נדרים לה

נדרים לה

אֵיתִיבֵיהּ, אָמַר לוֹ: ״הַשְׁאִילֵנִי פָּרָתְךָ״, אָמַר לוֹ: ״קֻוֽנָּם פָּרָה שֶׁאֲנִי קָנוּי לָךְ״, ״נְכָסַי עָלֶיךָ אִם יֵשׁ לִי פָּרָה אֶלָּא זוֹ״. ״הַשְׁאִילֵנִי קַרְדּוּמְּךָ״, אָמַר לוֹ: ״קֻוֽנָּם קַרְדּוֹם שֶׁיֵּשׁ לִי שֶׁאֲנִי קָנוּי״, ״נְכָסַי עָלַי אִם יֵשׁ לִי קַרְדּוֹם אֶלָּא זֶה״, וְנִמְצָא שֶׁיֵּשׁ לוֹ — בְּחַיָּיו אָסוּר, מֵת אוֹ שֶׁנִּתְּנָה לוֹ בְּמַתָּנָה — הֲרֵי זֶה מוּתָּר.

The Gemara raised an objection to Rava. If another person said to him: Lend me your cow, and the owner answered and said to him: Every cow that I purchased other than this one, which I need, is konam for you; or if he said: My property is forbidden to you if I have a cow other than this one, and in fact, he owns other cows; or if another said to him: Lend me your spade, and the owner of the spade said to him: Every spade that I have that I purchased is konam for you; or if he said: My property is forbidden to me if I have a spade other than this one, and it is discovered that he has another spade and the konam takes effect, then during the life of the one who vowed, the cow or the spade is forbidden to the subject of the vow. If the one who vowed died or if the cow or the spade was given to the subject of the vow as a gift, it is permitted. Apparently, the konam is in effect only as long as the property is in his possession.

אָמַר רַב אַחָא בְּרֵיהּ דְּרַב אִיקָא: שֶׁנִּיתְּנָה לוֹ עַל יְדֵי אַחֵר.

Rav Aḥa, son of Rav Ika, said: It is referring to a case where it was given to the subject of the vow by another person. The one who vowed did not give him the gift directly. He sold or transferred the item to a third party, who gave it to the subject of the vow as a present. Since the property left the possession of its owner before it was given to the subject of the vow, the prohibition does not take effect upon it.

אָמַר רַב אָשֵׁי: דַּיְקָא נָמֵי דְּקָתָנֵי ״שֶׁנִּיתְּנָה לוֹ״, וְלָא קָתָנֵי ״שֶׁנְּתָנָהּ לוֹ״.

The Gemara states that Rav Ashi said: The language is also precise, as it teaches: That was given to him, and it is not taught: That he gave it to him. This indicates that this halakha applies specifically to a gift that was given to him by a third party, but not by the one who vowed.

בְּעָא מִינֵּיהּ רָבָא מֵרַב נַחְמָן: יֵשׁ מְעִילָה בְּקוּנָּמוֹת, אוֹ לָא?

§ Rava raised a dilemma before Rav Naḥman: Is there liability for misuse of consecrated property in cases of konamot or not? Since the legal status of an item that was rendered a konam is like that of consecrated property in that it is forbidden to the one who one vowed, is it like consecrated property in every sense, including liability for misuse of consecrated property?

אֲמַר לֵיהּ, תְּנֵיתוּהָ: מְקוֹם שֶׁנּוֹטְלִין עָלֶיהָ שָׂכָר — תִּיפּוֹל הֲנָאָה לַהֶקְדֵּשׁ. לְמֵימְרָא כִּי הֶקְדֵּשׁ, מָה הֶקְדֵּשׁ יֵשׁ בּוֹ מְעִילָה — אַף קוּנָּמוֹת יֵשׁ בָּהֶן מְעִילָה.

