to execute you, as the Torah says: 鈥淥n the basis of two witnesses or three witnesses shall he that is to die be put to death鈥 (Deuteronomy 17:6), and there are no witnesses here. Rather, the Omnipresent will exact retribution from you. The Sages said: They did not move from there until a snake came and bit the pursuer and he died. Rabbi A岣 would hold in that case that the pursuer could be executed by the court based on circumstantial evidence. Ostensibly, Rabbi Yosei HaGelili disagrees, as he says that testimony based on knowledge without sight exists only in cases of monetary law.

讗驻讬诇讜 转讬诪讗 讗讬转 诇讬讛 讚专讘讬 讗讞讗 讘砖诇诪讗 讬讚讬注讛 讘诇讗 专讗讬讛 诪砖讻讞转 诇讛 讗诇讗 专讗讬讛 讘诇讗 讬讚讬注讛 讛讬讻讬 诪砖讻讞转 诇讛 诪讬 诇讗 讘注讬 诪讬讚注 讗诐 讙讜讬 讛专讙 讗讜 讬砖专讗诇 讛专讙 讗诐 讗讚诐 讟专驻讛 讛专讙 讗讜 砖诇诐 讛专讙

The Gemara answers: Even if you say that Rabbi Yosei HaGelili is of the opinion that the ruling is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi A岣 that one may rely on circumstantial evidence even in cases of capital law, one may nevertheless distinguish between cases of monetary law and cases of capital law. Granted, even in cases of capital law you find testimony based on knowledge without sight, but how can you find a case of sight without knowledge? Don鈥檛 the witnesses need to know if the one whom he witnessed killing another killed a gentile or he killed a Jew, if he killed one who has a wound that would have caused him to die within twelve months [tereifa] or he killed one whose body is intact?

砖诪注 诪讬谞讛 拽住讘专 专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讛讙诇讬诇讬 诪砖讘讬注 注讚讬 拽谞住 驻讟讜专 讚讗讬 住诇拽讗 讚注转讱 讞讬讬讘 谞讛讬 讚讬讚讬注讛 讘诇讗 专讗讬讛 讗砖讻讞谉 诇讛 专讗讬讛 讘诇讗 讬讚讬注讛 诪讬 诇讗 讘注讬 诪讬讚注 讙讜讬讛 讘注诇 讘转 讬砖专讗诇 讘注诇 讘转讜诇讛 讘注诇 讘注讜诇讛 讘注诇

The Gemara notes: Conclude from it that Rabbi Yosei HaGelili holds that in a case where one administers an oath to witnesses with regard to testimony involving a fine, the witnesses are exempt from liability for taking a false oath of testimony. As if it enters your mind to say that the witnesses are liable, although you find testimony with regard to fines based on knowledge without sight, and witnesses may testify based on circumstantial evidence, in cases of sight without knowledge, when it comes to fines, don鈥檛 the witnesses need to know if the rapist engaged in intercourse with a gentile woman or if he engaged in intercourse with a Jewish woman, if he engaged in intercourse with a virgin or if he engaged in intercourse with a non-virgin? Rabbi Yosei HaGelili holds that witnesses are liable for taking a false oath of testimony only in cases where both testimony based on sight alone and testimony based on knowledge alone are accepted, which is not the case concerning testimony involving fines.

讬转讬讘 专讘 讛诪谞讜谞讗 拽诪讬讛 讚专讘 讬讛讜讚讛 讜讬转讬讘 专讘 讬讛讜讚讛 讜拽讗 诪讬讘注讬讗 诇讬讛 诪谞讛 诪谞讬转讬讱 讘驻谞讬 驻诇讜谞讬 讜驻诇讜谞讬

搂 Apropos the matter of sight without knowledge in cases of monetary law, the Gemara relates: Rav Hamnuna was sitting before Rav Yehuda, and Rav Yehuda was sitting and he was raising a dilemma: If one demands payment from another and claims: I counted for you and gave you one hundred dinars in the presence of so-and-so and so-and-so,

讜注讚讬诐 专讜讗讬谉 讗讜转讜 诪讘讞讜抓 诪讗讬

and witnesses see him counting the money from outside, what is the halakha? Is their testimony accepted?

