קידושין נג

קידושין נג

נִמְנוּ וְגָמְרוּ: הַמְקַדֵּשׁ בְּחֶלְקוֹ, בֵּין קׇדְשֵׁי קֳדָשִׁים וּבֵין קֳדָשִׁים קַלִּים – לֹא קִידֵּשׁ. וְרַב אֲמַר: עֲדַיִין הִיא מַחְלוֹקֶת. אָמַר אַבָּיֵי: כְּווֹתֵיהּ דְּרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן מִסְתַּבְּרָא,

They counted the opinions among the Sages, and they concluded: With regard to one who betroths a woman with his portion of the offerings, whether he did so with offerings of the most sacred order or whether he used the offerings of lesser sanctity, he has not betrothed her, in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei. And Rav says: It is still a matter of dispute and they did not reach that conclusion. Abaye said: It is reasonable to rule in accordance with the report of Rabbi Yoḥanan, who says that the halakha was decided in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei.

דְּתַנְיָא: מִנַּיִן שֶׁאֵין חוֹלְקִים מְנָחוֹת כְּנֶגֶד זְבָחִים – תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״וְכׇל מִנְחָה אֲשֶׁר תֵּאָפֶה בַּתַּנּוּר… לְכׇל בְּנֵי אַהֲרֹן תִּהְיֶה״.

Abaye quotes an extended baraita indicating that even Rabbi Yehuda accepted that the halakha was decided in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei. As it is taught in a baraita: From where is it derived that priests may not receive a share of meal-offerings in exchange for portions of animal offerings, i.e., they may not exchange their portion of a meal-offering for the meat of an animal sacrifice of which they did not receive a portion? The verse states: “And every meal-offering that is baked in the oven…shall all the sons of Aaron have” (Leviticus 7:9–10). This verse emphasizes that the sons of Aaron must divide the meal-offering equally among themselves, without exchanging it for a portion of any other offering.

יָכוֹל לֹא יַחְלְקוּ מְנָחוֹת כְּנֶגֶד זְבָחִים, שֶׁלֹּא קָמוּ תַּחְתֵּיהֶם בְּדַלּוּת, אֲבָל יַחְלְקוּ מְנָחוֹת כְּנֶגֶד עוֹפוֹת, שֶׁהֲרֵי קָמוּ תַּחְתֵּיהֶן בְּדַלּוּת? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״וְכׇל נַעֲשָׂה בַמַּרְחֶשֶׁת… לְכׇל בְּנֵי אַהֲרֹן תִּהְיֶה״.

The baraita continues: One might have thought that they may not receive a share of meal-offerings in exchange for portions of animal offerings since they do not substitute for them in the case of poverty. Even one who is too poor to afford to bring an animal offering, e.g., in the case of a sin-offering determined on a sliding scale, does not bring a meal-offering in its stead. Since meal-offerings can never be brought in place of animal offerings, there is clearly no connection between them. But perhaps they may receive a share of meal-offerings in exchange for portions of bird-offerings, since they do substitute for them in the case of poverty. If one is so destitute that he cannot afford to bring a bird-offering he brings a meal-offering. Therefore, the same verse states: “And all that is prepared in the deep pan…shall all the sons of Aaron have,” again stressing that all must have an equal share in that meal-offering.

יָכוֹל לֹא יַחְלְקוּ מְנָחוֹת כְּנֶגֶד עוֹפוֹת, שֶׁהַלָּלוּ מִינֵי דָמִים וְהַלָּלוּ מִינֵי קְמָחִים, אֲבָל יַחְלְקוּ עוֹפוֹת כְּנֶגֶד זְבָחִים, שֶׁהַלָּלוּ וְהַלָּלוּ מִינֵי דָמִים? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״וְעַל מַחֲבַת״.

The baraita continues: One might have thought that they may not receive a share of meal-offerings in exchange for portions of bird-offerings since these, bird-offerings, are types of offerings that involve blood sprinkled on the altar, and those, meal-offerings, are types of offerings made of flour. But perhaps they may receive a share of portions of bird-offerings in exchange for portions of animal offerings, since both categories are types of offerings that involve blood sprinkled on the altar. Therefore, the same verse states: “And on a griddle,” a seemingly superfluous phrase, which teaches that one may not receive a share even of bird-offerings in exchange for portions of animal offerings.

