Masechet Avodah Zarah
Masechet Avodah Zarah is sponsored by the Talmud class of Congregation Beth Jacob in Redwood City, CA, in honor of the Hadran staff who make learning possible.
This month’s learning is sponsored by Marci Glazer in loving memory of Rachel Brodie, Rachel Aviva bat Devora Chana, on her 4th yahrzeit. “To my extraordinary teacher and chevruta, I am only on this path because of you. All of my learning is dedicated in your name.”
This month’s learning is sponsored by Marci Glazer in loving memory of her teacher and chevruta, Rachel Brodie, Rachel Aviva bat Devora Chana, on her 4th yahrzeit. “She brought her love of Torah to thousands of people in her all-too-short life. A lover of Midrash, she still invited me on this Daf Yomi journey.”
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Masechet Avodah Zarah
Masechet Avodah Zarah is sponsored by the Talmud class of Congregation Beth Jacob in Redwood City, CA, in honor of the Hadran staff who make learning possible.
This month’s learning is sponsored by Marci Glazer in loving memory of Rachel Brodie, Rachel Aviva bat Devora Chana, on her 4th yahrzeit. “To my extraordinary teacher and chevruta, I am only on this path because of you. All of my learning is dedicated in your name.”
This month’s learning is sponsored by Marci Glazer in loving memory of her teacher and chevruta, Rachel Brodie, Rachel Aviva bat Devora Chana, on her 4th yahrzeit. “She brought her love of Torah to thousands of people in her all-too-short life. A lover of Midrash, she still invited me on this Daf Yomi journey.”
Avodah Zarah 63
לֵיחוּל עֲלַהּ אִיסּוּר אֶתְנַן לְמַפְרֵעַ! אָמַר רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר: כְּשֶׁקָּדְמָה וְהִקְרִיבַתּוּ.
the prohibition with regard to payment to a prostitute should apply to the payment retroactively. Rabbi Eliezer says: The baraita is referring to a situation when she sacrificed the payment in the Temple first, before the intercourse took place.
הֵיכִי דָמֵי? אִי דְּאָמַר לַהּ: ״קְנַי לִיךְ מֵעַכְשָׁיו״ — פְּשִׁיטָא דִּשְׁרֵי, דְּהָא לֵיתֵיהּ בִּשְׁעַת בִּיאָה, וּמַתָּנָה בְּעָלְמָא הוּא דְּיָהֵיב לַהּ!
The Gemara asks: What are the circumstances of such a situation? If the circumstances are that he said to her: Acquire this payment from now, it is obvious that it is permitted to sacrifice it, as it is not extant as payment at the time of the intercourse, and it is merely a gift that he gave her. It would not be necessary for the baraita to state this.
וְאִי דְּלָא אָמַר לַהּ ״קְנַי לִיךְ מֵעַכְשָׁיו״, הֵיכִי (מצי) [מָצְיָא] מַקְרְבָה? ״וְאִישׁ כִּי יַקְדִּשׁ אֶת בֵּיתוֹ קֹדֶשׁ״ אָמַר רַחֲמָנָא, מָה בֵּיתוֹ בִּרְשׁוּתוֹ, אַף כֹּל בִּרְשׁוּתוֹ.
And if the circumstances are that he did not say to her: Acquire this payment from now, how can she be allowed to sacrifice it? The Merciful One states in the Torah: “And when a man shall sanctify his house to be holy to the Lord” (Leviticus 27:14), from which it is derived that just as one’s house is in his possession, so too, any item that a person wishes to consecrate must be in his possession. The prostitute cannot consecrate an animal that is not in her possession.
אֶלָּא, דְּאָמַר לַהּ: ״לֶהֱוֵי גַּבִּיךְ עַד שְׁעַת בִּיאָה, וְאִי מִיצְטְרִיךְ לִיךְ קְנַי מֵעַכְשָׁיו״.
Rather, the baraita is referring to a situation where he said to her: Let the animal be with you until the time of intercourse, and if you need it in the meantime, acquire it from now. The baraita teaches that in this situation she may sacrifice her payment as an offering.
בָּעֵי רַב הוֹשַׁעְיָא: קָדְמָה וְהִקְדִּישַׁתּוּ, מַהוּ? כֵּיוָן דְּאָמַר מָר: אֲמִירָתוֹ לְגָבוֹהַּ כִּמְסִירָתוֹ לְהֶדְיוֹט, כְּמַאן דְּאַקְרֵיבְתֵּיהּ דָּמֵי, אוֹ דִּלְמָא הַשְׁתָּא מִיהָא הָא קָאֵי וְאִיתֵיהּ בְּעֵינֵיהּ?
Rav Hoshaya raises a dilemma: If she consecrated it first, before the intercourse, what is the halakha? Since the Master said that declaration to the Most High is equivalent to transfer to an ordinary person, i.e., a spoken consecration of an item to the Temple is deemed, in terms of acquisition, like the legal transfer of an item to a person, therefore, since she consecrated it by speech, is it considered tantamount to having sacrificed it, and consequently it would be permitted to sacrifice it? Or perhaps should it be reasoned that now, at the time of the intercourse, in any event, the animal is extant, i.e., it was not actually sacrificed, and therefore it is prohibited to sacrifice it?
וְתִפְשׁוֹט מִדְּרַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר, דְּאָמַר רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר: שֶׁקָּדְמָה וְהִקְרִיבַתּוּ — דַּוְקָא הִקְרִיבַתּוּ, אֲבָל הִקְדִּישַׁתּוּ — לָא.
