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Today's Daf Yomi

July 30, 2018 | 讬状讞 讘讗讘 转砖注状讞

  • This month's learning is dedicated by Debbie and Yossi Gevir to Rabbanit Michelle and the Hadran Zoom group for their kindness, support, and care during a medically challenging year.

Zevachim 108

Study Guide Zevachim 108. The debate regarding whether or not one is obligated for offering outside a sacrifice that was slaughtered outside or an impure person eating impure food (mentioned in the mishna) is discussed further by the gemara and arguments are brought to explain Rabbi Yosi the Galilean’s approach. The next mishna聽discusses cases in which聽slaughtering is more stringent than offering and one in which offering is more stringent than slaughtering and their derivations from the verses are brought by the gemara. There is a debate regarding one who offers up several pieces – is one obligated for one act or for several. There is a further debate regarding what is the case exactly that they are debating and in which case would they both agree.


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专讗砖 讘谉 讬讜谞讛 砖讗讬谉 讘讜 讻讝讬转 讜诪诇讞 诪砖诇讬诪讜 诇讻讝讬转 诪讛讜

the head of a pigeon burnt offering that does not have on it an olive-bulk of flesh, but the salt that adheres to it, after it was salted in accordance with the requirement to salt it (see Leviticus 2:13), completes the measure to make an olive-bulk, what is the halakha? Is one liable for offering it up outside?

讗诪专 诇讬讛 专讘讗 诪驻专讝拽讬讗 诇专讘 讗砖讬 诇讗讜 讛讬讬谞讜 驻诇讜讙转讬讬讛讜 讚专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讜专讬砖 诇拽讬砖 转讬讘注讬 诇专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讜转讬讘注讬 诇专讬砖 诇拽讬砖

Rava from Parzakya said to Rav Ashi: Is this not identical to the dispute between Rabbi Yo岣nan and Reish Lakish with regard to a bone attached to sacrificial flesh? Rav Ashi responded: No. The dilemma can be raised according to Rabbi Yo岣nan and the dilemma can be raised according to Reish Lakish.

转讬讘注讬 诇专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 注讚 讻讗谉 诇讗 拽讗诪专 专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讛转诐 讗诇讗 注爪诐 讚诪讬谞讗 讚讘砖专 讛讜讗 讗讘诇 诪诇讞 讚诇讗讜 诪讬谞讗 讚讘专 讬讜谞讛 讛讜讗 诇讗 转讬讘注讬 诇专讬砖 诇拽讬砖 注讚 讻讗谉 诇讗 拽讗诪专 专讬砖 诇拽讬砖 讛转诐 讗诇讗 讚讗讬 驻专讬砖 诪讬谞讛 诇讗讜 诪爪讜讛 诇讗住讜拽讬 讗讘诇 讛讻讗 讚讗讬 驻专讬砖 诪爪讜讛 诇讗住讜拽讬 诇讗 讗讜 讚诇诪讗 诇讗 砖谞讗

The Gemara elaborates: The dilemma can be raised according to Rabbi Yo岣nan: Perhaps Rabbi Yo岣nan states his opinion only there, with regard to a bone, claiming that it contributes to the measure of an olive-bulk as it is of the same kind that flesh is, i.e., they are both animal parts. But in the case of salt, which is not of the same kind as a pigeon, perhaps it would not contribute to the measure. And the dilemma can also be raised according to Reish Lakish: Perhaps Reish Lakish states his opinion only there, with regard to a bone, claiming that it does not contribute to the measure of an olive-bulk, as if the bone separates from the flesh, there is no mitzva to offer the bone up on the altar. But here, with regard to salt, concerning which if it separates from the pigeon there is a mitzva to offer it up, he would not rule as he does concerning a bone attached to flesh. Or perhaps there is no difference between the cases.

转讬拽讜

The Gemara concludes: The dilemma shall stand unresolved.

专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讛讙诇讬诇讬 讗讜诪专 讻讜壮

搂 The mishna teaches: Rabbi Yosei HaGelili says: If he slaughtered an offering inside the courtyard and then offered it up outside the courtyard, he is liable. But if he slaughtered it outside, thereby rendering it unfit, and then he offered it up outside, he is exempt for the offering up, as he offered up only an item that is unfit, and one is liable only for offering up an item that is fit to be offered up inside the Temple. The Rabbis said to him: According to your reasoning, even in a case where he slaughters it inside and offers it up outside, he should be exempt, since he rendered it unfit the moment that he took it outside the courtyard. Yet, in such a case, he is certainly liable for offering it up. So too, one who slaughters an offering outside and then offers it up outside is liable.

讛砖讬讘 专讘讬 转讞转 专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讛讙诇讬诇讬 诪讛 诇砖讜讞讟 讘驻谞讬诐 讜诪注诇讛 讘讞讜抓 砖讛讬转讛 诇讜 砖注转 讛讻讜砖专 转讗诪专 讘砖讜讞讟 讞讜抓 讜诪注诇讛 讘讞讜抓 砖诇讗 讛讬转讛 诇讜 砖注转 讛讻讜砖专

While a defense of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili鈥檚 opinion is not presented in the mishna, various possibilities are recorded in a baraita: Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi responded to this challenge on behalf of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili: What is notable about slaughtering an offering inside the courtyard and then offering it up outside? It is notable in that the offering had a period of fitness. Can you say the same about slaughtering an offering outside and then offering it up outside, where the offering never had a period of fitness? It was disqualified as soon as it was slaughtered and so it is reasonable that one is not liable for offering it up.

讛砖讬讘 专讘讬 讗诇注讝专 讘专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 转讞转 专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讛讙诇讬诇讬 诪讛 诇砖讜讞讟 讘驻谞讬诐 讜诪注诇讛 讘讞讜抓 砖讻谉 拽讜讚砖 诪拽讘诇讜 转讗诪专 讘砖讜讞讟 讘讞讜抓 砖讗讬谉 拽讜讚砖 诪拽讘诇讜

Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, responded to this challenge on behalf of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili: What is notable about slaughtering an offering inside the courtyard and then offering it up outside? It is notable in that even though the offering was taken outside the courtyard and thereby disqualified, if it is, albeit unlawfully, placed on the altar, the sanctity of the altar renders the offering acceptable and it should not be removed from the altar because the disqualification occurred in sanctity, i.e., during the course of the Temple service (see 84a). Can you say the same about slaughtering an offering outside and then offering it up outside, where the disqualification did not occur in sanctity and so the sanctity of the altar does not render the offering acceptable? Therefore, even if it were placed there, it must be removed.

诪讗讬 讘讬谞讬讬讛讜 讗诪专 讝注讬专讬 砖讞讬讟转 诇讬诇讛 讗讬讻讗 讘讬谞讬讬讛讜

The Gemara asks: What is the practical difference between these two responses? Ze鈥檈iri said: The practical difference between them is a case of slaughtering an offering at night inside the courtyard and then offering it up outside. According to Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi鈥檚 response, one would be exempt, as slaughtering at night disqualifies the offering from its very outset; whereas according to the response of Rabbi Elazar, one would be liable as this is a disqualification that occurs in sanctity.

专讘讛 讗诪专 拽讘诇讛 讘讻诇讬 讞讜诇 讗讬讻讗 讘讬谞讬讬讛讜

Rabba said: The practical difference between them is a case in which, after slaughtering the offering in the courtyard, the collection of the blood was done there in a non-sacred vessel and then the animal was offered up outside the courtyard. According to Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi鈥檚 defense, one would be exempt, as collecting the blood in a non-sacred vessel disqualifies the offering from its very outset; whereas according to the response of Rabbi Elazar, one would be liable as this is a disqualification that occurs in sanctity.

讟诪讗 砖讗讻诇 讘讬谉 拽讜讚砖 讻讜壮

搂 The mishna teaches: One who is ritually impure who ate sacrificial food, whether it was ritually impure sacrificial food or ritually pure sacrificial food, is liable to receive karet if he did so intentionally, and to bring a sliding-scale offering if he did so unwittingly. Rabbi Yosei HaGelili says: An impure person who ate pure sacrificial food is liable. But an impure person who ate impure sacrificial food is exempt, as he merely ate an impure item, and the prohibition against eating sacrificial food while one is impure applies only to pure sacrificial food. The Rabbis said to him: According to your logic, even in a case of an impure person who ate what had been pure sacrificial food, once he has touched it, he has thereby rendered it ritually impure. Yet, in such a case, he is certainly liable for eating it. So too, an impure person who ate impure sacrificial food is liable.

砖驻讬专 拽讗诪专讬 诇讬讛 专讘谞谉 诇专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讛讙诇讬诇讬

The Gemara notes: The Rabbis are saying well to Rabbi Yosei HaGelili; why does Rabbi Yosei HaGelili disagree?

讗诪专 专讘讗 讻诇 讛讬讻讗 讚谞讟诪讗 讟讜诪讗转 讛讙讜祝 讜讗讞专 讻讱 谞讟诪讗 讘砖专 讚讻讜诇讬 注诇诪讗 诇讗 驻诇讬讙讬 讚讞讬讬讘 砖讻谉 讟讜诪讗转 讛讙讜祝 讘讻专转

Rava said in elaboration of the dispute: Wherever one is first rendered impure with impurity of the body and then afterward the sacrificial meat is rendered impure, everyone agrees that he is liable if he eats the meat. This is because the prohibition due to the impurity of one鈥檚 body, which carries the punishment of karet, took effect while the meat was still ritually pure, and so this prohibition is not abrogated even when the meat is later rendered impure.

