גיטין פח

גיטין פח

הָכָא נָמֵי – כְּשֶׁיֵּשׁ רֶיוַח מִלְּמַעְלָה.

so too, it is a case where there is space above the latter one, so it is clearly not a separate bill of divorce that was cut.

וְדִלְמָא אִימְּלוֹכֵי אִימְּלִיךְ (וּכְתַב)!

The Gemara asks: But although it is clearly one bill of divorce, perhaps the scribe wrote the first part of the bill of divorce and then the husband changed his mind about divorcing his wife, thereby canceling the bill of divorce, and afterward he changed his mind again and the scribe then wrote the rest of the bill of divorce in the second column, after the first part was already canceled.

דִּכְתִיב ״הֲרֵי אַתְּ״ מִלְּמַטָּה, וּ״מוּתֶּרֶת״ מִלְּמַעְלָה. וְדִלְמָא אִיתְרְמִי לֵיהּ? כּוּלֵּי הַאי לָא חָיְישִׁינַן.

The Gemara answers: It is a case where he wrote: You are hereby, on the bottom of the first column, and continued: Permitted to marry any man, at the top of the second column. In this case there is obvious continuity between the columns, and he certainly did not change his mind in the meantime. The Gemara asks: But perhaps it happened that he stopped in the middle of the sentence? The Gemara answers: We are not concerned to such a degree; it is highly unlikely that he changed his mind in the middle of a sentence.

רַב אָשֵׁי אָמַר: דִּידִיעָה בֵּיהּ מְתַחְתָּא דִמְגִילְּתָא.

Rav Ashi said: The mishna is referring to a case where the stretch of the scroll is clear, so it is obvious that it is a complete piece of parchment and that nothing was cut out of it.

חָתְמוּ עֵדִים בְּרֹאשׁ הַדַּף וְכוּ׳. אִינִי?! וְהָא רַב חָתֵים מִן הַצַּד! הָתָם בְּשֶׁגַּגּוֹ כְּלַפֵּי כְתָב.

§ It is stated in the mishna: If the witnesses signed at the top of the column or on the side, the bill of divorce is invalid. The Gemara raises an objection: Is that so? Wouldn’t Rav sign on the side? The Gemara answers: There, in the case of Rav, he would sign with the roof, i.e., the top, of his signature facing the text of the document, so it was clear that he was signing the document.

אֶלָּא הָא דְּקָתָנֵי: הִקִּיף רֹאשׁוֹ שֶׁל זֶה בְּצַד רֹאשׁוֹ שֶׁל זֶה, וְהָעֵדִים בָּאֶמְצַע – שְׁנֵיהֶם פְּסוּלִין; וְלִיחְזֵי הֵי מִינַּיְיהוּ כְּלַפֵּי כְתָב, וְלִיתַּכְשַׁר!

The Gemara asks: But this contradicts that which is taught in the mishna: If the scribe placed the top of this bill of divorce next to the top of that bill of divorce, writing both bills of divorce in the same column in opposite directions, and the witnesses signed in the middle between them, both bills of divorce are invalid. According to the above answer, let us see with regard to which one of them the top of the witnesses’ signatures faces the text, and let it be rendered valid.

הָתָם, דִּרְמֵי לֵיהּ כְּעִיבְרָא.

The Gemara answers: There, in the mishna, it is a case where the signatures are not parallel to the text. Rather, they are placed like a door bolt, perpendicular to the text, so they are not written in the same direction as either of the bills of divorce.

אִי הָכִי, סֵיפָא דְּקָתָנֵי: רֹאשׁוֹ שֶׁל זֶה בְּצַד סוֹפוֹ שֶׁל זֶה, וְהָעֵדִים בָּאֶמְצַע – אֶת שֶׁהָעֵדִים נִיקְרִין בְּסוֹפוֹ, כָּשֵׁר. וְאִי דִּרְמֵי כְּעִיבְרָא – לָאו בַּהֲדֵי הַאי מִיקְּרֵי, וְלָאו בַּהֲדֵי הַאי מִיקְּרֵי!

