זבחים קח

זבחים קח

רֹאשׁ בֶּן יוֹנָה שֶׁאֵין בּוֹ כְּזַיִת, וּמֶלַח מַשְׁלִימוֹ לִכְזַיִת; מַהוּ?

the head of a pigeon burnt offering that does not have on it an olive-bulk of flesh, but the salt that adheres to it, after it was salted in accordance with the requirement to salt it (see Leviticus 2:13), completes the measure to make an olive-bulk, what is the halakha? Is one liable for offering it up outside?

אֲמַר לֵיהּ רָבָא מִפַּרְזִקְיָא לְרַב אָשֵׁי: לָאו הַיְינוּ פְּלוּגְתַּיְיהוּ דְּרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן וְרֵישׁ לָקִישׁ? תִּיבְּעֵי לְרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן, וְתִיבְּעֵי לְרֵישׁ לָקִישׁ;

Rava from Parzakya said to Rav Ashi: Is this not identical to the dispute between Rabbi Yoḥanan and Reish Lakish with regard to a bone attached to sacrificial flesh? Rav Ashi responded: No. The dilemma can be raised according to Rabbi Yoḥanan and the dilemma can be raised according to Reish Lakish.

תִּיבְּעֵי לְרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן – עַד כָּאן לָא קָאָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן הָתָם, אֶלָּא עֶצֶם – דְּמִינָא דְּבָשָׂר הוּא; אֲבָל מֶלַח, דְּלָאו מִינָא דְּבַר יוֹנָה הוּא – לָא. תִּיבְּעֵי לְרֵישׁ לָקִישׁ – עַד כָּאן לָא קָאָמַר רֵישׁ לָקִישׁ הָתָם, אֶלָּא דְּאִי פָּרֵישׁ מִינֵּהּ לָאו מִצְוָה לְאַסּוֹקֵי; אֲבָל הָכָא, דְּאִי פָּרֵישׁ מִצְוָה לְאַסּוֹקֵי – לָא. אוֹ דִלְמָא לָא שְׁנָא?

The Gemara elaborates: The dilemma can be raised according to Rabbi Yoḥanan: Perhaps Rabbi Yoḥanan states his opinion only there, with regard to a bone, claiming that it contributes to the measure of an olive-bulk as it is of the same kind that flesh is, i.e., they are both animal parts. But in the case of salt, which is not of the same kind as a pigeon, perhaps it would not contribute to the measure. And the dilemma can also be raised according to Reish Lakish: Perhaps Reish Lakish states his opinion only there, with regard to a bone, claiming that it does not contribute to the measure of an olive-bulk, as if the bone separates from the flesh, there is no mitzva to offer the bone up on the altar. But here, with regard to salt, concerning which if it separates from the pigeon there is a mitzva to offer it up, he would not rule as he does concerning a bone attached to flesh. Or perhaps there is no difference between the cases.

תֵּיקוּ.

The Gemara concludes: The dilemma shall stand unresolved.

רַבִּי יוֹסֵי הַגְּלִילִי אוֹמֵר כּוּ׳.

§ The mishna teaches: Rabbi Yosei HaGelili says: If he slaughtered an offering inside the courtyard and then offered it up outside the courtyard, he is liable. But if he slaughtered it outside, thereby rendering it unfit, and then he offered it up outside, he is exempt for the offering up, as he offered up only an item that is unfit, and one is liable only for offering up an item that is fit to be offered up inside the Temple. The Rabbis said to him: According to your reasoning, even in a case where he slaughters it inside and offers it up outside, he should be exempt, since he rendered it unfit the moment that he took it outside the courtyard. Yet, in such a case, he is certainly liable for offering it up. So too, one who slaughters an offering outside and then offers it up outside is liable.

הֵשִׁיב רַבִּי תַּחַת רַבִּי יוֹסֵי הַגְּלִילִי: מָה לְשׁוֹחֵט בִּפְנִים וּמַעֲלֶה בַּחוּץ – שֶׁהָיְתָה לוֹ שְׁעַת הַכּוֹשֶׁר; תֹּאמַר בְּשׁוֹחֵט חוּץ וּמַעֲלֶה בַּחוּץ – שֶׁלֹּא הָיְתָה לוֹ שְׁעַת הַכּוֹשֶׁר?!

While a defense of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili’s opinion is not presented in the mishna, various possibilities are recorded in a baraita: Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi responded to this challenge on behalf of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili: What is notable about slaughtering an offering inside the courtyard and then offering it up outside? It is notable in that the offering had a period of fitness. Can you say the same about slaughtering an offering outside and then offering it up outside, where the offering never had a period of fitness? It was disqualified as soon as it was slaughtered and so it is reasonable that one is not liable for offering it up.

