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Today's Daf Yomi

January 4, 2018 | 讬状讝 讘讟讘转 转砖注状讞

  • This month's learning is sponsored by Joanna Rom and Steven Goldberg in loving memory of Steve's mother Shirley "Nana" Goldberg (Sura Tema bat Chaim v'Hanka)

Shevuot 37

An oath denying a pikadon does not apply to k’nas payments (fines). Rav Kahana questions whether there will be lashes in addition to a sacrifice or in place of a sacrifice in a case where there are witnesses who warned the person before he/she too0k the oath. Several attempts are made to answer his questions from various sources, but not prove conclusive. Raba then questions Rav Kahana’s question and suggests that there can never be a case because if there are witnesses to warn, then they must also be witnesses to the act in which聽case the denial is irrelevant as the witnesses can make the person pay anyway. The gemara then tries to prove and then disprove this assumption of Raba that if there are witnesses, one cannot be obligated for an oath of pikadon. Only at the very last source do they succeed in conclusively disproving this assumption. Is an oath of pikadon relevant in a case relating to land?

诇讛讜 讛讝讬讚 讘砖讘讜注转 讛驻拽讚讜谉 讜讛转专讜 讘讜 诪讛讜 讻讬讜谉 讚讞讬讚讜砖 讛讜讗 讚讘讻诇 讛转讜专讛 诇讗 讗砖讻讞谉 诪讝讬讚 讚诪讬讬转讬 拽专讘谉 讜讛讻讗 诪讬讬转讬 拽专讘谉 诇讗 砖谞讗 讗转专讜 讘讬讛 讜诇讗 砖谞讗 诇讗 讗转专讜 讘讬讛 讗讜 讚诇诪讗 讛谞讬 诪讬诇讬 讛讬讻讗 讚诇讗 讗转专讜 讘讬讛 讗讘诇 讛讬讻讗 讚讗转专讜 讘讬讛 诪讬诇拽讗 诇拽讬 拽专讘谉 诇讗 诪讬讬转讬 讗讜 讚诇诪讗 讛讗 讜讛讗 注讘讚讬谞讗

to them: If one intentionally took a false oath on a deposit and witnesses forewarned him, what is the halakha? Is it the case that since the halakha of an oath on a deposit is a novelty, as in the entire Torah we do not find another case where one who transgressed intentionally brings an offering for atonement, but here he does bring an offering for transgressing the prohibition intentionally, there is no difference whether witnesses forewarned him and there is no difference whether they did not forewarn him, and he is liable to bring a guilt-offering, though generally, there is no offering brought when there was forewarning? Or perhaps, that matter of bringing a guilt-offering when one intentionally takes a false oath applies only when they did not forewarn him; but when they forewarned him, he is flogged, as this is the standard punishment for an intentional transgression, and he does not bring an offering. Or perhaps, we impose both lashes and a guilt-offering.

讗诪专讜 诇讬讛 转谞讬谞讗 讞诪讜专讛 讛讬诪谞讛 砖讘讜注转 讛驻拽讚讜谉 砖讞讬讬讘讬谉 注诇 讝讚讜谞讛 诪讻讜转 讜注诇 砖讙讙转讛 讗砖诐 讘讻住祝 砖拽诇讬诐 诪讚拽讗诪专 诇讬讛 注诇 讝讚讜谞讛 诪讻讜转 诪讻诇诇 讚讗转专讜 讘讬讛 讜拽讗诪专 诪讻讜转 讗讬谉 拽专讘谉 诇讗

They said to Rav Kahana: We learn in a baraita: The halakhot of an oath on a deposit are more stringent than the halakhot of an oath of testimony, as one is liable to receive lashes for intentionally taking a false oath on a deposit, and for unwittingly taking a false oath on a deposit one is liable to bring a guilt-offering worth at least two silver shekels; whereas one who takes a false oath of testimony, whether intentionally or unwittingly, brings a sin-offering. From the fact that the baraita states that for intentionally taking a false oath on a deposit one is liable to receive lashes, by inference it can be understood that the baraita is referring to a case where witnesses forewarned him, as one cannot receive lashes without forewarning, and it is stating: Yes, he is liable to receive lashes, but he is not liable to bring an offering. The baraita, then, resolves the question of Rav Kahana.

讜诪讗讬 讞讜诪专讗 讚谞讬讞讗 诇讬讛 诇讗讬谞讬砖 讚诪讬讬转讬 拽专讘谉 讜诇讗 诇讬诇拽讬

The Gemara elaborates: And what is the stringency in the fact that one who intentionally takes a false oath on a deposit receives lashes? It is due to the fact that a person prefers to bring an offering rather than receive lashes.

讗诪专 诇讛讜 专讘讗 讘专 讗讬转讬 诪讗谉 转谞讗 讝讚讜谉 砖讘讜注转 讛驻拽讚讜谉 诇讗 谞讬转谉 诇讻驻专讛 专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 讗讘诇 诇专讘谞谉 拽专讘谉 谞诪讬 诪讬讬转讬

Rava bar Itai said to the students of Rabba: You cannot answer the question from that baraita, as who is the tanna who taught that intentionally taking a false oath on a deposit is not subject to atonement? It is Rabbi Shimon. But according to the Rabbis, he is liable to bring a guilt-offering, as well as receiving lashes. Therefore, the question remains unanswered.

讗诪专 诇讛讜 专讘 讻讛谞讗 讘专 诪讬谞讛 讚讛讛讬讗 讚讗谞讗 转谞讬谞讗 诇讛 讜讛讻讬 转谞讬谞讗 诇讛 讗讞讚 讝讚讜谞讛 讜讗讞讚 砖讙讙转讛 讗砖诐 讘讻住祝 砖拽诇讬诐 讜诪讗讬 讞讜诪专讗 讚讗讬诇讜 讛转诐 讞讟讗转 讘转 讚谞拽讗 讜讛讻讗 讗砖诐 讘讻住祝 砖拽诇讬诐

Rav Kahana said to the students: Apart from this, you cannot answer my question from this baraita, as I am the one who teaches this baraita and this is how I teach it: An oath on a deposit is more stringent than an oath of testimony, since for taking a false oath on a deposit either intentionally or unwittingly one is liable to bring a guilt-offering worth at least two silver shekels. And what is the stringency in this halakha? It is that there, with regard to an oath of testimony, he is liable to bring a sin-offering that can be worth even one-sixth of one dinar, and here, the guilt-offering incurred for an oath on a deposit must be worth at least two silver shekels.

讜诇讬讙诪专 诪讬谞讛 讚诇诪讗 讚诇讗 讗转专讜 讘讬讛

The Gemara suggests: And let him derive an answer to his question from his version of the baraita, which indicates that one who intentionally takes a false oath on a deposit brings an offering and does not receive lashes. The Gemara responds: Perhaps it is referring to a case where they did not forewarn him; had he been forewarned, he would be flogged.

诇讬砖谞讗 讗讞专讬谞讗 转讗 砖诪注 讗讬谉 讞讬讬讘讬谉 注诇 砖讙讙转讛 诪讛 讛谉 讞讬讬讘讬谉 注诇 讝讚讜谞讛 讗砖诐 讘讻住祝 砖拽诇讬诐 诪讗讬 诇讗讜 讘讚讗转专讜 讘讬讛 讛讻讗 谞诪讬 讚诇讗 讗转专讜 讘讬讛

The Gemara presents a different version of the previous discussion: Come and hear an answer to the question of Rav Kahana from the mishna: One is not liable for taking a false oath on a deposit unwittingly. And what is he liable for when he intentionally takes a false oath? A guilt-offering worth at least two silver shekels. The Gemara explains: What, is it not that the mishna is referring to a case where witnesses forewarned him, and the mishna nevertheless rules only that he must bring an offering? The Gemara rejects the proof: Here, too, the mishna is referring to a case where the witnesses did not forewarn him.

转讗 砖诪注 诇讗 讗诐 讗诪专转 讘谞讝讬专 讟诪讗 砖讻谉 诇讜拽讛 转讗诪专 讘砖讘讜注转 讛驻拽讚讜谉 砖讗讬谞讜 诇讜拽讛 诪讚拽讗诪专 诇讜拽讛 诪讻诇诇 讚讗转专讜 讘讬讛 讜拽讗诪专 转讗诪专 讘砖讘讜注转 讛驻拽讚讜谉 砖讗讬谞讜 诇讜拽讛 讗讘诇 拽专讘谉 诪讬讬转讬

The Gemara continues to seek an answer to Rav Kahana鈥檚 question: Come and hear an answer from a baraita. After comparing the case of a nazirite to one who takes an oath on a deposit, the baraita states: No, if you said that the halakha that baraita discusses is true with regard to an impure nazirite, who is indeed flogged for intentionally becoming impure, shall you also say that this is the case with regard to one who took an oath on a deposit, who is not flogged? The Gemara notes: Now, from the fact that the baraita states that a nazirite is flogged, by inference it can be understood that the baraita is referring to a case where witnesses forewarned him, as one is not liable to receive lashes without forewarning; and yet the baraita states: Shall you say that this is the case with regard to one who took an oath on a deposit, who is not flogged? One can infer: But he does bring a guilt-offering.

