קידושין סה

קידושין סה

אֶמְצָעִית שֶׁבְּכַת שְׁנִיָּה תִּשְׁתְּרֵי! הָכָא בְּמַאי עָסְקִינַן, בְּשֶׁאֵין שָׁם אֶלָּא גְּדוֹלָה וּקְטַנָּה.

with regard to one who said: I betrothed my elder daughter, the middle daughter of the younger second group should be permitted, as he would have called her by name rather than referring to her as: The elder one. The Gemara answers: Here we are dealing with a case where there are only two daughters, an adult woman and a minor girl, but no middle daughter.

וְהָכִי נָמֵי מִסְתַּבְּרָא, דְּאִם אִיתָא דְּאִיכָּא, לִיתְנְיַיהּ. וּלְטַעְמָיךְ, אֶמְצָעִית שֶׁבְּכַת רִאשׁוֹנָה, דְּוַדַּאי סְפֵיקָא וַאֲסִירָא לֵיהּ, מִי קָתָנֵי לַהּ?

The Gemara adds: And so too, it is reasonable that this is the case, as, if it is so, that there is a middle daughter, let the mishna teach its halakha with a direct reference to her as well, as the uncertainty also applies to this daughter. In other words, the mishna should have stated: And I do not know if it was the middle of the younger group of daughters. The fact that the mishna does not refer to this daughter indicates that there are only two women in each group. The Gemara rejects this suggestion: But according to your reasoning, the middle one of the first group is definitely included in the uncertainty and is forbidden to the prospective husband, and yet does the mishna teach its halakha with a direct reference to her?

הָכִי הַשְׁתָּא?! הָתָם תַּנָּא קְטַנָּה דִּידַהּ לְאִיסּוּרָא, וְהוּא הַדִּין לְהָךְ דְּקַשִּׁישָׁא מִינַּהּ,

The Gemara questions this argument: How can these cases be compared? There it taught its halakha with a direct reference to a daughter who is younger than the middle daughter of the older group, and that daughter is mentioned for a prohibition, as the mishna states that the uncertainty applies even to the youngest of the older group; and if so, the same is true of this middle daughter, who is older than the youngest of the older group, i.e., it is evident that the same uncertainty applies to her, and therefore there is no reason to mention the middle daughter of the older group.

הָכָא, אִם אִיתָא דְּאִיכָּא – נִיתְנְיַיהּ.

Conversely, here, with regard to the younger group, if it is so that there is uncertainty with regard to the middle daughter and she is forbidden, the mishna should teach its halakha with a direct reference to her, as one might think she is excluded from the uncertainty because she is not the eldest. Consequently, the fact that the mishna omits all reference to the middle daughter from the second group proves that the second wife has only two daughters.

אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַב הוּנָא בְּרֵיהּ דְּרַב יְהוֹשֻׁעַ לְרָבָא: הָא פֶּסַח, דְּכִי כַת אַחַת דָּמֵי, וּפְלִיגִי!

Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, said to Rava: But there is the case of Passover, which is comparable to one group of daughters, as all the days of the Festival are part of a single group, and yet Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yosei disagree with regard to it. This apparently contradicts Abaye’s opinion that everyone agrees in the case of a single group.

אֲמַר לֵיהּ: הָתָם בְּלִישָּׁנָא דְעָלְמָא קָמִיפַּלְגִי. מָר סָבַר: ״עַד פְּנֵי הַפֶּסַח״ – עַד קַמֵּי פִיסְחָא, וּמָר סָבַר: עַד דְּמִיפְּנֵי פִּיסְחָא.

Rava said to him: There they disagree with regard to the general usage of language. In other words, their dispute in that case does not concern the basic issue of whether or not one places himself in a position of uncertainty. Rather, they disagree over the way people speak. One Sage, Rabbi Yosei, holds that the phrase: Until before Passover, means: Until just before Passover, and one Sage, Rabbi Meir, holds that it means until Passover passes and ends.

