נדרים עב

נדרים עב

תָּא שְׁמַע: אֵימָתַי אָמְרוּ ״מֵת הַבַּעַל, נִתְרוֹקְנָה רְשׁוּת לָאָב״ — בִּזְמַן שֶׁלֹּא שָׁמַע הַבַּעַל, אוֹ שָׁמַע וְהֵפֵר, אוֹ שָׁמַע וְשָׁתַק וּמֵת בּוֹ בַּיּוֹם. וְאִי אָמְרַתְּ גֵּירוּשִׁין כִּשְׁתִיקָה דָּמוּ, לִיתְנֵי נָמֵי ״אוֹ שָׁמַע וְגֵירַשׁ״! מִדְּלָא תָּנֵי הָכִי — שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ גֵּירוּשִׁין כַּהֲקָמָה דָּמוּ.

Come and hear a resolution of the dilemma from the following baraita: When did they say that if the husband died the authority to nullify a young woman’s vows reverts to the father? When the husband did not hear the vow; or he heard the vow and nullified it; or heard it, and was silent, and died on that day. And if you say that divorce is like silence, let the tanna of the baraita also teach with regard to the husband: Or he heard the vow and divorced her. From the fact that he did not teach this case, learn from the baraita that divorce is like ratification.

אֵימָא סֵיפָא: אֲבָל אִם שָׁמַע וְקַיָּים, אוֹ שָׁמַע וְשָׁתַק וּמֵת בְּיוֹם שֶׁל אַחֲרָיו — אֵין יָכוֹל לְהָפֵר. וְאִי אָמְרַתְּ גֵּירוּשִׁין כַּהֲקָמָה דָּמוּ, לִיתְנֵי ״וְאִם שָׁמַע וְגֵירֵשׁ״! אֶלָּא מִדְּלָא קָתָנֵי הָכִי, שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ: גֵּירוּשִׁין כִּשְׁתִיקָה דָּמוּ.

The Gemara rejects the proof from the baraita: State the latter clause of the baraita: But if he heard it and ratified it; or he heard it, and was silent, and died on the following day, then the father cannot nullify the vow. But according to this clause, if you say that divorce is like ratification, let the tanna of the baraita also teach: And if he heard the vow and divorced her. Rather, from the fact that the baraita does not teach this, learn from the baraita that divorce is like silence.

אֶלָּא מֵהָא לֵיכָּא לְמִשְׁמַע מִינֵּיהּ. אִי רֵישָׁא דַּוְקָא — נָסֵיב סֵיפָא מִשּׁוּם רֵישָׁא. אִי סֵיפָא דַּוְקָא — נָסֵיב רֵישָׁא מִשּׁוּם סֵיפָא.

Rather, one cannot learn anything from this baraita about the effect of divorce on her vows. The Gemara explains that the discrepancy between the two clauses is stylistic and can be explained either way: If the cases in the first clause are chosen precisely, allowing for the inference that divorce is like ratification, then one must say that the tanna formulates the last clause of the baraita as he does because of the first clause, i.e., in the same style, although it does not add anything. If the cases in the last clause are chosen precisely, allowing for the inference that divorce is like silence, then one must say that the tanna formulates the first clause of the baraita as he does because of the last clause, i.e., in the same style, although it does not add anything.

תָּא שְׁמַע: נָדְרָה וְהִיא אֲרוּסָה, וְנִתְגָּרְשָׁה וְנִתְאָרְסָה בּוֹ בַּיּוֹם, אֲפִילּוּ לְמֵאָה — אָבִיהָ וּבַעְלָהּ הָאַחֲרוֹן מְפִירִין נְדָרֶיהָ. שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ גֵּירוּשִׁין כִּשְׁתִיקָה דָּמוּ, דְּאִי כַּהֲקָמָה דָּמוּ — מִי מָצֵי מֵיפַר אָרוּס אַחֲרוֹן נִידְרֵי דְּאוֹקֵים אָרוּס רִאשׁוֹן?

