Zevachim 108

ראש בן יונה שאין בו כזית ומלח משלימו לכזית מהו

the head of a pigeon burnt offering that does not have on it an olive-bulk of flesh, but the salt that adheres to it, after it was salted in accordance with the requirement to salt it (see Leviticus 2:13), completes the measure to make an olive-bulk, what is the halakha? Is one liable for offering it up outside?

אמר ליה רבא מפרזקיא לרב אשי לאו היינו פלוגתייהו דרבי יוחנן וריש לקיש תיבעי לרבי יוחנן ותיבעי לריש לקיש

Rava from Parzakya said to Rav Ashi: Is this not identical to the dispute between Rabbi Yoḥanan and Reish Lakish with regard to a bone attached to sacrificial flesh? Rav Ashi responded: No. The dilemma can be raised according to Rabbi Yoḥanan and the dilemma can be raised according to Reish Lakish.

תיבעי לרבי יוחנן עד כאן לא קאמר רבי יוחנן התם אלא עצם דמינא דבשר הוא אבל מלח דלאו מינא דבר יונה הוא לא תיבעי לריש לקיש עד כאן לא קאמר ריש לקיש התם אלא דאי פריש מינה לאו מצוה לאסוקי אבל הכא דאי פריש מצוה לאסוקי לא או דלמא לא שנא

The Gemara elaborates: The dilemma can be raised according to Rabbi Yoḥanan: Perhaps Rabbi Yoḥanan states his opinion only there, with regard to a bone, claiming that it contributes to the measure of an olive-bulk as it is of the same kind that flesh is, i.e., they are both animal parts. But in the case of salt, which is not of the same kind as a pigeon, perhaps it would not contribute to the measure. And the dilemma can also be raised according to Reish Lakish: Perhaps Reish Lakish states his opinion only there, with regard to a bone, claiming that it does not contribute to the measure of an olive-bulk, as if the bone separates from the flesh, there is no mitzva to offer the bone up on the altar. But here, with regard to salt, concerning which if it separates from the pigeon there is a mitzva to offer it up, he would not rule as he does concerning a bone attached to flesh. Or perhaps there is no difference between the cases.

תיקו

The Gemara concludes: The dilemma shall stand unresolved.

רבי יוסי הגלילי אומר כו׳

§ The mishna teaches: Rabbi Yosei HaGelili says: If he slaughtered an offering inside the courtyard and then offered it up outside the courtyard, he is liable. But if he slaughtered it outside, thereby rendering it unfit, and then he offered it up outside, he is exempt for the offering up, as he offered up only an item that is unfit, and one is liable only for offering up an item that is fit to be offered up inside the Temple. The Rabbis said to him: According to your reasoning, even in a case where he slaughters it inside and offers it up outside, he should be exempt, since he rendered it unfit the moment that he took it outside the courtyard. Yet, in such a case, he is certainly liable for offering it up. So too, one who slaughters an offering outside and then offers it up outside is liable.

השיב רבי תחת רבי יוסי הגלילי מה לשוחט בפנים ומעלה בחוץ שהיתה לו שעת הכושר תאמר בשוחט חוץ ומעלה בחוץ שלא היתה לו שעת הכושר

While a defense of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili’s opinion is not presented in the mishna, various possibilities are recorded in a baraita: Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi responded to this challenge on behalf of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili: What is notable about slaughtering an offering inside the courtyard and then offering it up outside? It is notable in that the offering had a period of fitness. Can you say the same about slaughtering an offering outside and then offering it up outside, where the offering never had a period of fitness? It was disqualified as soon as it was slaughtered and so it is reasonable that one is not liable for offering it up.

