A case is brought in which a yabam committed to share his brother’s inheritance with his other brother but as opposed to that case in Ketubot 81, he did a kinyan to show he wanted to make sure it was effective. However, they still ruled that it was not effective as a kinyan cannot be effective when the item isn’t yours to sell. The property of his brother is not his, even once he married the yavama. Once a yabam marries his brother’s wife, she is his wife for all intents and purposes. Why was this necessary to say – for what halacha? Why does he not need to give her a ketuba, but she uses the one she has from his brother (the first marriage)? Shimon ben Shatach instituted that all the husband’s property be liened to the ketuba. What was before he instituted this and why was it a necessary takana?
This week’s learning is sponsored by Helen Danczak. “My dear uncle Phil passed on August 27 with family at hand. He was the kind of uncle that the kids (of all ages) gravitated to. I am not alone in saying he was my favorite uncle. He is missed. May his neshama have an aliyah.”
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This week’s learning is sponsored by Helen Danczak. “My dear uncle Phil passed on August 27 with family at hand. He was the kind of uncle that the kids (of all ages) gravitated to. I am not alone in saying he was my favorite uncle. He is missed. May his neshama have an aliyah.”
Ketubot 82
דִּלְמָא רַבִּי נָתָן הִיא. דְּתַנְיָא, רַבִּי נָתָן אוֹמֵר: מִנַּיִן לַנּוֹשֶׁה בַּחֲבֵירוֹ מָנֶה, וַחֲבֵירוֹ בַּחֲבֵירוֹ, מִנַּיִן שֶׁמּוֹצִיאִין מִזֶּה וְנוֹתְנִין לָזֶה — תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״וְנָתַן לַאֲשֶׁר אָשַׁם לוֹ״.
However, this still does not prove conclusively that the baraita is corrupt, as perhaps it is the opinion of Rabbi Natan. As it is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Natan says: From where is it derived that in the case of one who claims one hundred dinars of another, and the other claims money of another, that one appropriates the money from this one, the last borrower, and gives it to this one, the first lender, without each party claiming the money from the one with whom he did business? The verse states: “And he shall give it to him in respect of whom he has been guilty” (Numbers 5:7). The words “whom he has been guilty” are expounded to mean that the borrower pays the one who is owed by his creditor, since the borrower is a party to this case despite the fact that he never incurred direct liability to him. It is possible to explain the baraita cited by Rav Yosef based on this reasoning as well.
אֶלָּא: לָא אַשְׁכְּחַן תַּנָּא דְּמַחְמִיר תְּרֵי חוּמְרֵי בִּכְתוּבָּה, אֶלָּא אִי כְּרַבִּי מֵאִיר אִי כְּרַבִּי נָתָן.
Rather, a different justification exists for rejecting the baraita: We have not found a tanna who is stringent with these two stringencies with regard to a marriage contract. Rather, one rules either in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir that movable property is mortgaged for a marriage contract, or in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Natan. No one accepts both of these stringencies, and yet this baraita can be explained only by a combination of the two opinions. It must therefore be rejected as non-authoritative.
אָמַר רָבָא: אִם כֵּן, הַיְינוּ דִּשְׁמַעְנָא לֵיהּ לְאַבָּיֵי דְּאָמַר: ״זוֹ אֵינָהּ מִשְׁנָה״, וְלָא יָדַעְנָא מַאי הִיא.
Rava said: If so, that is the meaning of that which I heard from Abaye, who said: This is not a mishna, and I did not know what it is. Rava initially did not understand why the teaching should be dismissed, but he subsequently realized what Abaye was saying.
הָהוּא גַּבְרָא דִּנְפַלָה לֵיהּ יְבָמָה בְּמָתָא מַחְסֵיָא. בְּעָא אֲחוּהּ לְמִיפְסְלַהּ בְּגִיטָּא מִינֵּיהּ. אֲמַר לֵיהּ: מַאי דַּעְתָּיךְ, אִי מִשּׁוּם נִכְסֵי — אֲנָא בְּנִכְסֵי פָּלֵיגְנָא לָךְ. אֲמַר לֵיהּ: מִסְתְּפֵינָא דְּעָבְדַתְּ לִי כְּדַעֲבַיד פּוּמְבְּדִיתָאָה רַמָּאָה. אֲמַר לֵיהּ: אִי בָּעֵית — פְּלוֹג לָךְ מֵהַשְׁתָּא.
The Gemara relates a similar incident: There was a certain man who had a yevama happen before him for levirate marriage in the town of Mata Meḥasya, and his brother wanted to disqualify her from him by means of a bill of divorce. The man said to his brother: What is your opinion? Why are you doing this? If you are doing this due to the property of the dead brother, I will divide the property with you. The brother said to him: I am scared that you will do to me like the swindler from Pumbedita did, in the above story, when the man from Pumbedita promised he would share the inheritance and later retracted. The man said to him: If you wish, divide it for yourself from now. I am prepared for you to take the property already, although the acquisition will take effect only after I marry the yevama.
אָמַר מָר בַּר רַב אָשֵׁי: אַף עַל גַּב דְּכִי אֲתָא רַב דִּימִי, אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: הָאוֹמֵר לַחֲבֵירוֹ ״לֵךְ וּמְשׁוֹךְ פָּרָה זוֹ וְלֹא תִּהְיֶה קְנוּיָה לְךָ אֶלָּא לְאַחַר שְׁלֹשִׁים יוֹם״, לְאַחַר שְׁלֹשִׁים יוֹם קָנָה, וַאֲפִילּוּ עוֹמֶדֶת בַּאֲגַם.