הֵשִׁיב רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר בְּרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן תַּחַת רַבִּי יוֹסֵי הַגְּלִילִי: מָה לְשׁוֹחֵט בִּפְנִים וּמַעֲלֶה בַּחוּץ – שֶׁכֵּן קוֹדֶשׁ מְקַבְּלוֹ; תֹּאמַר בְּשׁוֹחֵט בַּחוּץ – שֶׁאֵין קוֹדֶשׁ מְקַבְּלוֹ?!

Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, responded to this challenge on behalf of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili: What is notable about slaughtering an offering inside the courtyard and then offering it up outside? It is notable in that even though the offering was taken outside the courtyard and thereby disqualified, if it is, albeit unlawfully, placed on the altar, the sanctity of the altar renders the offering acceptable and it should not be removed from the altar because the disqualification occurred in sanctity, i.e., during the course of the Temple service (see 84a). Can you say the same about slaughtering an offering outside and then offering it up outside, where the disqualification did not occur in sanctity and so the sanctity of the altar does not render the offering acceptable? Therefore, even if it were placed there, it must be removed.

מַאי בֵּינַיְיהוּ? אָמַר זְעֵירִי: שְׁחִיטַת לַיְלָה אִיכָּא בֵּינַיְיהוּ.

The Gemara asks: What is the practical difference between these two responses? Ze’eiri said: The practical difference between them is a case of slaughtering an offering at night inside the courtyard and then offering it up outside. According to Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi’s response, one would be exempt, as slaughtering at night disqualifies the offering from its very outset; whereas according to the response of Rabbi Elazar, one would be liable as this is a disqualification that occurs in sanctity.

רַבָּה אָמַר: קַבָּלָה בִּכְלִי חוֹל אִיכָּא בֵּינַיְיהוּ.

Rabba said: The practical difference between them is a case in which, after slaughtering the offering in the courtyard, the collection of the blood was done there in a non-sacred vessel and then the animal was offered up outside the courtyard. According to Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi’s defense, one would be exempt, as collecting the blood in a non-sacred vessel disqualifies the offering from its very outset; whereas according to the response of Rabbi Elazar, one would be liable as this is a disqualification that occurs in sanctity.

טָמֵא שֶׁאָכַל בֵּין קוֹדֶשׁ כּוּ׳.

§ The mishna teaches: One who is ritually impure who ate sacrificial food, whether it was ritually impure sacrificial food or ritually pure sacrificial food, is liable to receive karet if he did so intentionally, and to bring a sliding-scale offering if he did so unwittingly. Rabbi Yosei HaGelili says: An impure person who ate pure sacrificial food is liable. But an impure person who ate impure sacrificial food is exempt, as he merely ate an impure item, and the prohibition against eating sacrificial food while one is impure applies only to pure sacrificial food. The Rabbis said to him: According to your logic, even in a case of an impure person who ate what had been pure sacrificial food, once he has touched it, he has thereby rendered it ritually impure. Yet, in such a case, he is certainly liable for eating it. So too, an impure person who ate impure sacrificial food is liable.

שַׁפִּיר קָאָמְרִי לֵיהּ רַבָּנַן לְרַבִּי יוֹסֵי הַגְּלִילִי!

The Gemara notes: The Rabbis are saying well to Rabbi Yosei HaGelili; why does Rabbi Yosei HaGelili disagree?

אָמַר רָבָא: כֹּל הֵיכָא דְּנִטְמָא טוּמְאַת הַגּוּף וְאַחַר כָּךְ נִטְמָא בָּשָׂר – דְּכוּלֵּי עָלְמָא לָא פְּלִיגִי דְּחַיָּיב, שֶׁכֵּן טוּמְאַת הַגּוּף בְּכָרֵת.

Rava said in elaboration of the dispute: Wherever one is first rendered impure with impurity of the body and then afterward the sacrificial meat is rendered impure, everyone agrees that he is liable if he eats the meat. This is because the prohibition due to the impurity of one’s body, which carries the punishment of karet, took effect while the meat was still ritually pure, and so this prohibition is not abrogated even when the meat is later rendered impure.

כִּי פְּלִיגִי – כְּשֶׁנִּטְמָא בָּשָׂר וְאַחַר כָּךְ נִטְמָא הַגּוּף.