מַתְנִי׳ הָאוֹמֵר לְאִשָּׁה: ״קִדַּשְׁתִּיךְ״ וְהִיא אוֹמֶרֶת: ״לֹא קִדַּשְׁתַּנִי״ – הוּא אָסוּר בִּקְרוֹבוֹתֶיהָ וְהִיא מוּתֶּרֶת בִּקְרוֹבָיו. הִיא אוֹמֶרֶת ״קִדַּשְׁתַּנִי״ וְהוּא אוֹמֵר ״לֹא קִדַּשְׁתִּיךְ״ – הוּא מוּתָּר בִּקְרוֹבוֹתֶיהָ וְהִיא אֲסוּרָה בִּקְרוֹבָיו.

MISHNA: With regard to one who says to a woman: I betrothed you, and she says: You did not betroth me, he is forbidden to her relatives, as his claim that he has betrothed her renders himself forbidden to her relatives. And she is permitted to his relatives, in accordance with her stance that she is not betrothed to him. If she says: You betrothed me, and he says: I did not betroth you, he is permitted to her relatives and she is forbidden to his relatives by the same reasoning.

״קִידַּשְׁתִּיךְ״ וְהִיא אוֹמֶרֶת ״לֹא קִידַּשְׁתָּ אֶלָּא בִּתִּי״ – הוּא אָסוּר בִּקְרוֹבוֹת גְּדוֹלָה וּגְדוֹלָה מוּתֶּרֶת בִּקְרוֹבָיו. הוּא מוּתָּר בִּקְרוֹבוֹת קְטַנָּה וּקְטַנָּה מוּתֶּרֶת בִּקְרוֹבָיו.

If a man says to a woman: I betrothed you, and she says: You betrothed only my daughter, he is forbidden to the relatives of the older woman, the mother, whom he claims to have betrothed, and the older woman is permitted to his relatives. He is permitted to the relatives of the younger woman, the daughter, as he maintains that he did not betroth her, and the younger woman is permitted to his relatives, since her mother’s statement is insufficient to render her forbidden.

״קִדַּשְׁתִּי אֶת בִּתִּךְ״ וְהִיא אוֹמֶרֶת ״לֹא קִדַּשְׁתָּ אֶלָּא אוֹתִי״ – הוּא אָסוּר בִּקְרוֹבוֹת קְטַנָּה וּקְטַנָּה מוּתֶּרֶת בִּקְרוֹבָיו. הוּא מוּתָּר בִּקְרוֹבוֹת גְּדוֹלָה וּגְדוֹלָה אֲסוּרָה בִּקְרוֹבָיו.

Similarly, if he says: I betrothed your daughter, and she, the mother, says: You betrothed only me, he is forbidden to the relatives of the younger woman, and the younger woman is permitted to his relatives; he is permitted to the relatives of the older woman, and the older woman is forbidden to his relatives.

גְּמָ׳ הָאוֹמֵר לְאִשָּׁה קִדַּשְׁתִּיךְ וְכוּ׳. וּצְרִיכָא, דְּאִי אַשְׁמְעִינַן גַּבֵּיהּ דִּידֵיהּ, מִשּׁוּם דְּגַבְרָא לָא אִיכְפַּת לֵיהּ וּמִיקְּרֵי אָמַר.

GEMARA: The mishna taught that with regard to one who says to a woman: I betrothed you, and she denies his claim, he is forbidden to her relatives while she remains permitted to his. The mishna then provides several examples illustrating the same principle. The Gemara comments: And it is necessary for the mishna to specify all these cases. The Gemara elaborates: As, had the mishna taught us the halakha only with regard to himself, i.e., the case where he claims to have betrothed the woman, one might have said that he is not deemed credible at all, because a man does not care if he happens to say that he betrothed a woman even if he did not do so, as he can betroth another woman.

אֲבָל אִיהִי, אֵימָא: אִי לָאו דְּקִים לַהּ בְּדִיבּוּרַהּ, לָא הֲוָת אָמְרָה, וְלִיתְּסַר אִיהוּ בִּקְרוֹבוֹתֶיהָ, קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן.

But in a case where she claims to have been betrothed by him, one might say that if her statement was not certain to her she would not have said it. Since her claim that he betrothed her renders her forbidden to everyone else, it is likely that it is true, and therefore one might think that he should also be forbidden to her relatives on the basis of this assumption. The mishna therefore teaches us that this is not the case.

