קידושין סג

קידושין סג

״לֹא תַסְגִּיר עֶבֶד אֶל אֲדֹנָיו״, רַבִּי אוֹמֵר: בְּלוֹקֵחַ עֶבֶד עַל מְנָת לְשַׁחְרְרוֹ הַכָּתוּב מְדַבֵּר. הֵיכִי דָּמֵי? אָמַר רַב נַחְמָן בַּר יִצְחָק: כְּגוֹן דִּכְתַב לֵיהּ: ״לִכְשֶׁאֶקָּחֲךָ, הֲרֵי עַצְמְךָ קָנוּי לְךָ מֵעַכְשָׁיו״.

With regard to the verse: “You shall not deliver a slave to his master” (Deuteronomy 23:16), Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: The verse is speaking of one who acquires a slave, not to enslave him but in order to emancipate him. The court may not deliver the slave to this master, as this master has no right to enslave him. The Gemara asks: What are the circumstances of this case? Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak says: For example, if the new master wrote to the slave in his bill of manumission: When I will purchase you, you are hereby acquired to yourself from now. In that case the slave acquires himself from that moment, despite the fact that the buyer does not own him. This shows that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi maintains that a person can transfer an item that has not yet entered the world, as one can emancipate his slave before acquiring him.

רַבִּי מֵאִיר, דְּתַנְיָא: הָאוֹמֵר לְאִשָּׁה: ״הֲרֵי אַתְּ מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת לִי לְאַחַר שֶׁאֶתְגַּיֵּיר״, ״לְאַחַר שֶׁתִּתְגַּיְּירִי״, ״לְאַחַר שֶׁאֶשְׁתַּחְרֵר״, ״לְאַחַר שֶׁתִּשְׁתַּחְרְרִי״, ״לְאַחַר שֶׁיָּמוּת בַּעְלִיךְ״, ״לְאַחַר שֶׁתָּמוּת אֲחוֹתִיךְ״, ״לְאַחַר שֶׁיַּחְלוֹץ לָךְ יְבָמִיךְ״ – אֵינָהּ מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת. רַבִּי מֵאִיר אוֹמֵר: מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת. רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן הַסַּנְדְּלָר אוֹמֵר: אֵינָהּ מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת.

Rabbi Meir also holds that one can transfer an entity that has not yet come into the world, as it is taught in a baraita: With regard to one who says to a woman: You are hereby betrothed to me after I convert, or: After you convert, or: After I am emancipated, or: After you are emancipated, or: After your husband dies, or: After your sister dies, or: After your yavam performs ḥalitza for you, she is not betrothed. Rabbi Meir disagrees and says: She is betrothed. Rabbi Yoḥanan HaSandlar says: She is not betrothed.

רַבִּי יְהוּדָה הַנָּשִׂיא אוֹמֵר: מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת. וּמָה טַעַם אָמְרוּ ״אֵינָהּ מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת״ – מִשּׁוּם אֵיבָה.

Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says that in some of these cases, by Torah law she is betrothed. And for what reason did the Sages say she is not betrothed? Due to enmity. Giving betrothal to a married woman that will take effect after her husband dies can engender enmity between the woman and her husband. Giving betrothal to one sister that depends on the death of the other can engender enmity between the sisters. Nevertheless, Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi maintain that one can betroth a woman who is currently forbidden to him.

וְנִחְשׁוֹב נָמֵי רַבִּי יְהוּדָה הַנָּשִׂיא! הַיְינוּ רַבִּי, הַיְינוּ רַבִּי יְהוּדָה הַנָּשִׂיא.

The Gemara asks: And let us also count Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi among those who maintain that a person can acquire an entity that has not yet come into the world. The reason it asks is that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi is merely called Rabbi above. The Gemara answers: Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi is the same as Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi; they are one person.

וְנִחְשׁוֹב נָמֵי רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא, דְּתַנְיָא: ״קֻוֽנָּם שֶׁאֲנִי עוֹשָׂה לְפִיךָ״ – אֵין צָרִיךְ לְהָפֵר.