Mar bar Rav Ashi said that although when Rav Dimi came from Eretz Yisrael he said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: In the case of one who says to another: Go and pull this cow and it will be acquired for you only after thirty days, after thirty days he has acquired it through the act of pulling, and this is the halakha even if at the end of the thirty days the cow was standing in a meadow, i.e., a distant place that does not belong to the one acquiring the cow. This indicates that the present act of pulling is effective for later. Despite this halakha, Mar bar Rav Ashi claims that a difference exists between that case and the one currently under discussion.
הָתָם — בְּיָדוֹ, הָכָא — לָאו בְּיָדוֹ.
Mar bar Rav Ashi elaborates: There, with regard to the cow, it is in the seller’s power to transfer ownership at the present time, when the instruction to pull the cow is given, and therefore he can delay the acquisition. Here, however, it is not in his power to divide up the property, as he has yet to perform levirate marriage and the brother’s property does not belong to him. Consequently, he cannot transfer its ownership at the present time.
וְהָא כִּי אֲתָא רָבִין, אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: לָא קָנֵי! לָא קַשְׁיָא: הָא דַּאֲמַר לֵיהּ ״קְנֵי מֵעַכְשָׁיו״, הָא דְּלָא אֲמַר לֵיהּ ״קְנֵי מֵעַכְשָׁיו״.
The Gemara asks: But when Ravin came from Eretz Yisrael he said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: If one is instructed to pull a cow, but the acquisition will take effect only after thirty days, he has not acquired it. This contradicts Rabbi Yoḥanan’s own ruling. The Gemara answers: This is not difficult, as this case, when one acquires it, is referring to a situation when he says to him: Acquire it from now, so that once thirty days have passed it should belong to him retroactively, but that case, when one does not acquire it, is when he did not say to him: Acquire it from now. If the acquisition does not take effect now, it cannot take effect later.
בְּעוֹ מִינֵּיהּ מֵעוּלָּא: יִבֵּם וְאַחַר כָּךְ חִילֵּק, מַהוּ? לֹא עָשָׂה וְלֹא כְלוּם. חִילֵּק וְאַחַר כָּךְ יִבֵּם, מַהוּ? לֹא עָשָׂה וְלֹא כְלוּם.
They inquired of Ulla: If the yavam performed levirate marriage with the woman and afterward divided the property he promised to share with his brother, what is the halakha? He replied: He has done nothing. They further asked: If he divided the property and afterward performed levirate marriage, what is the halakha? He once again responded: He has done nothing.
מַתְקֵיף לַהּ רַב שֵׁשֶׁת: הַשְׁתָּא יִבֵּם וְאַחַר כָּךְ חִילֵּק, לֹא עָשָׂה וְלֹא כְלוּם, חִילֵּק וְאַחַר כָּךְ יִבֵּם מִבַּעְיָא?! שְׁנֵי מַעֲשִׂים הֲווֹ.
Rav Sheshet objects to this version of the discussion: Now if, when he performed levirate marriage and afterward divided the property when it was in his possession, Ulla answered that he has done nothing, then in a case where he divided it and afterward performed levirate marriage, is it necessary to inquire as to the halakha? It is obvious that such an action is of no consequence. The Gemara answers: Ulla was not asked these two questions on the same occasion. Rather, there were two incidents in which people raised these issues before Ulla, and he answered each inquiry separately.
כִּי אֲתָא רָבִין, אָמַר רֵישׁ לָקִישׁ: בֵּין יִבֵּם וְאַחַר כָּךְ חִילֵּק, בֵּין חִילֵּק וְאַחַר כָּךְ יִבֵּם — לֹא עָשָׂה וְלֹא כְלוּם. וְהִלְכְתָא: לֹא עָשָׂה וְלֹא כְלוּם.
When Ravin came from Eretz Yisrael he said that Reish Lakish said: Whether he performed levirate marriage and afterward divided the property, or whether he divided the property and afterward performed levirate marriage, he has done nothing. The Gemara concludes: And the practical halakha is that he has done nothing.
וַחֲכָמִים אוֹמְרִים: פֵּירוֹת הַמְחוּבָּרִים לַקַּרְקַע — שֶׁלּוֹ. אַמַּאי? וְהָא כׇּל נְכָסָיו אַחְרָאִין וְעַרְבָאִין לִכְתוּבָּתָהּ! אָמַר רֵישׁ לָקִישׁ: תְּנִי — שֶׁלָּהּ.
§ The mishna states: And the Rabbis say: Produce that is attached to the ground is his. The Gemara asks: Why is this so? Doesn’t all of his property serve as a guarantee and security for her marriage contract? Reish Lakish said: Emend the text and teach: Produce that is attached to the ground is hers.
כְּנָסָהּ — הֲרֵי הִיא כְּאִשְׁתּוֹ. לְמַאי הִלְכְתָא? אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹסֵי בְּרַבִּי חֲנִינָא: לוֹמַר שֶׁמְּגָרְשָׁהּ בְּגֵט וּמַחְזִירָהּ. מְגָרְשָׁהּ בְּגֵט פְּשִׁיטָא?
The mishna further stated that if he married her, she is like his regular wife. The Gemara asks: With regard to what halakha was this stated? Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Ḥanina, said: The mishna means to say that he divorces her with a bill of divorce and that he may remarry her afterward without violating a prohibition. The Gemara asks: The halakha that he divorces her with a bill of divorce is obvious; how else can he divorce her?
מַהוּ דְּתֵימָא: ״וְיִבְּמָהּ״ אָמַר רַחֲמָנָא, וַעֲדַיִין יִבּוּמִין הָרִאשׁוֹנִים עָלֶיהָ. לָא תִּיסְגֵּי לַהּ בְּגֵט אֶלָּא בַּחֲלִיצָה, קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן.
The Gemara explains: It is necessary to state this lest you say that since the Merciful One states in the Torah: “And he will take her to him to be his wife and consummate the levirate marriage” (Deuteronomy 25:5), and here the status of the first levirate marriage is still upon her, this would mean that it should not suffice for her to leave by a bill of divorce, but rather she can leave him only by performing ḥalitza as well. The tanna therefore teaches us that ḥalitza is not required, as once he has married her she is like any other woman, who can be divorced by a bill of divorce alone.
מַחְזִירָהּ: פְּשִׁיטָא!
The Gemara asks with regard to the second part of the interpretation of Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Ḥanina, that he may remarry her: It is obvious that he may remarry her if the couple chooses to do so.
מַהוּ דְּתֵימָא: מִצְוָה דִּרְמָא רַחֲמָנָא עֲלֵיהּ עַבְדַּהּ, וְהַשְׁתָּא תֵּיקוּם עֲלֵיהּ בְּאִיסּוּר אֵשֶׁת אָח, קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן.
The Gemara explains: It is necessary lest you say that he has performed the mitzva the Merciful One placed upon him by means of levirate marriage, and now that he has divorced her she should once again stand in relation to him with the prohibition proscribing a brother’s wife, which was her status before the mitzva of levirate marriage came into effect. The tanna therefore teaches us that since he performed levirate marriage with her, the prohibition proscribing a brother’s wife no longer applies at all.
וְאֵימָא הָכִי נָמֵי! אָמַר קְרָא ״וּלְקָחָהּ לוֹ לְאִשָּׁה״. כֵּיוָן שֶׁלְּקָחָהּ — נַעֲשֵׂית כְּאִשְׁתּוֹ.
The Gemara asks: And say that indeed, the prohibition proscribing a brother’s wife should be in force once again. The Gemara explains: The verse states: “And he will take her to him to be his wife” (Deuteronomy 25:5), which indicates that once he has taken her, she has become like his regular wife in all respects.
בִּלְבַד שֶׁתְּהֵא כְּתוּבָּתָהּ עַל נִכְסֵי בַּעְלָהּ הָרִאשׁוֹן. מַאי טַעְמָא — אִשָּׁה הִקְנוּ לוֹ מִן הַשָּׁמַיִם.
§ The mishna taught: She has the status of his wife in all respects after levirate marriage, except that the responsibility for her marriage contract is upon the property of her first husband. The Gemara inquires: What is the reason for this? It is that from Heaven they acquired a wife for him. Since he did not choose her but married her by force of a Torah commandment, he is not obligated to set aside for her a marriage contract of his own. Rather, he relies upon his brother’s marriage contract.
וְאִי לֵית לַהּ מֵרִאשׁוֹן, אִית לַהּ מִשֵּׁנִי. כְּדֵי שֶׁלֹּא תְּהֵא קַלָּה בְּעֵינָיו לְהוֹצִיאָהּ.
The Gemara adds: And if she does not have anything from the first husband, e.g., if he owned no property, she nevertheless has a marriage contract from the second one, for the same reason that any wife is entitled to a marriage contract in the first place: So that she will not be demeaned in his eyes such that he will easily divorce her.
לֹא יֹאמַר לָהּ ״הֲרֵי כְּתוּבָּתִיךְ״. מַאי וְכֵן?
The mishna further stated that the yavam may not say to her: Here is your marriage contract, and similarly, a man may not make such a statement to his wife. Rather, all of his property is mortgaged for her marriage contract. The Gemara asks: What is the relevance of the phrase: And similarly, here? The halakha in both cases appears to be identical.
מַהוּ דְּתֵימָא: הָתָם הוּא דְּלָא כְּתַב לָהּ ״דִּקְנַאי וּדְקָנֵינָא״, אֲבָל הָכָא דִּכְתַב לַהּ ״דִּקְנַאי וּדְקָנֵינָא״, אֵימָא סָמְכָה דַּעְתַּהּ — קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן.
The Gemara explains: It is necessary lest you say that this is the halakha only there, with regard to a yevama, where the yavam did not write a marriage contract for her and therefore never wrote: All property that I have bought and that I will buy is mortgaged to the marriage contract. But here, with regard to a regular wife, where he did write a marriage contract for her that included the clause: That I have bought and that I will buy, say that she relies upon that which he has set aside, and therefore there is no need for a full lien on all his property. The tanna therefore teaches us that this is not the case.
גֵּרְשָׁהּ — אֵין לָהּ אֶלָּא כְּתוּבָּתָהּ. גֵּרְשָׁהּ — אִין, לֹא גֵּרְשָׁהּ — לָא. קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן כִּדְרַבִּי אַבָּא.
§ The mishna states that if he divorced her she has only her marriage contract. There is no lien upon the property, and he may therefore sell it. The Gemara infers: If he divorced her, yes, that is the case, but if he did not divorce her, no, it is not. The tanna here teaches us indirectly that the halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Abba, who claims that the only way he can gain full control of all the property is by divorcing her.
הֶחְזִירָה — הֲרֵי הִיא כְּכׇל הַנָּשִׁים, וְאֵין לָהּ אֶלָּא כְּתוּבָּתָהּ. הֶחְזִירָה, מַאי קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן? תְּנֵינָא: הַמְגָרֵשׁ אֶת הָאִשָּׁה וּמַחְזִירָה, עַל מְנָת כְּתוּבָּה רִאשׁוֹנָה מַחְזִירָהּ!
It was further taught in the mishna that if he remarried her, she is like all women, and she has nothing other than her marriage contract. The Gemara asks: What is the tanna teaching us by mentioning the possibility that he remarried her? We already learned this: With regard to one who divorces a woman and remarries her, he remarries her on the basis of her first marriage contract, and he need not write her a new one. Why is it necessary to emphasize this halakha in the case of a yevama?
מַהוּ דְּתֵימָא: אִשְׁתּוֹ הוּא דְּאִיהוּ כְּתַב לַהּ כְּתוּבָּה מִינֵּיהּ, אֲבָל יְבִמְתּוֹ דְּלָא אִיהוּ כְּתַב לַהּ, הֵיכָא דְּגָרְשַׁהּ וְאַהְדְּרַהּ — אֵימָא כְּתוּבְּתַהּ מִינֵּיהּ, קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן.
The Gemara answers: It is necessary lest you say that it is the halakha in the case of a wife, since he writes for her a marriage contract from him, and therefore when he remarries her he does so on the basis of the first marriage contract. But as for his yevama, where he did not write for her the marriage contract but it was written by his brother, in a case where he divorced her and remarried her, say that her marriage contract should be from him and he should write a new one using his own property. Therefore, the tanna teaches us that this is not required.
אָמַר רַב יְהוּדָה: בָּרִאשׁוֹנָה הָיוּ כּוֹתְבִין לִבְתוּלָה מָאתַיִם וּלְאַלְמָנָה מָנֶה, וְהָיוּ מַזְקִינִין וְלֹא הָיוּ נוֹשְׂאִין נָשִׁים, עַד שֶׁבָּא שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן שָׁטַח וְתִיקֵּן, כׇּל נְכָסָיו אַחְרָאִין לִכְתוּבָּתָהּ.
§ The Gemara discusses the background for the rule that the husband’s property is mortgaged for the marriage contract. Rav Yehuda said: At first they would write for a virgin two hundred dinars and for a widow one hundred dinars. They would then demand that this amount be available in cash, and then the men would grow old and would not marry women, as they did not all possess such large sums of money, until Shimon ben Shataḥ came and instituted an ordinance that a man need not place the money aside in practice. Rather, all of his property is guaranteed for her marriage contract.
תַּנְיָא נָמֵי הָכִי: בָּרִאשׁוֹנָה הָיוּ כּוֹתְבִין לִבְתוּלָה מָאתַיִם וּלְאַלְמָנָה מָנֶה, וְהָיוּ מַזְקִינִין וְלֹא הָיוּ נוֹשְׂאִין נָשִׁים. הִתְקִינוּ שֶׁיִּהְיוּ מַנִּיחִין אוֹתָהּ בְּבֵית אָבִיהָ. וַעֲדַיִין: כְּשֶׁהוּא כּוֹעֵס עָלֶיהָ, אוֹמֵר לָהּ: ״לְכִי אֵצֶל כְּתוּבָּתִיךְ״,
The Gemara comments: That opinion is also taught in a baraita: At first they would write for a virgin two hundred and for a widow one hundred dinars, and they would grow old and would not marry women, since the women were concerned that their marriage contract money would be wasted or lost, and they had no guarantee that it would be collected. The Sages therefore instituted an ordinance that they should place it, the sum of the marriage contract, in her father’s house, thereby ensuring its safekeeping. And still problems arose, as when he was angry at his wife, he would say to her: Go to your marriage contract, as it was too easy for them to divorce.
הִתְקִינוּ שֶׁיִּהְיוּ מַנִּיחִין אוֹתָהּ בְּבֵית חָמִיהָ. עֲשִׁירוֹת עוֹשׂוֹת אוֹתָהּ קְלָתוֹת שֶׁל כֶּסֶף וְשֶׁל זָהָב, עֲנִיּוֹת הָיוּ עוֹשׂוֹת אוֹתָהּ עָבִיט שֶׁל מֵימֵי רַגְלַיִם.
Therefore, the Sages instituted an ordinance that they would place it in her father-in-law’s house, i.e., in her husband’s house. And wealthy women would craft their marriage contract money into baskets of silver and of gold, while poor ones would craft it into a large vessel for the collection of urine, as their marriage contract was large enough only for a small vessel.
וַעֲדַיִין, כְּשֶׁכּוֹעֵס עָלֶיהָ אוֹמֵר לָהּ: ״טְלִי כְּתוּבָּתִיךְ וָצֵאִי״. עַד שֶׁבָּא שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן שָׁטַח וְתִיקֵּן, שֶׁיְּהֵא כּוֹתֵב לָהּ: כׇּל נְכָסַי אַחְרָאִין לִכְתוּבָּתָהּ.
