שבועות ל״ז

שבועות ל״ז

לְהוּ: הֵזִיד בִּשְׁבוּעַת הַפִּקָּדוֹן וְהִתְרוּ בּוֹ, מַהוּ? כֵּיוָן דְּחִידּוּשׁ הוּא – דִּבְכׇל הַתּוֹרָה לָא אַשְׁכְּחַן מֵזִיד דְּמַיְיתֵי קׇרְבָּן, וְהָכָא מַיְיתֵי קׇרְבָּן – לָא שְׁנָא אַתְרוֹ בֵּיהּ וְלָא שְׁנָא לָא אַתְרוֹ בֵּיהּ? אוֹ דִּלְמָא, הָנֵי מִילֵּי הֵיכָא דְּלָא אַתְרוֹ בֵּיהּ; אֲבָל הֵיכָא דְּאַתְרוֹ בֵּיהּ – מִילְקָא לָקֵי, קׇרְבָּן לָא מַיְיתֵי; אוֹ דִלְמָא, הָא וְהָא עָבְדִינַן.

to them: If one intentionally took a false oath on a deposit and witnesses forewarned him, what is the halakha? Is it the case that since the halakha of an oath on a deposit is a novelty, as in the entire Torah we do not find another case where one who transgressed intentionally brings an offering for atonement, but here he does bring an offering for transgressing the prohibition intentionally, there is no difference whether witnesses forewarned him and there is no difference whether they did not forewarn him, and he is liable to bring a guilt-offering, though generally, there is no offering brought when there was forewarning? Or perhaps, that matter of bringing a guilt-offering when one intentionally takes a false oath applies only when they did not forewarn him; but when they forewarned him, he is flogged, as this is the standard punishment for an intentional transgression, and he does not bring an offering. Or perhaps, we impose both lashes and a guilt-offering.

אֲמַרוּ לֵיהּ, תְּנֵינָא: חֲמוּרָה הֵימֶנָּה שְׁבוּעַת הַפִּקָּדוֹן, שֶׁחַיָּיבִין עַל זְדוֹנָהּ מַכּוֹת וְעַל שִׁגְגָתָהּ אָשָׁם בְּכֶסֶף שְׁקָלִים. מִדְּקָאָמַר לֵיהּ עַל זְדוֹנָהּ מַכּוֹת – מִכְּלָל דְּאַתְרוֹ בֵּיהּ; וְקָאָמַר מַכּוֹת אִין, קׇרְבָּן לָא.

They said to Rav Kahana: We learn in a baraita: The halakhot of an oath on a deposit are more stringent than the halakhot of an oath of testimony, as one is liable to receive lashes for intentionally taking a false oath on a deposit, and for unwittingly taking a false oath on a deposit one is liable to bring a guilt-offering worth at least two silver shekels; whereas one who takes a false oath of testimony, whether intentionally or unwittingly, brings a sin-offering. From the fact that the baraita states that for intentionally taking a false oath on a deposit one is liable to receive lashes, by inference it can be understood that the baraita is referring to a case where witnesses forewarned him, as one cannot receive lashes without forewarning, and it is stating: Yes, he is liable to receive lashes, but he is not liable to bring an offering. The baraita, then, resolves the question of Rav Kahana.

וּמַאי חוּמְרָא? דְּנִיחָא לֵיהּ לְאִינִישׁ דְּמַיְיתֵי קׇרְבָּן וְלָא לִילְקֵי.

The Gemara elaborates: And what is the stringency in the fact that one who intentionally takes a false oath on a deposit receives lashes? It is due to the fact that a person prefers to bring an offering rather than receive lashes.

אֲמַר לְהוּ רָבָא בַּר אִיתַּי: מַאן תָּנָא זְדוֹן שְׁבוּעַת הַפִּקָּדוֹן לֹא נִיתַּן לְכַפָּרָה – רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן; אֲבָל לְרַבָּנַן – קׇרְבָּן נָמֵי מַיְיתֵי.

Rava bar Itai said to the students of Rabba: You cannot answer the question from that baraita, as who is the tanna who taught that intentionally taking a false oath on a deposit is not subject to atonement? It is Rabbi Shimon. But according to the Rabbis, he is liable to bring a guilt-offering, as well as receiving lashes. Therefore, the question remains unanswered.

אֲמַר לְהוּ רַב כָּהֲנָא: בַּר מִינַּהּ דְּהַהִיא; דַּאֲנָא תָּנֵינָא לַהּ – וְהָכִי תָּנֵינָא לַהּ: אֶחָד זְדוֹנָהּ וְאֶחָד שִׁגְגָתָהּ, אָשָׁם בְּכֶסֶף שְׁקָלִים. וּמַאי חוּמְרָא? דְּאִילּוּ הָתָם חַטָּאת בַּת דַּנְקָא, וְהָכָא אָשָׁם בְּכֶסֶף שְׁקָלִים.