השיב רבי אלעזר ברבי שמעון תחת רבי יוסי הגלילי מה לשוחט בפנים ומעלה בחוץ שכן קודש מקבלו תאמר בשוחט בחוץ שאין קודש מקבלו

Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, responded to this challenge on behalf of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili: What is notable about slaughtering an offering inside the courtyard and then offering it up outside? It is notable in that even though the offering was taken outside the courtyard and thereby disqualified, if it is, albeit unlawfully, placed on the altar, the sanctity of the altar renders the offering acceptable and it should not be removed from the altar because the disqualification occurred in sanctity, i.e., during the course of the Temple service (see 84a). Can you say the same about slaughtering an offering outside and then offering it up outside, where the disqualification did not occur in sanctity and so the sanctity of the altar does not render the offering acceptable? Therefore, even if it were placed there, it must be removed.

מאי בינייהו אמר זעירי שחיטת לילה איכא בינייהו

The Gemara asks: What is the practical difference between these two responses? Ze’eiri said: The practical difference between them is a case of slaughtering an offering at night inside the courtyard and then offering it up outside. According to Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi’s response, one would be exempt, as slaughtering at night disqualifies the offering from its very outset; whereas according to the response of Rabbi Elazar, one would be liable as this is a disqualification that occurs in sanctity.

רבה אמר קבלה בכלי חול איכא בינייהו

Rabba said: The practical difference between them is a case in which, after slaughtering the offering in the courtyard, the collection of the blood was done there in a non-sacred vessel and then the animal was offered up outside the courtyard. According to Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi’s defense, one would be exempt, as collecting the blood in a non-sacred vessel disqualifies the offering from its very outset; whereas according to the response of Rabbi Elazar, one would be liable as this is a disqualification that occurs in sanctity.

טמא שאכל בין קודש כו׳

§ The mishna teaches: One who is ritually impure who ate sacrificial food, whether it was ritually impure sacrificial food or ritually pure sacrificial food, is liable to receive karet if he did so intentionally, and to bring a sliding-scale offering if he did so unwittingly. Rabbi Yosei HaGelili says: An impure person who ate pure sacrificial food is liable. But an impure person who ate impure sacrificial food is exempt, as he merely ate an impure item, and the prohibition against eating sacrificial food while one is impure applies only to pure sacrificial food. The Rabbis said to him: According to your logic, even in a case of an impure person who ate what had been pure sacrificial food, once he has touched it, he has thereby rendered it ritually impure. Yet, in such a case, he is certainly liable for eating it. So too, an impure person who ate impure sacrificial food is liable.

שפיר קאמרי ליה רבנן לרבי יוסי הגלילי

The Gemara notes: The Rabbis are saying well to Rabbi Yosei HaGelili; why does Rabbi Yosei HaGelili disagree?

אמר רבא כל היכא דנטמא טומאת הגוף ואחר כך נטמא בשר דכולי עלמא לא פליגי דחייב שכן טומאת הגוף בכרת

Rava said in elaboration of the dispute: Wherever one is first rendered impure with impurity of the body and then afterward the sacrificial meat is rendered impure, everyone agrees that he is liable if he eats the meat. This is because the prohibition due to the impurity of one’s body, which carries the punishment of karet, took effect while the meat was still ritually pure, and so this prohibition is not abrogated even when the meat is later rendered impure.

כי פליגי כשנטמא בשר ואחר כך נטמא הגוף

When they disagree is in a case where first the meat is rendered impure and then afterward the person’s body is rendered impure. In general, once an item has become subject to a prohibition, it cannot then become subject to an additional prohibition. In this case, once the meat is rendered impure, it is prohibited for anyone to eat it, even if that person is ritually pure. If that person is later rendered impure, the meat should not become subject to the additional prohibition against a ritually impure person eating sacrificial meat.

דרבנן סברי אמרינן מיגו ורבי יוסי הגלילי סבר לא אמרינן מיגו

Rava explains that Rabbi Yosei HaGelili and the Rabbis disagree as to whether this case is an exception to that principle, as the Rabbis hold that we say that since the prohibition due to the ritual impurity of one’s body is a more inclusive prohibition, as it prohibits that person from eating all sacrificial meat, both pure and impure, it therefore takes effect also with regard to this meat, even though it was already rendered impure before the person was. And Rabbi Yosei HaGelili says that we do not say that since it is a more inclusive prohibition, it takes effect.