Come and hear a mishna (71a): If she took a vow while she was betrothed, and was divorced, and was betrothed again on the same day, even to one hundred men, her father and her final husband nullify her vows. Learn from this mishna that divorce is like silence, because if it were like ratification, could the final betrothed nullify vows that the first betrothed had already ratified?

הָכָא בְּמַאי עָסְקִינַן, בְּשֶׁלֹּא שָׁמַע אָרוּס רִאשׁוֹן. אִי הָכִי, מַאי אִירְיָא בּוֹ בַּיּוֹם? אֲפִילּוּ לְאַחַר מֵאָה יָמִים נָמֵי!

The Gemara rejects this proof: With what are we dealing here? We are dealing with a case in which the first betrothed man did not hear the vow, and for that reason his divorcing her does not constitute ratification. The Gemara then asks: If so, why mention specifically that the divorce occurred on that day? The same would hold true even after one hundred days as well. Since the first husband never heard the vow, the final husband can nullify it on whichever day he hears it.

כְּשֶׁלֹּא שָׁמַע אָרוּס וְשָׁמַע הָאָב, דְּבוֹ בַּיּוֹם הוּא דְּמָצֵי מֵיפַר, אֲבָל מִכָּאן וְאֵילָךְ לֹא מָצֵי מֵיפַר.

The Gemara answers: It is referring to a situation in which the betrothed man did not hear the vow but the father heard it. As in that case, it is only on the same day that he can nullify the vow, but he cannot nullify it from this point forward. Once her father has already heard the vow, her betrothed cannot nullify it on a different day. Therefore, one cannot infer from the mishna that divorce is like silence.

תָּא שְׁמַע: נָדְרָה בּוֹ בַּיּוֹם, גֵּירְשָׁהּ וְהֶחְזִירָהּ בּוֹ בַּיּוֹם — אֵין יָכוֹל לְהָפֵר. שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ: גֵּירוּשִׁין כַּהֲקָמָה דָּמוּ.

Come and hear a resolution of the dilemma from a mishna (89a): If she took a vow on that day, and he divorced her and remarried her on the same day, he cannot nullify her vow. Learn from the mishna that divorce is like ratification.

אָמְרִי: הָכָא בִּנְשׂוּאָה עָסְקִינַן, וְהַיְינוּ טַעְמָא דְּאֵין יָכוֹל לְהָפֵר, מִשּׁוּם דְּאֵין הַבַּעַל מֵיפֵר בְּקוֹדְמִין.

The Gemara rejects this proof: Say that here, i.e., in the mishna cited, we are dealing with a married woman, and that is the reason that he cannot nullify the vow. It is not because it has been ratified by divorce but because the husband cannot nullify his wife’s vows that precede their marriage. The dilemma remains unresolved.

מַתְנִי׳ דֶּרֶךְ תַּלְמִידֵי חֲכָמִים, עַד שֶׁלֹּא הָיְתָה בִּתּוֹ יוֹצְאָה מֵאֶצְלוֹ, אוֹמֵר לָהּ: כׇּל נְדָרִים שֶׁנָּדַרְתְּ בְּתוֹךְ בֵּיתִי — הֲרֵי הֵן מוּפָרִין. וְכֵן הַבַּעַל, עַד שֶׁלֹּא תִּכָּנֵס לִרְשׁוּתוֹ, אוֹמֵר לָהּ: כׇּל נְדָרִים שֶׁנָּדַרְתְּ עַד שֶׁלֹּא תִּכָּנְסִי לִרְשׁוּתִי — הֲרֵי הֵן מוּפָרִין. שֶׁמִּשֶּׁתִּכָּנֵס לִרְשׁוּתוֹ — אֵינוֹ יָכוֹל לְהָפֵר.

MISHNA: The practice of Torah scholars is to ensure that a woman about to be married should not be encumbered by any vows. A father, before his daughter would leave him through marriage, would say to her: All vows that you vowed in my house are hereby nullified. And similarly, the husband, before she would enter his jurisdiction, i.e., while they were still betrothed, would say to her: All vows that you vowed before you entered my jurisdiction are hereby nullified. This was necessary because once she enters his jurisdiction he cannot nullify the vows she made before that.

גְּמָ׳ בָּעֵי רָמֵי בַּר חָמָא: בַּעַל, מַהוּ שֶׁיָּפֵר בְּלֹא שְׁמִיעָה? ״וְשָׁמַע אִישָׁהּ״ דַּוְקָא הוּא, אוֹ לָאו דַּוְקָא הוּא?

GEMARA: Rami bar Ḥama asks: Concerning a husband, what is the halakha with regard to his nullifying a vow without hearing it? In other words, can a husband state a general nullification of his wife’s vows without being aware of any particular vow? When the verse states: “And her husband hears it, on the day that he hears it, and holds his peace at her, then her vows shall be ratified” (Numbers 30:8), is that referring specifically to a situation where he actually heard of a vow, and only then he can nullify it? Or is it not specifically referring to such a situation, and the mention of hearing is merely because the ordinary situation is that the husband nullifies a vow once he hears it?

אָמַר רָבָא, תָּא שְׁמַע: דֶּרֶךְ תַּלְמִידֵי חֲכָמִים, עַד שֶׁלֹּא יָצָאת בִּתּוֹ מֵאֶצְלוֹ, אוֹמֵר לָהּ: כׇּל נְדָרִים שֶׁנָּדַרְתְּ בְּתוֹךְ בֵּיתִי — הֲרֵי הֵן מוּפָרִין, וְהָא לָא שְׁמַע!

Rava said: Come and hear the mishna: The practice of Torah scholars is that a father, before his daughter would leave him through marriage, would say to her: All vows that you vowed in my house are hereby nullified. Rava points out: But the father did not hear her vows, so it must be that one can nullify vows without knowledge that they were actually made.

לְכִי שָׁמַע הוּא דְּמֵיפַר. אִם כֵּן, כִּי לָא שְׁמַע, לְמָה לֵיהּ לְמֵימַר? הָא קָמַשְׁמַע לַן: אוֹרְחֵיהּ דְּצוּרְבָּא מֵרַבָּנַן לְהַדּוֹרֵי.

The Gemara rejects this conclusion: The mishna means that the father states a preemptive nullification that when he will hear a particular vow is when he nullifies it. The vow is not actually nullified until he hears it. The Gemara asks: If so, when he has not actually heard those vows yet, why is it necessary for him to state preemptively that the vows will be nullified; why not wait until he actually hears the vow? The Gemara answers: This teaches us that it is the practice of a Torah scholar to pursue such matters, in order to prompt his daughter or his betrothed to inform him of vows she took, which will then be nullified when he hears of them.

תָּא שְׁמַע מִסֵּיפָא: וְכֵן הַבַּעַל, עַד שֶׁלֹּא תִּכָּנֵס לִרְשׁוּתוֹ, אוֹמֵר לָהּ. הָכָא נָמֵי, דְּאָמַר לַהּ: ״לְכִי שָׁמַעְנָא״.

The Gemara suggests: Come and hear from the latter clause of the mishna: And similarly, the husband, before she would enter his jurisdiction, i.e., while they were still betrothed, would say to her: All vows that you vowed before you entered my jurisdiction are hereby nullified. This implies that he can nullify vows without hearing them. The Gemara responds: Here too, it means that he says to her: When I hear the particular vow, then it will be nullified.

תָּא שְׁמַע: הָאוֹמֵר לְאִשְׁתּוֹ ״כׇּל נְדָרִים שֶׁתִּדּוֹרִי עַד שֶׁאָבֹא מִמָּקוֹם פְּלוֹנִי הֲרֵי הֵן קַיָּימִין״ — לֹא אָמַר כְּלוּם. ״הֲרֵי הֵן מוּפָרִין״, רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר אוֹמֵר: מוּפָר. וְהָא לָא שְׁמַע.

Come and hear another mishna to answer the question (Nedarim 75a): One who says to his wife: All vows that you vow until I arrive from such and such a place are hereby ratified, has not said anything, i.e., the vows are not ratified. If he says: All vows that you vow until then are hereby nullified, Rabbi Eliezer says: They are nullified. The Gemara comments: But he did not actually hear the particular vows, so one can infer from this that he need not hear her vows in order to nullify them.

הָכָא נָמֵי, דְּאָמַר: ״לְכִי שָׁמַעְנָא״. וּלְמָה לִי מִן הַשְׁתָּא? לְכִי שָׁמַע לֵיפַר לַהּ! קָסָבַר: דִּלְמָא מִטְּרִידְנָא הָהִיא שַׁעְתָּא.

The Gemara rejects this suggestion: Here too, one can understand the situation to be that he says: When I hear the particular vow, it will be nullified. The Gemara asks: But if so, why do I need, i.e., why must the husband state his nullification, from now; let him nullify them for her when he actually hears them. The Gemara answers: He reasons: Perhaps I will be preoccupied at that moment and will forget to nullify them. He therefore nullifies the vows beforehand, so that the nullification will take effect automatically when he hears them.

תָּא שְׁמַע: הָאוֹמֵר לְאַפּוֹטְרוֹפּוֹס ״כׇּל נְדָרִים שֶׁנּוֹדֶרֶת אִשְׁתִּי מִכָּאן וְעַד שֶׁאָבֹא מִמָּקוֹם פְּלוֹנִי הָפֵר״, וְהֵפֵר לֵהּ, יָכוֹל יְהוּ מוּפָרִין — תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״אִישָׁהּ יְקִימֶנּוּ וְאִישָׁהּ יְפֵרֶנּוּ״. דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי יֹאשִׁיָּה.

Come and hear a baraita: In the case of one who says to a steward [apotropos] appointed to manage his affairs in his absence: All vows that my wife vows from now until I arrive from such and such a place you should nullify, and the steward nullified the vows for her, one might have thought that they would be nullified. Therefore, the verse states: “Her husband may ratify it, or her husband may nullify it” (Numbers 30:14). The repetition of “her husband” teaches that it is the husband alone who may nullify his wife’s vows; this is the statement of Rabbi Yoshiya.

אָמַר לוֹ רַבִּי יוֹנָתָן: מָצִינוּ בְּכׇל הַתּוֹרָה כּוּלָּהּ שְׁלוּחוֹ שֶׁל אָדָם כְּמוֹתוֹ?

Rabbi Yonatan said to him: We have found everywhere in the Torah that the legal status of a person’s agent is like that of himself. Therefore, a steward can nullify the vows on the husband’s behalf.

וַאֲפִילּוּ רַבִּי יֹאשִׁיָּה לָא קָאָמַר אֶלָּא מִשּׁוּם דִּגְזֵירַת הַכָּתוּב הוּא ״אִישָׁהּ יְקִימֶנּוּ וְאִישָׁהּ יְפֵרֶנּוּ״, אֲבָל דְּכוּלֵּי עָלְמָא שְׁלוּחוֹ שֶׁל אָדָם כְּמוֹתוֹ. וְהָא לָא שְׁמִיעַ לֵיהּ!

The Gemara points out: And even Rabbi Yoshiya says that a steward cannot nullify the wife’s vows only because it is a Torah edict, based upon the words “her husband may ratify it, or her husband may nullify it” (Numbers 30:14). But according to everyone, the principle that the legal status of a person’s agent is like that of himself is generally valid. The only objection to the steward nullifying the vows is the Torah edict. The Gemara asks: But these vows were not heard by the steward? This indicates that not having heard the vows is not an obstacle to nullification.