And still, when he was angry at her he would say to her: Take your marriage contract and leave, until Shimon ben Shataḥ came and instituted an ordinance that he does not actually give her the money for her marriage contract. Rather, he should write to her: All my property is guaranteed for her marriage contract, and it is not localized to a particular place or object. Consequently, he would need to sell some of his property if he wished to divorce her, and would therefore think carefully before undertaking such a drastic course of action.
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Ketubot 82
דִּלְמָא רַבִּי נָתָן הִיא. דְּתַנְיָא, רַבִּי נָתָן אוֹמֵר: מִנַּיִן לַנּוֹשֶׁה בַּחֲבֵירוֹ מָנֶה, וַחֲבֵירוֹ בַּחֲבֵירוֹ, מִנַּיִן שֶׁמּוֹצִיאִין מִזֶּה וְנוֹתְנִין לָזֶה — תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״וְנָתַן לַאֲשֶׁר אָשַׁם לוֹ״.
However, this still does not prove conclusively that the baraita is corrupt, as perhaps it is the opinion of Rabbi Natan. As it is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Natan says: From where is it derived that in the case of one who claims one hundred dinars of another, and the other claims money of another, that one appropriates the money from this one, the last borrower, and gives it to this one, the first lender, without each party claiming the money from the one with whom he did business? The verse states: “And he shall give it to him in respect of whom he has been guilty” (Numbers 5:7). The words “whom he has been guilty” are expounded to mean that the borrower pays the one who is owed by his creditor, since the borrower is a party to this case despite the fact that he never incurred direct liability to him. It is possible to explain the baraita cited by Rav Yosef based on this reasoning as well.
אֶלָּא: לָא אַשְׁכְּחַן תַּנָּא דְּמַחְמִיר תְּרֵי חוּמְרֵי בִּכְתוּבָּה, אֶלָּא אִי כְּרַבִּי מֵאִיר אִי כְּרַבִּי נָתָן.
Rather, a different justification exists for rejecting the baraita: We have not found a tanna who is stringent with these two stringencies with regard to a marriage contract. Rather, one rules either in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir that movable property is mortgaged for a marriage contract, or in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Natan. No one accepts both of these stringencies, and yet this baraita can be explained only by a combination of the two opinions. It must therefore be rejected as non-authoritative.
אָמַר רָבָא: אִם כֵּן, הַיְינוּ דִּשְׁמַעְנָא לֵיהּ לְאַבָּיֵי דְּאָמַר: ״זוֹ אֵינָהּ מִשְׁנָה״, וְלָא יָדַעְנָא מַאי הִיא.
Rava said: If so, that is the meaning of that which I heard from Abaye, who said: This is not a mishna, and I did not know what it is. Rava initially did not understand why the teaching should be dismissed, but he subsequently realized what Abaye was saying.
הָהוּא גַּבְרָא דִּנְפַלָה לֵיהּ יְבָמָה בְּמָתָא מַחְסֵיָא. בְּעָא אֲחוּהּ לְמִיפְסְלַהּ בְּגִיטָּא מִינֵּיהּ. אֲמַר לֵיהּ: מַאי דַּעְתָּיךְ, אִי מִשּׁוּם נִכְסֵי — אֲנָא בְּנִכְסֵי פָּלֵיגְנָא לָךְ. אֲמַר לֵיהּ: מִסְתְּפֵינָא דְּעָבְדַתְּ לִי כְּדַעֲבַיד פּוּמְבְּדִיתָאָה רַמָּאָה. אֲמַר לֵיהּ: אִי בָּעֵית — פְּלוֹג לָךְ מֵהַשְׁתָּא.
The Gemara relates a similar incident: There was a certain man who had a yevama happen before him for levirate marriage in the town of Mata Meḥasya, and his brother wanted to disqualify her from him by means of a bill of divorce. The man said to his brother: What is your opinion? Why are you doing this? If you are doing this due to the property of the dead brother, I will divide the property with you. The brother said to him: I am scared that you will do to me like the swindler from Pumbedita did, in the above story, when the man from Pumbedita promised he would share the inheritance and later retracted. The man said to him: If you wish, divide it for yourself from now. I am prepared for you to take the property already, although the acquisition will take effect only after I marry the yevama.
אָמַר מָר בַּר רַב אָשֵׁי: אַף עַל גַּב דְּכִי אֲתָא רַב דִּימִי, אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: הָאוֹמֵר לַחֲבֵירוֹ ״לֵךְ וּמְשׁוֹךְ פָּרָה זוֹ וְלֹא תִּהְיֶה קְנוּיָה לְךָ אֶלָּא לְאַחַר שְׁלֹשִׁים יוֹם״, לְאַחַר שְׁלֹשִׁים יוֹם קָנָה, וַאֲפִילּוּ עוֹמֶדֶת בַּאֲגַם.
Mar bar Rav Ashi said that although when Rav Dimi came from Eretz Yisrael he said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: In the case of one who says to another: Go and pull this cow and it will be acquired for you only after thirty days, after thirty days he has acquired it through the act of pulling, and this is the halakha even if at the end of the thirty days the cow was standing in a meadow, i.e., a distant place that does not belong to the one acquiring the cow. This indicates that the present act of pulling is effective for later. Despite this halakha, Mar bar Rav Ashi claims that a difference exists between that case and the one currently under discussion.
הָתָם — בְּיָדוֹ, הָכָא — לָאו בְּיָדוֹ.
Mar bar Rav Ashi elaborates: There, with regard to the cow, it is in the seller’s power to transfer ownership at the present time, when the instruction to pull the cow is given, and therefore he can delay the acquisition. Here, however, it is not in his power to divide up the property, as he has yet to perform levirate marriage and the brother’s property does not belong to him. Consequently, he cannot transfer its ownership at the present time.
וְהָא כִּי אֲתָא רָבִין, אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: לָא קָנֵי! לָא קַשְׁיָא: הָא דַּאֲמַר לֵיהּ ״קְנֵי מֵעַכְשָׁיו״, הָא דְּלָא אֲמַר לֵיהּ ״קְנֵי מֵעַכְשָׁיו״.
The Gemara asks: But when Ravin came from Eretz Yisrael he said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: If one is instructed to pull a cow, but the acquisition will take effect only after thirty days, he has not acquired it. This contradicts Rabbi Yoḥanan’s own ruling. The Gemara answers: This is not difficult, as this case, when one acquires it, is referring to a situation when he says to him: Acquire it from now, so that once thirty days have passed it should belong to him retroactively, but that case, when one does not acquire it, is when he did not say to him: Acquire it from now. If the acquisition does not take effect now, it cannot take effect later.
בְּעוֹ מִינֵּיהּ מֵעוּלָּא: יִבֵּם וְאַחַר כָּךְ חִילֵּק, מַהוּ? לֹא עָשָׂה וְלֹא כְלוּם. חִילֵּק וְאַחַר כָּךְ יִבֵּם, מַהוּ? לֹא עָשָׂה וְלֹא כְלוּם.
They inquired of Ulla: If the yavam performed levirate marriage with the woman and afterward divided the property he promised to share with his brother, what is the halakha? He replied: He has done nothing. They further asked: If he divided the property and afterward performed levirate marriage, what is the halakha? He once again responded: He has done nothing.
מַתְקֵיף לַהּ רַב שֵׁשֶׁת: הַשְׁתָּא יִבֵּם וְאַחַר כָּךְ חִילֵּק, לֹא עָשָׂה וְלֹא כְלוּם, חִילֵּק וְאַחַר כָּךְ יִבֵּם מִבַּעְיָא?! שְׁנֵי מַעֲשִׂים הֲווֹ.
Rav Sheshet objects to this version of the discussion: Now if, when he performed levirate marriage and afterward divided the property when it was in his possession, Ulla answered that he has done nothing, then in a case where he divided it and afterward performed levirate marriage, is it necessary to inquire as to the halakha? It is obvious that such an action is of no consequence. The Gemara answers: Ulla was not asked these two questions on the same occasion. Rather, there were two incidents in which people raised these issues before Ulla, and he answered each inquiry separately.
כִּי אֲתָא רָבִין, אָמַר רֵישׁ לָקִישׁ: בֵּין יִבֵּם וְאַחַר כָּךְ חִילֵּק, בֵּין חִילֵּק וְאַחַר כָּךְ יִבֵּם — לֹא עָשָׂה וְלֹא כְלוּם. וְהִלְכְתָא: לֹא עָשָׂה וְלֹא כְלוּם.
When Ravin came from Eretz Yisrael he said that Reish Lakish said: Whether he performed levirate marriage and afterward divided the property, or whether he divided the property and afterward performed levirate marriage, he has done nothing. The Gemara concludes: And the practical halakha is that he has done nothing.
וַחֲכָמִים אוֹמְרִים: פֵּירוֹת הַמְחוּבָּרִים לַקַּרְקַע — שֶׁלּוֹ. אַמַּאי? וְהָא כׇּל נְכָסָיו אַחְרָאִין וְעַרְבָאִין לִכְתוּבָּתָהּ! אָמַר רֵישׁ לָקִישׁ: תְּנִי — שֶׁלָּהּ.
§ The mishna states: And the Rabbis say: Produce that is attached to the ground is his. The Gemara asks: Why is this so? Doesn’t all of his property serve as a guarantee and security for her marriage contract? Reish Lakish said: Emend the text and teach: Produce that is attached to the ground is hers.
כְּנָסָהּ — הֲרֵי הִיא כְּאִשְׁתּוֹ. לְמַאי הִלְכְתָא? אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹסֵי בְּרַבִּי חֲנִינָא: לוֹמַר שֶׁמְּגָרְשָׁהּ בְּגֵט וּמַחְזִירָהּ. מְגָרְשָׁהּ בְּגֵט פְּשִׁיטָא?
The mishna further stated that if he married her, she is like his regular wife. The Gemara asks: With regard to what halakha was this stated? Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Ḥanina, said: The mishna means to say that he divorces her with a bill of divorce and that he may remarry her afterward without violating a prohibition. The Gemara asks: The halakha that he divorces her with a bill of divorce is obvious; how else can he divorce her?
מַהוּ דְּתֵימָא: ״וְיִבְּמָהּ״ אָמַר רַחֲמָנָא, וַעֲדַיִין יִבּוּמִין הָרִאשׁוֹנִים עָלֶיהָ. לָא תִּיסְגֵּי לַהּ בְּגֵט אֶלָּא בַּחֲלִיצָה, קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן.
The Gemara explains: It is necessary to state this lest you say that since the Merciful One states in the Torah: “And he will take her to him to be his wife and consummate the levirate marriage” (Deuteronomy 25:5), and here the status of the first levirate marriage is still upon her, this would mean that it should not suffice for her to leave by a bill of divorce, but rather she can leave him only by performing ḥalitza as well. The tanna therefore teaches us that ḥalitza is not required, as once he has married her she is like any other woman, who can be divorced by a bill of divorce alone.
מַחְזִירָהּ: פְּשִׁיטָא!
The Gemara asks with regard to the second part of the interpretation of Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Ḥanina, that he may remarry her: It is obvious that he may remarry her if the couple chooses to do so.
מַהוּ דְּתֵימָא: מִצְוָה דִּרְמָא רַחֲמָנָא עֲלֵיהּ עַבְדַּהּ, וְהַשְׁתָּא תֵּיקוּם עֲלֵיהּ בְּאִיסּוּר אֵשֶׁת אָח, קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן.
The Gemara explains: It is necessary lest you say that he has performed the mitzva the Merciful One placed upon him by means of levirate marriage, and now that he has divorced her she should once again stand in relation to him with the prohibition proscribing a brother’s wife, which was her status before the mitzva of levirate marriage came into effect. The tanna therefore teaches us that since he performed levirate marriage with her, the prohibition proscribing a brother’s wife no longer applies at all.
וְאֵימָא הָכִי נָמֵי! אָמַר קְרָא ״וּלְקָחָהּ לוֹ לְאִשָּׁה״. כֵּיוָן שֶׁלְּקָחָהּ — נַעֲשֵׂית כְּאִשְׁתּוֹ.
The Gemara asks: And say that indeed, the prohibition proscribing a brother’s wife should be in force once again. The Gemara explains: The verse states: “And he will take her to him to be his wife” (Deuteronomy 25:5), which indicates that once he has taken her, she has become like his regular wife in all respects.
בִּלְבַד שֶׁתְּהֵא כְּתוּבָּתָהּ עַל נִכְסֵי בַּעְלָהּ הָרִאשׁוֹן. מַאי טַעְמָא — אִשָּׁה הִקְנוּ לוֹ מִן הַשָּׁמַיִם.
§ The mishna taught: She has the status of his wife in all respects after levirate marriage, except that the responsibility for her marriage contract is upon the property of her first husband. The Gemara inquires: What is the reason for this? It is that from Heaven they acquired a wife for him. Since he did not choose her but married her by force of a Torah commandment, he is not obligated to set aside for her a marriage contract of his own. Rather, he relies upon his brother’s marriage contract.
וְאִי לֵית לַהּ מֵרִאשׁוֹן, אִית לַהּ מִשֵּׁנִי. כְּדֵי שֶׁלֹּא תְּהֵא קַלָּה בְּעֵינָיו לְהוֹצִיאָהּ.
The Gemara adds: And if she does not have anything from the first husband, e.g., if he owned no property, she nevertheless has a marriage contract from the second one, for the same reason that any wife is entitled to a marriage contract in the first place: So that she will not be demeaned in his eyes such that he will easily divorce her.
לֹא יֹאמַר לָהּ ״הֲרֵי כְּתוּבָּתִיךְ״. מַאי וְכֵן?
The mishna further stated that the yavam may not say to her: Here is your marriage contract, and similarly, a man may not make such a statement to his wife. Rather, all of his property is mortgaged for her marriage contract. The Gemara asks: What is the relevance of the phrase: And similarly, here? The halakha in both cases appears to be identical.
מַהוּ דְּתֵימָא: הָתָם הוּא דְּלָא כְּתַב לָהּ ״דִּקְנַאי וּדְקָנֵינָא״, אֲבָל הָכָא דִּכְתַב לַהּ ״דִּקְנַאי וּדְקָנֵינָא״, אֵימָא סָמְכָה דַּעְתַּהּ — קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן.
The Gemara explains: It is necessary lest you say that this is the halakha only there, with regard to a yevama, where the yavam did not write a marriage contract for her and therefore never wrote: All property that I have bought and that I will buy is mortgaged to the marriage contract. But here, with regard to a regular wife, where he did write a marriage contract for her that included the clause: That I have bought and that I will buy, say that she relies upon that which he has set aside, and therefore there is no need for a full lien on all his property. The tanna therefore teaches us that this is not the case.
גֵּרְשָׁהּ — אֵין לָהּ אֶלָּא כְּתוּבָּתָהּ. גֵּרְשָׁהּ — אִין, לֹא גֵּרְשָׁהּ — לָא. קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן כִּדְרַבִּי אַבָּא.
§ The mishna states that if he divorced her she has only her marriage contract. There is no lien upon the property, and he may therefore sell it. The Gemara infers: If he divorced her, yes, that is the case, but if he did not divorce her, no, it is not. The tanna here teaches us indirectly that the halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Abba, who claims that the only way he can gain full control of all the property is by divorcing her.
הֶחְזִירָה — הֲרֵי הִיא כְּכׇל הַנָּשִׁים, וְאֵין לָהּ אֶלָּא כְּתוּבָּתָהּ. הֶחְזִירָה, מַאי קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן? תְּנֵינָא: הַמְגָרֵשׁ אֶת הָאִשָּׁה וּמַחְזִירָה, עַל מְנָת כְּתוּבָּה רִאשׁוֹנָה מַחְזִירָהּ!
It was further taught in the mishna that if he remarried her, she is like all women, and she has nothing other than her marriage contract. The Gemara asks: What is the tanna teaching us by mentioning the possibility that he remarried her? We already learned this: With regard to one who divorces a woman and remarries her, he remarries her on the basis of her first marriage contract, and he need not write her a new one. Why is it necessary to emphasize this halakha in the case of a yevama?
מַהוּ דְּתֵימָא: אִשְׁתּוֹ הוּא דְּאִיהוּ כְּתַב לַהּ כְּתוּבָּה מִינֵּיהּ, אֲבָל יְבִמְתּוֹ דְּלָא אִיהוּ כְּתַב לַהּ, הֵיכָא דְּגָרְשַׁהּ וְאַהְדְּרַהּ — אֵימָא כְּתוּבְּתַהּ מִינֵּיהּ, קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן.
The Gemara answers: It is necessary lest you say that it is the halakha in the case of a wife, since he writes for her a marriage contract from him, and therefore when he remarries her he does so on the basis of the first marriage contract. But as for his yevama, where he did not write for her the marriage contract but it was written by his brother, in a case where he divorced her and remarried her, say that her marriage contract should be from him and he should write a new one using his own property. Therefore, the tanna teaches us that this is not required.
אָמַר רַב יְהוּדָה: בָּרִאשׁוֹנָה הָיוּ כּוֹתְבִין לִבְתוּלָה מָאתַיִם וּלְאַלְמָנָה מָנֶה, וְהָיוּ מַזְקִינִין וְלֹא הָיוּ נוֹשְׂאִין נָשִׁים, עַד שֶׁבָּא שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן שָׁטַח וְתִיקֵּן, כׇּל נְכָסָיו אַחְרָאִין לִכְתוּבָּתָהּ.
§ The Gemara discusses the background for the rule that the husband’s property is mortgaged for the marriage contract. Rav Yehuda said: At first they would write for a virgin two hundred dinars and for a widow one hundred dinars. They would then demand that this amount be available in cash, and then the men would grow old and would not marry women, as they did not all possess such large sums of money, until Shimon ben Shataḥ came and instituted an ordinance that a man need not place the money aside in practice. Rather, all of his property is guaranteed for her marriage contract.
תַּנְיָא נָמֵי הָכִי: בָּרִאשׁוֹנָה הָיוּ כּוֹתְבִין לִבְתוּלָה מָאתַיִם וּלְאַלְמָנָה מָנֶה, וְהָיוּ מַזְקִינִין וְלֹא הָיוּ נוֹשְׂאִין נָשִׁים. הִתְקִינוּ שֶׁיִּהְיוּ מַנִּיחִין אוֹתָהּ בְּבֵית אָבִיהָ. וַעֲדַיִין: כְּשֶׁהוּא כּוֹעֵס עָלֶיהָ, אוֹמֵר לָהּ: ״לְכִי אֵצֶל כְּתוּבָּתִיךְ״,
The Gemara comments: That opinion is also taught in a baraita: At first they would write for a virgin two hundred and for a widow one hundred dinars, and they would grow old and would not marry women, since the women were concerned that their marriage contract money would be wasted or lost, and they had no guarantee that it would be collected. The Sages therefore instituted an ordinance that they should place it, the sum of the marriage contract, in her father’s house, thereby ensuring its safekeeping. And still problems arose, as when he was angry at his wife, he would say to her: Go to your marriage contract, as it was too easy for them to divorce.
הִתְקִינוּ שֶׁיִּהְיוּ מַנִּיחִין אוֹתָהּ בְּבֵית חָמִיהָ. עֲשִׁירוֹת עוֹשׂוֹת אוֹתָהּ קְלָתוֹת שֶׁל כֶּסֶף וְשֶׁל זָהָב, עֲנִיּוֹת הָיוּ עוֹשׂוֹת אוֹתָהּ עָבִיט שֶׁל מֵימֵי רַגְלַיִם.
Therefore, the Sages instituted an ordinance that they would place it in her father-in-law’s house, i.e., in her husband’s house. And wealthy women would craft their marriage contract money into baskets of silver and of gold, while poor ones would craft it into a large vessel for the collection of urine, as their marriage contract was large enough only for a small vessel.
וַעֲדַיִין, כְּשֶׁכּוֹעֵס עָלֶיהָ אוֹמֵר לָהּ: ״טְלִי כְּתוּבָּתִיךְ וָצֵאִי״. עַד שֶׁבָּא שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן שָׁטַח וְתִיקֵּן, שֶׁיְּהֵא כּוֹתֵב לָהּ: כׇּל נְכָסַי אַחְרָאִין לִכְתוּבָּתָהּ.
And still, when he was angry at her he would say to her: Take your marriage contract and leave, until Shimon ben Shataḥ came and instituted an ordinance that he does not actually give her the money for her marriage contract. Rather, he should write to her: All my property is guaranteed for her marriage contract, and it is not localized to a particular place or object. Consequently, he would need to sell some of his property if he wished to divorce her, and would therefore think carefully before undertaking such a drastic course of action.
הֲדַרַן עֲלָךְ הָאִשָּׁה
