קידושין סו

קידושין סו

״שׁוֹרְךָ נִרְבַּע״ וְהַלָּה שׁוֹתֵק – נֶאֱמָן, וְתַנָּא תּוּנָא: וְשֶׁנֶּעֶבְדָה בּוֹ עֲבֵירָה, וְשֶׁהֵמִית עַל פִּי עֵד אֶחָד אוֹ עַל פִּי הַבְּעָלִים – נֶאֱמָן. הַאי ״עַל פִּי עֵד אֶחָד״, הֵיכִי דָמֵי? אִי דְּקָא מוֹדוּ בְּעָלִים, הַיְינוּ ״עַל פִּי הַבְּעָלִים״, אֶלָּא לָאו דְּשָׁתֵיק?

Your ox was used by a man for an act of bestiality and is therefore unfit for an offering, and the other, the owner of the ox, is silent, the witness is deemed credible. And the tanna of the mishna also taught (Bekhorot 41a): And with regard to an animal that was used for a transgression or that killed, if this is attested to by one witness or by the owner, he is deemed credible. The Gemara clarifies this case: What are the circumstances of this case of the mishna, where the knowledge is established by one witness? If the owner admits to the claim, this is the same as: By the owner. Rather, is it not referring to a case where the owner remains silent?

וּצְרִיכָא, דְּאִי אַשְׁמְעִינַן הָךְ קַמַּיְיתָא, אִי לָאו דְּקִים לֵיהּ בְּנַפְשֵׁיהּ דַּעֲבַד – חוּלִּין בַּעֲזָרָה לָא הֲוָה מַיְיתֵי.

The Gemara comments: And each of these statements of Abaye is necessary. As, had he taught us only that first case, where the witness said someone ate forbidden fat, one might have said that he is deemed credible for the following reason: Were it not for the fact that he himself was convinced that he had committed a transgression, he would not commit the transgression of bringing a non-sacred animal to the Temple courtyard on the basis of the testimony of one witness. Consequently, his silence is evidently an admission.

אֲבָל ״נִטְמְאוּ טׇהֳרוֹתֶיךָ״ – מֵימָר אָמְרִינַן: הַאי דְּשָׁתֵיק – דְּסָבַר, חֲזֵי לֵיהּ בִּימֵי טוּמְאָתוֹ.

But if the witness said: Your ritually pure foods were rendered ritually impure, and the accused was silent, we would say: The reason that he is silent and refrains from denying the claim is that he thinks he is not suffering any significant loss, as the food is fit for him to eat on his days of ritual impurity, because he is not required to destroy ritually impure foods.

וְאִי אַשְׁמְעִינַן הָא, מִשּׁוּם דְּקָא מַפְסֵיד לֵיהּ בִּימֵי טׇהֳרָתוֹ, אֲבָל ״שׁוֹרוֹ נִרְבַּע״ מֵימָר אָמַר: כֹּל השְׁווֹרִים לָאו לְגַבֵּי מִזְבֵּחַ קָיְימִי, צְרִיכָא.

And had Abaye taught us only the case of: Your ritually pure food was rendered ritually impure, one might have said that the reason this witness is deemed credible is that he causes him a loss on his days of ritual purity, and therefore his silence is tantamount to a confession. But in the case of: His ox was used by a man for an act of bestiality, the owner of the ox can say with regard to his animal: Not all the oxen stand ready to be sacrificed as an offering on the altar. Perhaps one would think that the owner does not bother denying the claim because he merely forfeits the possibility of sacrificing his ox as an offering, which he considers an inconsequential matter. It is only if there were two witnesses to the act that the animal is put to death, whereas here there was only one witness. It is therefore necessary for Abaye to specify all these cases.

אִיבַּעְיָא לְהוּ: אִשְׁתּוֹ זִינְּתָה בְּעַד אֶחָד וְשׁוֹתֵק, מַהוּ? אָמַר אַבָּיֵי: נֶאֱמָן. רָבָא אָמַר: אֵינוֹ נֶאֱמָן. הָוֵי דָּבָר שֶׁבְּעֶרְוָה, וְאֵין דָּבָר שֶׁבְּעֶרְוָה פָּחוֹת מִשְּׁנַיִם.