When they disagree is in a case where first the meat is rendered impure and then afterward the person’s body is rendered impure. In general, once an item has become subject to a prohibition, it cannot then become subject to an additional prohibition. In this case, once the meat is rendered impure, it is prohibited for anyone to eat it, even if that person is ritually pure. If that person is later rendered impure, the meat should not become subject to the additional prohibition against a ritually impure person eating sacrificial meat.

דְּרַבָּנַן סָבְרִי אָמְרִינַן מִיגּוֹ, וְרַבִּי יוֹסֵי הַגְּלִילִי סָבַר לָא אָמְרִינַן מִיגּוֹ.

Rava explains that Rabbi Yosei HaGelili and the Rabbis disagree as to whether this case is an exception to that principle, as the Rabbis hold that we say that since the prohibition due to the ritual impurity of one’s body is a more inclusive prohibition, as it prohibits that person from eating all sacrificial meat, both pure and impure, it therefore takes effect also with regard to this meat, even though it was already rendered impure before the person was. And Rabbi Yosei HaGelili says that we do not say that since it is a more inclusive prohibition, it takes effect.

וְרַבִּי יוֹסֵי – נְהִי דְּמִיגּוֹ לָא אָמְרִינַן; תֵּיתֵי טוּמְאַת הַגּוּף דַּחֲמִירָא, וְתָחוּל עַל טוּמְאַת בָּשָׂר!

The Gemara asks: But even according to Rabbi Yosei HaGelili, granted that we do not say that since it is a more inclusive prohibition it will take effect. But still, the prohibition due to the impurity of a person’s body, which is a more stringent prohibition as it carries the punishment of karet, should come and take effect upon the prohibition due to the ritual impurity of the meat itself, as that prohibition is less stringent as it carries only the punishment of lashes. One exception to the principle that a second prohibition does not take effect is that even if an item or person is already subject to a prohibition, a more stringent prohibition will still take effect with regard to it.

אָמַר רַב אָשֵׁי: מִמַּאי דְּטוּמְאַת הַגּוּף חֲמוּרָה? דִּלְמָא טוּמְאַת בָּשָׂר חֲמוּרָה, שֶׁכֵּן אֵין לָהּ טׇהֳרָה בַּמִּקְוֶה!

Rav Ashi said: From where is it apparent that the prohibition due to the impurity of the person’s body is more stringent? Perhaps the prohibition due to the impurity of the meat is more stringent, as impure meat does not have the possibility of purification in a ritual bath, whereas a ritually impure person does. Since the prohibition due to the person’s impurity is not more stringent in every regard, it cannot take effect upon meat that is already prohibited due to its own impurity.

מַתְנִי׳ חוֹמֶר בַּשְּׁחִיטָה מִבָּעֲלִיָּיה, וּבָעֲלִיָּיה מִבַּשְּׁחִיטָה.

MISHNA: There is a greater stringency with regard to slaughtering outside the Temple courtyard than with regard to offering up outside, and there is a greater stringency with regard to offering up outside than with regard to slaughtering outside.

חוֹמֶר בַּשְּׁחִיטָה – שֶׁהַשּׁוֹחֵט לַהֶדְיוֹט חַיָּיב, וְהַמַּעֲלֶה לַהֶדְיוֹט פָּטוּר. חוֹמֶר בָּעֲלִיָּיה – שְׁנַיִם שֶׁאָחֲזוּ בְּסַכִּין וְשָׁחֲטוּ, פְּטוּרִים; אָחֲזוּ בְּאֵבֶר וְהֶעֱלוּ, חַיָּיבִין.

The mishna elaborates: The greater stringency with regard to slaughtering outside is that one who slaughters an offering outside the Temple courtyard even for the sake of an ordinary purpose, not for the sake of God, is liable. But one who offers up an offering outside the courtyard for the sake of an ordinary purpose is exempt. The greater stringency with regard to offering up outside is that two people who grasped a knife and together slaughtered an offering outside the courtyard are exempt. But if two grasped a limb from an offering and together offered it up outside, they are liable.

הֶעֱלָה חָזַר וְהֶעֱלָה וְחָזַר וְהֶעֱלָה – חַיָּיב עַל כׇּל עֲלִיָּיה. דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן. רַבִּי יוֹסֵי אוֹמֵר: אֵינוֹ חַיָּיב אֶלָּא אַחַת.

If one unwittingly offered up part of an offering outside the courtyard and then in a different lapse of awareness offered up other parts of that offering and then again, in another lapse of awareness, offered up yet other parts, he is liable to bring a sin offering for each act of offering up; this is the statement of Rabbi Shimon. Rabbi Yosei says: He is liable to bring only one sin offering.

