עירובין נא

עירובין נא

אָמַר רָבָא: וְהוּא דְּכִי רָהֵיט לְעִיקָּרוֹ מָטֵי. אֲמַר לֵיהּ אַבָּיֵי: וְהָא ״חָשְׁכָה לוֹ״ קָתָנֵי!

Rava said: This halakha applies only in a case where, were he to run to the trunk of the tree he could reach it before the onset of Shabbat. Abaye said to him: But doesn’t the mishna state: And it grew dark while he was traveling, indicating that he is farther away than that?

״חָשְׁכָה״ — לְבֵיתוֹ, אֲבָל לְעִיקָּרוֹ שֶׁל אִילָן מָצֵי אָזֵיל. אִיכָּא דְּאָמְרִי אָמַר רָבָא: חָשְׁכָה לוֹ כִּי מְסַגֵּי קַלִּי קַלִּי, אֲבָל רָהֵיט — מָטֵי.

The Gemara answers: The mishna means that it grew dark while he was traveling so that he can no longer return to his house before nightfall; however, he is able to go to the trunk of the tree before Shabbat. Some state a different version of the previous statement. Rava said: The mishna means that it grew dark while he was traveling, so that were he to walk very slowly he could not reach his house; however, if he runs, he can still arrive before Shabbat.

רַבָּה וְרַב יוֹסֵף הֲווֹ קָא אָזְלִי בְּאוֹרְחָא. אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַבָּה לְרַב יוֹסֵף: תְּהֵא שְׁבִיתָתֵנוּ תּוּתֵי דִּיקְלָא דְּסָבֵיל אֲחוּהּ. וְאָמְרִי לַהּ: תּוּתֵי דִּיקְלָא דְּפָרֵיק מָרֵיהּ מִכְּרָגָא.

Rabba and Rav Yosef were going together along the way. Rabba said to Rav Yosef: Our residence will be beneath the palm that carries its brother, the one with another palm tree leaning on it. And some say he said to him: Our residence will be beneath the palm that spared its owner from the land tax [karga], the palm which yielded enough dates for its owner to pay his entire land tax.

יָדַע לֵיהּ מָר? אֲמַר לֵיהּ: לָא יָדַעְנָא לֵיהּ. אֲמַר לֵיהּ: סְמוֹךְ עֲלַי, דְּתַנְיָא, רַבִּי יוֹסֵי אוֹמֵר: אִם הָיוּ שְׁנַיִם, אֶחָד מַכִּיר וְאֶחָד שֶׁאֵינוֹ מַכִּיר — זֶה שֶׁאֵינוֹ מַכִּיר מוֹסֵר שְׁבִיתָתוֹ לַמַּכִּיר, זֶה שֶׁמַּכִּיר אוֹמֵר: תְּהֵא ״שְׁבִיתָתֵנוּ בְּמָקוֹם פְּלוֹנִי״.

Rabba asked: Does the Master know of that tree? Rav Yosef said to him: No, I do not know of it. He said to him: Then rely on me, as it was taught in a baraita that Rabbi Yosei says: If two people were walking together, one of whom is familiar with a particular location in the distance, and one is not familiar with it, the one who is not familiar with it entrusts his right to designate his residence to the one who is familiar with it, and the one who is familiar with it says: My residence is in such-and-such place.

וְלָא הִיא, לָא תְּנָא לֵיהּ כְּרַבִּי יוֹסֵי, אֶלָּא כִּי הֵיכִי דְּלִיקַבֵּל לַהּ מִינֵּיהּ, מִשּׁוּם דְּרַבִּי יוֹסֵי נִימּוּקוֹ עִמּוֹ.

The Gemara comments: But it is not so; that is not the opinion of Rabbi Yosei. Rabba only taught it as if it is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei so that Rav Yosef would accept it from him, due to the fact that Rabbi Yosei’s reasoning accompanies his rulings, Since the halakha is usually in accordance with Rav Yosei’s opinion, Rav Yosef would be less likely to raise doubts with regard to the ruling.

אִם אֵינוֹ מַכִּיר אוֹ שֶׁאֵינוֹ בָּקִי וְכוּ׳.

We learned in the mishna: If one is not familiar with a tree or any other noticeable landmark, or if he is not an expert in the halakha, unaware that residence can be established from a distance, and he said: My residence is at my current location, his presence at his current location acquires for him the right to walk two thousand cubits in each direction.

הָנֵי אַלְפַּיִם אַמָּה הֵיכָן כְּתִיבָן? דְּתַנְיָא: ״שְׁבוּ אִישׁ תַּחְתָּיו״ — אֵלּוּ אַרְבַּע אַמּוֹת. ״אַל יֵצֵא אִישׁ מִמְּקוֹמוֹ״ — אֵלּוּ אַלְפַּיִם אַמָּה.

The Gemara raises a fundamental question: These two thousand cubits, where are they written in the Torah? The Gemara answers that it is as it was taught in a baraita: “Remain every man in his place” (Exodus 16:29); these are the four cubits, which constitute the minimum Shabbat limit, e.g., for one who ventured beyond his prescribed limit. “Let no man go out of his place” (Exodus 16:29); these are the two thousand cubits of the Shabbat limit for one who remains in his place. Unless otherwise specified, the measure of one’s place is two thousand cubits.

מְנָא לַן? אָמַר רַב חִסְדָּא: לָמַדְנוּ ׳מָקוֹם׳ מִ׳מָּקוֹם׳, וּ׳מָקוֹם׳ מִ׳נִּיסָה׳, וְ׳נִיסָּה׳ מִ׳נִּיסָה׳, וְ׳נִיסָּה׳ מִ׳גְּבוּל׳, וּ׳גְבוּל׳ מִ׳גְּבוּל׳, וּ׳גְבוּל׳ מִ׳חוּץ׳, וְ׳חוּץ׳ מִ׳חוּץ׳. דִּכְתִיב: ״וּמַדּוֹתֶם מִחוּץ לָעִיר אֶת פְּאַת קֵדְמָה אַלְפַּיִם בָּאַמָּה וְגוֹ׳״.

The Gemara asks: From where do we derive that this is the measure of one’s place? Rav Ḥisda said: We derive this by means of a verbal analogy between the term place written here: “Let no man go out of his place,” and from the term place written with regard to an unwitting murderer: “Then I will appoint you a place to where he shall flee” (Exodus 21:13). This last verse mentions both place and fleeing, and the term place is derived from the term fleeing. And the term fleeing is derived from the term fleeing, written in a different verse with regard to the unwitting murderer: “But if the slayer shall at any time come outside the border of the city of his refuge, whither he has fled” (Numbers 35:26). And the term fleeing is derived from the term border, which appears in the same verse. And the term border is derived from the term border, as it states there: “And the avenger of blood find him outside [miḥutz] the borders of the city of his refuge” (Numbers 35:27). Since this verse mentions both the term border and the term outside, the term border is derived from the term outside. And the term outside is derived from the term outside, as it is written with regard to the Levite cities, which also served as cities of refuge: “And you shall measure from outside [miḥutz] the city on the east side two thousand cubits, and on the south side two thousand cubits, and on the west side two thousand cubits, and on the north side two thousand cubits” (Numbers 35:5). From this chain of identical terms, the meaning of the term place stated in connection with Shabbat is derived from the two thousand cubits mentioned with regard to the Levite cities.

וְנֵילַף מִ״קִּיר הָעִיר וָחוּצָה אֶלֶף אַמָּה״? דָּנִין ׳חוּץ׳ מִ׳חוּץ׳, וְאֵין דָּנִין ׳חוּץ׳ מֵ׳חוּצָה׳.

The Gemara asks: But let us derive instead by means of a verbal analogy between the term outside in the verse: “Outside the borders of the city of refuge,” and the term outside in the verse: “From the wall of the city outward [vaḥutza] a thousand cubits” (Numbers 35:4), that the Shabbat limit measures only a thousand cubits. The Gemara answers: One derives the meaning of the term outside [ḥutz] by means of a verbal analogy from another instance of the term outside [ḥutz], but one does not derive the meaning of the term outside from the term outward [ḥutza].

וּמַאי נָפְקָא מִינַּהּ? הָא תָּנָא דְּבֵי רַבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל: ״וְשָׁב הַכֹּהֵן״ ״וּבָא הַכֹּהֵן״ — זוֹ הִיא שִׁיבָה, זוֹ הִיא בִּיאָה!

The Gemara raises a difficulty: What is significant about the difference between the two terms? Didn’t the school of Rabbi Yishmael teach a verbal analogy with regard to leprosy of houses between the verse: “And the priest shall return [veshav]” (Leviticus 14:39) and the verse: “And the priest shall come [uva]” (Leviticus 14:44), from which it is derived that this is the halakha with regard to returning, i.e., it is after seven days; this is the same halakha with regard to coming; it is after seven days. Obviously, the less pronounced difference of one letter between ḥutz and ḥutza, should not prevent the teaching of a verbal analogy.

הָנֵי מִילֵּי הֵיכָא דְּלֵיכָּא מִידֵּי דְּדָמֵי לֵיהּ, אֲבָל הֵיכָא דְּאִיכָּא מִידֵּי דְּדָמֵי לֵיהּ — מִדָּמֵי לֵיהּ יָלְפִינַן.

Gemara rejects this argument: This applies only when there are no terms that are identical to it however, where there are terms that are identical to it, we derive the verbal analogy from terms identical to it, rather than from the terms that are not precisely identical.

אַלְפַּיִם אַמָּה עֲגוּלּוֹת. וְרַבִּי חֲנִינָא בֶּן אַנְטִיגְנוֹס מָה נַפְשָׁךְ: אִי אִית לֵיהּ גְּזֵירָה שָׁוָה — פֵּיאוֹת כְּתִיבָן, אִי לֵית לֵיהּ גְּזֵירָה שָׁוָה — אַלְפַּיִם אַמָּה מְנָא לֵיהּ?

The tanna’im of the mishna disagree whether the two-thousand-cubit limit granted to a person in every direction is measured as a circle or as a square tablet. The Gemara poses a question: With regard to the opinion of Rabbi Ḥanina ben Antigenos that the limit is measured as a circle, no matter what you say, it is difficult. If he is of the opinion that there is a verbal analogy from the verse written with regard to the Levite cities it is difficult, because sides is the term written, indicating squared boundaries. And if he is not of the opinion that there is a verbal analogy, from where does he derive that the Shabbat limit is two thousand cubits?

לְעוֹלָם אִית לֵיהּ גְּזֵירָה שָׁוָה, וְשָׁאנֵי הָכָא דְּאָמַר קְרָא: ״זֶה יִהְיֶה לָהֶם מִגְרְשֵׁי הֶעָרִים״ — לָזֶה אַתָּה נוֹתֵן פֵּיאוֹת, וְאִי אַתָּה נוֹתֵן פֵּיאוֹת לְשׁוֹבְתֵי שַׁבָּת.

The Gemara answers: Actually, he is of the opinion that there is a verbal analogy, but here, with regard to the Levite cities, it is different, as the verse says: “This shall be to them the open space of the cities” (Numbers 35:5), from which it is inferred: To this, the open space of the city, you should provide sides and square it, but you do not provide sides to those resting on Shabbat. Instead, those who establish Shabbat residence are provided with a circular, two-thousand-cubit limit.

וְרַבָּנַן? תָּנֵי, רַב חֲנַנְיָה אוֹמֵר: כָּזֶה יְהוּ כׇּל שׁוֹבְתֵי שַׁבָּת.

The Gemara asks: And how do the Rabbis understand the emphasis placed on the word this in the verse? The Gemara answers: As it was taught in a baraita that Rav Ḥananya says: Like this measure shall be the calculations of measures for all those who rest on Shabbat, i.e., square.

אָמַר רַבִּי אַחָא בַּר יַעֲקֹב: הַמַּעֲבִיר אַרְבַּע אַמּוֹת בִּרְשׁוּת הָרַבִּים אֵינוֹ חַיָּיב עַד שֶׁמַּעֲבִיר הֵן וַאֲלַכְסוֹנָן.

Rav Aḥa bar Ya’akov said: One who carries an object four cubits in the public domain is only liable if he carries it four cubits with their diagonal. The four cubits mentioned in many places is only the basic measure by which the distance beyond which it is prohibited to carry is calculated. However, in practice, a person is liable only if he carries the object the length of the diagonal of a square with four-cubit sides.

אָמַר רַב פָּפָּא בָּדֵיק לַן רָבָא: עַמּוּד בִּרְשׁוּת הָרַבִּים גָּבוֹהַּ עֲשָׂרָה וְרוֹחַב אַרְבָּעָה, צָרִיךְ הֵן וַאֲלַכְסוֹנָן אוֹ לָא? וְאָמְרִינַן לֵיהּ: לָאו הַיְינוּ דְּרַב חֲנַנְיָה? דְּתַנְיָא, רַב חֲנַנְיָה אוֹמֵר: כָּזֶה יְהוּ כׇּל שׁוֹבְתֵי שַׁבָּת.

Rav Pappa said that Rava once tested us by asking: With regard to a pillar in the public domain, ten handbreadths high and four handbreadths wide, must the width be four handbreadths with their diagonal in order to be regarded a private domain, or not? And we said to him: Is this not that which was taught by Rav Ḥananya? As it was taught in a baraita: Rav Ḥananya says: Like this measure shall be that of all those who rest on Shabbat, indicating that the diagonal is the determining measure for the halakhot of rest on Shabbat.

וְזֶה הוּא שֶׁאָמְרוּ הֶעָנִי מְעָרֵב בְּרַגְלָיו. אָמַר רַבִּי מֵאִיר: אָנוּ אֵין לָנוּ אֶלָּא עָנִי וְכוּ׳.

We learned in the mishna: And this is the meaning of that which the Sages said: A pauper can establish an eiruv with his feet, i.e., one who does not have the bread required to establish an eiruv may walk anywhere within his Shabbat limit and acquire residence. We have this leniency in effect only for a pauper, who does not have food for two meals. However, one who has bread may only establish residence with bread. Rabbi Yehuda says: This leniency is in effect for both a pauper and a wealthy person.

אָמַר רַב נַחְמָן: מַחֲלוֹקֶת ״בִּמְקוֹמִי״, דְּרַבִּי מֵאִיר סָבַר: עִיקָּר עֵירוּב בְּפַת,

Rav Naḥman said: This dispute between Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehuda is with regard to a case where the person said: My residence is in my current location. As Rabbi Meir maintains: The primary ordinance and establishment of eiruv is with bread.

עָנִי הוּא דְּאַקִּילוּ רַבָּנַן עִילָּוֵיהּ, אֲבָל עָשִׁיר — לָא.

Therefore, it is only with regard to a pauper, who does not have food for two meals, that the Sages were lenient and permitted him to establish residence merely by saying: My residence is in my current location. However, with regard to a wealthy person in his own house who has bread, no, they did not permit him to do so.

וְרַבִּי יְהוּדָה סָבַר: עִיקַּר עֵירוּב בָּרֶגֶל, אֶחָד עָנִי וְאֶחָד עָשִׁיר. אֲבָל ״בְּמָקוֹם פְּלוֹנִי״ — דִּבְרֵי הַכֹּל: עָנֵי — אִין, עָשִׁיר — לָא.

And Rabbi Yehuda maintains: The primary ordinance of eiruv is by foot, i.e., by going and stating that he is establishing his residence in that location, and therefore it applies to both a pauper and a wealthy person. However, with regard a case when the person said: My residence is in such-and-such place, and he is not there, everyone, both Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehuda, agrees that for a pauper on the road on a Shabbat eve, yes, an eiruv may be established in that manner; however, for a wealthy person, no, an eiruv may not be established in that manner.

״וְזוֹ הִיא שֶׁאָמְרוּ״ מַאן קָתָנֵי לַהּ — רַבִּי מֵאִיר. וְאַהֵיָיא קָאֵי — אַ״אֵינוֹ מַכִּיר אוֹ שֶׁאֵינוֹ בָּקִי בַּהֲלָכָה״. ״וְלֹא אָמְרוּ מְעָרְבִין בְּפַת אֶלָּא לְהָקֵל״ מַאן קָתָנֵי לַהּ — רַבִּי יְהוּדָה.

And as for the mishna’s statement: And this is what the Sages meant when they said that a pauper can establish an eiruv with his feet, who, which Sage, is teaching it? It is Rabbi Meir. And to which clause of the mishna is it referring? It refers to the previous statement: If he is not familiar with a tree or any other noticeable landmark, or if he is not an expert in the halakha, and therefore is unaware that a residence can be established from a distance, and said: My residence is in my current location, he acquires two thousand cubits in each direction. And as for the statement in the continuation of the mishna: The Sages said that one establishes an eiruv with bread only to be lenient with the wealthy person, who, which Sage, is teaching it? It is Rabbi Yehuda, who maintains that the option of establishing an eiruv by foot is available to the wealthy as well.

וְרַב חִסְדָּא אָמַר: מַחֲלוֹקֶת ״בְּמָקוֹם פְּלוֹנִי״, דְּרַבִּי מֵאִיר סָבַר: עָנִי — אִין, עָשִׁיר — לָא, וְרַבִּי יְהוּדָה סָבַר: אֶחָד עָנִי וְאֶחָד עָשִׁיר. אֲבָל ״בִּמְקוֹמִי״, דִּבְרֵי הַכֹּל אֶחָד עָנִי וְאֶחָד עָשִׁיר, דְּעִיקַּר עֵירוּב בָּרֶגֶל.

Rav Ḥisda, however, disagreed with Rav Naḥman and said: The dispute between Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehuda in the mishna is with regard to a person who said: My residence is in such-and-such place, in which case his residence is neither acquired by foot nor with bread. As Rabbi Meir maintains: A pauper, yes, he establishes residence with an eiruv in that manner; however, a wealthy person, no, he does not. And Rabbi Yehuda maintains: Both a pauper and a wealthy person may establish an eiruv in that manner. However, in a case where one said: My residence is in my present location, everyone, both Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehuda, agrees that an eiruv of this kind is effective both for a pauper and for a wealthy person, as everyone agrees agree that the primary ordinance of eiruv is by foot.

״וְזוֹ הִיא שֶׁאָמְרוּ״ מַאן קָתָנֵי לַהּ — רַבִּי מֵאִיר. וְאַהֵיָיא קָאֵי — אַהָא: ״מִי שֶׁבָּא בַּדֶּרֶךְ וְחָשֵׁכָה״. ״וְלֹא אָמְרוּ מְעָרְבִין בְּפַת אֶלָּא לְהָקֵל״ מַאן קָתָנֵי לַהּ — דִּבְרֵי הַכֹּל.

And as for the mishna’s statement: And this is what the Sages meant when they said that a pauper can establish an eiruv by foot, who is teaching it? It is Rabbi Meir. And to which clause of the mishna is it referring? It is referring to this clause: One who was coming along the way on Shabbat eve, and it grew dark while he was traveling. According to Rabbi Yehuda, he could have established an eiruv even if he was in his house. And as for the statement in the continuation of the mishna: The Sages said that one establishes an eiruv with bread only in order to be lenient with the wealthy person, who is teaching it? Everyone agrees with this halakha, and it is taught according to both opinions.

תַּנְיָא כְּווֹתֵיהּ דְּרַב נַחְמָן: אֶחָד עָנִי וְאֶחָד עָשִׁיר מְעָרְבִין בְּפַת, וְלֹא יֵצֵא עָשִׁיר חוּץ לַתְּחוּם וְיֹאמַר: ״שְׁבִיתָתִי בִּמְקוֹמִי״ — לְפִי שֶׁלֹּא אָמְרוּ מְעָרְבִין בָּרֶגֶל אֶלָּא לְמִי שֶׁבָּא בַּדֶּרֶךְ וְחָשֵׁכָה, דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי מֵאִיר.

The Gemara comments: A baraita was taught in accordance with the opinion of Rav Naḥman, who said that the dispute between Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehuda is with regard to one who said: My residence is in my present location. It was stated in the baraita: Both a pauper and a wealthy person establish an eiruv with bread; however a wealthy person may not go out beyond the Shabbat limit and say: My residence is in my present location, because the Sages said that one can establish an eiruv by foot only in the case of a person who was coming along the way and it grew dark while he was traveling. This is the statement of Rabbi Meir.

רַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר: אֶחָד עָנִי וְאֶחָד עָשִׁיר מְעָרְבִין בָּרֶגֶל, וְיֵצֵא עָשִׁיר חוּץ לַתְּחוּם: וְיֹאמַר ״תְּהֵא שְׁבִיתָתִי בִּמְקוֹמִי״, וְזֶה הוּא עִיקָּרוֹ שֶׁל עֵירוּב. וְהִתִּירוּ חֲכָמִים לְבַעַל הַבַּיִת לְשַׁלֵּחַ עֵירוּבוֹ בְּיַד עַבְדּוֹ, בְּיַד בְּנוֹ, בְּיַד שְׁלוּחוֹ בִּשְׁבִיל לְהָקֵל עָלָיו.

Rabbi Yehuda says: Both a pauper and a wealthy person establish an eiruv by foot. And a wealthy person will go out beyond the Shabbat limit and say: My residence is in my present location. And this is the primary ordinance of eiruv. However, the Sages permitted a homeowner to send his eiruv in the hand of his servant, or in the hand of his son, or in the hand of his agent, in order to be lenient with him, so that he need not exert himself and go out and establish an eiruv by foot. This baraita presents the dispute between Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehuda as it was delineated by Rav Naḥman.

אָמַר רַבִּי יְהוּדָה: מַעֲשֶׂה בְּאַנְשֵׁי בֵּית מֶמֶל וּבְאַנְשֵׁי בֵּית גּוּרְיוֹן בְּאָרוֹמָא שֶׁהָיוּ מְחַלְּקִין גְּרוֹגְרוֹת וְצִימּוּקִין לַעֲנִיִּים בִּשְׁנֵי בַצּוֹרֶת, וּבָאִין עֲנִיֵּי כְּפַר שִׁיחִין וַעֲנִיֵּי כְּפַר חֲנַנְיָה וּמַחְשִׁיכִין עַל הַתְּחוּם, לַמׇּחֳרָת מַשְׁכִּימִין וּבָאִין.

The baraita continues. Rabbi Yehuda said: There was an incident involving the members of the household of the Memel family and members of the household of Guryon family in the village of Aroma, who were distributing dried figs and raisins to the paupers in years of famine, and the paupers of the village of Siḥin and the paupers of the village of Ḥananya would come to the edge of the Shabbat limit at nightfall, which was also within the Shabbat limit of Aroma, and then go home. The following day they would rise early and go to receive their figs and raisins. Apparently, one can establish an eiruv by foot, if he says: My residence is in my present location.

אָמַר רַב אָשֵׁי: מַתְנִיתִין נָמֵי דַּיְקָא, דְּקָתָנֵי: מִי שֶׁיָּצָא לֵילֵךְ לְעִיר שֶׁמְּעָרְבִין לָהּ, וְהֶחְזִירוֹ חֲבֵרוֹ — הוּא מוּתָּר לֵילֵךְ, וְכׇל בְּנֵי הָעִיר אֲסוּרִין, דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי יְהוּדָה.

Rav Ashi said: The formulation of the mishna is also precise, in accordance with Rav Naḥman’s explanation, as it teaches: If on a Shabbat eve one set out to go to a city for which an eiruv is established enabling him to go there on Shabbat, and another person caused him to return home, he himself is permitted to go to that city on Shabbat, and for all the other residents of the town it is prohibited to go there. This is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda.

וַהֲוֵינַן בַּהּ: מַאי שְׁנָא אִיהוּ וּמַאי שְׁנָא אִינְהוּ? וְאָמַר רַב הוּנָא: הָכָא בְּמַאי עָסְקִינַן — כְּגוֹן שֶׁיֵּשׁ לוֹ שְׁנֵי בָתִּים, וּשְׁנֵי תְּחוּמֵי שַׁבָּת בֵּינֵיהֶן.

And we discussed this mishna and raised a difficulty: What is different about him and what is different about them? Why is he permitted to proceed to the other town while it is prohibited for the other residents to do so? And Rav Huna said: We are dealing here with a case where he has two houses, one in each city, and there is the distance of two Shabbat limits, four thousand cubits, between them.

אִיהוּ, כֵּיוָן דְּנָפְקָא לֵיהּ לְאוֹרְחָא — הֲוָה לֵיהּ עָנִי.

With regard to him, since he set out on his way, his legal status is that of a pauper, as he did not intend to return to his first house, but to continue to his other house. Therefore, he can establish residence at the end of his Shabbat limit by verbal means alone.

וְהָנָךְ — עֲשִׁירִים נִינְהוּ. אַלְמָא כָּל ״בְּמָקוֹם פְּלוֹנִי״ — עָנִי אִין, עָשִׁיר לָא. שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ.

And the legal status of these other inhabitants of his city, is that of wealthy people, as they are in their houses and have food. Consequently, they can only establish residence at the end of their Shabbat limit by depositing food there prior the onset of Shabbat. Apparently, everything stated with regard to one who says: My residence is in such-and-such place; to a pauper, yes, it applies to a wealthy person, no, it does not apply. The Gemara concludes: Indeed, learn from this that this is the case.

מַתְנֵי לֵיהּ רַב חִיָּיא בַּר אָשֵׁי לְחִיָּיא בַּר רַב קַמֵּיהּ דְּרַב ״אֶחָד עָנִי וְאֶחָד עָשִׁיר״. אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַב: סַיֵּים בָּהּ נָמֵי הֲלָכָה כְּרַבִּי יְהוּדָה.

Rav Ḥiyya bar Ashi was teaching the mishna to Ḥiyya bar Rav before Rav. He stated that this leniency applies both to a pauper and to a wealthy person. Rav said to him: Conclude your statement also: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda.

רַבָּה בַּר רַב חָנָן הֲוָה רְגִיל דְּאָתֵי מֵאַרְטִיבְנָא לְפוּמְבְּדִיתָא.

The Gemara relates: Rabba bar Rav Ḥanan was in the habit of coming from his home in Artibbena to Pumbedita on Shabbat.