§ A dilemma was raised before the Sages: If a husband is told by one witness that his wife committed adultery, and the husband remains silent, what is the halakha? Abaye said: The witness is deemed credible. Rava said: He is not deemed credible. Why not? Because it is a matter involving forbidden relations, and there is no matter of testimony for forbidden sexual relations that can be attested to by fewer than two witnesses.

אָמַר אַבָּיֵי: מְנָא אָמֵינָא לַהּ, דְּהָהוּא סַמְיָא דַּהֲוָה מְסַדַּר מַתְנְיָיתָא קַמֵּיהּ דְּמָר שְׁמוּאֵל. יוֹמָא חַד נְגַהּ לֵיהּ וְלָא הֲוָה קָאָתֵי. שַׁדַּר שְׁלִיחָא אַבָּתְרֵיהּ. אַדְּאָזֵיל שְׁלִיחַ בַּחֲדָא אוֹרְחָא, אֲתָא אִיהוּ בַּחֲדָא. כִּי אֲתָא שָׁלִיחַ, אָמַר: אִשְׁתּוֹ זִינְּתָה. אֲתָא לְקַמֵּיהּ דְּמָר שְׁמוּאֵל, אֲמַר לֵיהּ: אִי מְהֵימַן לָךְ – זִיל אַפְּקַהּ, וְאִי לָא – לָא תַּפֵּיק.

Abaye said: From where do I say this claim of mine? It happened that there was a certain blind man who would review mishnayot before Mar Shmuel. One day the blind man was late for him and was not arriving. Mar Shmuel sent a messenger after him to assist him. While the messenger was going to the blind man’s house by one way, the blind man arrived at the house of study by a different route, and therefore the messenger missed him and reached his house. When the messenger came back, he said that he had been to the blind man’s house and saw that his wife committed adultery. The blind man came before Mar Shmuel to inquire whether he must pay heed to this testimony. Mar Shmuel said to him: If this messenger is trusted by you, go and divorce her, but if not, do not divorce her.

מַאי לָאו אִי מְהֵימַן עֲלָךְ דְּלָאו גַּזְלָנָא הוּא? וְרָבָא: אִי מְהֵימַן לָךְ כְּבֵי תְרֵי – זִיל אַפְּקַהּ, וְאִי לָא – לָא תַּפְּקַהּ.

Abaye comments: What, is it not correct to say that this means that if he is trusted by you that he is not a thief but is a valid witness, you must rely on him? This would prove that a single witness can testify in a case of this kind. And Rava explains that Mar Shmuel meant: If he is trusted by you like two witnesses, go and divorce her, but if not, do not divorce her. Consequently, Rava maintains that this episode affords no proof.

וְאָמַר אַבָּיֵי: מְנָא אָמֵינָא לַהּ, דְּתַנְיָא: מַעֲשֶׂה בִּינַאי הַמֶּלֶךְ שֶׁהָלַךְ לְכוּחְלִית שֶׁבַּמִּדְבָּר, וְכִיבֵּשׁ שָׁם שִׁשִּׁים כְּרַכִּים, וּבַחֲזָרָתוֹ הָיָה שָׂמֵחַ שִׂמְחָה גְּדוֹלָה. וְקָרָא לְכׇל חַכְמֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל, אָמַר לָהֶם: אֲבוֹתֵינוּ הָיוּ אוֹכְלִים מְלוּחִים בִּזְמַן שֶׁהָיוּ עֲסוּקִים בְּבִנְיַן בֵּית הַמִּקְדָּשׁ, אַף אָנוּ נֹאכַל מְלוּחִים זֵכֶר לַאֲבוֹתֵינוּ. וְהֶעֱלוּ מְלוּחִים עַל שׁוּלְחָנוֹת שֶׁל זָהָב, וְאָכְלוּ.

And Abaye said: From where do I say this claim of mine? As it is taught in a baraita: An incident occurred with King Yannai, who went to the region of Koḥalit in the desert and conquered sixty cities there. And upon his return he rejoiced with a great happiness over his victory. And he subsequently summoned all the Sages of the Jewish people and said to them: Our ancestors in their poverty would eat salty foods when they were busy with the building of the Temple; we too shall eat salty foods in memory of our ancestors. And they brought salty food on tables of gold, and ate.

וְהָיָה שָׁם אֶחָד, אִישׁ לֵץ לֵב רַע וּבְלִיַּעַל, וְאֶלְעָזָר בֶּן פּוֹעֵירָה שְׁמוֹ. וַיֹּאמֶר אֶלְעָזָר בֶּן פּוֹעֵירָה לְיַנַּאי הַמֶּלֶךְ: יַנַּאי הַמֶּלֶךְ, לִבָּם שֶׁל פְּרוּשִׁים עָלֶיךָ. וּמָה אֶעֱשֶׂה? הָקֵם לָהֶם בַּצִּיץ שֶׁבֵּין עֵינֶיךָ. הֵקִים לָהֶם בַּצִּיץ שֶׁבֵּין עֵינָיו.

And there was one person present, a scoffer, a man of an evil heart and a scoundrel called Elazar ben Po’ira. And Elazar ben Po’ira said to King Yannai: King Yannai, the hearts of the Pharisees, the Sages, are against you. In other words, they harbor secret resentment against you and do not like you. The king replied: And what shall I do to clarify this matter? Elazar responded: Have them stand by wearing the frontplate between your eyes. Since the frontplate bears the Divine Name, they should stand in its honor. Yannai, who was a member of the priestly Hasmonean family, also served as High Priest, who wears the frontplate. He had the Pharisees stand by wearing the frontplate between his eyes.

הָיָה שָׁם זָקֵן אֶחָד וִיהוּדָה בֶּן גְּדִידְיָה שְׁמוֹ, וַיֹּאמֶר יְהוּדָה בֶּן גְּדִידְיָה לְיַנַּאי הַמֶּלֶךְ: יַנַּאי הַמֶּלֶךְ! רַב לְךָ כֶּתֶר מַלְכוּת, הַנַּח כֶּתֶר כְּהוּנָּה לְזַרְעוֹ שֶׁל אַהֲרֹן. שֶׁהָיוּ אוֹמְרִים: אִמּוֹ נִשְׁבֵּית בְּמוֹדִיעִים. וַיְבוּקַּשׁ הַדָּבָר וְלֹא נִמְצָא. וַיִּבָּדְלוּ חַכְמֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל בְּזַעַם.

Now there was a certain elder present called Yehuda ben Gedidya, and Yehuda ben Gedidya said to King Yannai: King Yannai, the crown of the monarchy suffices for you, i.e., you should be satisfied that you are king. Leave the crown of the priesthood for the descendants of Aaron. The Gemara explains this last comment: As they would say that Yannai’s mother was taken captive in Modi’in, and she was therefore disqualified from marrying into the priesthood, which meant that Yannai was a ḥalal. And the matter was investigated and was not discovered, i.e., they sought witnesses for that event but none were found. And the Sages of Israel were expelled in the king’s rage, due to this rumor.

וַיֹּאמֶר אֶלְעָזָר בֶּן פּוֹעֵירָה לְיַנַּאי הַמֶּלֶךְ: יַנַּאי הַמֶּלֶךְ, הֶדְיוֹט שֶׁבְּיִשְׂרָאֵל כָּךְ הוּא דִּינוֹ, וְאַתָּה מֶלֶךְ וְכֹהֵן גָּדוֹל כָּךְ הוּא דִּינָךְ? וּמָה אֶעֱשֶׂה? אִם אַתָּה שׁוֹמֵעַ לַעֲצָתִי: רוֹמְסֵם. וְתוֹרָה מָה תְּהֵא עָלֶיהָ? הֲרֵי כְּרוּכָה וּמוּנַּחַת בְּקֶרֶן זָוִית, כָּל הָרוֹצֶה לִלְמוֹד יָבוֹא וְיִלְמוֹד.

And Elazar ben Po’ira said to King Yannai: King Yannai, such is the judgment of a common person in Israel. In other words, merely expelling a slanderer is appropriate if the subject of the slander is a commoner. But you are a king and a High Priest. Is this your judgment as well? Yannai replied: And what should I do? Elazar responded: If you listen to my advice, crush them. Yannai countered: But what will become of the Torah? He retorted: Behold, it is wrapped and placed in the corner. Anyone who wishes to study can come and study. We have no need for the Sages.

