יבמות צב

יבמות צב

כֹּל קָלָא דְּבָתַר נִשּׂוּאִין לָא חָיְישִׁינַן! מַהוּ דְּתֵימָא: הוֹאִיל וַאֲתַאי לְבֵי דִינָא וּשְׁרֵינַן, כְּקָלָא דְּקַמֵּי נִשּׂוּאִין דָּמֵי וְתִיתְּסַר, קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן.

We are not concerned about any rumor after marriage. If a rumor spread about a woman after her marriage that she was forbidden to her husband, the court takes no notice of these reports. The Gemara answers: There is a novel aspect to this teaching: Lest you say that since she came to the court and they permitted her, the very fact that her case had to be discussed indicates that her status is not fully established, and consequently one might think that it should be considered like a rumor before marriage, and she should therefore be forbidden, Rav Ashi therefore teaches us that even in this case, once she is married the court takes no notice of unsubstantiated rumors.

נִיסֵּת עַל פִּי בֵּית דִּין תֵּצֵא וְכוּ׳. אָמַר זְעֵירִי: לֵיתַהּ לְמַתְנִיתִין, מִדִּתְנַן בֵּי מִדְרְשָׁא. דְּתָנֵי בֵּי מִדְרְשָׁא: הוֹרוּ בֵּית דִּין שֶׁשָּׁקְעָה חַמָּה, וּלְבַסּוֹף זָרְחָה — אֵין זוֹ הוֹרָאָה, אֶלָּא טָעוּת.

§ The mishna further taught that if she married by permission of the court she must leave him, but she is exempt from bringing a sin-offering. On this issue, Ze’eiri said: The mishna is not accepted, and this is derived from what was taught in the study hall, as it was taught in a baraita in the study hall: If the court ruled that the sun had set at the conclusion of Shabbat, which means it is permitted to perform labor, and later the sun shone, this is not a ruling for which the court is to blame, but an error. Consequently, the court does not have to bring an offering for the unwitting communal sin. Rather, each individual is liable to bring a separate offering. Here too, although the woman married with the consent of the court, they did not issue a mistaken ruling of halakha but simply erred with regard to the facts. She is therefore an unwitting sinner and is liable to bring an offering.

וְרַב נַחְמָן אָמַר: הוֹרָאָה הִיא.

And conversely, Rav Naḥman said that the court’s permission is considered a ruling that renders them liable to bring an offering for an unwitting communal sin.

אָמַר רַב נַחְמָן: תֵּדַע דְּהוֹרָאָה הִיא, דִּבְכׇל הַתּוֹרָה כּוּלָּהּ עֵד אֶחָד לָא מְהֵימַן וְהָכָא מְהֵימַן, מַאי טַעְמָא? לָאו מִשּׁוּם דְּהוֹרָאָה הִיא. אָמַר רָבָא: תֵּדַע דְּטָעוּת הוּא, דְּאִילּוּ הוֹרוּ בֵּית דִּין בְּחֵלֶב וּבְדָם לְהֶיתֵּירָא, וַהֲדַר חֲזוֹ טַעְמָא לְאִיסּוּרָא, כִּי הָדְרִי וְאָמְרִי לְהֶיתֵּירָא — לָא מַשְׁגְּחִינַן בְּהוּ.

Rav Naḥman said: You can know that her permission to marry is a ruling, as in the entire Torah one witness is not deemed credible, and yet here he is deemed credible. What is the reason for this? Is it not because it is considered a ruling, i.e., she does not rely on the witness but on the decision of the court? By contrast, Rava said that we can know that her permission to marry is an error. His reasoning is that had the court ruled with regard to forbidden fat or with regard to blood that it is permitted, and they went back and saw a reason to prohibit it, if they subsequently retract and say that it is permitted we take no notice of them. If they did not find a conclusive proof but merely offered a new argument, this claim does not cancel the earlier ruling that the substance is forbidden.