וְאֵינוֹ חַיָּיב עַד שֶׁיַּעֲלֶה לְרֹאשׁ הַמִּזְבֵּחַ. רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן אוֹמֵר: אֲפִילּוּ הֶעֱלָה עַל הַסֶּלַע אוֹ עַל הָאֶבֶן – חַיָּיב.

Rabbi Yosei adds: And one is liable for offering up an offering outside the courtyard only once he offers it up at the top of an altar that was erected there. Rabbi Shimon says: Even if he offered it up on a rock or on a stone, not an altar, he is liable.

גְּמָ׳ מַאי שְׁנָא הַמַּעֲלֶה לְהֶדְיוֹט דְּפָטוּר – דִּכְתִיב ״לַה׳״, בַּשְּׁחִיטָה נָמֵי הָכְתִיב ״לַה׳״!

GEMARA: The Gemara analyzes the first halakha of the mishna: What is different about one who offers up outside for the sake of an ordinary purpose, that he is exempt? As it is written: “And he will not bring it to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting, to sacrifice it to the Lord” (Leviticus 17:9), which indicates that the liability applies only to offering up for the sake of the Lord. The Gemara questions this: But with regard to slaughtering, isn’t it also written: “Or that slaughters it outside the camp, and he did not bring it to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting to sacrifice an offering to the Lord” (Leviticus 17:3–4)?

שָׁאנֵי הָתָם, דְּאָמַר קְרָא: ״אִישׁ אִישׁ״. גַּבֵּי הַעֲלָאָה נָמֵי כְּתִיב: ״אִישׁ אִישׁ״! מִיבְּעֵי לֵיהּ לִשְׁנַיִם שֶׁהֶעֱלוּ בְּאֵבֶר – חַיָּיבִין.

The Gemara explains: It is different there, with regard to slaughtering, as the verse states: “Any man [ish ish] of the house of Israel…that slaughters it outside the camp” (Leviticus 17:3). The amplification indicated by the phrase “ish ish” teaches that one is liable even for slaughtering for the sake of an ordinary purpose. The Gemara challenges: But also with regard to offering up it is written: “Any man [ish ish] of the house of Israel…that offers up a burnt offering” (Leviticus 17:8). The Gemara explains: That amplification is necessary to teach that two people who offered up a limb of an offering together outside the courtyard are liable.

אִי הָכִי, הָכָא נָמֵי מִיבְּעֵי לֵיהּ לִשְׁנַיִם שֶׁאָחֲזוּ בְּסַכִּין וְשָׁחֲטוּ – שֶׁחַיָּיבִין! שָׁאנֵי הָתָם, דְּאָמַר קְרָא: ״הָהוּא״ – אֶחָד וְלֹא שְׁנַיִם.

The Gemara asks: If so, here too, with regard to slaughtering, the phrase “ish ish” should be used to teach that two people who grasped a knife and together slaughtered an offering outside the courtyard are liable, contrary to the ruling of the mishna. Why are the two parallel phrases expounded in different ways? The Gemara explains: It is different there, with regard to slaughtering, as the verse states: “And that man shall be cut off from among his people” (Leviticus 17:4). The term “that man,” which is in the singular, indicates that only one who acts alone is liable, but not two who act together.

אִי הָכִי, גַּבֵּי הַעֲלָאָה נָמֵי – הָא כְּתִיב ״הָהוּא״!

The Gemara challenges: But if so, also with regard to offering up, isn’t it written: “That man shall be cut off from his people” (Leviticus 17:9)? Why isn’t that term also expounded to teach that only one who acts alone is liable? The Gemara explains: That term is necessary

מִיבְּעֵי לֵיהּ לְמַעוֹטֵי שׁוֹגֵג, אָנוּס וּמוּטְעֶה. אִי הָכִי, הָכָא נָמֵי מִיבְּעֵי לְמַעוֹטֵי אָנוּס, שׁוֹגֵג וּמוּטְעֶה!

to exclude from the liability for karet one whose violation was unwitting, or who was compelled to act, or who was mistaken. The term “that man” teaches that only one who offered up with intent is liable to receive karet. The Gemara challenges: If so, here too, with regard to slaughtering outside, the term is necessary to exclude one whose violation was unwitting, or who was compelled to act, or who was mistaken. How can the term be used to teach that only one who acts alone is liable?

תְּרֵי ״הָהוּא״ כְּתִיבִי.

