חולין פה

חולין פה

אֶלָּא סְפֵק אִישׁ סְפֵק אִשָּׁה.

Rather, it must be that the uncertainty in the case of the sounding of the shofar concerns whether a particular individual is a man or a woman, e.g., a tumtum, whose sexual organs are indeterminate. Although a woman is not obligated in the mitzva of sounding the shofar, a tumtum is in fact obligated, despite the uncertainty of sex. It is therefore possible to derive from the sounding of the shofar that if one slaughters a koy, an animal whose status as a domesticated or undomesticated animal is uncertain, on a Festival, one covers its blood.

וְרַבִּי יוֹסֵי לְטַעְמֵיהּ, דְּאָמַר: אִשָּׁה וַדָּאִית נָמֵי תָּקְעָה. דְּתַנְיָא: בְּנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל סוֹמְכִין, וְלֹא בְּנוֹת יִשְׂרָאֵל סוֹמְכוֹת.

The Gemara notes: And Rabbi Yosei, who does not accept this refutation, conforms to his standard line of reasoning, as he says: One who is definitely a woman may also sound the shofar on Rosh HaShana. As it is taught in a baraita concerning the verse that discusses a burnt offering: “Speak to the sons of Israel…and he shall place his hands upon the head of the burnt offering” (Leviticus 1:2–4). The verse indicates that the sons of Israel place their hands upon the head of an offering, but the daughters of Israel do notplace their hands.

רַבִּי יוֹסֵי וְרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן אוֹמְרִים: נָשִׁים סוֹמְכוֹת רְשׁוּת.

Rabbi Yosei and Rabbi Shimon say: It is optional for women to place their hands on the head of an offering before it is slaughtered. Even though women are not obligated to place their hands, doing so is not considered to be performing labor with a sacrificial item, an act normally prohibited, despite the fact that one performs the placing of the hands by leaning with all of his weight on the animal. Similarly, Rabbi Yosei holds that although women are not obligated in the sounding of the shofar, it is optional for them to sound it, and it is not considered a desecration of the Festival.

אָמַר רָבִינָא: וּלְמַאי דְּקָאָמְרִי רַבָּנַן נָמֵי אִית לֵיהּ פִּירְכָא, מָה לִתְקִיעַת שׁוֹפָר שֶׁכֵּן וַדָּאָהּ דּוֹחֶה שַׁבָּת בַּמִּקְדָּשׁ, תֹּאמַר בְּכִיסּוּי דְּלֵיתֵיהּ כְּלָל!

Ravina said: And even according to what the Sages said, that a woman may not sound the shofar on Rosh HaShana but a tumtum is nevertheless obligated due to uncertainty, there is a refutation to their claim as well. One cannot derive from this that the obligation to cover the blood of a koy overrides a Festival. What is notable about the sounding of the shofar? It is notable in that its definite obligation overrides Shabbat in the Temple, as it was sounded in the Temple even when Rosh HaShana occurred on Shabbat, and it is therefore understandable that its uncertain obligation overrides a Festival as well. Can you say the same with regard to the mitzva of covering the blood, which does not override Shabbat in any instance?

הֵשִׁיב רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר הַקַּפָּר בְּרִיבִּי: מָה לְמִילָה שֶׁכֵּן אֵינָהּ נוֹהֶגֶת בְּלֵילֵי יָמִים טוֹבִים. בְּלֵילֵי יָמִים טוֹבִים הוּא דְּלָא נָהֲגָא, בִּשְׁאָר לֵילֵי נָהֲגָא?

The Gemara continues its analysis of the baraita: Rabbi Elazar HaKappar the Distinguished responded with another refutation to Rabbi Yosei’s a fortiori inference: One cannot infer from the mitzva of circumcision that an uncertain obligation to cover the blood of a koy does not override a Festival. What is notable about circumcision? It is notable in that it is not in effect on Festival nights. Can you say the same with regard to the mitzva of covering the blood, which is in effect on Festival nights? The Gemara asks: Does Rabbi Elazar HaKappar mean to say that the mitzva of circumcision is not in effect only on Festival nights, but it is in effect on other, non-Festival nights? Isn’t circumcision always performed during the day?

