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Today's Daf Yomi

July 29, 2018 | 讬状讝 讘讗讘 转砖注状讞

  • This month's learning is dedicated by Debbie and Yossi Gevir to Rabbanit Michelle and the Hadran Zoom group for their kindness, support, and care during a medically challenging year.

Zevachim 107

Study Guide Zevachim 107. What are the sources and prohibitions relating to sacrificial rites that are performed outside the azara?


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专讘讗 讗诪专 讻讚专讘讬 讬讜谞讛 讚讗诪专 专讘讬 讬讜谞讛 讗转讬讗 砖诐 砖诐 诪讛 诇讛诇谉 诇讗 注谞砖 讗诇讗 讗诐 讻谉 讛讝讛讬专 讗祝 讻讗谉 诇讗 注谞砖 讗诇讗 讗诐 讻谉 讛讝讛讬专

Rava said: The prohibition can be derived in accordance with the statement of Rabbi Yona, as Rabbi Yona says: It is derived from the verse: 鈥淏ut in the place that the Lord will choose in one of your tribes, there you shall offer up your burnt offerings and there you shall do all that I command you鈥 (Deuteronomy 12:14), through the juxtaposition of the word 鈥渢here鈥 in the first part of the verse to the word 鈥渢here鈥 in the second part of the verse. This serves to juxtapose the offering up, mentioned in the first part, to the sacrifice of an offering, mentioned in the second part, which includes slaughtering it. Accordingly, it teaches that just as there, with regard to offering up, the Torah did not prescribe punishment unless it also prohibited it, so too here, with regard to slaughtering, the Torah did not prescribe punishment unless it also prohibited it. Therefore, even though the Torah does not explicitly state the prohibition, it is evident that it is prohibited.

讗砖讻讞谉 诪讜拽讟专讬 驻谞讬诐 砖讛注诇谉 诇讞讜抓 诪讜拽讟专讬 讞讜抓 砖讛注诇谉 诇讞讜抓 诪谞讬谉

搂 The Gemara (106a) states that the source for the liability for offering up outside the Temple is the verse: 鈥淎ny man鈥hat offers up a burnt offering or sacrifice, and he will not bring it to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting, to sacrifice it to the Lord, and that man shall be cut off from his people鈥 (Leviticus 17:8鈥9). The Gemara asks: We have found that one is liable only for offerings that are fit to be burned inside the Temple courtyard, having been appropriately slaughtered inside the Temple courtyard, which one then offered up outside the courtyard. The verse states: 鈥淗e will not bring it to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting,鈥 which indicates that they were fit to be brought to the Temple. From where is it derived that one is also liable with regard to offerings that are unfit and are to be burned outside the Temple as they were unlawfully slaughtered outside the Temple courtyard, that one then offered up outside?

讗诪专 专讘 讻讛谞讗 讗诪专 拽专讗 讜讗诇讛诐 转讗诪专 注诇 讛住诪讜讻讬谉 转讗诪专

Rav Kahana said: The beginning of that verse states: 鈥淎nd to them [va鈥檃lehem] you shall say鈥 (Leviticus 17:8). The term 鈥alehem,鈥 to them, written with the letter alef, is phonetically similar to the term alehem, about them, written with the letter ayin. Therefore, the verse can be understood as saying: About that which is written in the adjacent passage you shall say. The preceding passage discusses offerings that were slaughtered outside the Temple, so the liability for offering up outside the Temple mentioned in this verse is also referring to those offerings.

诪转拽讬祝 诇讛 专讘讗 诪讬 讻转讬讘 讜注诇讬讛诐 讜讗诇讬讛诐 讻转讬讘 讗诇讗 讻讚转谞讗 讚讘讬 专讘讬 讬砖诪注讗诇 讜讗诇讛诐 转讗诪专 诇注专讘 驻专砖讬讜转

Rava objects to this: Is it written: And about them? 鈥淎nd to them鈥 is written, and it means that the command should be relayed to Aaron, his sons, and the Jewish people, who are mentioned in the beginning of the passage. Rather, liability in this case is derived as the school of Rabbi Yishmael taught: The opening phrase: 鈥淎nd to them you shall say,鈥 starts with the conjunction 鈥渁nd鈥 to mix the passages of slaughtering outside the Temple and offering up outside the Temple, in order to teach that one is liable for the latter even after having done the former.

专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讗诪专 讗转讬讗 讛讘讗讛 讛讘讗讛 诪讛 诇讛诇谉 诪讜拽讟专讬 讞讜抓 讗祝 讻讗谉 诪讜拽讟专讬 讞讜抓

Rabbi Yo岣nan said: Liability in this case is derived through a verbal analogy between the reference to bringing stated with regard to slaughtering (see Leviticus 17:4), and the reference to bringing stated with regard to offering up (see Leviticus 17:9). The verbal analogy teaches that just as there, with regard to slaughtering, one is liable for offerings that are going to be burned outside the Temple, since one slaughtered them there, so too here, with regard to offering up, one is liable even for offerings that are unfit and so will be burned outside the Temple, having been slaughtered there.

诪转拽讬祝 诇讛 专讘 讘讬讘讬 讛讗 讚转谞谉 砖诇砖讬诐 讜砖砖 讻专讬转讜转 讘转讜专讛 转诇转讬谉 讜砖讘 讛讜讬讬谉 讚讗讬讻讗 讛诪注诇讛 讜讛诪注诇讛 拽砖讬讗

Rav Beivai objects to these suggestions: But what about that which we learned in a mishna (Karetot 2a): There are thirty-six cases in the Torah for which one is liable to receive karet. The mishna enumerates all thirty-six, and offering up outside the Temple is counted as only one of them. According to these suggestions, there are thirty-seven, as there is one case of one who offers up an offering that was slaughtered inside the Temple, and the other case of one who offers up an offering that was slaughtered outside the Temple, which are considered two independent prohibitions. The Gemara concedes: This is difficult.

讜讛讚转谞谉 讛讝讜专拽 诪拽爪转 讚诪讬诐 讘讞讜抓 讞讬讬讘 诪谞诇谉 谞驻拽讗 诇讬讛 诪讚转谞讬讗 讚诐 讬讞砖讘 诇专讘讜转 讛讝讜专拽 讚讘专讬 专讘讬 讬砖诪注讗诇 专讘讬 注拽讬讘讗 讗讜诪专 讗讜 讝讘讞 诇专讘讜转 讗转 讛讝讜专拽

搂 The Gemara considers the source for other prohibitions. And concerning that which we learned in a mishna (110a): One who sprinkles part of the blood of an offering, e.g., if he sprinkles one sprinkling instead of four, outside the Temple courtyard, is liable; from where do we derive this? The tanna derives it from that which is taught in a baraita: The verse states with regard to one who slaughters outside the Temple courtyard: 鈥淏lood shall be imputed to that man, he has shed blood, and that man shall be cut off from among his people鈥 (Leviticus 17:4). This serves to include liability for one who sprinkles sacrificial blood outside the Temple courtyard; this is the statement of Rabbi Yishmael. Rabbi Akiva says: It is derived from the verse: 鈥淎ny man鈥hat offers up a burnt offering or sacrifice鈥 (Leviticus 17:8). The term 鈥渙r鈥 serves to include liability for one who sprinkles blood outside the Temple courtyard.

讜专讘讬 讬砖诪注讗诇 讛讗讬 讗讜 讝讘讞 诪讗讬 注讘讬讚 诇讬讛 诇讞诇拽

The Gemara asks: And as for Rabbi Yishmael, what does he do with this term 鈥渙r鈥 in 鈥渁 burnt offering or sacrifice鈥? It serves to divide them into two independent cases, such that liability is incurred even if one offered up only one of them.

讜专讘讬 注拽讬讘讗 诇讞诇拽 诪谞讗 诇讬讛 谞驻拽讗 诇讬讛 诪诇讗 讬讘讬讗谞讜

The Gemara asks: And as for Rabbi Akiva, from where does he derive the halakha to divide them into two cases? He derives it from the next verse: 鈥淎nd he will not bring it to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting鈥 (Leviticus 17:9). The term 鈥渋t鈥 is written in the singular to indicate that one is liable even if he offered up only one of them.

讜专讘讬 讬砖诪注讗诇 讛讛讜讗 诪讬讘注讬 诇讬讛 注诇 讛砖诇诐 讛讜讗 讞讬讬讘 讜讗讬谞讜 讞讬讬讘 注诇 讛讞住专 讜专讘讬 注拽讬讘讗 谞驻拽讗 诇讬讛 诪诇注砖讜转 讗转讜

And as for Rabbi Yishmael, why does he not derive that halakha from the term 鈥渋t鈥? The Gemara answers: According to him, that term is necessary as the source for the halakha that one is liable for offering up a complete animal, but one is not liable for offering up an incomplete animal. The term 鈥渋t鈥 indicates an animal in its entirety. And as for Rabbi Akiva, he derives this from the repetition of 鈥渋t鈥 in the continuation of the verse: 鈥淗e will not bring it鈥to sacrifice it to the Lord鈥 (Leviticus 17:9).

