יומא מא

יומא מא

סְתָם סִיפְרָא מַנִּי — רַבִּי יְהוּדָה, וְקָא תָנֵי: הַגּוֹרָל עוֹשֶׂה חַטָּאת, וְאֵין הַשֵּׁם עוֹשֶׂה חַטָּאת. אַלְמָא הַגְרָלָה מְעַכְּבָא, תְּיוּבְתָּא דְּמַאן דְּאָמַר הַגְרָלָה לָא מְעַכְּבָא. תְּיוּבְתָּא.

The Gemara now formulates the proof: Who is the author of anonymous halakhic statements made in the Sifra? Rabbi Yehuda. And this baraita from the Sifra teaches: The lottery makes it a sin-offering, but verbally designating the goat with the status of a sin-offering does not make it a sin-offering. Apparently, according to Rabbi Yehuda, the lottery is indispensable. This refutation of the opinion of the one who says that the lottery is not indispensable, i.e., Rabbi Yannai, according to the second version of his dispute, is indeed a conclusive refutation.

אָמַר רַב חִסְדָּא: אֵין הַקִּינִּין מִתְפָּרְשׁוֹת אֶלָּא אוֹ בִּלְקִיחַת בְּעָלִים, אוֹ בַּעֲשִׂיַּית כֹּהֵן.

§ The Gemara addresses a similar case of designating offerings: Rav Ḥisda said: Nests, a pair of birds of which one bird must be sacrificed as a sin-offering and the other as a burnt-offering become designated for the specific type of offering only at one of two distinct points: Either upon the owner’s taking of them, when he initially purchases and consecrates them for his offering, or upon the priest’s actual performance of the sacrificial rite upon them.

אָמַר רַב שִׁימִי בַּר אָשֵׁי: מַאי טַעְמָא דְּרַב חִסְדָּא, דִּכְתִיב: ״וְלָקְחָה״ ״וְעָשָׂה״. אוֹ בִּלְקִיחָה, אוֹ בַּעֲשִׂיָּיה.

Rav Shimi bar Ashi said: What is the reason of Rav Ḥisda? As it is written in one verse: “And she shall take two turtledoves or two young pigeons, the one for a burnt-offering and the other for a sin-offering” (Leviticus 12:8). In another verse, it is also written: “And the priest shall offer them, the one for a sin-offering and the other for a burnt-offering” (Leviticus 15:15). The verses mention only the possibility of designating the offering either upon taking them or upon the performance of the sacrificial rite.

מֵיתִיבִי: ״וְעָשָׂהוּ חַטָּאת״, הַגּוֹרָל עוֹשֶׂה חַטָּאת, וְאֵין הַשֵּׁם עוֹשֶׂה חַטָּאת.

The Gemara raises an objection to Rav Ḥisda’s ruling from the baraita cited above: The verse states, with regard to the goat of Yom Kippur: “And Aaron shall…offer it for a sin-offering” (Leviticus 16:9). This indicates that the lottery makes it a sin-offering, but verbally designating the goat with the status of a sin-offering does not make it a sin-offering.

שֶׁיָּכוֹל, וַהֲלֹא דִּין הוּא: וּמָה בִּמְקוֹם שֶׁלֹּא קִידֵּשׁ הַגּוֹרָל — קִידֵּשׁ הַשֵּׁם, מְקוֹם שֶׁקִּידֵּשׁ הַגּוֹרָל, אֵינוֹ דִּין שֶׁיְּקַדֵּשׁ הַשֵּׁם?!

A verse is needed to teach this halakha, as I might have come to the opposite conclusion: Is there not an a fortiori inference: Just as in a case in which the use of a lottery does not consecrate the animals with a specific designation, nevertheless verbally designating the animals with the required status does consecrate them, so too, in a case in which the use of a lottery does consecrate the animals, is it not logically right that verbally designating the animals with the required status should consecrate them?

תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״וְעָשָׂהוּ חַטָּאת״, הַגּוֹרָל עוֹשֶׂה חַטָּאת, וְאֵין הַשֵּׁם עוֹשֶׂה חַטָּאת.

To counter this reasoning, the verse states: “He shall make it a sin-offering” to indicate that the lottery makes it a sin-offering, but verbally designating the goat with the status of a sin-offering does not make it a sin-offering.