讻讬 驻诇讬讙讬 讻砖谞讟诪讗 讘砖专 讜讗讞专 讻讱 谞讟诪讗 讛讙讜祝

When they disagree is in a case where first the meat is rendered impure and then afterward the person鈥檚 body is rendered impure. In general, once an item has become subject to a prohibition, it cannot then become subject to an additional prohibition. In this case, once the meat is rendered impure, it is prohibited for anyone to eat it, even if that person is ritually pure. If that person is later rendered impure, the meat should not become subject to the additional prohibition against a ritually impure person eating sacrificial meat.

讚专讘谞谉 住讘专讬 讗诪专讬谞谉 诪讬讙讜 讜专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讛讙诇讬诇讬 住讘专 诇讗 讗诪专讬谞谉 诪讬讙讜

Rava explains that Rabbi Yosei HaGelili and the Rabbis disagree as to whether this case is an exception to that principle, as the Rabbis hold that we say that since the prohibition due to the ritual impurity of one鈥檚 body is a more inclusive prohibition, as it prohibits that person from eating all sacrificial meat, both pure and impure, it therefore takes effect also with regard to this meat, even though it was already rendered impure before the person was. And Rabbi Yosei HaGelili says that we do not say that since it is a more inclusive prohibition, it takes effect.

讜专讘讬 讬讜住讬 谞讛讬 讚诪讬讙讜 诇讗 讗诪专讬谞谉 转讬转讬 讟讜诪讗转 讛讙讜祝 讚讞诪讬专讗 讜转讞讜诇 注诇 讟讜诪讗转 讘砖专

The Gemara asks: But even according to Rabbi Yosei HaGelili, granted that we do not say that since it is a more inclusive prohibition it will take effect. But still, the prohibition due to the impurity of a person鈥檚 body, which is a more stringent prohibition as it carries the punishment of karet, should come and take effect upon the prohibition due to the ritual impurity of the meat itself, as that prohibition is less stringent as it carries only the punishment of lashes. One exception to the principle that a second prohibition does not take effect is that even if an item or person is already subject to a prohibition, a more stringent prohibition will still take effect with regard to it.

讗诪专 专讘 讗砖讬 诪诪讗讬 讚讟讜诪讗转 讛讙讜祝 讞诪讜专讛 讚诇诪讗 讟讜诪讗转 讘砖专 讞诪讜专讛 砖讻谉 讗讬谉 诇讛 讟讛专讛 讘诪拽讜讛

Rav Ashi said: From where is it apparent that the prohibition due to the impurity of the person鈥檚 body is more stringent? Perhaps the prohibition due to the impurity of the meat is more stringent, as impure meat does not have the possibility of purification in a ritual bath, whereas a ritually impure person does. Since the prohibition due to the person鈥檚 impurity is not more stringent in every regard, it cannot take effect upon meat that is already prohibited due to its own impurity.

诪转谞讬壮 讞讜诪专 讘砖讞讬讟讛 诪讘注诇讬讬讛 讜讘注诇讬讬讛 诪讘砖讞讬讟讛

MISHNA: There is a greater stringency with regard to slaughtering outside the Temple courtyard than with regard to offering up outside, and there is a greater stringency with regard to offering up outside than with regard to slaughtering outside.

讞讜诪专 讘砖讞讬讟讛 砖讛砖讜讞讟 诇讛讚讬讜讟 讞讬讬讘 讜讛诪注诇讛 诇讛讚讬讜讟 驻讟讜专 讞讜诪专 讘注诇讬讬讛 砖谞讬诐 砖讗讞讝讜 讘住讻讬谉 讜砖讞讟讜 驻讟讜专讬诐 讗讞讝讜 讘讗讘专 讜讛注诇讜 讞讬讬讘讬谉

The mishna elaborates: The greater stringency with regard to slaughtering outside is that one who slaughters an offering outside the Temple courtyard even for the sake of an ordinary purpose, not for the sake of God, is liable. But one who offers up an offering outside the courtyard for the sake of an ordinary purpose is exempt. The greater stringency with regard to offering up outside is that two people who grasped a knife and together slaughtered an offering outside the courtyard are exempt. But if two grasped a limb from an offering and together offered it up outside, they are liable.

讛注诇讛 讞讝专 讜讛注诇讛 讜讞讝专 讜讛注诇讛 讞讬讬讘 注诇 讻诇 注诇讬讬讛 讚讘专讬 专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讗讜诪专 讗讬谞讜 讞讬讬讘 讗诇讗 讗讞转

If one unwittingly offered up part of an offering outside the courtyard and then in a different lapse of awareness offered up other parts of that offering and then again, in another lapse of awareness, offered up yet other parts, he is liable to bring a sin offering for each act of offering up; this is the statement of Rabbi Shimon. Rabbi Yosei says: He is liable to bring only one sin offering.

讜讗讬谞讜 讞讬讬讘 注讚 砖讬注诇讛 诇专讗砖 讛诪讝讘讞 专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 讗讜诪专 讗驻讬诇讜 讛注诇讛 注诇 讛住诇注 讗讜 注诇 讛讗讘谉 讞讬讬讘

Rabbi Yosei adds: And one is liable for offering up an offering outside the courtyard only once he offers it up at the top of an altar that was erected there. Rabbi Shimon says: Even if he offered it up on a rock or on a stone, not an altar, he is liable.

讙诪壮 诪讗讬 砖谞讗 讛诪注诇讛 诇讛讚讬讜讟 讚驻讟讜专 讚讻转讬讘 诇讛壮 讘砖讞讬讟讛 谞诪讬 讛讻转讬讘 诇讛壮

GEMARA: The Gemara analyzes the first halakha of the mishna: What is different about one who offers up outside for the sake of an ordinary purpose, that he is exempt? As it is written: 鈥淎nd he will not bring it to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting, to sacrifice it to the Lord鈥 (Leviticus 17:9), which indicates that the liability applies only to offering up for the sake of the Lord. The Gemara questions this: But with regard to slaughtering, isn鈥檛 it also written: 鈥淥r that slaughters it outside the camp, and he did not bring it to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting to sacrifice an offering to the Lord鈥 (Leviticus 17:3鈥4)?

砖讗谞讬 讛转诐 讚讗诪专 拽专讗 讗讬砖 讗讬砖 讙讘讬 讛注诇讗讛 谞诪讬 讻转讬讘 讗讬砖 讗讬砖 诪讬讘注讬 诇讬讛 诇砖谞讬诐 砖讛注诇讜 讘讗讘专 讞讬讬讘讬谉

The Gemara explains: It is different there, with regard to slaughtering, as the verse states: 鈥淎ny man [ish ish] of the house of Israel鈥hat slaughters it outside the camp鈥 (Leviticus 17:3). The amplification indicated by the phrase 鈥ish ish鈥 teaches that one is liable even for slaughtering for the sake of an ordinary purpose. The Gemara challenges: But also with regard to offering up it is written: 鈥淎ny man [ish ish] of the house of Israel鈥hat offers up a burnt offering鈥 (Leviticus 17:8). The Gemara explains: That amplification is necessary to teach that two people who offered up a limb of an offering together outside the courtyard are liable.

讗讬 讛讻讬 讛讻讗 谞诪讬 诪讬讘注讬 诇讬讛 诇砖谞讬诐 砖讗讞讝讜 讘住讻讬谉 讜砖讞讟讜 砖讞讬讬讘讬谉 砖讗谞讬 讛转诐 讚讗诪专 拽专讗 讛讛讜讗 讗讞讚 讜诇讗 砖谞讬诐

The Gemara asks: If so, here too, with regard to slaughtering, the phrase 鈥ish ishshould be used to teach that two people who grasped a knife and together slaughtered an offering outside the courtyard are liable, contrary to the ruling of the mishna. Why are the two parallel phrases expounded in different ways? The Gemara explains: It is different there, with regard to slaughtering, as the verse states: 鈥淎nd that man shall be cut off from among his people鈥 (Leviticus 17:4). The term 鈥渢hat man,鈥 which is in the singular, indicates that only one who acts alone is liable, but not two who act together.

讗讬 讛讻讬 讙讘讬 讛注诇讗讛 谞诪讬 讛讗 讻转讬讘 讛讛讜讗 诪讬讘注讬 诇讬讛

The Gemara challenges: But if so, also with regard to offering up, isn鈥檛 it written: 鈥淭hat man shall be cut off from his people鈥 (Leviticus 17:9)? Why isn鈥檛 that term also expounded to teach that only one who acts alone is liable? The Gemara explains: That term is necessary

诇诪注讜讟讬 砖讜讙讙 讗谞讜住 讜诪讜讟注讛 讗讬 讛讻讬 讛讻讗 谞诪讬 诪讬讘注讬 诇诪注讜讟讬 讗谞讜住 砖讜讙讙 讜诪讜讟注讛

to exclude from the liability for karet one whose violation was unwitting, or who was compelled to act, or who was mistaken. The term 鈥渢hat man鈥 teaches that only one who offered up with intent is liable to receive karet. The Gemara challenges: If so, here too, with regard to slaughtering outside, the term is necessary to exclude one whose violation was unwitting, or who was compelled to act, or who was mistaken. How can the term be used to teach that only one who acts alone is liable?