אֶלָּא, מָה לְמִילָה – שֶׁכֵּן אֵינָהּ נוֹהֶגֶת בַּלֵּילוֹת כְּבַיָּמִים, תֹּאמַר בְּכִסּוּי – שֶׁנּוֹהֵג בַּלֵּילוֹת כְּבַיָּמִים! אָמַר רַבִּי אַבָּא: זֶה אֶחָד מִן הַדְּבָרִים שֶׁאָמַר רַבִּי חִיָּיא אֵין עֲלֵיהֶן תְּשׁוּבָה, וְהֵשִׁיב רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר בְּרַבִּי תְּשׁוּבָה.

The Gemara responds: Rather, Rabbi Elazar HaKappar meant the following: What is notable about circumcision? It is notable in that it is not in effect at night as it is by day. Can you say a similar halakha with regard to the mitzva of covering the blood, which is in effect at night as it is by day? Rabbi Abba said: This a fortiori inference drawn by Rabbi Yosei is one of the matters with regard to which Rabbi Ḥiyya says that there is no refutation for them, and Rabbi Elazar HaKappar the Distinguished successfully responded with a refutation.

מַתְנִי׳ הַשּׁוֹחֵט וְנִמְצֵאת טְרֵיפָה, וְהַשּׁוֹחֵט לַעֲבוֹדָה זָרָה, וְהַשּׁוֹחֵט חוּלִּין בִּפְנִים וְקָדָשִׁים בַּחוּץ, חַיָּה וָעוֹף הַנִּסְקָלִים – רַבִּי מֵאִיר מְחַיֵּיב, וַחֲכָמִים פּוֹטְרִים.

MISHNA: In the case of one who slaughters an undomesticated animal or a bird and it is discovered to be an animal with a wound that would have caused it to die within twelve months [tereifa]; and in the case of one who slaughters an undomesticated animal or a bird for the sake of idol worship; and in the case of one who slaughters a non-sacred animal or bird inside the Temple courtyard or a sacrificial bird outside the Temple courtyard; or in the case of one who slaughters an undomesticated animal or a bird that was sentenced to be stoned, e.g., for killing a person; in all these cases, even though it is prohibited to eat any of these animals or birds, Rabbi Meir deems one obligated to cover their blood, and the Rabbis deem one exempt from doing so because, in their opinion, slaughter that is not fit to render the meat permitted for consumption is not considered an act of slaughter.

הַשּׁוֹחֵט וְנִתְנַבְּלָה בְּיָדוֹ, הַנּוֹחֵר וְהַמְעַקֵּר – פָּטוּר מִלְּכַסּוֹת.

One who slaughters an animal or bird and it became a carcass by his hand, i.e., the slaughter was performed incorrectly, and one who stabs the animal or bird, and one who tears loose the windpipe and the gullet, are exempt from covering the blood, as no act of slaughter took place, and one is obligated to cover blood only after a valid slaughter.

גְּמָ׳ אָמַר רַבִּי חִיָּיא בַּר אַבָּא אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: רָאָה רַבִּי דְּבָרָיו שֶׁל רַבִּי מֵאִיר בְּאוֹתוֹ וְאֶת בְּנוֹ, וּשְׁנָאוֹ בִּלְשׁוֹן חֲכָמִים, וּדְרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בְּכִסּוּי הַדָּם, וּשְׁנָאוֹ בִּלְשׁוֹן חֲכָמִים.

GEMARA: With regard to the dispute in the mishna about whether an act of slaughter that is not fit to render the meat permitted renders one obligated to cover the blood, Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, the redactor of the Mishna, saw as correct the statement of Rabbi Meir, that ineffective slaughter is considered an act of slaughter, with regard to the prohibition against slaughtering a mother and its offspring on the same day, and taught that halakha in the mishna (81b) using the term: The Rabbis, so that it would be accepted. And he saw as correct the statement of Rabbi Shimon, that ineffective slaughter is not considered an act of slaughter with regard to the mitzva of covering the blood, and taught that halakha in the mishna here using the term: The Rabbis.

מַאי טַעְמָא דְּרַבִּי מֵאִיר בְּאוֹתוֹ וְאֶת בְּנוֹ? אָמַר רַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ בֶּן לֵוִי: גָּמַר שְׁחִיטָה שְׁחִיטָה מִשְּׁחוּטֵי חוּץ.

The Gemara asks: What is the reason that Rabbi Meir holds that ineffective slaughter is considered an act of slaughter in the case of a mother and its offspring? Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi said: He derives his opinion by means of a verbal analogy of the terms slaughter and slaughter, from the case of sacrificial animals slaughtered outside the Temple. The verse states with regard to a mother and its offspring: “It and its offspring you shall not slaughter [lo tishḥatu] in one day” (Leviticus 22:28), and the verse states with regard to sacrificial animals: “Or that is slaughtered [yishḥat] outside the camp” (Leviticus 17:3).

מָה הָתָם – שְׁחִיטָה שֶׁאֵינָהּ רְאוּיָה שְׁמָהּ שְׁחִיטָה, אַף הָכָא נָמֵי – שְׁחִיטָה שֶׁאֵינָהּ רְאוּיָה שְׁמָהּ שְׁחִיטָה.

Accordingly, just as there, with regard to one who slaughters an offering outside the Temple it is a case of slaughter that is not fit to render the meat permitted, as one is prohibited from deriving any benefit from such meat, and it is nevertheless considered an act of slaughter to render one liable for slaughtering it outside the Temple, so too here, in the case of a mother and its offspring, an act of slaughter that is not fit to render the meat permitted is considered an act of slaughter, and one is liable.

וְרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן, מַאי טַעְמָא? אָמַר רַבִּי מָנִי בַּר פַּטִּישׁ: גָּמַר מִ״טְּבוֹחַ טֶבַח וְהָכֵן״, מָה לְהַלָּן שְׁחִיטָה רְאוּיָה, אַף כָּאן שְׁחִיטָה רְאוּיָה.

The Gemara asks: And as for Rabbi Shimon, what is the reason he holds that an ineffective slaughter is not considered an act of slaughter? Rabbi Mani bar Pattish said: Rabbi Shimon derives his opinion from the verse: “Slaughter [tevo’aḥ] and prepare; for the men shall dine with me at noon” (Genesis 43:16). Just as there, the verse is referring to an act of slaughter that is fit to render the meat permitted, so too here, in the case of a mother and its offspring, only an act of slaughter that is fit to render the meat permitted is considered an act of slaughter.

וְרַבִּי מֵאִיר נָמֵי, לִיגְמַר מִ״טְּבוֹחַ״? דָּנִין שְׁחִיטָה מִשְּׁחִיטָה, וְאֵין דָּנִין שְׁחִיטָה מִטְּבִיחָה.

The Gemara suggests: And as for Rabbi Meir as well, let him derive from “tevo’aḥ” that only an effective slaughter is considered an act of slaughter. The Gemara responds: According to Rabbi Meir, one derives the halakha with regard to a term of sheḥita from another instance of a term of sheḥita, and one does not derive the halakha with regard to the term of sheḥita from the term of teviḥa.

מָה נָפְקָא מִינַּהּ? הָא תָּנָא דְּבֵי רַבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל: ״וְשָׁב הַכֹּהֵן״ ״וּבָא הַכֹּהֵן״ – זוֹ הִיא שִׁיבָה זוֹ הִיא בִּיאָה.

The Gemara asks: Being that both terms refer to slaughter, what is the difference which one is used; didn’t the school of Rabbi Yishmael teach a verbal analogy with regard to leprosy of houses: The verse states: “And the priest shall return [veshav] on the seventh day” (Leviticus 14:39), and another verse with regard to the priest’s visit seven days later states: “And the priest shall come [uva] and look” (Leviticus 14:44). This returning and this coming have the same meaning and one can therefore derive by verbal analogy that the halakha that applies if the leprosy had spread at the conclusion of the first week applies if it had spread again by the end of the following week.

הָנֵי מִילֵּי – הֵיכָא דְּלֵיכָּא דְּדָמֵי לֵיהּ, אֲבָל אִיכָּא דְּדָמֵי לֵיהּ – מִדְּדָמֵי לֵיהּ יָלְפִינַן.