וְהָא הָכָא, דְּלָאו שְׁעַת לְקִיחָה וְלָאו שְׁעַת עֲשִׂיָּיה הִיא, וְקָתָנֵי דְּקָבַע!

The Gemara explains the challenge to Rav Ḥisda’s ruling: But here, in the case of designating the goats, the baraita is focusing on the moment at which the lottery is held, which is neither the time of taking the goats nor the time of performing the sacrificial rite. Yet the baraita teaches that were it not for a verse that teaches otherwise, it would be possible to permanently establish the animals’ designation through a verbal designation at that time. This contradicts Rav Ḥisda’s ruling.

אָמַר רָבָא, הָכִי קָאָמַר: מָה בִּמְקוֹם שֶׁלֹּא קִידֵּשׁ הַגּוֹרָל וַאֲפִילּוּ בִּשְׁעַת לְקִיחָה, וַאֲפִילּוּ בִּשְׁעַת עֲשִׂיָּיה — קִידֵּשׁ הַשֵּׁם בִּשְׁעַת לְקִיחָה וּבִשְׁעַת עֲשִׂיָּיה, מְקוֹם שֶׁקִּידֵּשׁ הַגּוֹרָל שֶׁלֹּא בִּשְׁעַת לְקִיחָה וְשֶׁלֹּא בִּשְׁעַת עֲשִׂיָּיה, אֵינוֹ דִּין שֶׁיְּקַדֵּשׁ הַשֵּׁם בִּשְׁעַת לְקִיחָה וּבִשְׁעַת עֲשִׂיָּיה?

The Gemara rejects the challenge: Rava said: The baraita does not contradict Rav Ḥisda’s ruling. This is what the baraita is saying: Just as in a case in which the use of a lottery does not consecrate the animals with a specific designation, even if it is held at the time of taking the animals or at the time of performing the sacrificial rite, nevertheless verbally designating the animals with the required status does consecrate them if that is done at the time of taking the animals or at the time of performing the sacrificial rite; so too, in a case in which the use of a lottery does consecrate the animals, although it is held neither at the time of taking the animals nor at the time of performing the sacrificial rite, is it not logically right that verbally designating the animals with the required status should consecrate them, if it is done at the time of taking the animals or at the time of performing the sacrificial rite?

תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״וְעָשָׂהוּ חַטָּאת״, הַגּוֹרָל עוֹשֶׂה חַטָּאת, וְאֵין הַשֵּׁם עוֹשֶׂה חַטָּאת.

To counter this reasoning, the verse states: “He shall make it a sin-offering” to indicate that the lottery makes it a sin-offering, but verbally designating the goat with the status of a sin-offering does not make it a sin-offering. Rava has thereby explained the reasoning of the baraita in accordance with Rav Ḥisda’s ruling.

תָּא שְׁמַע: מְטַמֵּא מִקְדָּשׁ עָנִי, וְהִפְרִישׁ מָעוֹת לְקִינּוֹ וְהֶעֱשִׁיר, וְאַחַר כָּךְ אָמַר: אֵלּוּ לְחַטָּאתוֹ, וְאֵלּוּ לְעוֹלָתוֹ —

Come and hear another challenge to Rav Ḥisda’s ruling: One who inadvertently enters the Temple while ritually impure is required to bring a sliding-scale offering to achieve atonement. This offering is unique in that the specific offering one is required to bring depends upon his financial situation. With regard to this offering, a baraita teaches about the case of a poor person who ritually impurified the Temple, i.e., entered the Temple while ritually impure; and he set aside money for his nests, his bird pair, as he is required, as a poor person, to bring one bird as a sin-offering and one bird as a burnt-offering for atonement; and then he became wealthy, and he is consequently required to bring an animal sin-offering; and afterward, unaware of the halakha that he is no longer required to bring a bird pair, he separates his money into two portions and said that these coins are for his sin-offering and those coins are for his burnt-offering.

מוֹסִיף וּמֵבִיא חוֹבָתוֹ מִדְּמֵי חַטָּאתוֹ, וְאֵין מוֹסִיף וּמֵבִיא חוֹבָתוֹ מִדְּמֵי עוֹלָתוֹ.

Then, in such a case, he adds more money and brings his obligation of an animal sin-offering from the money set aside for his sin-offering, but he may not add more money and bring his obligation of an animal offering from the money set aside for his burnt-offering.