Rav Kahana said to the students: Apart from this, you cannot answer my question from this baraita, as I am the one who teaches this baraita and this is how I teach it: An oath on a deposit is more stringent than an oath of testimony, since for taking a false oath on a deposit either intentionally or unwittingly one is liable to bring a guilt-offering worth at least two silver shekels. And what is the stringency in this halakha? It is that there, with regard to an oath of testimony, he is liable to bring a sin-offering that can be worth even one-sixth of one dinar, and here, the guilt-offering incurred for an oath on a deposit must be worth at least two silver shekels.

וְלִיגְמַר מִינַּהּ! דִּלְמָא דְּלָא אַתְרוֹ בֵּיהּ.

The Gemara suggests: And let him derive an answer to his question from his version of the baraita, which indicates that one who intentionally takes a false oath on a deposit brings an offering and does not receive lashes. The Gemara responds: Perhaps it is referring to a case where they did not forewarn him; had he been forewarned, he would be flogged.

לִישָּׁנָא אַחֲרִינָא, תָּא שְׁמַע: אֵין חַיָּיבִין עַל שִׁגְגָתָהּ. מָה הֵן חַיָּיבִין עַל זְדוֹנָהּ? אָשָׁם בְּכֶסֶף שְׁקָלִים. מַאי, לָאו בִּדְאַתְרוֹ בֵּיהּ? הָכָא נָמֵי דְּלָא אַתְרוֹ בֵּיהּ.

The Gemara presents a different version of the previous discussion: Come and hear an answer to the question of Rav Kahana from the mishna: One is not liable for taking a false oath on a deposit unwittingly. And what is he liable for when he intentionally takes a false oath? A guilt-offering worth at least two silver shekels. The Gemara explains: What, is it not that the mishna is referring to a case where witnesses forewarned him, and the mishna nevertheless rules only that he must bring an offering? The Gemara rejects the proof: Here, too, the mishna is referring to a case where the witnesses did not forewarn him.

תָּא שְׁמַע: לֹא; אִם אָמַרְתָּ בְּנָזִיר טָמֵא – שֶׁכֵּן לוֹקֶה; תֹּאמַר בִּשְׁבוּעַת הַפִּקָּדוֹן – שֶׁאֵינוֹ לוֹקֶה?! מִדְּקָאָמַר לוֹקֶה – מִכְּלָל דְּאַתְרוֹ בֵּיהּ; וְקָאָמַר תֹּאמַר בִּשְׁבוּעַת הַפִּקָּדוֹן שֶׁאֵינוֹ לוֹקֶה – אֲבָל קׇרְבָּן מַיְיתֵי!

The Gemara continues to seek an answer to Rav Kahana’s question: Come and hear an answer from a baraita. After comparing the case of a nazirite to one who takes an oath on a deposit, the baraita states: No, if you said that the halakha that baraita discusses is true with regard to an impure nazirite, who is indeed flogged for intentionally becoming impure, shall you also say that this is the case with regard to one who took an oath on a deposit, who is not flogged? The Gemara notes: Now, from the fact that the baraita states that a nazirite is flogged, by inference it can be understood that the baraita is referring to a case where witnesses forewarned him, as one is not liable to receive lashes without forewarning; and yet the baraita states: Shall you say that this is the case with regard to one who took an oath on a deposit, who is not flogged? One can infer: But he does bring a guilt-offering.

מַאי אֵינוֹ לוֹקֶה – דְּאֵינוֹ נִפְטָר בְּמַלְקוֹת. מִכְּלָל דְּנָזִיר טָמֵא נִפְטָר בְּמַלְקוֹת?! הָא ״קׇרְבָּן״ כְּתִיב בֵּיהּ! הָתָם דְּמַיְיתֵי קׇרְבָּן כִּי הֵיכִי דְּתֵיחוּל עֲלֵיהּ נְזִירוּת בְּטׇהֳרָה.

The Gemara rejects the proof: What does the baraita mean when it states that he is not flogged? It means that he is not exempted through lashes alone and he must also bring an offering. The Gemara asks: By inference, does this mean that an impure nazirite is exempted through lashes alone? Isn’t it written in the Torah explicitly with regard to him that there is a requirement to bring an offering? The Gemara responds: The offering brought by an impure nazirite does not serve as an atonement. Rather, there, the nazirite brings an offering in order to purify himself so that his naziriteship can go into effect while he is in a state of purity. The offering must be brought even if the nazirite became impure unwittingly.