诪讗讬 讗讬谞讜 诇讜拽讛 讚讗讬谞讜 谞驻讟专 讘诪诇拽讜转 诪讻诇诇 讚谞讝讬专 讟诪讗 谞驻讟专 讘诪诇拽讜转 讛讗 拽专讘谉 讻转讬讘 讘讬讛 讛转诐 讚诪讬讬转讬 拽专讘谉 讻讬 讛讬讻讬 讚转讬讞讜诇 注诇讬讛 谞讝讬专讜转 讘讟讛专讛

The Gemara rejects the proof: What does the baraita mean when it states that he is not flogged? It means that he is not exempted through lashes alone and he must also bring an offering. The Gemara asks: By inference, does this mean that an impure nazirite is exempted through lashes alone? Isn鈥檛 it written in the Torah explicitly with regard to him that there is a requirement to bring an offering? The Gemara responds: The offering brought by an impure nazirite does not serve as an atonement. Rather, there, the nazirite brings an offering in order to purify himself so that his naziriteship can go into effect while he is in a state of purity. The offering must be brought even if the nazirite became impure unwittingly.

讗诪专讜讛 专讘谞谉 拽诪讬讛 讚专讘讛 讗诪专 诇讛讜 诪讻诇诇 讚讻讬 诇讗 讗转专讜 讘讬讛 讜讗讬讻讗 注讚讬诐 诪讬讞讬讬讘 讻驻讬专转 讚讘专讬诐 讘注诇诪讗 讛讜讗 讗诇诪讗 拽住讘专 专讘讛 讛讻讜驻专 讘诪诪讜谉 砖讬砖 注诇讬讜 注讚讬诐 驻讟讜专

The Sages said this matter before Rabba, i.e., they related the question of Rav Kahana as to whether one who intentionally takes a false oath and was forewarned by witnesses is liable to bring an offering. Rabba said to them: May one conclude by inference that in a case when they did not warn him but there are witnesses to the fact that the defendant owes money to the claimant, he is liable to bring an offering? Isn鈥檛 this case merely a verbal denial that does not have any effect with regard to liability to pay? Since there are witnesses who will testify that the defendant owes the claimant, his denial and false oath did not exempt him from payment and he therefore should not be liable to bring a guilt-offering for taking a false oath. The Gemara infers: Evidently, Rabba holds that one who denies a monetary claim to which there are witnesses is exempt from bringing a guilt-offering for taking a false oath, since the witnesses will testify to the validity of the claimant鈥檚 claim and the denial of the defendant is of no consequence.

讗诪专 诇讬讛 专讘 讞谞讬谞讗 诇专讘讛 转谞讬讗 讚诪住讬讬注 诇讱 讜讻讞砖 讘讛 驻专讟 诇诪讜讚讛 诇讗讞讚 诪谉 讛讗讞讬谉 讗讜 诇讗讞讚 诪谉 讛砖讜转驻讬谉 讜谞砖讘注 注诇 砖拽专 驻专讟 诇诇讜讛 讘砖讟专 讜诇诇讜讛 讘注讚讬诐

Rav 岣nina said to Rabba: A baraita is taught that supports your opinion: The verse states with regard to an oath denying a monetary claim: 鈥淎nd deal falsely therein鈥 (Leviticus 5:22), which serves to exclude one who admits to the truth of the claim of one of a group of brothers or to one of a group of partners, even if he denies the claim to the rest of the brothers or partners. The same verse also states: 鈥淎nd swear to a lie,鈥 which serves to exclude one who borrows money with a promissory note or one who borrows money in the presence of witnesses. Evidently, one is not liable for taking a false oath concerning a monetary claim when there are witnesses who can testify to it.

讗诪专 诇讬讛 讗讬 诪砖讜诐 讛讗 诇讗 转住讬讬注谉 讘讗讜诪专 诇讜讬转讬 讜诇讗 诇讜讬转讬 讘注讚讬诐 诇讜讬转讬 讜诇讗 诇讜讬转讬 讘砖讟专

Rabba said to him: If your proof is because of that baraita, you have not supported us, since that baraita is referring to a case where the defendant says: I borrowed, but I did not borrow in the presence of witnesses, or he says: I borrowed, but I did not borrow with a promissory note. Since his denial is only with regard to the circumstances of the loan and not to the actual debt, he is exempt from liability for taking the false oath.

诪诪讗讬 诪讚拽转谞讬 讜讻讞砖 讘讛 驻专讟 诇诪讜讚讛 诇讗讞讚 诪谉 讛讗讞讬谉 讗讜 诇讗讞讚 诪谉 讛砖讜转驻讬谉 讛讗讬 诇讗讞讚 诪谉 讛讗讞讬谉 讛讬讻讬 讚诪讬 讗讬诇讬诪讗 讚讗讜讚讬 诇讬讛 讘驻诇讙讗 讚讬讚讬讛 讛讗 讗讬讻讗 讻驻讬专讛 讚讗讬讚讱 讗诇讗 诇讗讜 讚讗诪专讬 诇讬讛 诪转专讜讬谞谉 讬讝驻转 讜讗诪专 诇讛讜 诇讗 诪讞讚 诪讬谞讬讬讻讜 讬讝驻讬 讚讛讜讬讗 诇讬讛 讻驻讬专转 讚讘专讬诐 讘注诇诪讗 讜诪讚专讬砖讗 讻驻讬专转 讚讘专讬诐 住讬驻讗 谞诪讬 讻驻讬专转 讚讘专讬诐

Rabba elaborates: From where in the baraita is this explanation apparent? From the fact that it teaches that the verse 鈥渁nd deal falsely therein鈥 serves to exclude one who admits to one of the brothers or to one of the partners. What are the circumstances of that case where one admits to one of the brothers? If we say that he admitted only the portion of the debt owed to that brother, then why is he exempt? Isn鈥檛 there the denial of the claim of the other brother, which is a denial of a monetary claim? Rather, is it not that the brothers said to him: You borrowed from both of us, and he said to them: No, I borrowed all of the amount in question from only one of you, which is merely a verbal denial, as he admits that he owes the claimed amount and disputes only the circumstances of the debt. And since the first clause of the baraita is referring to a case of a verbal denial, the last clause is also referring to a verbal denial. Consequently, one cannot cite a proof from this baraita.

(住讬诪谉 讞讜讘讛 讻讬转讜转 讚讘注诇 讛讘讬转 讞讜诪专 谞讝讬专讗) 转讗 砖诪注 讗讬谞讜 讞讬讬讘 注诇 砖讙讙转讛 讜诪讛讜 讞讬讬讘 注诇 讝讚讜谞讛 讗砖诐 讘讻住祝 砖拽诇讬诐 诪讗讬 诇讗讜 讝讚讜谉 注讚讬诐 诇讗 讝讚讜谉 注爪诪讜

The Gemara attempts to prove that one who takes a false oath on a deposit is liable to bring an offering even when there are witnesses, and presents a mnemonic to remember the series of proofs: Liability, sets, of the homeowner, stringent, nazirite. The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a proof from the mishna: He is not liable for unwittingly taking a false oath by itself. And what is he liable for when he intentionally takes a false oath? He must bring a guilt-offering worth at least two silver shekels. The Gemara continues: What, is it not referring to a case where he intentionally denies the claim of witnesses, and the mishna nevertheless teaches that he is liable to bring a guilt-offering? The Gemara rejects the proof: No, the mishna is referring to a case where there are no witnesses and he admits on his own that he intentionally took a false oath. Had there been witnesses, he would have been exempt from bringing an offering.

转讗 砖诪注 讛讬讜 砖转讬 讻转讬 注讚讬诐 讻驻专讛 讛专讗砖讜谞讛 讜讗讞专 讻讱 讻驻专讛 讛砖谞讬讛 砖转讬讛谉 讞讬讬讘讜转 诪驻谞讬 砖讬讻讜诇讛 注讚讜转 诇讛转拽讬讬诐 讘砖转讬讛谉 讘砖诇诪讗 砖谞讬讛 转讞讬讬讘 讚讛讗 讻驻专讛 诇讛 讻转 专讗砖讜谞讛 讗诇讗 专讗砖讜谞讛 讗诪讗讬 诪讬讞讬讬讘讗

The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a proof from a mishna (31b) that discusses an oath of testimony: If there were two sets of witnesses who took an oath of testimony, and the first set falsely denied knowledge of the matter and then the second set falsely denied knowledge of the matter, both are liable, because the testimony can exist with either of them. The Gemara clarifies: Granted, the second set should be liable, since the first set already denied knowledge of the incident and the validity of the claimant鈥檚 monetary claim now depends upon their testimony. But why is the first set liable?

讛讗 拽讬讬诪讗 砖谞讬讛

Doesn鈥檛 the second set stand ready to testify, so that the refusal of the first set of witnesses does not affect a monetary claim? Evidently, a denial of a monetary claim to which there are witnesses is still considered a denial.

讗诪专 专讘讬谞讗 讛讻讗 讘诪讗讬 注住拽讬谞谉 讻讙讜谉 砖讛讬转讛 砖谞讬讛 讘砖注转 讻驻讬专转 讛专讗砖讜谞讛 拽专讜讘讬谉 讘谞砖讜转讬讛谉 讜谞砖讜转讬讛谉 讙讜住住讜转 诪讛讜 讚转讬诪讗 专讜讘 讙讜住住讬谉 诇诪讬转讛 拽讗 诪砖诪注 诇谉 讛砖转讗 诪讬讛转 讞讬讬 谞讬谞讛讜 讜诇讗 砖讻讬讘讬

Ravina said: Here we are dealing with a case where at the time of the denial by the first set, the second set of witnesses were related to one another through their wives, so that the second set was unfit to provide testimony; and their wives were moribund. Lest you say: Most moribund people actually die soon thereafter, and the witnesses are considered fit to provide testimony, the baraita teaches us that in any event they are currently alive and have not died. The second set was therefore unfit to provide testimony.