ורבי יוסי נהי דמיגו לא אמרינן תיתי טומאת הגוף דחמירא ותחול על טומאת בשר

The Gemara asks: But even according to Rabbi Yosei HaGelili, granted that we do not say that since it is a more inclusive prohibition it will take effect. But still, the prohibition due to the impurity of a person’s body, which is a more stringent prohibition as it carries the punishment of karet, should come and take effect upon the prohibition due to the ritual impurity of the meat itself, as that prohibition is less stringent as it carries only the punishment of lashes. One exception to the principle that a second prohibition does not take effect is that even if an item or person is already subject to a prohibition, a more stringent prohibition will still take effect with regard to it.

אמר רב אשי ממאי דטומאת הגוף חמורה דלמא טומאת בשר חמורה שכן אין לה טהרה במקוה

Rav Ashi said: From where is it apparent that the prohibition due to the impurity of the person’s body is more stringent? Perhaps the prohibition due to the impurity of the meat is more stringent, as impure meat does not have the possibility of purification in a ritual bath, whereas a ritually impure person does. Since the prohibition due to the person’s impurity is not more stringent in every regard, it cannot take effect upon meat that is already prohibited due to its own impurity.

מתני׳ חומר בשחיטה מבעלייה ובעלייה מבשחיטה

MISHNA: There is a greater stringency with regard to slaughtering outside the Temple courtyard than with regard to offering up outside, and there is a greater stringency with regard to offering up outside than with regard to slaughtering outside.

חומר בשחיטה שהשוחט להדיוט חייב והמעלה להדיוט פטור חומר בעלייה שנים שאחזו בסכין ושחטו פטורים אחזו באבר והעלו חייבין

The mishna elaborates: The greater stringency with regard to slaughtering outside is that one who slaughters an offering outside the Temple courtyard even for the sake of an ordinary purpose, not for the sake of God, is liable. But one who offers up an offering outside the courtyard for the sake of an ordinary purpose is exempt. The greater stringency with regard to offering up outside is that two people who grasped a knife and together slaughtered an offering outside the courtyard are exempt. But if two grasped a limb from an offering and together offered it up outside, they are liable.

העלה חזר והעלה וחזר והעלה חייב על כל עלייה דברי רבי שמעון רבי יוסי אומר אינו חייב אלא אחת

If one unwittingly offered up part of an offering outside the courtyard and then in a different lapse of awareness offered up other parts of that offering and then again, in another lapse of awareness, offered up yet other parts, he is liable to bring a sin offering for each act of offering up; this is the statement of Rabbi Shimon. Rabbi Yosei says: He is liable to bring only one sin offering.

ואינו חייב עד שיעלה לראש המזבח רבי שמעון אומר אפילו העלה על הסלע או על האבן חייב

Rabbi Yosei adds: And one is liable for offering up an offering outside the courtyard only once he offers it up at the top of an altar that was erected there. Rabbi Shimon says: Even if he offered it up on a rock or on a stone, not an altar, he is liable.

גמ׳ מאי שנא המעלה להדיוט דפטור דכתיב לה׳ בשחיטה נמי הכתיב לה׳

GEMARA: The Gemara analyzes the first halakha of the mishna: What is different about one who offers up outside for the sake of an ordinary purpose, that he is exempt? As it is written: “And he will not bring it to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting, to sacrifice it to the Lord” (Leviticus 17:9), which indicates that the liability applies only to offering up for the sake of the Lord. The Gemara questions this: But with regard to slaughtering, isn’t it also written: “Or that slaughters it outside the camp, and he did not bring it to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting to sacrifice an offering to the Lord” (Leviticus 17:3–4)?