וְהָא הָכָא, דְּלָאו שְׁעַת לְקִיחָה וְלָאו שְׁעַת עֲשִׂיָּיה הִיא, וְקָתָנֵי דְּקָבַע!

The Gemara explains the challenge to Rav Ḥisda’s ruling: But here, in the case of designating the money, the baraita is focusing on a moment which is neither the time of taking the money nor the time of performing the sacrificial rite with the birds. And yet the baraita teaches that through a verbal designation one can permanently establish the status of the money, as is apparent from the fact that the money set aside for the burnt-offering may not be used toward the sin-offering. This contradicts Rav Ḥisda’s ruling.

אָמַר רַב שֵׁשֶׁת: וְתִסְבְּרָא? וְהָאָמַר רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר אָמַר רַבִּי הוֹשַׁעְיָא: מְטַמֵּא מִקְדָּשׁ עָשִׁיר וְהֵבִיא קׇרְבַּן עָנִי — לֹא יָצָא, וְכֵיוָן דְּלֹא יָצָא הֵיכִי קָבַע?

Rav Sheshet said: But how can you understand the baraita that way? Didn’t Rabbi Elazar say that Rabbi Hoshaya said: A wealthy person who ritually impurifies the Temple and brings the offering that a poor person is required to bring does not fulfill his obligation. Since he does not and cannot fulfill his obligation with that offering, how can that designation permanently establish the status of the money?

אֶלָּא מַאי אִית לָךְ לְמֵימַר — שֶׁכְּבָר אָמַר מֵעֲנִיּוּתוֹ, הָכָא נָמֵי — שֶׁכְּבָר אָמַר מִשְּׁעַת הַפְרָשָׁה.

Rather, what have you to say in order for the baraita to make sense? That he had already said his designation of the money while in his impoverished state. Here also, in order for the baraita not to contradict Rav Ḥisda’s ruling, it may be explained in a similar vein, that he had already said at the time of taking and setting aside his money, which monies were for his sin-offering and which were for his burnt-offering.

וּלְרַבִּי חַגָּא אָמַר רַבִּי יֹאשִׁיָּה, דְּאָמַר יָצָא,

The Gemara asks: But according to Rabbi Ḥaga, who said that Rabbi Yoshiya said that a wealthy person who brings the offering that a poor person is required to bring does fulfill his obligation,

מַאי אִיכָּא לְמֵימַר? לָא תֵּימָא: וְאַחַר כָּךְ אָמַר, אֶלָּא אֵימָא: וְאַחַר כָּךְ לָקַח וְאָמַר.

what can be said? According to this opinion, there is no inherent difficulty in the baraita that requires interpreting it as Rav Sheshet explained; read simply, it appears to contradict Rav Ḥisda’s ruling. The Gemara answers: The baraita should be emended: Do not say that the baraita says: If afterward he said. Rather, say that the baraita says: If afterward he took, i.e., purchased and consecrated the bird pair, and said.

לָקַח, מוֹסִיף וּמֵבִיא חוֹבָתוֹ מַאי נִיהוּ?!

The Gemara asks: How can the baraita be referring to a case where he had taken the birds for his offering? If so, the next statement in the baraita: He adds more money and brings his obligation of an animal sin-offering from the money set aside for his sin-offering, what does it mean? If he had taken them, then clearly he is not holding onto money with which to purchase them.

דְּפָרֵיק לֵיהּ. וְהָא אֵין פִּדְיוֹן לָעוֹף!

The Gemara suggests a solution: That statement in the baraita is referring to a case in which he redeemed the bird by transferring its sanctity to money that can then be used toward the purchase of an animal. The Gemara rejects this possibility: But there is no redemption for a bird, so this could not possibly be the case of the baraita.

אָמַר רַב פָּפָּא: כְּגוֹן שֶׁלָּקַח פְּרֵידָה אַחַת, אִי עוֹלָה זְבַן — מוֹסִיף וּמֵבִיא חוֹבָתוֹ מִדְּמֵי חַטָּאתוֹ, וְהַאי עוֹלָה אָזְלָא לִנְדָבָה. אִי חַטָּאת זְבַן — אֵין מוֹסִיף וּמֵבִיא חוֹבָתוֹ מִדְּמֵי עוֹלָתוֹ, וְהַאי חַטָּאת אָזְלָא לְמִיתָה.

Rav Pappa said: That statement in the baraita is referring to a case where he took only one bird. As such, the baraita means: If he purchased the bird for his burnt-offering, then he should add more money and bring his obligation of an animal sin-offering from the money he had intended to use to purchase the second bird for his sin-offering. And this bird, which was purchased for his burnt-offering, goes toward a free-will offering. However, if he purchased the bird for his sin-offering, then he cannot add more money and bring his obligation of an animal sin-offering from the money he had intended to use to purchase the second bird for his burnt-offering. And this bird, which was purchased for his sin-offering, goes to its death, i.e., it is left to die, as is the halakha of a sin-offering whose owner has achieved atonement with another offering.

גּוּפָא. אָמַר רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר אָמַר רַבִּי הוֹשַׁעְיָא: מְטַמֵּא מִקְדָּשׁ עָשִׁיר וְהֵבִיא קׇרְבַּן עָנִי — לֹא יָצָא. וְרַבִּי חַגָּא אָמַר רַבִּי הוֹשַׁעְיָא: יָצָא.

The Gemara proceeds to examine the dispute cited above. Returning to the matter itself, Rabbi Elazar said that Rabbi Hoshaya said: A wealthy person who ritually impurifies the Temple, and brings the offering that a poor person is required to bring, i.e., a bird pair, he does not fulfill his obligation. Rabbi Ḥaga said that Rabbi Hoshaya said: He does fulfill his obligation.

מֵיתִיבִי: מְצוֹרָע עָנִי שֶׁהֵבִיא קׇרְבַּן עָשִׁיר — יָצָא, עָשִׁיר שֶׁהֵבִיא קׇרְבַּן עָנִי — לֹא יָצָא. שָׁאנֵי הָתָם, דִּכְתִיב: ״זֹאת״.

The Gemara raises an objection from a mishna: A poor leper who brings the offering that a wealthy person is required to bring fulfills his obligation. A wealthy person who brings the offering that a poor person is required to bring does not fulfill his obligation. The Gemara answers: It is different there, in the case of leper, as it is written: “This shall be the law of the leper on the day of his purification” (Leviticus 14:2). The word “this” serves to emphasize that the details of the purification process must be carried out without any deviation.

אִי הָכִי, רֵישָׁא נָמֵי! הָא רַבִּי רַחֲמָנָא ״תּוֹרַת״, וְהָתַנְיָא: ״תּוֹרַת״, לְרַבּוֹת מְצוֹרָע עָנִי שֶׁהֵבִיא קׇרְבַּן עָשִׁיר. יָכוֹל אֲפִילּוּ עָשִׁיר שֶׁהֵבִיא קׇרְבַּן עָנִי — תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״זֹאת״.

The Gemara asks: If so, if any deviation is unacceptable, then in the case of the first clause, in which a poor leper brings the offering that a wealthy person is required to bring, he should also not fulfill his obligation. The Gemara answers: The Merciful One includes that case by stating: “The law of” (Leviticus 14:2). As it was taught in a baraita: “The law of” was stated in order to include a poor leper who brought the offering that a wealthy person is required to bring. One might have thought that even a wealthy person who brought the offering that a poor person is required to bring also fulfills his obligation. Therefore, the verse states “this” to indicate that the wealthy person may not deviate from what is required of him.

וְנֵילַף מִינַּהּ! מִיעֵט רַחֲמָנָא ״וְאִם דַּל הוּא״.

The Gemara asks: And let us derive the halakha for the parallel case of a sliding-scale offering from the halakha with regard to the offering of leper. Consequently, in the case of a sliding-scale offering, if a wealthy person brings the offering that a poor person is required to bring, he does fulfill his obligation, contrary to Rabbi Ḥaga’s opinion. The Gemara answers: With regard to a sliding-scale offering, the Merciful One excludes the validity of such an offering by stating: “If he be poor” (Leviticus 14:21). The word “he” serves to emphasize that the offering required for a poor person is valid only for him.

מַתְנִי׳ קָשַׁר לָשׁוֹן שֶׁל זְהוֹרִית בְּרֹאשׁ שָׂעִיר הַמִּשְׁתַּלֵּחַ, וְהֶעֱמִידוֹ כְּנֶגֶד בֵּית שִׁילּוּחוֹ, וְלַנִּשְׁחָט — כְּנֶגֶד בֵּית שְׁחִיטָתוֹ.