אַמְרוּהָ רַבָּנַן קַמֵּיהּ דְּרַבָּה. אֲמַר לְהוּ: מִכְּלָל דְּכִי לָא אַתְרוֹ בֵּיהּ וְאִיכָּא עֵדִים – מִיחַיַּיב?! כְּפִירַת דְּבָרִים בְּעָלְמָא הוּא! אַלְמָא קָסָבַר רַבָּה: הַכּוֹפֵר בְּמָמוֹן שֶׁיֵּשׁ עָלָיו עֵדִים – פָּטוּר.

The Sages said this matter before Rabba, i.e., they related the question of Rav Kahana as to whether one who intentionally takes a false oath and was forewarned by witnesses is liable to bring an offering. Rabba said to them: May one conclude by inference that in a case when they did not warn him but there are witnesses to the fact that the defendant owes money to the claimant, he is liable to bring an offering? Isn’t this case merely a verbal denial that does not have any effect with regard to liability to pay? Since there are witnesses who will testify that the defendant owes the claimant, his denial and false oath did not exempt him from payment and he therefore should not be liable to bring a guilt-offering for taking a false oath. The Gemara infers: Evidently, Rabba holds that one who denies a monetary claim to which there are witnesses is exempt from bringing a guilt-offering for taking a false oath, since the witnesses will testify to the validity of the claimant’s claim and the denial of the defendant is of no consequence.

אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַב חֲנִינָא לְרַבָּה, תַּנְיָא דִּמְסַיַּיע לָךְ: ״וְכִחֵשׁ בָּהּ״ – פְּרָט לְמוֹדֶה לְאֶחָד מִן הָאַחִין אוֹ לְאֶחָד מִן הַשּׁוּתָּפִין. ״וְנִשְׁבַּע עַל שָׁקֶר״ – פְּרָט לְלֹוֶה בִּשְׁטָר וּלְלֹוֶה בְּעֵדִים.

Rav Ḥanina said to Rabba: A baraita is taught that supports your opinion: The verse states with regard to an oath denying a monetary claim: “And deal falsely therein” (Leviticus 5:22), which serves to exclude one who admits to the truth of the claim of one of a group of brothers or to one of a group of partners, even if he denies the claim to the rest of the brothers or partners. The same verse also states: “And swear to a lie,” which serves to exclude one who borrows money with a promissory note or one who borrows money in the presence of witnesses. Evidently, one is not liable for taking a false oath concerning a monetary claim when there are witnesses who can testify to it.

אֲמַר לֵיהּ: אִי מִשּׁוּם הָא – לָא תְּסַיְּיעַן; בְּאוֹמֵר ״לָוִיתִי, וְלֹא לָוִיתִי בְּעֵדִים״, ״לָוִיתִי, וְלֹא לָוִיתִי בִּשְׁטָר״.

Rabba said to him: If your proof is because of that baraita, you have not supported us, since that baraita is referring to a case where the defendant says: I borrowed, but I did not borrow in the presence of witnesses, or he says: I borrowed, but I did not borrow with a promissory note. Since his denial is only with regard to the circumstances of the loan and not to the actual debt, he is exempt from liability for taking the false oath.

מִמַּאי? מִדְּקָתָנֵי ״וְכִחֵשׁ בָּהּ״ – פְּרָט לְמוֹדֶה לְאֶחָד מִן הָאַחִין אוֹ לְאֶחָד מִן הַשּׁוּתָּפִין. הַאי לְאֶחָד מִן הָאַחִין הֵיכִי דָמֵי? אִילֵּימָא דְּאוֹדִי לֵיהּ בְּפַלְגָא דִּידֵיהּ – הָא אִיכָּא כְּפִירָה דְּאִידַּךְ! אֶלָּא לָאו דְּאָמְרִי לֵיהּ: מִתַּרְוֵינַן יְזַפְתְּ; וַאֲמַר לְהוּ: לָא, מֵחַד מִינַּיְיכוּ יְזַפִי – דְּהָוְיָא לֵיהּ כְּפִירַת דְּבָרִים בְּעָלְמָא? וּמִדְּרֵישָׁא כְּפִירַת דְּבָרִים – סֵיפָא נָמֵי כְּפִירַת דְּבָרִים.