The Gemara suggests: Resolve the dilemma from the statement of Rabbi Eliezer, as Rabbi Eliezer says: The baraita is referring to a case where she sacrificed it first. By inference, it is referring specifically to a case where she sacrificed it; but if she merely consecrated it, then it is not permitted to sacrifice the animal, as it is considered in her possession at the time of the intercourse.
דְּרַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר גּוּפֵיהּ קָא מִיבַּעְיָא לֵיהּ, מַאי? מִיפְשָׁט פְּשִׁיטָא לֵיהּ לְרַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר דְּהִקְרִיבַתּוּ דַּוְקָא, אֲבָל הִקְדִּישַׁתּוּ — לָא, דְּהָא אִיתֵיהּ בִּשְׁעַת בִּיאָה? אוֹ דִלְמָא הִקְרִיבַתּוּ פְּשִׁיטָא לֵיהּ, וְהִקְדִּישַׁתּוּ מְסַפְּקָא לֵיהּ? תֵּיקוּ.
The Gemara rejects this resolution: Rav Hoshaya raises the dilemma with regard to the statement of Rabbi Eliezer itself, asking what his intent is: Is it obvious to Rabbi Eliezer that the animal is permitted specifically in a case where she sacrificed it, but in a case where she merely consecrated it, that is not the halakha, and the payment is forbidden, because it is extant as payment at the time of the intercourse? Or perhaps does he mention specifically the case where she sacrificed it because that case is obvious to him, but with regard to the case where she consecrated it, he is uncertain whether it is permitted or not, and he therefore did not rule on the matter? The Gemara comments: The dilemma shall stand unresolved.
בָּא עָלֶיהָ וְאַחַר כָּךְ נָתַן לָהּ אֶתְנַנָּהּ — מוּתָּר, וּרְמִינְהִי: בָּא עָלֶיהָ וְאַחַר כָּךְ נָתַן לָהּ, אֲפִילּוּ מִכָּאן עַד שָׁלֹשׁ שָׁנִים — אֶתְנַנָּהּ אָסוּר!
§ The baraita teaches: If he engaged in intercourse with her and afterward, after some time elapsed, gave her payment, her payment is permitted. The Gemara raises a contradiction from another baraita: If he engaged in intercourse with her and afterward gave her payment, even from now until three years afterward, her payment is forbidden.
אָמַר רַב נַחְמָן בַּר יִצְחָק אָמַר רַב חִסְדָּא: לָא קַשְׁיָא, הָא דְּאָמַר ״הִתְבַּעֲלִי לִי בְּטָלֶה זֶה״, הָא דַּאֲמַר לַהּ ״הִתְבַּעֲלִי בְּטָלֶה״ סְתָם.
Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said that Rav Ḥisda said: This is not difficult. This case, where it is forbidden, is where he said in advance: Engage in intercourse with me in exchange for this lamb. In this case the lamb is considered to be her property immediately, even if he actually gave it to her only after some time had elapsed. That case, where the animal is permitted, is where he said to her: Engage in intercourse with me in exchange for a lamb, without specifying a particular one. Since he did not specify a particular lamb as the fee, when he later gives her a lamb, it is not deemed payment.
וְכִי אָמַר לַהּ ״בְּטָלֶה זֶה״ מַאי הָוֵי? הָא מְחַסַּר מְשִׁיכָה! בְּזוֹנָה גּוֹיָה, דְּלָא קָנְיָא בִּמְשִׁיכָה. וְאִיבָּעֵית אֵימָא: לְעוֹלָם בְּזוֹנָה יִשְׂרְאֵלִית, וּכְגוֹן דְּקָאֵי בַּחֲצֵירָהּ.
The Gemara asks: But when he says to her: In exchange for this lamb, what of it? Isn’t a formal act of acquisition, such as pulling the lamb, absent from the transaction? In any case she has not acquired it. The Gemara answers: The reference is to the case of a gentile prostitute, who does not acquire by pulling; gentiles acquire an item by paying money for it. And if you wish, say instead that actually, the reference is to a Jewish prostitute, and it is a case where the lamb is already standing in her courtyard. This effected the acquisition as soon as the man stated his intent to give her the lamb, in accordance with the principle that a person acquires that which is within his property.
אִי דְּקָאֵי בַּחֲצֵירָהּ, בָּא עָלֶיהָ וְאַחַר כָּךְ נָתַן לָהּ, הָא קָנְיָא לֵהּ! לָא צְרִיכָא, דְּשַׁוְּיֵהּ נִיהֲלַהּ אַפּוֹתֵיקֵי, דַּאֲמַר לַהּ: ״אִי מַיְיתֵינָא לִיךְ זוּזֵי מִכָּאן עַד יוֹם פְּלוֹנִי — מוּטָב, וְאִי לָא — שִׁקְלֵיהּ בְּאֶתְנַנִּיךְ״.
The Gemara challenges: If the reference is to a case where it is standing in her courtyard, that is not a case where he engaged in intercourse with her and afterward he gave her payment, since it was acquired by her before he engaged in intercourse with her. The Gemara answers: No, it is necessary to state this halakha with regard to a case where he rendered the lamb as designated payment [appoteiki] for her, i.e., a case where he said to her: If I bring you dinars from now until such and such a day, all is well, and you will return the lamb to me, but if not, take the lamb as your payment.