转讗 砖诪注 讘注诇 讛讘讬转 砖讟注谉 讟注谞转 讙谞讘 讘驻拽讚讜谉 讜谞砖讘注 讜讛讜讚讛 讜讘讗讜 注讚讬诐 讗诐 注讚 砖诇讗 讘讗讜 注讚讬诐 讛讜讚讛 诪砖诇诐 拽专谉 讜讞讜诪砖 讜讗砖诐 讗诐 诪砖讘讗讜 注讚讬诐 讛讜讚讛 诪砖诇诐 转砖诇讜诪讬 讻驻诇 讜讗砖诐

The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a proof from a baraita: In the case of a homeowner acting as a bailee who falsely claimed that a thief stole a deposit from him, and the homeowner took an oath to that effect and then admitted that he was lying, and witnesses came and testified that the item was not stolen from the homeowner, the halakha depends on the circumstances. If he admitted to his lie before the witnesses came and testified, he pays the principal value of the item and the additional one-fifth payment for denying that he possessed the deposit, and he brings a guilt-offering as atonement for a false oath on a deposit. If he admitted his guilt after the witnesses came and testified, he pays the double payment and brings a guilt-offering. The baraita indicates that even in the case of a monetary claim to which there are witnesses, one is liable to bring a guilt-offering.

讛讻讗 谞诪讬 讻讚专讘讬谞讗

The Gemara responds: Here, too, explain this baraita as Ravina explained the previous baraita, that at the time the homeowner took his oath, the witnesses were related through their moribund wives and were unfit to provide testimony.

讗诪专 诇讬讛 专讘讬谞讗 诇专讘 讗砖讬 转讗 砖诪注 讞诪讜专讛 诪诪谞讛 砖讘讜注转 讛驻拽讚讜谉 砖讞讬讬讘讬谉 注诇 讝讚讜谞讛 诪讻讜转 讜注诇 砖讙讙转讛 讗砖诐 讘讻住祝 砖拽诇讬诐 诪讚拽讗诪专 诇讜拽讛 诪讻诇诇 讚讗讬讻讗 注讚讬诐 讜拽讗诪专 注诇 砖讙讙转讛 讗砖诐 讘讻住祝 砖拽诇讬诐

Ravina said to Rav Ashi: Come and hear another proof from that which is taught in a baraita: The halakhot of an oath on a deposit are more stringent than the halakhot of an oath of testimony, as one is liable to receive lashes for intentionally taking a false oath on a deposit, and one is liable to bring a guilt-offering worth at least two silver shekels for taking the oath unwittingly. Ravina infers: From the fact that the baraita states that one is flogged, by inference it can be understood that the baraita is referring to a case where there are witnesses to the fact that the deposit is in the defendant鈥檚 possession and the defendant was forewarned, and yet it states: One is liable to bring a guilt-offering worth at least two silver shekels for taking the oath unwittingly.

讗诪专 诇讛讜 专讘 诪专讚讻讬 讘专 诪讬谞讛 讚讛讛讬讗 讚讛讗诪专 诇讛讜 专讘 讻讛谞讗 讗谞讗 转谞讬谞讗 诇讛 讜讛讻讬 转谞讬谞讗 诇讛 讗讞讚 讝讚讜谞讛 讜讗讞讚 砖讙讙转讛 讗砖诐 讘讻住祝 砖拽诇讬诐

Rav Mordekhai said to them: Apart from this, you cannot cite this baraita as a proof. As, didn鈥檛 Rav Kahana already say to the students (37a): I am the one who teaches this baraita and this is how I teach it: An oath on a deposit is more stringent than an oath of testimony, since for taking a false oath on a deposit either intentionally or unwittingly one is liable to bring a guilt-offering worth at least two silver shekels. The baraita is not referring to a case in which there were witnesses who forewarned him.

转讗 砖诪注 诇讗 讗诐 讗诪专转 讘谞讝讬专 讟诪讗 砖讻谉 诇讜拽讛 转讗诪专 讘砖讘讜注转 讛驻拽讚讜谉 砖讗讬谞讜 诇讜拽讛 讛讬讻讬 讚诪讬 讗讬 讚诇讬讻讗 注讚讬诐 讗诪讗讬 诇讜拽讛 讗诇讗 驻砖讬讟讗 讚讗讬讻讗 注讚讬诐 讜拽转谞讬 转讗诪专 讘砖讘讜注转 讛驻拽讚讜谉 砖讗讬谞讜 诇讜拽讛 诪诇拽讗 讛讜讗 讚诇讗 诇拽讬 讗讘诇 拽专讘谉 诪讬讬转讬 转讬讜讘转讗 讚专讘讛 转讬讜讘转讗

The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a proof from another baraita: No, if you said that the halakha that baraita discusses is true with regard to an impure nazirite, who is indeed flogged for intentionally becoming impure, shall you also say that this is the case with regard to one who took an oath on a deposit, who is not flogged? The Gemara elaborates: What are the circumstances of the baraita? If it is a case where there were no witnesses, why is the nazirite flogged? Rather, isn鈥檛 it obvious that there are witnesses, and yet, the baraita teaches: Shall you also say that this is the case with regard to one who took an oath on a deposit, who is not flogged? It may be inferred that he does not receive lashes but does bring an offering, even though there are witnesses. The Gemara concludes: The refutation of the opinion of Rabba is indeed a conclusive refutation.

专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讗诪专 讛讻讜驻专 讘诪诪讜谉 砖讬砖 注诇讬讜 注讚讬诐 讞讬讬讘 讘砖讟专 驻讟讜专 讗诪专 专讘 驻驻讗 诪讗讬 讟注诪讬讛 讚专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 注讚讬诐 注讘讬讚讬 讚诪讬讬转讬 砖讟专 讛讗 诪谞讞

Rabbi Yo岣nan says: One who denies a monetary claim to which there are witnesses is liable to bring a guilt-offering for a false oath on a deposit. But if he denies a debt concerning which there is a promissory note, he is exempt. Rav Pappa said: What is the reasoning of Rabbi Yo岣nan? It occurs that witnesses die, and it is therefore possible that he would not be found liable through their testimony; he is therefore considered to have denied a monetary claim. By contrast, a promissory note remains in its place, and his denial would never have exempted him from payment.

讗诪专 诇讬讛 专讘 讛讜谞讗 讘专讬讛 讚专讘 讬讛讜砖注 诇专讘 驻驻讗 砖讟专讗 谞诪讬 注讘讬讚 讚诪专讻住 讗诇讗 讗诪专 专讘 讛讜谞讗 讘专讬讛 讚专讘 讬讛讜砖注 讛讬讬谞讜 讟注诪讬讛 讚专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 诪砖讜诐 讚讛讜讛 砖讟专 砖注讘讜讚 拽专拽注讜转 讜讗讬谉 诪讘讬讗讬谉 拽专讘谉 注诇 讻驻讬专转 砖注讘讜讚 拽专拽注讜转

Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, said to Rav Pappa: This cannot be the reasoning of Rabbi Yo岣nan, as it also occurs that a promissory note becomes lost. Rather, Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, said: This is the reasoning of Rabbi Yo岣nan: It is because a promissory note comprises a lien on land, since the promissory note places a lien on the debtor鈥檚 property, and one does not bring an offering for an oath on a deposit for denying a lien on land, since one does not take an oath concerning land.

讗讬转诪专 诪砖讘讬注 注讚讬 拽专拽注 驻诇讬讙讬 专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讜专讘讬 讗诇注讝专 讞讚 讗诪专 讞讬讬讘 讜讞讚 讗诪专 驻讟讜专 转住转讬讬诐 讚专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讚讗诪专 驻讟讜专 诪讚讗诪专 专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讛讻讜驻专 讘诪诪讜谉 砖讬砖 注诇讬讜 注讚讬诐 讞讬讬讘 砖讟专 驻讟讜专 讜讻讚专讘 讛讜谞讗 讘专讬讛 讚专讘 讬讛讜砖注 转住转讬讬诐

It was stated: In a case where one administers an oath to witnesses who deny knowing information with regard to ownership of land and they deny knowledge of the matter, Rabbi Yo岣nan and Rabbi Elazar disagree: One says that the witnesses are liable to bring a sin-offering for a false oath of testimony, and one says that they are exempt. The Gemara notes: It may be concluded that it is Rabbi Yo岣nan who says they are exempt. This can be inferred from the fact that Rabbi Yo岣nan says: One who denies a monetary claim to which there are witnesses is liable, but one who denies a claim concerning which there is a promissory note is exempt. And this conclusion is in accordance with the explanation of Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, that the reasoning of Rabbi Yo岣nan is that a promissory note comprises a lien on land, and one does not bring an offering for denying a lien on land. The Gemara affirms: Indeed, it may be concluded.