שאני התם דאמר קרא איש איש גבי העלאה נמי כתיב איש איש מיבעי ליה לשנים שהעלו באבר חייבין

The Gemara explains: It is different there, with regard to slaughtering, as the verse states: “Any man [ish ish] of the house of Israel…that slaughters it outside the camp” (Leviticus 17:3). The amplification indicated by the phrase “ish ish” teaches that one is liable even for slaughtering for the sake of an ordinary purpose. The Gemara challenges: But also with regard to offering up it is written: “Any man [ish ish] of the house of Israel…that offers up a burnt offering” (Leviticus 17:8). The Gemara explains: That amplification is necessary to teach that two people who offered up a limb of an offering together outside the courtyard are liable.

אי הכי הכא נמי מיבעי ליה לשנים שאחזו בסכין ושחטו שחייבין שאני התם דאמר קרא ההוא אחד ולא שנים

The Gemara asks: If so, here too, with regard to slaughtering, the phrase “ish ish” should be used to teach that two people who grasped a knife and together slaughtered an offering outside the courtyard are liable, contrary to the ruling of the mishna. Why are the two parallel phrases expounded in different ways? The Gemara explains: It is different there, with regard to slaughtering, as the verse states: “And that man shall be cut off from among his people” (Leviticus 17:4). The term “that man,” which is in the singular, indicates that only one who acts alone is liable, but not two who act together.

אי הכי גבי העלאה נמי הא כתיב ההוא מיבעי ליה

The Gemara challenges: But if so, also with regard to offering up, isn’t it written: “That man shall be cut off from his people” (Leviticus 17:9)? Why isn’t that term also expounded to teach that only one who acts alone is liable? The Gemara explains: That term is necessary

למעוטי שוגג אנוס ומוטעה אי הכי הכא נמי מיבעי למעוטי אנוס שוגג ומוטעה

to exclude from the liability for karet one whose violation was unwitting, or who was compelled to act, or who was mistaken. The term “that man” teaches that only one who offered up with intent is liable to receive karet. The Gemara challenges: If so, here too, with regard to slaughtering outside, the term is necessary to exclude one whose violation was unwitting, or who was compelled to act, or who was mistaken. How can the term be used to teach that only one who acts alone is liable?

תרי ההוא כתיבי

The Gemara explains: With regard to slaughtering outside, two instances of the term “that man” are written: “Blood shall be imputed to that man, he has shed blood, and that man shall be cut off from among his people” (Leviticus 17:4). One instance teaches that only one who acts with intent is liable to receive karet, and the other teaches that only one who acts alone is liable.

ואלא לה׳ למה לי להוציא שעיר המשתלח

The Gemara has now justified its claim that the liability of one who slaughters an offering outside for the sake of an ordinary purpose is derived from the phrase “ish ish.” Accordingly, the Gemara asks: But why do I need the term “to the Lord”? The Gemara explains: It is written to exclude from liability one who slaughters the Yom Kippur scapegoat outside the courtyard.

חומר בהעלאה כו׳

§ The mishna teaches: The greater stringency with regard to offering up outside is that two people who grasped a knife and together slaughtered an offering outside the courtyard are exempt. But if two grasped a limb from an offering and together offered it up outside, they are liable.

תנו רבנן איש איש מה תלמוד לומר שנים שאחזו באבר והעלו שחייבין שיכול והלא דין הוא ומה השוחט להדיוט שחייב שנים שאחזו בסכין ושחטו פטורין המעלה להדיוט שפטור אינו דין ששנים שאחזו פטורין תלמוד לומר איש איש דברי רבי שמעון

The Sages taught in a baraita: What halakha is alluded to when the verse states: “Any man [ish ish]…that offers up a burnt offering or sacrifice” (Leviticus 17:8)? The verse teaches that two people who grasped a limb of an offering and offered it up together outside the courtyard are liable. It is necessary for the verse to teach this, as one might have thought to say: Could this not be derived through an a fortiori inference: If with regard to slaughtering outside the courtyard, one who slaughters for the sake of an ordinary purpose is liable, and nevertheless, two who grasped a knife and together slaughtered an offering are exempt, then with regard to offering up outside the courtyard, where one who offers up for the sake of an ordinary purpose is exempt, is it not logical that two who grasped a limb and offered it up will also be exempt? To counter this, the verse states “ish ish” to teach that they are liable for offering up together; this is the statement of Rabbi Shimon.