Rabba elaborates: From where in the baraita is this explanation apparent? From the fact that it teaches that the verse “and deal falsely therein” serves to exclude one who admits to one of the brothers or to one of the partners. What are the circumstances of that case where one admits to one of the brothers? If we say that he admitted only the portion of the debt owed to that brother, then why is he exempt? Isn’t there the denial of the claim of the other brother, which is a denial of a monetary claim? Rather, is it not that the brothers said to him: You borrowed from both of us, and he said to them: No, I borrowed all of the amount in question from only one of you, which is merely a verbal denial, as he admits that he owes the claimed amount and disputes only the circumstances of the debt. And since the first clause of the baraita is referring to a case of a verbal denial, the last clause is also referring to a verbal denial. Consequently, one cannot cite a proof from this baraita.

(סִימָן – חוֹבָה; כִּיתּוֹת; דְּבַעַל הַבַּיִת; חוֹמֶר; נְזִירָא) תָּא שְׁמַע: אֵינוֹ חַיָּיב עַל שִׁגְגָתָהּ. וּמַהוּ חַיָּיב עַל זְדוֹנָהּ? אָשָׁם בְּכֶסֶף שְׁקָלִים. מַאי, לָאו זְדוֹן עֵדִים? לָא, זְדוֹן עַצְמוֹ.

The Gemara attempts to prove that one who takes a false oath on a deposit is liable to bring an offering even when there are witnesses, and presents a mnemonic to remember the series of proofs: Liability, sets, of the homeowner, stringent, nazirite. The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a proof from the mishna: He is not liable for unwittingly taking a false oath by itself. And what is he liable for when he intentionally takes a false oath? He must bring a guilt-offering worth at least two silver shekels. The Gemara continues: What, is it not referring to a case where he intentionally denies the claim of witnesses, and the mishna nevertheless teaches that he is liable to bring a guilt-offering? The Gemara rejects the proof: No, the mishna is referring to a case where there are no witnesses and he admits on his own that he intentionally took a false oath. Had there been witnesses, he would have been exempt from bringing an offering.

תָּא שְׁמַע: הָיוּ שְׁתֵּי כִּתֵּי עֵדִים, כָּפְרָה הָרִאשׁוֹנָה וְאַחַר כָּךְ כָּפְרָה הַשְּׁנִיָּה – שְׁתֵּיהֶן חַיָּיבוֹת, מִפְּנֵי שֶׁיְּכוֹלָה עֵדוּת לְהִתְקַיֵּים בִּשְׁתֵּיהֶן. בִּשְׁלָמָא שְׁנִיָּה תִּחַיַּיב – דְּהָא כָּפְרָה לָהּ כַּת רִאשׁוֹנָה; אֶלָּא רִאשׁוֹנָה אַמַּאי מִיחַיְּיבָא?

The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a proof from a mishna (31b) that discusses an oath of testimony: If there were two sets of witnesses who took an oath of testimony, and the first set falsely denied knowledge of the matter and then the second set falsely denied knowledge of the matter, both are liable, because the testimony can exist with either of them. The Gemara clarifies: Granted, the second set should be liable, since the first set already denied knowledge of the incident and the validity of the claimant’s monetary claim now depends upon their testimony. But why is the first set liable?

הָא קָיְימָא שְׁנִיָּה!

Doesn’t the second set stand ready to testify, so that the refusal of the first set of witnesses does not affect a monetary claim? Evidently, a denial of a monetary claim to which there are witnesses is still considered a denial.

אָמַר רָבִינָא: הָכָא בְּמַאי עָסְקִינַן – כְּגוֹן שֶׁהָיְתָה שְׁנִיָּה בִּשְׁעַת כְּפִירַת הָרִאשׁוֹנָה קְרוֹבִין בִּנְשׁוֹתֵיהֶן, וּנְשׁוֹתֵיהֶן גּוֹסְסוֹת. מַהוּ דְּתֵימָא: רוֹב גּוֹסְסִין לְמִיתָה; קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן: הַשְׁתָּא מִיהַת חָיֵי נִינְהוּ וְלָא שְׁכִיבֵי.

Ravina said: Here we are dealing with a case where at the time of the denial by the first set, the second set of witnesses were related to one another through their wives, so that the second set was unfit to provide testimony; and their wives were moribund. Lest you say: Most moribund people actually die soon thereafter, and the witnesses are considered fit to provide testimony, the baraita teaches us that in any event they are currently alive and have not died. The second set was therefore unfit to provide testimony.

תָּא שְׁמַע: בַּעַל הַבַּיִת שֶׁטָּעַן טַעֲנַת גַּנָּב בְּפִקָּדוֹן, וְנִשְׁבַּע, וְהוֹדָה, וּבָאוּ עֵדִים; אִם עַד שֶׁלֹּא בָּאוּ עֵדִים הוֹדָה – מְשַׁלֵּם קֶרֶן וָחוֹמֶשׁ וְאָשָׁם. אִם מִשֶּׁבָּאוּ עֵדִים הוֹדָה – מְשַׁלֵּם תַּשְׁלוּמֵי כֶפֶל וְאָשָׁם!