״קִידַּשְׁתִּיךְ״ וְהִיא אוֹמֶרֶת וְכוּ׳. הָא תּוּ לְמָה לִי? אִיצְטְרִיךְ, סָלְקָא דַּעְתָּךְ אָמֵינָא: מִדְּאוֹרָיְיתָא הֵימְנֵיהּ רַחֲמָנָא לְאָב, מִדְּרַבָּנַן הֵימְנוּהָ לְדִידַהּ וְתִיתְּסַר בְּרַתַּהּ בְּדִיבּוּרַהּ, קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן.

Likewise, with regard to one who says: I betrothed you, and she says: You betrothed only my daughter, in which case he is forbidden to her relatives but she is permitted to his, the Gemara asks: Why do I need this as well? The principle has already been established. The Gemara answers: It was necessary to state this case too, as it might enter your mind to say: Since by Torah law, the Merciful One deems credible a father who claims to have betrothed his daughter to a particular person, perhaps the Sages deem a mother credible by rabbinic law, and therefore her daughter should be forbidden based on her statement. The mishna therefore teaches us that a mother is not believed with regard to her daughter.

״קִידַּשְׁתִּי אֶת בִּתִּךְ״ וְכוּ׳. הָא תּוּ לְמָה לִי? אַיְּידֵי דִּתְנָא הָא, תְּנָא נָמֵי הָא.

The Gemara continues this line of questioning. With regard to the case where a man says: I betrothed your daughter, and she replies: You betrothed only me, why do I need this as well? What novelty is taught in this case? The Gemara answers: Since the mishna taught this other case, of a man claiming he betrothed a woman and the woman replying that it was her daughter, it also taught this last case, so that it mentions all the permutations, despite the fact that this particular case provides no novelty.

אִיתְּמַר, רַב אָמַר: כּוֹפִין, וּשְׁמוּאֵל אָמַר: מְבַקְּשִׁין. אַהֵיָיא? אִילֵּימָא אַרֵישָׁא – לָאו ״כּוֹפִין״ אִיכָּא וְלָא ״מְבַקְּשִׁין״ אִיכָּא! אֶלָּא אַסֵּיפָא.

§ It was stated that amora’im disagreed over how the court should proceed in practice with regard to the cases described in the mishna. Rav says: The court forces the man to give her a bill of divorce, and Shmuel says: The court requests that he give a bill of divorce. The Gemara asks: With regard to which case of the mishna is this referring? If we say it is referring to the first clause, where he says: I betrothed you, and she replies: You did not betroth me, no ruling of: The court forces, is relevant here, nor is the ruling: The court requests, relevant. Since she is permitted to marry even his relatives, she is certainly permitted to marry anyone else. Why, then, would it be necessary for him to give her a bill of divorce? Rather, the dispute applies to the latter clause of the mishna, where he denies her claim that he betrothed her. To allow her to marry somebody else, the court either forces or requests of him to give her a bill of divorce.

בִּשְׁלָמָא ״מְבַקְּשִׁין״ – לְחַיֵּי, אֶלָּא ״כּוֹפִין״ אַמַּאי?! אָמַר: לָא נִיחָא לִי דְּאִיתְּסַר בְּקָרִיבֶיהָ.

The Gemara asks: Granted, according to the opinion that the court requests that he give a bill of divorce, it is well. Since she has rendered herself forbidden to everyone, one can ask him to release her. But why should the court force him to issue a bill of divorce? Can’t he say: It is not satisfactory for me to be forbidden to her relatives? His giving her a bill of divorce is an admission that he betrothed her, which means that he may not marry her relatives.

אֶלָּא: שְׁמַעְתָּתָא אַהֲדָדֵי אִיתְּמַר, אָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל: מְבַקְּשִׁין מִמֶּנּוּ לִיתֵּן גֵּט. אָמַר רַב: אִם נָתַן גֵּט מֵעַצְמוֹ – כּוֹפִין אוֹתוֹ לִיתֵּן כְּתוּבָּה.

Rather, the Gemara offers a different explanation: These halakhot were stated together, as follows: Shmuel says that the court requests of him to give a bill of divorce. Rav says: If he gave a bill of divorce of his own accord, without being asked to do so but merely in response to her claim, the court forces him to give her payment for her marriage contract as well. By giving her a bill of divorce of his own volition, he has effectively admitted that he betrothed her, despite the fact that he has not said so explicitly. Consequently, he must also provide her with payment for her marriage contract.

אִיתְּמַר נָמֵי: אָמַר רַב אַחָא בַּר אַדָּא אָמַר רַב, וְאָמְרִי לַהּ אָמַר רַב אַחָא בַּר אַדָּא אָמַר רַב הַמְנוּנָא אָמַר רַב: כּוֹפִין וּמְבַקְּשִׁין. תַּרְתֵּי?! הָכִי קָאָמַר: מְבַקְּשִׁין מִמֶּנּוּ לִיתֵּן גֵּט, וְאִם נָתַן מֵעַצְמוֹ – כּוֹפִין אוֹתוֹ לִיתֵּן כְּתוּבָּה.

It was also stated: Rav Aḥa bar Adda says that Rav says, and some say Rav Aḥa bar Adda says that Rav Hamnuna says that Rav says: The court forces him and requests of him. The Gemara expresses puzzlement at this statement: How can these two statements be reconciled? Rather, it must be that this is what Rav Aḥa bar Adda is saying: The court requests of him to give a bill of divorce, and if he gave a bill of divorce of his own accord the court forces him to give her payment for her marriage contract.

אָמַר רַב יְהוּדָה: הַמְקַדֵּשׁ בְּעֵד אֶחָד – אֵין חוֹשְׁשִׁין לְקִידּוּשָׁיו. בְּעוֹ מִינֵּיהּ מֵרַב יְהוּדָה: שְׁנֵיהֶם מוֹדִים, מַאי? אִין וְלָא וְרַפְיָא בִּידֵיהּ. אִיתְּמַר, אָמַר רַב נַחְמָן אָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל: הַמְקַדֵּשׁ בְּעֵד אֶחָד – אֵין חוֹשְׁשִׁין לְקִידּוּשָׁיו, וַאֲפִילּוּ שְׁנֵיהֶם מוֹדִים.

§ Rav Yehuda says: With regard to one who betroths another with, i.e., in the presence of, one witness, one need not be concerned that his betrothal has taken effect. The students raised a dilemma before Rav Yehuda: If both the man and the woman concede that it was a betrothal, what is the halakha? Is the betrothal valid? Rav Yehuda did not provide a clear answer. He said: Yes and no, and the matter was uncertain to him. It was stated that amora’im discussed this point. Rav Naḥman says that Shmuel says: With regard to one who betroths a woman with one witness, one need not be concerned that his betrothal has taken effect, and this is the halakha even if both parties concede that there was a betrothal.

אֵיתִיבֵיהּ רָבָא לְרַב נַחְמָן: הָאוֹמֵר לְאִשָּׁה ״קִדַּשְׁתִּיךְ״ וְהִיא אוֹמֶרֶת ״לֹא קִדַּשְׁתַּנִי״ – הוּא אָסוּר בִּקְרוֹבוֹתֶיהָ וְהִיא מוּתֶּרֶת בִּקְרוֹבָיו. אִי דְּאִיכָּא עֵדִים – אַמַּאי מוּתֶּרֶת בִּקְרוֹבָיו? וְאִי דְּלֵיכָּא עֵדִים – אַמַּאי אָסוּר בִּקְרוֹבוֹתֶיהָ? אֶלָּא לָאו בְּעֵד אֶחָד!

Rava raised an objection to the opinion of Rav Naḥman from the mishna: With regard to one who says to a woman: I betrothed you, and she says: You did not betroth me, he is forbidden to her relatives and she is permitted to his relatives. Rava proceeds to analyze the exact circumstances of this case. If the case is one where there are witnesses, why is she permitted to his relatives? It is a full-fledged betrothal performed in the presence of witnesses. And if there are no witnesses at all, why is he forbidden to her relatives without any testimony to that effect? Rather, is it not referring to a case where there was one witness?

הָכָא בְּמַאי עָסְקִינַן – כְּגוֹן דַּאֲמַר לַהּ ״קִידַּשְׁתִּיךְ בִּפְנֵי פְּלוֹנִי וּפְלוֹנִי״, וְהָלְכוּ לָהֶם לִמְדִינַת הַיָּם.