MISHNA: The High Priest tied a strip of crimson wool upon the head of the scapegoat and positioned the goat opposite the place from which it was dispatched, i.e., near the gate through which it was taken; and the same was done to the goat that was to be slaughtered, opposite the place of its slaughter.

בָּא לוֹ אֵצֶל פָּרוֹ שְׁנִיָּה, וְסוֹמֵךְ שְׁתֵּי יָדָיו עָלָיו וּמִתְוַדֶּה, וְכָךְ הָיָה אוֹמֵר: אָנָא הַשֵּׁם! (חָטָאתִי עָוִיתִי וּפָשַׁעְתִּי) לְפָנֶיךָ אֲנִי וּבֵיתִי וּבְנֵי אַהֲרֹן עַם קְדוֹשֶׁךָ. אָנָא הַשֵּׁם! כַּפֶּר נָא לָעֲוֹנוֹת וְלַפְּשָׁעִים וְלַחֲטָאִים שֶׁעָוִיתִי וְשֶׁפָּשַׁעְתִּי וְשֶׁחָטָאתִי לְפָנֶיךָ אֲנִי וּבֵיתִי וּבְנֵי אַהֲרֹן עַם קְדוֹשֶׁךָ, כַּכָּתוּב בְּתוֹרַת מֹשֶׁה עַבְדֶּךָ: ״כִּי בַיּוֹם הַזֶּה יְכַפֵּר עֲלֵיכֶם לְטַהֵר אֶתְכֶם מִכֹּל חַטֹּאתֵיכֶם לִפְנֵי ה׳ תִּטְהָרוּ״, וְהֵן עוֹנִין אַחֲרָיו: ״בָּרוּךְ שֵׁם כְּבוֹד מַלְכוּתוֹ לְעוֹלָם וְעַד״.

He comes and stands next to his bull a second time, and places his two hands upon it, and confesses. And this is what he would say: Please God, I have sinned, I have done wrong, and I have rebelled before You, I and my family and the children of Aaron, your sacred people. Please God, grant atonement, please, for the sins, and for the wrongs, and for the rebellions that I have sinned, and done wrong, and rebelled before You, I, and my family, and the children of Aaron, your sacred people, as it is written in the Torah of Moses, your servant: “For on this day atonement shall be made for you to cleanse you of all your sins; you shall be clean before the Lord” (Leviticus 16:30). And they, the priests and the people in the Temple courtyard, respond after him upon hearing the name of God: Blessed be the name of His glorious kingdom forever and all time.

גְּמָ׳ אִיבַּעְיָא לְהוּ: ״וְלַנִּשְׁחָט״ — אַקְּשִׁירָה קָאֵי, אוֹ אַהַעֲמָדָה קָאֵי?

GEMARA: A dilemma was raised before them: The mishna teaches two halakhot with regard to the scapegoat: A strip of crimson is tied to it, and it is positioned opposite the place from which it will be dispatched. When the mishna continues: And the same is done to the slaughtered one opposite its place of slaughter, is it referring to the tying of a strip of crimson, and it is teaching that a strip is also tied on the goat being sacrificed around the place of its slaughter, i.e., its neck? Or, is it referring to the positioning of the goat, and it is teaching that the goat being sacrificed should be stood opposite the place where it will be slaughtered?

תָּא שְׁמַע, דְּתָנֵי רַב יוֹסֵף: קָשַׁר לָשׁוֹן שֶׁל זְהוֹרִית בְּרֹאשׁ שָׂעִיר הַמִּשְׁתַּלֵּחַ, וְהֶעֱמִידוֹ כְּנֶגֶד בֵּית שִׁילּוּחוֹ, וְלַנִּשְׁחָט — כְּנֶגֶד בֵּית שְׁחִיטָתוֹ, שֶׁלֹּא יִתְעָרֵב זֶה בָּזֶה, וְלֹא יִתְעָרֵב בַּאֲחֵרִים.

Come and hear a resolution from a baraita that Rav Yosef taught: He ties a strip of crimson to the head of the scapegoat and positions it opposite the place from which it will be sent; and the same is done to the slaughtered one, opposite its place of slaughter. This is done for two reasons: So that each goat, i.e., the goat for God and the goat for Azazel, cannot become mixed up with the other one, and so that the goats cannot become mixed up with other goats.