מֵתִיב רַב שֵׁשֶׁת: אוֹמֵר אָדָם לַחֲמָרָיו וּלְפוֹעֲלָיו ״לְכוּ וְאִכְלוּ בְּדִינָר זֶה״, ״צְאוּ וּשְׁתוּ בְּדִינָר זֶה״, וְאֵינוֹ חוֹשֵׁשׁ
§ The Gemara resumes discussion of the practice of the Sages from the school of Rabbi Yannai, who would borrow produce from the poor during the Sabbatical Year and repay them after the Sabbatical Year, and Rabbi Yoḥanan’s ruling that this is permitted, as it is not considered commerce with Sabbatical-Year produce. Rav Sheshet raises an objection to this ruling from a baraita: A person may say to his donkey drivers or to his laborers: Go and eat with this dinar, or: Go and drink with this dinar, and he does not need to be concerned that his workers will transgress a prohibition with the money he has given them,
לֹא מִשּׁוּם שְׁבִיעִית, וְלֹא מִשּׁוּם מַעֲשֵׂר, וְלֹא מִשּׁוּם יֵין נֶסֶךְ.
neither with regard to the prohibitions concerning Sabbatical-Year produce, nor with regard to restrictions on the consumption of tithe, nor with regard to the prohibition against consumption of wine used for a libation. This is because whatever food or drink that they acquire, they acquire it of their own volition, and the employer does not bear responsibility for their actions.
וְאִם אָמַר לָהֶם: ״צְאוּ וְאִכְלוּ וַאֲנִי פּוֹרֵעַ״, ״צְאוּ וּשְׁתוּ וַאֲנִי פּוֹרֵעַ״ — חוֹשֵׁשׁ מִשּׁוּם שְׁבִיעִית, וּמִשּׁוּם מַעֲשֵׂר, וּמִשּׁוּם יֵין נֶסֶךְ.
But if he said to them: Go and eat and I will reimburse you, or: Go and drink and I will reimburse you, he must be concerned with regard to the possibility that his workers will transgress a prohibition with the money, whether with regard to prohibitions concerning Sabbatical-Year produce, or with regard to restrictions on the consumption of tithe, or with regard to the prohibition against consuming wine used for a libation. This is because if they acquire forbidden food or drink, it is tantamount to his acquiring these items and giving them to the laborers.
אַלְמָא, כִּי קָא פָרַע — דְּמֵי אִיסּוּר קָא פָרַע; הָכָא נָמֵי, כִּי קָא פָרַע — דְּמֵי אִיסּוּרָא קָא פָרַע.
Rav Sheshet infers: Apparently, when he pays his laborers after some time has elapsed, it is considered as though he is paying money for forbidden items, even though the forbidden items no longer exist. Here too, when people borrow Sabbatical-Year produce with the intent of paying for it afterward, when one pays, he is paying for a forbidden purchase.
תַּרְגְּמַהּ רַב חִסְדָּא בְּחֶנְוָנִי הַמַּקִּיפוֹ, דְּמִשְׁתַּעְבַּד לֵיהּ, דְּכֵיוָן דְּאוֹרְחֵיהּ לְאַקּוֹפֵי — קְנֵי לֵיהּ דִּינָר גַּבֵּיהּ.
Rav Ḥisda interpreted this baraita with regard to a storekeeper who regularly gives credit to the employer, so that the employer incurs the debt to him at the moment the storekeeper gives the food or drink to the laborers. This is because, since it is his custom to give him credit, it is considered as though the storekeeper acquires the dinar from him at that moment. Therefore, if the laborers bought from him Sabbatical-Year produce, it is considered as though the employer paid his laborers with Sabbatical-Year produce, which is prohibited. Therefore, this case is not comparable to the case of the Sages who borrowed Sabbatical-Year produce.
אֲבָל חֶנְוָנִי שֶׁאֵין מַקִּיפוֹ מַאי מוּתָּר? אִי הָכִי, אַדְּתָנֵי ״צְאוּ וְאִכְלוּ בְּדִינָר זֶה״, ״צְאוּ וּשְׁתוּ בְּדִינָר זֶה״, לִיפְלוֹג וְלִיתְנֵי בְּדִידַהּ:
The Gemara asks: But in the case of a storekeeper who does not give credit to the employer, what is the halakha? Is it permitted for the employer to send his laborers to buy food, committing to reimburse them afterward? If so, rather than the tanna teaching that if the employer says: Go and eat with this dinar, or: Go and drink with this dinar, he does need to be concerned that they will buy forbidden food, let him distinguish and teach the distinction within the case itself where he says: Go and eat and I will reimburse you.
בַּמֶּה דְּבָרִים אֲמוּרִים? בְּחֶנְוָנִי הַמַּקִּיפוֹ, דְּמִשְׁתַּעְבַּד לֵיהּ, אֲבָל חֶנְוָנִי שֶׁאֵין מַקִּיפוֹ — מוּתָּר.
The tanna could teach as follows: In what case is this statement said, i.e., that if the employer says: I will reimburse you, he cannot allow his laborer to buy forbidden food? It is stated with regard to the case of a storekeeper who regularly gives credit to the employer, such that the employer incurs the debt to him at the moment the storekeeper gives the food or drink to the laborers. But in the case of a storekeeper who does not give credit to the employer, it is permitted for the employer to instruct his laborers in this manner.
וְעוֹד: חֶנְוָנִי שֶׁאֵין מַקִּיפוֹ מִי לָא מִשְׁתַּעְבַּד? וְהָאָמַר רָבָא: הָאוֹמֵר לַחֲבֵירוֹ ״תֵּן מָנֶה לִפְלוֹנִי וְיִקָּנוּ כׇּל נְכָסַאי לָךְ״, קָנָה מִדִּין עָרֵב!
And furthermore, there is another difficulty with this interpretation: In the case of a storekeeper who does not give credit to the employer, does he not incur the debt to him? But doesn’t Rava say that in the case of one who says to another: Give one hundred dinars to so-and-so and all of my property will be transferred to you, he acquires it by the halakha of a guarantor? Just as a guarantor for another person’s loan renders himself liable to pay for someone else’s debt, so too, the owner of the property renders himself liable to give the property in exchange for the one hundred dinars that the acquiring party gives that so-and-so. Here too, the employer renders himself liable to pay the storekeeper when the storekeeper gives food to his laborers at his request.
אֶלָּא אָמַר רָבָא: לָא שְׁנָא מַקִּיפוֹ, וְלָא שְׁנָא שֶׁאֵין מַקִּיפוֹ, אַף עַל גַּב דִּמְשַׁעְבַּד לֵיהּ, כֵּיוָן דְּלָא מְיַיחַד שִׁיעְבּוּדֵיהּ — לָא מִיתְּסַר.
Rather, Rava says: There is no difference whether the storekeeper gives him credit, and there is no difference whether he does not give him credit. Any commitment to pay causes a liability. But although he incurs a debt to him, since he does not designate specific coins as payment for his debt the employer’s conduct is not prohibited. Therefore, the Sages of the school of Rabbi Yannai acted in a permitted manner.
אֶלָּא הָכָא אַמַּאי חוֹשֵׁשׁ מִשּׁוּם שְׁבִיעִית? הָא לָא מְיַיחַד שִׁיעְבּוּדֵיהּ הָכָא! אָמַר רַב פָּפָּא: כְּגוֹן שֶׁהִקְדִּים לוֹ דִּינָר.
The Gemara asks: But here, in the baraita, why does the employer need to be concerned with regard to the prohibitions concerning Sabbatical-Year produce? He does not designate specific money as payment for his debt here. Rav Pappa said: The baraita is referring to a case where the employer first paid the storekeeper a dinar for the food he would provide to the laborers, before they actually purchased food. Therefore, the employer is considered to have acquired forbidden items and paid his laborers’ wages with them.
אָמַר רַב כָּהֲנָא: אַמְרִיתַהּ לִשְׁמַעְתָּא קַמֵּיהּ דְּרַב זְבִיד מִנְּהַרְדְּעָא, אָמַר לִי: אִי הָכִי, אַדְּתָנֵי ״צְאוּ וְאִכְלוּ, צְאוּ וּשְׁתוּ, וַאֲנִי פּוֹרֵעַ״, ״צְאוּ וְאִכְלוּ, צְאוּ וּשְׁתוּ, וַאֲנִי מְחַשֵּׁב״ מִיבְּעֵי לֵיהּ! אֲמַר לֵיהּ: תְּנִי ״צְאוּ וַאֲנִי מְחַשֵּׁב״.
Rav Kahana said: I stated this halakha before Rav Zevid of Neharde’a. He said to me: If so, if the latter clause of the baraita is understood as referring to a case where the employer paid the storekeeper a dinar in advance, rather than teaching a case where the employer said to his laborers: Go and eat, go and drink, and I will reimburse you, the tanna should have taught a case where he said: Go and eat, go and drink, and I will calculate the amount that should be deducted from the dinar I gave him. Rav Kahana said to him: That is not difficult; teach the baraita as stating: Go, and I will calculate the amount that should be deducted from the dinar I gave him.
רַב אָשֵׁי אָמַר: כְּגוֹן שֶׁנָּטַל וְנָתַן בַּיָּד. אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַב יֵימַר לְרַב אָשֵׁי: אִי הָכִי, אַדְּתָנֵי ״צְאוּ וְאִכְלוּ, צְאוּ וּשְׁתוּ״, ״טְלוּ וְאִכְלוּ, טְלוּ וּשְׁתוּ״ מִיבְּעֵי לֵיהּ! אֲמַר לֵיהּ: תָּנֵי ״טְלוּ וְאִכְלוּ, טְלוּ וּשְׁתוּ״.
Rav Ashi said: The baraita is referring to a case where the employer took the food and drink from the storekeeper and gave it to the laborers with his own hand. Rav Yeimar said to Rav Ashi: If that is so, rather than teaching that the employer said: Go and eat, go and drink, the tanna should have taught a case where he said: Take and eat, take and drink. Rav Ashi said to him: Teach the baraita as stating: Take and eat, take and drink.
יָתֵיב רַב נַחְמָן וְעוּלָּא וַאֲבִימִי בַּר פַּפִּי, וְיָתֵיב רַבִּי חִיָּיא בַּר אַמֵּי גַּבַּיְיהוּ, וְיָתְבִי וְקָא מִיבַּעְיָא לְהוּ: שְׂכָרוֹ לִשְׁבּוֹר בְּיֵין נֶסֶךְ מַהוּ? מִי אָמְרִינַן כֵּיוָן דְּרוֹצֶה בְּקִיּוּמוֹ — אָסוּר, אוֹ דִלְמָא כֹּל לְמַעוֹטֵי תִּיפְלָה שַׁפִּיר דָּמֵי?
§ Rav Naḥman and Ulla and Avimi bar Pappi were sitting, and Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Ami, who was studying with them, was sitting among them, and they were sitting and a dilemma was raised before them: If one hired a person to break barrels of wine used for a libation so the wine will spill out, what is the halakha? Do we say that since he has an interest in the preservation of the barrels until he breaks them, so that he can be paid for breaking them, his wage is forbidden, or perhaps should it be reasoned that any action that one performs to reduce impropriety [tifela] is permitted, even if he is paid for the actual breaking?
אָמַר רַב נַחְמָן: יִשְׁבּוֹר, וְתָבֹא עָלָיו בְּרָכָה. לֵימָא מְסַיַּיע לֵיהּ: אֵין עוֹדְרִין עִם הַגּוֹי בְּכִלְאַיִם,
Rav Naḥman said: He may break them, and let a blessing come upon him. The Gemara suggests: Let us say that a baraita supports his opinion: One may not hoe together with a gentile in a field that contains a forbidden mixture of diverse kinds,
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Avodah Zarah 63
לֵיחוּל עֲלַהּ אִיסּוּר אֶתְנַן לְמַפְרֵעַ! אָמַר רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר: כְּשֶׁקָּדְמָה וְהִקְרִיבַתּוּ.
the prohibition with regard to payment to a prostitute should apply to the payment retroactively. Rabbi Eliezer says: The baraita is referring to a situation when she sacrificed the payment in the Temple first, before the intercourse took place.
הֵיכִי דָמֵי? אִי דְּאָמַר לַהּ: ״קְנַי לִיךְ מֵעַכְשָׁיו״ — פְּשִׁיטָא דִּשְׁרֵי, דְּהָא לֵיתֵיהּ בִּשְׁעַת בִּיאָה, וּמַתָּנָה בְּעָלְמָא הוּא דְּיָהֵיב לַהּ!
The Gemara asks: What are the circumstances of such a situation? If the circumstances are that he said to her: Acquire this payment from now, it is obvious that it is permitted to sacrifice it, as it is not extant as payment at the time of the intercourse, and it is merely a gift that he gave her. It would not be necessary for the baraita to state this.
וְאִי דְּלָא אָמַר לַהּ ״קְנַי לִיךְ מֵעַכְשָׁיו״, הֵיכִי (מצי) [מָצְיָא] מַקְרְבָה? ״וְאִישׁ כִּי יַקְדִּשׁ אֶת בֵּיתוֹ קֹדֶשׁ״ אָמַר רַחֲמָנָא, מָה בֵּיתוֹ בִּרְשׁוּתוֹ, אַף כֹּל בִּרְשׁוּתוֹ.
And if the circumstances are that he did not say to her: Acquire this payment from now, how can she be allowed to sacrifice it? The Merciful One states in the Torah: “And when a man shall sanctify his house to be holy to the Lord” (Leviticus 27:14), from which it is derived that just as one’s house is in his possession, so too, any item that a person wishes to consecrate must be in his possession. The prostitute cannot consecrate an animal that is not in her possession.
אֶלָּא, דְּאָמַר לַהּ: ״לֶהֱוֵי גַּבִּיךְ עַד שְׁעַת בִּיאָה, וְאִי מִיצְטְרִיךְ לִיךְ קְנַי מֵעַכְשָׁיו״.
Rather, the baraita is referring to a situation where he said to her: Let the animal be with you until the time of intercourse, and if you need it in the meantime, acquire it from now. The baraita teaches that in this situation she may sacrifice her payment as an offering.
בָּעֵי רַב הוֹשַׁעְיָא: קָדְמָה וְהִקְדִּישַׁתּוּ, מַהוּ? כֵּיוָן דְּאָמַר מָר: אֲמִירָתוֹ לְגָבוֹהַּ כִּמְסִירָתוֹ לְהֶדְיוֹט, כְּמַאן דְּאַקְרֵיבְתֵּיהּ דָּמֵי, אוֹ דִּלְמָא הַשְׁתָּא מִיהָא הָא קָאֵי וְאִיתֵיהּ בְּעֵינֵיהּ?
Rav Hoshaya raises a dilemma: If she consecrated it first, before the intercourse, what is the halakha? Since the Master said that declaration to the Most High is equivalent to transfer to an ordinary person, i.e., a spoken consecration of an item to the Temple is deemed, in terms of acquisition, like the legal transfer of an item to a person, therefore, since she consecrated it by speech, is it considered tantamount to having sacrificed it, and consequently it would be permitted to sacrifice it? Or perhaps should it be reasoned that now, at the time of the intercourse, in any event, the animal is extant, i.e., it was not actually sacrificed, and therefore it is prohibited to sacrifice it?
וְתִפְשׁוֹט מִדְּרַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר, דְּאָמַר רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר: שֶׁקָּדְמָה וְהִקְרִיבַתּוּ — דַּוְקָא הִקְרִיבַתּוּ, אֲבָל הִקְדִּישַׁתּוּ — לָא.
The Gemara suggests: Resolve the dilemma from the statement of Rabbi Eliezer, as Rabbi Eliezer says: The baraita is referring to a case where she sacrificed it first. By inference, it is referring specifically to a case where she sacrificed it; but if she merely consecrated it, then it is not permitted to sacrifice the animal, as it is considered in her possession at the time of the intercourse.
דְּרַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר גּוּפֵיהּ קָא מִיבַּעְיָא לֵיהּ, מַאי? מִיפְשָׁט פְּשִׁיטָא לֵיהּ לְרַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר דְּהִקְרִיבַתּוּ דַּוְקָא, אֲבָל הִקְדִּישַׁתּוּ — לָא, דְּהָא אִיתֵיהּ בִּשְׁעַת בִּיאָה? אוֹ דִלְמָא הִקְרִיבַתּוּ פְּשִׁיטָא לֵיהּ, וְהִקְדִּישַׁתּוּ מְסַפְּקָא לֵיהּ? תֵּיקוּ.
The Gemara rejects this resolution: Rav Hoshaya raises the dilemma with regard to the statement of Rabbi Eliezer itself, asking what his intent is: Is it obvious to Rabbi Eliezer that the animal is permitted specifically in a case where she sacrificed it, but in a case where she merely consecrated it, that is not the halakha, and the payment is forbidden, because it is extant as payment at the time of the intercourse? Or perhaps does he mention specifically the case where she sacrificed it because that case is obvious to him, but with regard to the case where she consecrated it, he is uncertain whether it is permitted or not, and he therefore did not rule on the matter? The Gemara comments: The dilemma shall stand unresolved.
בָּא עָלֶיהָ וְאַחַר כָּךְ נָתַן לָהּ אֶתְנַנָּהּ — מוּתָּר, וּרְמִינְהִי: בָּא עָלֶיהָ וְאַחַר כָּךְ נָתַן לָהּ, אֲפִילּוּ מִכָּאן עַד שָׁלֹשׁ שָׁנִים — אֶתְנַנָּהּ אָסוּר!
§ The baraita teaches: If he engaged in intercourse with her and afterward, after some time elapsed, gave her payment, her payment is permitted. The Gemara raises a contradiction from another baraita: If he engaged in intercourse with her and afterward gave her payment, even from now until three years afterward, her payment is forbidden.
אָמַר רַב נַחְמָן בַּר יִצְחָק אָמַר רַב חִסְדָּא: לָא קַשְׁיָא, הָא דְּאָמַר ״הִתְבַּעֲלִי לִי בְּטָלֶה זֶה״, הָא דַּאֲמַר לַהּ ״הִתְבַּעֲלִי בְּטָלֶה״ סְתָם.
Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said that Rav Ḥisda said: This is not difficult. This case, where it is forbidden, is where he said in advance: Engage in intercourse with me in exchange for this lamb. In this case the lamb is considered to be her property immediately, even if he actually gave it to her only after some time had elapsed. That case, where the animal is permitted, is where he said to her: Engage in intercourse with me in exchange for a lamb, without specifying a particular one. Since he did not specify a particular lamb as the fee, when he later gives her a lamb, it is not deemed payment.
וְכִי אָמַר לַהּ ״בְּטָלֶה זֶה״ מַאי הָוֵי? הָא מְחַסַּר מְשִׁיכָה! בְּזוֹנָה גּוֹיָה, דְּלָא קָנְיָא בִּמְשִׁיכָה. וְאִיבָּעֵית אֵימָא: לְעוֹלָם בְּזוֹנָה יִשְׂרְאֵלִית, וּכְגוֹן דְּקָאֵי בַּחֲצֵירָהּ.
The Gemara asks: But when he says to her: In exchange for this lamb, what of it? Isn’t a formal act of acquisition, such as pulling the lamb, absent from the transaction? In any case she has not acquired it. The Gemara answers: The reference is to the case of a gentile prostitute, who does not acquire by pulling; gentiles acquire an item by paying money for it. And if you wish, say instead that actually, the reference is to a Jewish prostitute, and it is a case where the lamb is already standing in her courtyard. This effected the acquisition as soon as the man stated his intent to give her the lamb, in accordance with the principle that a person acquires that which is within his property.
אִי דְּקָאֵי בַּחֲצֵירָהּ, בָּא עָלֶיהָ וְאַחַר כָּךְ נָתַן לָהּ, הָא קָנְיָא לֵהּ! לָא צְרִיכָא, דְּשַׁוְּיֵהּ נִיהֲלַהּ אַפּוֹתֵיקֵי, דַּאֲמַר לַהּ: ״אִי מַיְיתֵינָא לִיךְ זוּזֵי מִכָּאן עַד יוֹם פְּלוֹנִי — מוּטָב, וְאִי לָא — שִׁקְלֵיהּ בְּאֶתְנַנִּיךְ״.
The Gemara challenges: If the reference is to a case where it is standing in her courtyard, that is not a case where he engaged in intercourse with her and afterward he gave her payment, since it was acquired by her before he engaged in intercourse with her. The Gemara answers: No, it is necessary to state this halakha with regard to a case where he rendered the lamb as designated payment [appoteiki] for her, i.e., a case where he said to her: If I bring you dinars from now until such and such a day, all is well, and you will return the lamb to me, but if not, take the lamb as your payment.
מֵתִיב רַב שֵׁשֶׁת: אוֹמֵר אָדָם לַחֲמָרָיו וּלְפוֹעֲלָיו ״לְכוּ וְאִכְלוּ בְּדִינָר זֶה״, ״צְאוּ וּשְׁתוּ בְּדִינָר זֶה״, וְאֵינוֹ חוֹשֵׁשׁ
§ The Gemara resumes discussion of the practice of the Sages from the school of Rabbi Yannai, who would borrow produce from the poor during the Sabbatical Year and repay them after the Sabbatical Year, and Rabbi Yoḥanan’s ruling that this is permitted, as it is not considered commerce with Sabbatical-Year produce. Rav Sheshet raises an objection to this ruling from a baraita: A person may say to his donkey drivers or to his laborers: Go and eat with this dinar, or: Go and drink with this dinar, and he does not need to be concerned that his workers will transgress a prohibition with the money he has given them,
לֹא מִשּׁוּם שְׁבִיעִית, וְלֹא מִשּׁוּם מַעֲשֵׂר, וְלֹא מִשּׁוּם יֵין נֶסֶךְ.
neither with regard to the prohibitions concerning Sabbatical-Year produce, nor with regard to restrictions on the consumption of tithe, nor with regard to the prohibition against consumption of wine used for a libation. This is because whatever food or drink that they acquire, they acquire it of their own volition, and the employer does not bear responsibility for their actions.
וְאִם אָמַר לָהֶם: ״צְאוּ וְאִכְלוּ וַאֲנִי פּוֹרֵעַ״, ״צְאוּ וּשְׁתוּ וַאֲנִי פּוֹרֵעַ״ — חוֹשֵׁשׁ מִשּׁוּם שְׁבִיעִית, וּמִשּׁוּם מַעֲשֵׂר, וּמִשּׁוּם יֵין נֶסֶךְ.
But if he said to them: Go and eat and I will reimburse you, or: Go and drink and I will reimburse you, he must be concerned with regard to the possibility that his workers will transgress a prohibition with the money, whether with regard to prohibitions concerning Sabbatical-Year produce, or with regard to restrictions on the consumption of tithe, or with regard to the prohibition against consuming wine used for a libation. This is because if they acquire forbidden food or drink, it is tantamount to his acquiring these items and giving them to the laborers.
אַלְמָא, כִּי קָא פָרַע — דְּמֵי אִיסּוּר קָא פָרַע; הָכָא נָמֵי, כִּי קָא פָרַע — דְּמֵי אִיסּוּרָא קָא פָרַע.
Rav Sheshet infers: Apparently, when he pays his laborers after some time has elapsed, it is considered as though he is paying money for forbidden items, even though the forbidden items no longer exist. Here too, when people borrow Sabbatical-Year produce with the intent of paying for it afterward, when one pays, he is paying for a forbidden purchase.
תַּרְגְּמַהּ רַב חִסְדָּא בְּחֶנְוָנִי הַמַּקִּיפוֹ, דְּמִשְׁתַּעְבַּד לֵיהּ, דְּכֵיוָן דְּאוֹרְחֵיהּ לְאַקּוֹפֵי — קְנֵי לֵיהּ דִּינָר גַּבֵּיהּ.
Rav Ḥisda interpreted this baraita with regard to a storekeeper who regularly gives credit to the employer, so that the employer incurs the debt to him at the moment the storekeeper gives the food or drink to the laborers. This is because, since it is his custom to give him credit, it is considered as though the storekeeper acquires the dinar from him at that moment. Therefore, if the laborers bought from him Sabbatical-Year produce, it is considered as though the employer paid his laborers with Sabbatical-Year produce, which is prohibited. Therefore, this case is not comparable to the case of the Sages who borrowed Sabbatical-Year produce.
אֲבָל חֶנְוָנִי שֶׁאֵין מַקִּיפוֹ מַאי מוּתָּר? אִי הָכִי, אַדְּתָנֵי ״צְאוּ וְאִכְלוּ בְּדִינָר זֶה״, ״צְאוּ וּשְׁתוּ בְּדִינָר זֶה״, לִיפְלוֹג וְלִיתְנֵי בְּדִידַהּ:
The Gemara asks: But in the case of a storekeeper who does not give credit to the employer, what is the halakha? Is it permitted for the employer to send his laborers to buy food, committing to reimburse them afterward? If so, rather than the tanna teaching that if the employer says: Go and eat with this dinar, or: Go and drink with this dinar, he does need to be concerned that they will buy forbidden food, let him distinguish and teach the distinction within the case itself where he says: Go and eat and I will reimburse you.
בַּמֶּה דְּבָרִים אֲמוּרִים? בְּחֶנְוָנִי הַמַּקִּיפוֹ, דְּמִשְׁתַּעְבַּד לֵיהּ, אֲבָל חֶנְוָנִי שֶׁאֵין מַקִּיפוֹ — מוּתָּר.
The tanna could teach as follows: In what case is this statement said, i.e., that if the employer says: I will reimburse you, he cannot allow his laborer to buy forbidden food? It is stated with regard to the case of a storekeeper who regularly gives credit to the employer, such that the employer incurs the debt to him at the moment the storekeeper gives the food or drink to the laborers. But in the case of a storekeeper who does not give credit to the employer, it is permitted for the employer to instruct his laborers in this manner.
וְעוֹד: חֶנְוָנִי שֶׁאֵין מַקִּיפוֹ מִי לָא מִשְׁתַּעְבַּד? וְהָאָמַר רָבָא: הָאוֹמֵר לַחֲבֵירוֹ ״תֵּן מָנֶה לִפְלוֹנִי וְיִקָּנוּ כׇּל נְכָסַאי לָךְ״, קָנָה מִדִּין עָרֵב!
And furthermore, there is another difficulty with this interpretation: In the case of a storekeeper who does not give credit to the employer, does he not incur the debt to him? But doesn’t Rava say that in the case of one who says to another: Give one hundred dinars to so-and-so and all of my property will be transferred to you, he acquires it by the halakha of a guarantor? Just as a guarantor for another person’s loan renders himself liable to pay for someone else’s debt, so too, the owner of the property renders himself liable to give the property in exchange for the one hundred dinars that the acquiring party gives that so-and-so. Here too, the employer renders himself liable to pay the storekeeper when the storekeeper gives food to his laborers at his request.
אֶלָּא אָמַר רָבָא: לָא שְׁנָא מַקִּיפוֹ, וְלָא שְׁנָא שֶׁאֵין מַקִּיפוֹ, אַף עַל גַּב דִּמְשַׁעְבַּד לֵיהּ, כֵּיוָן דְּלָא מְיַיחַד שִׁיעְבּוּדֵיהּ — לָא מִיתְּסַר.
Rather, Rava says: There is no difference whether the storekeeper gives him credit, and there is no difference whether he does not give him credit. Any commitment to pay causes a liability. But although he incurs a debt to him, since he does not designate specific coins as payment for his debt the employer’s conduct is not prohibited. Therefore, the Sages of the school of Rabbi Yannai acted in a permitted manner.
אֶלָּא הָכָא אַמַּאי חוֹשֵׁשׁ מִשּׁוּם שְׁבִיעִית? הָא לָא מְיַיחַד שִׁיעְבּוּדֵיהּ הָכָא! אָמַר רַב פָּפָּא: כְּגוֹן שֶׁהִקְדִּים לוֹ דִּינָר.
The Gemara asks: But here, in the baraita, why does the employer need to be concerned with regard to the prohibitions concerning Sabbatical-Year produce? He does not designate specific money as payment for his debt here. Rav Pappa said: The baraita is referring to a case where the employer first paid the storekeeper a dinar for the food he would provide to the laborers, before they actually purchased food. Therefore, the employer is considered to have acquired forbidden items and paid his laborers’ wages with them.
אָמַר רַב כָּהֲנָא: אַמְרִיתַהּ לִשְׁמַעְתָּא קַמֵּיהּ דְּרַב זְבִיד מִנְּהַרְדְּעָא, אָמַר לִי: אִי הָכִי, אַדְּתָנֵי ״צְאוּ וְאִכְלוּ, צְאוּ וּשְׁתוּ, וַאֲנִי פּוֹרֵעַ״, ״צְאוּ וְאִכְלוּ, צְאוּ וּשְׁתוּ, וַאֲנִי מְחַשֵּׁב״ מִיבְּעֵי לֵיהּ! אֲמַר לֵיהּ: תְּנִי ״צְאוּ וַאֲנִי מְחַשֵּׁב״.
Rav Kahana said: I stated this halakha before Rav Zevid of Neharde’a. He said to me: If so, if the latter clause of the baraita is understood as referring to a case where the employer paid the storekeeper a dinar in advance, rather than teaching a case where the employer said to his laborers: Go and eat, go and drink, and I will reimburse you, the tanna should have taught a case where he said: Go and eat, go and drink, and I will calculate the amount that should be deducted from the dinar I gave him. Rav Kahana said to him: That is not difficult; teach the baraita as stating: Go, and I will calculate the amount that should be deducted from the dinar I gave him.
רַב אָשֵׁי אָמַר: כְּגוֹן שֶׁנָּטַל וְנָתַן בַּיָּד. אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַב יֵימַר לְרַב אָשֵׁי: אִי הָכִי, אַדְּתָנֵי ״צְאוּ וְאִכְלוּ, צְאוּ וּשְׁתוּ״, ״טְלוּ וְאִכְלוּ, טְלוּ וּשְׁתוּ״ מִיבְּעֵי לֵיהּ! אֲמַר לֵיהּ: תָּנֵי ״טְלוּ וְאִכְלוּ, טְלוּ וּשְׁתוּ״.
Rav Ashi said: The baraita is referring to a case where the employer took the food and drink from the storekeeper and gave it to the laborers with his own hand. Rav Yeimar said to Rav Ashi: If that is so, rather than teaching that the employer said: Go and eat, go and drink, the tanna should have taught a case where he said: Take and eat, take and drink. Rav Ashi said to him: Teach the baraita as stating: Take and eat, take and drink.
יָתֵיב רַב נַחְמָן וְעוּלָּא וַאֲבִימִי בַּר פַּפִּי, וְיָתֵיב רַבִּי חִיָּיא בַּר אַמֵּי גַּבַּיְיהוּ, וְיָתְבִי וְקָא מִיבַּעְיָא לְהוּ: שְׂכָרוֹ לִשְׁבּוֹר בְּיֵין נֶסֶךְ מַהוּ? מִי אָמְרִינַן כֵּיוָן דְּרוֹצֶה בְּקִיּוּמוֹ — אָסוּר, אוֹ דִלְמָא כֹּל לְמַעוֹטֵי תִּיפְלָה שַׁפִּיר דָּמֵי?
§ Rav Naḥman and Ulla and Avimi bar Pappi were sitting, and Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Ami, who was studying with them, was sitting among them, and they were sitting and a dilemma was raised before them: If one hired a person to break barrels of wine used for a libation so the wine will spill out, what is the halakha? Do we say that since he has an interest in the preservation of the barrels until he breaks them, so that he can be paid for breaking them, his wage is forbidden, or perhaps should it be reasoned that any action that one performs to reduce impropriety [tifela] is permitted, even if he is paid for the actual breaking?
אָמַר רַב נַחְמָן: יִשְׁבּוֹר, וְתָבֹא עָלָיו בְּרָכָה. לֵימָא מְסַיַּיע לֵיהּ: אֵין עוֹדְרִין עִם הַגּוֹי בְּכִלְאַיִם,
Rav Naḥman said: He may break them, and let a blessing come upon him. The Gemara suggests: Let us say that a baraita supports his opinion: One may not hoe together with a gentile in a field that contains a forbidden mixture of diverse kinds,