The Gemara answers: Here we are dealing with a case where he said to her: I betrothed you in the presence of so-and-so and so-and-so, i.e., there were two witnesses, but they went overseas and there is no way of clarifying what really occurred. Consequently, there are only the conflicting accounts of the man and woman, and therefore he is prohibited from marrying her relatives while she is permitted to marry his.

אֵיתִיבֵיהּ: הַמְגָרֵשׁ אֶת אִשְׁתּוֹ וְלָנָה עִמּוֹ בְּפוּנְדְּקִי, בֵּית שַׁמַּאי אוֹמְרִים: אֵינָהּ צְרִיכָה הֵימֶנּוּ גֵּט שֵׁנִי, וּבֵית הִלֵּל אוֹמְרִים: צְרִיכָה הֵימֶנּוּ גֵּט שֵׁנִי. הֵיכִי דָּמֵי? אִי דְּאִיכָּא עֵדִים – מַאי טַעְמַיְיהוּ דְּבֵית שַׁמַּאי? וְאִי דְּלֵיכָּא עֵדִים – מַאי טַעְמַיְיהוּ דְּבֵית הִלֵּל? אֶלָּא לָאו בְּעֵד אֶחָד!

Rava raised an objection to the opinion of Rav Naḥman from a mishna (Eduyyot 4:7): If one divorces his wife, and she subsequently lodged with him in an inn, Beit Shammai say: She does not require a second bill of divorce from him, and Beit Hillel say: She requires a second bill of divorce from him. The Gemara clarifies: What are the circumstances of this case? If there are witnesses who saw them engage in sexual intercourse for the purpose of betrothal, what is the reason that Beit Shammai do not require a second bill of divorce? If there are no witnesses, what is the reason that Beit Hillel require a second bill of divorce? Rather, is it not referring to a case where there was one witness who saw them engage in intercourse for the purpose of betrothal?

וְלִיטַעְמָיךְ, אֵימָא סֵיפָא: וּמוֹדִים בְּנִתְגָּרְשָׁה מִן הָאֵירוּסִין שֶׁאֵין צְרִיכָה הֵימֶנּוּ גֵּט שֵׁנִי, מִפְּנֵי שֶׁאֵין לִבּוֹ גַּס בָּהּ. וְאִי סָלְקָא דַעְתָּךְ עֵד אֶחָד מְהֵימַן – מָה לִי מִן הָאֵירוּסִין, מָה לִי מִן הַנִּשּׂוּאִין?

Rav Naḥman responds: And according to your reasoning, that there was one witness, say the latter clause of that mishna: And Beit Hillel concede with regard to a woman who was divorced after betrothal that she does not require a second bill of divorce from him, due to the fact that he is not accustomed to her. Since he had not previously been intimate with her, there is no concern that they engaged in intercourse, even though they lodged together at the inn. And if it enters your mind that one witness is deemed credible in this case, what difference is it to me whether it was after her betrothal, and what difference is it to me if it occurred after her marriage?

אֶלָּא, הָכָא בְּמַאי עָסְקִינַן – כְּגוֹן דְּאִיכָּא עֵדֵי יִחוּד וְלֵיכָּא עֵדֵי בִיאָה. בֵּית שַׁמַּאי סָבְרִי: לָא

Rather, it is clear that the mishna is not referring to when there is one witness, and here we are dealing with a case where there are witnesses to their seclusion, but there are no witnesses to their engaging in intercourse. The dispute is based on the implications of this seclusion. Beit Shammai hold: One does not

אָמְרִינַן הֵן הֵן עֵדֵי יִחוּד, הֵן הֵן עֵדֵי בִיאָה. וּבֵית הִלֵּל סָבְרִי: אָמְרִינַן הֵן הֵן עֵדֵי יִחוּד, הֵן הֵן עֵדֵי בִיאָה. וּמוֹדִים וַדַּאי בְּנִתְגָּרְשָׁה מִן הָאֵירוּסִין, דְּלָא אָמְרִינַן הֵן הֵן עֵדֵי יִחוּד הֵן הֵן עֵדֵי בִיאָה, מִפְּנֵי שֶׁאֵין לִבּוֹ גַּס בָּהּ.

