עירובין נ

עירובין נ

אָמַר רַבָּה: מַאי טַעְמָא דְּרַב — מִשּׁוּם דְּלָא מְסַיַּים אַתְרֵיהּ.

Rabba said: What is the reason for Rav’s statement that one who declares his intention to establish residence beneath a tree has said nothing at all? It is because the place he designated is not precisely defined. Since he did not establish his residence in one particular location, he did not establish it at all.

וְאִיכָּא דְאָמְרִי, אָמַר רַבָּה: מַאי טַעְמָא דְּרַב — מִשּׁוּם דְּקָסָבַר: כׇּל שֶׁאֵינוֹ בְּזֶה אַחַר זֶה — אֲפִילּוּ בְּבַת אַחַת אֵינוֹ.

And some say an alternative version of Rabba’s statement. Rabba said: What is the reason for the statement of Rav? It is Because he maintains: Anything that cannot be accomplished sequentially, due to halakhic or practical considerations, even simultaneously, cannot be accomplished, as one negates the other. In this case, since one cannot establish residence in an area of four cubits on one side of a tree and proceed to establish residence in an area of four cubits on the other side of the tree, neither can he simultaneously establish residence beneath a tree greater than four cubits.

מַאי בֵּינַיְיהוּ? אִיכָּא בֵּינַיְיהוּ דְּאָמַר: ״לִיקְנוֹ לִי בְּאַרְבַּע אַמּוֹת מִגּוֹ שְׁמוֹנֶה״.

The Gemara asks: What is the practical difference between these two versions of Rabba’s statement? The Gemara answers: There is a practical difference between them with regard to a case where he said: Let residence be acquired for me in four cubits of the eight or more cubits beneath that tree.

מַאן דְּאָמַר מִשּׁוּם דְּלָא מְסַיַּים אַתְרֵיהּ — הָא לָא מְסַיַּים אַתְרֵיהּ.

According to the one who said that it is because the place he designated is not precisely defined, here too, the place he designated is not precisely defined, as he failed to specify the precise location of the four cubits in which to establish his residence.

וּמַאן דְּאָמַר מִשּׁוּם ״כׇּל שֶׁאֵינוֹ בְּזֶה אַחַר זֶה אֲפִילּוּ בְּבַת אַחַת אֵינוֹ״ — הַאי כְּאַרְבַּע אַמּוֹת דָּמֵי, דְּהָכָא אַרְבַּע אַמּוֹת קָאָמַר.

And according to the one who said it is because anything that cannot be accomplished sequentially even simultaneously it cannot be accomplished, this is considered as if he established his residence in four cubits, as here he stated that he is designated only four cubits as his place of residence.

גּוּפָא, אָמַר רַבָּה: כׇּל דָּבָר שֶׁאֵינוֹ בְּזֶה אַחַר זֶה — אֲפִילּוּ בְּבַת אַחַת אֵינוֹ, אֵיתִיבֵיהּ אַבָּיֵי לְרַבָּה: הַמַּרְבֶּה בְּמַעַשְׂרוֹת — פֵּירוֹתָיו מְתוּקָּנִין, וּמַעְשְׂרוֹתָיו מְקוּלְקָלִין.

The Gemara proceeds to analyze the matter of Rabba’s statement itself. Rabba said: Anything that cannot be accomplished sequentially even simultaneously it cannot be accomplished. Abaye raised an objection to the opinion of Rabba based on the Tosefta: One who increases tithes, i.e., he tithes two-tenths instead of one-tenth, the remainder of his produce is rendered fit for consumption, as he properly tithed it; however, his tithes are ruined, as the additional tenth is neither a tithe nor is it tithed produce. It is not a tithe because tithe status applies only to one tenth, and neither is it tithed produce as it was not tithed. Since it is unclear which of the two-tenths is the actual tithe and which is not, this produce may neither be treated as a tithe nor as tithed produce.

אַמַּאי? לֵימָא: כׇּל שֶׁאֵינוֹ בְּזֶה אַחַר זֶה — אֲפִילּוּ בְּבַת אַחַת אֵינוֹ!

According to Rabba’s opinion, the question arises: Why should the produce be rendered fit for consumption? Let us say and apply his principle: Anything that cannot be accomplished sequentially; even simultaneously it cannot be accomplished. Since one may not designate two tenths sequentially, one tenth followed by a second tenth, likewise, he should be precluded from simultaneously designating two tenths of his produce as a tithe. Accordingly, it should be considered as though he had not designated any tithe at all, and therefore his produce should not be regarded as tithed.