The Gemara challenges: If so, consider the latter clause of the mishna, which teaches that if the scribe placed the top of this bill of divorce next to the end of that bill of divorce, and the witnesses signed in the middle, the bill of divorce at the end of which the witnesses are read is valid. And if the mishna is referring to a case where the signatures are placed like a bolt, perpendicular to the text, they are neither read with this bill of divorce, nor are they read with that one.

אֶלָּא רַב בְּדִיסְקֵי הֲוָה חָתֵים.

Rather, a different answer must be offered: Rav would sign only letters and rulings on the side, where the location of his signature is inconsequential. By contrast, bills of divorce and monetary documents must be signed beneath the text.

גֵּט שֶׁכְּתָבוֹ עִבְרִית וְכוּ׳ כָּתַב סוֹפֵר וְעֵד כָּשֵׁר. אָמַר רַבִּי יִרְמְיָה: ״חָתַם סוֹפֵר״ שָׁנִינוּ.

§ It is stated in the mishna: With regard to a bill of divorce that was written in Hebrew and its witnesses signed in Greek, or that was written in Greek and its witnesses signed in Hebrew, or in which one witness signed in Hebrew and one witness signed in Greek, or if a bill of divorce has the writing of a scribe, and the scribe identifies his handwriting, and one witness verifies his signature, it is valid as though two witnesses testified to ratify their signatures. Rabbi Yirmeya says: We learned that the mishna means that the scribe signed the bill of divorce as a witness; his handwriting in the text is not sufficient.

אָמַר רַב חִסְדָּא: הָא מַנִּי – רַבִּי יוֹסֵי הִיא.

Rav Ḥisda says: In accordance with whose opinion is this? It is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei that there is no concern that the scribe signed unlawfully.

הָהִיא כְּתוּבַּת חֲתָנִים דַּאֲתַאי לְקַמֵּיהּ דְּרַבִּי אֲבָהוּ, דַּהֲווֹ יָדְעִי לֵיהּ לְטוּפְסָא, וְלַחֲתִימַת יְדָא דְּחַד סָהֲדָא. סְבַר לְאַכְשׁוֹרַהּ, אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַבִּי יִרְמְיָה: ״חָתַם סוֹפֵר״ שָׁנִינוּ.

The Gemara relates: There was a certain marriage contract that was brought before Rabbi Abbahu, which people recognized and verified its formula, i.e., the scribe’s handwriting, and the signature of one witness. Rabbi Abbahu thought to deem it valid based on the scribe’s handwriting and the witness. Rabbi Yirmeya said to him: We learned that the mishna means that the scribe signed the bill of divorce; his handwriting alone is not sufficient.

כָּתַב חֲנִיכָתוֹ וַחֲנִיכָתָהּ – כָּשֵׁר. תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: חֲנִיכַת אָבוֹת בְּגִיטִּין – עַד עֲשָׂרָה דּוֹרוֹת. רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן אֶלְעָזָר אוֹמֵר: שְׁלֹשָׁה דּוֹרוֹת – כָּשֵׁר, מִכָּאן וְאֵילָךְ – פָּסוּל.

§ It is stated in the mishna: With regard to the names of the husband and wife, if the scribe wrote his surname or nickname and her surname or nickname, it is valid. The Sages taught (Tosefta 8:6): A surname from one’s forefathers is valid with regard to bills of divorce until ten generations after the forefather. Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar says: It is valid for only three generations; from this point forward it is invalid.

כְּמַאן אָזְלָא הָא דְּאָמַר רַבִּי חֲנִינָא: כָּתַב חֲנִיכַת אָבוֹת בְּגִיטִּין עַד שְׁלֹשָׁה דּוֹרוֹת? כְּמַאן – כְּרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן אֶלְעָזָר.

The Gemara asks: In accordance with whose opinion is that which Rabbi Ḥanina said, that the writing of a surname from one’s forefathers is valid with regard to bills of divorce until three generations after the forefather? It is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar.

אָמַר רַב הוּנָא: מַאי קְרָאָה? ״כִּי תוֹלִיד בָּנִים וּבְנֵי בָנִים וְנוֹשַׁנְתֶּם״.