say: These are the witnesses of seclusion, these are the witnesses of intercourse. According to Beit Shammai, although there are witnesses that they were secluded, this is not considered to be tantamount to testimony that they engaged in intercourse. And Beit Hillel hold: We do say that these are the witnesses of seclusion, these are the witnesses of intercourse. Since it is assumed that they engaged in intercourse, she is required to obtain a second bill of divorce from him. And Beit Hillel concede to Beit Shammai that certainly in the case of a woman divorced from betrothal, that we do not say that these are the witnesses of seclusion, these are the witnesses of intercourse, because he is not accustomed to her.

אָמַר רַב יִצְחָק בַּר שְׁמוּאֵל בַּר מָרְתָא מִשְּׁמֵיהּ דְרַב: הַמְקַדֵּשׁ בְּעֵד אֶחָד – אֵין חוֹשְׁשִׁין לְקִידּוּשָׁיו, וַאֲפִילּוּ שְׁנֵיהֶם מוֹדִים. אָמַר רַבָּה בַּר רַב הוּנָא: הַמְקַדֵּשׁ בְּעֵד אֶחָד, בֵּי דִינָא רַבָּה אָמְרִי: אֵין חוֹשְׁשִׁין לְקִידּוּשָׁיו. מַאן בֵּי דִינָא רַבָּה? רַב. וְאִיכָּא דְּאָמְרִי: אָמַר רַבָּה בַּר רַב הוּנָא אָמַר רַב. הַמְקַדֵּשׁ בְּעֵד אֶחָד, בֵּי דִינָא רַבָּה אָמְרִי: אֵין חוֹשְׁשִׁין לְקִידּוּשָׁיו. מַאן בֵּי דִינָא רַבָּה – רַבִּי.

Rav Yitzḥak bar Shmuel bar Marta says in the name of Rav: With regard to one who betroths a woman with one witness, one need not be concerned that his betrothal has taken effect, and this is the halakha even if the man and woman both concede that there was a betrothal. Rabba bar Rav Huna says: With regard to one who betroths a woman with one witness, the Great Court says that one need not be concerned that his betrothal has taken effect. The Gemara asks: Who is the Great Court? Rav. And there are those who say a different version of this discussion. Rabba bar Rav Huna said that Rav said: With regard to one who betroths a woman with one witness, the Great Court says that one need not be concerned that his betrothal has taken effect. Who is the Great Court? Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi.

מֵתִיב רַב אַחָדְבוּי בַּר אַמֵּי: שְׁנַיִם שֶׁבָּאוּ מִמְּדִינַת הַיָּם וְאִשָּׁה עִמָּהֶם וַחֲבִילָה עִמָּהֶם, זֶה אוֹמֵר: זוֹ אִשְׁתִּי, וְזֶה עַבְדִּי, וְזוֹ חֲבִילָתִי, וְזֶה אוֹמֵר: זוֹ אִשְׁתִּי, וְזֶה עַבְדִּי, וְזוֹ חֲבִילָתִי. וְאִשָּׁה אוֹמֶרֶת: אֵלּוּ שְׁנֵי עֲבָדַי, וַחֲבִילָה שֶׁלִּי – צְרִיכָה שְׁנֵי גִיטִּין, וְגוֹבָה כְּתוּבָּתָהּ מִן הַחֲבִילָה.

Rav Aḥadvoi bar Ami raises an objection from the following baraita: There were two men who came from overseas and a woman was with them, and they had a bundle with them. This man says: This is my wife, and this other man is my slave, and this is my bundle. And this second man says: This is my wife, and this other man is my slave, and this is my bundle. And the woman says: These are my two slaves and this is my bundle. In this case she requires two bills of divorce, as with each of them there is uncertainty concerning whether she is married to him, and she collects payment of her marriage contract from the bundle. Even according to their claims that she is married to one of them, now that they have each divorced her she is at least entitled to payment of her marriage contract from the bundle.

הֵיכִי דָמֵי? אִי דְּאִית לֵיהּ סָהֲדֵי לְהַאי וְאִית לֵיהּ סָהֲדֵי לְהַאי, מִי מָצְיָ[א] אַמְרַהּ: אֵלּוּ שְׁנֵי עֲבָדַי וַחֲבִילָה שֶׁלִּי? אֶלָּא לָאו בְּעֵד אֶחָד!

Rav Aḥadvoi’s objection is as follows: What are the circumstances of this case? If the baraita is referring to a case where this man has two witnesses supporting his claim and that man has two witnesses supporting his claim, can the woman say: These are my two slaves, and this is my bundle? After all, there are two witnesses that one of the men is her husband. Rather, is it not referring to a case where each of the men has only one witness? This proves that a betrothal performed in the presence of a single witness is effective, as she requires a bill of divorce from each of them.

וְתִסְבְּרַאּ? עֵד אֶחָד בְּהַכְחָשָׁה מִי מְהֵימַן? אֶלָּא: לְמִישְׁרֵי לְעָלְמָא, דְּכוּלֵּי עָלְמָא לָא פְּלִיגִי דִּשְׁרֵי,

The Gemara rejects this opinion: And how can you understand it that way? In a situation involving one witness in the face of contradicting testimony, as in the case here, where another witness claims she is betrothed to the second man, is a single witness deemed credible at all? Rather, one must understand this case as follows: Everyone agrees that with regard to permitting her to marry all other people, she is permitted even without a bill of divorce.

וְהָכָא הָכִי קָאָמַר: צְרִיכָה שְׁנֵי גִיטִּין – כְּדֵי לִגְבּוֹת כְּתוּבָּתָהּ מִן הַחֲבִילָה. וְרַבִּי מֵאִיר הִיא, דְּאָמַר מִטַּלְטְלֵי מִשְׁתַּעְבְּדִי לִכְתוּבָּה.

And here, this is what the baraita is saying: She requires two bills of divorce in order to collect payment of her marriage contract from the bundle. And this ruling is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, who says: Even movable property, not only land, is subject to a lien for payment of a marriage contract. Consequently, to collect from this bundle, which has three claimants, the woman must receive a bill of divorce from both men, thereby obligating them to give her payment of a marriage contract.

מַאי הָוֵי עֲלַהּ? רַב כָּהֲנָא אָמַר: אֵין חוֹשְׁשִׁין לְקִידּוּשָׁיו. רַב פָּפָּא אָמַר: חוֹשְׁשִׁין לְקִדּוּשָׁיו. אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַב אָשֵׁי לְרַב כָּהֲנָא: מַאי דַּעְתָּיךְ – דְּיָלְפַתְּ ״דָּבָר״ ״דָּבָר״ מִמָּמוֹן?

The Gemara asks: What conclusion was reached about the case of one who betroths another in the presence of one witness? Rav Kahana said: One need not be concerned that his betrothal has taken effect. Rav Pappa said: One need be concerned that his betrothal has taken effect. Rav Ashi said to Rav Kahana: What is your opinion that leads you to claim that there is no concern that his betrothal has taken effect? It must be that you derive it by means of a verbal analogy from the word “matter” written with regard to forbidden sexual intercourse and the word matter written with regard to monetary matters. The Torah states concerning one who desires to divorce his wife: “Because he has found some unseemly matter in her” (Deuteronomy 24:1), a reference to adulterous intercourse, and with regard to monetary matters it states: “At the mouths of two witnesses, or at the mouths of three witnesses, shall a matter be established” (Deuteronomy 19:15).

אִי מָה לְהַלָּן הוֹדָאַת בַּעַל דִּין כְּמֵאָה עֵדִים דָּמֵי, אַף כָּאן הוֹדָאַת בַּעַל דִּין כְּמֵאָה עֵדִים דָּמֵי. אֲמַר לֵיהּ: הָתָם לָא קָא חָיֵיב לְאַחֲרִינֵי, הָכָא קָא חָיֵיב לְאַחֲרִינֵי.

Rav Ashi asks: But if so, just as there, with regard to monetary matters, the legal status of the admission of a litigant is similar to that of one hundred witnesses and it renders him liable, so too here, the admission of a litigant should be similar to that of one hundred witnesses. This would mean that if the man and woman both admit to the betrothal, they should be liable to bear the consequences of this claim. Rav Kahana said to him: There is a difference between the two cases. There, with regard to one who admits that he owes money, he does not act to the detriment of another, whereas here, he acts to the detriment of another, as their confessions render them forbidden to each other’s relatives, which means that their claims affect others as well.

מָר זוּטְרָא וְרַב אַדָּא סָבָא בְּנֵי דְּרַב מָרִי בַּר אִיסּוּר פְּלוּג נִיכְסַיְיהוּ בַּהֲדֵי הֲדָדֵי. אֲתוֹ לְקַמֵּיהּ דְּרַב אָשֵׁי, אֲמַרוּ לֵיהּ: ״עַל פִּי שְׁנֵי עֵדִים״ אָמַר רַחֲמָנָא, דְּאִי בָּעֵי לְמִיהְדַּר לָא מָצוּ הָדְרִי בְּהוּ, וַאֲנַן לָא הָדְרִי,

The Gemara relates: Mar Zutra and Rav Adda the Elder, the sons of Rav Mari bar Issur, divided their shared property between them. They came before Rav Ashi and said to him that they had the following dilemma. The Merciful One states: “At the mouths of two witnesses, or at the mouths of three witnesses, shall a matter be established” (Deuteronomy 19:15). Why do we say that two witnesses are required? So that if the parties involved wish to retract from their agreement and say that it never happened, they cannot retract from their agreement. And as we will not retract from our agreement, we do not require witnesses to establish our division of the property.

אוֹ דִלְמָא לָא מִקַּיְימָא מִלְּתָא אֶלָּא בְּסָהֲדֵי? אֲמַר לְהוּ: לָא אִיבְּרוֹ סָהֲדֵי אֶלָּא לְשַׁקָּרֵי.

Or perhaps the matter is established only through witnesses. In other words, perhaps the witnesses do not merely provide proof that the division occurred, but they are a constitutive factor in its establishment from a legal perspective. Rav Ashi said to them: Witnesses were created only for liars, and they are not needed to establish the matter. If no one denies the transaction, it remains in effect.

אָמַר אַבָּיֵי: אָמַר לוֹ עֵד אֶחָד ״אָכַלְתָּ חֵלֶב״, וְהַלָּה שׁוֹתֵק – נֶאֱמָן. וְתַנָּא תּוּנָא: אָמַר לוֹ עֵד אֶחָד ״אָכַלְתָּ חֵלֶב״ וְהַלָּה אוֹמֵר ״לֹא אָכַלְתִּי״ – פָּטוּר. טַעְמָא דְּאָמַר ״לֹא״, הָא אִישְׁתִּיק – מְהֵימַן.

§ With regard to a related issue, Abaye says: If one witness says to someone: You ate forbidden fat, and that one, the subject of the testimony, remains silent and does not deny it, the witness is deemed credible and the person in question must bring a sin-offering for his sin. And the tanna of the mishna also taught (Karetot 11b): If one witness said to someone: You ate forbidden fat, and that person says: I did not eat it, he is exempt from bringing an offering. One can infer from this that the reason he is exempt is only because he said definitively: I did not eat, which indicates that if he was silent, the witness is deemed credible.

וְאָמַר אַבָּיֵי: אָמַר לוֹ עֵד אֶחָד ״נִטְמְאוּ טׇהֳרוֹתֶיךָ״, וְהַלָּה שׁוֹתֵק – נֶאֱמָן. וְתַנָּא תּוּנָא: עֵד אֶחָד אוֹמֵר ״נִטְמְאוּ״ וְהַלָּה אוֹמֵר ״לֹא נִטְמְאוּ״ – פָּטוּר. טַעְמָא דְּאָמַר לֹא, הָא אִישְׁתִּיק – מְהֵימַן.

And Abaye says that if one witness says to someone: Your ritually pure food was rendered impure, and that person remained silent, the witness is deemed credible. And the tanna of the mishna also taught (Karetot 12a): If one witness said to someone: Your ritually pure food was rendered impure, and that person says: It was not rendered impure, he is exempt. The reason he is exempt is only because he said definitively that his food was not rendered ritually impure, which indicates that if he was silent, the witness is deemed credible.

וְאָמַר אַבָּיֵי: אָמַר לוֹ עֵד אֶחָד

And Abaye further says that if one witness says to someone: