נדרים יא

נדרים יא

גְּמָ׳ סַבְרוּהָ: מַאי ״לַחוּלִּין״ — לָא לְחוּלִּין לֶיהֱוֵי, אֶלָּא קׇרְבָּן.

GEMARA: They assumed: What is the meaning of the term laḥullin? The individual is saying: It shall not [la] be non-sacred [ḥullin] but rather it should have the status of an offering.

מַנִּי מַתְנִיתִין? אִי רַבִּי מֵאִיר — לֵית לֵיהּ מִכְּלָל לָאו אַתָּה שׁוֹמֵעַ הֵן. דִּתְנַן, רַבִּי מֵאִיר אוֹמֵר: כׇּל תְּנַאי שֶׁאֵינוֹ כִּתְנַאי בְּנֵי גָד וּבְנֵי רְאוּבֵן — אֵינוֹ תְּנַאי.

The Gemara says: Whose opinion is expressed in the mishna? If you say it is that of Rabbi Meir, he does not hold that from a negative statement you can infer a positive statement. As we learned in a mishna: Rabbi Meir says that any condition that is not like the condition of the sons of the tribe of Gad and the sons of the tribe of Reuben, when Moses gave them land on the eastern bank of the Jordan River (see Numbers 32:29–30), is not a valid condition. Moses phrased the agreement as a double condition, stating that if they would join the other tribes in battle they would receive their inheritance on the eastern bank of the Jordan River, and if not, they would not receive that territory. Because Rabbi Meir holds that only a condition expressed in this manner is valid, it is clear that he holds that one may not infer a negative statement from a positive one or vice versa.

אֶלָּא רַבִּי יְהוּדָה הִיא. אֵימָא סֵיפָא, רַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר: הָאוֹמֵר ״יְרוּשָׁלַיִם״ — לֹא אָמַר כְּלוּם. מִדְּסֵיפָא רַבִּי יְהוּדָה — רֵישָׁא לָאו רַבִּי יְהוּדָה הִיא!

Rather, the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda. The Gemara challenges this statement: Say the latter clause of the mishna: Rabbi Yehuda says: One who says that an item shall be considered Jerusalem has not said anything. From the fact that the latter clause is stated by Rabbi Yehuda, it is clear that the first clause is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda.

כּוּלֵּהּ רַבִּי יְהוּדָה הִיא, וְהָכִי קָתָנֵי: שֶׁרַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר: הָאוֹמֵר ״יְרוּשָׁלַיִם״ — לֹא אָמַר כְּלוּם.

The Gemara responds: The entire mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, and this is what it is teaching: Although one who declares an item to be like Jerusalem has taken a vow rendering it forbidden, one who says that an item shall be considered Jerusalem has not taken a vow. This is as Rabbi Yehuda says, that one who says that an item shall be considered Jerusalem has not said anything, since this expression has no meaning.

וְכִי אָמַר ״כִּירוּשָׁלַיִם״, לְרַבִּי יְהוּדָה מִי מִיתְּסַר? וְהָתַנְיָא, רַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר: הָאוֹמֵר ״כִּירוּשָׁלַיִם״ — לֹא אָמַר כְּלוּם, עַד שֶׁיִּדּוֹר בְּדָבָר הַקָּרֵב בִּירוּשָׁלַיִם!

The Gemara asks: When one says that an item should be like Jerusalem, is it prohibited according to Rabbi Yehuda? Isn’t it taught in a baraita that Rabbi Yehuda says: One who says that an item shall be considered like Jerusalem has not said anything unless he vows by means of an item that is sacrificed in Jerusalem. Consequently, the first clause of the mishna, which states that one has vowed if he declares an item to be like Jerusalem, cannot be in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda.

כּוּלַּהּ רַבִּי יְהוּדָה הִיא, וּתְרֵי תַּנָּאֵי אַלִּיבָּא דְּרַבִּי יְהוּדָה.

The Gemara responds: The entire mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, and the mishna and baraita express the opinions of two tanna’im in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda.

תַּנְיָא: ״חוּלִּין״ ״הַחוּלִּין״ ״כְּחוּלִּין״, בֵּין ״שֶׁאוֹכַל לָךְ״ וּבֵין ״שֶׁלֹּא אוֹכַל לָךְ״, — מוּתָּר. ״לַחוּלִּין שֶׁאוֹכַל לָךְ״ — אָסוּר. ״לַחוּלִּין לֹא אוֹכַל לָךְ״ — מוּתָּר.

It is taught in a baraita: If one declares food: Non-sacred, or: The non-sacred, or: Like the non-sacred, then whether he combines that expression with the phrase: That which I eat of yours, or: That which I do not eat of yours, he has not expressed a vow and the food remains permitted. However, if he says: That which I eat of yours shall be considered laḥullin, i.e., not non-sacred, but rather consecrated, the food is forbidden. If he says: That which I do not eat of yours shall be considered laḥullin, the other individual’s food remains permitted to him.

רֵישָׁא מַנִּי — רַבִּי מֵאִיר הִיא, דְּלֵית לֵיהּ מִכְּלָל לָאו אַתָּה שׁוֹמֵעַ הֵין.

The Gemara analyzes this baraita: Who is the author of the first clause of the baraita? It is Rabbi Meir, who does not hold that from a negative statement you can infer a positive statement. Consequently, even if one said: That which I do not eat of yours shall be considered non-sacred, that does not indicate that what he does eat shall be considered consecrated.

אֵימָא סֵיפָא: ״לַחוּלִּין לֹא אוֹכַל לָךְ״ — מוּתָּר. וְהָתְנַן: ״לַקׇּרְבָּן לֹא אוֹכַל לָךְ״ — רַבִּי מֵאִיר אוֹסֵר. וְקַשְׁיָא לַן: הָא לֵית לֵיהּ מִכְּלָל לָאו אַתָּה שׁוֹמֵעַ הֵין?

However, say the latter clause of that baraita: If one says: That which I will not eat of yours shall be considered laḥullin, the other individual’s food remains permitted to him. But didn’t we learn in a mishna (13a) that if one says: That which I will not eat of yours shall be considered lakorban, Rabbi Meir prohibits him from eating food belonging to the other individual? Lakorban apparently means la korban, it is not an offering. The reason for this opinion is that his statement indicates that what he does not eat is not an offering, but what he does eat shall be considered an offering. This poses a difficulty for us because Rabbi Meir does not hold that from a negative statement you can infer a positive statement.

וְאָמַר רַבִּי אַבָּא, נַעֲשָׂה כְּאוֹמֵר: לְקׇרְבָּן יְהֵא, לְפִיכָךְ לֹא אוֹכַל לָךְ. הָכָא נָמֵי הָכִי קָאָמַר לֵיהּ: לָא חוּלִּין לֶיהֱוֵי, לְפִיכָךְ לֹא אוֹכַל לָךְ!

And to answer this difficulty, Rabbi Abba said: It is as though he said: It shall be for an offering [lekorban], and therefore I will not eat that which is yours. Here too, when he said: That which I will not eat of yours shall be considered laḥullin, this is what he said to him: It shall not be non-sacred, and therefore I will not eat that which is yours. Consequently, the vow should take effect even according to Rabbi Meir; why does the baraita rule that the vow does not take effect and the food remains permitted?

הַאי תַּנָּא סָבַר לַהּ כְּרַבִּי מֵאִיר בַּחֲדָא וּפְלִיג עֲלֵיהּ בַּחֲדָא? סָבַר לַהּ כְּוָתֵיהּ בַּחֲדָא — דְּלֵית לֵיהּ מִכְּלָל לָאו אַתָּה שׁוֹמֵעַ הֵין, וּפְלִיג עֲלֵיהּ בַּחֲדָא — בְּקׇרְבָּן.

The Gemara answers: This tanna of the baraita holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir in one case and disagrees with his opinion in another. He holds in accordance with his opinion in one case, in that he does not hold that from a negative statement you can infer a positive statement. And he disagrees with his opinion in another case, i.e., in the case of an offering. This tanna holds that if one says: That which I will not eat of yours shall be considered lakorban, he does not mean: It is to be considered an offering and therefore I will not eat from that which is yours. Similarly, in the case in the baraita, the tanna does not hold that the individual means to say: It shall not be non-sacred and therefore I will not eat that which is yours. In order to effect a vow, one must express it clearly.

רַב אָשֵׁי אָמַר: הָא דְאָמַר ״לַחוּלִּין״, וְהָא דְּאָמַר ״לָא לְחוּלִּין״, דְּמַשְׁמַע: לָא לֶיהֱוֵי חוּלִּין אֶלָּא כְּקׇרְבָּן.

Rav Ashi said: The apparent contradiction between the baraita and the mishna can be resolved in a different manner. This case in the baraita is where he said: That which I will not eat of yours shall be considered as non-sacred, and that case, where it is forbidden, in accordance with Rabbi Meir’s ruling in the mishna, is where he said: That which I will not eat of yours should not be considered as non-sacred, which indicates: It shall not be considered non-sacred but rather like an offering, and therefore I will not eat it.

״טָהוֹר״ וְ״טָמֵא״, ״נוֹתָר״ וּ״פִיגּוּל״ — אָסוּר. בָּעֵי רָמֵי בַּר חָמָא: ״הֲרֵי עָלַי כִּבְשַׂר זִבְחֵי שְׁלָמִים לְאַחַר זְרִיקַת דָּמִים״, מַהוּ?

§ It is stated in the mishna that if one says that a food item shall be considered not ritually pure, or if he said the food shall be considered an offering that has become ritually impure, left over [notar], or piggul, i.e., an offering that was sacrificed with the intent to consume it after its appointed time, it is forbidden. Rami bar Ḥama raises a dilemma: If one said with regard to a particular item: This is prohibited to me like the meat of peace-offerings after the sprinkling of their blood, what is the halakha? Is this an effective vow, which prohibits the item?

אִי דְּקָאָמַר בְּהָדֵין לִישָּׁנָא — בְּהֶיתֵּרָא קָא מַתְפֵּיס! אֶלָּא: כְּגוֹן דְּמַחֵית בְּשַׂר זִבְחֵי שְׁלָמִים, וּמַחֵית דְּהֶיתֵּרָא גַּבֵּיהּ, וְאָמַר: ״זֶה כָּזֶה״, מַאי: בְּעִיקָּרוֹ קָא מַתְפֵּיס, אוֹ בְּהֶיתֵּרָא קָא מַתְפֵּיס?

The Gemara responds: If he said it with this formulation, he is associating the object of his vow with a permitted item, as the meat of peace-offerings is permitted to be eaten after the blood is sprinkled on the altar. Consequently, the declaration does not express a vow. Rather, it is a case where he places the meat of peace-offerings following the sprinkling of the blood in one place, and he places an item that is permitted next to it. And he says: This is like that. In this case, what is the halakha? Is he associating the object of his vow with the original forbidden status of the peace-offering before the blood is sprinkled, or is he associating the object of his vow with the current permitted status of the peace-offering?

אָמַר רָבָא, תָּא שְׁמַע: נוֹתָר וּפִיגּוּל.

To resolve this question, Rava said: Come and hear a proof from the mishna: If he said the food shall be considered an offering that has become notar or piggul, i.e. an offering that was sacrificed with the intent to consume it after its appointed time, it is forbidden.