The Gemara asks: And let us also count Rabbi Akiva, as it is taught in a mishna (see Nedarim 85a): If a woman stated a vow to her husband: I will not produce anything for you, including the work that she is obligated to do for him according to the terms of her marriage contract, as that is konam, i.e., forbidden like an offering, for me, her husband need not nullify the vow at all. It is automatically void, since she is obligated to perform those tasks.

רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא אוֹמֵר: יָפֵר, שֶׁמָּא תַּעֲדִיף עָלָיו יָתֵר מִן הָרָאוּי לוֹ. הָאִיתְּמַר עֲלַהּ, אָמַר רַב הוּנָא בְּרֵיהּ דְּרַב יְהוֹשֻׁעַ: בְּאוֹמֶרֶת: ״יִקְדְּשׁוּ יָדַי לְעוֹשֵׂיהֶם״, וְיָדַיִם אִיתַנְהוּ בָּעוֹלָם.

Rabbi Akiva says: He should nevertheless nullify the vow, as perhaps she will exceed the required amount of work and do more for him than is fitting for him to receive. If she does more than the fixed amount of work that a woman is obligated to perform for her husband, the vow will be valid with respect to the excess to which he is not legally entitled, and he might inadvertently come to benefit from something that is forbidden to him. That excess is an entity that has not yet come into the world. The Gemara rejects this suggestion: Wasn’t it already stated with regard to this ruling that Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, says: This is referring to a woman who says: Let my hands be sanctified to their Maker? She sanctifies her actual hands, and these hands exist in the world; therefore the vow takes effect.

מַתְנִי׳ הָאוֹמֵר לָאִשָּׁה ״הֲרֵי אַתְּ מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת לִי עַל מְנָת שֶׁאֲדַבֵּר עָלַיִךְ לַשִּׁלְטוֹן״, ״וְאֶעֱשֶׂה עִמָּךְ כְּפוֹעֵל״, דִּבֵּר עָלֶיהָ לַשִּׁלְטוֹן וְעָשָׂה עִמָּהּ כְּפוֹעֵל – מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת, וְאִם לָאו – אֵינָהּ מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת.

MISHNA: With regard to one who says to a woman: You are hereby betrothed to me on the condition that I will speak in your favor to the authorities, e.g., to help her address some legal matter, or: On the condition that I will act for you as a laborer, if he spoke in her favor to the authorities or acted for her as a laborer, she is betrothed. But if not, she is not betrothed.

גְּמָ׳ אָמַר רֵישׁ לָקִישׁ: וְהוּא שֶׁנָּתַן לָהּ שָׁוֶה פְּרוּטָה. וּבְשָׂכָר לָא? וְהָתַנְיָא: בִּשְׂכַר שֶׁהִרְכַּבְתִּיךְ עַל הַחֲמוֹר שֶׁהוֹשַׁבְתִּיךְ בְּקָרוֹן אוֹ בִּסְפִינָה – אֵינָהּ מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת.

GEMARA: Reish Lakish says: And this halakha applies only if he gave her an item worth one peruta at the time of the betrothal. She is not betrothed via his recommendation to the authorities or via the work itself, as these are merely conditions appended to the betrothal. The Gemara asks: And is she not betrothed by the monetary value of his recommendation or action? But isn’t it taught in a baraita that if one says to a woman: You are hereby betrothed to me by the monetary value you received when I had you ride on a donkey, or: By the monetary value you received when I had you sit on a wagon [karon], or: By the monetary value you received when I had you ride in a boat, she is not betrothed, as she has already done the action and therefore owes him this debt, and one cannot betroth a woman with a loan.

בִּשְׂכַר שֶׁאַרְכִּיבִךְ עַל הַחֲמוֹר, שֶׁאוֹשִׁיבִךְ בְּקָרוֹן אוֹ בִּסְפִינָה – מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת. וְכִי תֵּימָא הָכָא נָמֵי בְּדִיהַב לַהּ שָׁוֶה פְּרוּטָה, וְהָא בִּשְׂכַר קָאָמַר.

But if he says to her: By the monetary value you will receive when I will have you ride on a donkey, or: By the monetary value you will receive when I will have you sit on a wagon, or: By the monetary value you will receive when I will have you ride in a boat, she is betrothed. And if you would say that here too, it is referring to a case where he gave her an item worth one peruta, the baraita says: By the monetary value, which indicates that she is betrothed via this sum.

וְעוֹד תַּנְיָא: שֵׁב עִמִּי בְּצַוְותָּא וְאֶקַּדֵּשׁ לָךְ, שְׂחוֹק לְפָנַי, רְקוֹד לְפָנַי, עֲשֵׂה כַּדִּימוֹס הַזֶּה – שָׁמִין, אִם יֵשׁ בּוֹ שָׁוֶה פְּרוּטָה – מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת, וְאִם לָאו – אֵינָהּ מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת. וְכִי תֵּימָא, הָכָא נָמֵי בְּדִיהַב לַהּ שָׁוֶה פְּרוּטָה, וְהָא שָׁמִין אוֹתוֹ קָאָמַר! תְּיוּבְתָּא דְּרֵישׁ לָקִישׁ.

And furthermore, it is taught in a baraita that if a woman says to a man: Sit together with me and I will be betrothed to you, or: Perform entertainment before me, or: Dance before me, or: Perform work for me like this layer [dimus] of a building, the court appraises the monetary value of his action. If the action he performs for her is worth the value of one peruta, she is betrothed, but if not, she is not betrothed. And if you would say that here too, it is referring to a case where he gave her an item worth one peruta, and the betrothal is with that; but the baraita says: The court appraises it. If this were merely a condition, there would be no need for an appraisal. Isn’t this a conclusive refutation of the opinion of Reish Lakish?

אָמַר לָךְ רֵישׁ לָקִישׁ: הַאי תַּנָּא בָּרָא סָבַר: אֵינָהּ לִשְׂכִירוּת אֶלָּא לְבַסּוֹף. וְתַנָּא דִידַן סָבַר יֶשְׁנָהּ לִשְׂכִירוּת מִתְּחִילָּה וְעַד סוֹף.

The Gemara answers that Reish Lakish could have said to you: This tanna of the baraita maintains that the obligation to pay a person’s wage is incurred only at the end of the period for which he was hired. Consequently, she is betrothed via money rather than by a loan. And the tanna of our mishna maintains that the obligation to pay a wage is incurred continuously from the beginning of the period he was hired to its end. Since the debt accumulates throughout the duration that the service is performed, by the time he has finished the work she owes him the entire sum, and a debt cannot be used for a betrothal.

וּמַאי דּוּחְקֵיהּ דְּרֵישׁ לָקִישׁ לְאוֹקוֹמַיהּ לְמַתְנִיתִין בְּיֶשְׁנָהּ לִשְׂכִירוּת מִתְּחִילָּה וְעַד סוֹף, וּבְדִיהַב לַהּ?

The Gemara asks: And what forces Reish Lakish to establish the mishna in accordance with the opinion that the obligation to pay a wage is incurred continuously from the beginning of the period he was hired to its end, and that it is referring to a case where he gave her the value of one peruta? Why does he reject the possibility that the mishna is referring to one who did not give an extra peruta, and instead he betrothed her with the value of the service he performed, in accordance with the opinion that the obligation to pay a person’s wage is incurred only at the end of the period for which he was hired?

אָמַר רָבָא: מַתְנִיתִין קְשִׁיתֵיהּ, מַאי אִירְיָא דְּתָנֵי ״עַל מְנָת״? נִיתְנֵי ״בִּשְׂכַר״, אֶלָּא שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ: כֹּל ״עַל מְנָת״ הֵיכָא דִּיהַב לַהּ הוּא.

The Gemara replies: Rava said that the mishna was difficult for Reish Lakish: Why does the tanna specifically teach: On the condition? Let him teach: By the monetary value, as stated in the baraita. Rather, conclude from it that any statement of: On the condition, is referring to a stipulation, and therefore the mishna must be dealing with a case where he has already given her the value of one peruta. Consequently, the value of his service cannot be the money for the betrothal itself, and instead serves as a later condition.

מַתְנִי׳ ״עַל מְנָת שֶׁיִּרְצֶה אַבָּא״, רָצָה הָאָב – מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת, וְאִם לָאו – אֵינָהּ מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת. מֵת הָאָב – הֲרֵי זוֹ מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת. מֵת הַבֵּן – מְלַמְּדִין הָאָב לוֹמַר שֶׁאֵינוֹ רוֹצֶה.

MISHNA: With regard to one who betroths a woman and says to her that the betrothal is: On the condition that my father will want this betrothal, if his father wants it, she is betrothed; but if not, she is not betrothed. If the father dies, she is betrothed, despite the fact that he did not reveal his wishes. If the son dies, one instructs the father to say that he does not want the betrothal, so that the betrothal will never have taken effect, thereby enabling her to avoid the requirement of levirate marriage.

גְּמָ׳ מַאי ״עַל מְנָת שֶׁיִּרְצֶה אַבָּא״? אִילֵּימָא עַד דְּאָמַר אַבָּא ״אִין״, אֵימָא מְצִיעֲתָא: מֵת הָאָב – הֲרֵי זוֹ מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת, וְהָא לָא אֲמַר ״אִין״! אֶלָּא:

GEMARA: What is the meaning of: On the condition that my father will want this betrothal? If we say it means they are not married until his father says yes, indicating his agreement, then say the middle clause of the mishna: If the father dies, she is betrothed. But how can she be betrothed? After all, he did not say yes, and the condition was not fulfilled. Rather,

עַל מְנָת שֶׁיִּשְׁתּוֹק אַבָּא. אֵימָא סֵיפָא: מֵת הַבֵּן – מְלַמְּדִין אֶת הָאָב לוֹמַר שֶׁאֵינוֹ רוֹצֶה. אַמַּאי? וְהָא שְׁתֵיק! אֶלָּא אֲמַר לַהּ ״עַל מְנָת שֶׁלֹּא יְמַחֶה אַבָּא״.

the phrase: On the condition that my father wants this betrothal, means: On the condition that my father will remain silent and will not object when he hears of the betrothal. But if this is the case, say the last clause of the mishna: If the son died, one instructs the father to say that he does not want the betrothal. Why should this matter? After all, he remained silent when he first heard about it. Clearly his mere silence does not constitute agreement. Rather, one must say that the phrase: On the condition that my father wants this betrothal, means that he said to her: On the condition that my father will not object to this betrothal at any point in time.

רֵישָׁא בְּחַד טַעְמָא וּמְצִיעֲתָא וְסֵיפָא בְּחַד טַעְמָא! אָמַר רַבִּי יַנַּאי: אִין. אָמַר רֵישׁ לָקִישׁ: שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ לִדְרַבִּי יַנַּאי דָּחֲקִינַן וּמוֹקְמִינַן מַתְנִיתִין בִּתְרֵי טַעֲמֵי וְאַלִּיבָּא דְּחַד תַּנָּא וְלָא מוֹקְמִינַן בִּתְרֵי תַּנָּאֵי וּבְחַד טַעְמָא.

The Gemara asks: Wouldn’t this mean that the first clause of the mishna describes one reason, i.e., one set of circumstances, and the middle clause and last clause describe one other reason? Rabbi Yannai said: Yes, this is so. Reish Lakish said: Conclude from his statement that according to the opinion of Rabbi Yannai one forces a mishna to be explained as following two reasons, and in accordance with the opinion of one tanna, rather than establishing a mishna as following the opinions of two tanna’im and one reason. In other words, an interpretation that maintains the unified attribution of one mishna is preferable, even if one is thereby forced to say that it addresses different situations.

רַב יוֹסֵף בַּר אַמֵּי אָמַר: לְעוֹלָם חַד טַעְמָא הוּא, וּמַאי ״עַל מְנָת שֶׁיִּרְצֶה אַבָּא״ – עַל מְנָת שֶׁלֹּא יְמַחֶה אַבָּא מִכָּאן וְעַד שְׁלֹשִׁים יוֹם.

Rav Yosef bar Ami said: Actually, the entire mishna is addressing one reason, i.e., one case, and what is the meaning of: On the condition that my father wants the betrothal? It means: On the condition that my father will not object from now and until thirty days have elapsed. His silence for thirty days indicates his acceptance of the betrothal.

מַתְנִי׳ ״קִדַּשְׁתִּי אֶת בִּתִּי וְאֵינִי יוֹדֵעַ לְמִי קִידַּשְׁתִּיהָ״, וּבָא אֶחָד וְאָמַר ״אֲנִי קִידַּשְׁתִּיהָ״ – נֶאֱמָן. זֶה אָמַר ״אֲנִי קִידַּשְׁתִּיהָ״ וְזֶה אָמַר ״אֲנִי קִידַּשְׁתִּיהָ״ – שְׁנֵיהֶם נוֹתְנִים גֵּט. וְאִם רָצוּ – אֶחָד נוֹתֵן גֵּט, וְאֶחָד כּוֹנֵס.

MISHNA: With regard to a man who said: I betrothed my minor daughter to someone but I do not know to whom I betrothed her, and one man came forward and said: I betrothed her, his claim is deemed credible. If two men stepped forward and this one said: I betrothed her, and that one said: I betrothed her, they must both give her a bill of divorce to render it permitted for her to marry anyone else. And if they so desire, one of them gives her a bill of divorce and the other one may marry her.

גְּמָ׳ אָמַר רַב: – נֶאֱמָן לִיתֵּן גֵּט, וְאֵין נֶאֱמָן לִכְנוֹס. נֶאֱמָן לִיתֵּן גֵּט, אֵין אָדָם חוֹטֵא וְלֹא לוֹ. וְאֵין נֶאֱמָן לִכְנוֹס? אֵימָא יִצְרוֹ תּוֹקְפוֹ.

GEMARA: Rav says: When the mishna states that the claim of one who says that he betrothed this girl is deemed credible, it means that he is deemed credible to the extent that he may give her a bill of divorce, but he is not deemed credible to marry her. He is deemed credible to give her a bill of divorce, as there is a presumption that a person sins only for his own benefit. No one is suspected of sinning when he does not stand to gain from it. Since he is not allowed to marry her himself, we do not say that he lied without purpose. But he is not deemed credible to marry her, as we say that his inclination might have overcome him, leading him to falsely claim that he is the one who betrothed her.

רַב אַסִּי אָמַר: אַף נֶאֱמָן לִכְנוֹס. וּמוֹדֶה רַב אַסִּי בְּאוֹמֶרֶת ״נִתְקַדַּשְׁתִּי וְאֵינִי יוֹדַעַת לְמִי נִתְקַדַּשְׁתִּי״ וּבָא אֶחָד וְאָמַר ״קִידַּשְׁתִּיהָ״ שֶׁאֵין נֶאֱמָן לִכְנוֹס.

Rav Asi disagrees with Rav’s interpretation of the mishna and says: He is deemed credible even to marry her, as he would not dare to lie directly to the father of the girl he claims to have betrothed. And Rav Asi concedes in the case of a woman who says: I became betrothed but I do not know to whom I became betrothed, and one man came and said: I betrothed her, that he is not deemed credible to marry her. In this situation she might have agreed to collude with him, as the Gemara will explain.

תְּנַן: רָצוּ – אֶחָד נוֹתֵן גֵּט וְאֶחָד כּוֹנֵס, תְּיוּבְתָּא דְרַב! אָמַר לְךָ רַב: שָׁאנֵי הָתָם, דְּכֵיוָן דְּאִיכָּא אַחֵר בַּהֲדֵיהּ – אִירְתוֹתֵי מִירְתַת.

The Gemara raises a difficulty: We learned in the mishna that if they so desire, one of them gives her a bill of divorce and the other one may marry her. This is apparently a conclusive refutation of the opinion of Rav, who says that he may not marry her. The Gemara answers: Rav could have said to you: There, in our mishna, it is different, as, since there is another person with him also claiming to have betrothed her, he is afraid to lie.

תַּנְיָא כְּווֹתֵיהּ דְּרַב אַסִּי: קִידַּשְׁתִּי אֶת בִּתִּי וְאֵינִי יוֹדֵעַ לְמִי קִידַּשְׁתִּיהָ, וּבָא אֶחָד וְאָמַר קִידַּשְׁתִּיהָ – אַף נֶאֱמָן לִכְנוֹס. כְּנָסָהּ וּבָא אַחֵר וְאָמַר אֲנִי קִדַּשְׁתִּיהָ – לֹא כׇּל הֵימֶנּוּ לְאוֹסְרָהּ עָלָיו.

The Gemara comments: It is taught in a baraita in accordance with the opinion of Rav Asi: If a man said: I have betrothed my daughter to someone but I do not know to whom I betrothed her, and one person came forward and said: I betrothed her, he is deemed credible even to marry her. If that person married her, and another man came forward and said: It was I who betrothed her, it is not within the second man’s power to prohibit her to her husband.

הָאִשָּׁה שֶׁאָמְרָה ״נִתְקַדַּשְׁתִּי וְאֵינִי יוֹדַעַת לְמִי נִתְקַדַּשְׁתִּי״ וּבָא אֶחָד וְאָמַר ״אֲנִי קִידַּשְׁתִּי״ – אֵין נֶאֱמָן לִכְנוֹס. מִפְּנֵי שֶׁהִיא מְחַפָּה עָלָיו.

The baraita cites another case: With regard to a woman who said: I became betrothed but I do not know to whom I became betrothed, and one man came and said: I betrothed her, he is not deemed credible to marry her. Why not? Because she is protecting him. Perhaps she decided only now that she wants to marry him and is therefore identifying him as the man who betrothed her, although she knows it was someone else. The same suspicions do not arise in the case of a father, who has no inclinations in this regard.

אִיבַּעְיָא לְהוּ: מַהוּ לִסְקוֹל עַל יָדוֹ? רַב אָמַר: אֵין סוֹקְלִין. וְרַב אַסִּי אָמַר: סוֹקְלִין.

§ A dilemma was raised before the Sages: In the case of the mishna, where the father claims to have betrothed his daughter to someone, what is the halakha with regard to stoning based on the father’s account? Is a father who says: I betrothed my daughter, deemed credible to the extent that she is stoned as an adulteress if she engages in sexual intercourse with someone? Rav says the court does not stone her, and Rav Asi says the court stones her.

רַב אָמַר: אֵין סוֹקְלִין, כִּי הֵימְנֵיהּ רַחֲמָנָא לְאָב, לְאִיסּוּרָא, לִקְטָלָא לָא הֵימְנֵיהּ. רַב אַסִּי אָמַר: סוֹקְלִין, לְכוּלַּהּ מִילְּתֵיהּ הֵימְנֵיהּ רַחֲמָנָא לְאָב. אָמַר רַב אַסִּי: וּמוֹדֵינָא בְּאוֹמֶרֶת ״נִתְקַדַּשְׁתִּי״, שֶׁאֵין סוֹקְלִים.

The Gemara elaborates: Rav said that the court does not stone her, because when the Merciful One deems the father credible when he says he betrothed his daughter, this is referring only to the prohibition against her marrying anyone else. By contrast, with regard to killing her, the Torah did not deem him credible. Rav Asi said: The court stones her, as the Merciful One deems the father credible with regard to all matters, including the death penalty. Rav Asi says: And I concede in the case of a woman who says: I became betrothed, that the court does not stone her on the basis of her own admission.

וְאָמַר רַב אַסִּי: הָנֵי שְׁמַעְתָּתָא דִּידִי מְרַפְּסָן אִיגָּרֵי. הַשְׁתָּא, וּמָה בִּמְקוֹם שֶׁאִם בָּא לִכְנוֹס כּוֹנֵס – אָמַרְתָּ סוֹקְלִים, מְקוֹם שֶׁאִם בָּא לִכְנוֹס אֵין כּוֹנֵס – אֵינוֹ דִּין שֶׁסּוֹקְלִין?

And Rav Asi says: These halakhot of mine are roof breakers, i.e., they are difficult and incomprehensible. Rav Asi explains: Now, in a case where a father said: I have betrothed my daughter to someone but I do not know to whom, where if someone came to marry her he is deemed credible and may marry her, which means you say that the court then stones her on the basis of the father’s testimony if she later commits adultery, is it not logical that the court should stone her in a case where a woman said: I became betrothed but I do not know to whom, thereby prohibiting herself to everyone to the extent that if someone came to marry her he may not marry her?

וְלָא הִיא, לְאָב הֵימְנֵיהּ רַחֲמָנָא, לְדִידַהּ לָא הֵימְנַהּ.

But that is not so, i.e., Rav Asi’s rulings are in fact reasonable: The Merciful One deems credible a father who says that his daughter is betrothed, and therefore she can even be stoned, but the Torah did not deem her, i.e., the woman herself, credible in this regard. She does not receive a special degree of credibility, and although she can declare herself a forbidden item, i.e., she can render herself forbidden to all men, as far as punishment is concerned her claim is treated by a court in accordance with the regular rules of evidence.

וְרַב חִסְדָּא אָמַר: אֶחָד זֶה וְאֶחָד זֶה – אֵין סוֹקְלִין. וְאַזְדָּא רַב חִסְדָּא לְטַעְמֵיהּ, דְּאָמַר רַב חִסְדָּא: ״בְּנִי זֶה בֶּן תֵּשַׁע שָׁנִים וְיוֹם אֶחָד״, ״בִּתִּי זוֹ בַּת שָׁלֹשׁ שָׁנִים וְיוֹם אֶחָד״ – נֶאֱמָן לְקׇרְבָּן, אֲבָל לֹא לְמַכּוֹת וְלֹא לָעוֹנָשִׁין.

And Rav Ḥisda said: Both in this case, when the father says: I betrothed my daughter, and in that case, when she herself says: I became betrothed, the court does not stone her. The Gemara comments: And Rav Ḥisda follows his standard line of reasoning, as Rav Ḥisda says that if a father declared: This son of mine is nine years and one day old, or: This daughter of mine is three years and one day old, and the son engaged in intercourse with a woman forbidden to him, or the daughter engaged in intercourse with a man forbidden to her, he is deemed credible concerning his children’s ages with regard to the requirement for the adult to bring an offering if they performed the act unwittingly, but not with regard to their receiving the punishment of lashes and not with regard to other punishments.

תַּנְיָא כְּווֹתֵיהּ דְּרַב חִסְדָּא: ״בְּנִי זֶה בֶּן שְׁלֹשׁ עֶשְׂרֵה שָׁנָה וְיוֹם אֶחָד״ ״בִּתִּי זוֹ בַּת שְׁתֵּים עֶשְׂרֵה שָׁנָה וְיוֹם אֶחָד״ –

The Gemara comments: It is taught in a baraita in accordance with the opinion of Rav Ḥisda that if one said: This son of mine is thirteen years and one day old, or: This daughter of mine is twelve years and one day old,