Avodah Zarah 71

Avodah Zarah 71

גְּמָ׳ וּרְמִינְהִי: עִיר שֶׁכְּבָשׁוּהָ כַּרְקוֹם — כׇּל כֹּהֲנוֹת שֶׁבְּתוֹכָהּ פְּסוּלוֹת! אָמַר רַב מָרִי: לְנַסֵּךְ אֵין פְּנַאי, לִבְעוֹל יֵשׁ פְּנַאי.

GEMARA: And the Gemara raises a contradiction to the assumption that soldiers during wartime do not have time to commit transgressions from that which is taught in another mishna (Ketubot 27a): With regard to a city that was conquered by an army laying siege, all the women married to priests located in the city are unfit and forbidden to their husbands, due to the concern that they were raped. Rav Mari resolved the contradiction and said: They do not have time to pour wine for libations, as their passion for idolatry is not pressing at that time, but they have time to engage in intercourse, because their lust is great even during wartime.

מַתְנִי׳ הָאוּמָּנִין שֶׁל יִשְׂרָאֵל שֶׁשָּׁלַח לָהֶם נׇכְרִי חָבִית שֶׁל יֵין נֶסֶךְ בִּשְׂכָרָן — מוּתָּר לוֹמַר: ״תֵּן לָנוּ אֶת דָּמֶיהָ״, מִשֶּׁנִּכְנְסָה לִרְשׁוּתָן — אָסוּר.

MISHNA: With regard to Jewish craftsmen to whom a gentile sent a barrel of wine used for a libation in lieu of their wage, it is permitted for them to say to him: Give us its monetary value instead. But once it has entered into their possession, it is prohibited for them to say so, as that would be tantamount to selling the wine to the gentile and deriving benefit from it.

גְּמָ׳ אָמַר רַב יְהוּדָה אָמַר רַב: מוּתָּר לָאָדָם לוֹמַר לְגוֹי: ״צֵא וְהָפֵס עָלַי מְנָת הַמֶּלֶךְ״.

GEMARA: Rav Yehuda says that Rav says: It is permitted for a person to say to a gentile: Go and placate the collectors of the governmental tax on wine for me, and I will reimburse you subsequently, even if he pays the tax with wine used for a libation.

מֵיתִיבִי: אַל יֹאמַר אָדָם לְגוֹי ״עוּל תַּחְתַּי לָעוֹצֵר״. אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַב: ״עוּל תַּחְתַּי לָעוֹצֵר״ קָאָמְרַתְּ? הָא לָא דָּמְיָא אֶלָּא לְהָא, אֲבָל אוֹמֵר לוֹ ״מַלְּטֵנִי מִן הָעוֹצֵר״.

One of the Sages raised an objection from a baraita: A person may not say to a gentile: Go in my stead to the commissary [la’otzer] to pay the wine tax for me, if he pays it in wine used for a libation. Rav said to him: You say that the case I am referring to is similar to one who says to a gentile: Go in my stead to the commissary? In that case, since he says: In my stead, whatever the gentile gives the commissary is considered as though the Jew gave it himself. This case that I am referring to is comparable only to that which is taught in the baraita: But the Jew may say to a gentile: Save me from the commissary.

מַתְנִי׳ הַמּוֹכֵר יֵינוֹ לְנׇכְרִי, פָּסַק עַד שֶׁלֹּא מָדַד — דָּמָיו מוּתָּרִין, מָדַד עַד שֶׁלֹּא פָּסַק — דָּמָיו אֲסוּרִין.

MISHNA: In the case of a Jew who sells his wine to a gentile, if he fixed a price before he measured the wine into the gentile’s vessel, deriving benefit from the money paid for the wine is permitted. It is not tantamount to selling wine used for a libation, as the gentile purchased the wine before it became forbidden, and the money already belonged to the Jew. But if the Jew measured the wine into the gentile’s vessel, thereby rendering it forbidden, before he fixed a price, the money paid for the wine is forbidden.