רבי יוסי אומר ההוא אחד ולא שנים אם כן מה תלמוד לומר איש איש דברה תורה כלשון בני אדם

Rabbi Yosei says that the halakha concerning this case is derived from a different verse. The term “that [hahu] man” (Leviticus 17:9), which is in the singular, indicates that only one who acts alone is liable, but not two who act together. The baraita asks: If so, what halakha is alluded to when the verse states “ish ish”? The baraita explains: Rabbi Yosei holds that the reason the Torah uses the doubled term “ish ish” is that the Torah spoke in the language of people, and no halakhot are to be derived from it.

ורבי שמעון האי ההוא מיבעי ליה למעוטי שוגג אנוס מוטעה ורבי יוסי מהוא ההוא ורבי שמעון הוא ההוא לא דריש

The Gemara asks: And Rabbi Shimon, what does he derive from the term “that man”? The Gemara explains: This term: “That man,” is necessary to exclude from liability one whose violation was unwitting, or who was compelled to act, or who was mistaken. The Gemara notes: And Rabbi Yosei derives that halakha from the fact that the verse could have stated hu and instead stated “hahu.” The Hebrew word for: That, hahu, is formed of the definite article ha and the pronoun hu. And Rabbi Shimon does not expound any halakhot from the fact that the verse could have stated hu and instead stated “hahu.” He holds that the expanded form is used because the Torah spoke in the language of people.

ורבי יוסי מדהאי איש איש דברה תורה כלשון בני אדם ההוא איש איש נמי דברה תורה כלשון בני אדם ואלא השוחט להדיוט מנא ליה דחייב נפקא ליה מדם יחשב לאיש ההוא דם שפך ואפילו השוחט לאיש

The Gemara asks: And as for Rabbi Yosei, from the fact that he holds that nothing is to be derived from the phrase “ish ish” written with regard to offering up, as he holds that the Torah spoke in the language of people, then also with regard to that phrase: “Any man [ish ish]” (Leviticus 17:3), written with regard to slaughtering, since he holds that the Torah spoke in the language of people, he should not derive any halakhot from it. But if so, from where does he derive that one who slaughters outside for the sake of an ordinary purpose is liable? The Gemara answers: He derives it from the verse: “Blood shall be imputed to that man; he has shed blood” (Leviticus 17:4), which teaches that even one who slaughters for the sake of an ordinary man is liable.

העלה וחזר והעלה כו׳

§ The mishna teaches: If one unwittingly offered up part of an offering outside the courtyard and then in a different lapse of awareness offered up other parts of that offering and then again, in another lapse of awareness, offered up yet other parts, he is liable to bring a sin offering for each act of offering up; this is the statement of Rabbi Shimon. Rabbi Yosei says: He is liable to bring only one sin offering.

אמר ריש לקיש מחלוקת בארבעה וחמשה אברים דמר סבר כי כתיב לעשות אתו על השלם הוא חייב ואינו חייב על החסר אכל בהמה כתיב ומר סבר אכל אבר ואבר כתיב אבל אבר אחד דברי הכל אינו חייב אלא אחת

The Gemara cites two opinions concerning the case under dispute. Reish Lakish says: The dispute in the mishna concerns four or five limbs that were offered up in different lapses of awareness. As one Sage, Rabbi Yosei, holds: When it is written: “To sacrifice it” (Leviticus 17:9), which teaches the halakha that for offering up a complete item one is liable but that one is not liable for offering up an incomplete item, it is written with regard to a whole animal. Accordingly, liability to bring a sin offering is incurred only once one offers up the entire animal, even if that was done limb by limb. And the other Sage, Rabbi Shimon, holds that that verse is written with regard to each and every limb of an animal. Accordingly, one is liable for each limb he offered up. But with regard to the offering up of one limb in parts, everyone agrees that a person is liable to bring only one sin offering. According to Rabbi Shimon this would apply even if that were the only limb that was offered up; according to Rabbi Yosei this would apply only if the rest of the animal had already been offered up.