转专讬 讛讛讜讗 讻转讬讘讬

The Gemara explains: With regard to slaughtering outside, two instances of the term 鈥渢hat man鈥 are written: 鈥淏lood shall be imputed to that man, he has shed blood, and that man shall be cut off from among his people鈥 (Leviticus 17:4). One instance teaches that only one who acts with intent is liable to receive karet, and the other teaches that only one who acts alone is liable.

讜讗诇讗 诇讛壮 诇诪讛 诇讬 诇讛讜爪讬讗 砖注讬专 讛诪砖转诇讞

The Gemara has now justified its claim that the liability of one who slaughters an offering outside for the sake of an ordinary purpose is derived from the phrase 鈥ish ish.鈥 Accordingly, the Gemara asks: But why do I need the term 鈥渢o the Lord鈥? The Gemara explains: It is written to exclude from liability one who slaughters the Yom Kippur scapegoat outside the courtyard.

讞讜诪专 讘讛注诇讗讛 讻讜壮

搂 The mishna teaches: The greater stringency with regard to offering up outside is that two people who grasped a knife and together slaughtered an offering outside the courtyard are exempt. But if two grasped a limb from an offering and together offered it up outside, they are liable.

转谞讜 专讘谞谉 讗讬砖 讗讬砖 诪讛 转诇诪讜讚 诇讜诪专 砖谞讬诐 砖讗讞讝讜 讘讗讘专 讜讛注诇讜 砖讞讬讬讘讬谉 砖讬讻讜诇 讜讛诇讗 讚讬谉 讛讜讗 讜诪讛 讛砖讜讞讟 诇讛讚讬讜讟 砖讞讬讬讘 砖谞讬诐 砖讗讞讝讜 讘住讻讬谉 讜砖讞讟讜 驻讟讜专讬谉 讛诪注诇讛 诇讛讚讬讜讟 砖驻讟讜专 讗讬谞讜 讚讬谉 砖砖谞讬诐 砖讗讞讝讜 驻讟讜专讬谉 转诇诪讜讚 诇讜诪专 讗讬砖 讗讬砖 讚讘专讬 专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉

The Sages taught in a baraita: What halakha is alluded to when the verse states: 鈥淎ny man [ish ish]鈥that offers up a burnt offering or sacrifice鈥 (Leviticus 17:8)? The verse teaches that two people who grasped a limb of an offering and offered it up together outside the courtyard are liable. It is necessary for the verse to teach this, as one might have thought to say: Could this not be derived through an a fortiori inference: If with regard to slaughtering outside the courtyard, one who slaughters for the sake of an ordinary purpose is liable, and nevertheless, two who grasped a knife and together slaughtered an offering are exempt, then with regard to offering up outside the courtyard, where one who offers up for the sake of an ordinary purpose is exempt, is it not logical that two who grasped a limb and offered it up will also be exempt? To counter this, the verse states 鈥ish ish to teach that they are liable for offering up together; this is the statement of Rabbi Shimon.

专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讗讜诪专 讛讛讜讗 讗讞讚 讜诇讗 砖谞讬诐 讗诐 讻谉 诪讛 转诇诪讜讚 诇讜诪专 讗讬砖 讗讬砖 讚讘专讛 转讜专讛 讻诇砖讜谉 讘谞讬 讗讚诐

Rabbi Yosei says that the halakha concerning this case is derived from a different verse. The term 鈥渢hat [hahu] man鈥 (Leviticus 17:9), which is in the singular, indicates that only one who acts alone is liable, but not two who act together. The baraita asks: If so, what halakha is alluded to when the verse states 鈥ish ish鈥? The baraita explains: Rabbi Yosei holds that the reason the Torah uses the doubled term 鈥ish ish鈥 is that the Torah spoke in the language of people, and no halakhot are to be derived from it.

讜专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 讛讗讬 讛讛讜讗 诪讬讘注讬 诇讬讛 诇诪注讜讟讬 砖讜讙讙 讗谞讜住 诪讜讟注讛 讜专讘讬 讬讜住讬 诪讛讜讗 讛讛讜讗 讜专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 讛讜讗 讛讛讜讗 诇讗 讚专讬砖

The Gemara asks: And Rabbi Shimon, what does he derive from the term 鈥渢hat man鈥? The Gemara explains: This term: 鈥淭hat man,鈥 is necessary to exclude from liability one whose violation was unwitting, or who was compelled to act, or who was mistaken. The Gemara notes: And Rabbi Yosei derives that halakha from the fact that the verse could have stated hu and instead stated hahu.鈥 The Hebrew word for: That, hahu, is formed of the definite article ha and the pronoun hu. And Rabbi Shimon does not expound any halakhot from the fact that the verse could have stated hu and instead stated hahu.鈥 He holds that the expanded form is used because the Torah spoke in the language of people.

讜专讘讬 讬讜住讬 诪讚讛讗讬 讗讬砖 讗讬砖 讚讘专讛 转讜专讛 讻诇砖讜谉 讘谞讬 讗讚诐 讛讛讜讗 讗讬砖 讗讬砖 谞诪讬 讚讘专讛 转讜专讛 讻诇砖讜谉 讘谞讬 讗讚诐 讜讗诇讗 讛砖讜讞讟 诇讛讚讬讜讟 诪谞讗 诇讬讛 讚讞讬讬讘 谞驻拽讗 诇讬讛 诪讚诐 讬讞砖讘 诇讗讬砖 讛讛讜讗 讚诐 砖驻讱 讜讗驻讬诇讜 讛砖讜讞讟 诇讗讬砖

The Gemara asks: And as for Rabbi Yosei, from the fact that he holds that nothing is to be derived from the phrase ish ish written with regard to offering up, as he holds that the Torah spoke in the language of people, then also with regard to that phrase: 鈥淎ny man [ish ish]鈥 (Leviticus 17:3), written with regard to slaughtering, since he holds that the Torah spoke in the language of people, he should not derive any halakhot from it. But if so, from where does he derive that one who slaughters outside for the sake of an ordinary purpose is liable? The Gemara answers: He derives it from the verse: 鈥淏lood shall be imputed to that man; he has shed blood鈥 (Leviticus 17:4), which teaches that even one who slaughters for the sake of an ordinary man is liable.

讛注诇讛 讜讞讝专 讜讛注诇讛 讻讜壮

搂 The mishna teaches: If one unwittingly offered up part of an offering outside the courtyard and then in a different lapse of awareness offered up other parts of that offering and then again, in another lapse of awareness, offered up yet other parts, he is liable to bring a sin offering for each act of offering up; this is the statement of Rabbi Shimon. Rabbi Yosei says: He is liable to bring only one sin offering.

讗诪专 专讬砖 诇拽讬砖 诪讞诇讜拽转 讘讗专讘注讛 讜讞诪砖讛 讗讘专讬诐 讚诪专 住讘专 讻讬 讻转讬讘 诇注砖讜转 讗转讜 注诇 讛砖诇诐 讛讜讗 讞讬讬讘 讜讗讬谞讜 讞讬讬讘 注诇 讛讞住专 讗讻诇 讘讛诪讛 讻转讬讘 讜诪专 住讘专 讗讻诇 讗讘专 讜讗讘专 讻转讬讘 讗讘诇 讗讘专 讗讞讚 讚讘专讬 讛讻诇 讗讬谞讜 讞讬讬讘 讗诇讗 讗讞转

The Gemara cites two opinions concerning the case under dispute. Reish Lakish says: The dispute in the mishna concerns four or five limbs that were offered up in different lapses of awareness. As one Sage, Rabbi Yosei, holds: When it is written: 鈥淭o sacrifice it鈥 (Leviticus 17:9), which teaches the halakha that for offering up a complete item one is liable but that one is not liable for offering up an incomplete item, it is written with regard to a whole animal. Accordingly, liability to bring a sin offering is incurred only once one offers up the entire animal, even if that was done limb by limb. And the other Sage, Rabbi Shimon, holds that that verse is written with regard to each and every limb of an animal. Accordingly, one is liable for each limb he offered up. But with regard to the offering up of one limb in parts, everyone agrees that a person is liable to bring only one sin offering. According to Rabbi Shimon this would apply even if that were the only limb that was offered up; according to Rabbi Yosei this would apply only if the rest of the animal had already been offered up.

