יומא כג

יומא כג

שֶׁאֵינוֹ נוֹקֵם וְנוֹטֵר כְּנָחָשׁ — אֵינוֹ תַּלְמִיד חָכָם. וְהָכְתִיב: ״לֹא תִקּוֹם וְלֹא תִטּוֹר״? הָהוּא, בְּמָמוֹן הוּא דִּכְתִיב, דְּתַנְיָא: אֵיזוֹ הִיא נְקִימָה וְאֵיזוֹ הִיא נְטִירָה? נְקִימָה — אָמַר לוֹ: הַשְׁאִילֵנִי מַגָּלְךָ, אָמַר לוֹ: לָאו. לְמָחָר אָמַר לוֹ הוּא: הַשְׁאִילֵנִי קַרְדּוּמְּךָ, אָמַר לוֹ: אֵינִי מַשְׁאִילְךָ, כְּדֶרֶךְ שֶׁלֹּא הִשְׁאַלְתַּנִי — זוֹ הִיא נְקִימָה.

who does not avenge himself and bear a grudge like a snake when insulted is not considered a Torah scholar at all, as it is important to uphold the honor of Torah and its students by reacting harshly to insults. The Gemara asks: But isn’t it written explicitly in the Torah: “You shall not take vengeance nor bear any grudge against the children of your people” (Leviticus 19:18)? The Gemara responds: That prohibition is written with regard to monetary matters and not personal insults, as it was taught in a baraita: What is revenge and what is bearing a grudge? Revenge is illustrated by the following example: One said to his fellow: Lend me your sickle, and he said: No. The next day he, the one who had refused to lend the sickle, said to the other person: Lend me your ax. If he said to him: I will not lend to you, just as you did not lend to me, that is revenge.

וְאֵיזוֹ הִיא נְטִירָה? אָמַר לוֹ: הַשְׁאִילֵנִי קַרְדּוּמְּךָ, אָמַר לוֹ: לֹא. לְמָחָר אָמַר לוֹ: הַשְׁאִילֵנִי חֲלוּקְךָ! אָמַר לוֹ: הֵילָךְ, אֵינִי כְּמוֹתְךָ שֶׁלֹּא הִשְׁאַלְתַּנִי. זוֹ הִיא נְטִירָה.

And what is bearing a grudge? If one said to his fellow: Lend me your ax, and he said: No, and the next day he, the one who had refused to lend the ax, said to the other man: Lend me your robe; if the first one said to him: Here it is, as I am not like you, who would not lend to me, that is bearing a grudge. Although he does not respond to his friend’s inconsiderate behavior in kind, he still makes it known to his friend that he resents his inconsiderate behavior. This baraita shows that the prohibition relates only to monetary matters, such as borrowing and lending.

וְצַעֲרָא דְגוּפָא לָא? וְהָא תַּנְיָא: הַנֶּעֱלָבִין וְאֵינָן עוֹלְבִין, שׁוֹמְעִין חֶרְפָּתָן וְאֵינָן מְשִׁיבִין, עוֹשִׂין מֵאַהֲבָה וּשְׂמֵחִין בְּיִסּוּרִין, עֲלֵיהֶן הַכָּתוּב אוֹמֵר: ״וְאוֹהֲבָיו כְּצֵאת הַשֶּׁמֶשׁ בִּגְבוּרָתוֹ״!

The Gemara asks: But does the prohibition against vengeance really not relate also to matters of personal anguish suffered by someone? Wasn’t it taught in a baraita: Those who are insulted but do not insult others, who hear themselves being shamed but do not respond, who act out of love for God, and who remain happy in their suffering, about them the verse states: “They that love Him be as the sun when it goes forth in its might” (Judges 5:31). This baraita shows that one should forgive personal insults as well as wrongs in monetary matters.

לְעוֹלָם דְּנָקֵיט לֵיהּ בְּלִיבֵּיהּ. וְהָאָמַר רָבָא: כׇּל הַמַּעֲבִיר עַל מִדּוֹתָיו — מַעֲבִירִין לוֹ עַל כׇּל פְּשָׁעָיו! דִּמְפַיְּיסוּ לֵיהּ וּמִפַּיַּיס.

The Gemara responds that the prohibition against taking vengeance and bearing a grudge indeed applies to cases of personal anguish; however, actually, the scholar may keep resentment in his heart, though he should not act on it or remind the other person of his insulting behavior. The Gemara asks: But didn’t Rava say: With regard to whoever forgoes his reckonings with others for injustices done to him, the heavenly court in turn forgoes punishment for all his sins? The Gemara answers: Indeed, even a scholar who is insulted must forgive insults, but that is only in cases where his antagonist has sought to appease him, in which case he should allow himself to be appeased toward him. However, if no apology has been offered, the scholar should not forgive him, in order to uphold the honor of the Torah.

וּמָה הֵן מוֹצִיאִין — אַחַת אוֹ שְׁתַּיִם וְכוּ׳. הַשְׁתָּא שְׁתַּיִם מוֹצִיאִין, אַחַת מִבַּעְיָא?

§ The mishna describes that the lottery between competing priests is conducted by the priests extending their fingers for a count. And the mishna elaborated: And what fingers do they extend for the lottery? They may extend one or two fingers, and the priests do not extend a thumb in the Temple. The Gemara asks: Now that the mishna states that the priest may extend two fingers, is it necessary to state that they may also extend one finger?

אָמַר רַב חִסְדָּא, לָא קַשְׁיָא: כָּאן בְּבָרִיא, כָּאן בְּחוֹלֶה. וְהָתַנְיָא: אַחַת — מוֹצִיאִין, שְׁתַּיִם — אֵין מוֹצִיאִין. בַּמֶּה דְּבָרִים אֲמוּרִים — בְּבָרִיא, אֲבָל בְּחוֹלֶה — אֲפִילּוּ שְׁתַּיִם מוֹצִיאִין. וְהַיְּחִידִין מוֹצִיאִין שְׁתַּיִם, וְאֵין מוֹנִין לָהֶן אֶלָּא אַחַת.

Rav Ḥisda said: This is not difficult. Here, when the mishna speaks of extending one finger, it is referring to a healthy person, who has no difficulty extending just one finger without extending a second one. There, when the mishna mentions two fingers, it is referring to a sick person, for whom it is difficult to extend a single finger at a time. And so it was taught in a baraita: They may extend one finger, but they may not extend two. In what case is this statement said? It is said in reference to a healthy person; however, a sick person may extend even two fingers. And the sick priests who sit or lie alone, separately from the other priests, extend two fingers, but their two fingers are counted only as one.

וְאֵין מוֹנִין לוֹ אֶלָּא אַחַת? וְהָתַנְיָא: אֵין מוֹצִיאִין לֹא שָׁלִישׁ וְלֹא גּוּדָל מִפְּנֵי הָרַמָּאִים. וְאִם הוֹצִיא שָׁלִישׁ — מוֹנִין לוֹ, גּוּדָל — אֵין מוֹנִין לוֹ, וְלֹא עוֹד, [אֶלָּא] שֶׁלּוֹקֶה מִן הַמְמוּנֶּה בַּפְּקִיעַ.

The Gemara asks: And are the sick priest’s two fingers really counted as only one? Wasn’t it taught in a baraita: The priests may not extend the third finger, i.e., the middle finger, or the thumb, together with the index finger, due to concern for cheaters. One who sees that the count is approaching him might intentionally extend or withdraw an extra finger so that the lottery will fall on him. But if he does extend the third finger it is counted for him. This is because the third finger cannot be stretched very far from the index finger, so that it is easily recognizable that both fingers are from the same person, and this is not taken as an attempt to cheat. If he extends his thumb, however, it is not counted for him, and moreover he is punished with lashes administered by the person in charge of the pakia. The implication of the baraita is that when the third finger is extended along with the index finger, both fingers are counted.

מַאי מוֹנִין לוֹ — נָמֵי אַחַת.

The Gemara answers: What does the baraita mean when it says that if the priest extended his middle finger along with his index finger, it is counted for him? It also means, as stated earlier, that the two fingers are counted as one.

מַאי פְּקִיעַ? אָמַר רַב: מַדְרָא. מַאי מַדְרָא? אָמַר רַב פָּפָּא: מַטְרְקָא דְטַיָּיעֵי דִּפְסִיק רֵישֵׁיהּ.

The baraita mentions lashes administered by the person in charge of the pakia. What is a pakia? Rav said: It is a madra. However, the meaning of that term also became unclear over time, so the Gemara asks: What is a madra? Rav Pappa said: It is a whip [matraka] used by the Arabs, the end of which is split into several strands. That is the pakia mentioned above, which was used for punishing the priests.

אָמַר אַבָּיֵי: מֵרֵישׁ הֲוָה אָמֵינָא הָא דִּתְנַן: בֶּן בֵּיבַאי מְמוּנֶּה עַל הַפְּקִיעַ, אָמֵינָא פְּתִילָתָא. כְּדִתְנַן: מִבְּלָאֵי מִכְנְסֵי הַכֹּהֲנִים וּמֵהֶמְיָינֵיהֶן, מֵהֶן הָיוּ מַפְקִיעִין וּבָהֶן הָיוּ מַדְלִיקִין. כֵּיוָן דִּשְׁמַעְנָא לְהָא דְּתַנְיָא: וְלֹא עוֹד אֶלָּא שֶׁלּוֹקֶה מִן הַמְמוּנֶּה בַּפְּקִיעַ, אָמֵינָא: מַאי פְּקִיעַ — נַגְדָּא.

Apropos this discussion, Abaye said: At first I would say as follows: When we learned in a mishna that ben Beivai was in charge of the pakia, I would say that it means that he was in charge of producing wicks, as we learned in another mishna: They would tear [mafkia] strips from the priests’ worn-out trousers and belts and make wicks out of them, with which they lit the lamps for the Celebration of Drawing Water. But once I heard that which is taught in the previously cited baraita: And moreover, he is punished with lashes administered by the person in charge of the pakia, I now say: What is a pakia? It is lashes. Ben Beivai was in charge of corporal punishment in the Temple.

מַעֲשֶׂה שֶׁהָיוּ שְׁנֵיהֶן שָׁוִין וְרָצִין וְעוֹלִין בַּכֶּבֶשׁ. תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: מַעֲשֶׂה בִּשְׁנֵי כֹהֲנִים שֶׁהָיוּ שְׁנֵיהֶן שָׁוִין, וְרָצִין וְעוֹלִין בַּכֶּבֶשׁ, קָדַם אֶחָד מֵהֶן לְתוֹךְ אַרְבַּע אַמּוֹת שֶׁל חֲבֵירוֹ, נָטַל סַכִּין וְתָקַע לוֹ בְּלִבּוֹ.

§ It was taught in the mishna: An incident occurred where both of the priests were equal as they were running and ascending on the ramp, and one of them shoved the other and he fell and his leg was broken. The Sages taught in the Tosefta: An incident occurred where there were two priests who were equal as they were running and ascending the ramp. One of them reached the four cubits before his colleague, who then, out of anger, took a knife and stabbed him in the heart.

עָמַד רַבִּי צָדוֹק עַל מַעֲלוֹת הָאוּלָם, וְאָמַר: אָחִינוּ בֵּית יִשְׂרָאֵל שִׁמְעוּ! הֲרֵי הוּא אוֹמֵר ״כִּי יִמָּצֵא חָלָל בָּאֲדָמָה … וְיָצְאוּ זְקֵנֶיךָ וְשׁוֹפְטֶיךָ״. אָנוּ, עַל מִי לְהָבִיא עֶגְלָה עֲרוּפָה? עַל הָעִיר, אוֹ עַל הָעֲזָרוֹת? גָּעוּ כׇּל הָעָם בִּבְכִיָּה.

The Tosefta continues: Rabbi Tzadok then stood up on the steps of the Entrance Hall of the Sanctuary and said: Hear this, my brothers of the house of Israel. The verse states: “If one be found slain in the land… and it be not known who had smitten him; then your Elders and your judges shall come forth and they shall measure…and it shall be that the city which is nearest to the slain man…shall take a heifer” (Deuteronomy 21:1–3). And the Elders of that city took that heifer and broke its neck in a ritual of atonement. But what of us, in our situation? Upon whom is the obligation to bring the heifer whose neck is broken? Does the obligation fall on the city, Jerusalem, so that its Sages must bring the calf, or does the obligation fall upon the Temple courtyards, so that the priests must bring it? At that point the entire assembly of people burst into tears.

בָּא אָבִיו שֶׁל תִּינוֹק וּמְצָאוֹ כְּשֶׁהוּא מְפַרְפֵּר. אָמַר: הֲרֵי הוּא כַּפָּרַתְכֶם, וַעֲדַיִין בְּנִי מְפַרְפֵּר, וְלֹא נִטְמְאָה סַכִּין. לְלַמֶּדְךָ שֶׁקָּשָׁה עֲלֵיהֶם טׇהֳרַת כֵּלִים יוֹתֵר מִשְּׁפִיכוּת דָּמִים. וְכֵן הוּא אוֹמֵר: ״וְגַם דָּם נָקִי שָׁפַךְ מְנַשֶּׁה [הַרְבֵּה מְאֹד] עַד אֲשֶׁר מִלֵּא [אֶת] יְרוּשָׁלִַים פֶּה לָפֶה״.

The father of the boy, i.e., the young priest who was stabbed, came and found that he was still convulsing. He said: May my son’s death be an atonement for you. But my son is still convulsing and has not yet died, and as such, the knife, which is in his body, has not become ritually impure through contact with a corpse. If you remove it promptly, it will still be pure for future use. The Tosefta comments: This incident comes to teach you that the ritual purity of utensils was of more concern to them than the shedding of blood. Even the boy’s father voiced more concern over the purity of the knife than over the death of his child. And similarly, it says: “Furthermore, Manasseh spilled innocent blood very much, till he had filled Jerusalem from one end to another” (II Kings 21:16), which shows that in his day as well people paid little attention to bloodshed.

הַי מַעֲשֶׂה קָדֵים? אִילֵּימָא דִּשְׁפִיכוּת דָּמִים, הַשְׁתָּא אַשְּׁפִיכוּת דָּמִים לָא תַּקִּינוּ פַּיְיסָא, אַנִּשְׁבְּרָה רַגְלוֹ תַּקִּינוּ?! אֶלָּא, דְּנִשְׁבְּרָה רַגְלוֹ קָדֵים.

The Gemara asks: Which incident came first, the one about the broken leg reported in the mishna or the one about the slain priest in the Tosefta? If we say that the incident of bloodshed came first, this raises a problem: Now, if in response to a case of bloodshed they did not establish a lottery but continued with the running competition, can it be that in response to an incident of a priest’s leg being broken they did establish a lottery? Rather, we must say that the case in which the priest’s leg was broken in the course of the race came first, and as the mishna states, the establishment of the lottery was in response to that incident.

וְכֵיוָן דְּתַקִּינוּ פַּיְיסָא, אַרְבַּע אַמּוֹת מַאי עֲבִידְתַּיְיהוּ? אֶלָּא, לְעוֹלָם דִּשְׁפִיכוּת דָּמִים קָדֵים, וּמֵעִיקָּרָא סְבוּר אַקְרַאי בְּעָלְמָא הוּא. כֵּיוָן דַּחֲזוֹ אֲפִילּוּ מִמֵּילָא אָתוּ לִידֵי סַכָּנָה — תַּקִּינוּ רַבָּנַן פַּיְיסָא.

The Gemara asks: If the running competition was abolished immediately after the incident of the broken leg and a lottery was instituted to replace it, once they established the lottery, what were they doing still running to within the four cubits in the incident that led to the priest’s murder? Rather, actually, it is necessary to return to the approach suggested earlier, that the case involving bloodshed came first. Initially, the Sages thought that it was merely a random, i.e., isolated, event, and because it was extremely unlikely for a murder to happen again they did not abolish the competition due to that incident. Then, once they saw that in any event the priests were coming to danger, as one of them was pushed and broke his leg, the Sages established a lottery.

עָמַד רַבִּי צָדוֹק עַל מַעֲלוֹת הָאוּלָם וְאָמַר: אַחֵינוּ בֵּית יִשְׂרָאֵל שִׁמְעוּ! הֲרֵי הוּא אוֹמֵר: ״כִּי יִמָּצֵא חָלָל בָּאֲדָמָה״, אֲנַן, עַל מִי לְהָבִיא? עַל הָעִיר, אוֹ עַל הָעֲזָרוֹת? וִירוּשָׁלַיִם בַּת אֵתוֹיֵי עֶגְלָה עֲרוּפָה הִיא? וְהָתַנְיָא: עֲשָׂרָה דְּבָרִים נֶאֶמְרוּ בִּירוּשָׁלַיִם, וְזוֹ אַחַת מֵהֶן:

The Gemara returns to the incident of the slain priest and discusses several details of it. It was related that Rabbi Tzadok stood up on the steps of the Entrance Hall of the Sanctuary and said: Hear this, my brothers of the house of Israel. The verse states: “If one be found slain in the land, etc.” But what of us, in our situation? Upon whom is the obligation to bring the heifer whose neck is broken? Does the obligation fall upon the city, Jerusalem, or does the obligation fall upon the Temple courtyards? The Gemara asks: Is Jerusalem subject to bringing a heifer whose neck is broken? Wasn’t it taught in a baraita: Ten things were said about Jerusalem to distinguish it from all other cities in Eretz Yisrael, and this is one of them:

אֵינָהּ מְבִיאָה עֶגְלָה עֲרוּפָה: וְעוֹד: ״לֹא נוֹדַע מִי הִכָּהוּ״ כְּתִיב, וְהָא נוֹדַע מִי הִכָּהוּ! אֶלָּא, כְּדֵי לְהַרְבּוֹת בִּבְכִיָּה.

Jerusalem does not bring a heifer whose neck is broken. The reason for this is that the halakha of the heifer whose neck is broken applies only to land that was apportioned to a specific tribe of the Jewish people. Jerusalem alone was not divided among the tribes, but was shared equally by the entire nation. And furthermore, it is written that the heifer whose neck is broken is brought when “it be not known who had smitten him,” and here, in the case of the slain priest, it was well known who had smitten him. Rather, one must conclude that Rabbi Tzadok invoked the halakha of the heifer whose neck is broken not because it actually applied in this case but only in order to arouse the people’s grief and to increase weeping.

בָּא אָבִיו שֶׁל תִּינוֹק וּמְצָאוֹ כְּשֶׁהוּא מְפַרְפֵּר, אָמַר: הֲרֵי הוּא כַּפָּרַתְכֶם וַעֲדַיִין בְּנִי קַיָּים [כּוּ׳]. לְלַמֶּדְךָ שֶׁקָּשָׁה עֲלֵיהֶם טׇהֳרַת כֵּלִים יוֹתֵר מִשְּׁפִיכוּת דָּמִים. אִיבַּעְיָא לְהוּ: שְׁפִיכוּת דָּמִים הוּא דְּזָל, אֲבָל טׇהֳרַת כֵּלִים — כִּדְקָיְימָא קָיְימָא. אוֹ דִילְמָא: שְׁפִיכוּת דָּמִים — כִּדְקָיְימָא קָיְימָא, אֲבָל טׇהֳרַת כֵּלִים הִיא דַּחֲמִירָא?

In relating the above incident the Tosefta said: The father of the boy came and found that he was still convulsing. He said: May my son’s death be an atonement for you. But my son is still alive, etc. This incident comes to teach you that the ritual purity of utensils was of more concern to them than the shedding of blood. A dilemma was raised before the Sages: Should one conclude from this comment that bloodshed had become trivialized in their eyes but their concern for purity of utensils remained where it was originally, meaning that while they cared less than they should have about murder, they did not exaggerate the importance of purity of utensils; or perhaps their concern for bloodshed remained where it was originally, but their concern for purity of vessels had become too strict, to the extent that its importance was exaggerated beyond concern for human life?

תָּא שְׁמַע, מִדְּקָא נָסֵיב לַהּ תַּלְמוּדָא: ״וְגַם דָּם נָקִי שָׁפַךְ מְנַשֶּׁה״, שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ שְׁפִיכוּת דָּמִים הוּא דְּזָל, וְטַהֲרַת כֵּלִים — כִּדְקָיְימָא קָיְימָא.

The Gemara answers: Come and hear an answer to the dilemma: Since the Tosefta adduces a biblical teaching from the verse, “Furthermore, Manasseh spilled innocent blood,” conclude from this that it was bloodshed that had become trivialized, and the importance of purity of utensils remained where it had been.

תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: ״וּפָשַׁט … וְלָבַשׁ בְּגָדִים אֲחֵרִים וְהוֹצִיא אֶת הַדֶּשֶׁן״, שׁוֹמְעַנִי כְּדֶרֶךְ יוֹם הַכִּפּוּרִים, שֶׁפּוֹשֵׁט בִּגְדֵי קוֹדֶשׁ וְלוֹבֵשׁ בִּגְדֵי חוֹל,

§ The Gemara returns to the mitzva of removing the ashes from the altar and associated issues. The Sages taught in a baraita: The Torah states, after describing the removal of the ashes: “And he shall put off his garments, and put on other garments, and carry the ashes out of the camp to a clean place” (Leviticus 6:4). I might understand from here that this change of garments is a mitzva to change into a different kind of garment, similar to the change of garments performed on Yom Kippur, when the High Priest changes back and forth from gold clothes to white clothes. Here, too, the Torah requires that he remove his sacred garments and put on non-sacred garments.

תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״וּפָשַׁט אֶת בְּגָדָיו וְלָבַשׁ בְּגָדִים אֲחֵרִים״, מַקִּישׁ בְּגָדִים שֶׁלּוֹבֵשׁ לִבְגָדִים שֶׁפּוֹשֵׁט, מָה לְהַלָּן בִּגְדֵי קוֹדֶשׁ, אַף כָּאן בִּגְדֵי קוֹדֶשׁ.

The baraita continues: To teach us otherwise, the verse states: “And he shall put off his garments, and put on other garments,” thereby juxtaposing the garments he puts on to the garments he takes off. This indicates that just as there, the garments he removes, i.e., those in which he had performed the mitzva of removal of the ashes, are sacred garments, so too here, the clothes he puts on to take the ashes out of the camp are sacred garments.

אִם כֵּן, מָה תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר ״אֲחֵרִים״? פְּחוּתִין מֵהֶן. רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר אוֹמֵר: ״אֲחֵרִים וְהוֹצִיא״, לִימֵּד עַל הַכֹּהֲנִים בַּעֲלֵי מוּמִין שֶׁכְּשֵׁרִין לְהוֹצִיא הַדֶּשֶׁן.

If so, what is the meaning when the verse states: Other garments, which implies that the second set of garments is different from the first? It means they are of lower quality than the first set of garments. Rabbi Eliezer says a different interpretation of the words: Other garments. The verse states: “And put on other garments, and carry the ashes out of the camp,” in which the Hebrew juxtaposes the words “other” and “carry out.” This teaches that priests with physical blemishes, who are considered others in that they are not eligible to perform sacred tasks, are eligible to carry out the ashes.

אָמַר מָר: ״אֲחֵרִים״ — פְּחוּתִין מֵהֶן, כִּדְתָנָא דְּבֵי רַבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל. דְּתָנָא דְּבֵי רַבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל: בְּגָדִים שֶׁבִּשֵּׁל בָּהֶן קְדֵרָה לְרַבּוֹ — לֹא יִמְזוֹג בָּהֶן כּוֹס לְרַבּוֹ.

The Gemara now explains the baraita in detail. The Master said in the baraita: The words: Other garments, teach that they are to be of lower quality than the garments worn during the removal of the ashes. This is in accordance with what was taught in the school of Rabbi Yishmael, as it was taught in the school of Rabbi Yishmael: Clothes worn by a servant as he was cooking food for his master that became soiled in the process should not be worn by him when he pours a cup for his master, which is a task that calls for the servant to present a dignified appearance. Similarly, one who performs the dirtying task of carrying out the ashes should not wear the same fine clothes worn to perform other services.

אָמַר רֵישׁ לָקִישׁ: כְּמַחְלוֹקֶת בְּהוֹצָאָה, כָּךְ מַחְלוֹקֶת בַּהֲרָמָה. וְרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן אָמַר: מַחְלוֹקֶת בְּהוֹצָאָה, אֲבָל בַּהֲרָמָה — דִּבְרֵי הַכֹּל עֲבוֹדָה הִיא.

The baraita taught that Rabbi Eliezer derived from the word other that blemished priests are eligible for the task of carrying out the ashes, while the first tanna derived a different teaching from those words. The Gemara clarifies the scope of the dispute between the first tanna and Rabbi Eliezer. Reish Lakish said: Just as there is a dispute between Rabbi Eliezer and the first tanna with regard to carrying the ashes out of the camp, so too, there is a dispute with regard to the removal of the ashes from the altar. Rabbi Eliezer maintains that the removal of the ashes may also be performed by blemished priests, while the first tanna disagrees. But Rabbi Yoḥanan said: The dispute is only with regard to carrying the ashes out of the camp, but all agree that the removal of the ashes is a bona fide Temple service that cannot be performed by blemished priests.

מַאי טַעְמָא דְּרֵישׁ לָקִישׁ? אָמַר לָךְ: אִי סָלְקָא דַעְתָּךְ עֲבוֹדָה הִיא, יֵשׁ לְךָ עֲבוֹדָה שֶׁכְּשֵׁירָה בִּשְׁנֵי כֵלִים?

The Gemara explains: What is the reason behind the opinion of Reish Lakish? Reish Lakish could have said to you: If it enters your mind that the removal of the ashes is a bona fide Temple service, you are faced with the following difficulty: Do you have any Temple service that may be performed with only two garments rather than the full set of four vestments worn by the priests? In the Torah’s description of the garments worn to remove the ashes it says: “And the priest shall put on his linen garment, and his linen trousers shall he put on his flesh” (Leviticus 6:3).

וְרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: גַּלִּי רַחֲמָנָא בְּכֻתּוֹנֶת וּמִכְנָסַיִם, וְהוּא הַדִּין לְמִצְנֶפֶת וְאַבְנֵט.

And what is the explanation for Rabbi Yoḥanan’s opinion? In fact, the priest is required to wear all four priestly garments. The Merciful One reveals in the Torah that the priest must wear the tunic and the trousers like any other service so that one would not think that taking out the ashes may be performed in regular, non-sacred clothes. Once the Torah has made this point and mentioned these two specific garments, the same is true for the other two garments as well, i.e., the mitre and the belt.

וּמַאי שְׁנָא הָנֵי? ״מִדּוֹ בַּד״, מִדּוֹ — כְּמִדָּתוֹ. ״מִכְנְסֵי בַד״, לְכִדְתַנְיָא: מִנַּיִן שֶׁלֹּא יְהֵא דָּבָר קוֹדֶם לַמִּכְנָסַיִם, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר: ״וּמִכְנְסֵי בַד יִלְבַּשׁ עַל בְּשָׂרוֹ״.

The Gemara asks: If the Torah requires all four garments and mentions the tunic and trousers only as examples, what is different about these two that the Torah mentioned them in particular? The Gemara answers that these two particular garments were mentioned in order to teach certain halakhot. The Torah refers to the tunic as “his linen garment,” with the words “his garment” [middo], indicating that the tunic must conform to his exact size [middato] and should fit the priest perfectly. As for the words “linen trousers,” they come to teach that which was taught in a baraita: From where is it derived that as the priest gets dressed no garment should precede the trousers? As it is stated: “And his linen trousers shall he put on his flesh,” which implies that the trousers should be donned when the priest has nothing but his flesh, i.e., when he has no other garments on him yet.

וְרֵישׁ לָקִישׁ? מִדּוֹ כְּמִדָּתוֹ — מִדְּאַפְּקֵיהּ רַחֲמָנָא בִּלְשׁוֹן ״מִדּוֹ״. שֶׁלֹּא יְהֵא דָּבָר קוֹדֶם לַמִּכְנָסַיִם — מֵ״עַל בְּשָׂרוֹ״ נָפְקָא.

The Gemara asks: And with regard to Reish Lakish, who maintains that these two garments are mentioned because they are the only two that the priest wears when removing the ashes, from where does he derive these two halakhot? The Gemara answers: The halakha that his linen garment, i.e., the tunic, must be according to his size is derived the fact that the Merciful One uses the expression “his garment,” i.e., his fitted garment, in the Torah, rather than calling it by its usual name, tunic. And the halakha that no garment should precede the trousers when the priest dresses is derived from the fact that the Torah added the phrase “on his flesh.”

נֵימָא כְּתַנָּאֵי: ״עַל בְּשָׂרוֹ״, מָה תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר ״יִלְבַּשׁ״? לְהָבִיא מִצְנֶפֶת וְאַבְנֵט לַהֲרָמָה, דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי יְהוּדָה.

Let us say that the dispute between Rabbi Yoḥanan and Reish Lakish is parallel to a dispute between tanna’im. As it was taught in a baraita that the Torah states: “And the priest shall put on his linen garment, and his linen trousers shall he put on his flesh” (Leviticus 6:3). The words “shall he put on” seem superfluous, since these same words were already stated earlier in the verse. Therefore, the Torah could have sufficed with saying: “And linen trousers on his flesh.” What is the meaning when the verse states: “Shall he put on”? This extra expression comes to include the donning of the mitre and the belt, which are not mentioned here explicitly, for the removal of the ash; this is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda.

רַבִּי דּוֹסָא אוֹמֵר: לְרַבּוֹת בִּגְדֵי כֹּהֵן גָּדוֹל בְּיוֹם הַכִּפּוּרִים, שֶׁכְּשֵׁירִין לְכֹהֵן הֶדְיוֹט.

Rabbi Dosa says: The extra expression comes to include the permissibility of the High Priest’s clothes that he wears on Yom Kippur, which are linen garments identical to those of the common priest, to teach that they are acceptable to be used afterward by common priests in their service. In other words, the expression teaches that the High Priest’s garments need not be permanently retired from service after Yom Kippur, unlike the opinion of another Sage, as will be explained below.

אָמַר רַבִּי: שְׁתֵּי תְשׁוּבוֹת בְּדָבָר, חֲדָא: דְּאַבְנֵטוֹ שֶׁל כֹּהֵן גָּדוֹל לֹא זֶה הוּא אַבְנֵטוֹ שֶׁל כֹּהֵן הֶדְיוֹט. וְעוֹד: בְּגָדִים שֶׁנִּשְׁתַּמַּשְׁתָּ בָּהֶן קְדוּשָּׁה חֲמוּרָה, תִּשְׁתַּמֵּשׁ בָּהֶן קְדוּשָּׁה קַלָּה?! אֶלָּא, מָה תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר ״יִלְבַּשׁ״ —

Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: There are two refutations against Rabbi Dosa’s interpretation: One is that the belt of the High Priest that he wears on Yom Kippur is made only of linen and is not identical to the belt of the common priest, which, in Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi’s opinion, is made of wool and linen. Therefore, it is impossible for the High Priest’s Yom Kippur garments to be used by a common priest. And furthermore, with regard to garments that you used to perform the services of the most severe sanctity, i.e., the services performed by the High Priest on Yom Kippur, can it be that you will then use them to perform services of lesser sanctity by a common priest? Instead of this, a different interpretation must be said. What, then, is the meaning when the verse states the superfluous words “shall he put on”?