יָכוֹל לֹא יַחְלְקוּ עוֹפוֹת כְּנֶגֶד זְבָחִים, שֶׁהַלָּלוּ מַעֲשֵׂיהֶם בַּיָּד וְהַלָּלוּ מַעֲשֵׂיהֶם בִּכְלִי, אֲבָל יַחְלְקוּ מְנָחוֹת כְּנֶגֶד מְנָחוֹת, שֶׁהַלָּלוּ וְהַלָּלוּ מַעֲשֵׂיהֶם בַּיָּד? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״וְכׇל מִנְחָה בְלוּלָה בַשֶּׁמֶן לְכׇל בְּנֵי אַהֲרֹן״.

The baraita continues: One might have thought that they may not receive a share of bird-offerings in exchange for portions of animal offerings because the actions, i.e., killing, of these birds is by hand, by pinching the neck, and the actions, i.e., killing, of those animals is with a utensil, by slaughtering with a knife. But perhaps they may receive a share of meal-offerings in exchange for portions of other meal-offerings, since the actions with both these and those are by hand. Therefore, the next verse states: “And every meal-offering mingled with oil…shall all the sons of Aaron have” (Leviticus 7:10).

יָכוֹל לֹא יַחְלְקוּ מַחֲבַת כְּנֶגֶד מַרְחֶשֶׁת וּמַרְחֶשֶׁת כְּנֶגֶד מַחֲבַת, שֶׁזּוֹ מַעֲשֶׂיהָ רַכִּים וְזוֹ מַעֲשֶׂיהָ קָשִׁים, אֲבָל יַחְלְקוּ מַחֲבַת כְּנֶגֶד מַחֲבַת וּמַרְחֶשֶׁת כְּנֶגֶד מַרְחֶשֶׁת, שֶׁהַלָּלוּ וְהַלָּלוּ מַעֲשֵׂיהֶם קָשִׁים, אִי נָמֵי מַעֲשֵׂיהֶם רַכִּים? – תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״וַחֲרֵבָה לְכׇל בְּנֵי אַהֲרֹן תִּהְיֶה״.

The baraita continues: One might have thought that they may not receive a share of a meal-offering prepared on a griddle in exchange for portions of a meal–offering prepared in a deep pan, or portions of a meal-offering prepared in a deep pan in exchange for portions of a meal–offering prepared on a griddle, since the actions with this deep pan result in a soft product, and the actions with that griddle result in a hard product. But perhaps they may receive a share of a meal-offering prepared on a griddle in exchange for the portions of a meal-offering prepared on a griddle, or a share of a meal-offering prepared in a deep pan in exchange for portions of a meal-offering prepared in a deep pan, since the actions with both these and those result in a hard product, in the case of a griddle, or alternatively, with regard to a deep pan, the actions result in a soft product. Therefore, the same verse states: “Or dry, shall all the sons of Aaron have” (Leviticus 7:10).

יָכוֹל לֹא יַחְלְקוּ בְּקׇדְשֵׁי קָדָשִׁים אֲבָל יַחְלְקוּ בְּקָדָשִׁים קַלִּים? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״אִישׁ כְּאָחִיו״ וּסְמִיךְ לֵיהּ: ״אִם עַל תּוֹדָה״ – כְּשֵׁם שֶׁאֵין חוֹלְקִין בְּקׇדְשֵׁי קֳדָשִׁים כָּךְ אֵין חוֹלְקִים בְּקָדָשִׁים קַלִּים.

The baraita continues: One might have thought that they may not receive a share of offerings of the most sacred order, e.g., meal-offerings, in exchange for a portion of another similar offering, but they may receive a share of offerings of lesser sanctity in exchange for a portion of another similar offering. Therefore, the same verse states with regard to meal-offerings: “Shall all the sons of Aaron have, one as well as another” (Leviticus 7:10), and near it appears the verse: “If he offers it for a thanks-offering” (Leviticus 7:12), from which is derived: Just as one may not receive a share of one offering in exchange for a portion of another similar offering in the case of offerings of the most sacred order, so too, one may not receive a share of one offering in exchange for a portion of another similar offering in the case of offerings of lesser sanctity, e.g., a thanks-offering.

״אִישׁ״ אִישׁ חוֹלֵק, אֲפִילּוּ בַּעַל מוּם, וְאֵין הַקָּטָן חוֹלֵק וַאֲפִילּוּ תָּם. סְתָם סִפְרָא מַנִּי? רַבִּי יְהוּדָה, וְהוּא קָאָמַר דְּלֵית בַּהּ דִּין חֲלוּקָהּ כְּלָל. שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ.

The baraita expounds this verse further: It states: “One as well as another [ish ke’aḥiv],” which teaches that with regard to priests, a man [ish] who is an adult receives a share even if he is blemished, but a priest who is a minor may not receive a share even if he is unblemished. This baraita is found in the Sifra, a collection of halakhic midrashim on the book of Leviticus. And who is the tanna to whom unattributed statements in the Sifra are assigned? It is Rabbi Yehuda, and here he says that no law of receiving a share applies to it at all, which means that priests cannot exchange one portion of any type of offering for another portion, so they cannot use it to betroth a woman. Conclude from it that Rabbi Yehuda retracted his opinion and subscribes to the opinion that a priest does not own the portion of the offerings he receives.

אָמַר רָבָא: וּכְרַב מִי לָא תַּנְיָא? וְהָתַנְיָא: הַצְּנוּעִים מוֹשְׁכִין אֶת יְדֵיהֶם, וְהַגַּרְגְּרָנִים חוֹלְקִים. מַאי חוֹלְקִים? חוֹטְפִים, כִּדְקָתָנֵי סֵיפָא: מַעֲשֶׂה בְּאֶחָד שֶׁחָטַף חֶלְקוֹ וְחֵלֶק חֲבֵרוֹ, וְהָיוּ קוֹרְאִין אוֹתוֹ: ״בֶּן חַמְצָן״ עַד יוֹם מוֹתוֹ.

Rava said: But isn’t it taught in a baraita in accordance with the opinion of Rav? But isn’t it taught in a baraita (Tosefta, Sota 13:7): When the priests receive their portion of the shewbread each week, the modest ones withdraw their hands and do not take it, and the gluttons receive all the shares of the bread. This indicates that offerings may be apportioned according to the priests’ wishes. The Gemara rejects this: What is the meaning of receive the shares? It does not mean that they exchange one portion for another with halakhic sanction; it means that they would snatch their colleagues’ portions, as it teaches in the latter clause of that same baraita: An incident occurred involving one who snatched his share and his colleague’s share, and they called him ben Ḥamtzan, son of the snatcher, until the day he died.

אָמַר רַבָּה בַּר רַב שֵׁילָא: מַאי קְרָאָה? ״אֱלֹהַי פַּלְּטֵנִי מִיַּד רָשָׁע מִכַּף מְעַוֵּל וְחוֹמֵץ״. רַבָּה אָמַר: מֵהָכָא, ״לִמְדוּ הֵיטֵב דִּרְשׁוּ מִשְׁפָּט אַשְּׁרוּ חָמוֹץ״

Rabba bar Rav Sheila said: What is the verse from which is derived that ḥamtzan means one who snatches? The verse states: “My God, rescue me out of the hand of the wicked, out of the grasp of the unrighteous and grasping man [ḥometz]” (Psalms 71:4). Rabba said: It is derived from here: “Learn to do well; seek justice, relieve the oppressed [ḥamotz]” (Isaiah 1:17), i.e., restore property stolen from victims of theft.

מַעֲשֵׂר שֵׁנִי, בֵּין בְּשׁוֹגֵג, בֵּין בְּמֵזִיד – לֹא קִידֵּשׁ, דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי מֵאִיר. רַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר: שׁוֹגֵג – לֹא קִידֵּשׁ, מֵזִיד – קִידֵּשׁ וְכוּ׳. מְנָא הָנֵי מִילֵּי? אָמַר רַב אַחָא בְּרֵיהּ דְּרָבָא מִשְּׁמֵיהּ דִּגְמָרָא: ״וְכׇל מַעְשַׂר הָאָרֶץ מִזֶּרַע הָאָרֶץ מִפְּרִי הָעֵץ לַה׳ הוּא קֹדֶשׁ לַה׳״ – לַה׳ הוּא, וְלֹא לְקַדֵּשׁ בּוֹ אִשָּׁה.