The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a proof from a baraita: In the case of a homeowner acting as a bailee who falsely claimed that a thief stole a deposit from him, and the homeowner took an oath to that effect and then admitted that he was lying, and witnesses came and testified that the item was not stolen from the homeowner, the halakha depends on the circumstances. If he admitted to his lie before the witnesses came and testified, he pays the principal value of the item and the additional one-fifth payment for denying that he possessed the deposit, and he brings a guilt-offering as atonement for a false oath on a deposit. If he admitted his guilt after the witnesses came and testified, he pays the double payment and brings a guilt-offering. The baraita indicates that even in the case of a monetary claim to which there are witnesses, one is liable to bring a guilt-offering.

הָכָא נָמֵי, כִּדְרָבִינָא.

The Gemara responds: Here, too, explain this baraita as Ravina explained the previous baraita, that at the time the homeowner took his oath, the witnesses were related through their moribund wives and were unfit to provide testimony.

אֲמַר לֵיהּ רָבִינָא לְרַב אָשֵׁי, תָּא שְׁמַע: חֲמוּרָה מִמֶּנָּה שְׁבוּעַת הַפִּקָּדוֹן – שֶׁחַיָּיבִין עַל זְדוֹנָהּ מַכּוֹת, וְעַל שִׁגְגָתָהּ אָשָׁם בְּכֶסֶף שְׁקָלִים. מִדְּקָאָמַר לוֹקֶה – מִכְּלָל דְּאִיכָּא עֵדִים; וְקָאָמַר: עַל שִׁגְגָתָהּ אָשָׁם בְּכֶסֶף שְׁקָלִים!

Ravina said to Rav Ashi: Come and hear another proof from that which is taught in a baraita: The halakhot of an oath on a deposit are more stringent than the halakhot of an oath of testimony, as one is liable to receive lashes for intentionally taking a false oath on a deposit, and one is liable to bring a guilt-offering worth at least two silver shekels for taking the oath unwittingly. Ravina infers: From the fact that the baraita states that one is flogged, by inference it can be understood that the baraita is referring to a case where there are witnesses to the fact that the deposit is in the defendant’s possession and the defendant was forewarned, and yet it states: One is liable to bring a guilt-offering worth at least two silver shekels for taking the oath unwittingly.

אֲמַר לְהוּ רַב מָרְדֳּכַי: בַּר מִינַּהּ דְּהַהִיא; דְּהָאָמַר לְהוּ רַב כָּהֲנָא: אֲנָא תְּנֵינָא לַהּ – וְהָכִי תְּנֵינָא לַהּ: אֶחָד זְדוֹנָהּ וְאֶחָד שִׁגְגָתָהּ, אָשָׁם בְּכֶסֶף שְׁקָלִים.

Rav Mordekhai said to them: Apart from this, you cannot cite this baraita as a proof. As, didn’t Rav Kahana already say to the students (37a): I am the one who teaches this baraita and this is how I teach it: An oath on a deposit is more stringent than an oath of testimony, since for taking a false oath on a deposit either intentionally or unwittingly one is liable to bring a guilt-offering worth at least two silver shekels. The baraita is not referring to a case in which there were witnesses who forewarned him.

תָּא שְׁמַע: לֹא; אִם אָמַרְתָּ בְּנָזִיר טָמֵא – שֶׁכֵּן לוֹקֶה; תֹּאמַר בִּשְׁבוּעַת הַפִּקָּדוֹן – שֶׁאֵינוֹ לוֹקֶה?! הֵיכִי דָמֵי? אִי דְּלֵיכָּא עֵדִים – אַמַּאי לוֹקֶה? אֶלָּא פְּשִׁיטָא דְּאִיכָּא עֵדִים; וְקָתָנֵי: תֹּאמַר בִּשְׁבוּעַת הַפִּקָּדוֹן שֶׁאֵינוֹ לוֹקֶה; מִלְקָא הוּא דְּלָא לָקֵי – אֲבָל קׇרְבָּן מַיְיתֵי; תְּיוּבְתָּא דְּרַבָּה! תְּיוּבְתָּא.

The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a proof from another baraita: No, if you said that the halakha that baraita discusses is true with regard to an impure nazirite, who is indeed flogged for intentionally becoming impure, shall you also say that this is the case with regard to one who took an oath on a deposit, who is not flogged? The Gemara elaborates: What are the circumstances of the baraita? If it is a case where there were no witnesses, why is the nazirite flogged? Rather, isn’t it obvious that there are witnesses, and yet, the baraita teaches: Shall you also say that this is the case with regard to one who took an oath on a deposit, who is not flogged? It may be inferred that he does not receive lashes but does bring an offering, even though there are witnesses. The Gemara concludes: The refutation of the opinion of Rabba is indeed a conclusive refutation.

רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן אָמַר: הַכּוֹפֵר בְּמָמוֹן שֶׁיֵּשׁ עָלָיו עֵדִים – חַיָּיב. בִּשְׁטָר – פָּטוּר. אָמַר רַב פָּפָּא: מַאי טַעְמֵיהּ דְּרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן? עֵדִים – עֲבִידִי דְּמָיְיתִי, שְׁטָר – הָא מַנַּח.

§ Rabbi Yoḥanan says: One who denies a monetary claim to which there are witnesses is liable to bring a guilt-offering for a false oath on a deposit. But if he denies a debt concerning which there is a promissory note, he is exempt. Rav Pappa said: What is the reasoning of Rabbi Yoḥanan? It occurs that witnesses die, and it is therefore possible that he would not be found liable through their testimony; he is therefore considered to have denied a monetary claim. By contrast, a promissory note remains in its place, and his denial would never have exempted him from payment.

אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַב הוּנָא בְּרֵיהּ דְּרַב יְהוֹשֻׁעַ לְרַב פָּפָּא: שְׁטָרָא נָמֵי עֲבִיד דְּמִרְכַס! אֶלָּא אָמַר רַב הוּנָא בְּרֵיהּ דְּרַב יְהוֹשֻׁעַ: הַיְינוּ טַעְמֵיהּ דְּרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן – מִשּׁוּם דְּהָוֵה שְׁטָר שִׁעְבּוּד קַרְקָעוֹת, וְאֵין מְבִיאִין קׇרְבָּן עַל כְּפִירַת שִׁעְבּוּד קַרְקָעוֹת.

Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, said to Rav Pappa: This cannot be the reasoning of Rabbi Yoḥanan, as it also occurs that a promissory note becomes lost. Rather, Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, said: This is the reasoning of Rabbi Yoḥanan: It is because a promissory note comprises a lien on land, since the promissory note places a lien on the debtor’s property, and one does not bring an offering for an oath on a deposit for denying a lien on land, since one does not take an oath concerning land.

אִיתְּמַר: מַשְׁבִּיעַ עֵדֵי קַרְקַע – פְּלִיגִי רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן וְרַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר; חַד אָמַר חַיָּיב, וְחַד אָמַר פָּטוּר. תִּסְתַּיַּים דְּרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן דְּאָמַר פָּטוּר – מִדְּאָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: הַכּוֹפֵר בְּמָמוֹן שֶׁיֵּשׁ עָלָיו עֵדִים – חַיָּיב, שְׁטָר – פָּטוּר; וְכִדְרַב הוּנָא בְּרֵיהּ דְּרַב יְהוֹשֻׁעַ. תִּסְתַּיַּים.

It was stated: In a case where one administers an oath to witnesses who deny knowing information with regard to ownership of land and they deny knowledge of the matter, Rabbi Yoḥanan and Rabbi Elazar disagree: One says that the witnesses are liable to bring a sin-offering for a false oath of testimony, and one says that they are exempt. The Gemara notes: It may be concluded that it is Rabbi Yoḥanan who says they are exempt. This can be inferred from the fact that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: One who denies a monetary claim to which there are witnesses is liable, but one who denies a claim concerning which there is a promissory note is exempt. And this conclusion is in accordance with the explanation of Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, that the reasoning of Rabbi Yoḥanan is that a promissory note comprises a lien on land, and one does not bring an offering for denying a lien on land. The Gemara affirms: Indeed, it may be concluded.

אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַבִּי יִרְמְיָה לְרַבִּי אֲבָהוּ: לֵימָא רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן וְרַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר בִּפְלוּגְתָּא דְּרַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר וְרַבָּנַן קָא מִיפַּלְגִי? דִּתְנַן: הַגּוֹזֵל שָׂדֶה מֵחֲבֵירוֹ וּשְׁטָפָהּ נָהָר – חַיָּיב לְהַעֲמִיד לוֹ שָׂדֶה. דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר. וַחֲכָמִים אוֹמְרִים: אוֹמֵר לוֹ ״הֲרֵי שֶׁלְּךָ לְפָנֶיךָ״.

Rabbi Yirmeya said to Rabbi Abbahu: Shall we say that Rabbi Yoḥanan and Rabbi Elazar disagree with regard to the issue that is the subject of the dispute of Rabbi Eliezer and the Rabbis? As we learned in a baraita: In the case of one who robbed another of a field and then a river flooded it, he is liable to provide the field’s owner with a different field, since the value of the flooded field was significantly decreased and the robber must return the value of that which he stole; this is the statement of Rabbi Eliezer. And the Rabbis say: He is exempt from doing so, as he can say to the owner: That which is yours is before you. The robber may return the flooded field to its owner without reimbursing him for the loss in its value, since according to the Rabbis, land cannot be stolen. Consequently, the field is considered to be in the possession of its owner, and the thief is not obligated in the mitzva of returning a stolen item.

וְאָמְרִינַן: בְּמַאי קָמִיפַּלְגִי? רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר דָּרֵישׁ רִבּוּיֵי וּמִיעוּטֵי, וְרַבָּנַן דָּרְשִׁי כְּלָלֵי וּפְרָטֵי.

Rabbi Yirmeya continues: And we say: With regard to what do they disagree? Rabbi Eliezer interprets the verses that discuss an oath on a deposit and the mitzva to return stolen items according to the hermeneutical principle of amplifications and restrictions, and the Rabbis interpret them according to the hermeneutical principle of generalizations and details.

רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר דָּרֵישׁ רִבּוּיֵי וּמִיעוּטֵי: ״וְכִחֵשׁ בַּעֲמִיתוֹ״ – רִיבָּה, ״בְּפִקָּדוֹן אוֹ בִתְשׂוּמֶת יָד״ – מִיעֵט, ״אוֹ מִכֹּל אֲשֶׁר יִשָּׁבַע״ – חָזַר וְרִיבָּה.

He explains: Rabbi Eliezer interprets the verses: “If anyone sin, and commit a trespass against the Lord, and deal falsely with his neighbor in a matter of deposit or of pledge, or of robbery, or have oppressed his neighbor…or of anything about which he has sworn falsely, he shall restore it in full” (Leviticus 5:21–24), according to the hermeneutical principle of amplifications and restrictions. The phrase “if anyone sin, and commit a trespass against the Lord, and deal falsely with his neighbor” amplified the halakha. When the verse states: “In a matter of deposit or of pledge,” it has restricted the halakha to the case of a deposit. When the verse then states: “Or of anything about which he has sworn falsely, he shall restore it in full,” it has then amplified the halakha again.

רִיבָּה וּמִיעֵט וְרִיבָּה – רִיבָּה הַכֹּל. מַאי רִיבָּה? רִיבָּה כֹּל מִילֵּי; וּמַאי מִיעֵט? מִיעֵט שְׁטָרוֹת.

Accordingly, as the Torah amplified and then restricted and then amplified again, it has amplified the halakha to include everything except for the specific matter excluded by the restriction. What is included due to the fact that the verse has amplified the halakha? The verse has amplified the halakha to include everything that one steals. And what is excluded due to the fact that the verse restricted the halakha? It restricted the halakha to exclude financial documents, which are dissimilar to a deposit in that their value is not intrinsic but rather due to their function. Consequently, according to Rabbi Eliezer, land that was stolen is included in the halakhot stated in these verses, and one who steals land must reimburse the field’s owner.

וְרַבָּנַן דָּרְשִׁי כְּלָלֵי וּפְרָטֵי: ״וְכִחֵשׁ בַּעֲמִיתוֹ״ – כְּלָל, ״בְּפִקָּדוֹן אוֹ בִתְשׂוּמֶת יָד אוֹ בְגָזֵל״ – פְּרָט, ״אוֹ מִכֹּל אֲשֶׁר יִשָּׁבַע עָלָיו״ – חָזַר וְכָלַל. כְּלָל וּפְרָט וּכְלָל – אִי אַתָּה דָן אֶלָּא כְּעֵין הַפְּרָט.

And the Rabbis interpreted these verses according to the hermeneutical principle of generalizations and details. The phrase “and deal falsely with his neighbor” is a generalization, while the subsequent phrase, “in a matter of deposit or of pledge, or of robbery,” is a detail. When the verse then states: “Or of anything about which he has sworn falsely, he shall restore it in full,” it has then generalized again. In the case of a generalization, and a detail, and a generalization, you may deduce that the verse is referring only to items similar to the detail.

מָה הַפְּרָט מְפוֹרָשׁ – דָּבָר הַמִּטַּלְטֵל וְגוּפוֹ מָמוֹן; אַף כׇּל דָּבָר הַמִּטַּלְטֵל וְגוּפוֹ מָמוֹן. יָצְאוּ קַרְקָעוֹת – שֶׁאֵין (מטלטל) [מִטַּלְטְלִין]; יָצְאוּ עֲבָדִים – שֶׁהוּקְּשׁוּ לְקַרְקָעוֹת; יָצְאוּ שְׁטָרוֹת – שֶׁאַף עַל פִּי שֶׁמִּטַּלְטְלִין, אֵין גּוּפָן מָמוֹן.

