קידושין עט

קידושין עט

– שְׁנֵיהֶם נוֹתְנִים גֵּט. וְאִם רָצוּ – אֶחָד נוֹתֵן גֵּט, וְאֶחָד כּוֹנֵס.

both men who might have betrothed her give her a bill of divorce in order to render her permitted to marry someone else. And if they wish and agree between them, one gives a bill of divorce and the other marries her.

וְכֵן הָאִשָּׁה שֶׁנָּתְנָה רְשׁוּת לִשְׁלוּחָהּ לְקַדְּשָׁהּ, וְהָלְכָה וְקִדְּשָׁהּ אֶת עַצְמָהּ, אִם שֶׁלָּהּ קָדְמוּ – קִדּוּשֶׁיהָ קִידּוּשִׁין, וְאִם שֶׁל שְׁלוּחָהּ קָדְמוּ – קִידּוּשָׁיו קִידּוּשִׁין. וְאִם אֵינָן יוֹדְעִין – שְׁנֵיהֶם נוֹתְנִים לָהּ גֵּט, וְאִם רָצוּ – אֶחָד נוֹתֵן לָהּ גֵּט וְאֶחָד כּוֹנֵס.

And similarly, with regard to a woman who authorized her agent to betroth her and she then went and betrothed herself to someone else, if her own betrothal preceded that of the agent, her betrothal is a valid betrothal, and if that of her agent preceded hers, the agent’s betrothal is a valid betrothal. And if they do not know whose betrothal came first, both men who may have betrothed her give her a bill of divorce. And if they wish, one may give a bill of divorce and the other marries her.

גְּמָ׳ וּצְרִיכָא, דְּאִי אַשְׁמְעִינַן גַּבֵּי דִידֵיהּ, מִשּׁוּם דְּגַבְרָא קִים לֵיהּ בְּיוּחֲסִין, אֲבָל אִיתְּתָא דְּלָא קִים לַהּ בְּיוּחֲסִין, אֵימָא לָא נִיהְווֹ קִידּוּשֶׁיהָ קִידּוּשִׁין.

GEMARA: And it is necessary to state this halakha with regard to one who betroths his daughter as well as with regard to a woman who betroths herself. As had the mishna taught us this halakha only with regard to the father himself, one might say that it is because a man is expert with regard to lineage, and his decision to betroth his daughter on his own after having appointed an agent must have been due to the superior lineage of the man that he found willing to marry her. But with regard to a woman, who is not expert with regard to lineage, one might say her betrothal should not be considered a valid betrothal, as she still intends for her agent to be able to accept betrothal for her from a man with superior lineage.

וְאִי אַשְׁמְעִינַן גַּבֵּי דִידַהּ, מִשּׁוּם דְּאִיתְּתָא דָּיְיקָא וּמִינַּסְבָא, אֲבָל אִיהוּ אֵימָא לָא אִיכְפַּת לֵיהּ, צְרִיכָא.

And conversely, had the mishna taught us this halakha only with regard to the woman herself, one might say that it is because a woman is particular about whom she marries, i.e., she is careful when selecting a husband for herself. Therefore, she would have chosen the partner she deems most suitable and would not want the agent to act on her behalf after she had found someone on her own. But with regard to the father, one might say that he does not care to the same extent, and he may authorize the agent to act in any case. Therefore, it is necessary for the mishna to include both cases.

אִיתְּמַר: קִידְּשָׁהּ אָבִיהָ בַּדֶּרֶךְ, וְקִידְּשָׁה עַצְמָהּ בָּעִיר, וַהֲרֵי הִיא בּוֹגֶרֶת. רַב אָמַר: הֲרֵי הִיא בּוֹגֶרֶת לְפָנֵינוּ. וּשְׁמוּאֵל אָמַר: חָיְישִׁינַן לְקִידּוּשֵׁי שְׁנֵיהֶם.

§ It was stated that the amora’im discussed the following question: If her father betrothed her on the way, when he was traveling, and in the meantime she betrothed herself in the city, and she is now a grown woman, Rav said: She is a grown woman at present, and her father cannot currently betroth her. Therefore, even if he did betroth her at some point, his betrothal is assumed not to have taken effect. And Shmuel said: We are concerned with regard to the betrothal of both of them.

אֵימַת? אִילֵּימָא בְּתוֹךְ שִׁשָּׁה, בְּהָא נֵימָא רַב הֲרֵי הִיא בּוֹגֶרֶת לְפָנֵינוּ? הַשְׁתָּא הוּא דְּבָגְרָה. אֶלָּא לְאַחַר שִׁשָּׁה, בְּהָא נֵימָא שְׁמוּאֵל: חָיְישִׁינַן לְקִידּוּשֵׁי שְׁנֵיהֶם? וְהָא אָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל: אֵין בֵּין נְעָרוֹת לְבַגְרוּת אֶלָּא שִׁשָּׁה חֳדָשִׁים בִּלְבַד!

The Gemara clarifies the case: When did the father’s betrothal occur? If we say it occurred during the six months when the daughter was no longer a minor and had the status of a young woman, in that case would Rav say: She is a grown woman at present? It is reasonable to say that it is only now that she has reached her majority, i.e., assumed the status of a grown woman, and in that case her father’s betrothal should take effect, since a father can betroth his daughter when she is a young woman. Rav would not rule that the father’s betrothal is disregarded. Rather, perhaps it occurred after the six months had elapsed since she became a young woman. In that case would Shmuel say: We are concerned with regard to the betrothal of both of them? But doesn’t Shmuel say: The difference between the status of a young woman and the status of a grown woman is six months alone, after which the girl has the status of a grown woman, which means her father can no longer betroth her?

לָא צְרִיכָא, דְּקַדֵּישׁ בְּהָהוּא יוֹמָא דְּמַשְׁלֵים שִׁשָּׁה. רַב אָמַר: הֲרֵי הִיא בּוֹגֶרֶת לְפָנֵינוּ, מִדְּהַשְׁתָּא בּוֹגֶרֶת, בְּצַפְרָא נָמֵי בּוֹגֶרֶת. וּשְׁמוּאֵל אֲמַר: הַשְׁתָּא הוּא דְּאַיְיתַי סִימָנִים.

The Gemara answers: No, it is necessary in a case where he betrothed her on the day that these six months were completed. Rav said: She is a grown woman at present. There is therefore a presumption that since she is now a grown woman, she was also a grown woman when her father betrothed her in the morning. And Shmuel said: Perhaps it is only now that her signs indicating puberty came, but she might have still been a young woman when her father betrothed her.

וּשְׁמוּאֵל, מַאי שְׁנָא מִמִּקְוֶה? דִּתְנַן: מִקְוֶה שֶׁנִּמְדַּד וְנִמְצָא חָסֵר – כׇּל טְהָרוֹת שֶׁנַּעֲשׂוּ עַל גַּבָּיו לְמַפְרֵעַ, בֵּין בִּרְשׁוּת הַיָּחִיד בֵּין בִּרְשׁוּת הָרַבִּים – טְמֵאוֹת.

The Gemara asks: And according to Shmuel, in what way is this case different from the case of a ritual bath? As we learned in a mishna (Mikvaot 2:2): With regard to a ritual bath that was known to have contained the requisite forty se’a of water, which was then measured and found deficient in its quantity of water, what is the halakha? All pure items whose purification had been performed in it, i.e., any impure items that had been purified through immersion in this ritual bath, retroactive to when the ritual bath was last measured, whether this ritual bath is found in the private domain or in the public domain, are impure. This indicates that the current situation, i.e., the deficient ritual bath, is presumed to extend back until when it was known with certainty to have contained the requisite amount of water. In this case too, the woman should be considered a grown woman at the time of the first betrothal, and the second betrothal should not take effect.

שָׁאנֵי הָתָם, דְּאִיכָּא לְמֵימַר: הַעֲמֵד טָמֵא עַל חֶזְקָתוֹ וְאֵימַר לֹא טָבַל.

The Gemara answers: There, in the case of a ritual bath, it is different, since it can be said: Maintain an impure item in its presumptive status and say that it was not properly immersed. There, the presumptive status of the item being ritually impure is supported by the current state of the ritual bath, which is now deficient.

אַדְּרַבָּה, הַעֲמֵד מִקְוֶה עַל חֶזְקָתוֹ וְאֵימַר לֹא חָסַר! הֲרֵי חָסֵר לְפָנֶיךָ. הָכָא נָמֵי: הֲרֵי בּוֹגֶרֶת לְפָנֶיךָ! הַשְׁתָּא הוּא דִּבְגַרָה. הָתָם נָמֵי: הַשְׁתָּא הוּא דַּחֲסַר!

The Gemara continues to compare the two cases: On the contrary, it could be said: Maintain the ritual bath in its presumptive status, that it was known to have previously contained the requisite forty se’a, and say that it was not deficient at the time of the immersion and that the items should be considered ritually pure. The Gemara answers: There is a deficient ritual bath at present, which counteracts the presumptive status that it contained the requisite forty se’a. The Gemara asks: Here too, there is a grown woman before you, which should counteract the fact that she was previously a young woman. The Gemara answers: In this case, it is only now that she has reached her majority. The Gemara asks: There too, in the case of a ritual bath, one can also say it is only now that it has become deficient. Perhaps it contained the requisite forty se’a shortly beforehand.

הָתָם תַּרְתֵּי לְרֵיעוּתָא, הָכָא חֲדָא לְרֵיעוּתָא.

The Gemara responds: There, in the case of the ritual bath, there are two reasons to weaken the possibility that the items are ritually pure: First, there is a deficient ritual bath at present; second, the item has a presumptive status of impurity. Here, by contrast, there is only one reason to weaken the possibility that she was a young woman at the time of the betrothal, i.e., the fact that she is now a grown woman. Shmuel therefore maintains that her earlier status of young woman is not nullified, and both betrothals must be taken into account.

וּשְׁמוּאֵל, מַאי שְׁנָא מֵחָבִית? דְּתַנְיָא: הָיָה בּוֹדֵק אֶת הֶחָבִית לְהַפְרִישׁ עָלֶיהָ תְּרוּמָה וְהוֹלֵךְ, וְאַחַר כָּךְ נִמְצֵאת חוֹמֶץ – כׇּל שְׁלֹשָׁה יָמִים וַדַּאי, מִיכָּן וְאֵילָךְ – סָפֵק.

The Gemara poses another question: And according to Shmuel, in what way is this case different from the case of a barrel? As it is taught in a baraita (Tosefta, Terumot 2:8): If one would inspect the contents of a barrel to see if it still contained enough wine to continually mentally separate teruma from it to exempt other untithed wine he had, until all the wine in that barrel would be teruma and would be given to a priest, and afterward the contents of the barrel were found to be vinegar, which cannot be set aside as teruma for untithed wine, then all three days after he had last inspected it is definitely viewed as having been wine, and any untithed wine for which teruma was separated during those days is tithed. From then onward, more than three days after the previous inspection, it is uncertain as to whether it had already turned to vinegar, and any untithed wine for which teruma was separated during those days is not tithed.

וְרָמֵינַן חָבִית אַמִּקְוֶה: מַאי שְׁנָא דְּהָכָא וַדַּאי וּמַאי שְׁנָא דְּהָכָא סָפֵק?

Before stating the difficulty with Shmuel’s opinion, the Gemara first clarifies the baraita. And we raised a contradiction between the halakha of the barrel and that of the ritual bath: What is different in that here, with regard to the ritual bath, the halakha is that the items are definitely impure, and what is different in that there, with regard to the barrel, it is only uncertain whether the produce remains untithed? In both cases the situation at present, the ritual bath being deficient and the contents of the barrel having turned to vinegar, should lead to a definite conclusion.

וְאָמַר רַב חֲנִינָא מִסּוּרְיָא: מַאן תְּנָא חָבִית – רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן הִיא, דְּגַבֵּי מִקְוֶה נָמֵי סְפֵיקָא מְשַׁוֵּי.

The Gemara continues its analysis of the baraita: And Rav Ḥanina from Syria says: Who is the tanna that taught the halakha of the barrel? It is Rabbi Shimon, who with regard to a ritual bath also considers it as a matter of uncertainty rather than as definitively impure. Therefore, there is no contradiction between the baraita and the mishna.

דְּתַנְיָא: כׇּל טְהָרוֹת שֶׁנַּעֲשׂוּ עַל גַּבָּיו לְמַפְרֵעַ, בֵּין בִּרְשׁוּת הַיָּחִיד בֵּין בִּרְשׁוּת הָרַבִּים – טְמֵאוֹת. וְרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן אוֹמֵר: בִּרְשׁוּת הָרַבִּים טְהוֹרוֹת, בִּרְשׁוּת הַיָּחִיד – תּוֹלִין.

As it is taught in a baraita: All pure items whose purification had been performed in it, i.e., any impure items that had been purified through immersion in the ritual bath that was found to be deficient, retroactive to when the ritual bath was last measured, whether this ritual bath is found in the private domain or in the public domain, are impure. And Rabbi Shimon says they are impure due to the uncertainty, and therefore, if the ritual bath was located in the public domain, they are pure, in accordance with the principle that uncertain cases of impurity in the public domain are deemed pure. But if the ritual bath was located in the private domain, the decision is suspended, i.e., if the impure items came into contact with teruma, one may not partake of the teruma due to the uncertainty, but it is also not burned as though it were definitely impure.

אֲבָל לְרַבָּנַן, טֶבֶל לְמַפְרֵעַ! שָׁאנֵי הָתָם, דְּאִיכָּא לְמֵימַר: הַעֲמֵד טֶבֶל עַל חֶזְקָתוֹ – וְאֵימַר לֹא נִיתְקַן.

The Gemara returns to complete the difficulty with Shmuel’s opinion: But according to the Rabbis, who hold that in the case of the ritual bath the items are definitely impure, with regard to the wine that had been exempted from teruma by means of separating teruma from the contents of the barrel, that wine will be untithed produce retroactively, since they hold that the current status extends to the past. This is unlike the ruling of Shmuel, who ruled that in the case of the woman who was betrothed to two men it is uncertain to whom she is betrothed. The Gemara answers: There, in the case of the barrel, it is different, as it can be said: Maintain the untithed produce in its presumptive status, as when it first grew it was definitely untithed, and say it was not fixed, i.e., exempted.

אַדְּרַבָּה, הַעֲמֵד יַיִן עַל חֶזְקָתוֹ, וְאֵימַר לֹא הֶחְמִיץ! הֲרֵי הֶחְמִיץ לְפָנֶיךָ. הָכָא נָמֵי, הֲרֵי הִיא בּוֹגֶרֶת לְפָנֵינוּ! הַשְׁתָּא הוּא דִּבְגַרָה. הָכָא נָמֵי: הַשְׁתָּא הוּא דְּאַחְמֵיץ!

The Gemara asks: On the contrary, why not maintain the wine in its presumptive status, and say it had not turned to vinegar? The Gemara rejects this: That is impossible, as it is turned to vinegar at present. The Gemara replies: In the case of the betrothal, here too, she is a grown woman at present; what is the difference? The Gemara rejects this claim: With regard to the woman, it is possible that only now has she reached her majority. The Gemara challenges: Here too, it could be that it is only now that it has turned to vinegar, but not earlier.

הָתָם תַּרְתֵּי לְרֵיעוּתָא, הָכָא חֲדָא לְרֵיעוּתָא הוּא דְּאִיכָּא.

The Gemara explains: There, in the case of the barrel, there are two reasons to weaken the possibility that the wine is tithed: First, it is vinegar at present; second, the wine has a presumptive status of being untithed. Here, by contrast, there is only one reason to weaken the possibility that she was a young woman at the time of the betrothal, i.e., the fact that she is now a grown woman. Shmuel therefore maintains that her earlier status of a young woman is not nullified, and both betrothals must be taken into account.

נֵימָא כְּתַנָּאֵי:

The Gemara suggests: Let us say that it is parallel to a dispute between tanna’im:

מִי מוֹצִיא מִיַּד מִי?

The halakha is that a moribund person who transfers all of his property to others without leaving anything for himself can retract his bequest upon regaining his health. This is due to the assumption that one would give away all his possessions only if he believes he is going to die, and the bequest was therefore made in error. By contrast, if a healthy person gave all his property to others, he cannot later retract his bequest. The tanna’im discuss the case of one who gave away all his property and later, seeking to retrieve his property, claims that he was moribund at the time, while the recipients of the bequest maintain that he was healthy. Who is able to remove the property from the possession of whom?

הוּא מוֹצִיא מִיָּדָם בְּלֹא רְאָיָה, וְהֵן אֵין מוֹצִיאִים מִיָּדוֹ בְּלֹא רְאָיָה, דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי יַעֲקֹב. רַבִּי נָתָן אוֹמֵר: אִם בָּרִיא הוּא – עָלָיו לְהָבִיא רְאָיָה שֶׁהָיָה שְׁכִיב מְרַע, וְאִם שְׁכִיב מְרַע הוּא – עֲלֵיהֶם לְהָבִיא רְאָיָה שֶׁבָּרִיא הָיָה.

He is able to remove his property held by others from their possession without needing to bring proof that he was moribund at the time, and they may not remove the property from his possession, if he still is in possession of the property, without proof that he was healthy. This is the statement of Rabbi Ya’akov. Rabbi Natan says: If he is currently healthy, the obligation is upon him to bring proof that he was on his deathbed at the time of the bequest, and if he is now on his deathbed, the obligation is upon them to bring proof that he was healthy at the time of the bequest.

נֵימָא רַב דְּאָמַר כְּרַבִּי נָתָן וּשְׁמוּאֵל דְּאָמַר כְּרַבִּי יַעֲקֹב? אָמַר לָךְ רַב: אֲנָא דַּאֲמַרִי אֲפִילּוּ כְּרַבִּי יַעֲקֹב. עַד כָּאן לָא קָאָמַר רַבִּי יַעֲקֹב הָתָם דְּאִיכָּא לְמֵימַר הַעֲמֵד מָמוֹן עַל חֶזְקָתוֹ, אֲבָל הָכָא מִי נֵימָא הַעֲמֵד גּוּף עַל חֶזְקָתוֹ?!

The Gemara suggests: Let us say that Rav spoke in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Natan that one’s current status is paramount, and Shmuel spoke in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Ya’akov, who holds that the question of whether he was moribund remains a matter of uncertainty, and they may not claim the property from him even if he is now healthy. The Gemara rejects this: Rav could have said to you: I spoke even in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Ya’akov, as Rabbi Ya’akov states his opinion only there, because it can be said that the principle of: Leave the property in its previous status, applies, so the property should remain where it is. But here, with regard to the question of when a young woman became a grown woman, shall we say: Establish the body according to its previous status? It is obvious that her body was due to mature.

וּשְׁמוּאֵל אָמַר: אֲנָא דַּאֲמַרִי אֲפִילּוּ לְרַבִּי נָתָן. עַד כָּאן לָא קָאָמַר רַבִּי נָתָן הָתָם דְּכוּלֵּי עָלְמָא בְּחֶזְקַת בְּרִיאִים קָיְימִי, מַאן דְּקָא מַפֵּיק נַפְשֵׁיהּ מֵחֲזָקָה – (הָוֵי) עֲלֵיהּ לְאֵיתוֹיֵי רְאָיָה, אֲבָל הָכָא מִי קָא מַפְּקָא נַפְשַׁהּ מֵחֲזָקָה דְּקַמֵּיהּ?

And Shmuel could have said: I spoke even in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Natan, since Rabbi Natan states his opinion that the current state is paramount only there, as everyone has a presumptive status of being healthy. Consequently, if a person removes himself from this presumption by claiming he was moribund, the obligation falls upon him to bring proof. But here, does she remove herself from a presumption that was present? There is no presumption that she was a grown woman in the morning.

נֵימָא כְּהָנֵי תַּנָּאֵי: קִידְּשָׁהּ אָבִיהָ בַּדֶּרֶךְ וְקִידְּשָׁה עַצְמָהּ בָּעִיר וַהֲרֵי הִיא בּוֹגֶרֶת, תָּנָא חֲדָא: הֲרֵי הִיא בּוֹגֶרֶת לְפָנֵינוּ, וְתַנְיָא אִידַּךְ: חָיְישִׁינַן לְקִידּוּשֵׁי שְׁנֵיהֶם. מַאי לָאו: חַד כְּרַב וְחַד כִּשְׁמוּאֵל?

The Gemara further suggests: Let us say that this dispute between Rav and Shmuel is parallel to a dispute between these tanna’im: With regard to a case where her father betrothed her on the way, when he was traveling, and in the meantime she betrothed herself in the city, and she is now a grown woman, one baraita taught: She is a grown woman at present, and her father cannot currently betroth her; therefore, his betrothal does not take effect. And it is taught in another baraita: We are concerned with regard to the betrothal of both of them. What, is it not the case that one baraita is in accordance with the opinion of Rav, and one baraita is in accordance with the opinion of Shmuel?

לָא, אִידִי וְאִידִי כִּשְׁמוּאֵל – כָּאן בְּמַכְחַשְׁתּוֹ, כָּאן בְּשֶׁאֵין מַכְחַשְׁתּוֹ.

The Gemara rejects this: No; it is possible that both this and that are in accordance with the opinion of Shmuel. Here, in this baraita, it is referring to a case where she denies his right to betroth her, as she claims that she was a grown woman before his betrothal. There, it is referring to a situation where she does not deny his right to betroth her, and therefore it is uncertain which betrothal takes effect.

וְנֵימָא מִדְּמַתְנִיתָא לָא פְּלִיגִי, אָמוֹרָאֵי נָמֵי לָא פְּלִיגִי! וְתִסְבְּרָא? הָא רַב יוֹסֵף בְּרֵיהּ דְּרַב מְנַשְּׁיָא מִדְּוִויל עֲבַד עוֹבָדָא כְּווֹתֵיהּ דְּרַב, וְאִיקְּפִיד שְׁמוּאֵל וְאָמַר: כּוּלֵּי עָלְמָא כָּיְילִי לֵיהּ בְּקַבָּא זוּטָא וְהַאי מִדְּרַבָּנַן כָּיְילִי לֵיהּ בְּקַבָּא רַבָּה? וְאִי סָלְקָא דַּעְתָּךְ לָא פְּלִיגִי, אַמַּאי קָא מִקְּפֵיד?

The Gemara asks: If so, let us also say that since the baraitot do not disagree, the opinions of the amora’im, Rav and Shmuel, do not disagree either. One is referring to a case where she denies her father’s right to betroth her, while the other is referring to a case where she does not. The Gemara rejects this: And how can you understand it that way? But Rav Yosef, son of Rav Menashya of Dabil, performed an action in this case in accordance with the opinion of Rav and did not take the father’s betrothal into account, and Shmuel took offense at this and said sarcastically: Is wisdom measured out to everyone in a small measure, and measured out to this member of the Sages in a large measure? He was angered that Rav Yosef had the audacity to rule against him in this case. Now, if it enters your mind that they did not disagree at all, why did Shmuel take offense?

דִּילְמָא כִּי עֲבַד עוֹבָדָא, בְּמַכְחַשְׁתּוֹ.

Perhaps when Rav Yosef performed an action, he did so in an instance where she denied her father’s right to betroth her, in which case even Shmuel would agree that the father’s betrothal does not take effect. Rather, it must be that Rav and Shmuel did disagree, and Rav Yosef must have ruled in the case of a woman who did not deny her father’s right to betroth her, which explains why Shmuel took exception to his ruling.

אֲמַר לֵיהּ מָר זוּטְרָא לְרַב אָשֵׁי, הָכִי אָמַר אַמֵּימָר: הִילְכְתָא כְּווֹתֵיהּ דִּשְׁמוּאֵל. וְרַב אָשֵׁי אָמַר: הִילְכְתָא כְּווֹתֵיהּ דְּרַב. וְהִילְכְתָא כְּווֹתֵיהּ דְּרַב.

Mar Zutra said to Rav Ashi: This is what Ameimar said: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Shmuel. And Rav Ashi said: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rav. The Gemara concludes: And the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rav.

מַתְנִי׳ מִי שֶׁיָּצָא הוּא וְאִשְׁתּוֹ לִמְדִינַת הַיָּם, וּבָא הוּא וְאִשְׁתּוֹ וּבָנָיו וְאָמַר: ״אִשָּׁה שֶׁיָּצָאת עִמִּי לִמְדִינַת הַיָּם – הֲרֵי הִיא זוֹ, וְאֵלּוּ בָּנֶיהָ״ – אֵין צָרִיךְ לְהָבִיא רְאָיָה לֹא עַל הָאִשָּׁה, וְלֹא עַל הַבָּנִים. ״מֵתָה וְאֵלּוּ בָּנֶיהָ״ – מֵבִיא רְאָיָה עַל הַבָּנִים, וְאֵינוֹ מֵבִיא רְאָיָה עַל הָאִשָּׁה.

MISHNA: With regard to one who went overseas with his wife, and returned with his wife and children, and said: This is the woman who went overseas with me and these are her children, he is not required to bring proof with regard to the lineage of the woman, since her lineage was already investigated at the time of their marriage, nor with regard to the lineage of the children. If he returned without the woman and said: My wife died and these are her children, he must bring proof that the children were born to his wife, but he does not need to bring proof with regard to the lineage of the woman.

״אִשָּׁה נָשָׂאתִי בִּמְדִינַת הַיָּם – הֲרֵי הִיא זוֹ, וְאֵלּוּ בָּנֶיהָ״ – מֵבִיא רְאָיָה עַל הָאִשָּׁה וְאֵין צָרִיךְ לְהָבִיא רְאָיָה עַל הַבָּנִים. ״מֵתָה וְאֵלּוּ בָּנֶיהָ״ – צָרִיךְ לְהָבִיא רְאָיָה עַל הָאִשָּׁה וְעַל הַבָּנִים.

If he left when he was unmarried and said upon his return: I married a woman overseas, and this is she, and these are her children, he must bring proof with regard to the lineage of the woman, but he is not required to bring proof with regard to the lineage of the children. If he said: I married a woman overseas and she died, and these are her children, he is required to bring proof with regard to both the lineage of the woman and the children.

גְּמָ׳ אָמַר רַבָּה בַּר רַב הוּנָא: וְכוּלָּן בִּכְרוּכִים אַחֲרֶיהָ.

GEMARA: Rabba bar Rav Huna says: And all of the statements that he is not required to bring proof with regard to the lineage of the children are said in a case where they cling to her and treat the woman like their mother.

תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: ״אִשָּׁה נָשָׂאתִי בִּמְדִינַת הַיָּם״ – מֵבִיא רְאָיָה עַל הָאִשָּׁה, וְאֵין צָרִיךְ לְהָבִיא רְאָיָה עַל הַבָּנִים. וּמֵבִיא רְאָיָה עַל הַגְּדוֹלִים, וְאֵין צָרִיךְ לְהָבִיא רְאָיָה עַל הַקְּטַנִּים. בַּמֶּה דְּבָרִים אֲמוּרִים: בְּאִשָּׁה אַחַת, אֲבָל בִּשְׁתֵּי נָשִׁים – מֵבִיא רְאָיָה עַל הָאִשָּׁה וְעַל הַבָּנִים, עַל הַגְּדוֹלִים וְעַל הַקְּטַנִּים.

The Sages taught that if a man says: I married a woman overseas, he must bring proof with regard to the lineage of the woman, but he is not required to bring proof with regard to the lineage of the children. And he must bring proof with regard to the lineage of the adult children, but he is not required to bring proof with regard to the lineage of the minor children. Since their attachment to their mother is apparent, it can be assumed they are her offspring. In what case is this statement said? It is in the case of one who said he married one woman, but when it is the case of one who said he married two women overseas, he must bring proof with regard to the lineage of both the woman and the children, with regard to the adult ones and with regard to the minor ones. Even if they cling to the woman whose lineage has been found to be unflawed, they might be the children of the other wife and are merely being raised by this one.

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