讗诪专 诇讬讛 专讘讬 讬专诪讬讛 诇专讘讬 讗讘讛讜 诇讬诪讗 专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讜专讘讬 讗诇注讝专 讘驻诇讜讙转讗 讚专讘讬 讗诇讬注讝专 讜专讘谞谉 拽讗 诪讬驻诇讙讬 讚转谞谉 讛讙讜讝诇 砖讚讛 诪讞讘讬专讜 讜砖讟驻讛 谞讛专 讞讬讬讘 诇讛注诪讬讚 诇讜 砖讚讛 讚讘专讬 专讘讬 讗诇讬注讝专 讜讞讻诪讬诐 讗讜诪专讬诐 讗讜诪专 诇讜 讛专讬 砖诇讱 诇驻谞讬讱

Rabbi Yirmeya said to Rabbi Abbahu: Shall we say that Rabbi Yo岣nan and Rabbi Elazar disagree with regard to the issue that is the subject of the dispute of Rabbi Eliezer and the Rabbis? As we learned in a baraita: In the case of one who robbed another of a field and then a river flooded it, he is liable to provide the field鈥檚 owner with a different field, since the value of the flooded field was significantly decreased and the robber must return the value of that which he stole; this is the statement of Rabbi Eliezer. And the Rabbis say: He is exempt from doing so, as he can say to the owner: That which is yours is before you. The robber may return the flooded field to its owner without reimbursing him for the loss in its value, since according to the Rabbis, land cannot be stolen. Consequently, the field is considered to be in the possession of its owner, and the thief is not obligated in the mitzva of returning a stolen item.

讜讗诪专讬谞谉 讘诪讗讬 拽诪讬驻诇讙讬 专讘讬 讗诇讬注讝专 讚专讬砖 专讘讜讬讬 讜诪讬注讜讟讬 讜专讘谞谉 讚专砖讬 讻诇诇讬 讜驻专讟讬

Rabbi Yirmeya continues: And we say: With regard to what do they disagree? Rabbi Eliezer interprets the verses that discuss an oath on a deposit and the mitzva to return stolen items according to the hermeneutical principle of amplifications and restrictions, and the Rabbis interpret them according to the hermeneutical principle of generalizations and details.

专讘讬 讗诇讬注讝专 讚专讬砖 专讘讜讬讬 讜诪讬注讜讟讬 讜讻讞砖 讘注诪讬转讜 专讬讘讛 讘驻拽讚讜谉 讗讜 讘转砖讜诪转 讬讚 诪讬注讟 讗讜 诪讻诇 讗砖专 讬砖讘注 讞讝专 讜专讬讘讛

He explains: Rabbi Eliezer interprets the verses: 鈥淚f anyone sin, and commit a trespass against the Lord, and deal falsely with his neighbor in a matter of deposit or of pledge, or of robbery, or have oppressed his neighbor鈥r of anything about which he has sworn falsely, he shall restore it in full鈥 (Leviticus 5:21鈥24), according to the hermeneutical principle of amplifications and restrictions. The phrase 鈥渋f anyone sin, and commit a trespass against the Lord, and deal falsely with his neighbor鈥 amplified the halakha. When the verse states: 鈥淚n a matter of deposit or of pledge,鈥 it has restricted the halakha to the case of a deposit. When the verse then states: 鈥淥r of anything about which he has sworn falsely, he shall restore it in full,鈥 it has then amplified the halakha again.

专讬讘讛 讜诪讬注讟 讜专讬讘讛 专讬讘讛 讛讻诇 诪讗讬 专讬讘讛 专讬讘讛 讻诇 诪讬诇讬 讜诪讗讬 诪讬注讟 诪讬注讟 砖讟专讜转

Accordingly, as the Torah amplified and then restricted and then amplified again, it has amplified the halakha to include everything except for the specific matter excluded by the restriction. What is included due to the fact that the verse has amplified the halakha? The verse has amplified the halakha to include everything that one steals. And what is excluded due to the fact that the verse restricted the halakha? It restricted the halakha to exclude financial documents, which are dissimilar to a deposit in that their value is not intrinsic but rather due to their function. Consequently, according to Rabbi Eliezer, land that was stolen is included in the halakhot stated in these verses, and one who steals land must reimburse the field鈥檚 owner.

讜专讘谞谉 讚专砖讬 讻诇诇讬 讜驻专讟讬 讜讻讞砖 讘注诪讬转讜 讻诇诇 讘驻拽讚讜谉 讗讜 讘转砖讜诪转 讬讚 讗讜 讘讙讝诇 驻专讟 讗讜 诪讻诇 讗砖专 讬砖讘注 注诇讬讜 讞讝专 讜讻诇诇 讻诇诇 讜驻专讟 讜讻诇诇 讗讬 讗转讛 讚谉 讗诇讗 讻注讬谉 讛驻专讟

And the Rabbis interpreted these verses according to the hermeneutical principle of generalizations and details. The phrase 鈥渁nd deal falsely with his neighbor鈥 is a generalization, while the subsequent phrase, 鈥渋n a matter of deposit or of pledge, or of robbery,鈥 is a detail. When the verse then states: 鈥淥r of anything about which he has sworn falsely, he shall restore it in full,鈥 it has then generalized again. In the case of a generalization, and a detail, and a generalization, you may deduce that the verse is referring only to items similar to the detail.

诪讛 讛驻专讟 诪驻讜专砖 讚讘专 讛诪讟诇讟诇 讜讙讜驻讜 诪诪讜谉 讗祝 讻诇 讚讘专 讛诪讟诇讟诇 讜讙讜驻讜 诪诪讜谉 讬爪讗讜 拽专拽注讜转 砖讗讬谉 诪讟诇讟诇 讬爪讗讜 注讘讚讬诐 砖讛讜拽砖讜 诇拽专拽注讜转 讬爪讗讜 砖讟专讜转 砖讗祝 注诇 驻讬 砖诪讟诇讟诇讬谉 讗讬谉 讙讜驻谉 诪诪讜谉

Accordingly, just as the detail, i.e., a deposit, is explicitly a case of movable property and has intrinsic monetary value, so too, the verse includes anything that is movable property and has intrinsic monetary value. Consequently, land has been excluded, as it is not movable property. Canaanite slaves have been excluded, as they are compared to land with regard to many areas of halakha. Financial documents have been excluded because although they are movable property, they do not have intrinsic monetary value.

诪讗谉 讚诪讞讬讬讘 讻专讘讬 讗诇讬注讝专 讜诪讗谉 讚驻讟专 讻专讘谞谉

Rabbi Yirmeya concludes: Shall we say that the one who deems the witnesses liable in a case of an oath of testimony concerning land, i.e., Rabbi Elazar, holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer, that land is included in the mitzva of returning stolen property and in the halakhot of an oath on a deposit, and by extension, in the halakhot of an oath of testimony; and the one who deems them exempt, i.e., Rabbi Yo岣nan, holds in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, that land is excluded from these halakhot?

讗诪专 诇讬讛 诇讗 诪讗谉 讚诪讞讬讬讘 讻专讘讬 讗诇讬注讝专 讜诪讗谉 讚驻讟专 讗诪专 诇讱 讘讛讗 讗驻讬诇讜 专讘讬 讗诇讬注讝专 诪讜讚讛 讚专讞诪谞讗 讗诪专 诪讻诇 讜诇讗 讛讻诇

Rabbi Abbahu said to Rabbi Yirmeya: No, the two disagreements do not completely correspond. The one who deems the witnesses liable must in fact hold in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer. But the one who deems them exempt could have said to you: In this case of an oath of testimony, even Rabbi Eliezer concedes that they are exempt from bringing an offering, as the Merciful One states: 鈥淥f anything about which he has sworn falsely,鈥 and not: Everything about which he has sworn falsely. The verse indicates that only certain items are included in the halakhot of an oath of testimony. Therefore, land is excluded, since it is dissimilar to the specific instances mentioned in the verse.

讗诪专 专讘 驻驻讗 诪砖诪讬讛 讚专讘讗 诪转谞讬转讬谉 谞诪讬 讚讬拽讗 讚拽转谞讬 讙谞讘转 讗转 砖讜专讬 讜讛讜讗 讗讜诪专 诇讗 讙谞讘转讬 诪砖讘讬注讱 讗谞讬 讜讗诪专 讗诪谉 讞讬讬讘 讜讗讬诇讜 讙谞讘转 讗转 注讘讚讬 诇讗 拽转谞讬 诪讗讬 讟注诪讗 诇讗讜 诪砖讜诐 讚注讘讚 讗讬转拽砖 诇拽专拽注讜转 讜讗讬谉 诪讘讬讗讬谉 拽专讘谉 注诇 讻驻讬专转 砖注讘讜讚 拽专拽注讜转

Rav Pappa said in the name of Rava: The mishna is also precisely formulated, as it teaches: In a case where one accuses another: You stole my ox, and the defendant says: I did not steal your ox, if the claimant replied: I administer an oath to you, and the defendant said: Amen, he is liable. The mishna discusses a claim of a stolen ox, whereas it does not teach a claim of: You stole my Canaanite slave. What is the reason? Is it not due to the fact that a Canaanite slave is compared to land, and one is not liable to bring an offering for a denial in a matter of a lien on land?

讗诪专 专讘 驻驻讬 诪砖诪讬讛 讚专讘讗 讗讬诪讗 住讬驻讗 讝讛 讛讻诇诇 讻诇 讛诪砖诇诐 注诇 驻讬 注爪诪讜 讞讬讬讘 讜砖讗讬谞讜 诪砖诇诐 注诇 驻讬 注爪诪讜 驻讟讜专 讝讛 讛讻诇诇 诇讗转讜讬讬 诪讗讬 诇讗讜 诇讗转讜讬讬 讙谞讘转 讗转 注讘讚讬

Rav Pappi said in the name of Rava: There is no proof from the mishna, as say the last clause of the mishna: This is the principle: For any claim that the defendant would have to pay based on his own admission, he is liable. And for any claim that he would not pay based on his own admission, but by the testimony of witnesses, he is exempt, even if he denies the claim against him and takes an oath to that effect. Rav Pappi asks: What is added by the phrase: This is the principle? Is it not to include even an accusation of: You stole my Canaanite slave, in the halakha of oaths on a deposit?