וְאִילּוּ, הֵיכָא דַּאֲתָא עֵד אֶחָד — שְׁרֵינָא. אֲתוֹ תְּרֵי — אֲסַרְנָא. כִּי הֲדַר אֲתָא עֵד אַחֲרִינָא — שָׁרֵינַן לַהּ. מַאי טַעְמָא, לָאו מִשּׁוּם דְּטָעוּת הוּא?!

Whereas in the case of marriage, when one witness comes the court permits her, and when two witnesses subsequently come and testify that her husband is alive, they render her forbidden. When one other witness again comes forward, claiming that the husband is dead, they permit her. What is the reason for this? Is it not because it is considered an error of the court, as they did not issue their rulings based on their own reasoning but in reliance on the facts they had garnered from the witnesses? It is therefore considered a factual error, not a mistaken ruling.

וְאַף רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר סָבַר דְּטָעוּת הוּא, דְּתַנְיָא, רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר אוֹמֵר: יִקּוֹב הַדִּין אֶת הָהָר, וְתָבִיא חַטַּאת שְׁמֵינָה. אִי אָמְרַתְּ בִּשְׁלָמָא דְּטָעוּת הוּא — מִשּׁוּם הָכִי מַתְיָא קׇרְבָּן, אֶלָּא אִי אָמְרַתְּ דְּהוֹרָאָה הִיא, אַמַּאי מַתְיָא קׇרְבָּן?

The Gemara adds: And Rabbi Eliezer also maintains that the ruling of the court is an error, as it is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Eliezer says: If a woman married by permission of the court and it later turned out that her husband was alive, let the law pierce the mountain, i.e., the matter must be fully investigated. If it turns out that the ruling of the court is incorrect, it is nullified and she brings a choice sin-offering. Granted, if you say that it is an error, it is due to that reason that she must bring an offering. However, if you say it is a ruling, why does she bring an offering? It is the court that should be liable to bring an offering for its incorrect ruling.

וְדִלְמָא קָסָבַר רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר יָחִיד שֶׁעָשָׂה בְּהוֹרָאַת בֵּית דִּין חַיָּיב?! אִם כֵּן, מָה ״יִקּוֹב הַדִּין אֶת הָהָר״.

The Gemara asks: But perhaps Rabbi Eliezer maintains that an individual who acted by ruling of the court is also liable to bring an offering, and this is why he obligates her to bring an offering, despite the fact that she went ahead with the consent of the court. The Gemara refutes this suggestion: If so, what need is there for the special mention of the rationale: Let the law pierce the mountain? He should simply have said that she is liable to bring an offering. Rather, Rabbi Eliezer evidently maintains that in general an individual does not have to bring an offering for a sin he committed based on the ruling of a court. Here, however, she must bring a sin-offering because there was an error with regard to the facts.

הוֹרוּהָ בֵּית דִּין לְהִנָּשֵׂא כּוּ׳. מַאי ״קִלְקְלָה״? רַבִּי אֶלְיעָזָר אוֹמֵר: זִינְּתָה. רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן אָמַר: אַלְמָנָה לְכֹהֵן גָּדוֹל, גְּרוּשָׁה וַחֲלוּצָה לְכֹהֵן הֶדְיוֹט.

§ The mishna taught that if the court instructed her to marry, and she went and ruined herself, she is liable to bring an offering. The Gemara asks: What is the meaning of: Ruined herself? Rabbi Eliezer says: She engaged in licentious sexual relations with a man, i.e., intercourse not for the purpose of marriage. Rabbi Yoḥanan said: It means that she married in a prohibited manner, e.g., a widow to a High Priest, or a divorcée or a yevama who had performed ḥalitza [ḥalutza] to a common priest.

מַאן דְּאָמַר זִינְּתָה — כׇּל שֶׁכֵּן אַלְמָנָה לְכֹהֵן גָּדוֹל. מַאן דְּאָמַר אַלְמָנָה לְכֹהֵן גָּדוֹל, אֲבָל זִינְּתָה — לָא. מַאי טַעְמָא — [דְּאָמְרָה] אַתּוּן הוּא דְּשַׁוִּיתוּן פְּנוּיָה.

The Gemara elaborates: According to the one who says that she engaged in licentious sexual relations, she is all the more so liable to bring an offering if she is a widow who had sexual relations with a High Priest, as she performed an act prohibited by Torah law. Conversely, according to the one who says that the mishna is speaking of a widow who engaged in relations with a High Priest, it is only in that case that she must bring an offering; however, if she engaged in licentious sexual relations she is not liable to bring an offering. What is the reason? As she can say: It is you who deemed me unattached, and although my behavior was unseemly, I may live with whomever I choose as a single woman.

תַּנְיָא כְּווֹתֵיהּ דְּרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: הוֹרוּהָ בֵּית דִּין לְהִנָּשֵׂא וְהָלְכָה וְקִלְקְלָה, כְּגוֹן: אַלְמָנָה לְכֹהֵן גָּדוֹל, גְּרוּשָׁה וַחֲלוּצָה לְכֹהֵן הֶדְיוֹט — חַיֶּיבֶת בְּקׇרְבָּן עַל כׇּל בִּיאָה וּבִיאָה, דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר,

The Gemara comments: It is taught in a baraita in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan: If the court ruled that she may marry, and she went and ruined herself, for example a widow who engaged in intercourse with a High Priest, or a divorcée or a ḥalutza who engaged in intercourse with a common priest, she is liable to bring an offering for each and every sexual act, as each is a separate transgression. This is the statement of Rabbi Elazar.

וַחֲכָמִים אוֹמְרִים: קׇרְבָּן אֶחָד עַל הַכֹּל. וּמוֹדִים חֲכָמִים לְרַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר שֶׁאִם נִשֵּׂאת לַחֲמִשָּׁה בְּנֵי אָדָם — שֶׁחַיֶּיבֶת בְּקׇרְבָּן עַל כׇּל אֶחָד וְאֶחָד, הוֹאִיל וְגוּפִין מוּחְלָקִין.

And the Rabbis say that she brings one offering for all of them, as she performed them all in a single lapse of awareness. And the Rabbis concede to Rabbi Elazar that if a married woman married in error, e.g., to five people, that she is liable to bring an offering for each and every one of them, since they are separate bodies. She is obligated to bring an offering for each separate man with whom she engaged in sexual relations.

מַתְנִי׳ הָאִשָּׁה שֶׁהָלַךְ בַּעְלָהּ וּבְנָהּ לִמְדִינַת הַיָּם, וּבָאוּ וְאָמְרוּ לָהּ: מֵת בַּעְלִיךְ וְאַחַר כָּךְ מֵת בְּנֵךְ, וְנִשֵּׂאת, וְאַחַר כָּךְ אָמְרוּ לָהּ: חִילּוּף הָיוּ הַדְּבָרִים — תֵּצֵא, וְהַוָּלָד רִאשׁוֹן וְאַחֲרוֹן מַמְזֵר.

MISHNA: With regard to a woman whose husband and child went overseas, and witnesses came and said to her: Your husband died and afterward your child died, she does not require levirate marriage, as she had a child when her husband died. And for this reason she married another man. And if afterward they said to her that the matters were reversed, i.e., the child died before the husband, which means that she did require levirate marriage, she is therefore a yevama who married a stranger without ḥalitza and she must consequently leave her second husband. And with regard to the first child, the one born before they heard about the reversal, and the last one, born after they realized who actually died first, each of these children is a mamzer.