אָמַר רַב נַחְמָן בַּר יִצְחָק: מִיָּד נִזְרְקָה בּוֹ מִינוּת, דַּהֲוָה לֵיהּ לְמֵימַר: תִּינַח תּוֹרָה שֶׁבִּכְתָב, תּוֹרָה שֶׁבְּעַל פֶּה מַאי? מִיָּד: וַתּוּצַץ הָרָעָה עַל יְדֵי אֶלְעָזָר בֶּן פּוֹעֵירָה, וַיֵּהָרְגוּ כׇּל חַכְמֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל, וְהָיָה הָעוֹלָם מִשְׁתּוֹמֵם, עַד שֶׁבָּא שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן שָׁטַח וְהֶחְזִיר אֶת הַתּוֹרָה לְיוֹשְׁנָהּ.

The Gemara interjects: Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak says: Immediately, heresy was injected into Yannai, as he should have said to Elazar ben Po’ira: This works out well with regard to the Written Torah, as it can be studied by all on their own, but what will become of the Oral Torah? The Oral Torah is transmitted only by the Sages. The baraita continues: Immediately, the evil arose and caught fire through Elazar ben Po’ira, and all the Sages of the Jewish people were killed. And the world was desolate of Torah until Shimon ben Shataḥ came and restored the Torah to its former glory. This completes the baraita.

הֵיכִי דָמֵי? אִילֵּימָא דְּבֵי תְרֵי אָמְרִי: ״אִישְׁתְּבַאי״ וּבֵי תְרֵי אָמְרִי: ״לָא אִישְׁתְּבַאי״ – מַאי חָזֵית דְּסָמְכַתְּ אַהָנֵי, סְמוֹךְ אַהָנֵי!

Abaye asks: What are the circumstances of this case? How did those who conducted the investigation refute the rumor that Yannai’s mother had been taken captive? If we say that two witnesses said that she was taken captive, and two others said that she was not taken captive, what did you see that you rely on these who said that she was not taken captive? Instead, rely on these who said that she was taken captive. In such a scenario, one cannot say definitively that the matter was investigated and found to be false.

אֶלָּא בְּעֵד אֶחָד, וְטַעְמָא דְּקָא מַכְחֲשִׁי לֵיהּ בֵּי תְרֵי, הָא לָאו הָכִי מְהֵימַן.

Rather, it must be referring to one witness who testified she was taken captive, and two testified that she was not taken captive. And the reason that the lone witness is not deemed credible is only that he is contradicted by the other two, from which it may be inferred that if not for that fact, he would be deemed credible. This supports Abaye’s claim that an uncontested lone witness is deemed credible in a case of this kind.

וְרָבָא: לְעוֹלָם תְּרֵי וּתְרֵי, וְכִדְאָמַר רַב אַחָא בַּר רַב מִנְיוֹמֵי: בְּעֵדֵי הֲזָמָה. הָכָא נָמֵי, בְּעֵדֵי הֲזָמָה.

And Rava could reply that this incident affords no proof, for the following reason: Actually, one can say that there were two witnesses who testified that she was captured and two who testified that she was not, and the case was decided in accordance with that which Rav Aḥa bar Rav Minyumi says in a different context, that it is referring to conspiring witnesses. The second pair of witnesses did not contradict the testimony of the first pair but established them as liars by stating that the first pair were not there to witness the event. This serves to disqualify the testimony of the first pair altogether. Here too, it is referring to witnesses who rendered the first set conspiring witnesses.

וְאִיבָּעֵית אֵימָא כִּדְרַבִּי יִצְחָק, דְּאָמַר רַבִּי יִצְחָק: שִׁפְחָה הִכְנִיסוּ תַּחְתֶּיהָ.

And if you wish, say that this is in accordance with the version of the story stated by Rabbi Yitzḥak, as Rabbi Yitzḥak says: They replaced Yannai’s mother with a maidservant. The first witnesses saw that Yannai’s mother was about to be taken captive, but the second pair revealed that she had actually been replaced with a maidservant, thereby negating the testimony of the first set.

אָמַר רָבָא:

Rava says:

מְנָא אָמֵינָא לַהּ, דִּתְנַן: אָמַר רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן: מַעֲשֶׂה בִּמְגוֹרָה שֶׁל דִּסְקִים בְּיַבְנֶה שֶׁהָיְתָה עוֹמֶדֶת בְּחֶזְקַת שְׁלֵימָה, וּמָדְדוּ וְנִמְצֵאת חֲסֵירָה –

From where do I say my claim that one does not rely on a lone witness in matters of forbidden relations? As we learned in a baraita: Rabbi Shimon said: An incident occurred with regard to a water reservoir of Diskim in Yavne, which had the presumptive status of being complete, i.e., they thought it contained forty se’a, the requisite amount for a ritual bath, and they measured it after a time and it was found to be deficient, as it contained less than that amount.

כׇּל טְהָרוֹת שֶׁנַּעֲשׂוּ עַל גַּבָּהּ הָיָה רַבִּי טַרְפוֹן מְטַהֵר, וְרַבִּי עֲקִיבָא מְטַמֵּא. אָמַר רַבִּי טַרְפוֹן: מִקְוֶה זֶה בְּחֶזְקַת שָׁלֵם הוּא עוֹמֵד, מִסָּפֵק אַתָּה בָּא לְחַסְּרוֹ – אַל תְּחַסְּרֶנּוּ מִסָּפֵק. אָמַר רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא: אָדָם זֶה בְּחֶזְקַת טָמֵא הוּא עוֹמֵד, מִסָּפֵק אַתָּה בָּא לְטַהֲרוֹ – אַל תְּטַהֲרֶנּוּ מִסָּפֵק.

With regard to all immersions of ritual purification performed in the reservoir before it was measured, Rabbi Tarfon would render them ritually pure, and Rabbi Akiva would render them ritually impure. The two Sages discussed the matter. Rabbi Tarfon said: This ritual bath retained the presumptive status of being whole throughout this period, and you are coming to declare it deficient in the past out of uncertainty. Do not deem it deficient out of uncertainty. Rabbi Akiva said in response: This person who immersed himself in that ritual bath retained the presumptive status of being ritually impure before he immersed. You are coming to purify him out of uncertainty. Do not deem him ritually pure out of uncertainty.

אָמַר רַבִּי טַרְפוֹן: מָשָׁל לְעוֹמֵד וּמַקְרִיב עַל גַּבֵּי הַמִּזְבֵּחַ, וְנוֹדַע שֶׁהוּא בֶּן גְּרוּשָׁה אוֹ בֶּן חֲלוּצָה, שֶׁעֲבוֹדָתוֹ כְּשֵׁירָה. אָמַר רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא: מָשָׁל לְעוֹמֵד וּמַקְרִיב עַל גַּבֵּי הַמִּזְבֵּחַ וְנוֹדַע שֶׁהוּא בַּעַל מוּם, שֶׁעֲבוֹדָתוֹ פְּסוּלָה.

Rabbi Tarfon said in response: There is a parable that illustrates this. A priest was standing and sacrificing offerings on the altar, and it became known that he is the son of a divorced woman or the son of a ḥalutza. The halakha is that his earlier service before this discovery remains valid. Rabbi Akiva said: A more accurate parable is that of a priest who was standing and sacrificing on the altar, and it became known that he is blemished. In this case, the halakha is that his earlier service is disqualified.

אָמַר רַבִּי טַרְפוֹן: אַתָּה דִּימִּיתוֹ לְבַעַל מוּם, וַאֲנִי דִּמִּיתִיו לְבֶן גְּרוּשָׁה אוֹ לְבֶן חֲלוּצָה, נִרְאֶה לְמִי דּוֹמֶה. אִי דּוֹמֶה לְבֶן גְּרוּשָׁה וּלְבֶן חֲלוּצָה – נְדוּנֶנּוּ כְּבֶן גְּרוּשָׁה אוֹ כְּבֶן חֲלוּצָה, אִם דּוֹמֶה לְבַעַל מוּם – נְדוּנֶנּוּ כְּבַעַל מוּם.

Rabbi Tarfon said: You compared the case of a ritual bath found to be deficient to that of a blemished priest, whereas I compared it to the case of the son of a divorced woman or the son of a ḥalutza. Let us see to which case it is similar. If this case is similar to that of the son of a divorced woman or the son of a ḥalutza, let us treat it like the case of the son of a divorced woman or the son of a ḥalutza; if it is similar to the case of a blemished priest, let us treat it like that of a blemished priest.

הִתְחִיל רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא לָדוּן: מִקְוֶה פְּסוּלוֹ בְּיָחִיד, וּבַעַל מוּם פְּסוּלוֹ בְּיָחִיד, וְאַל יוֹכִיחַ בֶּן גְּרוּשָׁה וּבֶן חֲלוּצָה שֶׁפְּסוּלוֹ בִּשְׁנַיִם.

Rabbi Akiva began to analyze the matter: The disqualification of a ritual bath is by the testimony of an individual, as witnesses are not required to establish that a ritual bath is deficient, and likewise the disqualification of a blemished priest with regard to performing the Temple service is by the testimony of an individual. And do not let the halakha of the son of a divorced woman or the son of a ḥalutza prove otherwise, as his disqualification is by the testimony of two witnesses. Two witnesses are required to testify about one’s mother to disqualify him from performing the Temple service; one is insufficient.

דָּבָר אַחֵר: מִקְוֶה פְּסוּלוֹ בְּגוּפוֹ, בַּעַל מוּם פְּסוּלוֹ בְּגוּפוֹ, וְאַל יוֹכִיחַ בֶּן גְּרוּשָׁה וּבֶן חֲלוּצָה שֶׁפְּסוּלוֹ מֵאֲחֵרִים. אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַבִּי טַרְפוֹן: עֲקִיבָא! כׇּל הַפּוֹרֵשׁ מִמְּךָ כְּפוֹרֵשׁ מִן הַחַיִּים.

Alternatively, one can say: The disqualification of a ritual bath is due to the bath itself, and similarly, the disqualification of a blemished priest is due to the priest himself. And do not let the halakha of the son of a divorced woman or the son of a ḥalutza prove otherwise, as his disqualification is due to others, i.e., through his mother. Rabbi Tarfon said to him: Akiva, anyone who separates from you, it is as though he has separated from life itself. Rabbi Tarfon was impressed by Rabbi Akiva’s explanation and accepted it. This concludes the baraita.

הַאי בַּעַל מוּם שֶׁפְּסוּלוֹ בְּיָחִיד הֵיכִי דָמֵי? אִי דְּקָא מַכְחֵישׁ לֵיהּ, מִי מְהֵימַן? אֶלָּא דְּשָׁתֵיק,

The Gemara returns to the topic at hand: What are the circumstances with regard to this blemished priest whose disqualification is by means of an individual witness? If the priest denies his claim, maintaining that he is not blemished, is a lone witness deemed credible? Rather, it must be that the priest remains silent and therefore is considered to have admitted to the accusation.

וְדִכְוָתֵיהּ גַּבֵּי בֶּן גְּרוּשָׁה וּבֶן חֲלוּצָה דְּשָׁתֵיק, וְקָתָנֵי: מִקְוֶה פְּסוּלוֹ בְּיָחִיד וּבַעַל מוּם פְּסוּלוֹ בְּיָחִיד, וְאַל יוֹכִיחַ בֶּן גְּרוּשָׁה וּבֶן חֲלוּצָה שֶׁפְּסוּלוֹ בִּשְׁנַיִם.

And similarly with regard to the son of a divorced woman or the son of a ḥalutza, it must also be referring to one who is silent, and yet the baraita teaches: The disqualification of a ritual bath is by the testimony of an individual, and likewise the disqualification of a blemished priest with regard to performing the Temple service is by the testimony of an individual. And do not let the halakha of the son of a divorced woman or the son of a ḥalutza prove otherwise, as his disqualification is by the testimony of two witnesses. This indicates that if the person under scrutiny himself remains silent, one witness is insufficient to disqualify him.

וְאַבָּיֵי אָמַר: לְעוֹלָם דְּקָא מַכְחֵישׁ לֵיהּ, וּדְקָאָמְרַתְּ: ׳אַמַּאי מְהֵימַן׳ – דְּאָמַר לֵיהּ: שְׁלַח אַחְוִי. וְהַיְינוּ דְּקָתָנֵי: מִקְוֶה פְּסוּלוֹ בְּגוּפוֹ וּבַעַל מוּם פְּסוּלוֹ בְּגוּפוֹ, וְאַל יוֹכִיחַ בֶּן גְּרוּשָׁה וּבֶן חֲלוּצָה שֶׁפְּסוּלוֹ מֵאֲחֵרִים.

And Abaye could have said in response to this proof: Actually, both cases deal with an individual who denies the witness’s testimony, and that which you said: Why is the witness deemed credible when he says that this priest is blemished, it is referring to a case where the witness said to him: Remove your clothes and show us that you are not blemished. Since this is a matter that can be investigated, the witness is deemed credible, because if he were lying the priest could prove it. And this explanation is consistent with that which the baraita teaches: The disqualification of a ritual bath is due to the bath itself, and similarly, the disqualification of a blemished priest is due to the priest himself, as he himself can be examined. And do not let the halakha of the son of a divorced woman or the son of a ḥalutza prove otherwise, as his disqualification is due to others.

וּבֶן גְּרוּשָׁה וּבֶן חֲלוּצָה דַּעֲבוֹדָתוֹ כְּשֵׁירָה, מְנָלַן? אָמַר רַב יְהוּדָה אָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל: דְּאָמַר קְרָא: ״וְהָיְתָה לּוֹ וּלְזַרְעוֹ אַחֲרָיו״ – בֵּין זֶרַע כָּשֵׁר וּבֵין זֶרַע פָּסוּל.

The Gemara asks a question with regard to the halakha of the baraita: And from where do we derive that the service of the son of a divorced woman or the son of a ḥalutza is valid after the fact? Rav Yehuda says that Shmuel says: As the verse states with regard to Pinehas the priest: “And it shall be for him and his seed after him the covenant of an everlasting priesthood” (Numbers 25:13), which includes both fit seed and unfit seed. This teaches that the service of a priest is valid after the fact even if he was disqualified.

אֲבוּהּ דִּשְׁמוּאֵל אָמַר: מֵהָכָא: ״בָּרֵךְ ה׳ חֵילוֹ וּפֹעַל יָדָיו תִּרְצֶה״ – אֲפִילּוּ חוּלִּין שֶׁבּוֹ תִּרְצֶה.

Shmuel’s father said that the proof text is from here: It states in the blessing of the tribe of Levi: “Bless, Lord, his substance [ḥeilo], and accept the work of his hands” (Deuteronomy 33:11). The word ḥeilo is expounded as including even the service of his profane ones [ḥullin], which God will accept after the fact.

רַבִּי יַנַּאי אָמַר: מֵהָכָא: ״וּבָאתָ אֶל הַכֹּהֵן אֲשֶׁר יִהְיֶה בַּיָּמִים הָהֵם״, וְכִי תַּעֲלֶה עַל דַּעְתְּךָ שֶׁאָדָם הוֹלֵךְ אֵצֶל כֹּהֵן שֶׁלֹּא הָיָה בְּיָמָיו? אֶלָּא זֶה כָּשֵׁר וְנִתְחַלֵּל.

Rabbi Yannai said: The source is from here, a verse stated with regard to first fruits: “And you shall come to the priest who shall be in those days” (Deuteronomy 26:3). But can it enter your mind that a person can come to a priest who is not alive in his days? What then is the meaning of the phrase “in those days”? Rather, this is referring to a fit priest who later became established as a ḥalal. All his previous days of service are considered those of a fit priest.

בַּעַל מוּם דַּעֲבוֹדָתוֹ פְּסוּלָה, מְנָלַן? אָמַר רַב יְהוּדָה אָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל: דְּאָמַר קְרָא: ״לָכֵן אֱמֹר הִנְנִי נֹתֵן לוֹ אֶת בְּרִיתִי שָׁלוֹם״ – כְּשֶׁהוּא שָׁלֵם וְלֹא כְּשֶׁהוּא חָסֵר. וְהָא ״שָׁלוֹם״ כְּתִיב! אָמַר רַב נַחְמָן: וָיו דְּשָׁלוֹם קְטִיעָה הִיא.

The Gemara continues its analysis of the baraita. From where do we derive that the service of a blemished priest is retroactively invalid? Rav Yehuda says that Shmuel says: As the verse states with regard to Pinehas: “Wherefore say: Behold, I give to him My covenant of peace [shalom]” (Numbers 25:12), which means that he receives the covenant when he is whole [shalem], but not when he is blemished and lacking a limb. The Gemara comments: But shalom is written, rather than shalem. Rav Naḥman says: The letter vav in the word shalom is severed. According to tradition, this letter is written with a break in it, and therefore the word can be read as though the vav were missing.

מַתְנִי׳ כׇּל מָקוֹם שֶׁיֵּשׁ קִידּוּשִׁין וְאֵין עֲבֵירָה – הַוָּלָד הוֹלֵךְ אַחַר הַזָּכָר. וְאֵיזֶה זוֹ – זוֹ כֹּהֶנֶת, לְוִיָּה, וְיִשְׂרְאֵלִית שֶׁנִּשְּׂאוּ לְכֹהֵן, לֵוִי, וְיִשְׂרָאֵל.

MISHNA: There is a principle with regard to the halakhot of lineage: Any case where there is betrothal, i.e., where the betrothal takes effect, and the marriage involves no transgression by Torah law, the lineage of the offspring follows the male, his father. And in which case is this applicable? For example, this is the case with regard to the daughter of a priest; or the daughter of a Levite; or the daughter of an Israelite, who married a priest, a Levite, or an Israelite. In all these cases the child’s lineage is established by his father’s family.

וְכׇל מָקוֹם שֶׁיֵּשׁ קִידּוּשִׁין וְיֵשׁ עֲבֵירָה – הַוָּלָד הוֹלֵךְ אַחַר הַפָּגוּם. וְאֵיזֶה זוֹ – זוֹ אַלְמָנָה לְכֹהֵן גָּדוֹל, גְּרוּשָׁה וַחֲלוּצָה לְכֹהֵן הֶדְיוֹט, מַמְזֶרֶת וּנְתִינָה לְיִשְׂרָאֵל, בַּת יִשְׂרָאֵל לְמַמְזֵר וּלְנָתִין.

And any case where there is a valid betrothal and yet there is a transgression, the offspring follows the flawed parent. And in which case is this applicable? For example, this is the case of a widow who is married to a High Priest, or a divorced woman or a ḥalutza who is married to a common priest, or a mamzeret or a Gibeonite woman who is married to an Israelite, or an Israelite woman who is married to a mamzer or to a Gibeonite. In these situations the child inherits the status of the blemished parent.

וְכׇל מִי שֶׁאֵין לָהּ עָלָיו קִידּוּשִׁין, אֲבָל יֵשׁ לָהּ עַל אֲחֵרִים קִידּוּשִׁין – הַוָּלָד מַמְזֵר. וְאֵיזֶה זֶה – זֶה הַבָּא עַל אַחַת מִכׇּל הָעֲרָיוֹת שֶׁבַּתּוֹרָה. וְכׇל מִי שֶׁאֵין לָהּ לֹא עָלָיו וְלֹא עַל אֲחֵרִים קִידּוּשִׁין – הַוָּלָד כְּמוֹתָהּ. וְאֵיזֶה זֶה – זֶה וְלַד שִׁפְחָה וְנׇכְרִית.

And in any case where a woman cannot join in betrothal with a particular man, as the betrothal does not take effect, but she can join in betrothal with others, i.e., the woman is considered a member of the Jewish people and can marry other Jews, in these cases the offspring is a mamzer. And in which case is this applicable? This is one who engages in intercourse with any one of those with whom relations are forbidden that are written in the Torah. And in any case where a woman cannot join in betrothal with him or with others, the offspring is like her. He is not considered his father’s son at all, but has the same status as his mother. And in which case is this applicable? This is the offspring of a Canaanite maidservant or a gentile woman, as her child is a slave or a gentile like her. If he converts, he is not a mamzer.

גְּמָ׳ כׇּל מָקוֹם שֶׁיֵּשׁ קִידּוּשִׁין. אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן לְרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: כְּלָלָא הוּא דְּכׇל מָקוֹם שֶׁיֵּשׁ קִידּוּשִׁין וְאֵין עֲבֵירָה הַוָּלָד הוֹלֵךְ אַחַר הַזָּכָר? הֲרֵי

GEMARA: The mishna teaches that any case where there is betrothal and the marriage involves no transgression, the lineage of the offspring follows the male. Rabbi Shimon said to Rabbi Yoḥanan: Is it an established principle that any case where there is betrothal and there is no transgression the offspring invariably follows the male? But