  • This month's learning is sponsored by Joanna Rom and Steven Goldberg in loving memory of Steve's mother Shirley "Nana" Goldberg (Sura Tema bat Chaim v'Hanka)

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Shevuot 37

The William Davidson Talmud | Powered by Sefaria

Shevuot 37

诇讛讜 讛讝讬讚 讘砖讘讜注转 讛驻拽讚讜谉 讜讛转专讜 讘讜 诪讛讜 讻讬讜谉 讚讞讬讚讜砖 讛讜讗 讚讘讻诇 讛转讜专讛 诇讗 讗砖讻讞谉 诪讝讬讚 讚诪讬讬转讬 拽专讘谉 讜讛讻讗 诪讬讬转讬 拽专讘谉 诇讗 砖谞讗 讗转专讜 讘讬讛 讜诇讗 砖谞讗 诇讗 讗转专讜 讘讬讛 讗讜 讚诇诪讗 讛谞讬 诪讬诇讬 讛讬讻讗 讚诇讗 讗转专讜 讘讬讛 讗讘诇 讛讬讻讗 讚讗转专讜 讘讬讛 诪讬诇拽讗 诇拽讬 拽专讘谉 诇讗 诪讬讬转讬 讗讜 讚诇诪讗 讛讗 讜讛讗 注讘讚讬谞讗

to them: If one intentionally took a false oath on a deposit and witnesses forewarned him, what is the halakha? Is it the case that since the halakha of an oath on a deposit is a novelty, as in the entire Torah we do not find another case where one who transgressed intentionally brings an offering for atonement, but here he does bring an offering for transgressing the prohibition intentionally, there is no difference whether witnesses forewarned him and there is no difference whether they did not forewarn him, and he is liable to bring a guilt-offering, though generally, there is no offering brought when there was forewarning? Or perhaps, that matter of bringing a guilt-offering when one intentionally takes a false oath applies only when they did not forewarn him; but when they forewarned him, he is flogged, as this is the standard punishment for an intentional transgression, and he does not bring an offering. Or perhaps, we impose both lashes and a guilt-offering.

讗诪专讜 诇讬讛 转谞讬谞讗 讞诪讜专讛 讛讬诪谞讛 砖讘讜注转 讛驻拽讚讜谉 砖讞讬讬讘讬谉 注诇 讝讚讜谞讛 诪讻讜转 讜注诇 砖讙讙转讛 讗砖诐 讘讻住祝 砖拽诇讬诐 诪讚拽讗诪专 诇讬讛 注诇 讝讚讜谞讛 诪讻讜转 诪讻诇诇 讚讗转专讜 讘讬讛 讜拽讗诪专 诪讻讜转 讗讬谉 拽专讘谉 诇讗

They said to Rav Kahana: We learn in a baraita: The halakhot of an oath on a deposit are more stringent than the halakhot of an oath of testimony, as one is liable to receive lashes for intentionally taking a false oath on a deposit, and for unwittingly taking a false oath on a deposit one is liable to bring a guilt-offering worth at least two silver shekels; whereas one who takes a false oath of testimony, whether intentionally or unwittingly, brings a sin-offering. From the fact that the baraita states that for intentionally taking a false oath on a deposit one is liable to receive lashes, by inference it can be understood that the baraita is referring to a case where witnesses forewarned him, as one cannot receive lashes without forewarning, and it is stating: Yes, he is liable to receive lashes, but he is not liable to bring an offering. The baraita, then, resolves the question of Rav Kahana.

讜诪讗讬 讞讜诪专讗 讚谞讬讞讗 诇讬讛 诇讗讬谞讬砖 讚诪讬讬转讬 拽专讘谉 讜诇讗 诇讬诇拽讬

The Gemara elaborates: And what is the stringency in the fact that one who intentionally takes a false oath on a deposit receives lashes? It is due to the fact that a person prefers to bring an offering rather than receive lashes.

讗诪专 诇讛讜 专讘讗 讘专 讗讬转讬 诪讗谉 转谞讗 讝讚讜谉 砖讘讜注转 讛驻拽讚讜谉 诇讗 谞讬转谉 诇讻驻专讛 专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 讗讘诇 诇专讘谞谉 拽专讘谉 谞诪讬 诪讬讬转讬

Rava bar Itai said to the students of Rabba: You cannot answer the question from that baraita, as who is the tanna who taught that intentionally taking a false oath on a deposit is not subject to atonement? It is Rabbi Shimon. But according to the Rabbis, he is liable to bring a guilt-offering, as well as receiving lashes. Therefore, the question remains unanswered.

讗诪专 诇讛讜 专讘 讻讛谞讗 讘专 诪讬谞讛 讚讛讛讬讗 讚讗谞讗 转谞讬谞讗 诇讛 讜讛讻讬 转谞讬谞讗 诇讛 讗讞讚 讝讚讜谞讛 讜讗讞讚 砖讙讙转讛 讗砖诐 讘讻住祝 砖拽诇讬诐 讜诪讗讬 讞讜诪专讗 讚讗讬诇讜 讛转诐 讞讟讗转 讘转 讚谞拽讗 讜讛讻讗 讗砖诐 讘讻住祝 砖拽诇讬诐

Rav Kahana said to the students: Apart from this, you cannot answer my question from this baraita, as I am the one who teaches this baraita and this is how I teach it: An oath on a deposit is more stringent than an oath of testimony, since for taking a false oath on a deposit either intentionally or unwittingly one is liable to bring a guilt-offering worth at least two silver shekels. And what is the stringency in this halakha? It is that there, with regard to an oath of testimony, he is liable to bring a sin-offering that can be worth even one-sixth of one dinar, and here, the guilt-offering incurred for an oath on a deposit must be worth at least two silver shekels.

讜诇讬讙诪专 诪讬谞讛 讚诇诪讗 讚诇讗 讗转专讜 讘讬讛

The Gemara suggests: And let him derive an answer to his question from his version of the baraita, which indicates that one who intentionally takes a false oath on a deposit brings an offering and does not receive lashes. The Gemara responds: Perhaps it is referring to a case where they did not forewarn him; had he been forewarned, he would be flogged.

诇讬砖谞讗 讗讞专讬谞讗 转讗 砖诪注 讗讬谉 讞讬讬讘讬谉 注诇 砖讙讙转讛 诪讛 讛谉 讞讬讬讘讬谉 注诇 讝讚讜谞讛 讗砖诐 讘讻住祝 砖拽诇讬诐 诪讗讬 诇讗讜 讘讚讗转专讜 讘讬讛 讛讻讗 谞诪讬 讚诇讗 讗转专讜 讘讬讛

The Gemara presents a different version of the previous discussion: Come and hear an answer to the question of Rav Kahana from the mishna: One is not liable for taking a false oath on a deposit unwittingly. And what is he liable for when he intentionally takes a false oath? A guilt-offering worth at least two silver shekels. The Gemara explains: What, is it not that the mishna is referring to a case where witnesses forewarned him, and the mishna nevertheless rules only that he must bring an offering? The Gemara rejects the proof: Here, too, the mishna is referring to a case where the witnesses did not forewarn him.

转讗 砖诪注 诇讗 讗诐 讗诪专转 讘谞讝讬专 讟诪讗 砖讻谉 诇讜拽讛 转讗诪专 讘砖讘讜注转 讛驻拽讚讜谉 砖讗讬谞讜 诇讜拽讛 诪讚拽讗诪专 诇讜拽讛 诪讻诇诇 讚讗转专讜 讘讬讛 讜拽讗诪专 转讗诪专 讘砖讘讜注转 讛驻拽讚讜谉 砖讗讬谞讜 诇讜拽讛 讗讘诇 拽专讘谉 诪讬讬转讬

The Gemara continues to seek an answer to Rav Kahana鈥檚 question: Come and hear an answer from a baraita. After comparing the case of a nazirite to one who takes an oath on a deposit, the baraita states: No, if you said that the halakha that baraita discusses is true with regard to an impure nazirite, who is indeed flogged for intentionally becoming impure, shall you also say that this is the case with regard to one who took an oath on a deposit, who is not flogged? The Gemara notes: Now, from the fact that the baraita states that a nazirite is flogged, by inference it can be understood that the baraita is referring to a case where witnesses forewarned him, as one is not liable to receive lashes without forewarning; and yet the baraita states: Shall you say that this is the case with regard to one who took an oath on a deposit, who is not flogged? One can infer: But he does bring a guilt-offering.

诪讗讬 讗讬谞讜 诇讜拽讛 讚讗讬谞讜 谞驻讟专 讘诪诇拽讜转 诪讻诇诇 讚谞讝讬专 讟诪讗 谞驻讟专 讘诪诇拽讜转 讛讗 拽专讘谉 讻转讬讘 讘讬讛 讛转诐 讚诪讬讬转讬 拽专讘谉 讻讬 讛讬讻讬 讚转讬讞讜诇 注诇讬讛 谞讝讬专讜转 讘讟讛专讛

The Gemara rejects the proof: What does the baraita mean when it states that he is not flogged? It means that he is not exempted through lashes alone and he must also bring an offering. The Gemara asks: By inference, does this mean that an impure nazirite is exempted through lashes alone? Isn鈥檛 it written in the Torah explicitly with regard to him that there is a requirement to bring an offering? The Gemara responds: The offering brought by an impure nazirite does not serve as an atonement. Rather, there, the nazirite brings an offering in order to purify himself so that his naziriteship can go into effect while he is in a state of purity. The offering must be brought even if the nazirite became impure unwittingly.

讗诪专讜讛 专讘谞谉 拽诪讬讛 讚专讘讛 讗诪专 诇讛讜 诪讻诇诇 讚讻讬 诇讗 讗转专讜 讘讬讛 讜讗讬讻讗 注讚讬诐 诪讬讞讬讬讘 讻驻讬专转 讚讘专讬诐 讘注诇诪讗 讛讜讗 讗诇诪讗 拽住讘专 专讘讛 讛讻讜驻专 讘诪诪讜谉 砖讬砖 注诇讬讜 注讚讬诐 驻讟讜专

The Sages said this matter before Rabba, i.e., they related the question of Rav Kahana as to whether one who intentionally takes a false oath and was forewarned by witnesses is liable to bring an offering. Rabba said to them: May one conclude by inference that in a case when they did not warn him but there are witnesses to the fact that the defendant owes money to the claimant, he is liable to bring an offering? Isn鈥檛 this case merely a verbal denial that does not have any effect with regard to liability to pay? Since there are witnesses who will testify that the defendant owes the claimant, his denial and false oath did not exempt him from payment and he therefore should not be liable to bring a guilt-offering for taking a false oath. The Gemara infers: Evidently, Rabba holds that one who denies a monetary claim to which there are witnesses is exempt from bringing a guilt-offering for taking a false oath, since the witnesses will testify to the validity of the claimant鈥檚 claim and the denial of the defendant is of no consequence.

讗诪专 诇讬讛 专讘 讞谞讬谞讗 诇专讘讛 转谞讬讗 讚诪住讬讬注 诇讱 讜讻讞砖 讘讛 驻专讟 诇诪讜讚讛 诇讗讞讚 诪谉 讛讗讞讬谉 讗讜 诇讗讞讚 诪谉 讛砖讜转驻讬谉 讜谞砖讘注 注诇 砖拽专 驻专讟 诇诇讜讛 讘砖讟专 讜诇诇讜讛 讘注讚讬诐

Rav 岣nina said to Rabba: A baraita is taught that supports your opinion: The verse states with regard to an oath denying a monetary claim: 鈥淎nd deal falsely therein鈥 (Leviticus 5:22), which serves to exclude one who admits to the truth of the claim of one of a group of brothers or to one of a group of partners, even if he denies the claim to the rest of the brothers or partners. The same verse also states: 鈥淎nd swear to a lie,鈥 which serves to exclude one who borrows money with a promissory note or one who borrows money in the presence of witnesses. Evidently, one is not liable for taking a false oath concerning a monetary claim when there are witnesses who can testify to it.

讗诪专 诇讬讛 讗讬 诪砖讜诐 讛讗 诇讗 转住讬讬注谉 讘讗讜诪专 诇讜讬转讬 讜诇讗 诇讜讬转讬 讘注讚讬诐 诇讜讬转讬 讜诇讗 诇讜讬转讬 讘砖讟专

Rabba said to him: If your proof is because of that baraita, you have not supported us, since that baraita is referring to a case where the defendant says: I borrowed, but I did not borrow in the presence of witnesses, or he says: I borrowed, but I did not borrow with a promissory note. Since his denial is only with regard to the circumstances of the loan and not to the actual debt, he is exempt from liability for taking the false oath.

诪诪讗讬 诪讚拽转谞讬 讜讻讞砖 讘讛 驻专讟 诇诪讜讚讛 诇讗讞讚 诪谉 讛讗讞讬谉 讗讜 诇讗讞讚 诪谉 讛砖讜转驻讬谉 讛讗讬 诇讗讞讚 诪谉 讛讗讞讬谉 讛讬讻讬 讚诪讬 讗讬诇讬诪讗 讚讗讜讚讬 诇讬讛 讘驻诇讙讗 讚讬讚讬讛 讛讗 讗讬讻讗 讻驻讬专讛 讚讗讬讚讱 讗诇讗 诇讗讜 讚讗诪专讬 诇讬讛 诪转专讜讬谞谉 讬讝驻转 讜讗诪专 诇讛讜 诇讗 诪讞讚 诪讬谞讬讬讻讜 讬讝驻讬 讚讛讜讬讗 诇讬讛 讻驻讬专转 讚讘专讬诐 讘注诇诪讗 讜诪讚专讬砖讗 讻驻讬专转 讚讘专讬诐 住讬驻讗 谞诪讬 讻驻讬专转 讚讘专讬诐

Rabba elaborates: From where in the baraita is this explanation apparent? From the fact that it teaches that the verse 鈥渁nd deal falsely therein鈥 serves to exclude one who admits to one of the brothers or to one of the partners. What are the circumstances of that case where one admits to one of the brothers? If we say that he admitted only the portion of the debt owed to that brother, then why is he exempt? Isn鈥檛 there the denial of the claim of the other brother, which is a denial of a monetary claim? Rather, is it not that the brothers said to him: You borrowed from both of us, and he said to them: No, I borrowed all of the amount in question from only one of you, which is merely a verbal denial, as he admits that he owes the claimed amount and disputes only the circumstances of the debt. And since the first clause of the baraita is referring to a case of a verbal denial, the last clause is also referring to a verbal denial. Consequently, one cannot cite a proof from this baraita.

(住讬诪谉 讞讜讘讛 讻讬转讜转 讚讘注诇 讛讘讬转 讞讜诪专 谞讝讬专讗) 转讗 砖诪注 讗讬谞讜 讞讬讬讘 注诇 砖讙讙转讛 讜诪讛讜 讞讬讬讘 注诇 讝讚讜谞讛 讗砖诐 讘讻住祝 砖拽诇讬诐 诪讗讬 诇讗讜 讝讚讜谉 注讚讬诐 诇讗 讝讚讜谉 注爪诪讜

The Gemara attempts to prove that one who takes a false oath on a deposit is liable to bring an offering even when there are witnesses, and presents a mnemonic to remember the series of proofs: Liability, sets, of the homeowner, stringent, nazirite. The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a proof from the mishna: He is not liable for unwittingly taking a false oath by itself. And what is he liable for when he intentionally takes a false oath? He must bring a guilt-offering worth at least two silver shekels. The Gemara continues: What, is it not referring to a case where he intentionally denies the claim of witnesses, and the mishna nevertheless teaches that he is liable to bring a guilt-offering? The Gemara rejects the proof: No, the mishna is referring to a case where there are no witnesses and he admits on his own that he intentionally took a false oath. Had there been witnesses, he would have been exempt from bringing an offering.

转讗 砖诪注 讛讬讜 砖转讬 讻转讬 注讚讬诐 讻驻专讛 讛专讗砖讜谞讛 讜讗讞专 讻讱 讻驻专讛 讛砖谞讬讛 砖转讬讛谉 讞讬讬讘讜转 诪驻谞讬 砖讬讻讜诇讛 注讚讜转 诇讛转拽讬讬诐 讘砖转讬讛谉 讘砖诇诪讗 砖谞讬讛 转讞讬讬讘 讚讛讗 讻驻专讛 诇讛 讻转 专讗砖讜谞讛 讗诇讗 专讗砖讜谞讛 讗诪讗讬 诪讬讞讬讬讘讗

The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a proof from a mishna (31b) that discusses an oath of testimony: If there were two sets of witnesses who took an oath of testimony, and the first set falsely denied knowledge of the matter and then the second set falsely denied knowledge of the matter, both are liable, because the testimony can exist with either of them. The Gemara clarifies: Granted, the second set should be liable, since the first set already denied knowledge of the incident and the validity of the claimant鈥檚 monetary claim now depends upon their testimony. But why is the first set liable?

讛讗 拽讬讬诪讗 砖谞讬讛

Doesn鈥檛 the second set stand ready to testify, so that the refusal of the first set of witnesses does not affect a monetary claim? Evidently, a denial of a monetary claim to which there are witnesses is still considered a denial.

讗诪专 专讘讬谞讗 讛讻讗 讘诪讗讬 注住拽讬谞谉 讻讙讜谉 砖讛讬转讛 砖谞讬讛 讘砖注转 讻驻讬专转 讛专讗砖讜谞讛 拽专讜讘讬谉 讘谞砖讜转讬讛谉 讜谞砖讜转讬讛谉 讙讜住住讜转 诪讛讜 讚转讬诪讗 专讜讘 讙讜住住讬谉 诇诪讬转讛 拽讗 诪砖诪注 诇谉 讛砖转讗 诪讬讛转 讞讬讬 谞讬谞讛讜 讜诇讗 砖讻讬讘讬

Ravina said: Here we are dealing with a case where at the time of the denial by the first set, the second set of witnesses were related to one another through their wives, so that the second set was unfit to provide testimony; and their wives were moribund. Lest you say: Most moribund people actually die soon thereafter, and the witnesses are considered fit to provide testimony, the baraita teaches us that in any event they are currently alive and have not died. The second set was therefore unfit to provide testimony.

转讗 砖诪注 讘注诇 讛讘讬转 砖讟注谉 讟注谞转 讙谞讘 讘驻拽讚讜谉 讜谞砖讘注 讜讛讜讚讛 讜讘讗讜 注讚讬诐 讗诐 注讚 砖诇讗 讘讗讜 注讚讬诐 讛讜讚讛 诪砖诇诐 拽专谉 讜讞讜诪砖 讜讗砖诐 讗诐 诪砖讘讗讜 注讚讬诐 讛讜讚讛 诪砖诇诐 转砖诇讜诪讬 讻驻诇 讜讗砖诐

The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a proof from a baraita: In the case of a homeowner acting as a bailee who falsely claimed that a thief stole a deposit from him, and the homeowner took an oath to that effect and then admitted that he was lying, and witnesses came and testified that the item was not stolen from the homeowner, the halakha depends on the circumstances. If he admitted to his lie before the witnesses came and testified, he pays the principal value of the item and the additional one-fifth payment for denying that he possessed the deposit, and he brings a guilt-offering as atonement for a false oath on a deposit. If he admitted his guilt after the witnesses came and testified, he pays the double payment and brings a guilt-offering. The baraita indicates that even in the case of a monetary claim to which there are witnesses, one is liable to bring a guilt-offering.

讛讻讗 谞诪讬 讻讚专讘讬谞讗

The Gemara responds: Here, too, explain this baraita as Ravina explained the previous baraita, that at the time the homeowner took his oath, the witnesses were related through their moribund wives and were unfit to provide testimony.

讗诪专 诇讬讛 专讘讬谞讗 诇专讘 讗砖讬 转讗 砖诪注 讞诪讜专讛 诪诪谞讛 砖讘讜注转 讛驻拽讚讜谉 砖讞讬讬讘讬谉 注诇 讝讚讜谞讛 诪讻讜转 讜注诇 砖讙讙转讛 讗砖诐 讘讻住祝 砖拽诇讬诐 诪讚拽讗诪专 诇讜拽讛 诪讻诇诇 讚讗讬讻讗 注讚讬诐 讜拽讗诪专 注诇 砖讙讙转讛 讗砖诐 讘讻住祝 砖拽诇讬诐

Ravina said to Rav Ashi: Come and hear another proof from that which is taught in a baraita: The halakhot of an oath on a deposit are more stringent than the halakhot of an oath of testimony, as one is liable to receive lashes for intentionally taking a false oath on a deposit, and one is liable to bring a guilt-offering worth at least two silver shekels for taking the oath unwittingly. Ravina infers: From the fact that the baraita states that one is flogged, by inference it can be understood that the baraita is referring to a case where there are witnesses to the fact that the deposit is in the defendant鈥檚 possession and the defendant was forewarned, and yet it states: One is liable to bring a guilt-offering worth at least two silver shekels for taking the oath unwittingly.

讗诪专 诇讛讜 专讘 诪专讚讻讬 讘专 诪讬谞讛 讚讛讛讬讗 讚讛讗诪专 诇讛讜 专讘 讻讛谞讗 讗谞讗 转谞讬谞讗 诇讛 讜讛讻讬 转谞讬谞讗 诇讛 讗讞讚 讝讚讜谞讛 讜讗讞讚 砖讙讙转讛 讗砖诐 讘讻住祝 砖拽诇讬诐

Rav Mordekhai said to them: Apart from this, you cannot cite this baraita as a proof. As, didn鈥檛 Rav Kahana already say to the students (37a): I am the one who teaches this baraita and this is how I teach it: An oath on a deposit is more stringent than an oath of testimony, since for taking a false oath on a deposit either intentionally or unwittingly one is liable to bring a guilt-offering worth at least two silver shekels. The baraita is not referring to a case in which there were witnesses who forewarned him.

转讗 砖诪注 诇讗 讗诐 讗诪专转 讘谞讝讬专 讟诪讗 砖讻谉 诇讜拽讛 转讗诪专 讘砖讘讜注转 讛驻拽讚讜谉 砖讗讬谞讜 诇讜拽讛 讛讬讻讬 讚诪讬 讗讬 讚诇讬讻讗 注讚讬诐 讗诪讗讬 诇讜拽讛 讗诇讗 驻砖讬讟讗 讚讗讬讻讗 注讚讬诐 讜拽转谞讬 转讗诪专 讘砖讘讜注转 讛驻拽讚讜谉 砖讗讬谞讜 诇讜拽讛 诪诇拽讗 讛讜讗 讚诇讗 诇拽讬 讗讘诇 拽专讘谉 诪讬讬转讬 转讬讜讘转讗 讚专讘讛 转讬讜讘转讗

The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a proof from another baraita: No, if you said that the halakha that baraita discusses is true with regard to an impure nazirite, who is indeed flogged for intentionally becoming impure, shall you also say that this is the case with regard to one who took an oath on a deposit, who is not flogged? The Gemara elaborates: What are the circumstances of the baraita? If it is a case where there were no witnesses, why is the nazirite flogged? Rather, isn鈥檛 it obvious that there are witnesses, and yet, the baraita teaches: Shall you also say that this is the case with regard to one who took an oath on a deposit, who is not flogged? It may be inferred that he does not receive lashes but does bring an offering, even though there are witnesses. The Gemara concludes: The refutation of the opinion of Rabba is indeed a conclusive refutation.

专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讗诪专 讛讻讜驻专 讘诪诪讜谉 砖讬砖 注诇讬讜 注讚讬诐 讞讬讬讘 讘砖讟专 驻讟讜专 讗诪专 专讘 驻驻讗 诪讗讬 讟注诪讬讛 讚专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 注讚讬诐 注讘讬讚讬 讚诪讬讬转讬 砖讟专 讛讗 诪谞讞

Rabbi Yo岣nan says: One who denies a monetary claim to which there are witnesses is liable to bring a guilt-offering for a false oath on a deposit. But if he denies a debt concerning which there is a promissory note, he is exempt. Rav Pappa said: What is the reasoning of Rabbi Yo岣nan? It occurs that witnesses die, and it is therefore possible that he would not be found liable through their testimony; he is therefore considered to have denied a monetary claim. By contrast, a promissory note remains in its place, and his denial would never have exempted him from payment.

讗诪专 诇讬讛 专讘 讛讜谞讗 讘专讬讛 讚专讘 讬讛讜砖注 诇专讘 驻驻讗 砖讟专讗 谞诪讬 注讘讬讚 讚诪专讻住 讗诇讗 讗诪专 专讘 讛讜谞讗 讘专讬讛 讚专讘 讬讛讜砖注 讛讬讬谞讜 讟注诪讬讛 讚专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 诪砖讜诐 讚讛讜讛 砖讟专 砖注讘讜讚 拽专拽注讜转 讜讗讬谉 诪讘讬讗讬谉 拽专讘谉 注诇 讻驻讬专转 砖注讘讜讚 拽专拽注讜转

Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, said to Rav Pappa: This cannot be the reasoning of Rabbi Yo岣nan, as it also occurs that a promissory note becomes lost. Rather, Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, said: This is the reasoning of Rabbi Yo岣nan: It is because a promissory note comprises a lien on land, since the promissory note places a lien on the debtor鈥檚 property, and one does not bring an offering for an oath on a deposit for denying a lien on land, since one does not take an oath concerning land.

讗讬转诪专 诪砖讘讬注 注讚讬 拽专拽注 驻诇讬讙讬 专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讜专讘讬 讗诇注讝专 讞讚 讗诪专 讞讬讬讘 讜讞讚 讗诪专 驻讟讜专 转住转讬讬诐 讚专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讚讗诪专 驻讟讜专 诪讚讗诪专 专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讛讻讜驻专 讘诪诪讜谉 砖讬砖 注诇讬讜 注讚讬诐 讞讬讬讘 砖讟专 驻讟讜专 讜讻讚专讘 讛讜谞讗 讘专讬讛 讚专讘 讬讛讜砖注 转住转讬讬诐

It was stated: In a case where one administers an oath to witnesses who deny knowing information with regard to ownership of land and they deny knowledge of the matter, Rabbi Yo岣nan and Rabbi Elazar disagree: One says that the witnesses are liable to bring a sin-offering for a false oath of testimony, and one says that they are exempt. The Gemara notes: It may be concluded that it is Rabbi Yo岣nan who says they are exempt. This can be inferred from the fact that Rabbi Yo岣nan says: One who denies a monetary claim to which there are witnesses is liable, but one who denies a claim concerning which there is a promissory note is exempt. And this conclusion is in accordance with the explanation of Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, that the reasoning of Rabbi Yo岣nan is that a promissory note comprises a lien on land, and one does not bring an offering for denying a lien on land. The Gemara affirms: Indeed, it may be concluded.

讗诪专 诇讬讛 专讘讬 讬专诪讬讛 诇专讘讬 讗讘讛讜 诇讬诪讗 专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讜专讘讬 讗诇注讝专 讘驻诇讜讙转讗 讚专讘讬 讗诇讬注讝专 讜专讘谞谉 拽讗 诪讬驻诇讙讬 讚转谞谉 讛讙讜讝诇 砖讚讛 诪讞讘讬专讜 讜砖讟驻讛 谞讛专 讞讬讬讘 诇讛注诪讬讚 诇讜 砖讚讛 讚讘专讬 专讘讬 讗诇讬注讝专 讜讞讻诪讬诐 讗讜诪专讬诐 讗讜诪专 诇讜 讛专讬 砖诇讱 诇驻谞讬讱

Rabbi Yirmeya said to Rabbi Abbahu: Shall we say that Rabbi Yo岣nan and Rabbi Elazar disagree with regard to the issue that is the subject of the dispute of Rabbi Eliezer and the Rabbis? As we learned in a baraita: In the case of one who robbed another of a field and then a river flooded it, he is liable to provide the field鈥檚 owner with a different field, since the value of the flooded field was significantly decreased and the robber must return the value of that which he stole; this is the statement of Rabbi Eliezer. And the Rabbis say: He is exempt from doing so, as he can say to the owner: That which is yours is before you. The robber may return the flooded field to its owner without reimbursing him for the loss in its value, since according to the Rabbis, land cannot be stolen. Consequently, the field is considered to be in the possession of its owner, and the thief is not obligated in the mitzva of returning a stolen item.

讜讗诪专讬谞谉 讘诪讗讬 拽诪讬驻诇讙讬 专讘讬 讗诇讬注讝专 讚专讬砖 专讘讜讬讬 讜诪讬注讜讟讬 讜专讘谞谉 讚专砖讬 讻诇诇讬 讜驻专讟讬

Rabbi Yirmeya continues: And we say: With regard to what do they disagree? Rabbi Eliezer interprets the verses that discuss an oath on a deposit and the mitzva to return stolen items according to the hermeneutical principle of amplifications and restrictions, and the Rabbis interpret them according to the hermeneutical principle of generalizations and details.

专讘讬 讗诇讬注讝专 讚专讬砖 专讘讜讬讬 讜诪讬注讜讟讬 讜讻讞砖 讘注诪讬转讜 专讬讘讛 讘驻拽讚讜谉 讗讜 讘转砖讜诪转 讬讚 诪讬注讟 讗讜 诪讻诇 讗砖专 讬砖讘注 讞讝专 讜专讬讘讛

He explains: Rabbi Eliezer interprets the verses: 鈥淚f anyone sin, and commit a trespass against the Lord, and deal falsely with his neighbor in a matter of deposit or of pledge, or of robbery, or have oppressed his neighbor鈥r of anything about which he has sworn falsely, he shall restore it in full鈥 (Leviticus 5:21鈥24), according to the hermeneutical principle of amplifications and restrictions. The phrase 鈥渋f anyone sin, and commit a trespass against the Lord, and deal falsely with his neighbor鈥 amplified the halakha. When the verse states: 鈥淚n a matter of deposit or of pledge,鈥 it has restricted the halakha to the case of a deposit. When the verse then states: 鈥淥r of anything about which he has sworn falsely, he shall restore it in full,鈥 it has then amplified the halakha again.

专讬讘讛 讜诪讬注讟 讜专讬讘讛 专讬讘讛 讛讻诇 诪讗讬 专讬讘讛 专讬讘讛 讻诇 诪讬诇讬 讜诪讗讬 诪讬注讟 诪讬注讟 砖讟专讜转

Accordingly, as the Torah amplified and then restricted and then amplified again, it has amplified the halakha to include everything except for the specific matter excluded by the restriction. What is included due to the fact that the verse has amplified the halakha? The verse has amplified the halakha to include everything that one steals. And what is excluded due to the fact that the verse restricted the halakha? It restricted the halakha to exclude financial documents, which are dissimilar to a deposit in that their value is not intrinsic but rather due to their function. Consequently, according to Rabbi Eliezer, land that was stolen is included in the halakhot stated in these verses, and one who steals land must reimburse the field鈥檚 owner.

讜专讘谞谉 讚专砖讬 讻诇诇讬 讜驻专讟讬 讜讻讞砖 讘注诪讬转讜 讻诇诇 讘驻拽讚讜谉 讗讜 讘转砖讜诪转 讬讚 讗讜 讘讙讝诇 驻专讟 讗讜 诪讻诇 讗砖专 讬砖讘注 注诇讬讜 讞讝专 讜讻诇诇 讻诇诇 讜驻专讟 讜讻诇诇 讗讬 讗转讛 讚谉 讗诇讗 讻注讬谉 讛驻专讟

And the Rabbis interpreted these verses according to the hermeneutical principle of generalizations and details. The phrase 鈥渁nd deal falsely with his neighbor鈥 is a generalization, while the subsequent phrase, 鈥渋n a matter of deposit or of pledge, or of robbery,鈥 is a detail. When the verse then states: 鈥淥r of anything about which he has sworn falsely, he shall restore it in full,鈥 it has then generalized again. In the case of a generalization, and a detail, and a generalization, you may deduce that the verse is referring only to items similar to the detail.

诪讛 讛驻专讟 诪驻讜专砖 讚讘专 讛诪讟诇讟诇 讜讙讜驻讜 诪诪讜谉 讗祝 讻诇 讚讘专 讛诪讟诇讟诇 讜讙讜驻讜 诪诪讜谉 讬爪讗讜 拽专拽注讜转 砖讗讬谉 诪讟诇讟诇 讬爪讗讜 注讘讚讬诐 砖讛讜拽砖讜 诇拽专拽注讜转 讬爪讗讜 砖讟专讜转 砖讗祝 注诇 驻讬 砖诪讟诇讟诇讬谉 讗讬谉 讙讜驻谉 诪诪讜谉

Accordingly, just as the detail, i.e., a deposit, is explicitly a case of movable property and has intrinsic monetary value, so too, the verse includes anything that is movable property and has intrinsic monetary value. Consequently, land has been excluded, as it is not movable property. Canaanite slaves have been excluded, as they are compared to land with regard to many areas of halakha. Financial documents have been excluded because although they are movable property, they do not have intrinsic monetary value.

诪讗谉 讚诪讞讬讬讘 讻专讘讬 讗诇讬注讝专 讜诪讗谉 讚驻讟专 讻专讘谞谉

Rabbi Yirmeya concludes: Shall we say that the one who deems the witnesses liable in a case of an oath of testimony concerning land, i.e., Rabbi Elazar, holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer, that land is included in the mitzva of returning stolen property and in the halakhot of an oath on a deposit, and by extension, in the halakhot of an oath of testimony; and the one who deems them exempt, i.e., Rabbi Yo岣nan, holds in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, that land is excluded from these halakhot?

讗诪专 诇讬讛 诇讗 诪讗谉 讚诪讞讬讬讘 讻专讘讬 讗诇讬注讝专 讜诪讗谉 讚驻讟专 讗诪专 诇讱 讘讛讗 讗驻讬诇讜 专讘讬 讗诇讬注讝专 诪讜讚讛 讚专讞诪谞讗 讗诪专 诪讻诇 讜诇讗 讛讻诇

Rabbi Abbahu said to Rabbi Yirmeya: No, the two disagreements do not completely correspond. The one who deems the witnesses liable must in fact hold in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer. But the one who deems them exempt could have said to you: In this case of an oath of testimony, even Rabbi Eliezer concedes that they are exempt from bringing an offering, as the Merciful One states: 鈥淥f anything about which he has sworn falsely,鈥 and not: Everything about which he has sworn falsely. The verse indicates that only certain items are included in the halakhot of an oath of testimony. Therefore, land is excluded, since it is dissimilar to the specific instances mentioned in the verse.

讗诪专 专讘 驻驻讗 诪砖诪讬讛 讚专讘讗 诪转谞讬转讬谉 谞诪讬 讚讬拽讗 讚拽转谞讬 讙谞讘转 讗转 砖讜专讬 讜讛讜讗 讗讜诪专 诇讗 讙谞讘转讬 诪砖讘讬注讱 讗谞讬 讜讗诪专 讗诪谉 讞讬讬讘 讜讗讬诇讜 讙谞讘转 讗转 注讘讚讬 诇讗 拽转谞讬 诪讗讬 讟注诪讗 诇讗讜 诪砖讜诐 讚注讘讚 讗讬转拽砖 诇拽专拽注讜转 讜讗讬谉 诪讘讬讗讬谉 拽专讘谉 注诇 讻驻讬专转 砖注讘讜讚 拽专拽注讜转

Rav Pappa said in the name of Rava: The mishna is also precisely formulated, as it teaches: In a case where one accuses another: You stole my ox, and the defendant says: I did not steal your ox, if the claimant replied: I administer an oath to you, and the defendant said: Amen, he is liable. The mishna discusses a claim of a stolen ox, whereas it does not teach a claim of: You stole my Canaanite slave. What is the reason? Is it not due to the fact that a Canaanite slave is compared to land, and one is not liable to bring an offering for a denial in a matter of a lien on land?

讗诪专 专讘 驻驻讬 诪砖诪讬讛 讚专讘讗 讗讬诪讗 住讬驻讗 讝讛 讛讻诇诇 讻诇 讛诪砖诇诐 注诇 驻讬 注爪诪讜 讞讬讬讘 讜砖讗讬谞讜 诪砖诇诐 注诇 驻讬 注爪诪讜 驻讟讜专 讝讛 讛讻诇诇 诇讗转讜讬讬 诪讗讬 诇讗讜 诇讗转讜讬讬 讙谞讘转 讗转 注讘讚讬

Rav Pappi said in the name of Rava: There is no proof from the mishna, as say the last clause of the mishna: This is the principle: For any claim that the defendant would have to pay based on his own admission, he is liable. And for any claim that he would not pay based on his own admission, but by the testimony of witnesses, he is exempt, even if he denies the claim against him and takes an oath to that effect. Rav Pappi asks: What is added by the phrase: This is the principle? Is it not to include even an accusation of: You stole my Canaanite slave, in the halakha of oaths on a deposit?

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