Accordingly, just as the detail, i.e., a deposit, is explicitly a case of movable property and has intrinsic monetary value, so too, the verse includes anything that is movable property and has intrinsic monetary value. Consequently, land has been excluded, as it is not movable property. Canaanite slaves have been excluded, as they are compared to land with regard to many areas of halakha. Financial documents have been excluded because although they are movable property, they do not have intrinsic monetary value.

מַאן דִּמְחַיֵּיב – כְּרַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר, וּמַאן דְּפָטַר – כְּרַבָּנַן.

Rabbi Yirmeya concludes: Shall we say that the one who deems the witnesses liable in a case of an oath of testimony concerning land, i.e., Rabbi Elazar, holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer, that land is included in the mitzva of returning stolen property and in the halakhot of an oath on a deposit, and by extension, in the halakhot of an oath of testimony; and the one who deems them exempt, i.e., Rabbi Yoḥanan, holds in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, that land is excluded from these halakhot?

אֲמַר לֵיהּ: לָא; מַאן דִּמְחַיֵּיב – כְּרַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר; וּמַאן דְּפָטַר אָמַר לָךְ: בְּהָא אֲפִילּוּ רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר מוֹדֶה, דְּרַחֲמָנָא אָמַר ״מִכֹּל״ – וְלֹא הַכֹּל.

Rabbi Abbahu said to Rabbi Yirmeya: No, the two disagreements do not completely correspond. The one who deems the witnesses liable must in fact hold in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer. But the one who deems them exempt could have said to you: In this case of an oath of testimony, even Rabbi Eliezer concedes that they are exempt from bringing an offering, as the Merciful One states: “Of anything about which he has sworn falsely,” and not: Everything about which he has sworn falsely. The verse indicates that only certain items are included in the halakhot of an oath of testimony. Therefore, land is excluded, since it is dissimilar to the specific instances mentioned in the verse.

אָמַר רַב פָּפָּא מִשְּׁמֵיהּ דְּרָבָא: מַתְנִיתִין נָמֵי דַּיְקָא, דְּקָתָנֵי: ״גָּנַבְתָּ אֶת שׁוֹרִי״, וְהוּא אוֹמֵר: ״לֹא גָּנַבְתִּי״; ״מַשְׁבִּיעֲךָ אֲנִי״, וְאָמַר: ״אָמֵן״ – חַיָּיב. וְאִילּוּ ״גָּנַבְתָּ אֶת עַבְדִּי״ – לָא קָתָנֵי; מַאי טַעְמָא? לָאו מִשּׁוּם דְּעֶבֶד אִיתַּקַּשׁ לְקַרְקָעוֹת, וְאֵין מְבִיאִין קׇרְבָּן עַל כְּפִירַת שִׁעְבּוּד קַרְקָעוֹת?

Rav Pappa said in the name of Rava: The mishna is also precisely formulated, as it teaches: In a case where one accuses another: You stole my ox, and the defendant says: I did not steal your ox, if the claimant replied: I administer an oath to you, and the defendant said: Amen, he is liable. The mishna discusses a claim of a stolen ox, whereas it does not teach a claim of: You stole my Canaanite slave. What is the reason? Is it not due to the fact that a Canaanite slave is compared to land, and one is not liable to bring an offering for a denial in a matter of a lien on land?

אָמַר רַב פַּפֵּי מִשְּׁמֵיהּ דְּרָבָא: אֵימָא סֵיפָא, זֶה הַכְּלָל: כׇּל הַמְשַׁלֵּם עַל פִּי עַצְמוֹ – חַיָּיב, וְשֶׁאֵינוֹ מְשַׁלֵּם עַל פִּי עַצְמוֹ – פָּטוּר. ״זֶה הַכְּלָל״ לְאֵתוֹיֵי מַאי? לָאו לְאֵתוֹיֵי ״גָּנַבְתָּ אֶת עַבְדִּי״?

Rav Pappi said in the name of Rava: There is no proof from the mishna, as say the last clause of the mishna: This is the principle: For any claim that the defendant would have to pay based on his own admission, he is liable. And for any claim that he would not pay based on his own admission, but by the testimony of witnesses, he is exempt, even if he denies the claim against him and takes an oath to that effect. Rav Pappi asks: What is added by the phrase: This is the principle? Is it not to include even an accusation of: You stole my Canaanite slave, in the halakha of oaths on a deposit?