The Gemara explains: With regard to slaughtering outside, two instances of the term “that man” are written: “Blood shall be imputed to that man, he has shed blood, and that man shall be cut off from among his people” (Leviticus 17:4). One instance teaches that only one who acts with intent is liable to receive karet, and the other teaches that only one who acts alone is liable.

וְאֶלָּא ״לַה׳״ לְמָה לִי? לְהוֹצִיא שָׂעִיר הַמִּשְׁתַּלֵּחַ.

The Gemara has now justified its claim that the liability of one who slaughters an offering outside for the sake of an ordinary purpose is derived from the phrase “ish ish.” Accordingly, the Gemara asks: But why do I need the term “to the Lord”? The Gemara explains: It is written to exclude from liability one who slaughters the Yom Kippur scapegoat outside the courtyard.

חוֹמֶר בְּהַעֲלָאָה כּוּ׳.

§ The mishna teaches: The greater stringency with regard to offering up outside is that two people who grasped a knife and together slaughtered an offering outside the courtyard are exempt. But if two grasped a limb from an offering and together offered it up outside, they are liable.

תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: ״אִישׁ אִישׁ״ – מָה תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר? שְׁנַיִם שֶׁאָחֲזוּ בְּאֵבֶר וְהֶעֱלוּ, שֶׁחַיָּיבִין. שֶׁיָּכוֹל וַהֲלֹא דִּין הוּא: וּמָה הַשּׁוֹחֵט לְהֶדְיוֹט, שֶׁחַיָּיב – שְׁנַיִם שֶׁאָחֲזוּ בְּסַכִּין וְשָׁחֲטוּ, פְּטוּרִין; הַמַּעֲלֶה לְהֶדְיוֹט, שֶׁפָּטוּר – אֵינוֹ דִּין שֶׁשְּׁנַיִם שֶׁאָחֲזוּ, פְּטוּרִין? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״אִישׁ אִישׁ״. דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן.

The Sages taught in a baraita: What halakha is alluded to when the verse states: “Any man [ish ish]…that offers up a burnt offering or sacrifice” (Leviticus 17:8)? The verse teaches that two people who grasped a limb of an offering and offered it up together outside the courtyard are liable. It is necessary for the verse to teach this, as one might have thought to say: Could this not be derived through an a fortiori inference: If with regard to slaughtering outside the courtyard, one who slaughters for the sake of an ordinary purpose is liable, and nevertheless, two who grasped a knife and together slaughtered an offering are exempt, then with regard to offering up outside the courtyard, where one who offers up for the sake of an ordinary purpose is exempt, is it not logical that two who grasped a limb and offered it up will also be exempt? To counter this, the verse states “ish ish” to teach that they are liable for offering up together; this is the statement of Rabbi Shimon.

רַבִּי יוֹסֵי אוֹמֵר: ״הַהוּא״ – אֶחָד וְלֹא שְׁנַיִם. אִם כֵּן, מָה תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״אִישׁ אִישׁ״? דִּבְּרָה תּוֹרָה כִּלְשׁוֹן בְּנֵי אָדָם.

Rabbi Yosei says that the halakha concerning this case is derived from a different verse. The term “that [hahu] man” (Leviticus 17:9), which is in the singular, indicates that only one who acts alone is liable, but not two who act together. The baraita asks: If so, what halakha is alluded to when the verse states “ish ish”? The baraita explains: Rabbi Yosei holds that the reason the Torah uses the doubled term “ish ish” is that the Torah spoke in the language of people, and no halakhot are to be derived from it.

וְרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן – הַאי ״הַהוּא״ מִיבְּעֵי לֵיהּ לְמַעוֹטֵי שׁוֹגֵג, אָנוּס, מוּטְעֶה. וְרַבִּי יוֹסֵי – מֵ״הוּא״–״הַהוּא״. וְרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן – ״הוּא״–״הַהוּא״ לָא דָּרֵישׁ.

The Gemara asks: And Rabbi Shimon, what does he derive from the term “that man”? The Gemara explains: This term: “That man,” is necessary to exclude from liability one whose violation was unwitting, or who was compelled to act, or who was mistaken. The Gemara notes: And Rabbi Yosei derives that halakha from the fact that the verse could have stated hu and instead stated “hahu.” The Hebrew word for: That, hahu, is formed of the definite article ha and the pronoun hu. And Rabbi Shimon does not expound any halakhot from the fact that the verse could have stated hu and instead stated “hahu.” He holds that the expanded form is used because the Torah spoke in the language of people.