讜专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讗诪专 诪讞诇讜拽转 讘讗讘专 讗讞讚 讚诪专 住讘专 诪讜拽讟专讬 驻谞讬诐 砖讞住专讜 讜讛注诇讛 讘讞讜抓 讞讬讬讘 讜诪专 住讘专 驻讟讜专 讗讘诇 讘讗专讘注讛 讜讞诪砖讛 讗讬讘专讬谉 讚讘专讬 讛讻诇 讞讬讬讘 注诇 讻诇 讗讘专 讜讗讘专

And Rabbi Yo岣nan says: Everyone agrees that one is liable even for offering up a single limb. Furthermore, if an offering is slaughtered outside the courtyard, everyone agrees that one is liable only once an entire limb has been offered up. The dispute in the mishna concerns one limb from an offering that was slaughtered inside the courtyard that was then taken outside and offered up in parts, during different lapses of awareness. As one Sage, Rabbi Shimon, holds that for offerings that are fit to be burned inside the Temple, that became incomplete and were instead offered up outside the Temple, one is liable. Accordingly, one is liable for each part of the limb. And the other Sage, Rabbi Yosei, holds that one is exempt for offering up part of a limb outside the courtyard. Accordingly, liability is incurred only once all the parts of the limb have been offered up. But with regard to offering up four or five limbs, everyone agrees that one is liable for each and every limb, as they understand that the phrase 鈥渢o sacrifice it鈥 is written with regard to each and every limb.

讜驻诇讬讙讗 讚注讜诇讗 讚讗诪专 注讜诇讗 讛讻诇 诪讜讚讬诐 讘诪讜拽讟专讬 驻谞讬诐 砖讞住专讜 讜讛注诇讜 讘讞讜抓 砖讞讬讬讘 诇讗 谞讞诇拽讜 讗诇讗 讘诪讜拽讟专讬 讘讞讜抓 砖讞住专讜 讜讛注诇讜 讘讞讜抓 讚诪专 住讘专 驻讟讜专 讜诪专 住讘专 讞讬讬讘

And Rabbi Yo岣nan disagrees with the opinion of Ulla, as Ulla says: Everyone in the mishna concedes with regard to offerings that are fit to be burned inside the Temple courtyard that became incomplete and were instead offered up outside the courtyard, that one is liable. They disagree only with regard to offerings that, having been slaughtered outside are unfit and so will be burned outside, that became incomplete and were offered up outside. As one Sage, Rabbi Yosei, holds that one is exempt, and the other Sage, Rabbi Shimon, holds that one is liable.

讗讬讻讗 讚讗诪专讬 讗诪专 注讜诇讗 讛讻诇 诪讜讚讬诐 讘诪讜拽讟专讬 讞讜抓 砖讞住专讜 讜讛注诇讜 讘讞讜抓 砖讛讜讗 驻讟讜专 诇讗 谞讞诇拽讜 讗诇讗 讘诪讜拽讟专讬 驻谞讬诐 砖讞住专讜 讜讛注诇讜 讘讞讜抓 讚诪专 住讘专 驻讟讜专 讜诪专 住讘专 讞讬讬讘

There are those who say there is a different version of Ulla鈥檚 statement, according to which he agrees with his teacher, Rabbi Yo岣nan. Ulla says: Everyone in the mishna concedes with regard to offerings that, having been slaughtered outside the Temple are unfit and so will be burned outside, that became incomplete and were offered up outside, that one is exempt. They disagree only with regard to offerings that are fit to be burned inside that became incomplete and were instead offered up outside. As one Sage, Rabbi Yosei, holds that one is exempt, and the other Sage, Rabbi Shimon, holds that one is liable.

讜驻诇讬讙讬 讚讗讘讜讛 讚砖诪讜讗诇 讗诇讬砖谞讗 拽诪讗 讚注讜诇讗 讚讗诪专 讗讘讜讛 讚砖诪讜讗诇 讻诪讗谉 诪讛讚专讬谞谉 驻讜拽注讬谉 诇讙讘讬 诪讝讘讞 讻诪讗谉 讚诇讗 讻专讘讬 讬讜住讬

And the statement of Shmuel鈥檚 father disagrees with the first version of Ulla鈥檚 statement, as Shmuel鈥檚 father says: In accordance with whose opinion do we restore limbs that were dislodged from upon the altar to the altar? In accordance with whose opinion? It is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei recorded in the mishna. Shmuel鈥檚 father assumes that Rabbi Yosei holds that incomplete limbs are never offered up on the altar, even if they were dislodged from the altar. Accordingly, he holds that one is not liable for offering them up outside the Temple courtyard. This is contrary to the first version of Ulla鈥檚 opinion, according to which one is liable for offering up incomplete offerings that were slaughtered inside the courtyard. Evidently, Ulla holds that an incomplete limb that was dislodged from the altar is to be restored to the altar.

讜讗讬谞讜 讞讬讬讘 注讚 砖讬注诇讛 讻讜壮 讗诪专 专讘 讛讜谞讗 诪讗讬 讟注诪讗 讚专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讚讻转讬讘 讜讬讘谉 谞讞 诪讝讘讞 诇讛壮

搂 The mishna teaches: Rabbi Yosei says: And one is liable for offering up an offering outside the courtyard only once he offers it up upon the top of an altar that was erected there. Rabbi Shimon says: Even if he offered it up on a rock or on a stone, not an altar, he is liable. Rav Huna says: What is the reason of Rabbi Yosei? As it is written: 鈥淎nd Noah built an altar to the Lord, and took of every pure animal, and of every pure bird, and offered up burnt offerings on the altar鈥 (Genesis 8:20). Noah was particular to use an altar rather than one of the available rocks. Apparently, this was because placing an item upon an altar is the only act that can be considered offering up.

讗诪专 专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 诪讗讬 讟注诪讗 讚专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 讚讻转讬讘 讜讬拽讞 诪谞讜讞 讗转 讙讚讬 讛注讝讬诐 讜讗转 讛诪谞讞讛 讜讬注诇 注诇 讛爪讜专 诇讛壮

Rabbi Yo岣nan said: What is the reason of Rabbi Shimon? As it is written: 鈥淎nd Manoah took the kid with the meal offering, and offered it up upon the rock, to the Lord鈥 (Judges 13:19). Evidently, even placing an offering upon a rock is considered an act of offering up.

讜讗讬讚讱 谞诪讬 讜讛讻转讬讘 讜讬讘谉 诪讝讘讞 诇讛壮 讛讛讜讗 讙讜讘讛讛 讘注诇诪讗 讜讗讬讚讱 谞诪讬 讛讗 讻转讬讘 讜讬拽讞 诪谞讜讞 讛讜专讗转 砖注讛 讛讬转讛

The Gemara explains how each tanna interprets the verse that supports the other. But also according to the other opinion, Rabbi Shimon鈥檚, isn鈥檛 it written: 鈥淎nd Noah built an altar to the Lord鈥? How does he explain that verse? The Gemara answers: That verse is referring merely to an elevated place and not specifically to an altar. But also according to the other opinion, Rabbi Yosei鈥檚, isn鈥檛 it written: 鈥淎nd Manoah took鈥nd offered it up upon the rock鈥? How does he explain that verse? The Gemara answers: The use of a rock in that case was a provisional edict issued in exigent circumstances, by the angel who visited Manoah, and so one cannot derive normative halakha from it.

讜讗讬讘注讬转 讗讬诪讗 讛讬讬谞讜 讟注诪讗 讚专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 讻讚转谞讬讗 专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 讗讜诪专 诪讝讘讞 驻转讞 讗讛诇 诪讜注讚 讜讗讬谉 诪讝讘讞 讘讘诪讛 诇驻讬讻讱 讛注诇讛 注诇 讛住诇注 讗讜 注诇 讛讗讘谉 讞讬讬讘

And if you wish, say instead that the reason of Rabbi Shimon is as it is taught in a baraita: Rabbi Shimon says that the verse states: 鈥淎nd the priest shall sprinkle the blood upon the altar of the Lord at the entrance of the Tent of Meeting鈥 (Leviticus 17:6). From here it is apparent that only in the Sanctuary is there a requirement for an altar, but a specifically erected altar is not required in order to offer up on a private altar during periods when it is permitted to do so. Therefore, one who offered up outside the courtyard on a rock or on a stone is liable.

讬爪讗 诪讬讘注讬 诇讬讛 讛讻讬 拽讗诪专 诇驻讬讻讱 讘砖注转 讗讬住讜专 讛讘诪讜转 讛注诇讛 注诇 讛住诇注 讗讜 注诇 讛讗讘谉 讞讬讬讘

The Gemara questions the formulation of the baraita: If the baraita was referring to offering up during a period when the use of private altars is permitted, it should have concluded: One who offered up outside on a rock or on a stone has fulfilled his obligation. Why does it state instead that he is liable? The Gemara explains: This is what the baraita is saying: Since there is no requirement for a specifically erected altar during a period when private altars are permitted, therefore, during a period when the use of private altars is prohibited, one who offers up outside on a rock or on a stone is liable.

讘注讬 专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讘专讘讬 讞谞讬谞讗 拽专谉 讜讻讘砖 讜讬住讜讚 讜专讬讘讜注 诪讛讜 砖讬注讻讘讜 讘讘诪讛

Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi 岣nina, raises a dilemma: Features that are indispensable with regard to the altar in the Temple are the corner, the ramp leading to the altar, the base of the altar, and the square shape. What is the halakha with regard to whether they are also indispensable for the validity of a private altar during a period when it is permitted to use private altars?