אָמְרוּ לָהּ: מֵת בְּנֵךְ וְאַחַר כָּךְ מֵת בַּעְלִיךְ, וְנִתְיַיבְּמָה, וְאַחַר כָּךְ אָמְרוּ לָהּ: חִילּוּף הָיוּ הַדְּבָרִים — תֵּצֵא, וְהַוָּלָד רִאשׁוֹן וְאַחֲרוֹן מַמְזֵר. אָמְרוּ לָהּ: מֵת בַּעְלִיךְ וְנִיסֵּת, וְאַחַר כָּךְ אָמְרוּ לָהּ: קַיָּים הָיָה וָמֵת — תֵּצֵא, וְהַוָּלָד רִאשׁוֹן — מַמְזֵר, וְהָאַחֲרוֹן — אֵינוֹ מַמְזֵר.

Conversely, if they said to her: Your child died and afterward your husband died, and she therefore entered into levirate marriage, and afterward they said to her that the matters were reversed, which means she married her husband’s brother when there was no obligation of levirate marriage, she must leave her husband, and the first child and the last one are each a mamzer. If they said to her: Your husband died, and she married, and afterward they said to her that he was alive at the time of her marriage and he later died, she must leave the second husband. And the first child, born when her original husband was still alive, is a mamzer, and the last one, born after his death, is not a mamzer.

אָמְרוּ לָהּ: מֵת בַּעְלִיךְ, וְנִתְקַדְּשָׁה, וְאַחַר כָּךְ בָּא בַּעְלָהּ — מוּתֶּרֶת לַחְזוֹר לוֹ. אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁנָּתַן לָהּ אַחֲרוֹן גֵּט — לֹא פְּסָלָהּ מִן הַכְּהוּנָּה. אֶת זוֹ דָּרַשׁ רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר בֶּן מַתְיָא: ״וְאִשָּׁה גְּרוּשָׁה מֵאִישָׁהּ״ — וְלֹא מֵאִישׁ שֶׁאֵינוֹ אִישָׁהּ.

If they said to her: Your husband died, and she became betrothed to another man, and afterward her husband came, she is permitted to return to him, as betrothal alone does not render her forbidden to her husband. Furthermore, although the last man, i.e., her betrothed, gave her a bill of divorce, he has not thereby disqualified her from marrying into the priesthood. She was never his wife, for the betrothal was invalid, and a bill of divorce given to the wife of another man does not disqualify her. This was taught by Rabbi Elazar ben Matya: The verse states with regard to priests: “Neither shall they take a woman divorced from her husband” (Leviticus 21:7), which indicates: And not one who was divorced from a man who is not her husband, e.g., the second man in this case.

גְּמָ׳ מַאי רִאשׁוֹן וּמַאי אַחֲרוֹן? אִילֵּימָא רִאשׁוֹן — לִפְנֵי שְׁמוּעָה, וְאַחֲרוֹן — לְאַחַר שְׁמוּעָה, לִיתְנֵי: הַוָּלָד מַמְזֵר!

GEMARA: The Gemara asks a question with regard to the first section of the mishna: What is the meaning of first child and what is the meaning of last child in this context? If we say that the first means the one born before her hearing that the report was erroneous, and the last means the one born after she heard, let him teach simply: The offspring is a mamzer, as there is no difference between the two cases.

מִשּׁוּם דְּקָבָעֵי לְמִיתְנֵי סֵיפָא: אָמְרוּ לָהּ מֵת בַּעְלִיךְ וְנִשֵּׂאת, וְאַחַר כָּךְ אָמְרוּ לָהּ קַיָּים הָיָה וּמֵת, הָרִאשׁוֹן מַמְזֵר וְהָאַחֲרוֹן אֵינוֹ מַמְזֵר — תְּנָא נָמֵי רֵישָׁא רִאשׁוֹן וְאַחֲרוֹן מַמְזֵר.

The Gemara explains that because the tanna wanted to teach in the latter clause: If they said to her your husband died, and she married, and afterward they said to her that he was alive and he later died, the first child is a mamzer and the last one is not a mamzer, he also taught in the first clause: The first and the last are each a mamzer, despite the fact that in this case it makes no difference whether the child was born before or after she heard.

תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: זוֹ דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא, שֶׁהָיָה אוֹמֵר: אֵין קִדּוּשִׁין תּוֹפְסִין בְּחַיָּיבֵי לָאוִין. אֲבָל חֲכָמִים אוֹמְרִים: אֵין מַמְזֵר מִיְּבָמָה. וְלֵימָא: אֵין מַמְזֵר מֵחַיָּיבֵי לָאוִין!

§ The Sages taught: This mishna is the statement of Rabbi Akiva, who would say that betrothal does not take effect for those liable for violating regular prohibitions, and therefore the child of a yevama who transgressed a prohibition by marrying someone else is a mamzer. However, the Rabbis say that there is no mamzer from a yevama. The Gemara asks: And let the Rabbis say, as a principle: There is no mamzer from those liable for violating regular prohibitions.

הַאי תַּנָּא — הָךְ תַּנָּא דְּרַבִּי עֲקִיבָא הוּא, דְּאָמַר: מֵחַיָּיבֵי לָאוִין דִּשְׁאֵר הָוֵי מַמְזֵר, מֵחַיָּיבֵי לָאוִין גְּרִידִי — לָא הָוֵי מַמְזֵר. אָמַר רַב יְהוּדָה

The Gemara answers: This tanna called the Rabbis is in fact another tanna citing the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, who claims that Rabbi Akiva said that a child born from those liable for violating prohibitions proscribing sexual relations with close relatives is a mamzer, but one born from those liable for violating regular prohibitions, i.e., a prohibition that does not involve a family relationship, such as the prohibition that “the wife of the dead man shall not be married outside of the family to one not of his kin” (Deuteronomy 25:5), is not a mamzer. Rav Yehuda said

אָמַר רַב: מִנַּיִן שֶׁאֵין קִדּוּשִׁין תּוֹפְסִין בִּיבָמָה, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר: ״לֹא תִהְיֶה אֵשֶׁת הַמֵּת הַחוּצָה לְאִישׁ זָר״ — לֹא תְּהֵא בָּהּ הֲוָיָה לְזָר.

that Rav said: From where is it derived that betrothal by another man does not take effect with a yevama? As it is stated: “The wife of the dead man shall not be married outside of the family to one not of his kin” (Deuteronomy 25:5), which indicates: She shall not have the possibility of becoming married to one not of his kin, i.e., his betrothal is of no account.

וּשְׁמוּאֵל אָמַר: בַּעֲנִיּוּתֵינוּ, צְרִיכָה גֵּט. מְסַפְּקָא לֵיהּ לִשְׁמוּאֵל הַאי ״לָא תִהְיֶה אֵשֶׁת הַמֵּת״, אִי לְלָאו הוּא דַּאֲתָא, אִי דְּלָא תָּפְסִי בַּהּ קִדּוּשִׁין הוּא דַּאֲתָא.

And Shmuel said: In our poverty of knowledge, as we do not fully understand the verse, she requires a bill of divorce. The Gemara explains: Shmuel was uncertain with regard to this verse: “The wife of the dead man shall not be married outside,” whether it comes for a prohibition, i.e., the woman is prohibited from marrying another man but the betrothal of that other man is effective, or whether it comes to teach that betrothal by any other man does not take effect with her.

אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַב מָרִי בַּר רָחֵל לְרַב אָשֵׁי, הָכִי אָמַר אַמֵּימָר: הֲלָכָה כְּווֹתֵיהּ דִּשְׁמוּאֵל. אָמַר רַב אָשֵׁי: הַשְׁתָּא דְּאָמַר אַמֵּימָר הִלְכְתָא כְּווֹתֵיהּ דִּשְׁמוּאֵל — אִם הָיָה יְבָמָהּ כֹּהֵן, חוֹלֵץ לָהּ, וְשַׁרְיָא לֵיהּ.

Rav Mari bar Raḥel said to Rav Ashi that Ameimar said as follows: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Shmuel. Rav Ashi said: Now that Ameimar said that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Shmuel, who maintains that one who betroths a yevama before she has performed ḥalitza must give her a bill of divorce, if her yavam was a priest, he performs ḥalitza with her, as she is forbidden to him after the man who betrothed her gave her a bill of divorce, and she is thereby permitted to the man to whom she was betrothed.

אִיתְּגוֹרֵי אִיתְּגַר, אִם כֵּן מָצִינוּ חוֹטֵא נִשְׂכָּר! אֶלָּא, אִם הָיָה יְבָמָהּ יִשְׂרָאֵל, נוֹתֵן לָהּ שֵׁנִי גֵּט, וְהוּתְּרָה לוֹ.

The Gemara expresses surprise at this ruling: But in that case, she thereby gains from her prohibited betrothal, as she may subsequently marry the man who betrothed her illegally. If so, we find a sinner benefiting from his transgression. Rather, the Gemara emends the teaching: If her yavam was a regular Israelite, this second man who betrothed her must give her a bill of divorce, and she is permitted to the yavam, as a non-priest may marry a divorcée.

אָמַר רַב גִּידֵּל אָמַר רַב חִיָּיא בַּר יוֹסֵף אָמַר רַב: יְבָמָה — קִדּוּשִׁין אֵין בָּהּ, נִשּׂוּאִין יֵשׁ בָּהּ. אִי קִדּוּשִׁין אֵין בָּהּ — נִשּׂוּאִין נָמֵי אֵין בָּהּ! אֵימָא: קִדּוּשִׁין וְנִשּׂוּאִין אֵין בָּהּ.

§ Rav Giddel said that Rav Ḥiyya bar Yosef said that Rav said: With regard to a yevama, betrothal does not apply to her, but marriage does apply to her. The Gemara expresses puzzlement: If betrothal does not apply to her, marriage also should not apply to her. How can marriage take effect if the earlier and less binding stage of betrothal is of no consequence? Rather, emend the above statement and say: Neither betrothal nor marriage apply to her.

וְאִיבָּעֵית אֵימָא: מַאי ״נִשּׂוּאִין יֵשׁ בָּהּ״ — בִּזְנוּת, כִּדְרַב הַמְנוּנָא. דְּאָמַר רַב הַמְנוּנָא: שׁוֹמֶרֶת יָבָם שֶׁזִּינְּתָה — אֲסוּרָה לִיבָמָהּ.

And if you wish, say a different explanation. What is the meaning of the phrase: Marriage does apply to her? It is referring to a case of licentious sexual relations. In other words, although Rav maintains that betrothal is ineffective for her, if she entered the wedding canopy with another man and had relations with him, her status changes and she is forbidden to the yavam. This is in accordance with the opinion of Rav Hamnuna, as Rav Hamnuna said that a widow awaiting her yavam who committed an act of licentious sexual relations is forbidden to her yavam.

וְאִי בָּעֵית אֵימָא, לְעוֹלָם כְּדַאֲמַרַן מֵעִיקָּרָא: קִדּוּשִׁין אֵין בָּהּ, נִשּׂוּאִין יֵשׁ בָּהּ. דְּמִיחַלְּפָא בְּאִשָּׁה שֶׁהָלַךְ בַּעְלָהּ לִמְדִינַת הַיָּם.

And if you wish, say: Actually, it is as we said initially, that betrothal does not apply to her but marriage does apply to her. However, this does not mean that marriage is actually effective. Rather, the halakha is that he must give her a bill of divorce, as people might confuse this case with that of a woman whose husband went overseas. The Sages decreed that he must give her a bill of divorce so that people would not say that a woman who remarried after hearing that her husband had died likewise does not require a bill of divorce.

אָמַר רַבִּי יַנַּאי: בַּחֲבוּרָה, נִמְנוּ וְגָמְרוּ: אֵין קִדּוּשִׁין תּוֹפְסִין בִּיבָמָה. אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: רַבִּי, לֹא מִשְׁנָתֵנוּ הִיא זוֹ? דִּתְנַן, הָאוֹמֵר לָאִשָּׁה: ״הֲרֵי אַתְּ מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת לִי לְאַחַר שֶׁאֶתְגַּיֵּיר״, ״לְאַחַר שֶׁתִּתְגַּיְּירִי״, ״לְאַחַר שֶׁאֶשְׁתַּחְרֵר״, ״לְאַחַר שֶׁתִּשְׁתַּחְרְרִי״, ״לְאַחַר שֶׁיָּמוּת בַּעְלִיךְ״, ״לְאַחַר שֶׁתָּמוּת אֲחוֹתִיךְ״, אוֹ ״לְאַחַר שֶׁיַּחְלוֹץ לִיךְ יְבָמִיךְ״ — אֵינָהּ מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת. אֲמַר לֵיהּ: אִי לָאו דְּדַלַּאי לָךְ חַסְפָּא, מִי מַשְׁכַּחַתְּ מַרְגָּנִיתָא תּוּתֵיהּ?

§ Rabbi Yannai said: In the group of Sages who discussed this matter, they counted and concluded that betrothal by another man does not take effect with a yevama. Rabbi Yoḥanan said to him: My teacher, is this not taught in a mishna that states that betrothal is of no account for such a woman? As we learned in a mishna (Bava Metzia 16b): With regard to one who says to a woman: You are hereby betrothed to me after I convert; after you convert; after I am freed from slavery; after you are freed; after your husband dies; after your sister dies; or after your yavam performs ḥalitza with you, she is not betrothed. The reason for the above ruling is that he is considered to be attempting to acquire an entity that is not yet in existence, as the betrothal cannot take effect at that point in time. This indicates that betrothal is entirely ineffective for a yevama until she performs ḥalitza. Rabbi Yannai said to Rabbi Yoḥanan: Had I not lifted the earthenware shard for you, would you have discovered the pearl [marganita] beneath it? It was only after I informed you of the halakha that you were able to cite a proof for it from a mishna.

אֲמַר לֵיהּ רֵישׁ לָקִישׁ: אִי לָאו דְּקַלְּסָךְ גַּבְרָא רַבָּה, הֲוָה אָמֵינָא לָךְ אֲנָא: מַתְנִיתִין רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא הִיא, דְּאָמַר: אֵין קִידּוּשִׁין תּוֹפְסִין בְּחַיָּיבֵי לָאוִין.

Sometime later, Reish Lakish said to Rav Yoḥanan: If it were not for the fact that a great man, Rabbi Yannai, praised you, I would say that this is no proof, as it is possible that the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, who said that betrothal does not take effect for those liable for violating regular prohibitions, and therefore it is not effective with a yevama. However, according to the opinion of the Rabbis, betrothal is effective for this woman, as is the case with all regular prohibitions.

וְאִי רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא, כִּי אָמַר לַהּ ״לְאַחַר שֶׁיַּחֲלוֹץ לִיךְ יְבָמִיךְ״ לִיתְפְּסוּ בָּהּ קִידּוּשֵׁי! דְּהָא שָׁמְעִינַן לֵיהּ לְרַבִּי עֲקִיבָא דְּאָמַר: אָדָם מַקְנֶה דָּבָר שֶׁלֹּא בָּא לָעוֹלָם. דִּתְנַן:

The Gemara asks: And if it is the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, when he said to her: After your yavam performs ḥalitza for you, let the betrothal take effect with her, as we have heard that Rabbi Akiva said that a man can transfer an entity that has not yet come into the world. In other words, Rabbi Akiva is of the opinion that an acquisition can take effect for something not yet in existence. If so, even if the betrothal cannot take effect now, it should be valid after she has performed ḥalitza. The proof that this is indeed Rabbi Akiva’s opinion is as we learned in a mishna (Ketubot 59a):