וְרַבִּי יוֹסֵי – מִדְּהַאי ״אִישׁ אִישׁ״ דִּבְּרָה תּוֹרָה כִלְשׁוֹן בְּנֵי אָדָם, הָהוּא ״אִישׁ אִישׁ״ נָמֵי דִּבְּרָה תּוֹרָה כִלְשׁוֹן בְּנֵי אָדָם. וְאֶלָּא הַשּׁוֹחֵט לְהֶדְיוֹט מְנָא לֵיהּ דְּחַיָּיב? נָפְקָא לֵיהּ מִ״דָּם יֵחָשֵׁב לָאִישׁ הַהוּא דָּם שָׁפָךְ״ – וַאֲפִילּוּ הַשּׁוֹחֵט לָאִישׁ.

The Gemara asks: And as for Rabbi Yosei, from the fact that he holds that nothing is to be derived from the phrase “ish ish” written with regard to offering up, as he holds that the Torah spoke in the language of people, then also with regard to that phrase: “Any man [ish ish]” (Leviticus 17:3), written with regard to slaughtering, since he holds that the Torah spoke in the language of people, he should not derive any halakhot from it. But if so, from where does he derive that one who slaughters outside for the sake of an ordinary purpose is liable? The Gemara answers: He derives it from the verse: “Blood shall be imputed to that man; he has shed blood” (Leviticus 17:4), which teaches that even one who slaughters for the sake of an ordinary man is liable.

הֶעֱלָה וְחָזַר וְהֶעֱלָה כּוּ׳.

§ The mishna teaches: If one unwittingly offered up part of an offering outside the courtyard and then in a different lapse of awareness offered up other parts of that offering and then again, in another lapse of awareness, offered up yet other parts, he is liable to bring a sin offering for each act of offering up; this is the statement of Rabbi Shimon. Rabbi Yosei says: He is liable to bring only one sin offering.

אָמַר רֵישׁ לָקִישׁ: מַחְלוֹקֶת בְּאַרְבָּעָה וַחֲמִשָּׁה אֵבָרִים; דְּמָר סָבַר: כִּי כְּתִיב ״לַעֲשׂוֹת אֹתוֹ״ – עַל הַשָּׁלֵם הוּא חַיָּיב וְאֵינוֹ חַיָּיב עַל הֶחָסֵר, אַכֹּל בְּהֵמָה כְּתִיב; וּמָר סָבַר: אַכֹּל אֵבֶר וְאֵבֶר כְּתִיב. אֲבָל אֵבֶר אֶחָד – דִּבְרֵי הַכֹּל אֵינוֹ חַיָּיב אֶלָּא אַחַת.

The Gemara cites two opinions concerning the case under dispute. Reish Lakish says: The dispute in the mishna concerns four or five limbs that were offered up in different lapses of awareness. As one Sage, Rabbi Yosei, holds: When it is written: “To sacrifice it” (Leviticus 17:9), which teaches the halakha that for offering up a complete item one is liable but that one is not liable for offering up an incomplete item, it is written with regard to a whole animal. Accordingly, liability to bring a sin offering is incurred only once one offers up the entire animal, even if that was done limb by limb. And the other Sage, Rabbi Shimon, holds that that verse is written with regard to each and every limb of an animal. Accordingly, one is liable for each limb he offered up. But with regard to the offering up of one limb in parts, everyone agrees that a person is liable to bring only one sin offering. According to Rabbi Shimon this would apply even if that were the only limb that was offered up; according to Rabbi Yosei this would apply only if the rest of the animal had already been offered up.

וְרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן אָמַר: מַחְלוֹקֶת בְּאֵבֶר אֶחָד – דְּמָר סָבַר: מוּקְטְרֵי פְּנִים שֶׁחָסְרוּ (והעלו) [וְהֶעֱלָן] בַּחוּץ – חַיָּיב, וּמָר סָבַר – פָּטוּר; אֲבָל בְּאַרְבָּעָה וַחֲמִשָּׁה אֵיבָרִין – דִּבְרֵי הַכֹּל חַיָּיב עַל כׇּל אֵבֶר וְאֵבֶר.

And Rabbi Yoḥanan says: Everyone agrees that one is liable even for offering up a single limb. Furthermore, if an offering is slaughtered outside the courtyard, everyone agrees that one is liable only once an entire limb has been offered up. The dispute in the mishna concerns one limb from an offering that was slaughtered inside the courtyard that was then taken outside and offered up in parts, during different lapses of awareness. As one Sage, Rabbi Shimon, holds that for offerings that are fit to be burned inside the Temple, that became incomplete and were instead offered up outside the Temple, one is liable. Accordingly, one is liable for each part of the limb. And the other Sage, Rabbi Yosei, holds that one is exempt for offering up part of a limb outside the courtyard. Accordingly, liability is incurred only once all the parts of the limb have been offered up. But with regard to offering up four or five limbs, everyone agrees that one is liable for each and every limb, as they understand that the phrase “to sacrifice it” is written with regard to each and every limb.

וּפְלִיגָא דְּעוּלָּא, דְּאָמַר עוּלָּא: הַכֹּל מוֹדִים בְּמוּקְטְרֵי פְּנִים שֶׁחָסְרוּ (וְהֶעֱלוֹ) [וְהֶעֱלָן] בַּחוּץ – שֶׁחַיָּיב. לֹא נֶחְלְקוּ אֶלָּא בְּמוּקְטְרֵי בַּחוּץ שֶׁחָסְרוּ (וְהֶעֱלוֹ) [וְהֶעֱלָן] בַּחוּץ – דְּמָר סָבַר פָּטוּר, וּמַר סָבַר חַיָּיב.

And Rabbi Yoḥanan disagrees with the opinion of Ulla, as Ulla says: Everyone in the mishna concedes with regard to offerings that are fit to be burned inside the Temple courtyard that became incomplete and were instead offered up outside the courtyard, that one is liable. They disagree only with regard to offerings that, having been slaughtered outside are unfit and so will be burned outside, that became incomplete and were offered up outside. As one Sage, Rabbi Yosei, holds that one is exempt, and the other Sage, Rabbi Shimon, holds that one is liable.

אִיכָּא דְּאָמְרִי, אָמַר עוּלָּא: הַכֹּל מוֹדִים בְּמוּקְטְרֵי חוּץ שֶׁחָסְרוּ (וְהֶעֱלוֹ) [וְהֶעֱלָן] בַּחוּץ שֶׁהוּא פָּטוּר, לֹא נֶחְלְקוּ אֶלָּא בְּמוּקְטְרֵי פְּנִים שֶׁחָסְרוּ (וְהֶעֱלוֹ) [וְהֶעֱלָן] בַּחוּץ, דְּמָר סָבַר פָּטוּר, וּמַר סָבַר חַיָּיב.

There are those who say there is a different version of Ulla’s statement, according to which he agrees with his teacher, Rabbi Yoḥanan. Ulla says: Everyone in the mishna concedes with regard to offerings that, having been slaughtered outside the Temple are unfit and so will be burned outside, that became incomplete and were offered up outside, that one is exempt. They disagree only with regard to offerings that are fit to be burned inside that became incomplete and were instead offered up outside. As one Sage, Rabbi Yosei, holds that one is exempt, and the other Sage, Rabbi Shimon, holds that one is liable.

(וּפְלִיגִי) [וּפְלִיגָא] דַּאֲבוּהּ דִּשְׁמוּאֵל אַלִּישָּׁנָא קַמָּא דְּעוּלָּא; דְּאָמַר אֲבוּהּ דִּשְׁמוּאֵל: כְּמַאן מַהְדְּרִינַן פּוֹקְעִין לְגַבֵּי מִזְבֵּחַ? כְּמַאן – דְּלָא כְּרַבִּי יוֹסֵי.

And the statement of Shmuel’s father disagrees with the first version of Ulla’s statement, as Shmuel’s father says: In accordance with whose opinion do we restore limbs that were dislodged from upon the altar to the altar? In accordance with whose opinion? It is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei recorded in the mishna. Shmuel’s father assumes that Rabbi Yosei holds that incomplete limbs are never offered up on the altar, even if they were dislodged from the altar. Accordingly, he holds that one is not liable for offering them up outside the Temple courtyard. This is contrary to the first version of Ulla’s opinion, according to which one is liable for offering up incomplete offerings that were slaughtered inside the courtyard. Evidently, Ulla holds that an incomplete limb that was dislodged from the altar is to be restored to the altar.

וְאֵינוֹ חַיָּיב עַד שֶׁיַּעֲלֶה כּוּ׳. אָמַר רַב הוּנָא: מַאי טַעְמָא דְּרַבִּי יוֹסֵי? דִּכְתִיב: ״וַיִּבֶן נֹחַ מִזְבֵּחַ לַה׳״.

§ The mishna teaches: Rabbi Yosei says: And one is liable for offering up an offering outside the courtyard only once he offers it up upon the top of an altar that was erected there. Rabbi Shimon says: Even if he offered it up on a rock or on a stone, not an altar, he is liable. Rav Huna says: What is the reason of Rabbi Yosei? As it is written: “And Noah built an altar to the Lord, and took of every pure animal, and of every pure bird, and offered up burnt offerings on the altar” (Genesis 8:20). Noah was particular to use an altar rather than one of the available rocks. Apparently, this was because placing an item upon an altar is the only act that can be considered offering up.

אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: מַאי טַעְמָא דְּרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן? דִּכְתִיב: ״וַיִּקַּח מָנוֹחַ אֶת גְּדִי הָעִזִּים וְאֶת הַמִּנְחָה וַיַּעַל עַל הַצּוּר לַה׳״.

Rabbi Yoḥanan said: What is the reason of Rabbi Shimon? As it is written: “And Manoah took the kid with the meal offering, and offered it up upon the rock, to the Lord” (Judges 13:19). Evidently, even placing an offering upon a rock is considered an act of offering up.

וְאִידַּךְ נָמֵי, וְהָכְתִיב: ״וַיִּבֶן מִזְבֵּחַ לַה׳״! הַהוּא גּוּבְהָה בְּעָלְמָא. וְאִידַּךְ נָמֵי, הָא כְּתִיב: ״וַיִּקַּח מָנוֹחַ״! הוֹרָאַת שָׁעָה הָיְתָה.

The Gemara explains how each tanna interprets the verse that supports the other. But also according to the other opinion, Rabbi Shimon’s, isn’t it written: “And Noah built an altar to the Lord”? How does he explain that verse? The Gemara answers: That verse is referring merely to an elevated place and not specifically to an altar. But also according to the other opinion, Rabbi Yosei’s, isn’t it written: “And Manoah took…and offered it up upon the rock”? How does he explain that verse? The Gemara answers: The use of a rock in that case was a provisional edict issued in exigent circumstances, by the angel who visited Manoah, and so one cannot derive normative halakha from it.

וְאִיבָּעֵית אֵימָא: הַיְינוּ טַעְמָא דְּרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן – כִּדְתַנְיָא, רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן אוֹמֵר: ״מִזְבֵּחַ פֶּתַח אֹהֶל מוֹעֵד״; וְאֵין מִזְבֵּחַ בְּבָמָה; לְפִיכָךְ הֶעֱלָה עַל הַסֶּלַע אוֹ עַל הָאֶבֶן – חַיָּיב.

And if you wish, say instead that the reason of Rabbi Shimon is as it is taught in a baraita: Rabbi Shimon says that the verse states: “And the priest shall sprinkle the blood upon the altar of the Lord at the entrance of the Tent of Meeting” (Leviticus 17:6). From here it is apparent that only in the Sanctuary is there a requirement for an altar, but a specifically erected altar is not required in order to offer up on a private altar during periods when it is permitted to do so. Therefore, one who offered up outside the courtyard on a rock or on a stone is liable.

יָצָא מִיבְּעֵי לֵיהּ! הָכִי קָאָמַר: לְפִיכָךְ בִּשְׁעַת אִיסּוּר הַבָּמוֹת – הֶעֱלָה עַל הַסֶּלַע אוֹ עַל הָאֶבֶן, חַיָּיב.

The Gemara questions the formulation of the baraita: If the baraita was referring to offering up during a period when the use of private altars is permitted, it should have concluded: One who offered up outside on a rock or on a stone has fulfilled his obligation. Why does it state instead that he is liable? The Gemara explains: This is what the baraita is saying: Since there is no requirement for a specifically erected altar during a period when private altars are permitted, therefore, during a period when the use of private altars is prohibited, one who offers up outside on a rock or on a stone is liable.

בָּעֵי רַבִּי יוֹסֵי בְּרַבִּי חֲנִינָא: קֶרֶן וְכֶבֶשׁ וִיסוֹד וְרִיבּוּעַ – מַהוּ שֶׁיְּעַכְּבוּ בְּבָמָה?

Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Ḥanina, raises a dilemma: Features that are indispensable with regard to the altar in the Temple are the corner, the ramp leading to the altar, the base of the altar, and the square shape. What is the halakha with regard to whether they are also indispensable for the validity of a private altar during a period when it is permitted to use private altars?

אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַבִּי יִרְמְיָה, תַּנְיָא: קֶרֶן וְכֶבֶשׁ וְרִיבּוּעַ וִיסוֹד – מְעַכְּבִין בְּבָמָה גְּדוֹלָה, וְאֵין מְעַכְּבִין בְּבָמָה קְטַנָּה.

Rabbi Yirmeya said to him: It is taught in a baraita: The corner, the ramp, the base, and the square shape are all indispensable for the validity of a great public altar, but they are not indispensable for the validity of a small private altar.