ורבי יוחנן אמר מחלוקת באבר אחד דמר סבר מוקטרי פנים שחסרו והעלה בחוץ חייב ומר סבר פטור אבל בארבעה וחמשה איברין דברי הכל חייב על כל אבר ואבר

And Rabbi Yoḥanan says: Everyone agrees that one is liable even for offering up a single limb. Furthermore, if an offering is slaughtered outside the courtyard, everyone agrees that one is liable only once an entire limb has been offered up. The dispute in the mishna concerns one limb from an offering that was slaughtered inside the courtyard that was then taken outside and offered up in parts, during different lapses of awareness. As one Sage, Rabbi Shimon, holds that for offerings that are fit to be burned inside the Temple, that became incomplete and were instead offered up outside the Temple, one is liable. Accordingly, one is liable for each part of the limb. And the other Sage, Rabbi Yosei, holds that one is exempt for offering up part of a limb outside the courtyard. Accordingly, liability is incurred only once all the parts of the limb have been offered up. But with regard to offering up four or five limbs, everyone agrees that one is liable for each and every limb, as they understand that the phrase “to sacrifice it” is written with regard to each and every limb.

ופליגא דעולא דאמר עולא הכל מודים במוקטרי פנים שחסרו והעלו בחוץ שחייב לא נחלקו אלא במוקטרי בחוץ שחסרו והעלו בחוץ דמר סבר פטור ומר סבר חייב

And Rabbi Yoḥanan disagrees with the opinion of Ulla, as Ulla says: Everyone in the mishna concedes with regard to offerings that are fit to be burned inside the Temple courtyard that became incomplete and were instead offered up outside the courtyard, that one is liable. They disagree only with regard to offerings that, having been slaughtered outside are unfit and so will be burned outside, that became incomplete and were offered up outside. As one Sage, Rabbi Yosei, holds that one is exempt, and the other Sage, Rabbi Shimon, holds that one is liable.

איכא דאמרי אמר עולא הכל מודים במוקטרי חוץ שחסרו והעלו בחוץ שהוא פטור לא נחלקו אלא במוקטרי פנים שחסרו והעלו בחוץ דמר סבר פטור ומר סבר חייב

There are those who say there is a different version of Ulla’s statement, according to which he agrees with his teacher, Rabbi Yoḥanan. Ulla says: Everyone in the mishna concedes with regard to offerings that, having been slaughtered outside the Temple are unfit and so will be burned outside, that became incomplete and were offered up outside, that one is exempt. They disagree only with regard to offerings that are fit to be burned inside that became incomplete and were instead offered up outside. As one Sage, Rabbi Yosei, holds that one is exempt, and the other Sage, Rabbi Shimon, holds that one is liable.

ופליגי דאבוה דשמואל אלישנא קמא דעולא דאמר אבוה דשמואל כמאן מהדרינן פוקעין לגבי מזבח כמאן דלא כרבי יוסי

And the statement of Shmuel’s father disagrees with the first version of Ulla’s statement, as Shmuel’s father says: In accordance with whose opinion do we restore limbs that were dislodged from upon the altar to the altar? In accordance with whose opinion? It is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei recorded in the mishna. Shmuel’s father assumes that Rabbi Yosei holds that incomplete limbs are never offered up on the altar, even if they were dislodged from the altar. Accordingly, he holds that one is not liable for offering them up outside the Temple courtyard. This is contrary to the first version of Ulla’s opinion, according to which one is liable for offering up incomplete offerings that were slaughtered inside the courtyard. Evidently, Ulla holds that an incomplete limb that was dislodged from the altar is to be restored to the altar.