אִי אָמְרַתְּ בִּשְׁלָמָא אַקְּשִׁירָה קָאֵי — שַׁפִּיר. אֶלָּא אִי אָמְרַתְּ אַהַעֲמָדָה קָאֵי, נְהִי דִּבְחַבְרֵיהּ לָא מִיעָרַב, דְּהַאי קְטִיר בֵּיהּ וְהַאי לָא קְטִיר בֵּיהּ, בְּאַחֲרִינֵי מִיהַת מִיעָרַב! אֶלָּא לָאו, שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ אַקְּשִׁירָה קָאֵי. שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ.

The Gemara explains the proof from the baraita. Granted, if you say that the baraita is referring to tying, it works out well. Since both goats have a strip tied to them and to different places upon them, they will always be distinguishable both from one another and also from any other animals. But, if you say that it is referring to positioning the goat being sacrificed, but no strip of crimson is tied to it, granted, each one cannot be mixed up with its counterpart, since this one, the goat to be sent away, has a strip of crimson tied to it, and that one, the goat being sacrificed, does not have a strip of crimson tied to it. However, the goat being sacrificed could still be mixed up with other animals, since it has no strip tied to it. Rather, must one not conclude from the baraita that it is referring to tying? The Gemara confirms: Indeed, learn from it that it is so.

אָמַר רַבִּי יִצְחָק: שְׁתֵּי לְשׁוֹנוֹת שָׁמַעְתִּי, אַחַת שֶׁל פָּרָה, וְאַחַת שֶׁל שָׂעִיר הַמִּשְׁתַּלֵּחַ. אַחַת צְרִיכָה שִׁיעוּר, וְאַחַת אֵינָהּ צְרִיכָה שִׁיעוּר. וְלָא יָדַעְנָא הֵי מִינַּיְיהוּ.

The Gemara discusses halakhot pertaining to the strip of crimson wool: Rabbi Yitzḥak said: I heard a teaching that there is a distinction between two strips of crimson, one of the red heifer and one of the scapegoat. One of them requires a minimum amount, and one does not require a minimum amount. But I do not know to which of them the requirement to have a minimum amount pertains.

אָמַר רַב יוֹסֵף, נִיחְזֵי אֲנַן: שֶׁל שָׂעִיר הַמִּשְׁתַּלֵּחַ דְּבָעֵי חֲלוּקָּה — בָּעֵי שִׁיעוּר, וְשֶׁל פָּרָה דְּלָא בָּעֵי חֲלוּקָּה — לָא בָּעֵי שִׁיעוּר.

Rav Yosef said: Let us see and examine the matter. It is logical that since the strip of the scapegoat, which requires division, it requires a minimum amount to be able to achieve this. Before the goat descends into Azazel, the strip is cut into two; half of it is tied between the goat’s horns and half of it is tied to a nearby rock. However, the crimson strip of the heifer does not require division, therefore it does not require a minimum amount.

מַתְקֵיף לַהּ רָמֵי בַּר חָמָא: דְּפָרָה נָמֵי בָּעֵי כּוֹבֶד! אֲמַר לֵיהּ רָבָא: כּוֹבֶד — תַּנָּאֵי הִיא.

Rami bar Ḥama strongly objects to this: The strip of the heifer also requires a minimum amount because it needs to have weight, in order to be heavy enough to fall into the heart of the fire in which the heifer is being burned (see Numbers 19:6). Rava said to him: The requirement for the strip to have weight is the subject of a dispute between tanna’im, and Rav Yosef holds in accordance with the opinion that it does not need to have weight.

וּדְפָרָה לָא בָּעֵי חֲלוּקָּה?! אֵיתִיבֵיהּ אַבָּיֵי: כֵּיצַד הוּא עוֹשֶׂה, כּוֹרְכָן בִּשְׁיָרֵי לָשׁוֹן! אֵימָא, בִּזְנַב לָשׁוֹן.

The Gemara asks: Is it true that the strip of the red heifer does not require division? Abaye raised an objection to this from a mishna in tractate Para: How does he perform the burning of the items that are burned together with the red heifer? He wraps the cedar wood and the hyssop with the remnants of the strip of crimson and casts them into the fire in which the heifer is being burnt. The reference to the remnant of the strip of crimson indicates that only part is burned. This suggests that it also requires division. The Gemara answers: Emend the mishna in tractate Para. Instead of saying: The remnants of the strip, say: It was done with the tail end of the strip of crimson.