讗诪专 诇讬讛 专讘 讛诪谞讜谞讗 讜讛诇讛 诪讛 讟讜注谉 讗讬 讗诪专 诇讗 讛讬讜 讚讘专讬诐 诪注讜诇诐 讛讜讞讝拽 讻驻专谉 讗讬 讗诪专 讗讬谉 砖拽诇讬 讜讚讬讚讬 砖拽诇讬 讻讬 讗转讜 注讚讬诐 诪讗讬 讛讜讬 讗诪专 诇讬讛 讛诪谞讜谞讗 讗转 注讜诇 转讗

Rav Hamnuna said to Rav Yehuda: And what does the other person claim in response to the demand for repayment? If he says: These matters never happened, he assumes the presumptive status of a denier of the truth, as the witnesses testify that they saw the claimant counting the money and giving it to him. If he says: Yes, I took money from him, but it is my money that I took, then when the witnesses come and testify that they saw the claimant counting the money and giving it to him, what of it? The testimony of the witnesses does not contradict his claim, as the witnesses do not know the circumstances under which the money changed hands. Rav Yehuda said to him: Are you Hamnuna? Enter and come into the study hall, as you make your teacher wiser.

讛讛讜讗 讚讗诪专 诇讬讛 诇讞讘专讬讛 诪谞讛 诪谞讬转讬 诇讱 讘爪讚 注诪讜讚 讝讛 讗诪专 诇讬讛 诇讗 注讘专转讬 讘爪讚 注诪讜讚 讝讛 讗转讜 转专讬 住讛讚讬 讗住讛讬讚讜 讘讬讛 讚讛砖转讬谉 诪讬诐 讘爪讚 注诪讜讚 讝讛 讗诪专 专讬砖 诇拽讬砖 讛讜讞讝拽 讻驻专谉

The Gemara relates a similar incident: There was a certain individual who said to another: I counted for you and gave you one hundred dinars as a loan alongside this column. The other person said to him in response: I did not pass alongside this column. Two witnesses came and testified about him that they saw that he urinated alongside this column. Reish Lakish said: He assumes the presumptive status of a denier of the truth, as the testimony of witnesses proves that he passed alongside the column.

诪转拽讬祝 诇讛 专讘 谞讞诪谉 讛讗讬 讚讬谞讗 驻专住讗讛 讛讜讗 诪讬 拽讗诪专 诪注讜诇诐 讘注住拽 讝讛 拽讗诪专 诇讬讛

Rav Na岣an objects to this: That is a ruling characteristic of a Persian court, not a reasonable ruling characteristic of a Jewish court. Did the respondent say that he never passed alongside the column? It was that he did not pass alongside the column in the context of this matter that he said to him that he did not pass the column; therefore, the testimony of the witnesses does not contradict his statement.

讗讬讻讗 讚讗诪专讬 讛讛讜讗 讚讗诪专 诇讬讛 诇讞讘专讬讛 诪谞讛 诪谞讬转讬 诇讱 讘爪讚 注诪讜讚 讝讛 讗诪专 诇讬讛 诇讗 注讘专转讬 讘爪讚 注诪讜讚 讝讛 诪注讜诇诐 谞驻拽讜 讘讬讛 住讛讚讬 讚讛砖转讬谉 诪讬诐 讘爪讚 注诪讜讚 讝讛 讗诪专 专讘 谞讞诪谉 讛讜讞讝拽 讻驻专谉

There are those who say that the incident transpired a bit differently. There was a certain individual who said to another: I counted for you and gave you one hundred dinars as a loan alongside this column. The other person said to him in response: I never passed alongside this column. Witnesses emerged and testified concerning him that he urinated alongside this column. Rav Na岣an said: He assumes the presumptive status of a denier of the truth, as the witnesses contradicted his claim.

讗诪专 诇讬讛 专讘讗 诇专讘 谞讞诪谉 讻诇 诪讬诇转讗 讚诇讗 专诪讬讗 注诇讬讛 讚讗讬谞讬砖 注讘讬讚 诇讛 讜诇讗讜 讗讚注转讬讛

Rava said to Rav Na岣an: There is no proof from here that he assumes the presumptive status of a denier, as any matter that is not incumbent upon a person to remember, he performs it and it is not on his mind. Therefore, when he denied ever passing alongside the column, it was because there was never any reason for him to remember that he had been there.

专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 讗讜诪专 讞讬讬讘 讻讗谉 讜讞讬讬讘 讘驻拽讚讜谉 讻讜壮

搂 The Gemara proceeds to cite the opinion cited last in the baraita explaining the source of the halakha that one is liable for taking a false oath of testimony only for a case involving monetary matters. Rabbi Shimon says: The Torah rendered one liable if he takes a false oath here, with regard to an oath of testimony, and the Torah rendered one liable if he takes a false oath with regard to an oath on a deposit; just as there, the verse is speaking of liability only in cases involving monetary claims, so too here, the verse is speaking of liability only in cases involving monetary claims.

诪讞讻讜 注诇讛 讘诪注专讘讗 诪讗讬 讞讜讻讗

They mocked this proof in the West, i.e., Eretz Yisrael. The Gemara asked: What is worthy of mockery in the statement of Rabbi Shimon?

讚拽转谞讬 诪讛 诇驻拽讚讜谉 砖讻谉 诇讗 注砖讛 讘讜 诪讜砖讘注 讻谞砖讘注 诪讝讬讚 讻砖讜讙讙

The Gemara explains that they mocked that which the baraita teaches in the continuation, rejecting the a fortiori inference suggested by Rabbi Shimon: What is notable about the case of a deposit? It is notable in that with regard to a deposit the Torah did not render the halakhic status of one to whom an oath was administered by others like that of one who himself took an oath, as one to whom an oath was administered by others is exempt; and the Torah did not render the halakhic status of one who takes an intentional false oath like that of one who takes an unwitting false oath.

诪讻讚讬 诪讜砖讘注 诪驻讬 注爪诪讜 讘注讚讜转 诇专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 诪谞讗 诇讬讛 讚讙诪专 诪驻拽讚讜谉 驻拽讚讜谉 谞诪讬 诪讜砖讘注 诪驻讬 讗讞专讬诐 谞讙诪专 诪注讚讜转

This rejection is difficult: Now, with regard to the fact that one who administered an oath to himself is liable in the case of an oath of testimony, from where is it derived according to Rabbi Shimon? Rabbi Shimon derives it by means of a verbal analogy from an oath on a deposit. If so, based on the same verbal analogy, in the case of an oath on a deposit too, let us derive from the case of an oath of testimony the fact that one is liable for a false oath that was administered by others.

讜诪讗讬 讞讜讻讗 讚诇诪讗 专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 讘拽诇 讜讞讜诪专 诪讬讬转讬 诇讛 诪驻讬 讗讞专讬诐 讞讬讬讘 诪驻讬 注爪诪讜 诇讗 讻诇 砖讻谉

The Gemara rejects this: And what is worthy of mockery in that statement? Perhaps Rabbi Shimon does not derive that one who takes a false oath of testimony on his own is liable by means of a verbal analogy from an oath on a deposit; rather, he derives it by means of an a fortiori inference: If one is liable for a false oath of testimony administered by others, is it not all the more so that he is liable for an oath that he takes on his own?

讗诇讗 讞讜讻讗 讗诪讝讬讚 讻砖讜讙讙 讚拽转谞讬 诪讛 诇驻拽讚讜谉 砖讻谉 诇讗 注砖讛 讘讜 诪讜砖讘注 讻谞砖讘注 诪讝讬讚 讻砖讜讙讙

The Gemara answers: Rather, the mockery is with regard to the distinction between an oath on a deposit and an oath of testimony in the matter of whether the halakhic status of one who takes an intentional false oath is like that of one who takes an unwitting false oath, as it teaches in the baraita: What is notable about the case of a deposit? It is notable in that with regard to a deposit the Torah did not render the halakhic status of one to whom an oath was administered by others like that of one who himself took an oath, as one to whom an oath was administered by others is exempt; and the Torah did not render the halakhic status of one who takes an intentional false oath like that of one who takes an unwitting false oath.

诪讻讚讬 诪讝讬讚 讙讘讬 注讚讜转 诪谞讗 诇讬讛 讚诇讗 讻转讬讘 讘讬讛 讜谞注诇诐 讛讻讗 谞诪讬 诇讗 讻转讬讘 讘讬讛 讜谞注诇诐

Now, from where does he derive that one who takes an intentional false oath of testimony is liable? He derives it as it is not written in the context of an oath of testimony: And it is hidden. Here too, it is not written in the context of an oath on a deposit: And it is hidden. Therefore, there should be no distinction between intentional and unwitting with regard to an oath on a deposit either.

讗诪专 诇讛讜 专讘 讛讜谞讗 讜诪讗讬 讞讜讻讗 讚诇诪讗 诪讝讬讚 讚诇讗讜 讻砖讜讙讙 讘驻拽讚讜谉 诪诪注讬诇讛 专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 讙诪专 诇讛

Rav Huna said to the Sages: And what is worthy of mockery in that statement? Perhaps the fact that the halakhic status of one who takes an intentional false oath is not like that of one who takes an unwitting false oath in the case of a deposit, and it is from the halakhot of misuse of consecrated property that Rabbi Shimon derived it. Just as one is liable to bring a guilt-offering for the misuse of consecrated property only if he did so unwittingly, one is liable to bring a guilt-offering for a false oath on a deposit only if he unwittingly took the false oath.

讜讛讬讬谞讜 讞讜讻讗 讗讚讙诪专 诇讛 诪诪注讬诇讛 谞讙诪专 诇讛 诪注讚讜转

The Gemara answers: And that is what is worthy of mockery. Instead of deriving the lack of liability for an intentional false oath of deposit from the case of misuse of consecrated property, let him derive liability for an intentional false oath on a deposit from the case of an oath of testimony.

诪住转讘专讗 诪诪注讬诇讛 讛讜讛 诇讬讛 诇诪讬诇祝 砖讻谉 诪注讬诇讛 诪诪注讬诇讛

The Gemara rejects this: It stands to reason that he should have derived it from the case of misuse of consecrated property, as that is a derivation of misuse written with regard to an oath on a deposit: 鈥淚f any one shall sin and commits an act of misuse and dealt falsely with his colleague in a matter of deposit鈥 (Leviticus 5:21), which is derived from misuse written with regard to misuse of consecrated property: 鈥淚f any one commits an act of misuse and sinned unwittingly from items consecrated to the Lord鈥 (Leviticus 5:15).

讗讚专讘讛 诪注讚讜转 讛讜讛 诇讬讛 诇诪讬诇祝 砖讻谉 转讞讟讗 诪转讞讟讗

The Gemara asks: On the contrary, he should have derived it from the case of an oath of testimony, as that is a derivation of 鈥渟hall sin鈥 written with regard to an oath on a deposit which is derived from 鈥渟hall sin鈥 written with regard to an oath of testimony: 鈥淎nd if any one shall sin and he hears the voice of an oath, and he is a witness鈥 (Leviticus 5:1).

诪住转讘专讗 诪诪注讬诇讛 讛讜讛 诇讬讛 诇诪讬诇祝 砖讻谉 诪注讬诇讛 讘讻诇 谞讛谞讛 讘拽讘讜注 讞讜诪砖 讜讗砖诐

The Gemara rejects this: It stands to reason that it is from the case of misuse of consecrated property that he should have derived it, as there are many elements common to an oath on a deposit and misuse of consecrated property represented by the mnemonic: Misuse, with regard to all, derive benefit, with fixed, one-fifth, and guilt-offering. The term misuse is employed in both cases. Both cases are relevant with regard to all individuals and not only those fit to testify. Both involve one deriving benefit from property that is not his. In both cases, one is liable to bring a fixed guilt-offering, as opposed to one who takes a false oath of testimony, who is liable to bring a sliding-scale offering. In both cases, one adds one-fifth to the payment of the principal. In both cases, that is the offering with which one gains atonement.

讗讚专讘讛 诪注讚讜转 讛讜讛 诇讬讛 诇诪讬诇祝 砖讻谉 讞讟讗 讛讚讬讜讟 讘砖讘讜注讛 转讘注讬讛 讜讻驻专讬讛 讜讗讜讗讬谉 讛谞讱 谞驻讬砖讬谉

The Gemara rejects this: On the contrary, he should have derived the halakha with regard to an oath on a deposit from the halakha of an oath of testimony, as there are many elements common to both oaths represented by the mnemonic: Sin, ordinary [hedyot], with an oath, claimed from him, denied his claim, and multiple instances of the term 鈥渙r.鈥 The term 鈥渟hall sin鈥 is written in both contexts. Both oaths relate to the property of ordinary individuals, not to consecrated property. In both cases there is a claim presented by one of the parties and denial of that claim by the one taking the oath. Multiple instances of the term 鈥渙r鈥 appear in both passages in the Torah. The Gemara responds: These elements common to an oath on a deposit and misuse of consecrated property are more numerous than the elements common to an oath on a deposit and an oath of testimony.

讗诇讗 诪讗讬 讞讜讻讗

Rather, after resolving all the difficulties that were raised against the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, the question remains: What did the Sages of Eretz Yisrael find that is worthy of mockery in that baraita?

讻讬 讗转讗 专讘 驻驻讗 讜专讘 讛讜谞讗 讘专讬讛 讚专讘 讬讛讜砖注 诪讘讬 专讘 讗诪专讬 讛讬讬谞讜 讞讜讻讗 诪讻讚讬 专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 讙讝讬专讛 砖讜讛 讙诪讬专 诇诪讛 诇讬讛 讚驻专讬讱 诪讛 诇驻拽讚讜谉 砖讻谉 诇讗 注砖讛 讘讜 诪讜砖讘注 讻谞砖讘注 诪讝讬讚 讻砖讜讙讙

When Rav Pappa and Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, came from the study hall of their teacher, they said: This is what is worthy of mockery: Now, since ultimately Rabbi Shimon derives the halakha by means of a verbal analogy between the term 鈥渟hall sin鈥 written with regard to an oath on a deposit and the term 鈥渟hall sin鈥 written with regard to an oath of testimony, why is it that he refutes the parallel between them by saying: What is notable about the case of a deposit? It is notable in that with regard to a deposit the Torah did not render the halakhic status of one to whom an oath was administered by others like that of one who himself took an oath, as one to whom an oath was administered by others is exempt; and the Torah did not render the halakhic status of one who takes an intentional false oath like that of one who takes an unwitting false oath. Rabbi Shimon should have derived by means of the verbal analogy that all the halakhot of an oath of testimony and all the halakhot of an oath on a deposit are identical.

讜诪讗讬 讞讜讻讗 讚诇诪讗 讻讬 驻专讬讱 诪拽诪讬 讚转讬拽讜诐 诇讬讛 讙讝讬专讛 砖讜讛 讘转专 讚拽诪讗 诇讬讛 讙讝讬专讛 砖讜讛 诇讗 驻专讬讱

The Gemara rejects this: And what is worthy of mockery in that statement? Perhaps when Rabbi Shimon refuted the parallel between the two oaths, it was prior to the verbal analogy being established for him, and the derivation was by means of a paradigm. After the verbal analogy was established for him, he does not refute the parallel and holds that in the case of an oath on a deposit one is liable to bring a guilt-offering for false oaths administered by others as well as for intentional false oaths.

讜诇讗 讜讛讗诪专 诇讛讜 专讘讗 讘专 讗讬转讬 诇专讘谞谉 诪讗谉 转谞讗 砖讘讜注转 讛驻拽讚讜谉 诇讗 谞讬转谉 讝讚讜谞讛 诇讻驻专讛 专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 讛讬讗

The Gemara asks: And does Rabbi Shimon not refute the parallel between the two oaths? But didn鈥檛 Rava bar Ittai say to the Sages: Who is the tanna who taught with regard to an oath on a deposit that atonement by means of an offering is not possible for one who takes an intentional false oath? It is Rabbi Shimon. Apparently, Rabbi Shimon concludes that there remains a distinction between intentional and unwitting in the case of an oath on a deposit.

讚诇诪讗 诪讝讬讚 讻砖讜讙讙 驻专讬讱 讚讙诪专 诇讛 诪诪注讬诇讛 讚讛谞讱 谞驻讬砖讬谉 讗讘诇 诪讜砖讘注 讻谞砖讘注 诇讗 驻专讬讱

The Gemara suggests: Perhaps with regard to the halakhic status of one who takes an intentional false oath being like that of one who takes an unwitting false oath, Rabbi Shimon refutes the parallel between the two oaths even after the verbal analogy is established for him, as he derives the halakha of an oath on a deposit from the halakha of misuse of consecrated property, where there is a distinction between intentional and unwitting, as those elements common to an oath on a deposit and the misuse of consecrated property are more numerous than the elements common to an oath on a deposit and an oath of testimony. But he does not refute the parallel between the two oaths with the claim that there is a distinction between them with regard to whether the halakhic status of one to whom an oath was administered by others is like that of one who himself took an oath. Once the verbal analogy was established for him, there is no longer a distinction between the two oaths in that regard.

讜转讛讚专 注讚讜转 讜转讙诪专 诇讛 诪驻拽讚讜谉 诪讝讬讚 讚诇讗讜 讻砖讜讙讙 诪讛 驻拽讚讜谉 砖讜讙讙 讗讬谉 诪讝讬讚 诇讗 讗祝 注讚讜转 砖讜讙讙 讗讬谉 诪讝讬讚 诇讗 讻讬 讛讬讻讬 讚讬诇讬祝 驻拽讚讜谉 诪诪注讬诇讛

The Gemara asks: If, according to Rabbi Shimon, based on the derivation from the misuse of consecrated property, one who intentionally takes a false oath on a deposit does not bring a guilt-offering like one who took the false oath unwittingly, let the discussion of the case of an oath of testimony return to the verbal analogy and derive it from the case of an oath on a deposit that the halakhic status of one who takes an intentional false oath is not like that of one who takes an unwitting false oath. Just as in the case of an oath on a deposit, one who takes an unwitting false oath, yes, he is liable to bring a guilt-offering, and one who takes an intentional false oath, no, he is not liable, so too, in the case of an oath of testimony, one who takes an unwitting false oath, yes, he is liable to bring a sin-offering, and one who takes an intentional false oath, no, he is not liable, just as he derives the case of an oath on a deposit from the case of misuse of consecrated property.

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