The Gemara responds: This statement of the school of Rabbi Yishmael applies only where there are no other terms that are identical to it from which one could derive a verbal analogy. But if there is another term that is identical to it, we derive the verbal analogy from the term that is identical to it. Accordingly, Rabbi Meir derives a verbal analogy from the instance of sheḥita that appears with regard to sacrificial animals that are slaughtered outside the Temple.

וְרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן נָמֵי לִיגְמַר מִשְּׁחוּטֵי חוּץ? דָּנִין חוּלִּין מֵחוּלִּין, וְאֵין דָּנִין חוּלִּין מִקֳּדָשִׁים.

The Gemara suggests: And as for Rabbi Shimon as well, let him derive from the case of sacrificial animals that were slaughtered outside the Temple that ineffective slaughter is considered an act of slaughter. The Gemara responds: Rabbi Shimon holds that one derives the halakha with regard to the slaughter of non-sacred animals from another instance of the slaughter of non-sacred animals, and one does not derive the halakha with regard to the slaughter of non-sacred animals from an instance of the slaughter of sacrificial animals. The prohibition against slaughtering a mother and its offspring on the same day is stated primarily with regard to non-sacred animals (see 78a).

וְרַבִּי מֵאִיר: אַטּוּ אוֹתוֹ וְאֶת בְּנוֹ בְּקָדָשִׁים מִי לָא נָהֵיג? הַיְינוּ דְּקָאָמַר רַבִּי חִיָּיא: רָאָה רַבִּי דְּבָרָיו שֶׁל רַבִּי מֵאִיר בְּאוֹתוֹ וְאֶת בְּנוֹ, וּשְׁנָאוֹ בִּלְשׁוֹן חֲכָמִים.

The Gemara continues: And Rabbi Meir would respond: Is this to say that the prohibition against slaughtering a mother and its offspring on the same day does not apply to sacrificial animals? Rather, since the prohibition also applies to sacrificial animals, one can derive its halakha from the case of sacrificial animals that were slaughtered outside the Temple. The Gemara comments: This is what Rabbi Ḥiyya was referring to when he said that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi saw as correct the statement of Rabbi Meir with regard to the halakha of a mother and its offspring, and taught it in the mishna using the term: The Rabbis.

מַאי טַעְמָא דְּרַבִּי מֵאִיר בְּכִסּוּי הַדָּם? אָמַר רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן לָקִישׁ: גָּמַר שְׁפִיכָה שְׁפִיכָה מִשְּׁחוּטֵי חוּץ, מָה לְהַלָּן – שְׁחִיטָה שֶׁאֵינָהּ רְאוּיָה שְׁמָהּ שְׁחִיטָה, אַף כָּאן – שְׁחִיטָה שֶׁאֵינָהּ רְאוּיָה שְׁמָהּ שְׁחִיטָה.

§ The Gemara resumes its discussion of the dispute in the mishna: What is the reason that Rabbi Meir holds one is obligated in the mitzva of covering the blood in a case of ineffective slaughter? Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish said: Rabbi Meir derives this from a verbal analogy between the terms pouring and pouring, from the case of a sacrificial animal that was slaughtered outside the Temple courtyard. One verse states with regard to covering the blood: “And he shall pour out its blood” (Leviticus 17:13), and one verse states with regard to sacrificial animals slaughtered outside the Temple courtyard: “He has poured blood” (Leviticus 17:4). Accordingly, just as there, with regard to offerings slaughtered outside the Temple courtyard, it is a case of slaughter that is not fit to render the meat permitted but is nevertheless considered an act of slaughter, so too here, with regard to covering the blood, an act of slaughter that is not fit to render the meat permitted is considered an act of slaughter.

וְרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן: ״אֲשֶׁר יֵאָכֵל״ כְּתִיב, וְרַבִּי מֵאִיר: הָהוּא לְמַעוֹטֵי עוֹף טָמֵא הוּא דַּאֲתָא, וְרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן: עוֹף טָמֵא מַאי טַעְמָא – דְּלָאו בַּר אֲכִילָה הוּא, טְרֵפָה נָמֵי – לָאו בַּר אֲכִילָה הוּא.