גְּמָ׳ אָמַר אַמֵּימָר: מְשִׁיכָה בְּגוֹי קוֹנָה, תִּדַּע, דְּהָנֵי פָּרְסָאֵי מְשַׁדְּרִי פַּרְדָּשְׁנֵי לַהֲדָדֵי וְלָא הָדְרִי בְּהוּ. רַב אָשֵׁי אָמַר: לְעוֹלָם אֵימָא לָךְ, מְשִׁיכָה בְּגוֹי אֵינָהּ קוֹנָה, וְהַאי דְּלָא הָדְרִי בְּהוּ — דְּרָמוּת רוּחָא הוּא דִּנְקִיטָא לְהוּ.

GEMARA: Ameimar says: The legal act of acquiring an object by pulling it applies to a gentile. Know that it is so, as those Persians send gifts [pardashnei] to one another and do not retract them, which shows that they acquire one from another by pulling the object alone, even without paying for it. Rav Ashi says: Actually, I will say to you that pulling an object does not acquire it in a transaction involving a gentile, and the fact that they do not retract their gifts is not due to the halakhot of acquisition but because they are taken over by haughtiness, and they consider it shameful to retract a gift.

אָמַר רַב אָשֵׁי: מְנָא אָמֵינָא לַהּ מִדְּאָמַר לְהוּ רַב לְהָנְהוּ סָבוֹיָתָא: כִּי כָיְילִיתוּ חַמְרָא לְגוֹיִם, שִׁקְלוּ זוּזֵי מִינַּיְיהוּ וַהֲדַר (כָּיְילָן) [כַּיְילוּ] לְהוּ, וְאִי לָא נְקִיטוּ בַּהֲדַיְיהוּ זוּזֵי, אוֹזִיפוּנְהוּ וַהֲדַר שְׁקִילוּ מִינַּיְיהוּ, כִּי הֵיכִי דְּתִיהְוֵי הַלְוָאָה גַּבַּיְיהוּ, דְּאִי לָא עָבְדִיתוּ הָכִי, כִּי קָא הָוֵי יֵין נֶסֶךְ — בִּרְשׁוּתַיְיכוּ קָא הָוֵי, וְכִי שָׁקְילִתוּ דְּמֵי יֵין נֶסֶךְ קָא שָׁקְילִתוּ. וְאִי סָלְקָא דַעְתָּךְ מְשִׁיכָה בְּגוֹי קוֹנָה?

Rav Ashi said: From where do I say that acquisition by pulling does not apply to gentiles? It is from that which Rav said to certain wine shopkeepers: When you measure wine for gentiles, take the dinars from them and then measure the wine for them. And if they do not have dinars with them readily available, lend them dinars and then take those dinars back from them, so that it will be a loan provided to them that they are repaying. As if you do not do so, when it becomes wine used for a libation it becomes so in your possession, and when you take the money it will be payment for wine used for a libation that you are taking. Rav Ashi concludes his proof for his opinion: And if it enters your mind that pulling an object acquires it in a transaction involving a gentile,

מִדְּמַשְׁכֵהּ גּוֹי קַנְיֵיהּ, יֵין נֶסֶךְ לָא הָוֵי עַד דְּנָגַע בֵּיהּ!

from the moment that he pulled it, the gentile acquired it, whereas it did not become wine used for a libation until he touched it. Therefore, the seller can receive payment for the wine he sold, because at the time of the acquisition the wine was permitted.

אִי דְּקָא כָיֵיל וְרָמֵי לְמָנָא דְּיִשְׂרָאֵל, הָכִי נָמֵי. לָא צְרִיכָא דְּקָא כָיֵיל וְרָמֵי לְמָנָא דְּגוֹי.

The Gemara rejects this proof: If it is a case where the seller measures the wine and pours it into the vessel of a Jew, it is indeed permitted to do so without receiving payment first. Rav’s ruling is not necessary except in a case where he measures the wine and pours it into the vessel of the gentile, which contains wine used for a libation, and the wine is rendered forbidden upon contact with the vessel even before the gentile acquires it by pulling it.