שָׁאנֵי מַעֲשֵׂר דְּאִיתֵיהּ לַחֲצָאִין, דְּאִי אָמַר: ״תִּקְדּוֹשׁ פַּלְגָא פַּלְגָא דְחִיטְּתָא״ — קָדְשָׁה.

Gemara answers: The case of a tithe is different, as tithe status takes effect partially, i.e., on less than a unit of produce. As if one said: Let half of each grain of wheat be designated as tithed, it is designated. Just as one can designate an entire grain of wheat as a tithe, he can likewise designate half a grain. In this case too, when one tithes two tenths of the produce, the ruling is not that one tenth is actual tithe and the other tenth is untithed produce mixed with the tithe. Instead, half of each grain of the set-aside portion is designated as a tithe, while the other half of each grain is not. Accordingly, the remainder of the produce is tithed, as one tenth of the total has been designated as first tithe. However, the portion designated as the tithe is ruined, because it is impossible to identify which part of each grain is designated.

מַעְשַׂר בְּהֵמָה דְּלֵיתֵיהּ לַחֲצָאִין.

Another objection was raised against Rabba’s opinion: Yet there is the case of the animal tithe, which does take effect partially, as one cannot consecrate half an animal for his tithe. Three times a year, the owner of a herd of kosher animals would gather all the animals born during the preceding period into an enclosure and let them out one by one. Every tenth animal would be marked with red paint to indicate that it was sacred. Only an entire animal could be consecrated as animal tithe, not a part of an animal.

וְאָמַר (רַבָּה): יָצְאוּ שְׁנַיִם בַּעֲשִׂירִי, וּקְרָאָן עֲשִׂירִי — עֲשִׂירִי וְאַחַד עָשָׂר מְעוֹרָבִין זֶה בָּזֶה!

And Rabba said: If two animals emerged from the enclosure together as the tenth, and he designated them both as the tenth, the tenth and eleventh animals are intermingled with each other. One is sacred with the sanctity of the animal tithe, while the other remains a peace-offering, but there is no way to determine which is which. The question arises: If the principle that anything which cannot be accomplished sequentially; even simultaneously it cannot be accomplished applies, neither animal is consecrated, as one cannot designate both the tenth and the eleventh animals as the animal tithe, one after the other.

שָׁאנֵי מַעְשַׂר בְּהֵמָה דְּאִיתֵיהּ בְּזֶה אַחַר זֶה בְּטָעוּת.

The Gemara answers: The animal tithe is different, as two animals can indeed be designated as animal tithe one after the other in the case of an error. Although one cannot designate the tenth and eleventh animals as the animal tithe ab initio, if he did so in error they are both consecrated.

דִּתְנַן: קָרָא לַתְּשִׁיעִי עֲשִׂירִי, וְלָעֲשִׂירִי תְּשִׁיעִי, וְלָאַחַד עָשָׂר עֲשִׂירִי — שְׁלָשְׁתָּן מְקוּדָּשִׁין.

As we learned in a mishna: If one erred and designated the ninth animal as the tenth, and erred again and designated the tenth as the ninth and the eleventh as the tenth, all three animals are consecrated. The first is consecrated because it was designated as the tenth, the second because it actually is the tenth, while the third is also consecrated because it was designated as the tenth. Apparently, more than one animal can be consecrated as the animal tithe, if designated in error. Here too, a modicum of sanctity applies to the two animals that emerged together and were together designated as the tenth.

וַהֲרֵי תּוֹדָה, דְּלֵיתַהּ בְּטָעוּת, וְלֵיתַהּ בְּזֶה אַחַר זֶה, וְאִיתְּמַר: תּוֹדָה שֶׁנִּשְׁחֲטָה עַל שְׁמוֹנִים חַלּוֹת, חִזְקִיָּה אָמַר: קָדְשׁוּ עֲלַהּ אַרְבָּעִים מִתּוֹךְ שְׁמוֹנִים, רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן אָמַר: לֹא קָדְשׁוּ עֲלַהּ אַרְבָּעִים מִתּוֹךְ שְׁמוֹנִים.

The Gemara raises another objection to Rabba’s principle. But there is the case of the forty loaves that accompany a thanks-offering, which are not consecrated if they were designated in error, and likewise are not consecrated if two sets of loaves were designated for the same offering one after the other. And yet it is stated that amora’im disagreed with regard to a thanks-offering that was slaughtered accompanied by eighty loaves, twice the required amount. Ḥizkiya said: Forty of the eighty loaves are consecrated, even though their identity cannot be determined; Rabbi Yoḥanan said: Not even forty of the eighty loaves are consecrated. It would appear that these amora’im disagree whether or not sanctity that cannot take effect in sequence can take effect simultaneously.

הָא אִיתְּמַר עֲלַהּ, אָמַר רַבִּי (זֵירָא): הַכֹּל מוֹדִים הֵיכָא דְּאָמַר ״לִיקְדְּשׁוּ אַרְבָּעִים מִתּוֹךְ שְׁמוֹנִים״ — דְּקָדְשִׁי, ״לֹא יִקְדְּשׁוּ אַרְבָּעִים אֶלָּא אִם כֵּן קָדְשׁוּ שְׁמוֹנִים״ — כּוּלֵּי עָלְמָא לָא פְּלִיגִי דְּלֹא קָדְשׁוּ.

The Gemara rejects this contention. Wasn’t it stated with regard to this dispute that Rabbi Zeira said: Everyone, both Ḥizkiya and Rabbi Yoḥanan, concedes that in a case where the donor said: Let forty of the eighty loaves be consecrated, that the forty are consecrated; and in a case where he said: Let forty loaves only be consecrated if all eighty are consecrated, everyone agrees that they are not consecrated. This is in accordance with Rabba’s opinion.

כִּי פְּלִיגִי בִּסְתָמָא. מָר סָבַר: לְאַחְרָיוּת קָא מְכַוֵּין, וְעַל תְּנַאי אַיְיתִינְהוּ.

When Ḥizkiya and Rabbi Yoḥanan disagree is with regard a case where the donor designated eighty loaves without stipulation how many he wants consecrated. One Sage, Ḥizkiya, maintains: Although he designated eighty loaves, he seeks to consecrate only forty, and when he sets aside eighty loaves, he merely intends to ensure that he will have forty, and he therefore brought the extra loaves on condition that if the first forty loaves are lost or become ritually impure, the second forty will be consecrated in their place. Consequently, the first forty loaves are consecrated.

וּמָר סָבַר: לְקׇרְבָּן גָּדוֹל קָא מְכַוֵּין.

And the other Sage, Rabbi Yoḥanan, maintains: He intends to bring a large offering of eighty loaves, and therefore none of the loaves are consecrated.

אָמַר אַבָּיֵי: לֹא שָׁנוּ אֶלָּא בְּאִילָן שֶׁתַּחְתָּיו שְׁתֵּים עֶשְׂרֵה אַמָּה, אֲבָל בְּאִילָן שֶׁאֵין שְׁתֵּים עֶשְׂרֵה אַמָּה, הֲרֵי מִקְצָת בֵּיתוֹ נִיכָּר.

Abaye said: They only taught Rav’s ruling that one cannot establish residence beneath a tree without precisely defining a particular location, with regard to a tree beneath which there are at least twelve cubits. However, with regard to a tree beneath which there are not twelve cubits, he can establish residence there, as at least part of his residence is conspicuous. In that case, there is a partial overlap between the middle four cubits beneath the tree and the four cubits nearest him and the four cubits farthest from him, and consequently each necessarily contains at least part of his residence.

מַתְקֵיף לַהּ רַב הוּנָא בְּרֵיהּ דְּרַב יְהוֹשֻׁעַ: מִמַּאי דִּבְאַרְבְּעִי מְצִיעָתָא קָא מְסַיַּים, דִּלְמָא בְּאַרְבְּעִי דְּהַאי גִּיסָא וּבְאַרְבְּעִי דְּהַאי גִּיסָא קָמְסַיַּים!

Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, strongly objects to this: From where is it ascertained that he designates his residence in the four middle cubits, so that there is a partial overlap with both the nearest and the farthest cubits; perhaps he designates it in the four cubits on this side or in the four cubits on the other side? Since he does not know which location he designated as his residence, he did not establish residence anywhere beneath the tree.

אֶלָּא אָמַר רַב הוּנָא בְּרֵיהּ דְּרַב יְהוֹשֻׁעַ: לֹא שָׁנוּ אֶלָּא בְּאִילָן שֶׁתַּחְתָּיו שְׁמוֹנֶה אַמּוֹת, אֲבָל בְּאִילָן שֶׁתַּחְתָּיו שֶׁבַע אַמּוֹת — הֲרֵי מִקְצָת בֵּיתוֹ נִיכָּר.

Rather, Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, said: Abaye’s statement must be emended. They taught this only with regard to a tree that has at least eight cubits beneath it. However, with regard to a tree that has only seven cubits beneath it, even if one did not establish a particular location, he acquires residence, as at least part of his residence is conspicuous, as any four cubits must include at least one cubit of his residence.

תַּנְיָא כְּווֹתֵיהּ דְּרַב, תַּנְיָא כְּווֹתֵיהּ דִּשְׁמוּאֵל.

With regard to the dispute between Rav and Shmuel, the Gemara notes that one baraita was taught in accordance with the opinion of Rav and another baraita was taught in accordance with the opinion of Shmuel.

תַּנְיָא כְּווֹתֵיהּ דְּרַב: מִי שֶׁבָּא בַּדֶּרֶךְ וְחָשְׁכָה לוֹ, וְהָיָה מַכִּיר אִילָן אוֹ גָדֵר, וְאָמַר: ״שְׁבִיתָתִי תַּחְתָּיו״ — לֹא אָמַר כְּלוּם. אֲבָל אִם אָמַר: ״שְׁבִיתָתִי בְּמָקוֹם פְּלוֹנִי״ — מְהַלֵּךְ עַד שֶׁמַּגִּיעַ לְאוֹתוֹ מָקוֹם. הִגִּיעַ לְאוֹתוֹ מָקוֹם — מְהַלֵּךְ אֶת כּוּלּוֹ וְחוּצָה לוֹ אַלְפַּיִם אַמָּה.

The Gemara elaborates. A baraita was taught in accordance with the opinion of Rav: With regard to one who was coming along the way on Shabbat eve, and it grew dark while he was traveling, and he was familiar with a tree or a fence within two thousand cubits of his current location, and he said: My residence is beneath that tree, he has not said anything of legal consequence. However, if he said: My residence is in such-and-such place, he walks until he reaches that place. Once he reached that place that he established as his residence, he walks through all of it and another two thousand cubits beyond it.

בַּמֶּה דְּבָרִים אֲמוּרִים — בְּמָקוֹם הַמְסוּיָּים, כְּגוֹן שֶׁשָּׁבַת בְּתֵל שֶׁהוּא גָּבוֹהַּ עֲשָׂרָה טְפָחִים, וְהוּא מֵאַרְבַּע אַמּוֹת וְעַד בֵּית סָאתַיִם.

In what case are these matters, that he establishes four cubits as his residence, and another two thousand cubits in each direction, stated? In a case where he selected a well-defined, clearly demarcated place, i.e., a case where he established residence on a mound ten handbreadths high, and its area ranges from a minimum of four cubits to a maximum of two beit se’a.

וְכֵן בִּקְעָה שֶׁהִיא עֲמוּקָּה עֲשָׂרָה, וְהִיא מֵאַרְבַּע אַמּוֹת וְעַד בֵּית סָאתַיִם. אֲבָל בְּמָקוֹם שֶׁאֵין מְסוּיָּים — אֵין לוֹ אֶלָּא אַרְבַּע אַמּוֹת.

And, likewise, that is the halakha when he establishes residence on a plain ten handbreadths deeper than the surrounding area, and its area ranges from a minimum of four cubits to a maximum of two beit se’a. However, if he selected a place that is not defined, e.g., in the middle of a plain, he does not establish residence, and accordingly he has only four cubits in which to move.

הָיוּ שְׁנַיִם, אֶחָד מַכִּיר וְאֶחָד שֶׁאֵינוֹ מַכִּיר — זֶה שֶׁאֵינוֹ מַכִּיר מוֹסֵר שְׁבִיתָתוֹ לַמַּכִּיר, וְהַמַּכִּיר אוֹמֵר: ״שְׁבִיתָתִי בְּמָקוֹם פְּלוֹנִי״.

If two people were walking together, one of whom is familiar with a particular location in the distance, and one of whom is not familiar with it, the one who is not familiar with it entrusts his right to designate his residence to the one who is familiar with it, and the one who is familiar with it says: My residence is in such-and-such place.

בַּמֶּה דְּבָרִים אֲמוּרִים — כְּשֶׁסִּיֵּים אַרְבַּע אַמּוֹת שֶׁקָּבַע. אֲבָל לֹא סִיֵּים אַרְבַּע אַמּוֹת שֶׁקָּבַע — לֹא יָזוּז מִמְּקוֹמוֹ.

In what case are these matters, that he acquires four cubits as his residence and another two thousand cubits in each direction, stated? In a case where he defined the four cubits that he seeks to establish as his residence. However, if he did not define the four cubits that he seeks to establish as his residence, he may not move from his current place, as neither did he seek to establish residence there, nor did he acquire it in the location he sought to establish residence. This baraita is in accordance with the opinion of Rav that one who fails to designate the four cubits he seeks to establish as residence has no residence at all.

לֵימָא תֶּיהְוֵי תְּיוּבְתֵּיהּ דִּשְׁמוּאֵל? אָמַר לָךְ שְׁמוּאֵל: הָכָא בְּמַאי עָסְקִינַן, כְּגוֹן דְּאִיכָּא מִמְּקוֹם רַגְלָיו וְעַד עִיקָּרוֹ תְּרֵי אַלְפֵי וְאַרְבַּע גַּרְמִידֵי, דְּאִי מוֹקְמֵית לֵיהּ בְּאִידַּךְ גִּיסָא דְּאִילָן — קָם לֵיהּ לְבַר מִתְּחוּמָא.

Gemara poses a question: Let us say that this baraita is a conclusive refutation of the opinion of Shmuel? The Gemara answers: There is no difficulty, as Shmuel could have said to you: With what are we dealing here? We are dealing with a special case, where from the place he is standing to the trunk of the tree there is a distance of two thousand and four cubits, so that if you were to establish residence on the other side of the tree, it would be situated outside his Shabbat limit.

אִי סַיֵּים אַרְבַּע אַמּוֹת — מָצֵי אָזֵיל, וְאִי לָא — לָא מָצֵי אָזֵיל.

Consequently, if he designated his four cubits on the near side of the tree he may go there; and if not, he may not go from the place he is standing. In other words, since he did not establish residence in a particular location, the concern is that he sought to establish it beyond his two thousand cubit limit.

תַּנְיָא כְּווֹתֵיהּ דִּשְׁמוּאֵל: טָעָה וְעֵירַב לִשְׁתֵּי רוּחוֹת, כִּמְדוּמֶּה הוּא שֶׁמְּעָרְבִין לוֹ לִשְׁתֵּי רוּחוֹת, אוֹ שֶׁאָמַר לַעֲבָדָיו ״צְאוּ וְעָרְבוּ לִי״, אֶחָד עֵירַב עָלָיו לַצָּפוֹן וְאֶחָד עֵירַב עָלָיו לַדָּרוֹם — מְהַלֵּךְ לַצָּפוֹן כְּעֵירוּבוֹ לַדָּרוֹם, וְלַדָּרוֹם כְּעֵירוּבוֹ לַצָּפוֹן.

A baraita was taught in accordance with the opinion of Shmuel. If one erred and established an eiruv in two directions at once, for example, if in his ignorance he imagined that it is permitted to establish an eiruv in two directions, that he may extend the distance that he may walk on Shabbat in two opposite directions, or if he said to his servants: Go out and establish an eiruv for me, without specifying the direction, and one established an eiruv for him to the north, and one established an eiruv for him to the south, he may walk to the north as far as he is permitted go based on his eiruv to the south, and he may walk to the south as far as he is permitted go based on his eiruv to the north. In other words, the assumption is that he established residence in both directions based on the eiruv in each direction, and he must therefore take both into consideration before moving.

וְאִם מִיצְּעוּ עָלָיו אֶת הַתְּחוּם — לֹא יָזוּז מִמְּקוֹמוֹ.

And consequently, if each eiruv was placed two thousand cubits in opposite directions placing him in the middle of the limit, he may not move from his current location, as it is prohibited to venture beyond either limit. Apparently, even if one did not establish residence in a particular location, as in this case he has acquired residence in both places, nonetheless, the halakha is that residence has been established in his current location, in accordance with the opinion of Shmuel.

לֵימָא תֶּיהְוֵי תְּיוּבְתֵּיהּ דְּרַב? רַב תַּנָּא הוּא וּפָלֵיג.

The Gemara poses a question: Let us say that this baraita is a conclusive refutation of the opinion of Rav? The Gemara answers: This baraita indeed differs with Rav’s ruling. Nevertheless, his opinion is not disqualified, as Rav himself had tanna status and therefore, unlike later amora’im, could disagree with opinions of tanna’im.

אָמַר שְׁבִיתָתִי בְּעִיקָּרוֹ — מְהַלֵּךְ מִמְּקוֹם רַגְלָיו וְעַד עִיקָּרוֹ אַלְפַּיִם אַמָּה, וּמֵעִיקָּרוֹ לְבֵיתוֹ אַלְפַּיִם אַמָּה. נִמְצָא מְהַלֵּךְ מִשֶּׁחָשֵׁיכָה אַרְבַּעַת אֲלָפִים אַמָּה.

We learned in the mishna that if, however, he said: My residence is at the trunk of the tree, he established residence there, and he may walk from the place that he is standing to the trunk of the tree, up to two thousand cubits, and from the trunk of the tree to his house another two thousand cubits. Ultimately, he may walk after nightfall a total distance of four thousand cubits.