The Gemara continues: And Rabbi Shimon would respond: It is written with regard to covering the blood: “An undomesticated animal or bird that may be eaten” (Leviticus 17:13), indicating that the verse is referring specifically to slaughter fit to render the meat permitted for consumption. And Rabbi Meir holds: That phrase comes to exclude a ritually impure bird from the mitzva of covering the blood. And Rabbi Shimon would respond: What is the reason an impure bird is not included in the mitzva of covering the blood? It is because it is not fit for consumption. If so, a tereifa should also not be included in the mitzva of covering the blood, since it is also not fit for consumption.

וְהַיְינוּ דְּאָמַר רַבִּי חִיָּיא: רָאָה רַבִּי דְּבָרָיו שֶׁל רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בְּכִסּוּי הַדָּם, וּשְׁנָאוֹ בִּלְשׁוֹן חֲכָמִים.

The Gemara comments: And this is what Rabbi Ḥiyya is saying when he said that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi saw as correct the statement of Rabbi Shimon with regard to the halakha of covering the blood, and taught it in the mishna using the term: The Rabbis.

אָמַר רַבִּי אַבָּא:

§ Rabbi Abba says:

לֹא לַכֹּל אָמַר רַבִּי מֵאִיר שְׁחִיטָה שֶׁאֵינָהּ רְאוּיָה שְׁמָהּ שְׁחִיטָה: מוֹדֶה רַבִּי מֵאִיר שֶׁאֵין מַתִּירָתָהּ בַּאֲכִילָה; וְלֹא לַכֹּל אָמַר רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן שְׁחִיטָה שֶׁאֵינָהּ רְאוּיָה לֹא שְׁמָהּ שְׁחִיטָה: מוֹדֶה רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן שֶׁמְּטַהַרְתָּהּ מִידֵי נְבֵלָה.

Not with regard to all halakhot did Rabbi Meir say an act of slaughter that is not fit, e.g., where one slaughters a tereifa, is considered an act of slaughter, as Rabbi Meir does concede that such an act of slaughter does not render the meat of the animal permitted for consumption. And not with regard to all halakhot did Rabbi Shimon say an act of slaughter that is not fit is not considered an act of slaughter, as Rabbi Shimon does concede that such an act of slaughter renders the animal pure from having the impure status of an unslaughtered animal carcass.

אָמַר מָר: לֹא לַכֹּל אָמַר רַבִּי מֵאִיר שְׁחִיטָה שֶׁאֵינָהּ רְאוּיָה שְׁמָהּ שְׁחִיטָה, מוֹדֶה רַבִּי מֵאִיר שֶׁאֵין מַתִּירָתָהּ בַּאֲכִילָה. פְּשִׁיטָא! טְרֵפָה בִּשְׁחִיטָה מִי מִישְׁתַּרְיָא?

The Gemara analyzes this statement: The Master said that not with regard to all halakhot did Rabbi Meir say an act of slaughter that is not fit is considered an act of slaughter, as Rabbi Meir concedes that such an act of slaughter does not render the meat of the animal permitted for consumption. The Gemara asks: Isn’t this obvious? Can a tereifa become permitted for consumption through slaughter?

לָא צְרִיכָא, לְשׁוֹחֵט אֶת הַטְּרֵפָה וּמָצָא בָּהּ בֶּן תִּשְׁעָה חַי; סָלְקָא דַּעְתָּךְ אָמֵינָא: הוֹאִיל דְּאָמַר רַבִּי מֵאִיר: שְׁחִיטָה שֶׁאֵינָהּ רְאוּיָה שְׁמָהּ שְׁחִיטָה, תַּהֲנֵי לֵיהּ שְׁחִיטַת אִמּוֹ וְלָא לִיבְעֵי שְׁחִיטָה, קָמַשְׁמַע לַן.

The Gemara answers: No, this statement of Rabbi Abba is necessary in a case where one slaughtered a tereifa and found a living nine-month-old fetus inside it. It might enter your mind to say: Since Rabbi Meir said an act of slaughter that is not fit to render the meat permitted is considered an act of slaughter, the slaughter of its mother should be effective to render the meat of the fetus permitted for consumption, as it normally does when the mother is not a tereifa; and the fetus, after it is born, should not require its own slaughter. Rabbi Abba therefore teaches us that according to Rabbi Meir, slaughter that does not render the meat of the mother permitted for consumption does not render the fetus permitted either.

וְתִסְבְּרָא? וְהָאָמַר רַבִּי מֵאִיר: בֶּן פְּקוּעָה טָעוּן שְׁחִיטָה!

The Gemara asks: And how can you understand that without Rabbi Abba’s statement, one would have thought that according to Rabbi Meir, the fetus does not require its own slaughter? But doesn’t Rabbi Meir say that a fetus removed from its mother’s womb after the mother was properly slaughtered [ben pekua], requires slaughter, as the slaughter of the mother does not permit the fetus?

לָא צְרִיכָא, דְּרַבִּי סָבַר לַהּ כְּרַבִּי מֵאִיר וְסָבַר לַהּ כְּרַבָּנַן. סָבַר לַהּ כְּרַבִּי מֵאִיר, דְּאָמַר: שְׁחִיטָה שֶׁאֵינָהּ רְאוּיָה שְׁמָהּ שְׁחִיטָה, וְסָבַר לַהּ כְּרַבָּנַן, דְּאָמְרִי: שְׁחִיטַת אִמּוֹ מְטַהַרְתּוֹ.

The Gemara responds: The statement of Rabbi Abba is not necessary for the opinion of Rabbi Meir, but it is for the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi. This is because Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir in one instance, and holds in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis in another. In a case where one slaughtered a mother and its offspring on the same day he holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, who says an act of slaughter that is not fit to render the meat permitted is considered an act of slaughter. And with regard to a ben pekua, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi holds in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, who say the proper slaughter of the mother renders the fetus kosher, i.e., the fetus does not require its own ritual slaughter.

כֵּיוָן דַּאֲמוּר רַבָּנַן שְׁחִיטַת אִמּוֹ מְטַהַרְתּוֹ, תַּהֲנֵי לֵיהּ שְׁחִיטַת אִמּוֹ וְלָא לִיבְעֵי שְׁחִיטָה, קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן.

Therefore, since the Rabbis say the proper slaughter of the mother renders the fetus kosher, one might conclude that with regard to a tereifa as well, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi holds the slaughter of the mother should be effective to render the meat of the fetus permitted for consumption, and it should not require its own slaughter. In light of this, Rabbi Abba teaches us that although Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi agrees with Rabbi Meir that an ineffective slaughter is considered an act of slaughter, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi holds that in the case of a tereifa the slaughter of the mother is not effective for the fetus.

וְלֹא לַכֹּל אָמַר רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן שְׁחִיטָה שֶׁאֵינָהּ רְאוּיָה לֹא שְׁמָהּ שְׁחִיטָה, מוֹדֶה רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן שֶׁמְּטַהַרְתָּהּ מִידֵי נְבֵלָה. פְּשִׁיטָא! דְּאָמַר רַב יְהוּדָה אָמַר רַב, וְאָמְרִי לַהּ בְּמַתְנִיתָא תָּנָא: ״וְכִי יָמוּת מִן הַבְּהֵמָה״, מִקְצָת בְּהֵמָה מְטַמְּאָה וּמִקְצָת בְּהֵמָה אֵינָהּ מְטַמְּאָה, וְאֵי זוֹ זוֹ – טְרֵפָה שֶׁשְּׁחָטָהּ.

The Gemara addresses the second statement of Rabbi Abba: And not with regard to all halakhot did Rabbi Shimon say an act of slaughter that is not fit is not considered an act of slaughter, as Rabbi Shimon concedes that such an act of slaughter renders the animal pure from having the impure status of an unslaughtered animal carcass. The Gemara asks: Isn’t this obvious? As Rav Yehuda says that Rav says, and some say it was taught in a baraita: The verse states with regard to an animal carcass: “And if there dies of the animals…he that touches its carcass shall be unclean” (Leviticus 11:39). The word “of” indicates that some animals transmit impurity as a carcass and some animals do not transmit impurity. And which animal does not? That is a tereifa that one slaughtered.

לָא צְרִיכָא, לְשׁוֹחֵט אֶת הַטְּרֵפָה וְהִיא חוּלִּין בַּעֲזָרָה. דְּתַנְיָא: הַשּׁוֹחֵט אֶת הַטְּרֵפָה, וְכֵן הַשּׁוֹחֵט וְנִמְצֵאת טְרֵיפָה, זֶה וָזֶה חוּלִּין בַּעֲזָרָה – רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן מַתִּיר בַּהֲנָאָה, וַחֲכָמִים אוֹסְרִין.

The Gemara responds: No, Rabbi Abba’s statement is necessary in the case of one who slaughters a tereifa, and it is a non-sacred animal in the Temple courtyard. As it is taught in a baraita: In the case of one who slaughters a known tereifa, and likewise one who slaughters an animal and it was found to be a tereifa, and this and that were non-sacred animals slaughtered in the Temple courtyard, Rabbi Shimon permits one to derive benefit from them, as one is not considered to have transgressed the prohibition against slaughtering a non-sacred animal in the Temple courtyard. And the Rabbis prohibit one to derive benefit from them.

סָלְקָא דַּעְתָּךְ אָמֵינָא, הוֹאִיל וְאָמַר רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן: מוּתָּר בַּהֲנָאָה, אַלְמָא לָאו שְׁחִיטָה הִיא כְּלָל, אֵימָא: מִידֵי נְבֵלָה נָמֵי לָא מְטַהֲרָה, קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן.

Accordingly, it might enter your mind to say: Since Rabbi Shimon says it is permitted to derive benefit from such an animal, evidently slaughtering a tereifa is not considered slaughter at all. Therefore, say that slaughter does not have the ability to purify the tereifa from having the status of a ritually impure animal carcass either. Rabbi Abba therefore teaches us that even according to Rabbi Shimon, the slaughter is effective to remove it from the status of a carcass.

אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַב פָּפָּא לְאַבָּיֵי: וְסָבַר רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן חוּלִּין בַּעֲזָרָה דְּאוֹרָיְיתָא הִיא? אֲמַר לֵיהּ: אִין, וְהָתְנַן רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן אוֹמֵר: חוּלִּין שֶׁנִּשְׁחֲטוּ בַּעֲזָרָה יִשָּׂרְפוּ בָּאֵשׁ, וְכֵן חַיָּה שֶׁנִּשְׁחֲטָה בָּעֲזָרָה. אִי אָמְרַתְּ בִּשְׁלָמָא דְּאוֹרָיְיתָא – הַיְינוּ דְּגָזְרִינַן חַיָּה אַטּוּ בְּהֵמָה.

Rav Pappa said to Abaye: And does Rabbi Shimon hold that the prohibition against deriving benefit from non-sacred animals slaughtered in the Temple courtyard is by Torah law? Abaye said to Rav Pappa: Yes he does. And we learned in a mishna (Temura 33b) that Rabbi Shimon says: Non-sacred animals that were slaughtered in the Temple courtyard shall be burned in the fire. And likewise, an undomesticated animal that was slaughtered in the Temple courtyard shall be burned in the fire. Abaye continues: Granted, if you say the meat of a non-sacred domesticated animal slaughtered in the Temple courtyard is forbidden by Torah law, this is the reason why we decree that the meat of an undomesticated animal is prohibited as well, due to the Torah prohibition against deriving benefit from the meat of a domesticated animal.

אֶלָּא אִי אָמְרַתְּ דְּרַבָּנַן, בְּהֵמָה מַאי טַעְמָא? דִּילְמָא אָתֵי לְמֵיכַל קָדָשִׁים בַּחוּץ, הִיא גּוּפַהּ גְּזֵרָה, וַאֲנַן נֵיקוּם וְנִגְזוֹר גְּזֵירָה לִגְזֵירָה?

But if you say the meat of domesticated animals is forbidden by rabbinic law then the mishna is difficult: What is the reason the meat of a non-sacred domesticated animal is forbidden? It is forbidden lest one see someone consuming this meat outside the Temple courtyard and arrive at the erroneous conclusion that it is permitted to partake of sacrificial meat outside the Temple courtyard. If so, the prohibition against deriving benefit from the meat of a non-sacred domesticated animal is itself a rabbinic decree, and will we then proceed to issue a decree prohibiting one to derive benefit from a non-sacred undomesticated animal in order to prevent the violation of a decree?

רַבִּי חִיָּיא נְפַל לֵיהּ יָאנִיבָא בְּכִיתָּנֵיהּ, אֲתָא לְקַמֵּיהּ דְּרַבִּי, אֲמַר לֵיהּ: שְׁקוֹל עוֹפָא וּשְׁחוֹט עַל בּוּבִיתָא דְּמַיָּא, דְּמוֹרַח דְּמָא וְשָׁבֵיק לֵיהּ.

§ The mishna teaches that one who stabs an undomesticated animal or bird, or who tears loose its windpipe and gullet, is exempt from covering the blood. With regard to this the Gemara relates: Moths infested the flax of Rabbi Ḥiyya. He came before Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi to ask how to get rid of the moths. Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi said to him: Take a bird and slaughter it over the tub of water in which the flax was soaked, as the moths will smell the blood and leave the flax.

הֵיכִי עָבֵיד הָכִי? וְהָתַנְיָא: הַשּׁוֹחֵט וְצָרִיךְ לַדָּם – חַיָּיב לְכַסּוֹת. כֵּיצַד יַעֲשֶׂה? אוֹ נוֹחֲרוֹ, אוֹ עוֹקְרוֹ.

The Gemara asks: How could Rabbi Ḥiyya do this? But isn’t it taught in a baraita: One who slaughters a bird or an undomesticated animal, and does so only because he needs the blood, is nevertheless obligated to cover the blood and may not use it for any other purpose? Rather, how should one who needs the blood act? He either stabs it or tears loose its windpipe and its gullet, so that it is not killed with an act of slaughter. How, then, could Rabbi Ḥiyya use the blood of the bird that he slaughtered to rid his flax of the moths?

כִּי אֲתָא רַב דִּימִי אָמַר: ״צֵא טְרוֹף״ אֲמַר לֵיהּ, כִּי אֲתָא רָבִין אָמַר: ״צֵא נְחוֹר״ אֲמַר לֵיהּ.

The Gemara responds: When Rav Dimi came from Eretz Yisrael, he said that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi said to Rabbi Ḥiyya: Go out and render the bird a tereifa, and then slaughter it, as the mishna teaches that one who slaughters a tereifa is not required to cover its blood. When Ravin came from Eretz Yisrael, he said that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi said to Rabbi Ḥiyya: Go out and tear loose the bird’s windpipe and gullet.

לְמַאן דְּאָמַר ״צֵא טְרוֹף״, מַאי טַעְמָא לָא אָמַר ״צֵא נְחוֹר״?

The Gemara asks: According to the one who says that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi said to Rabbi Ḥiyya: Go out and render the bird a tereifa, what is the reason that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi did not say: Go out and tear loose its windpipe and gullet?

וְכִי תֵּימָא, קָסָבַר אֵין שְׁחִיטָה לָעוֹף מִן הַתּוֹרָה, וּנְחִירָתוֹ זוֹ הִיא שְׁחִיטָתוֹ, וְהָתַנְיָא: רַבִּי אוֹמֵר: ״כַּאֲשֶׁר צִוִּיתִךָ״ – מְלַמֵּד שֶׁנִּצְטַוָּה מֹשֶׁה עַל הַוֶּשֶׁט וְעַל הַקָּנֶה, וְעַל רוֹב אֶחָד בָּעוֹף, וְעַל רוֹב שְׁנַיִם בַּבְּהֵמָה.

And if you would say the reason is because Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi holds that slaughter of a bird is not obligatory by Torah law, and consequently the tearing loose of its windpipe and gullet is considered its slaughter such that he would be required to cover the blood, this is untenable. As isn’t it taught in a baraita that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: The verse states: “And you shall slaughter…as I have commanded you” (Deuteronomy 12:21). This teaches that Moses was previously commanded concerning the mitzvot of slaughter, i.e., he was taught about the gullet and the windpipe, that the cutting of these simanim constitutes slaughter, and about the requirement to cut the majority of one siman of a bird, and about the requirement to cut the majority of two simanim of an animal. If so, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi holds that the slaughter of a bird is obligatory by Torah law.