סוֹף סוֹף, כִּי מְטָא לְאַוֵּירָא דְּמָנָא קַנְיֵיהּ, יֵין נֶסֶךְ לָא הָוֵי עַד דְּמָטֵי לְאַרְעִיתֵיהּ דְּמָנָא, שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ נִצּוֹק חִבּוּר?

The Gemara raises an objection: Ultimately, even in this case, when the wine reaches the interior airspace of the gentile’s vessel, he acquires it, as this too is a mode of acquisition. And it does not become wine used for a libation until it reaches the bottom of the vessel, making contact with it, so the acquisition occurs before the wine becomes forbidden. Can one conclude from this that in the opinion of Rav a stream of liquid serves as a connection between two bodies of liquid? If so, when the Jew pours the wine into the gentile’s vessel, the flow of wine that is in contact with the forbidden wine at the bottom of the vessel would render all the wine being poured into the vessel forbidden.

לָא, אִי דְּנָקֵיט לֵיהּ גּוֹי לִכְלִי בִּידֵיהּ — הָכִי נָמֵי; לָא צְרִיכָא דְּמַנַּח אַאַרְעָא.

The Gemara rejects this conclusion: No, a stream of liquid does not serve as a connection, and therefore if the gentile is holding the vessel in his hand, the gentile indeed acquires the wine before it becomes forbidden, and therefore the money paid for it is permitted. Rav’s ruling is not necessary unless the gentile’s vessel is set on the ground, so that there is no act of acquisition before the wine becomes forbidden.

וְתִיקְּנֵי לֵיהּ כִּלְיוֹ! שָׁמְעַתְּ מִינַּהּ: כִּלְיוֹ שֶׁל לוֹקֵחַ בִּרְשׁוּת מוֹכֵר — לֹא קָנָה לוֹקֵחַ.

The Gemara asks: But let the vessels of the gentile acquire the wine from the moment it enters the interior airspace. Can one conclude from this that if the buyer’s vessels are in the domain of the seller, the buyer does not acquire the merchandise once it is placed in his vessels? This is an issue that is subject to a dispute between the Sages, which remains unresolved.

לָא, לְעוֹלָם אֵימָא לָךְ: קָנָה לוֹקֵחַ, וְהָכָא בְּמַאי עָסְקִינַן? כְּגוֹן דְּאִיכָּא עַכֶּבֶת יַיִן אַפּוּמַּיהּ דְּכוּזַנְתָּא, דְּקַמָּא קַמָּא אִינְּסֵיךְ לֵיהּ.

The Gemara rejects this: No, actually, I could say to you that the buyer acquires the merchandise in such a case. But here, where the wine is rendered forbidden before being acquired by the gentile, we are dealing with a case where there is a remnant of wine remaining on the mouth of the gentile’s jug [kuzanta], which renders the wine poured into the jug forbidden, as each bit of wine becomes libation wine when it comes into contact with the remnant of wine on the mouth as it is poured into the jug. This is why Rav told the wine shopkeepers to take the money before measuring the wine into the gentile’s vessel.

וּכְמַאן? דְּלָא כְּרַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל, דְּאִי רַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל, הָאָמַר: יִמָּכֵר כּוּלּוֹ לְגוֹיִם חוּץ מִדְּמֵי יֵין נֶסֶךְ שֶׁבּוֹ!

The Gemara raises an objection: And in accordance with whose opinion does Rav say this? It is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel; as, if it were in accordance with the opinion of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, doesn’t he say that libation wine that became mixed with other wine may all be sold to gentiles for the monetary value of the entire mixture except for the value of the wine used for a libation that is in the mixture? Accordingly, it is permitted to accept payment for wine that was poured into a gentile’s vessel, and the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel.

מִידֵּי הוּא טַעְמָא, אֶלָּא לְרַב, הָאָמַר רַב: הֲלָכָה כְּרַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל — חָבִית בְּחָבִית, אֲבָל לֹא יַיִן בְּיַיִן.

The Gemara answers: The explanation of this ruling can be only according to the opinion of Rav, who issued the ruling. And doesn’t Rav say that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel only in the case of a barrel of permitted wine that became intermingled with another barrel of libation wine, but not in the case of wine that became mixed with other wine in the same barrel? Therefore, explaining Rav’s statement as contradicting the opinion of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel is not problematic; consequently, it cannot be proven from his statement that a gentile does not acquire an item by pulling it.

מֵיתִיבִי: הַלּוֹקֵחַ גְּרוּטָאוֹת מִן הַגּוֹיִם וּמָצָא בָּהֶן עֲבוֹדָה זָרָה, אִם עַד שֶׁלֹּא נָתַן מָעוֹת מָשַׁךְ — יַחֲזִיר, אִם מִשֶּׁנָּתַן מָעוֹת מָשַׁךְ — יוֹלִיךְ לְיָם הַמֶּלַח. אִי סָלְקָא דַעְתָּךְ מְשִׁיכָה בְּגוֹי קוֹנָה, אַמַּאי יַחְזִיר? אָמַר אַבָּיֵי: מִשּׁוּם דְּמִיחֲזֵי כִּי מִקָּח טָעוּת.

The Gemara raises another objection to the statement of Ameimar that a gentile can acquire an object by pulling it. It is taught in a baraita: With regard to one who buys broken vessels made of gold or silver from the gentiles and finds among them an object of idol worship, if he pulled the object of idol worship, thereby performing an act of acquisition, before he gave the money to the gentile, he may return the object of idol worship to the gentile. But if he pulled it after he gave the money to the gentile, he may not return it. Since the idol’s status was not revoked, he must take it and cast it into the Dead Sea. In that case, if it enters your mind that pulling an object acquires it in a transaction with a gentile, as Ameimar maintains, then why may he return the object once he has pulled it, since it is his? Abaye said: He may return it because it appears to be a mistaken transaction, since he clearly did not intend to purchase an object of idol worship.

אָמַר רָבָא: רֵישָׁא מִקָּח טָעוּת, סֵיפָא לָאו מִקָּח טָעוּת? אֶלָּא אָמַר רָבָא: רֵישָׁא וְסֵיפָא מִקָּח טָעוּת, וְרֵישָׁא דְּלָא יָהֵיב זוּזֵי — לָא מִיתְחֲזֵי כַּעֲבוֹדָה זָרָה בְּיַד יִשְׂרָאֵל, סֵיפָא דְּיָהֵיב זוּזֵי — מִיתְחֲזֵי כַּעֲבוֹדָה זָרָה בְּיַד יִשְׂרָאֵל.

Rava said: Then why, in the second instance, where he paid the money, may he not return it? Is the purchase in the first clause a mistaken transaction but the purchase in the latter clause not a mistaken transaction? Rather, Rava said: The purchase in the first clause and the purchase in the latter clause are both a mistaken transaction, but in the case presented in the first clause, where he did not pay him the dinars, it does not appear as though there is an object of idol worship in the possession of a Jew, and so he may return it. By contrast, in the latter clause, where he did pay him the dinars, it appears as though there is an object of idol worship in the possession of a Jew, and therefore he must cast away the object rather than return it.

אֲמַר לֵיהּ מָר קַשִּׁישָׁא בְּרֵיהּ דְּרַב חִסְדָּא לְרַב אָשֵׁי: תָּא שְׁמַע, הַמּוֹכֵר יֵינוֹ לְנׇכְרִי, פָּסַק עַד שֶׁלֹּא מָדַד — דָּמָיו מוּתָּרִים. וְאִי אָמְרַתְּ מְשִׁיכָה בְּגוֹי אֵינָהּ קוֹנָה, אַמַּאי דָּמָיו מוּתָּרִין? הָכָא בְּמַאי עָסְקִינַן — דְּאַקְדֵּים לֵיהּ דִּינָר.

§ The Gemara cites a claim against Rav Ashi’s opinion that a gentile cannot acquire an item by pulling it: Mar Kashisha, son of Rav Ḥisda, said to Rav Ashi: Come and hear an objection to your opinion from the mishna: In the case of a Jew who sells his wine to a gentile, if he fixed a price before he measured the wine into the gentile’s vessel, deriving benefit from the money paid for the wine is permitted, as the wine was acquired by the gentile before he touched it. And if you say that pulling an item does not acquire it in a transaction involving a gentile, why is the money paid for it permitted? Rav Ashi replied: Here we are dealing with a case where the gentile paid him a dinar in advance, before the measuring, thereby acquiring the wine with money.

אִי הָכִי, אֵימָא סֵיפָא: מָדַד עַד שֶׁלֹּא פָּסַק — דָּמָיו אֲסוּרִין, וְאִי דְּקָדֵים לֵיהּ דִּינָר, אַמַּאי דָּמָיו אֲסוּרִין?

One of the Sages raised an objection: If that is so, say the last clause: But if the Jew measured the wine into the gentile’s vessel, thereby rendering it forbidden, before he fixed a price, the money paid for the wine is forbidden. And if he paid him a dinar in advance, why should the money paid for it be forbidden?

אֲמַר לֵיהּ: וּלְדִידָךְ דְּאָמְרַתְּ מְשִׁיכָה בְּגוֹי קוֹנָה, אַמַּאי רֵישָׁא דָּמָיו מוּתָּרִין, וְסֵיפָא דָּמָיו אֲסוּרִין?

Rav Ashi said to him: And according to you, as you say that pulling acquires items in a transaction involving a gentile, why in the first clause is the money paid for it permitted, and in the latter clause the money paid for it is forbidden?

אֶלָּא מַאי אִית לָךְ לְמֵימַר? פָּסַק — סָמְכָא דַּעְתֵּיהּ; לֹא פָּסַק — לָא סָמְכָא דַּעְתֵּיהּ.

Rather, what have you to say to explain the distinction between the two cases? You say that when the Jew fixed a price, the gentile consequently relied on him that the sale would not be canceled, and so the sale was concluded by the pulling. But in a case where he did not fix a price, the gentile did not rely on him that the sale would not be canceled, and therefore the sale was not concluded.

לְדִידִי נָמֵי, אַף עַל גַּב דִּקְדֵים לֵיהּ דִּינָר — פָּסַק, סָמְכָא דַּעְתֵּיהּ; לֹא פָּסַק, לָא סָמְכָא דַּעְתֵּיהּ.

According to my opinion as well, even though the gentile gave him a dinar in advance, if he fixed a price, the gentile relied on him that the sale would not be canceled, and if he did not fix a price, the gentile did not rely on him that the sale would not be canceled.

אֲמַר לֵיהּ רָבִינָא לְרַב אָשֵׁי: תָּא שְׁמַע, דְּאָמַר רַבִּי חִיָּיא בַּר אַבָּא אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: בֶּן נֹחַ נֶהֱרָג עַל פָּחוֹת מִשָּׁוֶה פְּרוּטָה, וְלֹא נִיתָּן לְהִישָּׁבוֹן, וְאִי אָמְרַתְּ מְשִׁיכָה בְּגוֹי אֵינָהּ קוֹנָה, אַמַּאי נֶהֱרָג?

Ravina said to Rav Ashi: Come and hear another proof against your opinion, as Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: A descendant of Noah, i.e., a gentile, is executed by the court for theft of even less than the value of one peruta; but if he stole less than the value of one peruta from a Jew, it is not subject to restitution, i.e., he is not obligated to return it, as the Jew presumably waived the debt. And if you say that pulling an item does not acquire it in a transaction involving a gentile, why should he be executed? He did not commit a legally significant act by stealing the item, as it remains in the possession of the owner.

מִשּׁוּם דְּצַעֲרֵיהּ לְיִשְׂרָאֵל.

The Gemara answers: He is executed because he caused a Jew distress by stealing the item, even though by the halakhot of acquisition the thief did not acquire it.