讜专讘讬 讬砖诪注讗诇 讞讚 诇诪讜拽讟专讬 驻谞讬诐 砖讞住专讜 讜讛注诇讜 讘讞讜抓 讜讞讚 诇诪讜拽讟专讬 讞讜抓 砖讞住专讜 讜讛注诇讜 讘讞讜抓 讜讛讗 转谞讬讗 专讘讬 讬砖诪注讗诇 讗讜诪专 讬讻讜诇 诪讜拽讟专讬 驻谞讬诐 砖讞住专讜 讜讛注诇讜 讘讞讜抓 讞讬讬讘 转诇诪讜讚 诇讜诪专 诇注砖讜转 讗转讜 注诇 讛砖诇诐 讞讬讬讘 讜讗讬谞讜 讞讬讬讘 注诇 讛讞住专

And as for Rabbi Yishmael, how does he explain the repetition of 鈥渋t鈥? He holds that each mention teaches about a different case: One is referring to offerings that are fit to be burned inside the Temple courtyard that became incomplete and were then offered up outside. And the other one is referring to offerings that are unfit and so will be burned outside the Temple as they were unlawfully slaughtered outside the Temple courtyard, that became incomplete and were offered up outside. In both cases one is exempt. And so it is taught in a baraita: Rabbi Yishmael says: One might have thought that with regard to offerings that were fit to be burned inside the Temple courtyard and that became incomplete and were instead offered up outside, one would be liable. To dispel this notion, the verse states: 鈥淭o sacrifice it,鈥 which indicates that for offering up a complete animal one is liable, but one is not liable for an incomplete animal.

讜专讘讬 注拽讬讘讗 诪讜拽讟专讬 驻谞讬诐 砖讞住专讜 讜讛注诇讜 讘讞讜抓 讞讬讬讘

And Rabbi Akiva, who has already expounded both mentions of 鈥渋t,鈥 disagrees with Rabbi Yishmael and holds that one is liable for offerings that are fit to be burned inside that became incomplete and were instead offered up outside.

讜专讘讬 注拽讬讘讗 讛讗讬 讚诐 讬讞砖讘 诪讗讬 注讘讬讚 诇讬讛 诇专讘讜转 砖讞讬讟转 讛注讜祝 讜专讘讬 讬砖诪注讗诇 谞驻拽讗 诇讬讛 诪讗讜 讗砖专 讬砖讞讟

Rabbi Yishmael derives the liability for sprinkling part of the blood of an offering outside the Temple courtyard from the verse 鈥淏lood shall be imputed to that man.鈥 The Gemara asks: And as for Rabbi Akiva, what does he do with this verse: 鈥淏lood shall be imputed to that man鈥? He expounds it to include liability for the slaughter of a bird offering outside the courtyard. One is liable despite the fact that inside the Temple, a bird is sacrificed by pinching the nape of its neck, not by slaughtering it. And as for Rabbi Yishmael, he derives this halakha from: 鈥淥r that slaughters it outside the camp鈥 (Leviticus 17:3).

讜专讘讬 注拽讬讘讗 讗诪专 诇讱 讛讛讜讗 诪讬讘注讬 诇讬讛 注诇 讛砖讜讞讟 讛讜讗 讞讬讬讘 讜诇讗 注诇 讛诪讜诇拽 讜专讘讬 讬砖诪注讗诇 谞驻拽讗 诇讬讛 诪讝讛 讛讚讘专

And Rabbi Akiva could have said to you that he does not derive it from that verse, as he holds that it is necessary to teach that only one who slaughters a bird offering outside is liable, but one is not liable for pinching its nape outside. And as for Rabbi Yishmael, from where does he derive that one is exempt if he pinches? He derives it from the phrase at the beginning of the passage about slaughtering outside: 鈥淭his is the matter鈥 (Leviticus 17:2), which indicates that one is liable only for slaughtering and not for any other method of killing.

讚转谞讬讗 讗砖专 讬砖讞讟 讗讬谉 诇讬 讗诇讗 砖讜讞讟 讘讛诪讛 砖讞讟 注讜祝 诪谞讗 诇谉 转诇诪讜讚 诇讜诪专 讗讜 讗砖专 讬砖讞讟

Rabbi Yishmael鈥檚 opinion is as it is taught in a baraita: The verse states: 鈥淎ny man of the house of Israel that slaughters an ox, or lamb, or goat, in the camp, or that slaughters it outside the camp鈥 (Leviticus 17:3). From this verse I have derived liability only for one who slaughters an animal offering outside; from where do we derive that one is liable if he slaughtered a bird offering outside? The verse states: 鈥淥r that slaughters,鈥 to include liability for slaughtering a bird.

讬讻讜诇 讗祝 讛诪讜诇拽 讜讚讬谉 讛讜讗 诪讛 砖讞讬讟讛 讚讗讬谉 讚专讱 讛讻砖讬专讛 讘驻谞讬诐 讞讬讬讘 诪诇讬拽讛 砖讚专讱 讛讻砖讬专讛 讘驻谞讬诐 讗讬谞讜 讚讬谉 砖讛讜讗 讞讬讬讘 转诇诪讜讚 诇讜诪专 讝讛 讛讚讘专

One might have thought that even one who pinches the nape of a bird offering outside would be liable. And there is a logical inference to support this: If with regard to the slaughter of a bird offering, which is not the valid method of preparation inside the Temple, one is nevertheless liable if he did it outside, then with regard to pinching the nape of a bird offering, which is the valid method of preparation inside the Temple, is it not logical that one is liable if he did it outside? To counter this, the verse states: 鈥淭his is the matter鈥 (Leviticus 17:2), which indicates one is liable only for slaughtering, not for any other method of killing.

讜专讘讬 注拽讬讘讗 讗诪专 诇讱 讛讛讜讗 诪讬讘注讬 诇讬讛 诇讙讝讬专讛 砖讜讛

And Rabbi Akiva could have said to you that he does not derive it from that verse, as he holds that it is necessary for expounding as part of a verbal analogy with the passage with regard to vows, where it is written: 鈥淭his is the matter that the Lord has commanded鈥 (Numbers 30:2).

讜讛讗 讚转谞谉 讛拽讜诪抓 讜讛诪拽讘诇 讚诪讬诐 讘讞讜抓 驻讟讜专 诪谞诇谉 讜诪讛讬讻讗 转讬转讬 讚讞讬讬讘

搂 The Gemara considers the source for other prohibitions. And concerning that which we learned in a mishna (112b): One who takes a handful from a meal offering outside the Temple courtyard but does not burn it, and one who collects the blood of an offering in a vessel outside the Temple courtyard but does not sprinkle it on an altar, he is exempt; from where do we derive this, that one is not liable unless he also completes the subsequent sacrificial rites? The Gemara is surprised by the question: But from where would it be derived that one is liable for these acts, necessitating a source for the fact that he is exempt?

转讬转讬 诪砖讞讬讟讛 诪讛 诇砖讞讬讟讛 砖讻谉 谞驻住诇转 砖诇讗 诇讗讜讻诇讬谉 讘驻住讞

The Gemara demonstrates that there is no reason to have assumed that one would be liable: If you suggest deriving it through a comparison to slaughtering outside the Temple, where one is liable even if he does not perform the subsequent sacrificial rites, this can be refuted: What is notable about slaughtering? It is notable in that with regard to a Paschal offering, if one slaughters it with the intent that it be for the sake of those who cannot eat it, it is thereby disqualified. The cases in the mishna do not share this stringency.

转讬转讬 诪讝专讬拽讛 诪讛 诇讝专讬拽讛 砖讻谉 讝专 讞讬讬讘 注诇讬讛 诪讬转讛

And if you suggest deriving it through a comparison to sprinkling blood outside the Temple, as one is liable for sprinkling the blood even though it is only one of the sacrificial rites of the offering that should have been performed inside the Temple, this can be refuted: What is notable about sprinkling? It is notable in that a non-priest who sprinkles blood in the Temple is liable to be punished with death at the hand of Heaven for this act. The cases in the mishna do not share this stringency.

转讬转讬 诪讘讬谞讬讬讗

Given that each suggestion has a different refutation, the Gemara suggests: Derive it through a comparison to the common element shared by these two cases. Slaughtering and sprinkling are each just one of the sacrificial rites that are performed with an offering, and yet one is liable for performing them outside the Temple. Since the derivation is based on a comparison to both cases, the refutations offered for each individual case are no longer relevant.

讗诐 讻谉 诇讗 讬讗诪专 讘讝专讬拽讛 讜转讬转讬 诪讘讬谞讬讬讗

The Gemara rejects this: If that were so, and one can derive liability for one rite through a comparison to the common element shared by two other rites, then let the Torah not state that one is liable for sprinkling blood outside the Temple, and instead derive it from the common element shared by slaughtering and offering up outside the Temple.

讜转讬转讬 诪砖讞讬讟讛 诪讛 诇砖讞讬讟讛 砖讻谉 谞驻住诇转 砖诇讗 诇砖诐 讗讜讻诇讬谉 讘驻住讞 转讬转讬 诪讛注诇讗讛 诪讛 诇讛注诇讗讛 砖讻谉 讬砖谞讛 讘诪谞讞讛 讜转讬转讬 诪讘讬谞讬讬讗

The derivation would be as follows: And if you suggest deriving liability for sprinkling from the liability for slaughtering, that could be refuted. What is notable about slaughtering? It is notable in that, with regard to a Paschal offering, if one slaughters it with the intent that it be for the sake of those who cannot eat, it is thereby disqualified. Sprinkling does not share this stringency. And if you suggest deriving liability for sprinkling from the liability for offering up, that could also be refuted. What is notable about offering up? It is notable in that liability for offering up also exists with regard to a meal offering. Sprinkling does not share this stringency. But it should still be possible to derive liability for sprinkling from the common element shared by the two cases. Since the derivation is based on a comparison to both cases, the refutations offered above for each individual case are no longer relevant.

诇讛讻讬 讻转讬讘 拽专讗 诇诪讬诪专 讚诇讗 讗转讗 诪讘讬谞讬讬讗

The Gemara explains: It is for this very reason that a verse is written to teach the liability for sprinkling outside the Temple, to say to you that liability for performing sacrificial rites outside the Temple cannot be derived from the common element shared by two other cases; rather, it must be directly derived from a verse. Accordingly, the Gemara has demonstrated that there is no basis to have assumed that one who takes a handful from a meal offering, or collects blood, outside the Temple is liable.

讗诪专 专讘讬 讗讘讛讜 砖讞讟 讜讝专拽 诇讚讘专讬 专讘讬 讬砖诪注讗诇 讞讬讬讘 讗讞转 诇讚讘专讬 专讘讬 注拽讬讘讗 讞讬讬讘 砖转讬诐

搂 The Gemara cited a dispute concerning the source for the liability for sprinkling part of the blood of an offering outside the Temple courtyard. According to Rabbi Yishmael, it is derived from the verse in the passage about slaughtering outside the Temple: 鈥淏lood shall be imputed to that man鈥 (Leviticus 17:4). According to Rabbi Akiva, it is derived from the verse in the passage about offering up outside the Temple: 鈥淎ny man鈥hat offers up a burnt offering or sacrifice鈥 (Leviticus 17:8). Rabbi Abbahu says: One who slaughtered an offering and sprinkled its blood outside the Temple in a single lapse of awareness, according to the statement of Rabbi Yishmael, is liable to bring one sin offering, as liability for each transgression is derived from the same passage and they are subcategories of the same prohibition. According to the statement of Rabbi Akiva, one is liable to bring two sin offerings, as the liability for each transgression is derived from a different passage and they are considered independent prohibitions.

讗讘讬讬 讗诪专 讗驻讬诇讜 [诇讚讘专讬] 专讘讬 注拽讬讘讗 讗讬谞讜 讞讬讬讘 讗诇讗 讗讞转 讚讗诪专 拽专讗 砖诐 转注砖讛 讛讻转讜讘 注砖讗谉 诇讻讜诇谉 注讘讜讚讛 讗讞转

Abaye said: Even according to the statement of Rabbi Akiva, he is liable to bring only one sin offering, as the verse states with regard to performing sacrificial rites outside the Temple courtyard: 鈥淏ut in the place that the Lord will choose in one of your tribes, there you shall offer up your burnt offerings, and there you shall do all that I command you鈥 (Deuteronomy 12:14). Since the first part of the verse makes reference to offering up, by inference, the term 鈥測ou shall do鈥 in the second part must be referring to all the other sacrificial rites. Therefore, the verse has regarded all of the sacrificial rites apart from offering up as one rite with regard to the prohibition against performing them outside the Temple courtyard.

讝专拽 讜讛注诇讛 诇讚讘专讬 专讘讬 讬砖诪注讗诇 讞讬讬讘 砖转讬诐 诇讚讘专讬 专讘讬 注拽讬讘讗 讗讬谞讜 讞讬讬讘 讗诇讗 讗讞转

Rabbi Abbahu also said: One who sprinkled the blood of an offering and offered it up outside, in a single lapse of awareness, according to the statement of Rabbi Yishmael is liable to bring two sin offerings. According to the statement of Rabbi Akiva, he is liable to bring only one sin offering.

讗讘讬讬 讗诪专 讗驻讬诇讜 [诇讚讘专讬] 专讘讬 注拽讬讘讗 讞讬讬讘 砖转讬诐 诇讛讻讬 驻诇讙讬谞讛讜 拽专讗 砖诐 转注诇讛 讜砖诐 转注砖讛

Abaye said: Even according to the statement of Rabbi Akiva he is liable to bring two sin offerings, as it is for this reason that the verse differentiated between the offering up and the slaughtering, as it states: 鈥淭here you shall offer up your burnt offerings, and there you shall do,鈥 in order to teach that one who performs both is liable for each one.

砖讞讟 讜讝专拽 讜讛注诇讛 诇讚讘专讬 讛讻诇 讞讬讬讘 砖转讬诐

Finally, Rabbi Abbahu adds the logical conclusion that with regard to one who slaughtered an offering and sprinkled its blood and offered it up outside, in a single lapse of awareness, all agree that he is liable to bring two sin offerings.

转谞讜 专讘谞谉 讘诪讞谞讛 讬讻讜诇 讛砖讜讞讟 注讜诇讛 讘讚专讜诐 讬讛讗 讞讬讬讘 转诇诪讜讚 诇讜诪专 讗诇 诪讞讜抓 诇诪讞谞讛

The Sages taught in a baraita: The verse states: 鈥淎ny man of the house of Israel that slaughters an ox, or lamb, or goat, in the camp, or that slaughters it outside the camp鈥 (Leviticus 17:3). Based on the first part of the verse: 鈥淭hat slaughters鈥in the camp,鈥 one might have thought that one who slaughters a burnt offering in the south of the courtyard, instead of in the north, where it should be slaughtered, will be liable, as he has slaughtered it outside the area in which it should be slaughtered. To counter this, the next part of the verse states: 鈥淭hat slaughters it outside the camp,鈥 indicating that liability is incurred only for slaughtering an offering outside the Temple courtyard.

讬讻讜诇 讞讜抓 诇砖诇砖 诪讞谞讜转 (转诇诪讜讚 诇讜诪专 讗讜 注讝 讘诪讞谞讛) 诪谞讬谉 讗祝 讘诪讞谞讛 诇讜讬讬讛 转诇诪讜讚 诇讜诪专 讘诪讞谞讛

The baraita continues: Three concentric areas, so-called camps, arranged according to decreasing level of sanctity, encompassed the Tabernacle and Temple: The camp of the Divine Presence comprised the courtyard of the Tabernacle, and later on, of the Temple. Surrounding that was the Levite camp and then the Israelite camp. If the verse had stated only: 鈥淭hat slaughters it outside the camp,鈥 one might have thought that a person would be liable only for slaughtering an offering outside all three of the camps. To dispel this notion, the first part of the verse states: 鈥淭hat slaughters an ox, or lamb, or goat, in the camp,鈥 which indicates that liability is incurred even for slaughtering inside these camps. From where is it derived that one is liable even if he slaughters inside the Levite camp? The verse states: 鈥淭hat slaughters鈥in the camp,鈥 which indicates that liability is incurred even for slaughtering inside the three camps.

讗讬 讘诪讞谞讛 讬讻讜诇 讛砖讜讞讟 注讜诇讛 讘讚专讜诐 讬讛讗 讞讬讬讘 转诇诪讜讚 诇讜诪专 讗讜 讗诇 诪讞讜抓 诇诪讞谞讛

If the verse stated only the term 鈥渋n the camp,鈥 which indicates that one is liable even for slaughtering inside the three camps, one might have thought that one who slaughters a burnt offering in the south of the courtyard, which is regarded as being outside of the holier northern section of the courtyard, where such an offering should be slaughtered, will also be liable. To counter this, the verse states: 鈥淥r that slaughters it outside the camp.鈥

诪讛 讞讜抓 诇诪讞谞讛 诪讬讜讞讚 砖讗讬谉 专讗讜讬 诇砖讞讬讟转 拽讚砖讬诐 讜诇砖讞讬讟转 讻诇 讝讘讞 讬爪讗 讚专讜诐 砖讗祝 注诇 驻讬 砖讗讬谉 专讗讜讬 诇砖讞讬讟转 拽讚砖讬 拽讚砖讬诐 专讗讜讬 诇砖讞讬讟转 拽讚砖讬诐 拽诇讬诐

This indicates that just as the phrase 鈥渙utside the camp鈥 is distinctive in that it is referring to an area that is not fit for slaughtering offerings of the most sacred order or for slaughtering any other type of offering, so too, the term 鈥渋n the camp鈥 is referring to an area unfit for the slaughter of any offering. This excludes the south of the courtyard, as even though it is an area that is not fit for slaughtering offerings of the most sacred order, it is fit for slaughtering offerings of lesser sanctity. Therefore, no liability is incurred for slaughtering an offering in the south of the courtyard, even if it should have been slaughtered in the north.

讗诪专 注讜诇讗 讛砖讜讞讟 注诇 讙讙讜 砖诇 讛讬讻诇 讞讬讬讘 讛讜讗讬诇 讜讗讬谉 专讗讜讬 诇砖讞讬讟转 讻诇 讝讘讞 诪转拽讬祝 诇讛 专讘讗 讗诐 讻谉 谞讬讻转讜讘 拽专讗 (讗诇) 诪讞讜抓 诇诪讞谞讛 讜诇讗 讘注讬 讗诇 驻转讞 讗讛诇 诪讜注讚 讗诇 驻转讞 讗讛诇 诪讜注讚 诇诪讛 诇讬 诇讗讜 诇诪注讜讟讬 讙讙讜

Based on this baraita, Ulla says: One who slaughters an offering on the roof of the Sanctuary is liable for slaughtering outside the Temple courtyard, since the roof is an area that is not fit for the slaughter of any offering. Rava objects to this: If so, let the verse write only: 鈥淥r that slaughters it outside the camp,鈥 and it would not be necessary to write: 鈥淎nd he did not bring it to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting鈥 (Leviticus 17:4). Why do I need the verse to also write: 鈥淎nd he did not bring it to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting鈥? Is it not to exclude the roof of the Sanctuary, as in the Temple the Sanctuary corresponded to the Tent of Meeting? Although the roof is an area that is not fit for slaughtering any offering, one should not be liable for slaughtering there since the offering was nevertheless brought to the Tent of Meeting.

讜诇专讘讗 讗诐 讻谉 谞讻转讜讘 讗诇 驻转讞 讗讛诇 诪讜注讚 讘诪讞谞讛 (讜讗诇) 诪讞讜抓 诇诪讞谞讛 诇诪讛 诇讬 诇讗讜 诇讗转讜讬讬 讙讙讜

The Gemara questions Rava鈥檚 claim: But according to Rava, if that is so and one is exempt if he slaughtered on the roof of the Sanctuary as ultimately the offering was brought to the Tent of Meeting, then let the verse write only: 鈥淎nd he did not bring it to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting.鈥 Why do I need the verse to also write 鈥渋n the camp鈥 and 鈥渙utside the camp鈥? Is it not that the term 鈥渋n the camp鈥 indicates that there is a case where one is liable even when slaughtering inside the courtyard, which serves to include liability for slaughtering on the roof of the Sanctuary? According to this, the term 鈥渙utside the camp鈥 would then be necessary to exclude liability for slaughtering a burnt offering in the south of the courtyard.

讗诪专 专讘 诪专讬 诇讗讬转讜讬讬 讻讜诇讛 讘驻谞讬诐 讜爪讜讗专讛 讘讞讜抓

Rav Mari said in defense of Rava: No, the term 鈥渋n the camp鈥 is written to include liability for slaughtering an offering in a case where its body is entirely inside the courtyard but its neck is outside the courtyard.

[爪讜讗专讛] 讘讞讜抓 驻砖讬讟讗 讗诪讗讬 拽驻讬讚 专讞诪谞讗 讗砖讞讬讟讛 讜砖讞讬讟讛 讘讞讜抓 讛讬讗 讗诇讗 诇讗讬转讜讬讬 讻讜诇讛 讘讞讜抓 讜爪讜讗专讛 讘驻谞讬诐

The Gemara modifies Rav Mari鈥檚 statement: If its neck is outside the courtyard, it is obvious that one is liable, as about what is the Merciful One particular? The Merciful One is particular about the slaughter. And in this case, the slaughter is done out-side the courtyard. Rather, say instead that the term 鈥渋n the camp鈥 is written to include liability for slaughtering an offering where its body is entirely outside the courtyard but its neck is inside the courtyard.

讗讬转诪专 讛诪注诇讛 讘讝诪谉 讛讝讛 专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讗诪专 讞讬讬讘 专讬砖 诇拽讬砖 讗诪专 驻讟讜专

搂 An amoraic dispute was stated with regard to one who offers up an offering outside the courtyard today, when there is no Temple: Rabbi Yo岣nan says: He is liable. Reish Lakish says: He is exempt.

专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讗诪专 讞讬讬讘 拽讚讜砖讛 专讗砖讜谞讛 拽讬讚砖讛 诇砖注转讛 讜拽讬讚砖讛 诇注转讬讚 诇讘讗 专讬砖 诇拽讬砖 讗诪专 驻讟讜专 拽讚讜砖讛 专讗砖讜谞讛 拽讬讚砖讛 诇砖注转诇砖注转讛 讜诇讗 拽讬讚砖讛 诇注转讬讚 诇讘讗

The Gemara elaborates: Rabbi Yo岣nan says that he is liable, as he holds that the initial consecration of the Temple sanctified it for its time and sanctified it forever, and the location of the Temple remains sacred even after the Temple was destroyed. Accordingly, it is still possible now to build an altar there and bring offerings upon it; therefore, one is liable if he instead offers up an offering outside the Temple courtyard area. Reish Lakish says that he is exempt, as he holds that the initial consecration of the Temple sanctified it for its time but did not sanctify it forever. Accordingly, one can no longer bring offerings there; therefore, one is not liable for offering up outside that area.

谞讬诪讗 讚讘驻诇讜讙转讗 讚专讘讬 讗诇讬注讝专 讜专讘讬 讬讛讜砖注 拽诪讬驻诇讙讬 讚转谞谉 讗诪专 专讘讬 讗诇讬注讝专 讻砖讛讬讜 讘讜谞讬谉 讘讛讬讻诇 讛讬讜 注讜砖讬诐 拽诇注讬诐 讘讛讬讻诇 拽诇注讬诐 讘注讝专讜转 讗诇讗 砖讘讛讬讻诇 讘讜谞讬谉 诪讘讞讜抓 讜讘注讝专讛 讘讜谞讬谉 诪讘驻谞讬诐

The Gemara suggests: Let us say that Rabbi Yo岣nan and Reish Lakish disagree with regard to the issue that is the subject of the dispute between Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Yehoshua, as we learned in a mishna (Eduyyot 8:6): Rabbi Eliezer said: I heard that when they were building the Sanctuary in the Second Temple, they would fashion temporary curtains for the Sanctuary and temporary curtains for the courtyards to serve as partitions until the construction of the stone walls was completed. The difference was only that in the Sanctuary, the workers built the walls outside the curtains, without entering, and in the courtyards, the workers built the walls within the curtains.

讗诪专 专讘讬 讬讛讜砖注 砖诪注转讬 砖讛讬讜 诪拽专讬讘讬谉 讗祝 注诇 驻讬 砖讗讬谉 讘讬转 讜讗讜讻诇讬诐 拽讚砖讬 拽讚砖讬诐 讗祝 注诇 驻讬 砖讗讬谉 拽诇注讬诐 拽讚砖讬诐 拽诇讬诐 讜诪注砖专 砖谞讬 讗祝 注诇 驻讬 砖讗讬谉 讞讜诪讛 诪驻谞讬 砖拽讚讜砖讛 专讗砖讜谞讛 拽讬讚砖讛 诇砖注转讛 讜拽讬讚砖讛 诇注转讬讚 诇讘讗

The mishna continues: Rabbi Yehoshua said: I heard that one sacrifices offerings on the altar even if there is no Temple, and one partakes of offerings of the most sacred order in the Temple courtyard even if there are no curtains, and one partakes of offerings of lesser sanctity and second-tithe produce in Jerusalem even if there is no wall surrounding the city. This is due to the fact that the initial consecration sanctified the Temple and Jerusalem for their time and also sanctified them forever.

诇讗讜 诪讻诇诇 讚专讘讬 讗诇讬注讝专 住讘专 诇讗 拽讬讚砖讛

The Gemara concludes: From the fact that Rabbi Yehoshua based his opinion on the principle that the initial consecration sanctified the Temple and Jerusalem forever, can one not learn by inference that Rabbi Eliezer maintains that it did not sanctify them for-ever? The dispute between Rabbi Yo岣nan and Reish Lakish would then directly parallel the dispute between Rabbi Yehoshua and Rabbi Eliezer.

讗诪专 诇讬讛 专讘讬谞讗 诇专讘 讗砖讬 诪诪讗讬 讚诇诪讗 讚讻讜诇讬 注诇诪讗 拽讚讜砖讛 专讗砖讜谞讛 拽讬讚砖讛 诇砖注转讛 讜拽讬讚砖讛 诇注转讬讚 诇讘讗 讜诪专 诪讗讬 讚砖诪讬注 诇讬讛 拽讗诪专 讜诪专 诪讗讬 讚砖诪讬注 诇讬讛 拽讗诪专 讜讻讬 转讬诪讗 拽诇注讬诐 诇专讘讬 讗诇讬注讝专 诇诪讛 诇讬 诇爪谞讬注讜转讗 讘注诇诪讗

Ravina said to Rav Ashi: From where do you draw this inference? Perhaps everyone maintains that the initial consecration sanctified the Temple and Jerusalem for their time and also sanctified them forever. And one Sage, Rabbi Eliezer, stated that tradition, which he heard from his teachers, and one Sage, Rabbi Yehoshua, stated that tradition, which he heard from his teachers, and there is no dispute between them. And if you would say: Why do I need curtains at all according to Rabbi Eliezer? The original sanctity remained when Jerusalem was not surrounded by walls, and similarly, the presence or absence of curtains is irrelevant to the sanctity of the Temple area as well. The Gemara answers: The curtains were established merely for seclusion, as it would have been unbecoming for the activity in this most sacred venue to have been visible to all.

讗讬转诪专 讛诪注诇讛 讜讗讬谉 讘讜 讻讝讬转 讜注爪诐 诪砖诇讬诪讜 诇讻讝讬转 专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讗诪专 讞讬讬讘 专讬砖 诇拽讬砖 讗诪专 驻讟讜专

搂 An amoraic dispute was stated with regard to one who offers up outside the Temple a limb of an offering and it does not have on it an olive-bulk of flesh, but the bone completes the measure to make an olive-bulk. Rabbi Yo岣nan says: He is liable. Reish Lakish says: He is exempt.

专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讗诪专 讞讬讬讘 讞讬讘讜专讬 注讜诇讬谉 讻注讜诇讬谉 讚诪讬 专讬砖 诇拽讬砖 讗诪专 驻讟讜专 讞讬讘讜专讬 注讜诇讬谉 诇讗讜 讻注讜诇讬谉 讚诪讜

The Gemara elaborates: Rabbi Yo岣nan says that he is liable, as he holds that an item attached to flesh that must be offered up on the altar, e.g., a bone attached to sacrificial flesh, is also regarded as an item that must be offered up on the altar. Even though if it were to become detached, there would be no requirement to offer it up, nevertheless, as long as it is attached it is considered part of the flesh and it contributes to the required measure of an olive-bulk. Reish Lakish says that he is exempt, as he holds that an item attached to flesh that must be offered up on the altar is not regarded as an item that must be offered up on the altar.

讘注讬 专讘讗 讛诪注诇讛

Rava raises a dilemma: With regard to one who offers up outside the Temple courtyard

  • This month's learning is dedicated by Debbie and Yossi Gevir to Rabbanit Michelle and the Hadran Zoom group for their kindness, support, and care during a medically challenging year.

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Zevachim 107

The William Davidson Talmud | Powered by Sefaria

Zevachim 107

专讘讗 讗诪专 讻讚专讘讬 讬讜谞讛 讚讗诪专 专讘讬 讬讜谞讛 讗转讬讗 砖诐 砖诐 诪讛 诇讛诇谉 诇讗 注谞砖 讗诇讗 讗诐 讻谉 讛讝讛讬专 讗祝 讻讗谉 诇讗 注谞砖 讗诇讗 讗诐 讻谉 讛讝讛讬专

Rava said: The prohibition can be derived in accordance with the statement of Rabbi Yona, as Rabbi Yona says: It is derived from the verse: 鈥淏ut in the place that the Lord will choose in one of your tribes, there you shall offer up your burnt offerings and there you shall do all that I command you鈥 (Deuteronomy 12:14), through the juxtaposition of the word 鈥渢here鈥 in the first part of the verse to the word 鈥渢here鈥 in the second part of the verse. This serves to juxtapose the offering up, mentioned in the first part, to the sacrifice of an offering, mentioned in the second part, which includes slaughtering it. Accordingly, it teaches that just as there, with regard to offering up, the Torah did not prescribe punishment unless it also prohibited it, so too here, with regard to slaughtering, the Torah did not prescribe punishment unless it also prohibited it. Therefore, even though the Torah does not explicitly state the prohibition, it is evident that it is prohibited.

讗砖讻讞谉 诪讜拽讟专讬 驻谞讬诐 砖讛注诇谉 诇讞讜抓 诪讜拽讟专讬 讞讜抓 砖讛注诇谉 诇讞讜抓 诪谞讬谉

搂 The Gemara (106a) states that the source for the liability for offering up outside the Temple is the verse: 鈥淎ny man鈥hat offers up a burnt offering or sacrifice, and he will not bring it to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting, to sacrifice it to the Lord, and that man shall be cut off from his people鈥 (Leviticus 17:8鈥9). The Gemara asks: We have found that one is liable only for offerings that are fit to be burned inside the Temple courtyard, having been appropriately slaughtered inside the Temple courtyard, which one then offered up outside the courtyard. The verse states: 鈥淗e will not bring it to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting,鈥 which indicates that they were fit to be brought to the Temple. From where is it derived that one is also liable with regard to offerings that are unfit and are to be burned outside the Temple as they were unlawfully slaughtered outside the Temple courtyard, that one then offered up outside?

讗诪专 专讘 讻讛谞讗 讗诪专 拽专讗 讜讗诇讛诐 转讗诪专 注诇 讛住诪讜讻讬谉 转讗诪专

Rav Kahana said: The beginning of that verse states: 鈥淎nd to them [va鈥檃lehem] you shall say鈥 (Leviticus 17:8). The term 鈥alehem,鈥 to them, written with the letter alef, is phonetically similar to the term alehem, about them, written with the letter ayin. Therefore, the verse can be understood as saying: About that which is written in the adjacent passage you shall say. The preceding passage discusses offerings that were slaughtered outside the Temple, so the liability for offering up outside the Temple mentioned in this verse is also referring to those offerings.

诪转拽讬祝 诇讛 专讘讗 诪讬 讻转讬讘 讜注诇讬讛诐 讜讗诇讬讛诐 讻转讬讘 讗诇讗 讻讚转谞讗 讚讘讬 专讘讬 讬砖诪注讗诇 讜讗诇讛诐 转讗诪专 诇注专讘 驻专砖讬讜转

Rava objects to this: Is it written: And about them? 鈥淎nd to them鈥 is written, and it means that the command should be relayed to Aaron, his sons, and the Jewish people, who are mentioned in the beginning of the passage. Rather, liability in this case is derived as the school of Rabbi Yishmael taught: The opening phrase: 鈥淎nd to them you shall say,鈥 starts with the conjunction 鈥渁nd鈥 to mix the passages of slaughtering outside the Temple and offering up outside the Temple, in order to teach that one is liable for the latter even after having done the former.

专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讗诪专 讗转讬讗 讛讘讗讛 讛讘讗讛 诪讛 诇讛诇谉 诪讜拽讟专讬 讞讜抓 讗祝 讻讗谉 诪讜拽讟专讬 讞讜抓

Rabbi Yo岣nan said: Liability in this case is derived through a verbal analogy between the reference to bringing stated with regard to slaughtering (see Leviticus 17:4), and the reference to bringing stated with regard to offering up (see Leviticus 17:9). The verbal analogy teaches that just as there, with regard to slaughtering, one is liable for offerings that are going to be burned outside the Temple, since one slaughtered them there, so too here, with regard to offering up, one is liable even for offerings that are unfit and so will be burned outside the Temple, having been slaughtered there.

诪转拽讬祝 诇讛 专讘 讘讬讘讬 讛讗 讚转谞谉 砖诇砖讬诐 讜砖砖 讻专讬转讜转 讘转讜专讛 转诇转讬谉 讜砖讘 讛讜讬讬谉 讚讗讬讻讗 讛诪注诇讛 讜讛诪注诇讛 拽砖讬讗

Rav Beivai objects to these suggestions: But what about that which we learned in a mishna (Karetot 2a): There are thirty-six cases in the Torah for which one is liable to receive karet. The mishna enumerates all thirty-six, and offering up outside the Temple is counted as only one of them. According to these suggestions, there are thirty-seven, as there is one case of one who offers up an offering that was slaughtered inside the Temple, and the other case of one who offers up an offering that was slaughtered outside the Temple, which are considered two independent prohibitions. The Gemara concedes: This is difficult.

讜讛讚转谞谉 讛讝讜专拽 诪拽爪转 讚诪讬诐 讘讞讜抓 讞讬讬讘 诪谞诇谉 谞驻拽讗 诇讬讛 诪讚转谞讬讗 讚诐 讬讞砖讘 诇专讘讜转 讛讝讜专拽 讚讘专讬 专讘讬 讬砖诪注讗诇 专讘讬 注拽讬讘讗 讗讜诪专 讗讜 讝讘讞 诇专讘讜转 讗转 讛讝讜专拽

搂 The Gemara considers the source for other prohibitions. And concerning that which we learned in a mishna (110a): One who sprinkles part of the blood of an offering, e.g., if he sprinkles one sprinkling instead of four, outside the Temple courtyard, is liable; from where do we derive this? The tanna derives it from that which is taught in a baraita: The verse states with regard to one who slaughters outside the Temple courtyard: 鈥淏lood shall be imputed to that man, he has shed blood, and that man shall be cut off from among his people鈥 (Leviticus 17:4). This serves to include liability for one who sprinkles sacrificial blood outside the Temple courtyard; this is the statement of Rabbi Yishmael. Rabbi Akiva says: It is derived from the verse: 鈥淎ny man鈥hat offers up a burnt offering or sacrifice鈥 (Leviticus 17:8). The term 鈥渙r鈥 serves to include liability for one who sprinkles blood outside the Temple courtyard.

讜专讘讬 讬砖诪注讗诇 讛讗讬 讗讜 讝讘讞 诪讗讬 注讘讬讚 诇讬讛 诇讞诇拽

The Gemara asks: And as for Rabbi Yishmael, what does he do with this term 鈥渙r鈥 in 鈥渁 burnt offering or sacrifice鈥? It serves to divide them into two independent cases, such that liability is incurred even if one offered up only one of them.

讜专讘讬 注拽讬讘讗 诇讞诇拽 诪谞讗 诇讬讛 谞驻拽讗 诇讬讛 诪诇讗 讬讘讬讗谞讜

The Gemara asks: And as for Rabbi Akiva, from where does he derive the halakha to divide them into two cases? He derives it from the next verse: 鈥淎nd he will not bring it to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting鈥 (Leviticus 17:9). The term 鈥渋t鈥 is written in the singular to indicate that one is liable even if he offered up only one of them.

讜专讘讬 讬砖诪注讗诇 讛讛讜讗 诪讬讘注讬 诇讬讛 注诇 讛砖诇诐 讛讜讗 讞讬讬讘 讜讗讬谞讜 讞讬讬讘 注诇 讛讞住专 讜专讘讬 注拽讬讘讗 谞驻拽讗 诇讬讛 诪诇注砖讜转 讗转讜

And as for Rabbi Yishmael, why does he not derive that halakha from the term 鈥渋t鈥? The Gemara answers: According to him, that term is necessary as the source for the halakha that one is liable for offering up a complete animal, but one is not liable for offering up an incomplete animal. The term 鈥渋t鈥 indicates an animal in its entirety. And as for Rabbi Akiva, he derives this from the repetition of 鈥渋t鈥 in the continuation of the verse: 鈥淗e will not bring it鈥to sacrifice it to the Lord鈥 (Leviticus 17:9).

讜专讘讬 讬砖诪注讗诇 讞讚 诇诪讜拽讟专讬 驻谞讬诐 砖讞住专讜 讜讛注诇讜 讘讞讜抓 讜讞讚 诇诪讜拽讟专讬 讞讜抓 砖讞住专讜 讜讛注诇讜 讘讞讜抓 讜讛讗 转谞讬讗 专讘讬 讬砖诪注讗诇 讗讜诪专 讬讻讜诇 诪讜拽讟专讬 驻谞讬诐 砖讞住专讜 讜讛注诇讜 讘讞讜抓 讞讬讬讘 转诇诪讜讚 诇讜诪专 诇注砖讜转 讗转讜 注诇 讛砖诇诐 讞讬讬讘 讜讗讬谞讜 讞讬讬讘 注诇 讛讞住专

And as for Rabbi Yishmael, how does he explain the repetition of 鈥渋t鈥? He holds that each mention teaches about a different case: One is referring to offerings that are fit to be burned inside the Temple courtyard that became incomplete and were then offered up outside. And the other one is referring to offerings that are unfit and so will be burned outside the Temple as they were unlawfully slaughtered outside the Temple courtyard, that became incomplete and were offered up outside. In both cases one is exempt. And so it is taught in a baraita: Rabbi Yishmael says: One might have thought that with regard to offerings that were fit to be burned inside the Temple courtyard and that became incomplete and were instead offered up outside, one would be liable. To dispel this notion, the verse states: 鈥淭o sacrifice it,鈥 which indicates that for offering up a complete animal one is liable, but one is not liable for an incomplete animal.

讜专讘讬 注拽讬讘讗 诪讜拽讟专讬 驻谞讬诐 砖讞住专讜 讜讛注诇讜 讘讞讜抓 讞讬讬讘

And Rabbi Akiva, who has already expounded both mentions of 鈥渋t,鈥 disagrees with Rabbi Yishmael and holds that one is liable for offerings that are fit to be burned inside that became incomplete and were instead offered up outside.

讜专讘讬 注拽讬讘讗 讛讗讬 讚诐 讬讞砖讘 诪讗讬 注讘讬讚 诇讬讛 诇专讘讜转 砖讞讬讟转 讛注讜祝 讜专讘讬 讬砖诪注讗诇 谞驻拽讗 诇讬讛 诪讗讜 讗砖专 讬砖讞讟

Rabbi Yishmael derives the liability for sprinkling part of the blood of an offering outside the Temple courtyard from the verse 鈥淏lood shall be imputed to that man.鈥 The Gemara asks: And as for Rabbi Akiva, what does he do with this verse: 鈥淏lood shall be imputed to that man鈥? He expounds it to include liability for the slaughter of a bird offering outside the courtyard. One is liable despite the fact that inside the Temple, a bird is sacrificed by pinching the nape of its neck, not by slaughtering it. And as for Rabbi Yishmael, he derives this halakha from: 鈥淥r that slaughters it outside the camp鈥 (Leviticus 17:3).

讜专讘讬 注拽讬讘讗 讗诪专 诇讱 讛讛讜讗 诪讬讘注讬 诇讬讛 注诇 讛砖讜讞讟 讛讜讗 讞讬讬讘 讜诇讗 注诇 讛诪讜诇拽 讜专讘讬 讬砖诪注讗诇 谞驻拽讗 诇讬讛 诪讝讛 讛讚讘专

And Rabbi Akiva could have said to you that he does not derive it from that verse, as he holds that it is necessary to teach that only one who slaughters a bird offering outside is liable, but one is not liable for pinching its nape outside. And as for Rabbi Yishmael, from where does he derive that one is exempt if he pinches? He derives it from the phrase at the beginning of the passage about slaughtering outside: 鈥淭his is the matter鈥 (Leviticus 17:2), which indicates that one is liable only for slaughtering and not for any other method of killing.

讚转谞讬讗 讗砖专 讬砖讞讟 讗讬谉 诇讬 讗诇讗 砖讜讞讟 讘讛诪讛 砖讞讟 注讜祝 诪谞讗 诇谉 转诇诪讜讚 诇讜诪专 讗讜 讗砖专 讬砖讞讟

Rabbi Yishmael鈥檚 opinion is as it is taught in a baraita: The verse states: 鈥淎ny man of the house of Israel that slaughters an ox, or lamb, or goat, in the camp, or that slaughters it outside the camp鈥 (Leviticus 17:3). From this verse I have derived liability only for one who slaughters an animal offering outside; from where do we derive that one is liable if he slaughtered a bird offering outside? The verse states: 鈥淥r that slaughters,鈥 to include liability for slaughtering a bird.

讬讻讜诇 讗祝 讛诪讜诇拽 讜讚讬谉 讛讜讗 诪讛 砖讞讬讟讛 讚讗讬谉 讚专讱 讛讻砖讬专讛 讘驻谞讬诐 讞讬讬讘 诪诇讬拽讛 砖讚专讱 讛讻砖讬专讛 讘驻谞讬诐 讗讬谞讜 讚讬谉 砖讛讜讗 讞讬讬讘 转诇诪讜讚 诇讜诪专 讝讛 讛讚讘专

One might have thought that even one who pinches the nape of a bird offering outside would be liable. And there is a logical inference to support this: If with regard to the slaughter of a bird offering, which is not the valid method of preparation inside the Temple, one is nevertheless liable if he did it outside, then with regard to pinching the nape of a bird offering, which is the valid method of preparation inside the Temple, is it not logical that one is liable if he did it outside? To counter this, the verse states: 鈥淭his is the matter鈥 (Leviticus 17:2), which indicates one is liable only for slaughtering, not for any other method of killing.

讜专讘讬 注拽讬讘讗 讗诪专 诇讱 讛讛讜讗 诪讬讘注讬 诇讬讛 诇讙讝讬专讛 砖讜讛

And Rabbi Akiva could have said to you that he does not derive it from that verse, as he holds that it is necessary for expounding as part of a verbal analogy with the passage with regard to vows, where it is written: 鈥淭his is the matter that the Lord has commanded鈥 (Numbers 30:2).

讜讛讗 讚转谞谉 讛拽讜诪抓 讜讛诪拽讘诇 讚诪讬诐 讘讞讜抓 驻讟讜专 诪谞诇谉 讜诪讛讬讻讗 转讬转讬 讚讞讬讬讘

搂 The Gemara considers the source for other prohibitions. And concerning that which we learned in a mishna (112b): One who takes a handful from a meal offering outside the Temple courtyard but does not burn it, and one who collects the blood of an offering in a vessel outside the Temple courtyard but does not sprinkle it on an altar, he is exempt; from where do we derive this, that one is not liable unless he also completes the subsequent sacrificial rites? The Gemara is surprised by the question: But from where would it be derived that one is liable for these acts, necessitating a source for the fact that he is exempt?

转讬转讬 诪砖讞讬讟讛 诪讛 诇砖讞讬讟讛 砖讻谉 谞驻住诇转 砖诇讗 诇讗讜讻诇讬谉 讘驻住讞

The Gemara demonstrates that there is no reason to have assumed that one would be liable: If you suggest deriving it through a comparison to slaughtering outside the Temple, where one is liable even if he does not perform the subsequent sacrificial rites, this can be refuted: What is notable about slaughtering? It is notable in that with regard to a Paschal offering, if one slaughters it with the intent that it be for the sake of those who cannot eat it, it is thereby disqualified. The cases in the mishna do not share this stringency.

转讬转讬 诪讝专讬拽讛 诪讛 诇讝专讬拽讛 砖讻谉 讝专 讞讬讬讘 注诇讬讛 诪讬转讛

And if you suggest deriving it through a comparison to sprinkling blood outside the Temple, as one is liable for sprinkling the blood even though it is only one of the sacrificial rites of the offering that should have been performed inside the Temple, this can be refuted: What is notable about sprinkling? It is notable in that a non-priest who sprinkles blood in the Temple is liable to be punished with death at the hand of Heaven for this act. The cases in the mishna do not share this stringency.

转讬转讬 诪讘讬谞讬讬讗

Given that each suggestion has a different refutation, the Gemara suggests: Derive it through a comparison to the common element shared by these two cases. Slaughtering and sprinkling are each just one of the sacrificial rites that are performed with an offering, and yet one is liable for performing them outside the Temple. Since the derivation is based on a comparison to both cases, the refutations offered for each individual case are no longer relevant.

讗诐 讻谉 诇讗 讬讗诪专 讘讝专讬拽讛 讜转讬转讬 诪讘讬谞讬讬讗

The Gemara rejects this: If that were so, and one can derive liability for one rite through a comparison to the common element shared by two other rites, then let the Torah not state that one is liable for sprinkling blood outside the Temple, and instead derive it from the common element shared by slaughtering and offering up outside the Temple.

讜转讬转讬 诪砖讞讬讟讛 诪讛 诇砖讞讬讟讛 砖讻谉 谞驻住诇转 砖诇讗 诇砖诐 讗讜讻诇讬谉 讘驻住讞 转讬转讬 诪讛注诇讗讛 诪讛 诇讛注诇讗讛 砖讻谉 讬砖谞讛 讘诪谞讞讛 讜转讬转讬 诪讘讬谞讬讬讗

The derivation would be as follows: And if you suggest deriving liability for sprinkling from the liability for slaughtering, that could be refuted. What is notable about slaughtering? It is notable in that, with regard to a Paschal offering, if one slaughters it with the intent that it be for the sake of those who cannot eat, it is thereby disqualified. Sprinkling does not share this stringency. And if you suggest deriving liability for sprinkling from the liability for offering up, that could also be refuted. What is notable about offering up? It is notable in that liability for offering up also exists with regard to a meal offering. Sprinkling does not share this stringency. But it should still be possible to derive liability for sprinkling from the common element shared by the two cases. Since the derivation is based on a comparison to both cases, the refutations offered above for each individual case are no longer relevant.

诇讛讻讬 讻转讬讘 拽专讗 诇诪讬诪专 讚诇讗 讗转讗 诪讘讬谞讬讬讗

The Gemara explains: It is for this very reason that a verse is written to teach the liability for sprinkling outside the Temple, to say to you that liability for performing sacrificial rites outside the Temple cannot be derived from the common element shared by two other cases; rather, it must be directly derived from a verse. Accordingly, the Gemara has demonstrated that there is no basis to have assumed that one who takes a handful from a meal offering, or collects blood, outside the Temple is liable.

讗诪专 专讘讬 讗讘讛讜 砖讞讟 讜讝专拽 诇讚讘专讬 专讘讬 讬砖诪注讗诇 讞讬讬讘 讗讞转 诇讚讘专讬 专讘讬 注拽讬讘讗 讞讬讬讘 砖转讬诐

搂 The Gemara cited a dispute concerning the source for the liability for sprinkling part of the blood of an offering outside the Temple courtyard. According to Rabbi Yishmael, it is derived from the verse in the passage about slaughtering outside the Temple: 鈥淏lood shall be imputed to that man鈥 (Leviticus 17:4). According to Rabbi Akiva, it is derived from the verse in the passage about offering up outside the Temple: 鈥淎ny man鈥hat offers up a burnt offering or sacrifice鈥 (Leviticus 17:8). Rabbi Abbahu says: One who slaughtered an offering and sprinkled its blood outside the Temple in a single lapse of awareness, according to the statement of Rabbi Yishmael, is liable to bring one sin offering, as liability for each transgression is derived from the same passage and they are subcategories of the same prohibition. According to the statement of Rabbi Akiva, one is liable to bring two sin offerings, as the liability for each transgression is derived from a different passage and they are considered independent prohibitions.

讗讘讬讬 讗诪专 讗驻讬诇讜 [诇讚讘专讬] 专讘讬 注拽讬讘讗 讗讬谞讜 讞讬讬讘 讗诇讗 讗讞转 讚讗诪专 拽专讗 砖诐 转注砖讛 讛讻转讜讘 注砖讗谉 诇讻讜诇谉 注讘讜讚讛 讗讞转

Abaye said: Even according to the statement of Rabbi Akiva, he is liable to bring only one sin offering, as the verse states with regard to performing sacrificial rites outside the Temple courtyard: 鈥淏ut in the place that the Lord will choose in one of your tribes, there you shall offer up your burnt offerings, and there you shall do all that I command you鈥 (Deuteronomy 12:14). Since the first part of the verse makes reference to offering up, by inference, the term 鈥測ou shall do鈥 in the second part must be referring to all the other sacrificial rites. Therefore, the verse has regarded all of the sacrificial rites apart from offering up as one rite with regard to the prohibition against performing them outside the Temple courtyard.

讝专拽 讜讛注诇讛 诇讚讘专讬 专讘讬 讬砖诪注讗诇 讞讬讬讘 砖转讬诐 诇讚讘专讬 专讘讬 注拽讬讘讗 讗讬谞讜 讞讬讬讘 讗诇讗 讗讞转

Rabbi Abbahu also said: One who sprinkled the blood of an offering and offered it up outside, in a single lapse of awareness, according to the statement of Rabbi Yishmael is liable to bring two sin offerings. According to the statement of Rabbi Akiva, he is liable to bring only one sin offering.

讗讘讬讬 讗诪专 讗驻讬诇讜 [诇讚讘专讬] 专讘讬 注拽讬讘讗 讞讬讬讘 砖转讬诐 诇讛讻讬 驻诇讙讬谞讛讜 拽专讗 砖诐 转注诇讛 讜砖诐 转注砖讛

Abaye said: Even according to the statement of Rabbi Akiva he is liable to bring two sin offerings, as it is for this reason that the verse differentiated between the offering up and the slaughtering, as it states: 鈥淭here you shall offer up your burnt offerings, and there you shall do,鈥 in order to teach that one who performs both is liable for each one.

砖讞讟 讜讝专拽 讜讛注诇讛 诇讚讘专讬 讛讻诇 讞讬讬讘 砖转讬诐

Finally, Rabbi Abbahu adds the logical conclusion that with regard to one who slaughtered an offering and sprinkled its blood and offered it up outside, in a single lapse of awareness, all agree that he is liable to bring two sin offerings.

转谞讜 专讘谞谉 讘诪讞谞讛 讬讻讜诇 讛砖讜讞讟 注讜诇讛 讘讚专讜诐 讬讛讗 讞讬讬讘 转诇诪讜讚 诇讜诪专 讗诇 诪讞讜抓 诇诪讞谞讛

The Sages taught in a baraita: The verse states: 鈥淎ny man of the house of Israel that slaughters an ox, or lamb, or goat, in the camp, or that slaughters it outside the camp鈥 (Leviticus 17:3). Based on the first part of the verse: 鈥淭hat slaughters鈥in the camp,鈥 one might have thought that one who slaughters a burnt offering in the south of the courtyard, instead of in the north, where it should be slaughtered, will be liable, as he has slaughtered it outside the area in which it should be slaughtered. To counter this, the next part of the verse states: 鈥淭hat slaughters it outside the camp,鈥 indicating that liability is incurred only for slaughtering an offering outside the Temple courtyard.

讬讻讜诇 讞讜抓 诇砖诇砖 诪讞谞讜转 (转诇诪讜讚 诇讜诪专 讗讜 注讝 讘诪讞谞讛) 诪谞讬谉 讗祝 讘诪讞谞讛 诇讜讬讬讛 转诇诪讜讚 诇讜诪专 讘诪讞谞讛

The baraita continues: Three concentric areas, so-called camps, arranged according to decreasing level of sanctity, encompassed the Tabernacle and Temple: The camp of the Divine Presence comprised the courtyard of the Tabernacle, and later on, of the Temple. Surrounding that was the Levite camp and then the Israelite camp. If the verse had stated only: 鈥淭hat slaughters it outside the camp,鈥 one might have thought that a person would be liable only for slaughtering an offering outside all three of the camps. To dispel this notion, the first part of the verse states: 鈥淭hat slaughters an ox, or lamb, or goat, in the camp,鈥 which indicates that liability is incurred even for slaughtering inside these camps. From where is it derived that one is liable even if he slaughters inside the Levite camp? The verse states: 鈥淭hat slaughters鈥in the camp,鈥 which indicates that liability is incurred even for slaughtering inside the three camps.

讗讬 讘诪讞谞讛 讬讻讜诇 讛砖讜讞讟 注讜诇讛 讘讚专讜诐 讬讛讗 讞讬讬讘 转诇诪讜讚 诇讜诪专 讗讜 讗诇 诪讞讜抓 诇诪讞谞讛

If the verse stated only the term 鈥渋n the camp,鈥 which indicates that one is liable even for slaughtering inside the three camps, one might have thought that one who slaughters a burnt offering in the south of the courtyard, which is regarded as being outside of the holier northern section of the courtyard, where such an offering should be slaughtered, will also be liable. To counter this, the verse states: 鈥淥r that slaughters it outside the camp.鈥

诪讛 讞讜抓 诇诪讞谞讛 诪讬讜讞讚 砖讗讬谉 专讗讜讬 诇砖讞讬讟转 拽讚砖讬诐 讜诇砖讞讬讟转 讻诇 讝讘讞 讬爪讗 讚专讜诐 砖讗祝 注诇 驻讬 砖讗讬谉 专讗讜讬 诇砖讞讬讟转 拽讚砖讬 拽讚砖讬诐 专讗讜讬 诇砖讞讬讟转 拽讚砖讬诐 拽诇讬诐

This indicates that just as the phrase 鈥渙utside the camp鈥 is distinctive in that it is referring to an area that is not fit for slaughtering offerings of the most sacred order or for slaughtering any other type of offering, so too, the term 鈥渋n the camp鈥 is referring to an area unfit for the slaughter of any offering. This excludes the south of the courtyard, as even though it is an area that is not fit for slaughtering offerings of the most sacred order, it is fit for slaughtering offerings of lesser sanctity. Therefore, no liability is incurred for slaughtering an offering in the south of the courtyard, even if it should have been slaughtered in the north.

讗诪专 注讜诇讗 讛砖讜讞讟 注诇 讙讙讜 砖诇 讛讬讻诇 讞讬讬讘 讛讜讗讬诇 讜讗讬谉 专讗讜讬 诇砖讞讬讟转 讻诇 讝讘讞 诪转拽讬祝 诇讛 专讘讗 讗诐 讻谉 谞讬讻转讜讘 拽专讗 (讗诇) 诪讞讜抓 诇诪讞谞讛 讜诇讗 讘注讬 讗诇 驻转讞 讗讛诇 诪讜注讚 讗诇 驻转讞 讗讛诇 诪讜注讚 诇诪讛 诇讬 诇讗讜 诇诪注讜讟讬 讙讙讜

Based on this baraita, Ulla says: One who slaughters an offering on the roof of the Sanctuary is liable for slaughtering outside the Temple courtyard, since the roof is an area that is not fit for the slaughter of any offering. Rava objects to this: If so, let the verse write only: 鈥淥r that slaughters it outside the camp,鈥 and it would not be necessary to write: 鈥淎nd he did not bring it to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting鈥 (Leviticus 17:4). Why do I need the verse to also write: 鈥淎nd he did not bring it to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting鈥? Is it not to exclude the roof of the Sanctuary, as in the Temple the Sanctuary corresponded to the Tent of Meeting? Although the roof is an area that is not fit for slaughtering any offering, one should not be liable for slaughtering there since the offering was nevertheless brought to the Tent of Meeting.

讜诇专讘讗 讗诐 讻谉 谞讻转讜讘 讗诇 驻转讞 讗讛诇 诪讜注讚 讘诪讞谞讛 (讜讗诇) 诪讞讜抓 诇诪讞谞讛 诇诪讛 诇讬 诇讗讜 诇讗转讜讬讬 讙讙讜

The Gemara questions Rava鈥檚 claim: But according to Rava, if that is so and one is exempt if he slaughtered on the roof of the Sanctuary as ultimately the offering was brought to the Tent of Meeting, then let the verse write only: 鈥淎nd he did not bring it to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting.鈥 Why do I need the verse to also write 鈥渋n the camp鈥 and 鈥渙utside the camp鈥? Is it not that the term 鈥渋n the camp鈥 indicates that there is a case where one is liable even when slaughtering inside the courtyard, which serves to include liability for slaughtering on the roof of the Sanctuary? According to this, the term 鈥渙utside the camp鈥 would then be necessary to exclude liability for slaughtering a burnt offering in the south of the courtyard.

讗诪专 专讘 诪专讬 诇讗讬转讜讬讬 讻讜诇讛 讘驻谞讬诐 讜爪讜讗专讛 讘讞讜抓

Rav Mari said in defense of Rava: No, the term 鈥渋n the camp鈥 is written to include liability for slaughtering an offering in a case where its body is entirely inside the courtyard but its neck is outside the courtyard.

[爪讜讗专讛] 讘讞讜抓 驻砖讬讟讗 讗诪讗讬 拽驻讬讚 专讞诪谞讗 讗砖讞讬讟讛 讜砖讞讬讟讛 讘讞讜抓 讛讬讗 讗诇讗 诇讗讬转讜讬讬 讻讜诇讛 讘讞讜抓 讜爪讜讗专讛 讘驻谞讬诐

The Gemara modifies Rav Mari鈥檚 statement: If its neck is outside the courtyard, it is obvious that one is liable, as about what is the Merciful One particular? The Merciful One is particular about the slaughter. And in this case, the slaughter is done out-side the courtyard. Rather, say instead that the term 鈥渋n the camp鈥 is written to include liability for slaughtering an offering where its body is entirely outside the courtyard but its neck is inside the courtyard.

讗讬转诪专 讛诪注诇讛 讘讝诪谉 讛讝讛 专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讗诪专 讞讬讬讘 专讬砖 诇拽讬砖 讗诪专 驻讟讜专

搂 An amoraic dispute was stated with regard to one who offers up an offering outside the courtyard today, when there is no Temple: Rabbi Yo岣nan says: He is liable. Reish Lakish says: He is exempt.

专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讗诪专 讞讬讬讘 拽讚讜砖讛 专讗砖讜谞讛 拽讬讚砖讛 诇砖注转讛 讜拽讬讚砖讛 诇注转讬讚 诇讘讗 专讬砖 诇拽讬砖 讗诪专 驻讟讜专 拽讚讜砖讛 专讗砖讜谞讛 拽讬讚砖讛 诇砖注转诇砖注转讛 讜诇讗 拽讬讚砖讛 诇注转讬讚 诇讘讗

The Gemara elaborates: Rabbi Yo岣nan says that he is liable, as he holds that the initial consecration of the Temple sanctified it for its time and sanctified it forever, and the location of the Temple remains sacred even after the Temple was destroyed. Accordingly, it is still possible now to build an altar there and bring offerings upon it; therefore, one is liable if he instead offers up an offering outside the Temple courtyard area. Reish Lakish says that he is exempt, as he holds that the initial consecration of the Temple sanctified it for its time but did not sanctify it forever. Accordingly, one can no longer bring offerings there; therefore, one is not liable for offering up outside that area.

谞讬诪讗 讚讘驻诇讜讙转讗 讚专讘讬 讗诇讬注讝专 讜专讘讬 讬讛讜砖注 拽诪讬驻诇讙讬 讚转谞谉 讗诪专 专讘讬 讗诇讬注讝专 讻砖讛讬讜 讘讜谞讬谉 讘讛讬讻诇 讛讬讜 注讜砖讬诐 拽诇注讬诐 讘讛讬讻诇 拽诇注讬诐 讘注讝专讜转 讗诇讗 砖讘讛讬讻诇 讘讜谞讬谉 诪讘讞讜抓 讜讘注讝专讛 讘讜谞讬谉 诪讘驻谞讬诐

The Gemara suggests: Let us say that Rabbi Yo岣nan and Reish Lakish disagree with regard to the issue that is the subject of the dispute between Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Yehoshua, as we learned in a mishna (Eduyyot 8:6): Rabbi Eliezer said: I heard that when they were building the Sanctuary in the Second Temple, they would fashion temporary curtains for the Sanctuary and temporary curtains for the courtyards to serve as partitions until the construction of the stone walls was completed. The difference was only that in the Sanctuary, the workers built the walls outside the curtains, without entering, and in the courtyards, the workers built the walls within the curtains.

讗诪专 专讘讬 讬讛讜砖注 砖诪注转讬 砖讛讬讜 诪拽专讬讘讬谉 讗祝 注诇 驻讬 砖讗讬谉 讘讬转 讜讗讜讻诇讬诐 拽讚砖讬 拽讚砖讬诐 讗祝 注诇 驻讬 砖讗讬谉 拽诇注讬诐 拽讚砖讬诐 拽诇讬诐 讜诪注砖专 砖谞讬 讗祝 注诇 驻讬 砖讗讬谉 讞讜诪讛 诪驻谞讬 砖拽讚讜砖讛 专讗砖讜谞讛 拽讬讚砖讛 诇砖注转讛 讜拽讬讚砖讛 诇注转讬讚 诇讘讗

The mishna continues: Rabbi Yehoshua said: I heard that one sacrifices offerings on the altar even if there is no Temple, and one partakes of offerings of the most sacred order in the Temple courtyard even if there are no curtains, and one partakes of offerings of lesser sanctity and second-tithe produce in Jerusalem even if there is no wall surrounding the city. This is due to the fact that the initial consecration sanctified the Temple and Jerusalem for their time and also sanctified them forever.

诇讗讜 诪讻诇诇 讚专讘讬 讗诇讬注讝专 住讘专 诇讗 拽讬讚砖讛

The Gemara concludes: From the fact that Rabbi Yehoshua based his opinion on the principle that the initial consecration sanctified the Temple and Jerusalem forever, can one not learn by inference that Rabbi Eliezer maintains that it did not sanctify them for-ever? The dispute between Rabbi Yo岣nan and Reish Lakish would then directly parallel the dispute between Rabbi Yehoshua and Rabbi Eliezer.

讗诪专 诇讬讛 专讘讬谞讗 诇专讘 讗砖讬 诪诪讗讬 讚诇诪讗 讚讻讜诇讬 注诇诪讗 拽讚讜砖讛 专讗砖讜谞讛 拽讬讚砖讛 诇砖注转讛 讜拽讬讚砖讛 诇注转讬讚 诇讘讗 讜诪专 诪讗讬 讚砖诪讬注 诇讬讛 拽讗诪专 讜诪专 诪讗讬 讚砖诪讬注 诇讬讛 拽讗诪专 讜讻讬 转讬诪讗 拽诇注讬诐 诇专讘讬 讗诇讬注讝专 诇诪讛 诇讬 诇爪谞讬注讜转讗 讘注诇诪讗

Ravina said to Rav Ashi: From where do you draw this inference? Perhaps everyone maintains that the initial consecration sanctified the Temple and Jerusalem for their time and also sanctified them forever. And one Sage, Rabbi Eliezer, stated that tradition, which he heard from his teachers, and one Sage, Rabbi Yehoshua, stated that tradition, which he heard from his teachers, and there is no dispute between them. And if you would say: Why do I need curtains at all according to Rabbi Eliezer? The original sanctity remained when Jerusalem was not surrounded by walls, and similarly, the presence or absence of curtains is irrelevant to the sanctity of the Temple area as well. The Gemara answers: The curtains were established merely for seclusion, as it would have been unbecoming for the activity in this most sacred venue to have been visible to all.

讗讬转诪专 讛诪注诇讛 讜讗讬谉 讘讜 讻讝讬转 讜注爪诐 诪砖诇讬诪讜 诇讻讝讬转 专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讗诪专 讞讬讬讘 专讬砖 诇拽讬砖 讗诪专 驻讟讜专

搂 An amoraic dispute was stated with regard to one who offers up outside the Temple a limb of an offering and it does not have on it an olive-bulk of flesh, but the bone completes the measure to make an olive-bulk. Rabbi Yo岣nan says: He is liable. Reish Lakish says: He is exempt.

专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讗诪专 讞讬讬讘 讞讬讘讜专讬 注讜诇讬谉 讻注讜诇讬谉 讚诪讬 专讬砖 诇拽讬砖 讗诪专 驻讟讜专 讞讬讘讜专讬 注讜诇讬谉 诇讗讜 讻注讜诇讬谉 讚诪讜

The Gemara elaborates: Rabbi Yo岣nan says that he is liable, as he holds that an item attached to flesh that must be offered up on the altar, e.g., a bone attached to sacrificial flesh, is also regarded as an item that must be offered up on the altar. Even though if it were to become detached, there would be no requirement to offer it up, nevertheless, as long as it is attached it is considered part of the flesh and it contributes to the required measure of an olive-bulk. Reish Lakish says that he is exempt, as he holds that an item attached to flesh that must be offered up on the altar is not regarded as an item that must be offered up on the altar.

讘注讬 专讘讗 讛诪注诇讛

Rava raises a dilemma: With regard to one who offers up outside the Temple courtyard

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