ואינו חייב עד שיעלה כו׳ אמר רב הונא מאי טעמא דרבי יוסי דכתיב ויבן נח מזבח לה׳

§ The mishna teaches: Rabbi Yosei says: And one is liable for offering up an offering outside the courtyard only once he offers it up upon the top of an altar that was erected there. Rabbi Shimon says: Even if he offered it up on a rock or on a stone, not an altar, he is liable. Rav Huna says: What is the reason of Rabbi Yosei? As it is written: “And Noah built an altar to the Lord, and took of every pure animal, and of every pure bird, and offered up burnt offerings on the altar” (Genesis 8:20). Noah was particular to use an altar rather than one of the available rocks. Apparently, this was because placing an item upon an altar is the only act that can be considered offering up.

אמר רבי יוחנן מאי טעמא דרבי שמעון דכתיב ויקח מנוח את גדי העזים ואת המנחה ויעל על הצור לה׳

Rabbi Yoḥanan said: What is the reason of Rabbi Shimon? As it is written: “And Manoah took the kid with the meal offering, and offered it up upon the rock, to the Lord” (Judges 13:19). Evidently, even placing an offering upon a rock is considered an act of offering up.

ואידך נמי והכתיב ויבן מזבח לה׳ ההוא גובהה בעלמא ואידך נמי הא כתיב ויקח מנוח הוראת שעה היתה

The Gemara explains how each tanna interprets the verse that supports the other. But also according to the other opinion, Rabbi Shimon’s, isn’t it written: “And Noah built an altar to the Lord”? How does he explain that verse? The Gemara answers: That verse is referring merely to an elevated place and not specifically to an altar. But also according to the other opinion, Rabbi Yosei’s, isn’t it written: “And Manoah took…and offered it up upon the rock”? How does he explain that verse? The Gemara answers: The use of a rock in that case was a provisional edict issued in exigent circumstances, by the angel who visited Manoah, and so one cannot derive normative halakha from it.

ואיבעית אימא היינו טעמא דרבי שמעון כדתניא רבי שמעון אומר מזבח פתח אהל מועד ואין מזבח בבמה לפיכך העלה על הסלע או על האבן חייב

And if you wish, say instead that the reason of Rabbi Shimon is as it is taught in a baraita: Rabbi Shimon says that the verse states: “And the priest shall sprinkle the blood upon the altar of the Lord at the entrance of the Tent of Meeting” (Leviticus 17:6). From here it is apparent that only in the Sanctuary is there a requirement for an altar, but a specifically erected altar is not required in order to offer up on a private altar during periods when it is permitted to do so. Therefore, one who offered up outside the courtyard on a rock or on a stone is liable.

יצא מיבעי ליה הכי קאמר לפיכך בשעת איסור הבמות העלה על הסלע או על האבן חייב

The Gemara questions the formulation of the baraita: If the baraita was referring to offering up during a period when the use of private altars is permitted, it should have concluded: One who offered up outside on a rock or on a stone has fulfilled his obligation. Why does it state instead that he is liable? The Gemara explains: This is what the baraita is saying: Since there is no requirement for a specifically erected altar during a period when private altars are permitted, therefore, during a period when the use of private altars is prohibited, one who offers up outside on a rock or on a stone is liable.

בעי רבי יוסי ברבי חנינא קרן וכבש ויסוד וריבוע מהו שיעכבו בבמה

Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Ḥanina, raises a dilemma: Features that are indispensable with regard to the altar in the Temple are the corner, the ramp leading to the altar, the base of the altar, and the square shape. What is the halakha with regard to whether they are also indispensable for the validity of a private altar during a period when it is permitted to use private altars?

אמר ליה רבי ירמיה תניא קרן וכבש וריבוע ויסוד מעכבין בבמה גדולה ואין מעכבין בבמה קטנה

Rabbi Yirmeya said to him: It is taught in a baraita: The corner, the ramp, the base, and the square shape are all indispensable for the validity of a great public altar, but they are not indispensable for the validity of a small private altar.