Rav Naḥman said to him: You learned this halakha from a mishna (33a): In a place where one takes payment for returning a lost item, that benefit that he receives for returning the item should fall into the category of consecrated Temple property. That is to say, an item forbidden by a konam is like consecrated property. Just as with regard to consecrated property there is liability for misuse, so too with regard to konamot there is liability for misuse.

כְּתַנָּאֵי: ״קֻוֽנָּם כִּכָּר זוֹ הֶקְדֵּשׁ״ וַאֲכָלָהּ, בֵּין הוּא וּבֵין חֲבֵירוֹ — מָעַל, לְפִיכָךְ יֵשׁ לָהּ פִּדְיוֹן. ״כִּכָּר זוֹ עָלַי לְהֶקְדֵּשׁ״ וַאֲכָלָהּ, הוּא — מָעַל, חֲבֵירוֹ — לֹא מָעַל. לְפִיכָךְ אֵין לָהּ פִּדְיוֹן. דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי מֵאִיר.

The Gemara comments on this. This dilemma is like a dispute between tanna’im. If one said: This loaf is konam to all like consecrated property, and he ate it, then, whether he ate it or whether another ate it, the one who ate it misused consecrated property. Therefore, since its status is that of consecrated property, it has the possibility of desanctification through redemption. If one said: This loaf is konam for me like consecrated property and he eats it, he misused consecrated property. If another eats it, he did not misuse consecrated property, as he said: To me. Therefore, it does not have the possibility of desanctification through redemption, since its status is not that of full-fledged consecrated property. This is the statement of Rabbi Meir.

וַחֲכָמִים אוֹמְרִים: בֵּין כָּךְ וּבֵין כָּךְ לֹא מָעַל, לְפִי שֶׁאֵין מְעִילָה בְּקוּנָּמוֹת.

And the Rabbis say: In the case of both vows taken in this manner and vows taken in that manner, no one misused consecrated property because there is no liability for misuse of consecrated objects in cases of konamot. Rabbi Meir disagrees and holds that there is liability for misuse in konamot.

אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַב אַחָא בְּרֵיהּ דְּרַב אַוְיָא לְרַב אָשֵׁי: ״כִּכָּרִי עָלֶיךָ״ וּנְתָנָהּ לוֹ בְּמַתָּנָה, מִי מָעַל? לִמְעוֹל נוֹתֵן — הָא לָא אֲסִירָא עֲלֵיהּ! לִמְעוֹל מְקַבֵּל — יָכוֹל דְּאָמַר: הֶיתֵּירָא בְּעֵיתִי, אִיסּוּרָא לָא בְּעֵיתִי. אֲמַר לֵיהּ: מְקַבֵּל מָעַל לִכְשֶׁיּוֹצִיא, שֶׁכׇּל הַמּוֹצִיא מְעוֹת הֶקְדֵּשׁ לְחוּלִּין, כְּסָבוּר שֶׁל חוּלִּין הוּא — מוֹעֵל. אַף זֶה — מוֹעֵל.

Rav Aḥa, son of Rav Avya, said to Rav Ashi: If one said to another: My loaf is konam for you, and he then gave it to him as a gift, which of them misused consecrated property? If you say: Let the one who gives the loaf be liable for misuse, why would he be liable; the loaf is not forbidden to him? If you say: Let the one who receives the loaf be liable for misuse, he can say: I wanted to receive a permitted item; I did not want to receive a forbidden item. Since the loaf is forbidden, if I accepted it from you, it was not my intention to do so. Rav Ashi said to him: The one who receives the loaf is liable for misuse when he utilizes the loaf, as the principle with regard to misuse is that anyone who utilizes consecrated money for non-sacred purposes, when he is under the impression that it is non-sacred, misuses consecrated property. This person who received the loaf also misuses consecrated property.

מַתְנִי׳ וְתוֹרֵם אֶת תְּרוּמָתוֹ וּמַעְשְׂרוֹתָיו לְדַעְתּוֹ, וּמַקְרִיב עָלָיו קִינֵּי זָבִין, קִינֵּי זָבוֹת, קִינֵּי יוֹלְדוֹת, חַטָּאוֹת וַאֲשָׁמוֹת. וּמְלַמְּדוֹ מִדְרָשׁ הֲלָכוֹת וְאַגָּדוֹת, אֲבָל לֹא יְלַמְּדֶנּוּ מִקְרָא. אֲבָל מְלַמֵּד הוּא אֶת בָּנָיו וְאֶת בְּנוֹתָיו מִקְרָא.

MISHNA: The mishna proceeds to list other tasks that one may perform for someone who is prohibited by vow from benefiting from him. And he separates his teruma and his tithes, provided that it is with the knowledge and consent of the owner of the produce. And he sacrifices for him the bird nests, i.e., pairs of birds, pigeons and turtledoves, of zavin (see Leviticus 15:13–15); the bird nests of zavot (see Leviticus 15:28–30); the bird nests of women after childbirth (see Leviticus 12:6–8); sin-offerings; and guilt-offerings. And he teaches him midrash, halakhot, and aggadot, but he may not teach him Bible. However, he may teach his sons and daughters Bible.

גְּמָ׳ אִיבַּעְיָא לְהוּ: הָנֵי כָּהֲנֵי, שְׁלוּחֵי דִידַן הָווּ, אוֹ שְׁלוּחֵי דִשְׁמַיָּא? לְמַאי נָפְקָא מִינַּהּ — לְמוּדָּר הֲנָאָה. אִי אָמְרַתְּ דִּשְׁלוּחֵי דִידַן הָווּ, הָא מְהַנֵּי לֵיהּ וְאָסוּר. וְאִי אָמְרַתְּ שְׁלוּחֵי דִשְׁמַיָּא — שְׁרֵי. מַאי?

GEMARA: A dilemma was raised before the Sages: Are these priests our agents or agents of Heaven when they perform the Temple service? The Gemara elaborates: What is the practical difference whether they are our agents or God’s agents? The Gemara answers: The difference is with regard to one prohibited by vow from deriving benefit from another. If you say that the priests are our agents, don’t the priests provide benefit for the one for whom benefit is forbidden by vow, and therefore, sacrificing that person’s offering is prohibited? And if you say that they are agents of Heaven, it is permitted. What is the status of priests?

תָּא שְׁמַע, דִּתְנַן: מַקְרִיב עָלָיו קִינֵּי זָבִין כּוּ׳. אִי אָמְרַתְּ שְׁלוּחֵי דִידַן, קָא מְהַנֵּי לֵיהּ?

Come and hear proof to resolve the dilemma, as we learned in the mishna: And he sacrifices for him the bird nests of zavin, etc. The Gemara infers: If you say that the priests are our agents, the priests would thereby provide benefit to one for whom benefit from them is forbidden. Based on the ruling in the mishna, apparently, priests are agents of Heaven.

וְלִיטַעְמָיךְ, לִיתְנֵי: מַקְרִיב עָלָיו קׇרְבָּנוֹת! אֶלָּא, מְחוּסְּרֵי כַפָּרָה שָׁאנֵי. דְּאָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: הַכֹּל צְרִיכִין דַּעַת, חוּץ מִמְּחוּסְּרֵי כַפָּרָה. שֶׁהֲרֵי אָדָם מֵבִיא קׇרְבָּן עַל בָּנָיו וְעַל בְּנוֹתָיו הַקְּטַנִּים, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר: ״זֹאת תּוֹרַת הַזָּב״, בֵּין גָּדוֹל בֵּין קָטָן.

The Gemara rejects the proof: And according to your reasoning, that the mishna holds that priests are agents of Heaven, let the mishna teach in general: He sacrifices for him offerings. Why did the mishna list these particular offerings? Rather, perforce, offerings brought by those lacking atonement are different from other offerings, as Rabbi Yoḥanan said: Everyone who brings an offering requires knowledge and intent in order to bring the offering, except for those lacking atonement, who bring the offering in order to complete their purification. This can be proven from the fact that a person brings a purification offering for his minor sons and daughters, although they lack halakhic intelligence, as it is stated: “This is the law of the zav” (Leviticus 15:32). This apparently superfluous verse comes to teach that the halakhot of the zav apply to both an adult and a minor.

אֶלָּא מֵעַתָּה, לְרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן ״זֹאת תּוֹרַת הַיֹּלֶדֶת וְגוֹ׳״, בֵּין קְטַנָּה וּבֵין גְּדוֹלָה? קְטַנָּה בַּת לֵידָה הִיא?! וְהָא תָּנֵי רַב בִּיבִי קַמֵּיהּ דְּרַב נַחְמָן: שָׁלֹשׁ נָשִׁים מְשַׁמְּשׁוֹת בְּמוֹךְ: קְטַנָּה וּמְעוּבֶּרֶת וּמְנִיקָה. קְטַנָּה — שֶׁמָּא תִּתְעַבֵּר וְתָמוּת.

The Gemara asks: However, if that is so according to Rabbi Yoḥanan, with regard to that which is written: “This is the law of a woman after childbirth” (Leviticus 12:7), would he interpret that the halakhot of a woman after childbirth apply to both an adult and a minor? Is a minor capable of giving birth? But didn’t Rav Beivai teach a baraita before Rav Naḥman: It is permitted for three women to engage in intercourse with a contraceptive resorbent: A minor, and a pregnant woman, and a nursing woman; a minor may do so lest she conceive and die. Apparently, a minor is incapable of giving birth, as she would die first.

הַהִיא ״זֹאת תּוֹרַת הַיֹּלֶדֶת״, בֵּין פִּקַּחַת בֵּין שׁוֹטָה, שֶׁכֵּן אָדָם מֵבִיא קׇרְבָּן עַל אִשְׁתּוֹ שׁוֹטָה,

The Gemara explains: That verse: “This is the law of a woman after childbirth,” does not come to include a minor. Rather, it comes to teach that the halakhot of a woman after childbirth apply to both a halakhically competent woman and a woman who is an imbecile, as a man brings an offering for his wife who is an imbecile.

כְּדִבְרֵי רַבִּי יְהוּדָה. דְּתַנְיָא, רַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר: אָדָם מֵבִיא קׇרְבַּן עָשִׁיר עַל אִשְׁתּוֹ, וְכׇל קׇרְבָּנוֹת שֶׁחַיֶּיבֶת,

This halakha is in accordance with the statement of Rabbi Yehuda, as it is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Yehuda says: A man brings the offering of a wealthy person for his wife, as well as all offerings that she is obligated to bring. A wealthy woman after childbirth brings a lamb as a burnt-offering and a dove or turtledove as a sin-offering. A poor woman brings two turtledoves or two pigeons, one as a burnt-offering and one as a sin-offering. Even if the woman is poor, and based on her usufruct property, she would bring the offering of the poor; if her husband is wealthy, he brings the offering of a wealthy person on her behalf. And he must bring on her behalf all the offerings for which she is obligated.

שֶׁכָּךְ כּוֹתֵב לָהּ: וְאַחְרָיוּת דְּאִית לִיךְ עֲלַי מִן קַדְמַת דְּנָא.

The fact that he is obligated to bring a wealthy person’s offering on her behalf is due to the fact that this is what he writes in her marriage contract: And responsibility to pay any financial obligations that you have incurred before this moment is incumbent upon me. Offerings that she is obligated to bring are included in those obligations, irrespective of her degree of halakhic competence. The offering of a woman after childbirth is one of the offerings brought by those lacking atonement. Therefore, even if priests are our agents, they may sacrifice the offering on behalf of the woman; since they may do so without her knowledge and intent, no agency is required. Therefore, there is no proof from the mishna that priests are agents of Heaven.