Rav Huna said: What is the verse from which this opinion is derived? It is the verse: “When you will beget children, and children’s children, and you will have been long [venoshantem] in the land” (Deuteronomy 4:25). Since the word venoshantem stems from the word yashan, meaning old, it is derived that after one’s grandchildren, or three generations, a matter is considered old and forgotten.

אָמַר רַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ בֶּן לֵוִי: לֹא חָרְבָה אֶרֶץ יִשְׂרָאֵל עַד שֶׁעָבְדוּ בָּהּ שִׁבְעָה בָּתֵּי דִינִים עֲבוֹדָה זָרָה, וְאֵלּוּ הֵן: יָרׇבְעָם בֶּן נְבָט, וּבַעְשָׁא בֶּן אֲחִיָּה, וְאַחְאָב בֶּן עָמְרִי, וְיֵהוּא בֶּן נִמְשִׁי, וּפֶקַח בֶּן רְמַלְיָהוּ, וּמְנַחֵם בֶּן גָּדִי, וְהוֹשֵׁעַ בֶּן אֵלָה. שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר: ״אוּמְלְלָה יוֹלֶדֶת הַשִּׁבְעָה, נָפְחָה נַפְשָׁהּ, בָּאָה שִׁמְשָׁהּ בְּעוֹד יוֹמָם, בּוֹשָׁה וְחָפֵרָה״.

§ The Gemara cites another derivation from this verse. Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi says: The first destruction of Eretz Yisrael did not occur until seven dynasties and their courts committed idol worship in it, and they are these: Jeroboam, son of Nevat; and Baasa, son of Ahijah; and Ahab, son of Omri; and Jehu, son of Nimshi; and Pekah, son of Remaliah; and Menahem, son of Gadi; and Hoshea, son of Elah, as it is stated: “She who has given birth to seven languishes; her spirit droops; her sun is gone down while it was yet day, she is ashamed and confounded” (Jeremiah 15:9).

אָמַר רַב אַמֵּי: מַאי קְרָאָה? ״כִּי תוֹלִיד בָּנִים וּבְנֵי בָנִים״.

Rabbi Ammi said: What is the verse from which it is derived that it was seven dynasties? “When you will beget children, and children’s children, and you will have been long in the land, and will deal corruptly, and make a graven image, even the form of anything…you will soon utterly perish from off the land” (Deuteronomy 4:25–26). The phrase “when you will beget children and children’s children” is interpreted homiletically as indicating seven generations. This is because the term “you will beget [tolid],” written in the singular form, indicates one generation, and the word “children,” written in the plural form, indicates two generations. Since the word “children” is mentioned three times, seven generations are indicated in total.

אֲמַרוּ לֵיהּ רַב כָּהֲנָא וְרַב אַסִּי לְרַב, כְּתִיב בֵּיהּ בְּהוֹשֵׁעַ בֶּן אֵלָה: ״וַיַּעַשׂ הָרַע בְּעֵינֵי ה׳, רַק לֹא כְּמַלְכֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל״, וּכְתִיב: ״עָלָיו עָלָה שַׁלְמַנְאֶסֶר וְגוֹ׳״?

Rav Kahana and Rav Asi said to Rav: It is written with regard to Hoshea ben Elah: “And he did that which was evil in the eyes of the Lord, yet not as the kings of Israel that were before him” (II Kings 17:2). But it is written subsequently: “Against him came up Shalmaneser, king of Assyria” (II Kings 17:3) and exiled the people of Israel. If Hoshea performed less evil than the previous kings of Israel, why was his generation the one that was punished?

אֲמַר לְהוּ: אוֹתָן פַּרְדְּסִיאוֹת שֶׁהוֹשִׁיב יָרׇבְעָם עַל הַדְּרָכִים כְּדֵי שֶׁלֹּא יַעֲלוּ יִשְׂרָאֵל לָרֶגֶל, בָּא הוֹשֵׁעַ וּבִיטְּלָן, וְאַף עַל פִּי כֵן לֹא עָלוּ יִשְׂרָאֵל לָרֶגֶל. אָמַר הַקָּדוֹשׁ בָּרוּךְ הוּא: אוֹתָן שָׁנִים שֶׁלֹּא עָלוּ יִשְׂרָאֵל לָרֶגֶל – יֵלְכוּ בַּשֶּׁבִי.

Rav said to them: Hoshea came and canceled those guards [pardesei’ot] that Jeroboam placed on the roads in order to prevent the subjects of the kingdom of Israel from ascending to Jerusalem on the pilgrimage Festival, and even so the subjects of the kingdom of Israel did not ascend to Jerusalem on the pilgrimage Festival. The Holy One, Blessed be He, therefore said that for those years that the subjects of the kingdom of Israel did not ascend to Jerusalem on the pilgrimage Festival they will go into captivity.

אָמַר רַב חִסְדָּא אָמַר מָר עוּקְבָא, וְאָמְרִי לַהּ אָמַר רַב חִסְדָּא אָמַר רַבִּי יִרְמְיָה, דָּרֵשׁ מָרִימָר: מַאי דִּכְתִיב: ״וַיִּשְׁקוֹד ה׳ עַל הָרָעָה וַיְבִיאֶהָ עָלֵינוּ, כִּי צַדִּיק ה׳ אֱלֹהֵינוּ״? מִשּׁוּם דְּ״צַדִּיק ה׳ אֱלֹהֵינוּ״ – ״וַיִּשְׁקוֹד ה׳ עַל הָרָעָה וַיְבִיאֶהָ עָלֵינוּ״?!

Rav Ḥisda said that Mar Ukva said, and some say that it was Rav Ḥisda who said that Rabbi Yirmeya said, that Mareimar interpreted a verse homiletically as follows: What is the meaning of that which is written: “And so the Lord has watched over the evil, and brought it upon us; for the Lord our God is righteous [tzaddik]” (Daniel 9:14)? How can it be that because the Lord, our God, is righteous, the Lord watched over the evil and brought it upon us?

אֶלָּא צְדָקָה עָשָׂה הַקָּדוֹשׁ בָּרוּךְ הוּא עִם יִשְׂרָאֵל, שֶׁהִגְלָה גָּלוּת צִדְקִיָּהוּ – וַעֲדַיִין גָּלוּת יְכָנְיָה קַיֶּימֶת; דִּכְתִיב בֵּיהּ בְּגָלוּת יְכָנְיָה: ״הֶחָרָשׁ וְהַמַּסְגֵּר אֶלֶף״;

Rather, it must be interpreted as follows: The Holy One, Blessed be He, performed charity [tzedaka] with the people of Israel by exiling them in the exile of Zedekiah while the exile of Jeconiah still existed in Babylonia, as it is written with regard to the exile of Jeconiah: “And the craftsmen [ḥarash] and the smiths [masger] a thousand” (II Kings 24:16). The great scholars, referred to in this verse as craftsmen and smiths, of the generation were exiled with Jeconiah, and they were therefore able to give guidance to those who were exiled in the time of Zedekiah when they came to Babylonia.

״חָרָשׁ״ – שֶׁבְּשָׁעָה שֶׁפּוֹתְחִין, נַעֲשׂוּ הַכֹּל כְּחֵרְשִׁין. ״מַסְגֵּר״ – כֵּיוָן שֶׁסּוֹגְרִין, שׁוּב אֵינָן פּוֹתְחִין. וְכַמָּה – אֶלֶף.

Why are the great scholars referred to as craftsmen [ḥarash] and smiths [masger]? Ḥarash, containing the same letters as ḥeresh, meaning deaf, is an allusion to the fact that when they would introduce a statement of Torah everyone would become like deaf persons, as they would not understand. Masger, which stems from the root samekh, gimmel, reish, meaning to close, alludes to the fact that once they would close a certain matter that they did not comprehend, no one would introduce it again, as no one was capable of solving such a problem. And how many scholars were there? There were one thousand.

עוּלָּא אָמַר: שֶׁהִקְדִּים שְׁתֵּי שָׁנִים לִ״וְנוֹשַׁנְתֶּם״.

Ulla says that God performed charity with the people of Israel by advancing their exile by two years relative to the numerical value of the word venoshantem that appears in the verse. Although the numerical value of the word is 852, God exiled the Jewish people from the land after only 850 years, so that the punishment mentioned subsequently, i.e., utter annihilation, would not be fulfilled either.

אָמַר רַב אַחָא בַּר יַעֲקֹב: שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ, ״מְהֵרָה״ דְּמָרֵי עָלְמָא – תַּמְנֵי מְאָה וְחַמְשִׁין וְתַרְתֵּי הוּא.

Rav Aḥa bar Ya’akov said: Learn from this numerical value that soon [mehera] for the Master of the World is eight hundred and fifty-two years, as it is stated in the verse in Deuteronomy: “You will soon [maher] utterly perish.” Since the Jewish people dwelled in Eretz Yisrael for almost this amount of time, it is apparently considered soon.

מַתְנִי׳ גֵּט מְעוּשֶּׂה, בְּיִשְׂרָאֵל – כָּשֵׁר, וּבְגוֹיִם – פָּסוּל. וּבְגוֹיִם – חוֹבְטִין אוֹתוֹ וְאוֹמְרִים לוֹ: ״עֲשֵׂה מַה שֶּׁיִּשְׂרָאֵל אוֹמְרִים לָךְ״ (וְכָשֵׁר).

MISHNA: With regard to a bill of divorce that the husband was compelled by the court to write and give his wife, if he was compelled by a Jewish court it is valid, but if he was compelled by gentiles it is invalid. But with regard to gentiles they may beat him at the request of the Jewish court and say to him: Do what the Jews are telling you, and it is a valid divorce.

גְּמָ׳ אָמַר רַב נַחְמָן אָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל: גֵּט הַמְעוּשֶּׂה בְּיִשְׂרָאֵל, כַּדִּין – כָּשֵׁר; שֶׁלֹּא כַּדִּין – פָּסוּל, וּפוֹסֵל.

GEMARA: Rav Naḥman says that Shmuel says: With regard to a bill of divorce that the husband was compelled by a Jewish court to give his wife, if they did so lawfully, as the halakha obligated the husband to divorce his wife, it is valid. This is referring to cases where sexual intercourse is forbidden or specific cases where the Sages instituted that the husband is obligated to divorce his wife. If they did so unlawfully, the bill of divorce is invalid, but it is not considered entirely invalid, as it disqualifies the wife from marrying a priest after her husband’s death.

וּבְגוֹיִם, כַּדִּין – פָּסוּל וּפוֹסֵל, שֶׁלֹּא כַּדִּין – אֲפִילּוּ רֵיחַ הַגֵּט אֵין בּוֹ.

And in a case where the husband was compelled by gentiles, if he was compelled lawfully, the bill of divorce is invalid, but it also disqualifies the wife from marrying a priest. But if he was compelled unlawfully it does not have even the trace of a bill of divorce, and the wife is not even disqualified from marrying a priest.

מָה נַפְשָׁךְ? אִי גּוֹיִם בְּנֵי עַשּׂוֹיֵי נִינְהוּ, אִיתַּכְשׁוֹרֵי נָמֵי לִיתַּכְשַׁר! אִי לָאו בְּנֵי עַשּׂוֹיֵי נִינְהוּ, מִיפְסָל לָא לִיפְסֹל!

The Gemara raises an objection: With regard to the statement that if the husband was compelled by gentiles the divorce is invalid but it also disqualifies the wife from marrying a priest, whichever way you look at it, the statement is difficult. If gentiles are legally capable of compulsion, it should be rendered valid with regard to the woman’s permission to remarry as well. If they are not legally capable of compulsion, it should not disqualify her either.

אָמַר רַב מְשַׁרְשְׁיָא: דְּבַר תּוֹרָה – גֵּט מְעוּשֶּׂה בַּגּוֹיִם, כָּשֵׁר. וּמָה טַעַם אָמְרוּ פָּסוּל – שֶׁלֹּא תְּהֵא כׇּל אַחַת וְאַחַת הוֹלֶכֶת וְתוֹלָה עַצְמָהּ בְּגוֹי, ומַפְקַעַת עַצְמָהּ מִיַּד בַּעְלָהּ.

Rav Mesharshiyya says: By Torah law a bill of divorce that the husband was compelled by gentiles to write and give his wife is valid, and what is the reason the Sages said that it is invalid? It is so that each and every woman will not go and depend on a gentile to compel her husband to divorce her through temptation or bribery, and thereby she will release herself from her husband unlawfully.

אִי הָכִי, שֶׁלֹּא כַּדִּין – אֲפִילּוּ רֵיחַ הַגֵּט אֵין בּוֹ?! וְנֶהֱוֵי שֶׁלֹּא כַּדִּין כְּיִשְׂרָאֵל, וּמִפְסָל נָמֵי לִפְסוֹל!

The Gemara asks: If that is so, that where the husband was compelled by gentiles the bill of divorce is valid by Torah law, why did Shmuel rule that if he was compelled unlawfully it does not have even the trace of a bill of divorce? Let a bill of divorce that the husband was compelled unlawfully by gentiles to give his wife be compared to a case where he was compelled unlawfully by Jews, and disqualify the wife from marrying a priest as well.

אֶלָּא הָא דְּרַב מְשַׁרְשְׁיָא – בְּדוּתָא הִיא.

Rather, that statement of Rav Mesharshiyya, that by Torah law a bill of divorce is valid even if the husband was compelled by gentiles to write it and give it to his wife, is a mistake. In principle it does not have even the trace of a bill of divorce, even if the husband is required by law to divorce his wife.

וְטַעְמָא מַאי? כַּדִּין בְּכַדִּין דְּיִשְׂרָאֵל – מִיחַלַּף. שֶׁלֹּא כַּדִּין בְּכַדִּין [דְּ]יִשְׂרָאֵל – לָא מִיחַלַּף.

And what is the reason that the wife is disqualified from marrying a priest in this case? It is because the case where the husband was compelled lawfully by gentiles can be confused with a case where he was compelled lawfully by Jews. If a bill of divorce that gentiles compelled the husband to write and give to his wife carries no weight, people might think that this is likewise the halakha with regard to a case where Jews compelled the husband to do so. Therefore, the Sages issued a decree that even if the husband was compelled by gentiles the wife is disqualified from marrying a priest. By contrast, the case where the husband was compelled unlawfully by gentiles cannot be confused with a case where he was compelled lawfully by Jews, as they are too dissimilar. Therefore, a bill of divorce that gentiles unlawfully compelled the husband to write and give his wife is entirely invalid.

אַבָּיֵי אַשְׁכְּחֵיהּ לְרַב יוֹסֵף דְּיָתֵיב וְקָא מְעַשֵּׂה אַגִּיטֵּי, אֲמַר לֵיהּ: וְהָא אֲנַן – הֶדְיוֹטוֹת אֲנַן, וְתַנְיָא, הָיָה רַבִּי טַרְפוֹן אוֹמֵר: כׇּל מָקוֹם שֶׁאַתָּה מוֹצֵא אֲגוֹרִיאוֹת שֶׁל גּוֹיִם, אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁדִּינֵיהֶם כְּדִינֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל – אִי אַתָּה רַשַּׁאי לְהִיזָּקֵק לָהֶם, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר: ״וְאֵלֶּה הַמִּשְׁפָּטִים אֲשֶׁר תָּשִׂים לִפְנֵיהֶם״; ״לִפְנֵיהֶם״ – וְלֹא לִפְנֵי גּוֹיִם. דָּבָר אַחֵר: ״לִפְנֵיהֶם״ – וְלֹא לִפְנֵי הֶדְיוֹטוֹת!

§ Abaye found Rav Yosef sitting in court as the judge and compelling husbands to give their wives bills of divorce. He said to him: But aren’t we ordinary people, not ordained judges? And it is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Tarfon would say: With regard to any place where you find gentile courts [agoriot], even if their laws are like Jewish laws, you may not attend them, as it is stated: “Now these are the ordinances which you shall set before them” (Exodus 21:1). It is derived from here that one may go to court only before them, i.e., Jewish judges, and not before gentiles. Alternatively, it is derived that one may go to court before them, i.e., ordained judges, and not before ordinary people. Since we are not ordained judges, how can you perform a distinctly judicial act?

אֲמַר לֵיהּ: אֲנַן – שְׁלִיחוּתַיְיהוּ קָא עָבְדִינַן, מִידֵּי דְּהָוֵה אַהוֹדָאוֹת וְהַלְוָאוֹת.

Rav Yosef said to him: We see ourselves as agents of the ordained judges in Eretz Yisrael, and we are performing our task as judges on the basis of their agency, just as is the case with regard to cases of admissions and loans, which we attend to on the same basis.

אִי הָכִי, גְּזֵילוֹת וְחַבָּלוֹת נָמֵי! כִּי עָבְדִינַן שְׁלִיחוּתַיְיהוּ – בְּמִילְּתָא דִשְׁכִיחָא, בְּמִילְּתָא דְּלָא שְׁכִיחָא – לָא עָבְדִינַן שְׁלִיחוּתַיְיהוּ.

The Gemara asks: If so, why is the halakha that judges living outside Eretz Yisrael do not judge in cases of robbery and personal injury? They should judge in these cases as well. The Gemara answers: When we perform our tasks as judges on the basis of their agency, it is with regard to common matters, e.g., cases that pertain to the halakhot of admissions and loans, which arise frequently between people. But with regard to uncommon matters, e.g., cases of robbery or personal injury, we do not perform our tasks as judges on the basis of their agency.

מַתְנִי׳ יָצָא שְׁמָהּ בָּעִיר ״מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת״ – הֲרֵי זוֹ מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת; ״מְגוֹרֶשֶׁת״ – הֲרֵי זוֹ מְגוֹרֶשֶׁת. וּבִלְבַד שֶׁלֹּא יְהֵא שָׁם אֲמַתְלָא.

MISHNA: If a rumor circulated in the city that an unmarried woman is betrothed, she is considered to be betrothed. Similarly, if a rumor circulated that a married woman is divorced, she is divorced, provided there is no valid alternative explanation [amatla] for the rumor.

אֵיזוֹ הִיא אֲמַתְלָא? גֵּירַשׁ אִישׁ פְּלוֹנִי אֶת אִשְׁתּוֹ עַל תְּנַאי; זָרַק לָהּ קִידּוּשֶׁיהָ – סָפֵק קָרוֹב לָהּ, סָפֵק קָרוֹב לוֹ – זוֹ הִיא אֲמַתְלָא.

What is considered a valid explanation? For example, it is a case where there is a rumor that so-and-so divorced his wife but that the bill of divorce was given to her conditionally. It is therefore possible that the condition was not fulfilled and she is not actually divorced. Similarly, if there is a rumor that a woman was betrothed but that the man threw her betrothal, i.e., the money or document of betrothal, to her, and it is uncertain whether it was closer to her and uncertain whether it was closer to him, and therefore the status of their betrothal is likewise uncertain, this is considered a valid explanation.

גְּמָ׳ וְאָסְרִינַן לַהּ אַגַּבְרָא?! וְהָא אָמַר רַב אָשֵׁי: כֹּל קָלָא דְּבָתַר נִישּׂוּאִין – לָא חָיְישִׁינַן לֵיהּ!

GEMARA: With regard to the statement that a woman who is rumored to be divorced is divorced, do we render her forbidden to her husband if she is married to a priest? But didn’t Rav Ashi say that we are not concerned about any rumor that circulates after marriage? Accordingly, a woman should not be compelled to leave her husband merely on the basis of a rumor.

הָכִי קָאָמַר: יָצָא שְׁמָהּ בָּעִיר ״מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת״ – הֲרֵי זוֹ מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת. ״מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת וּמְגוֹרֶשֶׁת״ –

The Gemara answers that this is what the mishna is saying: If a rumor circulated in the city that a woman is betrothed, she is betrothed, and she may not marry another man until she receives a bill of divorce from the man to whom she is rumored to be betrothed. If she is rumored to have been betrothed to a certain man and subsequently divorced from him,