讗诪专 诇讬讛 专讘讬 讬专诪讬讛 转谞讬讗 拽专谉 讜讻讘砖 讜专讬讘讜注 讜讬住讜讚 诪注讻讘讬谉 讘讘诪讛 讙讚讜诇讛 讜讗讬谉 诪注讻讘讬谉 讘讘诪讛 拽讟谞讛

Rabbi Yirmeya said to him: It is taught in a baraita: The corner, the ramp, the base, and the square shape are all indispensable for the validity of a great public altar, but they are not indispensable for the validity of a small private altar.

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Zevachim 108

The William Davidson Talmud | Powered by Sefaria

Zevachim 108

专讗砖 讘谉 讬讜谞讛 砖讗讬谉 讘讜 讻讝讬转 讜诪诇讞 诪砖诇讬诪讜 诇讻讝讬转 诪讛讜

the head of a pigeon burnt offering that does not have on it an olive-bulk of flesh, but the salt that adheres to it, after it was salted in accordance with the requirement to salt it (see Leviticus 2:13), completes the measure to make an olive-bulk, what is the halakha? Is one liable for offering it up outside?

讗诪专 诇讬讛 专讘讗 诪驻专讝拽讬讗 诇专讘 讗砖讬 诇讗讜 讛讬讬谞讜 驻诇讜讙转讬讬讛讜 讚专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讜专讬砖 诇拽讬砖 转讬讘注讬 诇专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讜转讬讘注讬 诇专讬砖 诇拽讬砖

Rava from Parzakya said to Rav Ashi: Is this not identical to the dispute between Rabbi Yo岣nan and Reish Lakish with regard to a bone attached to sacrificial flesh? Rav Ashi responded: No. The dilemma can be raised according to Rabbi Yo岣nan and the dilemma can be raised according to Reish Lakish.

转讬讘注讬 诇专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 注讚 讻讗谉 诇讗 拽讗诪专 专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讛转诐 讗诇讗 注爪诐 讚诪讬谞讗 讚讘砖专 讛讜讗 讗讘诇 诪诇讞 讚诇讗讜 诪讬谞讗 讚讘专 讬讜谞讛 讛讜讗 诇讗 转讬讘注讬 诇专讬砖 诇拽讬砖 注讚 讻讗谉 诇讗 拽讗诪专 专讬砖 诇拽讬砖 讛转诐 讗诇讗 讚讗讬 驻专讬砖 诪讬谞讛 诇讗讜 诪爪讜讛 诇讗住讜拽讬 讗讘诇 讛讻讗 讚讗讬 驻专讬砖 诪爪讜讛 诇讗住讜拽讬 诇讗 讗讜 讚诇诪讗 诇讗 砖谞讗

The Gemara elaborates: The dilemma can be raised according to Rabbi Yo岣nan: Perhaps Rabbi Yo岣nan states his opinion only there, with regard to a bone, claiming that it contributes to the measure of an olive-bulk as it is of the same kind that flesh is, i.e., they are both animal parts. But in the case of salt, which is not of the same kind as a pigeon, perhaps it would not contribute to the measure. And the dilemma can also be raised according to Reish Lakish: Perhaps Reish Lakish states his opinion only there, with regard to a bone, claiming that it does not contribute to the measure of an olive-bulk, as if the bone separates from the flesh, there is no mitzva to offer the bone up on the altar. But here, with regard to salt, concerning which if it separates from the pigeon there is a mitzva to offer it up, he would not rule as he does concerning a bone attached to flesh. Or perhaps there is no difference between the cases.

转讬拽讜

The Gemara concludes: The dilemma shall stand unresolved.

专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讛讙诇讬诇讬 讗讜诪专 讻讜壮

搂 The mishna teaches: Rabbi Yosei HaGelili says: If he slaughtered an offering inside the courtyard and then offered it up outside the courtyard, he is liable. But if he slaughtered it outside, thereby rendering it unfit, and then he offered it up outside, he is exempt for the offering up, as he offered up only an item that is unfit, and one is liable only for offering up an item that is fit to be offered up inside the Temple. The Rabbis said to him: According to your reasoning, even in a case where he slaughters it inside and offers it up outside, he should be exempt, since he rendered it unfit the moment that he took it outside the courtyard. Yet, in such a case, he is certainly liable for offering it up. So too, one who slaughters an offering outside and then offers it up outside is liable.

讛砖讬讘 专讘讬 转讞转 专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讛讙诇讬诇讬 诪讛 诇砖讜讞讟 讘驻谞讬诐 讜诪注诇讛 讘讞讜抓 砖讛讬转讛 诇讜 砖注转 讛讻讜砖专 转讗诪专 讘砖讜讞讟 讞讜抓 讜诪注诇讛 讘讞讜抓 砖诇讗 讛讬转讛 诇讜 砖注转 讛讻讜砖专

While a defense of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili鈥檚 opinion is not presented in the mishna, various possibilities are recorded in a baraita: Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi responded to this challenge on behalf of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili: What is notable about slaughtering an offering inside the courtyard and then offering it up outside? It is notable in that the offering had a period of fitness. Can you say the same about slaughtering an offering outside and then offering it up outside, where the offering never had a period of fitness? It was disqualified as soon as it was slaughtered and so it is reasonable that one is not liable for offering it up.

讛砖讬讘 专讘讬 讗诇注讝专 讘专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 转讞转 专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讛讙诇讬诇讬 诪讛 诇砖讜讞讟 讘驻谞讬诐 讜诪注诇讛 讘讞讜抓 砖讻谉 拽讜讚砖 诪拽讘诇讜 转讗诪专 讘砖讜讞讟 讘讞讜抓 砖讗讬谉 拽讜讚砖 诪拽讘诇讜

Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, responded to this challenge on behalf of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili: What is notable about slaughtering an offering inside the courtyard and then offering it up outside? It is notable in that even though the offering was taken outside the courtyard and thereby disqualified, if it is, albeit unlawfully, placed on the altar, the sanctity of the altar renders the offering acceptable and it should not be removed from the altar because the disqualification occurred in sanctity, i.e., during the course of the Temple service (see 84a). Can you say the same about slaughtering an offering outside and then offering it up outside, where the disqualification did not occur in sanctity and so the sanctity of the altar does not render the offering acceptable? Therefore, even if it were placed there, it must be removed.

诪讗讬 讘讬谞讬讬讛讜 讗诪专 讝注讬专讬 砖讞讬讟转 诇讬诇讛 讗讬讻讗 讘讬谞讬讬讛讜

The Gemara asks: What is the practical difference between these two responses? Ze鈥檈iri said: The practical difference between them is a case of slaughtering an offering at night inside the courtyard and then offering it up outside. According to Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi鈥檚 response, one would be exempt, as slaughtering at night disqualifies the offering from its very outset; whereas according to the response of Rabbi Elazar, one would be liable as this is a disqualification that occurs in sanctity.

专讘讛 讗诪专 拽讘诇讛 讘讻诇讬 讞讜诇 讗讬讻讗 讘讬谞讬讬讛讜

Rabba said: The practical difference between them is a case in which, after slaughtering the offering in the courtyard, the collection of the blood was done there in a non-sacred vessel and then the animal was offered up outside the courtyard. According to Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi鈥檚 defense, one would be exempt, as collecting the blood in a non-sacred vessel disqualifies the offering from its very outset; whereas according to the response of Rabbi Elazar, one would be liable as this is a disqualification that occurs in sanctity.

讟诪讗 砖讗讻诇 讘讬谉 拽讜讚砖 讻讜壮

搂 The mishna teaches: One who is ritually impure who ate sacrificial food, whether it was ritually impure sacrificial food or ritually pure sacrificial food, is liable to receive karet if he did so intentionally, and to bring a sliding-scale offering if he did so unwittingly. Rabbi Yosei HaGelili says: An impure person who ate pure sacrificial food is liable. But an impure person who ate impure sacrificial food is exempt, as he merely ate an impure item, and the prohibition against eating sacrificial food while one is impure applies only to pure sacrificial food. The Rabbis said to him: According to your logic, even in a case of an impure person who ate what had been pure sacrificial food, once he has touched it, he has thereby rendered it ritually impure. Yet, in such a case, he is certainly liable for eating it. So too, an impure person who ate impure sacrificial food is liable.

砖驻讬专 拽讗诪专讬 诇讬讛 专讘谞谉 诇专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讛讙诇讬诇讬

The Gemara notes: The Rabbis are saying well to Rabbi Yosei HaGelili; why does Rabbi Yosei HaGelili disagree?

讗诪专 专讘讗 讻诇 讛讬讻讗 讚谞讟诪讗 讟讜诪讗转 讛讙讜祝 讜讗讞专 讻讱 谞讟诪讗 讘砖专 讚讻讜诇讬 注诇诪讗 诇讗 驻诇讬讙讬 讚讞讬讬讘 砖讻谉 讟讜诪讗转 讛讙讜祝 讘讻专转

Rava said in elaboration of the dispute: Wherever one is first rendered impure with impurity of the body and then afterward the sacrificial meat is rendered impure, everyone agrees that he is liable if he eats the meat. This is because the prohibition due to the impurity of one鈥檚 body, which carries the punishment of karet, took effect while the meat was still ritually pure, and so this prohibition is not abrogated even when the meat is later rendered impure.