§ The mishna teaches: One who betroths a woman with second tithe, whether unwittingly or intentionally, has not betrothed her; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Yehuda says: If he did so unwittingly he has not betrothed her, but if he did so intentionally he has betrothed her. The Gemara asks: From where are these matters derived? From where does Rabbi Meir derive that second tithe cannot be used for betrothal? Rav Aḥa, son of Rava, says in the name of tradition: The verse states: “And all the tithe of the land, whether of the seed of the land, or of the fruit of the tree, is the Lord’s; it is holy to the Lord” (Leviticus 27:30). This verse indicates that it is for the Lord, but not for betrothing a woman with it.

הֲרֵי תְּרוּמַת מַעֲשֵׂר, דִּכְתִיב: ״כֵּן תָּרִימוּ גַם אַתֶּם תְּרוּמַת ה׳״, וּתְנַן: הַמְקַדֵּשׁ בִּתְרוּמָה – מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת! – דְּלָא כְּתִיב בֵּיהּ ״לַה׳״.

The Gemara questions this derivation from several instances where similar wording is employed in a different verse, yet one may use those items for betrothal. But there is teruma of the tithe, about which it is written: “So you also shall set apart a gift of the Lord of all your tithes” (Numbers 18:28)? And we learned in a mishna (58a): With regard to one who betroths a woman with teruma, she is betrothed. The Gemara answers: Teruma of the tithe is different, as “to the Lord” is not written with regard to it, indicating that it can be used for betrothal.

וַהֲרֵי חַלָּה, דִּכְתִיב בַּהּ: ״תִּתְּנוּ לַה׳״, וּתְנַן: הַמְקַדֵּשׁ בִּתְרוּמוֹת – מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת! – דְּלָא כְּתִיב בַּיהּ ״קֹדֶשׁ״.

The Gemara asks: But there is ḥalla, the portion of dough that one must separate and give to a priest, about which it is written: “Of the first of your dough you shall give to the Lord” (Numbers 15:21)? And we also learned in that same mishna: With regard to one who betroths a woman with terumot, of which ḥalla is one type, she is betrothed. The Gemara answers: Although the verse does write “to the Lord,” ḥalla is different, as the word “holy” was not written with regard to it.

וַהֲרֵי שְׁבִיעִית, דִּכְתִיב בַּהּ: ״יוֹבֵל הִיא קֹדֶשׁ תִּהְיֶה לָכֶם״, וּתְנַן: הַמְקַדֵּשׁ בְּפֵירוֹת שְׁבִיעִית – מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת! – דְּלָא כְּתִיב בַּיהּ ״לַה׳״.

The Gemara asks: But there is produce of the Sabbatical Year, about which it is written: “It is a Jubilee, it shall be holy to you” (Leviticus 25:12)? And we learned by inferring from a mishna (50b) that in the case of one who betroths a woman with produce of the Sabbatical Year, she is betrothed. The Gemara answers: With regard to produce of the Sabbatical Year, the verse writes “holy,” but “to the Lord” is not written with regard to it.

וַהֲרֵי תְּרוּמָה, דִּכְתִיב: ״קֹדֶשׁ יִשְׂרָאֵל לַה׳ רֵאשִׁית תְּבוּאָתֹה״, וּתְנַן: הַמְקַדֵּשׁ בִּתְרוּמָה – מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת! הָהוּא בְּיִשְׂרָאֵל כְּתִיב.

The Gemara asks: But there is teruma, about which it is written: “The Jewish people are the Lord’s holy portion, His first fruits of the increase” (Jeremiah 2:3)? And we learned in a mishna (58a) that in the case of one who betroths a woman with teruma, she is betrothed. The Gemara answers: That verse was written with regard to the Jewish people, who are called the Lord’s holy portion, but not with regard to teruma itself.

וְלָאו מִמֵּילָא שָׁמְעַתְּ מִינַּהּ? תַּרְגְּמַהּ רָבִין סָבָא קַמֵּיהּ דְּרַב: אָמַר קְרָא: ״הוּא״ – בַּהֲוָיָיתוֹ יְהֵא.

The Gemara asks: But don’t you understand it by itself from this verse? Since the verse compares the Jewish people to teruma, the categorization of “holy” evidently applies to teruma as well. Ravin the Elder interpreted it before Rav: The difference is that with regard to tithe the verse states: “It is for the Lord,” which indicates: As it is, it should be, as consecrated.

וּבַהֶקְדֵּשׁ, בְּמֵזִיד – קִידֵּשׁ, בְּשׁוֹגֵג – לֹא קִידֵּשׁ, דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי מֵאִיר. רַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר: בְּשׁוֹגֵג – קִידֵּשׁ, בְּמֵזִיד – לֹא קִידֵּשׁ. אָמַר רַבִּי יַעֲקֹב: שְׁמַעִית מִינֵּהּ דְּרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן תַּרְתֵּי: שִׁגְגַת מַעֲשֵׂר דְּרַבִּי יְהוּדָה, שִׁגְגַת הֶקְדֵּשׁ דְּרַבִּי מֵאִיר – שְׁנֵיהֶם אֵין אִשָּׁה מִתְקַדֶּשֶׁת בָּהֶם.

§ The mishna teaches: And if he betrothed a woman with consecrated property belonging to the Temple treasury, if he does so intentionally he has betrothed her, and if he does so unwittingly he has not betrothed her; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Yehuda says the opposite: If he did so unwittingly he has betrothed her, but if he does so intentionally he has not betrothed her. Rabbi Ya’akov said: I learned two halakhot from Rabbi Yoḥanan, the halakha of an unwitting error involving tithe according to the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda and the halakha of an unwitting error involving consecrated items according to the opinion of Rabbi Meir. In both of these cases the woman is not betrothed with the items.

חֲדָא – לְפִי שֶׁאֵין אִשָּׁה רוֹצֶה, וַחֲדָא – לְפִי שֶׁאֵין שְׁנֵיהֶם רוֹצִים, וְלָא יָדַעְנָא הֵי מִינַּיְיהוּ. אָמַר רַבִּי יִרְמְיָה: נִיחְזֵי אֲנַן: מַעֲשֵׂר – אִיהִי לָא נִיחָא לַהּ מִשּׁוּם טִרְחָא דְאוֹרְחָא, אִיהוּ נִיחָא לֵיהּ דְּנִיקְנֵי אִיתְּתָא מִמֵּילָא. אֶלָּא הֶקְדֵּשׁ – תַּרְוַיְיהוּ לָא נִיחָא לְהוּ דְּנִתַּחִיל הֶקְדֵּשׁ עַל יְדַיְיהוּ.

He proceeds to explain. One of these halakhot is because the woman does not want to become betrothed with the item, and the reason for the other is because neither the man nor the woman wants it. He adds: And I do not know which of them is due to the woman alone, and which is due to both parties. Rabbi Yirmeya said: Let us see which reason is applicable to which case. It must be that with regard to second tithe, which may be eaten only in Jerusalem, it is not satisfactory for her to be betrothed with it due to the trouble of transporting it all the way to Jerusalem to enjoy it, whereas it is satisfactory for him to betroth her with it, since he acquires a woman by itself, i.e., by the tithe alone, without having to spend additional money of his own. But in the case of consecrated items, it is not satisfactory for the two of them that consecrated property be desacralized by their using it for betrothal.

וְרַבִּי יַעֲקֹב אָמַר: אִיפְּכָא מִסְתַּבְּרָא, מִי לָא אִיכָּא לְמֵימַר: מַעֲשֵׂר, אִיהִי לָא נִיחָא לַהּ מִשּׁוּם טִירְחָא דְאוֹרְחָא, אִיהוּ לָא נִיחָא לֵיהּ מִשּׁוּם אוּנְסָא דְאוֹרְחָא?! אֶלָּא הֶקְדֵּשׁ, בִּשְׁלָמָא אִיהִי לָא נִיחָא לַהּ דְּנִתַּחִיל הֶקְדֵּשׁ עַל יְדַהּ, אֶלָּא אִיהוּ מִי לָא נִיחָא לֵיהּ דְּנִיקְנֵי אִיתְּתָא מִמֵּילָא?

And Rabbi Ya’akov said the opposite is more reasonable. Couldn’t it be said that in the case of second tithe it is not satisfactory for her to be betrothed with it due to the trouble of transporting it all the way, and it is not satisfactory for him to betroth her with it due to the danger of an accident along the way. If the second tithe gets lost on the way to Jerusalem, she will not have derived any benefit from it. It will cause her distress to think she received nothing for her betrothal, and he does not want to cause her distress. But in the case of consecrated items, granted that with regard to her, it is not satisfactory for her that consecrated property be desacralized through her, but why wouldn’t it be satisfactory for him to acquire a woman by itself, without the expenditure of redeeming a consecrated item? Therefore, the reasons for Rabbi Yoḥanan’s statement cannot be determined by logic alone.

בְּעָא מִינֵּיהּ רָבָא מֵרַב חִסְדָּא: אִשָּׁה אֵין מִתְקַדֶּשֶׁת, מָעוֹת מַהוּ שֶׁיֵּצְאוּ לְחוּלִּין? אֲמַר לֵיהּ: אִשָּׁה אֵין מִתְקַדֶּשֶׁת – מָעוֹת הֵיאַךְ יֵצְאוּ לְחוּלִּין?

Rava inquired of Rav Ḥisda: According to Rabbi Meir, a woman cannot be betrothed by receiving consecrated money, but what is the halakha with regard to the money he gives her for betrothal: Does the money become desacralized as a result of the act of betrothal, as is usually the case when one uses a consecrated item for his own benefit? Rav Ḥisda said to him: If the woman is not betrothed, how can the money become desacralized? Since the money has not actually been used, nothing has changed with regard to its status.

בְּעָא מִינֵּהּ רַב חִיָּיא בַּר אָבִין מֵרַב חִסְדָּא: בְּמֶכֶר מַאי? אֲמַר לֵיהּ: אַף בְּמֶכֶר לֹא קָנָה.

Rav Ḥiyya bar Avin inquired of Rav Ḥisda: What is the halakha with regard to a sale: If one unwittingly uses consecrated money to purchase an item, does the sale take effect? Rav Ḥisda said to him: Even with regard to a sale he does not acquire the item.

אֵיתִיבֵיהּ: חֶנְוָנִי כְּבַעַל הַבַּיִת, דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי מֵאִיר. רַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר: חֶנְוָנִי כְּשׁוּלְחָנִי.

Rav Ḥiyya bar Avin raised an objection to him: The halakha is that if a man deposited a bundle of money with a money changer, the latter may not use the money. If the money changer untied the bundle and used the money, and it turned out that it was consecrated, the money changer is liable to bring an offering for the misuse of consecrated property, since he acted without the permission of the depositor. If the money was not in a bundle, the money changer has the right to use it, since the depositor knows that a money changer frequently distributes money. Consequently, in this case, if the money was consecrated, it is the depositor who is liable to bring an offering for the misuse of consecrated property, since the money changer is considered to have acted with his awareness. If one deposited the money with a homeowner, i.e., not a money changer, the latter may not use it in either case, and he is liable to bring an offering for the misuse of consecrated property if he does. With regard to a storekeeper, the tanna’im disagree: The same halakha applies to a storekeeper as to a homeowner; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. But Rabbi Yehuda says: The same halakha applies to a storekeeper as to a money changer.

עַד כָּאן לָא קָא מִיפַּלְגִי אֶלָּא דְּמָר סָבַר: חֶנְוָנִי כְּשׁוּלְחָנִי, וּמָר סָבַר חֶנְוָנִי כְּבַעַל הַבַּיִת. אֲבָל דְּכוּלֵּי עָלְמָא: אִם הוֹצִיא – מָעַל! רַבִּי מֵאִיר לִדְבָרָיו דְּרַבִּי יְהוּדָה קָאָמַר: לְדִידִי, אִם הוֹצִיא נָמֵי לֹא מָעַל, אֶלָּא לְדִידָךְ, אוֹדִי לִי מִיהָא דְּחֶנְוָנִי כְּבַעַל הַבַּיִת! וַאֲמַר לֵיהּ: לָא, כְּשׁוּלְחָנִי.

The Gemara analyzes this: They disagree only with regard to that issue: As one Sage, Rabbi Yehuda, holds that the same halakha applies to a storekeeper as to a money changer, and one Sage, Rabbi Meir, holds that the same halakha applies to a storekeeper as to a homeowner. But everyone agrees that if the storekeeper did spend the money, he has misused consecrated property. This indicates that even according to the opinion of Rabbi Meir, whatever transaction he performed did take effect. The Gemara rejects this: Rabbi Meir stated his opinion in accordance with the statement of Rabbi Yehuda, as follows: According to me, if he spent the money he has also not misused consecrated property, but according to you, at least concede to me that the same halakha applies to a storekeeper as to a homeowner. And Rabbi Yehuda said to him: No, I do not concede to you even with regard to this point, as I hold that the same halakha applies to a storekeeper as to a money changer.

אָמַר רַב:

The Gemara records a discussion as to the reasons for the rulings of Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehuda. Rav says: