קידושין ט

קידושין ט

חוּמְרֵי פְּתַכְיָיתָא. אֲתַאי הָהִיא אִיתְּתָא, אֲמַרָה לֵיהּ: ״הַב לִי חַד שׂוֹכָא״. אֲמַר לַהּ: ״אִי יָהֲבִינָא לִיךְ מִיקַּדְּשַׁתְּ לִי״? אֲמַרָה לֵיהּ: ״הַבָה מֵיהֲבָה״. אָמַר רַב חָמָא: כֹּל ״הַבָה מֵיהֲבָה״ לָאו כְּלוּם הוּא.

beads [ḥumrei] of glass [petakhyata]. A certain woman came and said to him: Give me one string. He said to her: If I give you this string will you be betrothed to me with it? She said to him: Give, give. Rav Ḥama said: Any use of the expression: Give, give, is nothing. Although she said: Give, give, she did not agree to the condition, as she was mocking him and had no intention of actually becoming betrothed.

הָהוּא גַּבְרָא דַּהֲוָה קָא שָׁתֵי חַמְרָא בְּחָנוּתָא. אֲתַאי הָהִיא אִיתְּתָא, אֲמַרָה לֵיהּ: ״הַב לִי חַד כָּסָא״. אֲמַר לַהּ: ״אִי יָהֵיבְנָא לִיךְ מִיקַּדְּשַׁתְּ לִי״? אֲמַרָה לֵיהּ: ״אַשְׁקוֹיֵי אַשְׁקְיַין״. אָמַר רַב חָמָא: כֹּל ״אַשְׁקוֹיֵי אַשְׁקְיַין״ לָאו כְּלוּם הוּא.

The Gemara relates a similar incident: There was a certain man who was drinking wine in a store. A woman came in and said to him: Give me one cup of wine. He said to her: If I give you a cup of wine will you be betrothed to me with it? She said to him: Give to drink, give it to me to drink. Rav Ḥama said that any use of the expression: Give to drink, give it to me to drink, is nothing, i.e., she certainly did not intend to accept the condition and she is not betrothed.

הָהוּא גַּבְרָא דַּהֲוָה קָא שָׁדֵי תַּמְרֵי מִדִּקְלָא. אֲתַאי הָהִיא אִיתְּתָא, אֲמַרָה לֵיהּ: ״שְׁדִי לִי תַּרְתֵּי״! אֲמַר לַהּ: ״אִי שָׁדֵינָא לִיךְ מִיקַּדְּשַׁתְּ לִי״? אֲמַרָה לֵיהּ: ״שְׁדִי מִישְׁדָּא״. אָמַר רַב זְבִיד: כֹּל ״שְׁדִי מִישְׁדָּא״ לָאו כְּלוּם הוּא.

The Gemara further relates: There was a certain man who was picking dates from a date tree. A certain woman came and said to him: Throw me two. He said to her: If I throw two dates to you will you be betrothed to me with them? She said to him: Throw, throw. Rav Zevid said: Any use of the expression: Throw, throw, is nothing, and she is not betrothed.

אִיבַּעְיָא לְהוּ: ״הַב״, ״אַשְׁקִי״, ״וּשְׁדִי״, מַהוּ? – אָמַר רָבִינָא: מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת. רַב סַמָּא בַּר רַקְתָּא אָמַר: תָּגָא דְמַלְכָּא! אֵינָהּ מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת. וְהִלְכְתָא: אֵינָהּ מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת.

A dilemma was raised before the Sages: If she said: Give, or: Give to drink, or: Throw, without the additional emphasis of the repetition, what is the halakha? Does this straightforward statement indicate that she actually meant him to give it to her in accordance with his stated condition, or does she not agree to betrothal even here? Ravina said: She is betrothed. Rav Sama bar Rakta said in the form of an oath: By the king’s crown! She is not betrothed. The Gemara states: And the halakha is that she is not betrothed.

וְהִלְכְתָא: שִׁירָאֵי לָא צְרִיכִי שׁוּמָא. וְהִלְכְתָא כְּרַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר, וְהִלְכְתָא כְּרָבָא אָמַר רַב נַחְמָן.

The Gemara issues further rulings concerning the previous cases. And the halakha is: With regard to silk garments that are worth more than one peruta, appraisal is not necessary before a woman can be betrothed with them. And the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar, that if a man promised a woman one hundred dinars as betrothal money and gave her only a dinar, she is betrothed. And the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rava, who said that Rav Naḥman said that if he promised one hundred dinars and gave her only collateral, this is not a valid betrothal.

תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: בִּשְׁטָר כֵּיצַד? כָּתַב לוֹ עַל הַנְּיָיר אוֹ עַל הַחֶרֶס, אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁאֵין בּוֹ שָׁוֶה פְרוּטָה, ״בִּתְּךָ מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת לִי״, ״בִּתְּךָ מְאוֹרֶסֶת לִי״, ״בִּתְּךָ לִי לְאִינְתּוּ״ – הֲרֵי זוֹ מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת.

§ The Sages taught: How is betrothal performed with a document? If he wrote the following for a young woman’s father on paper or earthenware, despite the fact that the paper or earthenware is not worth one peruta: Your daughter is betrothed [mekuddeshet] to me, or: Your daughter is betrothed [me’oreset] to me, or: Your daughter is to me as a wife, then she is betrothed. There is no requirement for the paper or earthenware to be worth one peruta, as she is not betrothed through the value of the paper or earthenware.

מַתְקֵיף לַהּ רַבִּי זֵירָא בַּר מֶמֶל: הָא לָא דָּמֵי הַאי שְׁטָרָא לִשְׁטַר זְבִינֵי! הָתָם, מוֹכֵר כּוֹתֵב לוֹ ״שָׂדִי מְכוּרָה לָךְ״, הָכָא בַּעַל כּוֹתֵב ״בִּתְּךָ מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת לִי״!

Rabbi Zeira bar Memel objects to this description of the writing of the document: But this document is not comparable to a bill of sale. There, in the case of a bill of sale, the seller is the one who writes to the buyer: My field is sold to you. Here, the husband, who is akin to a buyer, is the one who writes: Your daughter is betrothed to me.

אָמַר רָבָא: הָתָם מֵעִנְיָינָא דִּקְרָא וְהָכָא מֵעִנְיָינָא דִּקְרָא. הָתָם כְּתִיב ״וּמָכַר מֵאֲחֻזָּתוֹ״ – בְּמוֹכֵר תְּלָה רַחֲמָנָא, הָכָא כְּתִיב ״כִּי יִקַּח״ – בְּבַעַל תְּלָה רַחֲמָנָא.

Rava said: There, in the case of a sale, the formulation of the document is taken from the context of the verse, and here, in the case of betrothal, the formulation of the document is likewise taken from the context of the verse. Rava elaborates: There, with regard to a sale, it is written: “And sells of his ancestral land” (Leviticus 25:25), which indicates that the Merciful One renders the transaction dependent on the seller. Here, it is written: “If a man takes a woman” (Deuteronomy 22:13), meaning that the Merciful One renders the betrothal dependent on the husband.

הָתָם נָמֵי כְּתִיב ״שָׂדוֹת בַּכֶּסֶף יִקְנוּ״! קְרִי בֵּיהּ ״יַקְנוּ״. מַאי טַעְמָא קָרֵית בֵּיהּ ״יַקְנוּ״ – מִשּׁוּם דִּכְתִיב ״וּמָכַר״, הָכִי נָמֵי קְרִי בֵּיהּ ״כִּי יַקַּח״, דִּכְתִיב ״אֶת בִּתִּי נָתַתִּי לָאִישׁ הַזֶּה״.

The Gemara asks: There, in the case of a sale, it is also written: “Men shall buy [yiknu] fields for money” (Jeremiah 32:44), which indicates that the matter depends upon the buyer. The Gemara answers: Read into the verse: Shall sell [yikkanu]. The Gemara asks: What is the reason that you read it as yikkanu; because it is written in the verse in Leviticus: “And sells,” and there is a preference to have the verse from the Prophets accord with that of the Torah? So too, instead of: “If a man takes [ki yikaḥ]” (Deuteronomy 22:13), read into the verse: When he is given [ki yakiaḥ], as it is written: “I gave my daughter to this man” (Deuteronomy 22:16), so that the verses will accord with each other.

אֶלָּא אָמַר רָבָא: הִלְכְתָא נִינְהוּ וְאַסְמְכִינְהוּ רַבָּנַן אַקְּרָאֵי. וְאִיבָּעֵית אֵימָא: הָתָם נָמֵי כְּתִיב ״וָאֶקַּח אֶת סֵפֶר הַמִּקְנָה״.

Rather, Rava said: There is no proof from the verses for these rulings, as they are a halakha received through tradition, and the Sages based them on the verses. And if you wish, say: There too, in the case in Jeremiah, it is written with regard to the buyer: “And I took the deed of purchase” (Jeremiah 32:11), thereby indicating that it is the seller who writes the document.

וְאָמַר רָבָא אָמַר רַב נַחְמָן: כָּתַב לוֹ עַל הַנְּיָיר אוֹ עַל הַחֶרֶס, אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁאֵין בּוֹ שָׁוֶה פְרוּטָה, ״בִּתְּךָ מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת לִי״, ״בִּתְּךָ מְאוֹרֶסֶת לִי״, ״בִּתְּךָ לִי לְאִינְתּוּ״, בֵּין עַל יְדֵי אָבִיהָ בֵּין עַל יְדֵי עַצְמָהּ – מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת מִדַּעְתּוֹ, וְהוּא שֶׁלֹּא בָּגְרָה.

And Rava says that Rav Naḥman says: If he wrote the following for him on paper or earthenware, despite the fact that the paper or earthenware is not worth one peruta: Your daughter is betrothed [mekuddeshet] to me, or: Your daughter is betrothed [me’oreset] to me, or: Your daughter is to me as a wife, whether he gave it to her father or whether he gave it directly to her, she is betrothed with the consent of her father. And this is the halakha provided that she has not yet reached her majority, before which her father alone has the authority to betroth her.

כָּתַב לָהּ עַל הַנְּיָיר אוֹ עַל הַחֶרֶס, אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁאֵין בּוֹ שָׁוֶה פְרוּטָה, ״הֲרֵי אַתְּ מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת לִי״, ״הֲרֵי אַתְּ לִי לְאִינְתּוּ״, ״הֲרֵי אַתְּ מְאוֹרֶסֶת לִי״ – מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת, בֵּין עַל יְדֵי אָבִיהָ, בֵּין עַל יְדֵי עַצְמָהּ, מִדַּעְתָּהּ, וְהוּא שֶׁבָּגְרָה.

If he wrote for her on paper or earthenware, despite the fact that the paper or earthenware is not worth one peruta: You are hereby betrothed [mekuddeshet] to me, or: You are hereby to me as a wife, or: You are hereby betrothed [me’oreset] to me, then she is betrothed whether he gave it to her father or to her, as long as this was with her consent. And this is the halakha provided that she has reached her majority and is under her own authority.

בָּעֵי רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן לָקִישׁ: שְׁטַר אֵירוּסִין שֶׁכְּתָבוֹ שֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁמָהּ, מַהוּ? הֲוָיוֹת לִיצִיאוֹת מַקְּשִׁינַן, מָה

§ Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish raises a dilemma: With regard to a document of betrothal that was written not for her sake, i.e., not for this particular woman, what is the halakha? Do we juxtapose the halakhot of the modes of becoming betrothed to the halakhot of the modes of leaving a marriage, i.e., divorce? If so, one should say: Just as

יְצִיאָה בָּעֵינַן לִשְׁמָהּ – אַף הֲוָיָיה בָּעֵינַן לִשְׁמָהּ, אוֹ דִלְמָא הֲוָיוֹת לַהֲדָדֵי מַקְּשִׁינַן, מָה הֲוָיָיה דְכֶסֶף לָא בָּעֵינַן לִשְׁמָהּ – אַף הֲוָיָיה דִשְׁטָר לָא בָּעֵינַן לִשְׁמָהּ?

we require that the document of leaving, i.e., a bill of divorce, must be written specifically for her sake, so too, we require that the document of becoming betrothed be written for her sake. Or perhaps we juxtapose the different modes of becoming betrothed to each other and say: Just as we do not require that becoming betrothed with money must be carried out with coins minted for her sake, so too, we do not require that becoming betrothed with a document must be with a document written for her sake.

בָּתַר דְּבַעְיָא הֲדַר פַּשְׁטַהּ: הֲוָיָיה לִיצִיאָה מַקְּשִׁינַן, דְּאָמַר קְרָא ״וְיָצְאָה״ ״וְהָיְתָה״.

After he raised the dilemma, Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish then resolved it. We juxtapose becoming betrothed to leaving a marriage, as the verse states: “And she departs out of his house, and goes and becomes” (Deuteronomy 24:2). This shows that the halakhot of a betrothal document are derived from those of a bill of divorce, and therefore a document of betrothal must also be written for her sake.

אִיתְּמַר: כְּתָבוֹ לִשְׁמָהּ, וְשֶׁלֹּא מִדַּעְתָּהּ – רָבָא וְרָבִינָא אָמְרִי: מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת. רַב פָּפָּא וְרַב שֵׁרֵבְיָא אָמְרִי: אֵינָהּ מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת. אָמַר רַב פָּפָּא: אֵימָא טַעְמָא דִידְהוּ וְאֵימָא טַעְמָא דִידִי. אֵימָא טַעְמָא דִידְהוּ – דִּכְתִיב: ״וְיָצְאָה״ ״וְהָיְתָה״ – מַקִּישׁ הֲוָיָיה לִיצִיאָה, מָה יְצִיאָה לִשְׁמָהּ וְשֶׁלֹּא מִדַּעְתָּהּ, אַף הֲוָיָיה נָמֵי לִשְׁמָהּ וְשֶׁלֹּא מִדַּעְתָּהּ.

It was stated that amora’im disagreed with regard to the following issue: If a man wrote a document of betrothal for her sake but without her consent, i.e., she did not know at the time that they were writing it but accepted it afterward, Rava and Ravina say: She is betrothed. Rav Pappa and Rav Sherevya say: She is not betrothed. Rav Pappa said: I will say their reason and I will say my reason. I will state their reason, as it is written: “And she departs out of his house, and goes and becomes,” by which the verse juxtaposes becoming betrothed to leaving a marriage. Just as a bill of divorce, written for leaving a marriage must be written for her own sake but can be written without her consent, so too, a document written for becoming betrothed must be written for her own sake and can even be without her consent.

וְאֵימָא טַעְמָא דִידִי: ״וְיָצְאָה״ ״וְהָיְתָה״ – מַקִּישׁ הֲוָיָיה לִיצִיאָה, מָה יְצִיאָה בָּעֵינַן דַּעַת מַקְנֶה, אַף הֲוָיָיה בָּעֵינַן דַּעַת מַקְנֶה.

And I will say my reason: The verse says: “And she departs out of his house, and goes and becomes.” The verse juxtaposes becoming betrothed to leaving a marriage. Just as with regard to a bill of divorce, written for leaving a marriage, we require the consent of the one transferring ownership, i.e., the man, as he divorces and transfers authority of the woman to herself, so too, with regard to a document written for becoming betrothed, we require the consent of the one transferring ownership, which in this case is the woman, who must agree to the marriage.

מֵיתִיבִי: אֵין כּוֹתְבִין שְׁטָרֵי אֵירוּסִין וְנִשּׂוּאִין אֶלָּא מִדַּעַת שְׁנֵיהֶן. מַאי לָאו שְׁטָרֵי אֵירוּסִין וְנִשּׂוּאִין מַמָּשׁ! לָא, שְׁטָרֵי פְּסִיקָתָא. וְכִדְרַב גִּידֵּל אָמַר רַב,

The Gemara raises an objection from a mishna (Bava Batra 167b) against the opinion that she is betrothed if the document was written without her consent. One writes documents of betrothal and marriage only with the consent of both the man and woman. What, is the mishna not referring to actual documents of betrothal and marriage, which indicates that the document must be written with the woman’s consent? The Gemara rejects this proof: No, this is referring to documents of stipulation, which contain the details of the dowry. And this statement is in accordance with that which Rav Giddel says that Rav says.

דְּאָמַר רַב גִּידֵּל אָמַר רַב: ״כַּמָּה אַתָּה נוֹתֵן לְבִנְךָ״? – ״כָּךְ וְכָךְ״, ״לְבִתְּךָ״? – ״כָּךְ וְכָךְ״, עָמְדוּ וְקִדְּשׁוּ – קָנוּ, הֵן הֵן הַדְּבָרִים הַנִּקְנִים בַּאֲמִירָה.

As Rav Giddel says that Rav says: If the father of one member of the couple says to the father of the other: How much are you giving to your son? And he answers: Such and such, and adds: How much are you giving to your daughter? And the other responds: Such and such, then if they, the couple, subsequently arose and became betrothed, they acquire everything that was promised. These are the matters that are acquired through speech, and they do not require an act of acquisition. The documents of betrothal mentioned here that require the woman’s consent are those which contain this type of monetary obligation, not actual documents of betrothal.

וּבְבִיאָה. מְנָא לַן? אָמַר רַבִּי אֲבָהוּ אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: דְּאָמַר קְרָא ״בְּעֻלַת בַּעַל״ – מְלַמֵּד שֶׁנַּעֲשֶׂה לָהּ בַּעַל עַל יְדֵי בְעִילָה. אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַבִּי זֵירָא לְרַבִּי אֲבָהוּ וְאָמְרִי לַהּ רֵישׁ לָקִישׁ לְרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: כְּעוּרָה זוֹ שֶׁשָּׁנָה רַבִּי ״וּבְעָלָהּ״ – מְלַמֵּד שֶׁנִּקְנֵית בְּבִיאָה?

§ The mishna teaches that a woman can be betrothed through sexual intercourse. The Gemara asks: From where do we derive this? Rabbi Abbahu said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said that the verse states: “If a man be found lying with a married woman [beulat ba’al]” (Deuteronomy 22:22). This teaches that he becomes her husband [ba’al] by means of sexual intercourse [be’ila]. Rabbi Zeira said to Rabbi Abbahu, and some say it was Reish Lakish who said this to Rabbi Yoḥanan: Is this other proof, taught by Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, unacceptable: “When a man takes a woman and engages in sexual intercourse with her” (Deuteronomy 24:1)? This verse teaches that she can be acquired through intercourse.

אִי מֵהָתָם, הֲוָה אָמֵינָא עַד דִּמְקַדֵּשׁ וַהֲדַר בָּעֵיל, קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן.

The Gemara answers that the verse cited by Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi is insufficient proof that a woman can be betrothed via intercourse, as, if this halakha were derived only from there, I would say that she is not considered his wife unless he first betroths her through money, indicated by the phrase “takes a woman,” and then engages in intercourse with her. This is the only valid mode of betrothal, and intercourse alone is not enough. Therefore, the verse states “a married woman [beulat ba’al]” and teaches us that intercourse by itself is a valid means of betrothal.

מַתְקֵיף לַהּ רַבִּי אַבָּא בַּר מֶמֶל: אִם כֵּן, נַעֲרָה הַמְאוֹרָסָה, דְּאָמַר רַחֲמָנָא בִּסְקִילָה, הֵיכִי מַשְׁכַּחַתְּ לַהּ?

Rabbi Abba bar Memel objects to this: The above suggestion, that both money and sexual intercourse are required for betrothal, cannot be the correct interpretation of the verse: “When a man takes a woman and engages in sexual intercourse with her.” This is because, if it is so, that a woman can be acquired only through both betrothal money and intercourse, the case of one who engages in intercourse with a betrothed young woman, concerning which the Merciful One states in the Torah that he is punished by stoning (see Deuteronomy 22:23–24), how can you find a case where he is liable to be punished in this manner?

אִי דְּאקַדֵּישׁ וַהֲדַר בְּעֵיל בְּעוּלָה הִיא, אִי דְּאקַדֵּישׁ וְלָא בְּעֵיל לָאו כְּלוּם הוּא! אַמְרוּהָ רַבָּנַן קַמֵּיהּ דְּאַבָּיֵי: מַשְׁכַּחַתְּ לַהּ, כְּגוֹן שֶׁבָּא עָלֶיהָ אָרוּס שֶׁלֹּא כְּדַרְכָּהּ.

Rabbi Abba bar Memel elaborates: If this is referring to a case where he betrothed her with money and then engaged in sexual intercourse with her, she is a non-virgin, and the punishment of stoning applies only to one who engages in intercourse with a betrothed young virgin. If it is referring to a case where he betrothed her with money and did not engage in intercourse with her, this is nothing, as the betrothal has not been completed. The Rabbis said before Abaye: You find it in a case where he betrothed her with money and then the betrothed man engaged in intercourse with her in an atypical manner, i.e., anal intercourse. Despite the fact that she is still a virgin, the betrothal has taken effect by means of this type of sexual intercourse.

אֲמַר לְהוּ אַבָּיֵי: עַד כָּאן לָא פְּלִיגִי רַבִּי וְרַבָּנַן אֶלָּא בְּאַחֵר, אֲבָל בַּעַל – דִּבְרֵי הַכֹּל אִם בָּא עָלֶיהָ שֶׁלֹּא כְּדַרְכָּהּ – עֲשָׂאָהּ בְּעוּלָה!

Abaye said to those Sages: The verse cannot be explained in that manner, as Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi and the Rabbis disagree only with regard to another man, i.e., whether a woman is considered to be a virgin after engaging in anal intercourse with another man. But with regard to her husband, everyone agrees that if he engages in intercourse in an atypical manner with her he has rendered her a non-virgin. If so, she is no longer considered a virgin with regard to the halakha of a betrothed young woman.

מַאי הִיא? דְּתַנְיָא: בָּאוּ עָלֶיהָ עֲשָׂרָה אֲנָשִׁים, וַעֲדַיִין הִיא בְּתוּלָה – כּוּלָּן בִּסְקִילָה. רַבִּי אוֹמֵר, אוֹמֵר אֲנִי: הָרִאשׁוֹן בִּסְקִילָה, וְכוּלָּן בְּחֶנֶק.

The Gemara clarifies: What is the dispute to which Abaye refers? As it is taught in a baraita (Tosefta, Sanhedrin 10:4): If ten men engaged in sexual intercourse with a betrothed young woman, and she is still a virgin, as they engaged in anal intercourse with her, they are all punished by stoning. Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: I say that the first one is punished by stoning, as he engaged in intercourse with a virgin young woman, but all the others are punished by strangulation. Once the first man engages in intercourse with her she is no longer considered a virgin, even if he engaged in anal intercourse with her.

אָמַר רַב נַחְמָן בַּר יִצְחָק: מַשְׁכַּחַתְּ לַהּ כְּגוֹן שֶׁקִּדְּשָׁהּ בִּשְׁטָר, הוֹאִיל וְגוֹמֵר וּמוֹצִיא, גּוֹמֵר וּמַכְנִיס.

Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said a different answer to Rabbi Abba bar Memel’s question: You find a situation where a man who engages in intercourse with a betrothed young woman is punished by stoning in a case where he betrothed her with a document. Everyone agrees that since a document, i.e., a bill of divorce, completely removes a woman from her husband, without the need for an additional act, it also completely brings her into the state of betrothal. If a young woman is betrothed by means of a document, she can be a betrothed young woman while remaining a virgin.

וְרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן, הַאי ״וּבְעָלָהּ״, מַאי עָבֵיד לֵיהּ? הַהוּא מִיבְּעֵי לֵיהּ – זוֹ נִקְנֵית בְּבִיאָה, וְאֵין אָמָה הָעִבְרִיָּה נִקְנֵית בְּבִיאָה.

The Gemara returns to the different derivations of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi and Rabbi Yoḥanan. And Rabbi Yoḥanan, who maintains that the mode of betrothal through intercourse is derived from the verse: “If a man be found lying with a married woman [beulat ba’al]” (Deuteronomy 22:22), what does he do with this verse: “When a man takes a woman and engages in sexual intercourse with her” (Deuteronomy 24:1)? The Gemara answers: He requires that verse for a different halakha, as he maintains that it teaches that this woman can be acquired through intercourse, but a Hebrew maidservant cannot be acquired through intercourse.

סָלְקָא דַּעְתָּךְ אָמֵינָא תֵּיתֵי בְּקַל וָחוֹמֶר מִיבָמָה: וּמָה יְבָמָהּ שֶׁאֵין נִקְנֵית בְּכֶסֶף, נִקְנֵית בְּבִיאָה, זוֹ, שֶׁנִּקְנֵית בְּכֶסֶף, אֵינוֹ דִּין שֶׁנִּקְנֵית בְּבִיאָה?

As it might enter your mind to say: Let the halakha of a Hebrew maidservant be derived through an a fortiori inference from the halakha of a yevama: Just as a yevama, who cannot be acquired through money at all, nevertheless can be acquired through intercourse, which indicates that the ability of an act of sexual intercourse to effect acquisition is greater than that of money, is it not logical that this Hebrew maidservant, who can be acquired through money, can also be acquired through intercourse?

מָה לִיבָמָה, שֶׁכֵּן זְקוּקָה וְעוֹמֶדֶת. סָלְקָא דַּעְתָּךְ אָמֵינָא: הוֹאִיל וּכְתִב ״אִם אַחֶרֶת יִקַּח לוֹ״, הִקִּישָׁהּ הַכָּתוּב לְאַחֶרֶת. מָה אַחֶרֶת מִיקַּנְיָא בְּבִיאָה – אַף אָמָה הָעִבְרִיָּה מִיקַּנְיָא בְּבִיאָה, קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן.

The Gemara rejects this opinion: What is unique about a yevama is that she is bound and standing waiting for the yavam, i.e., there is already a connection between them. Perhaps it is for this reason that intercourse enables a yavam to acquire a yevama, and the same cannot be said of a maidservant. Rather, it might enter your mind to say a different claim: Since it is written with regard to a the master of a Hebrew maidservant: “If he take himself another wife” (Exodus 21:10), this verse juxtaposes a Hebrew maidservant with another woman that a master marries: Just as another woman that a master marries can be acquired through intercourse, so too, a Hebrew maidservant can be acquired through intercourse. Therefore, the verse teaches us, with the phrase “and engages in sexual intercourse with her,” that this is not the case.

וְרַבִּי, הַאי סְבָרָא מְנָא לֵיהּ? אִם כֵּן לִכְתּוֹב רַחֲמָנָא ״וּבָעַל״, מַאי ״וּבְעָלָהּ״ – שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ תַּרְתֵּי.

The Gemara asks: And Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, who learns that betrothal can be effected through sexual intercourse from this verse, from where does he derive this conclusion that a Hebrew maidservant cannot be acquired through intercourse? The Gemara answers: If so, that this verse is teaching only one halakha, let the Merciful One write simply: And he engages in sexual intercourse. What is the meaning of the phrase “And he engages in sexual intercourse with her”? Learn two halakhot from it. One can learn from this verse both that a woman can be acquired through intercourse, and that an ordinary woman can be betrothed through intercourse but a Hebrew maidservant cannot be acquired through intercourse.

וּלְרָבָא דְּאָמַר: בַּר אֲהִינָא אַסְבְּרַהּ לִי: ״כִּי יִקַּח אִישׁ אִשָּׁה וּבְעָלָהּ״ – קִידּוּשִׁין הַמְסוּרִין לְבִיאָה הָווּ קִידּוּשִׁין, קִידּוּשִׁין שֶׁאֵין מְסוּרִין לְבִיאָה לָא הָווּ קִידּוּשִׁין. מַאי אִיכָּא לְמֵימַר?

The Gemara asks: And according to the opinion of Rava, who said: Bar Ahina explained this to me by citing a proof from the following verse: “When a man takes a woman and engages in sexual intercourse with her” (Deuteronomy 24:1), which teaches that betrothal that is given to consummation, i.e., betrothal when it is permitted for the man and woman to engage in intercourse, is a betrothal, but betrothal that is not given to consummation is not a valid betrothal, what is there to say? Since he uses this verse for a different purpose, from where does Rava derive that a woman can be betrothed through intercourse and that a Hebrew maidservant cannot be acquired in this manner?

אִם כֵּן נִכְתּוֹב קְרָא ״אוֹ בְעָלָהּ״, מַאי ״וּבְעָלָהּ״ – שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ כּוּלְּהוּ.

The Gemara answers: If so, that a woman cannot be betrothed through intercourse, let the verse write: When a man takes a woman or engages in intercourse with her. What is indicated by the phrase: “And engages in sexual intercourse with her”? One can learn from the verse all these halakhot, that intercourse is a valid mode of betrothing a woman but not acquiring a maidservant, and betrothal is effective only when it is given to consummation.

וְרַבִּי, הַאי ״בְּעֻלַת בַּעַל״, מַאי עָבֵיד לֵיהּ? הַאי מִיבְּעֵי לֵיהּ – בַּעַל עוֹשֶׂה אוֹתָהּ בְּעוּלָה שֶׁלֹּא כְּדַרְכָּהּ, וְאֵין אַחֵר עוֹשֶׂה אוֹתָהּ בְּעוּלָה שֶׁלֹּא כְּדַרְכָּהּ.

The Gemara asks: And Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, what does he do with this verse: “If a man be found lying with a married woman [beulat ba’al]” (Deuteronomy 22:22), from which Rabbi Yoḥanan derives that intercourse is a valid means of betrothal? The Gemara answers: Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi requires this verse for the halakha that the husband renders her a non-virgin even if he engages in intercourse with her in an atypical manner, but no other man renders her a non-virgin by engaging in intercourse with her in an atypical manner.

וּמִי אִית לֵיהּ לְרַבִּי הַאי סְבָרָא? וְהָתַנְיָא: בָּאוּ עָלֶיהָ עֲשָׂרָה אֲנָשִׁים וַעֲדַיִין הִיא בְּתוּלָה – כּוּלָּם בִּסְקִילָה. רַבִּי אוֹמֵר: אוֹמֵר אֲנִי הָרִאשׁוֹן בִּסְקִילָה, וְכוּלָּם בְּחֶנֶק!

The Gemara asks: And does Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi accept this opinion? But isn’t it taught in a baraita: If ten men engaged in intercourse with a betrothed young woman, and she is still a virgin, they are all punished by stoning. Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: I say that the first one is punished by stoning, but the others are all punished by strangulation. This proves that in the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, even one who is not her husband can render a woman a non-virgin by engaging in anal intercourse with her.