讻讬 驻诇讬讙讬 讻砖谞讟诪讗 讘砖专 讜讗讞专 讻讱 谞讟诪讗 讛讙讜祝

When they disagree is in a case where first the meat is rendered impure and then afterward the person鈥檚 body is rendered impure. In general, once an item has become subject to a prohibition, it cannot then become subject to an additional prohibition. In this case, once the meat is rendered impure, it is prohibited for anyone to eat it, even if that person is ritually pure. If that person is later rendered impure, the meat should not become subject to the additional prohibition against a ritually impure person eating sacrificial meat.

讚专讘谞谉 住讘专讬 讗诪专讬谞谉 诪讬讙讜 讜专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讛讙诇讬诇讬 住讘专 诇讗 讗诪专讬谞谉 诪讬讙讜

Rava explains that Rabbi Yosei HaGelili and the Rabbis disagree as to whether this case is an exception to that principle, as the Rabbis hold that we say that since the prohibition due to the ritual impurity of one鈥檚 body is a more inclusive prohibition, as it prohibits that person from eating all sacrificial meat, both pure and impure, it therefore takes effect also with regard to this meat, even though it was already rendered impure before the person was. And Rabbi Yosei HaGelili says that we do not say that since it is a more inclusive prohibition, it takes effect.

讜专讘讬 讬讜住讬 谞讛讬 讚诪讬讙讜 诇讗 讗诪专讬谞谉 转讬转讬 讟讜诪讗转 讛讙讜祝 讚讞诪讬专讗 讜转讞讜诇 注诇 讟讜诪讗转 讘砖专

The Gemara asks: But even according to Rabbi Yosei HaGelili, granted that we do not say that since it is a more inclusive prohibition it will take effect. But still, the prohibition due to the impurity of a person鈥檚 body, which is a more stringent prohibition as it carries the punishment of karet, should come and take effect upon the prohibition due to the ritual impurity of the meat itself, as that prohibition is less stringent as it carries only the punishment of lashes. One exception to the principle that a second prohibition does not take effect is that even if an item or person is already subject to a prohibition, a more stringent prohibition will still take effect with regard to it.

讗诪专 专讘 讗砖讬 诪诪讗讬 讚讟讜诪讗转 讛讙讜祝 讞诪讜专讛 讚诇诪讗 讟讜诪讗转 讘砖专 讞诪讜专讛 砖讻谉 讗讬谉 诇讛 讟讛专讛 讘诪拽讜讛

Rav Ashi said: From where is it apparent that the prohibition due to the impurity of the person鈥檚 body is more stringent? Perhaps the prohibition due to the impurity of the meat is more stringent, as impure meat does not have the possibility of purification in a ritual bath, whereas a ritually impure person does. Since the prohibition due to the person鈥檚 impurity is not more stringent in every regard, it cannot take effect upon meat that is already prohibited due to its own impurity.

诪转谞讬壮 讞讜诪专 讘砖讞讬讟讛 诪讘注诇讬讬讛 讜讘注诇讬讬讛 诪讘砖讞讬讟讛

MISHNA: There is a greater stringency with regard to slaughtering outside the Temple courtyard than with regard to offering up outside, and there is a greater stringency with regard to offering up outside than with regard to slaughtering outside.

讞讜诪专 讘砖讞讬讟讛 砖讛砖讜讞讟 诇讛讚讬讜讟 讞讬讬讘 讜讛诪注诇讛 诇讛讚讬讜讟 驻讟讜专 讞讜诪专 讘注诇讬讬讛 砖谞讬诐 砖讗讞讝讜 讘住讻讬谉 讜砖讞讟讜 驻讟讜专讬诐 讗讞讝讜 讘讗讘专 讜讛注诇讜 讞讬讬讘讬谉

The mishna elaborates: The greater stringency with regard to slaughtering outside is that one who slaughters an offering outside the Temple courtyard even for the sake of an ordinary purpose, not for the sake of God, is liable. But one who offers up an offering outside the courtyard for the sake of an ordinary purpose is exempt. The greater stringency with regard to offering up outside is that two people who grasped a knife and together slaughtered an offering outside the courtyard are exempt. But if two grasped a limb from an offering and together offered it up outside, they are liable.

讛注诇讛 讞讝专 讜讛注诇讛 讜讞讝专 讜讛注诇讛 讞讬讬讘 注诇 讻诇 注诇讬讬讛 讚讘专讬 专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讗讜诪专 讗讬谞讜 讞讬讬讘 讗诇讗 讗讞转

If one unwittingly offered up part of an offering outside the courtyard and then in a different lapse of awareness offered up other parts of that offering and then again, in another lapse of awareness, offered up yet other parts, he is liable to bring a sin offering for each act of offering up; this is the statement of Rabbi Shimon. Rabbi Yosei says: He is liable to bring only one sin offering.

讜讗讬谞讜 讞讬讬讘 注讚 砖讬注诇讛 诇专讗砖 讛诪讝讘讞 专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 讗讜诪专 讗驻讬诇讜 讛注诇讛 注诇 讛住诇注 讗讜 注诇 讛讗讘谉 讞讬讬讘

Rabbi Yosei adds: And one is liable for offering up an offering outside the courtyard only once he offers it up at the top of an altar that was erected there. Rabbi Shimon says: Even if he offered it up on a rock or on a stone, not an altar, he is liable.

讙诪壮 诪讗讬 砖谞讗 讛诪注诇讛 诇讛讚讬讜讟 讚驻讟讜专 讚讻转讬讘 诇讛壮 讘砖讞讬讟讛 谞诪讬 讛讻转讬讘 诇讛壮

GEMARA: The Gemara analyzes the first halakha of the mishna: What is different about one who offers up outside for the sake of an ordinary purpose, that he is exempt? As it is written: 鈥淎nd he will not bring it to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting, to sacrifice it to the Lord鈥 (Leviticus 17:9), which indicates that the liability applies only to offering up for the sake of the Lord. The Gemara questions this: But with regard to slaughtering, isn鈥檛 it also written: 鈥淥r that slaughters it outside the camp, and he did not bring it to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting to sacrifice an offering to the Lord鈥 (Leviticus 17:3鈥4)?

砖讗谞讬 讛转诐 讚讗诪专 拽专讗 讗讬砖 讗讬砖 讙讘讬 讛注诇讗讛 谞诪讬 讻转讬讘 讗讬砖 讗讬砖 诪讬讘注讬 诇讬讛 诇砖谞讬诐 砖讛注诇讜 讘讗讘专 讞讬讬讘讬谉

The Gemara explains: It is different there, with regard to slaughtering, as the verse states: 鈥淎ny man [ish ish] of the house of Israel鈥hat slaughters it outside the camp鈥 (Leviticus 17:3). The amplification indicated by the phrase 鈥ish ish鈥 teaches that one is liable even for slaughtering for the sake of an ordinary purpose. The Gemara challenges: But also with regard to offering up it is written: 鈥淎ny man [ish ish] of the house of Israel鈥hat offers up a burnt offering鈥 (Leviticus 17:8). The Gemara explains: That amplification is necessary to teach that two people who offered up a limb of an offering together outside the courtyard are liable.

讗讬 讛讻讬 讛讻讗 谞诪讬 诪讬讘注讬 诇讬讛 诇砖谞讬诐 砖讗讞讝讜 讘住讻讬谉 讜砖讞讟讜 砖讞讬讬讘讬谉 砖讗谞讬 讛转诐 讚讗诪专 拽专讗 讛讛讜讗 讗讞讚 讜诇讗 砖谞讬诐

The Gemara asks: If so, here too, with regard to slaughtering, the phrase 鈥ish ishshould be used to teach that two people who grasped a knife and together slaughtered an offering outside the courtyard are liable, contrary to the ruling of the mishna. Why are the two parallel phrases expounded in different ways? The Gemara explains: It is different there, with regard to slaughtering, as the verse states: 鈥淎nd that man shall be cut off from among his people鈥 (Leviticus 17:4). The term 鈥渢hat man,鈥 which is in the singular, indicates that only one who acts alone is liable, but not two who act together.

讗讬 讛讻讬 讙讘讬 讛注诇讗讛 谞诪讬 讛讗 讻转讬讘 讛讛讜讗 诪讬讘注讬 诇讬讛

The Gemara challenges: But if so, also with regard to offering up, isn鈥檛 it written: 鈥淭hat man shall be cut off from his people鈥 (Leviticus 17:9)? Why isn鈥檛 that term also expounded to teach that only one who acts alone is liable? The Gemara explains: That term is necessary

诇诪注讜讟讬 砖讜讙讙 讗谞讜住 讜诪讜讟注讛 讗讬 讛讻讬 讛讻讗 谞诪讬 诪讬讘注讬 诇诪注讜讟讬 讗谞讜住 砖讜讙讙 讜诪讜讟注讛

to exclude from the liability for karet one whose violation was unwitting, or who was compelled to act, or who was mistaken. The term 鈥渢hat man鈥 teaches that only one who offered up with intent is liable to receive karet. The Gemara challenges: If so, here too, with regard to slaughtering outside, the term is necessary to exclude one whose violation was unwitting, or who was compelled to act, or who was mistaken. How can the term be used to teach that only one who acts alone is liable?

转专讬 讛讛讜讗 讻转讬讘讬

The Gemara explains: With regard to slaughtering outside, two instances of the term 鈥渢hat man鈥 are written: 鈥淏lood shall be imputed to that man, he has shed blood, and that man shall be cut off from among his people鈥 (Leviticus 17:4). One instance teaches that only one who acts with intent is liable to receive karet, and the other teaches that only one who acts alone is liable.

讜讗诇讗 诇讛壮 诇诪讛 诇讬 诇讛讜爪讬讗 砖注讬专 讛诪砖转诇讞

The Gemara has now justified its claim that the liability of one who slaughters an offering outside for the sake of an ordinary purpose is derived from the phrase 鈥ish ish.鈥 Accordingly, the Gemara asks: But why do I need the term 鈥渢o the Lord鈥? The Gemara explains: It is written to exclude from liability one who slaughters the Yom Kippur scapegoat outside the courtyard.

讞讜诪专 讘讛注诇讗讛 讻讜壮

搂 The mishna teaches: The greater stringency with regard to offering up outside is that two people who grasped a knife and together slaughtered an offering outside the courtyard are exempt. But if two grasped a limb from an offering and together offered it up outside, they are liable.

转谞讜 专讘谞谉 讗讬砖 讗讬砖 诪讛 转诇诪讜讚 诇讜诪专 砖谞讬诐 砖讗讞讝讜 讘讗讘专 讜讛注诇讜 砖讞讬讬讘讬谉 砖讬讻讜诇 讜讛诇讗 讚讬谉 讛讜讗 讜诪讛 讛砖讜讞讟 诇讛讚讬讜讟 砖讞讬讬讘 砖谞讬诐 砖讗讞讝讜 讘住讻讬谉 讜砖讞讟讜 驻讟讜专讬谉 讛诪注诇讛 诇讛讚讬讜讟 砖驻讟讜专 讗讬谞讜 讚讬谉 砖砖谞讬诐 砖讗讞讝讜 驻讟讜专讬谉 转诇诪讜讚 诇讜诪专 讗讬砖 讗讬砖 讚讘专讬 专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉

The Sages taught in a baraita: What halakha is alluded to when the verse states: 鈥淎ny man [ish ish]鈥that offers up a burnt offering or sacrifice鈥 (Leviticus 17:8)? The verse teaches that two people who grasped a limb of an offering and offered it up together outside the courtyard are liable. It is necessary for the verse to teach this, as one might have thought to say: Could this not be derived through an a fortiori inference: If with regard to slaughtering outside the courtyard, one who slaughters for the sake of an ordinary purpose is liable, and nevertheless, two who grasped a knife and together slaughtered an offering are exempt, then with regard to offering up outside the courtyard, where one who offers up for the sake of an ordinary purpose is exempt, is it not logical that two who grasped a limb and offered it up will also be exempt? To counter this, the verse states 鈥ish ish to teach that they are liable for offering up together; this is the statement of Rabbi Shimon.

专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讗讜诪专 讛讛讜讗 讗讞讚 讜诇讗 砖谞讬诐 讗诐 讻谉 诪讛 转诇诪讜讚 诇讜诪专 讗讬砖 讗讬砖 讚讘专讛 转讜专讛 讻诇砖讜谉 讘谞讬 讗讚诐

Rabbi Yosei says that the halakha concerning this case is derived from a different verse. The term 鈥渢hat [hahu] man鈥 (Leviticus 17:9), which is in the singular, indicates that only one who acts alone is liable, but not two who act together. The baraita asks: If so, what halakha is alluded to when the verse states 鈥ish ish鈥? The baraita explains: Rabbi Yosei holds that the reason the Torah uses the doubled term 鈥ish ish鈥 is that the Torah spoke in the language of people, and no halakhot are to be derived from it.

讜专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 讛讗讬 讛讛讜讗 诪讬讘注讬 诇讬讛 诇诪注讜讟讬 砖讜讙讙 讗谞讜住 诪讜讟注讛 讜专讘讬 讬讜住讬 诪讛讜讗 讛讛讜讗 讜专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 讛讜讗 讛讛讜讗 诇讗 讚专讬砖

The Gemara asks: And Rabbi Shimon, what does he derive from the term 鈥渢hat man鈥? The Gemara explains: This term: 鈥淭hat man,鈥 is necessary to exclude from liability one whose violation was unwitting, or who was compelled to act, or who was mistaken. The Gemara notes: And Rabbi Yosei derives that halakha from the fact that the verse could have stated hu and instead stated hahu.鈥 The Hebrew word for: That, hahu, is formed of the definite article ha and the pronoun hu. And Rabbi Shimon does not expound any halakhot from the fact that the verse could have stated hu and instead stated hahu.鈥 He holds that the expanded form is used because the Torah spoke in the language of people.

讜专讘讬 讬讜住讬 诪讚讛讗讬 讗讬砖 讗讬砖 讚讘专讛 转讜专讛 讻诇砖讜谉 讘谞讬 讗讚诐 讛讛讜讗 讗讬砖 讗讬砖 谞诪讬 讚讘专讛 转讜专讛 讻诇砖讜谉 讘谞讬 讗讚诐 讜讗诇讗 讛砖讜讞讟 诇讛讚讬讜讟 诪谞讗 诇讬讛 讚讞讬讬讘 谞驻拽讗 诇讬讛 诪讚诐 讬讞砖讘 诇讗讬砖 讛讛讜讗 讚诐 砖驻讱 讜讗驻讬诇讜 讛砖讜讞讟 诇讗讬砖

The Gemara asks: And as for Rabbi Yosei, from the fact that he holds that nothing is to be derived from the phrase ish ish written with regard to offering up, as he holds that the Torah spoke in the language of people, then also with regard to that phrase: 鈥淎ny man [ish ish]鈥 (Leviticus 17:3), written with regard to slaughtering, since he holds that the Torah spoke in the language of people, he should not derive any halakhot from it. But if so, from where does he derive that one who slaughters outside for the sake of an ordinary purpose is liable? The Gemara answers: He derives it from the verse: 鈥淏lood shall be imputed to that man; he has shed blood鈥 (Leviticus 17:4), which teaches that even one who slaughters for the sake of an ordinary man is liable.

讛注诇讛 讜讞讝专 讜讛注诇讛 讻讜壮

搂 The mishna teaches: If one unwittingly offered up part of an offering outside the courtyard and then in a different lapse of awareness offered up other parts of that offering and then again, in another lapse of awareness, offered up yet other parts, he is liable to bring a sin offering for each act of offering up; this is the statement of Rabbi Shimon. Rabbi Yosei says: He is liable to bring only one sin offering.

讗诪专 专讬砖 诇拽讬砖 诪讞诇讜拽转 讘讗专讘注讛 讜讞诪砖讛 讗讘专讬诐 讚诪专 住讘专 讻讬 讻转讬讘 诇注砖讜转 讗转讜 注诇 讛砖诇诐 讛讜讗 讞讬讬讘 讜讗讬谞讜 讞讬讬讘 注诇 讛讞住专 讗讻诇 讘讛诪讛 讻转讬讘 讜诪专 住讘专 讗讻诇 讗讘专 讜讗讘专 讻转讬讘 讗讘诇 讗讘专 讗讞讚 讚讘专讬 讛讻诇 讗讬谞讜 讞讬讬讘 讗诇讗 讗讞转

The Gemara cites two opinions concerning the case under dispute. Reish Lakish says: The dispute in the mishna concerns four or five limbs that were offered up in different lapses of awareness. As one Sage, Rabbi Yosei, holds: When it is written: 鈥淭o sacrifice it鈥 (Leviticus 17:9), which teaches the halakha that for offering up a complete item one is liable but that one is not liable for offering up an incomplete item, it is written with regard to a whole animal. Accordingly, liability to bring a sin offering is incurred only once one offers up the entire animal, even if that was done limb by limb. And the other Sage, Rabbi Shimon, holds that that verse is written with regard to each and every limb of an animal. Accordingly, one is liable for each limb he offered up. But with regard to the offering up of one limb in parts, everyone agrees that a person is liable to bring only one sin offering. According to Rabbi Shimon this would apply even if that were the only limb that was offered up; according to Rabbi Yosei this would apply only if the rest of the animal had already been offered up.

讜专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讗诪专 诪讞诇讜拽转 讘讗讘专 讗讞讚 讚诪专 住讘专 诪讜拽讟专讬 驻谞讬诐 砖讞住专讜 讜讛注诇讛 讘讞讜抓 讞讬讬讘 讜诪专 住讘专 驻讟讜专 讗讘诇 讘讗专讘注讛 讜讞诪砖讛 讗讬讘专讬谉 讚讘专讬 讛讻诇 讞讬讬讘 注诇 讻诇 讗讘专 讜讗讘专

And Rabbi Yo岣nan says: Everyone agrees that one is liable even for offering up a single limb. Furthermore, if an offering is slaughtered outside the courtyard, everyone agrees that one is liable only once an entire limb has been offered up. The dispute in the mishna concerns one limb from an offering that was slaughtered inside the courtyard that was then taken outside and offered up in parts, during different lapses of awareness. As one Sage, Rabbi Shimon, holds that for offerings that are fit to be burned inside the Temple, that became incomplete and were instead offered up outside the Temple, one is liable. Accordingly, one is liable for each part of the limb. And the other Sage, Rabbi Yosei, holds that one is exempt for offering up part of a limb outside the courtyard. Accordingly, liability is incurred only once all the parts of the limb have been offered up. But with regard to offering up four or five limbs, everyone agrees that one is liable for each and every limb, as they understand that the phrase 鈥渢o sacrifice it鈥 is written with regard to each and every limb.

讜驻诇讬讙讗 讚注讜诇讗 讚讗诪专 注讜诇讗 讛讻诇 诪讜讚讬诐 讘诪讜拽讟专讬 驻谞讬诐 砖讞住专讜 讜讛注诇讜 讘讞讜抓 砖讞讬讬讘 诇讗 谞讞诇拽讜 讗诇讗 讘诪讜拽讟专讬 讘讞讜抓 砖讞住专讜 讜讛注诇讜 讘讞讜抓 讚诪专 住讘专 驻讟讜专 讜诪专 住讘专 讞讬讬讘

And Rabbi Yo岣nan disagrees with the opinion of Ulla, as Ulla says: Everyone in the mishna concedes with regard to offerings that are fit to be burned inside the Temple courtyard that became incomplete and were instead offered up outside the courtyard, that one is liable. They disagree only with regard to offerings that, having been slaughtered outside are unfit and so will be burned outside, that became incomplete and were offered up outside. As one Sage, Rabbi Yosei, holds that one is exempt, and the other Sage, Rabbi Shimon, holds that one is liable.

讗讬讻讗 讚讗诪专讬 讗诪专 注讜诇讗 讛讻诇 诪讜讚讬诐 讘诪讜拽讟专讬 讞讜抓 砖讞住专讜 讜讛注诇讜 讘讞讜抓 砖讛讜讗 驻讟讜专 诇讗 谞讞诇拽讜 讗诇讗 讘诪讜拽讟专讬 驻谞讬诐 砖讞住专讜 讜讛注诇讜 讘讞讜抓 讚诪专 住讘专 驻讟讜专 讜诪专 住讘专 讞讬讬讘

There are those who say there is a different version of Ulla鈥檚 statement, according to which he agrees with his teacher, Rabbi Yo岣nan. Ulla says: Everyone in the mishna concedes with regard to offerings that, having been slaughtered outside the Temple are unfit and so will be burned outside, that became incomplete and were offered up outside, that one is exempt. They disagree only with regard to offerings that are fit to be burned inside that became incomplete and were instead offered up outside. As one Sage, Rabbi Yosei, holds that one is exempt, and the other Sage, Rabbi Shimon, holds that one is liable.

讜驻诇讬讙讬 讚讗讘讜讛 讚砖诪讜讗诇 讗诇讬砖谞讗 拽诪讗 讚注讜诇讗 讚讗诪专 讗讘讜讛 讚砖诪讜讗诇 讻诪讗谉 诪讛讚专讬谞谉 驻讜拽注讬谉 诇讙讘讬 诪讝讘讞 讻诪讗谉 讚诇讗 讻专讘讬 讬讜住讬

And the statement of Shmuel鈥檚 father disagrees with the first version of Ulla鈥檚 statement, as Shmuel鈥檚 father says: In accordance with whose opinion do we restore limbs that were dislodged from upon the altar to the altar? In accordance with whose opinion? It is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei recorded in the mishna. Shmuel鈥檚 father assumes that Rabbi Yosei holds that incomplete limbs are never offered up on the altar, even if they were dislodged from the altar. Accordingly, he holds that one is not liable for offering them up outside the Temple courtyard. This is contrary to the first version of Ulla鈥檚 opinion, according to which one is liable for offering up incomplete offerings that were slaughtered inside the courtyard. Evidently, Ulla holds that an incomplete limb that was dislodged from the altar is to be restored to the altar.

讜讗讬谞讜 讞讬讬讘 注讚 砖讬注诇讛 讻讜壮 讗诪专 专讘 讛讜谞讗 诪讗讬 讟注诪讗 讚专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讚讻转讬讘 讜讬讘谉 谞讞 诪讝讘讞 诇讛壮

搂 The mishna teaches: Rabbi Yosei says: And one is liable for offering up an offering outside the courtyard only once he offers it up upon the top of an altar that was erected there. Rabbi Shimon says: Even if he offered it up on a rock or on a stone, not an altar, he is liable. Rav Huna says: What is the reason of Rabbi Yosei? As it is written: 鈥淎nd Noah built an altar to the Lord, and took of every pure animal, and of every pure bird, and offered up burnt offerings on the altar鈥 (Genesis 8:20). Noah was particular to use an altar rather than one of the available rocks. Apparently, this was because placing an item upon an altar is the only act that can be considered offering up.

讗诪专 专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 诪讗讬 讟注诪讗 讚专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 讚讻转讬讘 讜讬拽讞 诪谞讜讞 讗转 讙讚讬 讛注讝讬诐 讜讗转 讛诪谞讞讛 讜讬注诇 注诇 讛爪讜专 诇讛壮

Rabbi Yo岣nan said: What is the reason of Rabbi Shimon? As it is written: 鈥淎nd Manoah took the kid with the meal offering, and offered it up upon the rock, to the Lord鈥 (Judges 13:19). Evidently, even placing an offering upon a rock is considered an act of offering up.

讜讗讬讚讱 谞诪讬 讜讛讻转讬讘 讜讬讘谉 诪讝讘讞 诇讛壮 讛讛讜讗 讙讜讘讛讛 讘注诇诪讗 讜讗讬讚讱 谞诪讬 讛讗 讻转讬讘 讜讬拽讞 诪谞讜讞 讛讜专讗转 砖注讛 讛讬转讛

The Gemara explains how each tanna interprets the verse that supports the other. But also according to the other opinion, Rabbi Shimon鈥檚, isn鈥檛 it written: 鈥淎nd Noah built an altar to the Lord鈥? How does he explain that verse? The Gemara answers: That verse is referring merely to an elevated place and not specifically to an altar. But also according to the other opinion, Rabbi Yosei鈥檚, isn鈥檛 it written: 鈥淎nd Manoah took鈥nd offered it up upon the rock鈥? How does he explain that verse? The Gemara answers: The use of a rock in that case was a provisional edict issued in exigent circumstances, by the angel who visited Manoah, and so one cannot derive normative halakha from it.

讜讗讬讘注讬转 讗讬诪讗 讛讬讬谞讜 讟注诪讗 讚专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 讻讚转谞讬讗 专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 讗讜诪专 诪讝讘讞 驻转讞 讗讛诇 诪讜注讚 讜讗讬谉 诪讝讘讞 讘讘诪讛 诇驻讬讻讱 讛注诇讛 注诇 讛住诇注 讗讜 注诇 讛讗讘谉 讞讬讬讘

And if you wish, say instead that the reason of Rabbi Shimon is as it is taught in a baraita: Rabbi Shimon says that the verse states: 鈥淎nd the priest shall sprinkle the blood upon the altar of the Lord at the entrance of the Tent of Meeting鈥 (Leviticus 17:6). From here it is apparent that only in the Sanctuary is there a requirement for an altar, but a specifically erected altar is not required in order to offer up on a private altar during periods when it is permitted to do so. Therefore, one who offered up outside the courtyard on a rock or on a stone is liable.

讬爪讗 诪讬讘注讬 诇讬讛 讛讻讬 拽讗诪专 诇驻讬讻讱 讘砖注转 讗讬住讜专 讛讘诪讜转 讛注诇讛 注诇 讛住诇注 讗讜 注诇 讛讗讘谉 讞讬讬讘

The Gemara questions the formulation of the baraita: If the baraita was referring to offering up during a period when the use of private altars is permitted, it should have concluded: One who offered up outside on a rock or on a stone has fulfilled his obligation. Why does it state instead that he is liable? The Gemara explains: This is what the baraita is saying: Since there is no requirement for a specifically erected altar during a period when private altars are permitted, therefore, during a period when the use of private altars is prohibited, one who offers up outside on a rock or on a stone is liable.

讘注讬 专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讘专讘讬 讞谞讬谞讗 拽专谉 讜讻讘砖 讜讬住讜讚 讜专讬讘讜注 诪讛讜 砖讬注讻讘讜 讘讘诪讛

Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi 岣nina, raises a dilemma: Features that are indispensable with regard to the altar in the Temple are the corner, the ramp leading to the altar, the base of the altar, and the square shape. What is the halakha with regard to whether they are also indispensable for the validity of a private altar during a period when it is permitted to use private altars?

讗诪专 诇讬讛 专讘讬 讬专诪讬讛 转谞讬讗 拽专谉 讜讻讘砖 讜专讬讘讜注 讜讬住讜讚 诪注讻讘讬谉 讘讘诪讛 讙讚讜诇讛 讜讗讬谉 诪注讻讘讬谉 讘讘诪讛 拽讟谞讛

Rabbi Yirmeya said to him: It is taught in a baraita: The corner, the ramp, the base, and the square shape are all indispensable for the validity of a great public altar, but they are not indispensable for the validity of a small private altar.

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