אָמַר רַבִּי חָנִין אָמַר רַב: עֵץ אֶרֶז וּשְׁנִי תּוֹלַעַת שֶׁקְּלָטָתַן שַׁלְהֶבֶת — כְּשֵׁרָה. מֵיתִיבִי: נִתְהַבְהֵב הַלָּשׁוֹן — מֵבִיא לָשׁוֹן אַחֵר וּמְקַדֵּשׁ!

The Torah requires that as part of the preparation of the ashes of the red heifer, cedar wood, hyssop, and a strip of crimson be cast “into the midst of the burning of the heifer” (Number 19:6). The Gemara discusses what happens if these items burn before actually reaching the burning mass of the heifer: Rabbi Ḥanin said that Rav said: If the cedar wood and the strip of crimson were caught by the flame of the burning heifer, and they burned in the air before coming into contact with the mass of the heifer itself, it is valid. The Gemara raises an objection from a baraita: If the strip of crimson was singed before reaching the heart of fire, he brings another strip and sanctifies it by ensuring it burns together with the mass of the heifer.

אָמַר אַבָּיֵי, לָא קַשְׁיָא: כָּאן בְּקוֹלַחַת, כָּאן בְּנִכְפֶּפֶת.

Abaye said: This is not difficult: Here, the baraita is dealing with a case in which the flame blazes high. Since the strip was still a significant distance from the burning mass, its burning is invalid. There, Rabbi Ḥanin is dealing with a case in which the flame blazes low, in close proximity to the mass of the heifer. Therefore, it is considered to have been burned together with it and is valid.

רָבָא אוֹמֵר: כּוֹבֶד תַּנָּאֵי הִיא. דְּתַנְיָא: לָמָּה כּוֹרְכָן — כְּדֵי שֶׁיִּהְיוּ כּוּלָּן בַּאֲגוּדָּה אַחַת, דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי. רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר בְּרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן אוֹמֵר: כְּדֵי שֶׁיְּהֵא בָּהֶן כּוֹבֶד, וְיִפְּלוּ לְתוֹךְ שְׂרֵיפַת הַפָּרָה.

Rava said: The baraita and Rabbi Ḥanin’s ruling follow different opinions with regard to whether the strip of crimson needs to have weight. The baraita assumes the items must reach the heart of the fire; therefore, they must have weight. Rabbi Ḥanin assumes the items don’t need to reach the heart of the fire; therefore, they do not need to have weight. The issue of whether the strip of crimson needs to have weight is a dispute between tanna’im, as it was taught in a baraita: Why does he wrap the cedar wood and the hyssop together using the strip of crimson? So that they will all be in a single bundle and burn simultaneously, as implied by the fact the Torah mentions all three together; this is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi. Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, says: So that they will have weight and fall into the burning heifer.

כִּי אֲתָא רַב דִּימִי אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: שָׁלֹשׁ לְשׁוֹנוֹת שָׁמַעְתִּי, אַחַת שֶׁל פָּרָה, וְאַחַת שֶׁל שָׂעִיר הַמִּשְׁתַּלֵּחַ, וְאַחַת שֶׁל מְצוֹרָע. אַחַת מִשְׁקַל עֲשָׂרָה זוּז, וְאַחַת מִשְׁקַל שְׁנֵי סְלָעִים, וְאַחַת מִשְׁקַל שֶׁקֶל, וְאֵין לִי לְפָרֵשׁ.

When Rav Dimi came from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia he said in the name of Rabbi Yoḥanan: I heard a teaching that there is a distinction between three strips of crimson: One of the red heifer, and one of the scapegoat, and one of the leper. One of them must have the weight of ten zuz; and one of them must have the weight of two sela, which is eight zuz; and one of them must have the weight of a shekel, which is two zuz, but I cannot explain which is which.

כִּי אֲתָא רָבִין, פֵּירְשַׁהּ מִשְּׁמֵיהּ דְּרַבִּי יוֹנָתָן,

When Ravin came from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia he explained in the name of Rabbi Yonatan which weight each item requires, as follows: