Shevuot 21
קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן כִּדְשַׁנִּי לֵיהּ.
it teaches us as Abaye answers him below.
וְאִיבָּעֵית אֵימָא: כְּשֵׁם שֶׁמֵּבִיא קׇרְבָּן עַל שֶׁקֶר, כָּךְ מֵבִיא קׇרְבָּן עַל שָׁוְא; וְרַבִּי עֲקִיבָא הִיא, דִּמְחַיֵּיב לְשֶׁעָבַר כִּלְהַבָּא.
The Gemara offers an alternative resolution of the difficulty posed by the baraita: And if you wish, say that the assertion of the baraita that the prohibitions against taking an oath in vain and taking a false oath are one means: Just as one brings an offering for taking a false oath, so one brings an offering for taking an oath in vain. And this is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, who deems one liable to bring an offering for taking an oath in vain that refers to the past, just as for taking a false oath that refers to the future.
מֵיתִיבִי: אֵי זוֹ הִיא שְׁבוּעַת שָׁוְא – נִשְׁבָּע לְשַׁנּוֹת אֶת הַיָּדוּעַ לְאָדָם. שְׁבוּעַת שֶׁקֶר – נִשְׁבָּע לְהַחְלִיף! אֵימָא נִשְׁבָּע וּמַחְלִיף.
The Gemara raises an objection to Rabbi Yoḥanan’s distinction between a false oath and an oath taken in vain from a baraita: Which oath is an oath taken in vain? It is when one takes an oath to deny that which is known to people to be true. And a false oath is when one takes an oath that contradicts the past. The Gemara answers: Say, i.e., emend the baraita to say, that a false oath is when one takes an oath and subsequently contradicts it by acting otherwise.
כִּי אֲתָא רָבִין, אָמַר רַבִּי יִרְמְיָה, אָמַר רַבִּי אֲבָהוּ, אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: ״אָכַלְתִּי״ וְ״לֹא אָכַלְתִּי״ – שֶׁקֶר, וְאַזְהַרְתֵּיהּ מִ״לֹּא תִשָּׁבְעוּ בִשְׁמִי לַשָּׁקֶר״. ״אוֹכַל״ וְ״לֹא אוֹכַל״ – עוֹבֵר בְּ״לֹא יַחֵל דְּבָרוֹ״. וְאֵי זוֹ הִיא שְׁבוּעַת שָׁוְא? נִשְׁבָּע לְשַׁנּוֹת אֶת הַיָּדוּעַ לְאָדָם.
§ When Ravin came from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia, he reported that Rabbi Yirmeya says that Rabbi Abbahu says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: If one takes an oath, saying: I ate, or: I did not eat, it is a false oath if it is not true. And its prohibition in the Torah is from: “And you shall not take an oath by My name falsely, so that you profane the name of your God; I am the Lord” (Leviticus 19:12). If one takes an oath, saying: I will eat, or: I will not eat, and breaks his oath, he violates the prohibition: “When a man vows a vow to the Lord, or takes an oath to bind his soul with a bond, he shall not break his word” (Numbers 30:3). And which oath is an oath taken in vain? It is when one takes an oath to deny that which is known to people to be true.
אָמַר רַב פָּפָּא: הָא דְּרַבִּי אֲבָהוּ – לָאו בְּפֵירוּשׁ אִיתְּמַר, אֶלָּא מִכְּלָלָא אִיתְּמַר; דְּאָמַר רַב אִידִי בַּר אָבִין: אָמַר רַב עַמְרָם, אָמַר רַב יִצְחָק, אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן, רַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר מִשּׁוּם רַבִּי יוֹסֵי הַגְּלִילִי: כֹּל לֹא תַעֲשֶׂה שֶׁבַּתּוֹרָה – לָאו שֶׁיֵּשׁ בּוֹ מַעֲשֶׂה לוֹקִין עָלָיו, וְשֶׁאֵין בּוֹ מַעֲשֶׂה אֵין לוֹקִין עָלָיו; חוּץ מִנִּשְׁבָּע וּמֵימֵר וּמְקַלֵּל אֶת חֲבֵירוֹ בַּשֵּׁם.
Rav Pappa said: This statement of Rabbi Abbahu, i.e., conveying the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan, was not stated explicitly by Rabbi Abbahu; rather, it was stated by inference. It was inferred from that which Rav Idi bar Avin says that Rav Amram says that Rav Yitzḥak says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says that Rabbi Yehuda says in the name of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili: With regard to any prohibition in the Torah, if it is a prohibition that involves an action, one is flogged for violating it. But with regard to a prohibition that does not involve an action, one is not flogged for violating it, except in the cases of one who takes an oath, and one who substitutes a different animal for one that is consecrated to be sacrificed (see Leviticus 27:10), and one who curses another using the Divine Name (see Leviticus 19:14).
נִשְׁבָּע מְנָלַן? אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן מִשּׁוּם רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן יוֹחַאי, אָמַר קְרָא: ״לֹא תִשָּׂא אֶת שֵׁם ה׳ אֱלֹהֶיךָ לַשָּׁוְא כִּי לֹא יְנַקֶּה״ – בֵּית דִּין שֶׁל מַעְלָה אֵין מְנַקִּין אוֹתוֹ, אֲבָל בֵּית דִּין שֶׁל מַטָּה מַלְקִין אוֹתוֹ וּמְנַקִּין אוֹתוֹ.
The Gemara asks: From where do we derive that one who takes an oath that is not true is flogged? Rabbi Yoḥanan says in the name of Rabbi Shimon ben Yoḥai: The verse states: “You shall not take the name of the Lord your God in vain; for the Lord will not absolve of guilt he that takes His name in vain” (Exodus 20:7). It is the heavenly court that does not absolve him; but the earthly court flogs him, and in doing so, absolves him of guilt.
אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַב פָּפָּא לְאַבָּיֵי: דִּלְמָא הָכִי קָאָמַר רַחֲמָנָא: ״לֹא יְנַקֶּה״ כְּלָל? אִי כְּתִיב ״כִּי לֹא יְנַקֶּה״ – כִּדְקָאָמְרַתְּ; הַשְׁתָּא דִּכְתִיב ״כִּי לֹא יְנַקֶּה ה׳״ – ה׳ הוּא דְּאֵינוֹ מְנַקֶּה, אֲבָל בֵּית דִּין שֶׁל מַטָּה מַלְקִין אוֹתוֹ וּמְנַקִּין אוֹתוֹ.
Rav Pappa said to Abaye: Perhaps this is what the Merciful One is saying: He will not be absolved of guilt at all. Abaye answered: If it were written: For he will not be absolved of guilt, it would be as you say. Now that it is written: “For the Lord will not absolve of guilt,” the verse teaches that it is the Lord Who will not absolve one who takes His name in vain; but the earthly court flogs him, and in doing so absolves him of guilt.
אַשְׁכְּחַן שְׁבוּעַת שָׁוְא, שְׁבוּעַת שֶׁקֶר מְנָלַן? רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן דִּידֵיהּ אָמַר: ״לַשָּׁוְא״ ״לַשָּׁוְא״ שְׁתֵּי פְּעָמִים; אִם אֵינוֹ עִנְיָן לִשְׁבוּעַת שָׁוְא, תְּנֵהוּ עִנְיָן לִשְׁבוּעַת שֶׁקֶר.
The Gemara asks: We found a source for receiving lashes for an oath taken in vain, despite the fact that no physical action was performed. From where do we derive that this is also the halakha with regard to a false oath? Rabbi Yoḥanan himself said: The verse states: “In vain…in vain,” twice. If the second mention is not necessary for the matter of an oath taken in vain, since it was already stated, apply it to the matter of a false oath.
וְהָוֵי בַּהּ רַבִּי אֲבָהוּ: הַאי שְׁבוּעַת שֶׁקֶר הֵיכִי דָמֵי? אִילֵּימָא ״שְׁבוּעָה שֶׁלֹּא אוֹכַל״, וְאָכַל – לָאו שֶׁיֵּשׁ בּוֹ מַעֲשֶׂה הוּא! וְאֶלָּא דְּאָמַר ״שְׁבוּעָה שֶׁאוֹכַל״, וְלֹא אָכַל – הַאי מִי לוֹקֶה?! וְהָא אִיתְּמַר: ״שְׁבוּעָה שֶׁאוֹכַל כִּכָּר זוֹ הַיּוֹם״, וְעָבַר הַיּוֹם וְלֹא אֲכָלָהּ – רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן וְרֵישׁ לָקִישׁ דְּאָמְרִי תַּרְוַיְיהוּ: אֵינוֹ לוֹקֶה!
And Rabbi Abbahu discusses this: With regard to this false oath referred to by Rabbi Yoḥanan, what are the circumstances under which one who takes it is flogged? If we say it is when he says: On my oath I will not eat, and he then ate, that is a prohibition that involves an action. And if one would rather say that he says: On my oath I will eat, and he does not eat, is one who breaks his oath like that flogged? But wasn’t it stated that with regard to one who says: On my oath I will eat this loaf today, and the day passed and he did not eat it, Rabbi Yoḥanan and Reish Lakish both say he is not flogged?
רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן אָמַר אֵינוֹ לוֹקֶה – מִשּׁוּם דְּהָוֵה לָאו שֶׁאֵין בּוֹ מַעֲשֶׂה, וְכׇל לָאו שֶׁאֵין בּוֹ מַעֲשֶׂה אֵין לוֹקִין עָלָיו. וְרֵישׁ לָקִישׁ אָמַר אֵינוֹ לוֹקֶה – מִשּׁוּם דְּהָוֵה הַתְרָאַת סָפֵק, וְהַתְרָאַת סָפֵק לֹא שְׁמָהּ הַתְרָאָה.
Rabbi Yoḥanan says he is not flogged because it is a prohibition that does not involve an action, and concerning any prohibition that does not involve an action, one is not flogged for violating it. And Reish Lakish says he is not flogged because his violation of the prohibition necessarily involves an uncertain forewarning, and an uncertain forewarning is not considered a forewarning at all. Only if one is forewarned immediately prior to violating a prohibition does he receive lashes. Since not fulfilling his oath is a sin of omission, whenever the forewarning is offered, it remains uncertain whether one will fulfill the oath or not.
וְאָמַר רַבִּי אֲבָהוּ: תְּהֵא בְּ״אָכַלְתִּי״ וְ״לֹא אָכַלְתִּי״. וּמַאי שְׁנָא? אָמַר רָבָא: בְּפֵירוּשׁ רִיבְּתָה תּוֹרָה שְׁבוּעַת שֶׁקֶר דּוֹמָה לְשָׁוְא, מָה שָׁוְא לְשֶׁעָבַר, אַף שֶׁקֶר נָמֵי לְשֶׁעָבַר.
In response to his own question, Rabbi Abbahu says: The case where one who takes a false oath is flogged will be where he takes an oath saying: I ate, or: I did not eat. The Gemara asks: What is different about oaths relating to the past, for which one is liable to receive lashes even though he did not perform an action, and oaths relating to the future that one violates by omission, and for which one is therefore exempt from lashes according to Rabbi Yoḥanan because it is a prohibition that does not involve an action? Rava said: The Torah explicitly extended the liability to receive lashes to one who takes a false oath that is similar to an oath taken in vain. Just as an oath taken in vain refers to the past, so too, one is liable for a false oath that refers to the past. This discussion of Rabbi Abbahu’s is the source of his inference as to the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan mentioned by Rav Pappa.
אֵיתִיבֵיהּ רַבִּי יִרְמְיָה לְרַבִּי אֲבָהוּ: ״שְׁבוּעָה שֶׁלֹּא אוֹכַל כִּכָּר זוֹ״, ״שְׁבוּעָה שֶׁלֹּא אוֹכְלֶנָּה״, ״שְׁבוּעָה שֶׁלֹּא אוֹכְלֶנָּה״, וַאֲכָלָהּ – אֵינוֹ חַיָּיב אֶלָּא אַחַת. זוֹ הִיא שְׁבוּעַת בִּטּוּי, שֶׁחַיָּיבִין עַל זְדוֹנָהּ מַכּוֹת וְעַל שִׁגְגָתָהּ קׇרְבָּן עוֹלֶה וְיוֹרֵד.
Rabbi Yirmeya raised an objection to the opinion of Rabbi Abbahu from a mishna (27b): If one says: On my oath I will not eat this loaf, and then says: On my oath I will not eat it, and then again: On my oath I will not eat it, and he subsequently ate it, he is liable only once. This is the oath on an utterance for which one who violates the prohibition intentionally is liable to receive lashes and one who violates it unwittingly is liable to bring a sliding-scale offering.
זוֹ הִיא – לְמַעוֹטֵי מַאי? לָאו לְמַעוֹטֵי ״אָכַלְתִּי״ וְ״לֹא אָכַלְתִּי״ – דְּלָא לָקֵי?
Rabbi Yirmeya asks: When the mishna says: This is the oath on an utterance, it is to exclude what? Is it not to exclude the case of one who takes an oath relating to the past, saying: I ate, or: I did not eat, thereby indicating that he is not flogged?
לָא, לְמַעוֹטֵי ״אָכַלְתִּי״ וְ״לֹא אָכַלְתִּי״ מִקׇּרְבָּן – זוֹ הִיא דְּעַל שִׁגְגָתָהּ קׇרְבָּן עוֹלֶה וְיוֹרֵד, אֲבָל ״אָכַלְתִּי״ וְ״לֹא אָכַלְתִּי״ לָא. וְרַבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל הִיא, דְּאָמַר: אֵינוֹ חַיָּיב אֶלָּא עַל הֶעָתִיד לָבֹא; אֲבָל מִילְקָא לָקֵי.
The Gemara responds: No. It serves to exclude one who takes an oath saying: I ate, or: I did not eat, from liability to bring an offering. The Gemara explains: This is the oath on an utterance for which one who violates it unwittingly is liable to bring a sliding-scale offering. But if one takes an oath saying: I ate, or: I did not eat, then no, one does not bring an offering. And this is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yishmael, who says: One is liable to bring an offering only for breaking oaths relating to the future, but one is flogged even for false oaths relating to the past.
אֵימָא סֵיפָא: זוֹ הִיא שְׁבוּעַת שָׁוְא שֶׁחַיָּיבִין עַל זְדוֹנָהּ מַכּוֹת וְעַל שִׁגְגָתָהּ פָּטוּר. זוֹ הִיא לְמַעוֹטֵי מַאי? מַאי לָאו לְמַעוֹטֵי ״אָכַלְתִּי״ וְ״לֹא אָכַלְתִּי״ – דְּלָא לָקֵי?
The Gemara asks: Say the latter clause of the mishna (29a): Which oath is an oath taken in vain? It is when one takes an oath to deny that which is known to people to be true, like one says with regard to a stone column that it is made of gold. This is an oath taken in vain, for which one is liable to receive lashes if he takes the oath intentionally, and for which he is exempt if he takes it unwittingly. When the mishna says: This is an oath taken in vain, it is to exclude what? What, isn’t that phrase added to the mishna to exclude one who takes an oath saying: I ate, or: I did not eat, teaching that he is not flogged?
לָא; זוֹ הִיא דְּעַל שִׁגְגָתָהּ פָּטוּר מִקׇּרְבָּן, אֲבָל ״אָכַלְתִּי״ וְ״לֹא אָכַלְתִּי״ עַל שִׁגְגָתָהּ חַיָּיב קׇרְבָּן; וְרַבִּי עֲקִיבָא הִיא, דִּמְחַיֵּיב לְשֶׁעָבַר כִּלְהַבָּא.
The Gemara responds: No, the mishna adds: This is an oath, to teach that for violating the prohibition against taking an oath in vain unwittingly, one is exempt from bringing an offering; but one who takes an oath saying: I ate, or: I did not eat, is liable to bring an offering for an unwitting violation. And this is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, who deems one liable to bring an offering for oaths referring to the past just like one is liable for oaths referring to the future.
הָא אָמְרַתְּ רֵישָׁא רַבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל הִיא! רֵישָׁא רַבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל וְסֵיפָא רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא?! כּוּלַּהּ רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא, וְרֵישָׁא לָאו לְמַעוֹטֵי ״אָכַלְתִּי״ וְ״לֹא אָכַלְתִּי״ מִקׇּרְבָּן, אֶלָּא לְמַעוֹטֵי ״אוֹכַל״ וְלֹא אָכַל מִמַּלְקוֹת, אֲבָל קׇרְבָּן מִיחַיַּיב.
The Gemara asks: But didn’t you say that the first clause of that mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yishmael? How can the first clause follow Rabbi Yishmael’s opinion and the latter clause follow Rabbi Akiva’s conflicting opinion? The Gemara answers: The entire mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, and the first clause does not serve to exclude one who took an oath saying: I ate, or: I did not eat, from the liability to bring an offering. Rather, it serves to exclude one who took an oath saying: I will eat, and who subsequently did not eat, from the liability to receive lashes. But he is still liable to bring an offering.
וּמַאי שְׁנָא? מִסְתַּבְּרָא, קָאֵי בִּלְהַבָּא – מְמַעֵט לְהַבָּא; קָאֵי בִּלְהַבָּא – מְמַעֵט לְשֶׁעָבַר?
The Gemara asks: And what is different about this way of understanding the mishna that it is to be preferred? The Gemara answers: It stands to reason that when the mishna is addressing an oath referring to the future, it excludes an oath referring to the future, in accordance with the reading that the entire mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva. Does it makes sense that when addressing an oath referring to the future, it excludes an oath referring to the past, as the reading of the first clause in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yishmael would have it? Therefore, the added sentence: This is an oath on an utterance, in the first clause, serves to exclude one who took an oath saying: I will eat, and who subsequently did not eat, from the liability to receive lashes; and the whole mishna can be understood as being in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva that one is liable to bring an offering even for oaths relating to the past.
״שְׁבוּעָה שֶׁלֹּא אוֹכַל״ וְאָכַל כׇּל שֶׁהוּא, חַיָּיב כּוּ׳. אִיבַּעְיָא לְהוּ: רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא, בְּכׇל הַתּוֹרָה כּוּלָּהּ – כְּרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן סְבִירָא לֵיהּ, דִּמְחַיֵּיב בְּמַשֶּׁהוּ? דְּתַנְיָא, רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן אוֹמֵר: כׇּל שֶׁהוּא לְמַכּוֹת, וְלֹא אָמְרוּ כְּזַיִת אֶלָּא לְעִנְיַן קׇרְבָּן.
§ The mishna teaches that if one says: On my oath I will not eat, and he then ate any amount, even less than an olive-bulk, he is liable according to Rabbi Akiva. A dilemma was raised before the Sages: Does Rabbi Akiva in the entire Torah, i.e., in general, hold that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, who deems one liable for eating any amount of forbidden food? As it is taught in a baraita: Rabbi Shimon says: One who eats any amount of forbidden food is liable to receive lashes, and the Sages stated the measure of an olive-bulk only in the matter of determining liability to bring an offering.
וּבְדִין הוּא דְּבָעֵי אִיפְּלוֹגֵי בְּעָלְמָא, וְהַאי דְּקָא מִיפַּלְגִי הָכָא – לְהוֹדִיעֲךָ כּוֹחָן דְּרַבָּנַן, דְּאַף עַל גַּב דְּאִיכָּא לְמֵימַר: הוֹאִיל וּמְפָרֵשׁ חַיָּיב, סְתָם נָמֵי חַיָּיב; קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן דְּפָטְרִי.
And if in fact Rabbi Akiva agrees with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, then by right, the mishna should have taught that Rabbi Akiva and the Rabbis disagree in general. And the reason that it states only here that they disagree is to convey to you the far-reaching nature of the opinion of the Rabbis. The Rabbis hold that even though it is possible to say that since one who eats less than an olive-bulk after taking an oath in which he specifically forbids himself any amount is liable, one who eats less than an olive-bulk without so specifying in his oath will also be liable, as that is included in his oath not to eat, that reasoning is not accepted. The mishna therefore states the dispute in the context of an oath that he will not eat in order to teach us that, according to the Rabbis, as long as he did not specify that his oath includes any amount, he is exempt from receiving lashes.
אוֹ דִלְמָא, בְּעָלְמָא – כְּרַבָּנַן סְבִירָא לֵיהּ; וְהָכָא הַיְינוּ טַעְמָא – הוֹאִיל וּמְפָרֵשׁ חַיָּיב, סְתָם נָמֵי חַיָּיב.
The Gemara presents the other side of the dilemma: Or perhaps, in general, Rabbi Akiva holds like the Rabbis that one must consume at least an olive-bulk in order to be liable for a prohibition that involves eating. And here, with regard to an oath that one will not eat, this is the reason he disagrees: Since one who specifically forbids himself any amount is liable, one who eats less than an olive-bulk without so specifying in his oath will also be liable.
תָּא שְׁמַע, דְּאָמְרוּ לוֹ לְרַבִּי עֲקִיבָא: הֵיכָן מָצִינוּ בְּאוֹכֵל כָּל שֶׁהוּא חַיָּיב, שֶׁזֶּה חַיָּיב? וְאִם אִיתָא, לֵימָא לְהוּ: אֲנָא בְּכׇל הַתּוֹרָה כּוּלָּהּ כְּרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן סְבִירָא לִי!
Come and hear that which the Rabbis said to Rabbi Akiva: Where do we find that one who eats any amount is liable, leading you to say that this person is liable? The Gemara explains why this is relevant: If it is so that according to Rabbi Akiva one is always liable for eating any amount, let him say to them: In the entire Torah I hold in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon.
לְדִבְרֵיהֶם דְּרַבָּנַן קָאָמַר לְהוּ: לְדִידִי, בְּכׇל הַתּוֹרָה כּוּלָּהּ כְּרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן סְבִירָא לִי. לְדִידְכוּ, אוֹדוֹ לִי מִיהָא, הוֹאִיל וּמְפָרֵשׁ חַיָּיב, סְתָם נָמֵי חַיָּיב! וַאֲמַרוּ לֵיהּ רַבָּנַן: לָא.
The Gemara answers: The fact that Rabbi Akiva did not answer the Rabbis in that way does not necessarily indicate that he does not agree with Rabbi Shimon in general. Perhaps he is speaking to the Rabbis in accordance with their own statement, and this is how he would respond to their question: As far as my opinion is concerned, in the entire Torah I hold that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon that one is liable for all prohibitions involving eating when one eats any amount. According to you, admit to me at least that since one who specifically forbids himself any amount is liable, one who eats less than an olive-bulk without so specifying in his oath will also be liable. And the Rabbis said to him: No, we will not admit that.
תָּא שְׁמַע, רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא אוֹמֵר: נָזִיר שֶׁשָּׁרָה פִּתּוֹ בְּיַיִן, וְיֵשׁ בָּהּ כְּדֵי לְצָרֵף כְּזַיִת – חַיָּיב. וְאִי סָלְקָא דַעְתָּךְ בְּעָלְמָא כְּרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן סְבִירָא לֵיהּ, לְמָה לִי לְצָרֵף?
The Gemara presents another attempt to resolve the dilemma. Come and hear a mishna (Nazir 34b): Rabbi Akiva says: A nazirite who soaked his bread in wine and ate it, and the two together contain enough to combine to an olive-bulk, is liable, even though there is less than the minimal measure of wine. And if it should enter your mind that he holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon in general, then why do I need the wine and bread to combine to the measure of an olive-bulk? Consumption of any amount of wine should be sufficient for him to be liable.
וְעוֹד תְּנַן: ״שְׁבוּעָה שֶׁלֹּא אוֹכַל״, וְאָכַל נְבֵילוֹת וּטְרֵיפוֹת, שְׁקָצִים וּרְמָשִׂים – חַיָּיב. וְרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן פּוֹטֵר. וְהָוֵינַן בַּהּ: אַמַּאי חַיָּיב? מוּשְׁבָּע מֵהַר סִינַי הוּא! רַב וּשְׁמוּאֵל וְרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן דְּאָמְרִי תַּרְוַיְיהוּ: בְּכוֹלֵל דְּבָרִים הַמּוּתָּרִין עִם דְּבָרִים הָאֲסוּרִין.
And additionally, we learned in a mishna (22b): If one says: On my oath I will not eat, and then ate the meat of unslaughtered carcasses, or animals with a wound that will cause them to die within twelve months [tereifot], or repugnant creatures, or creeping animals, he is liable; and Rabbi Shimon deems him exempt. And we discussed it: Why is he liable for breaking his oath when he eats non-kosher food? He is already under oath from Mount Sinai not to eat forbidden food, and an oath cannot take effect to render a matter forbidden that is already forbidden. Rav and Shmuel and Rabbi Yoḥanan both, i.e., all, say that this is a case where he incorporates into the oath that he will not eat some permitted items, along with the statement concerning the forbidden items. Since the oath takes effect with regard to the permitted items, it extends also to the forbidden ones.
וְרֵישׁ לָקִישׁ אָמַר: אִי אַתָּה מוֹצֵא אֶלָּא אִי בִּמְפָרֵשׁ חֲצִי שִׁיעוּר – וְאַלִּיבָּא דְרַבָּנַן, אִי בִּסְתָם – וְאַלִּיבָּא דְּרַבִּי עֲקִיבָא דְּאָמַר: אָדָם אוֹסֵר עַצְמוֹ בְּכׇל שֶׁהוּא.
And Reish Lakish says: You find that one is liable for eating forbidden food as the result of an oath only if it is both an oath where he specifies that it includes a half-measure, in this case, less than an olive-bulk, and in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis that one is not liable for eating a half-measure unless it is specified in the oath. Since eating a half-measure is not prohibited by the Torah, the oath takes effect. Alternatively, you find that one is liable if he took the oath without specifying that the oath prohibits less than the usual measure and in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, who says that a person renders himself prohibited from eating any amount by taking an oath not to eat.
וְאִי סָלְקָא דַעְתָּךְ בְּעָלְמָא כְּרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן סְבִירָא לֵיהּ, כָּל שֶׁהוּא נָמֵי מוּשְׁבָּע וְעוֹמֵד מֵהַר סִינַי הוּא! אֶלָּא לָאו שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ: בְּעָלְמָא כְּרַבָּנַן סְבִירָא לֵיהּ? שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ.
And if it enters your mind that Rabbi Akiva holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon in general, this is difficult, as one who consumes any amount is also already under oath from Mount Sinai. Why should the oath take effect according to Reish Lakish? Rather, must one not conclude from it: In general, Rabbi Akiva holds like the Rabbis, and it is only with regard to unspecified oaths that he deems one liable for eating any amount? The Gemara affirms: Conclude from it that Rabbi Akiva holds like the Rabbis.
אָמְרוּ לוֹ לְרַבִּי עֲקִיבָא: הֵיכָן מָצִינוּ כּוּ׳. וְלָא?! וַהֲרֵי נְמָלָה! בְּרִיָּה שָׁאנֵי.
§ The mishna teaches: The Rabbis said to Rabbi Akiva: Where do we find that one who eats any amount is liable, leading you to say that this person is liable? The Gemara asks: And do we not? But isn’t one who eats an ant liable, despite the fact that it is smaller than an olive-bulk? The Gemara answers: A whole entity is different, since it has significance.
וַהֲרֵי הֶקְדֵּשׁ! הָא בָּעֵינַן שָׁוֶה פְּרוּטָה.
The Gemara asks: But isn’t one who eats less than an olive-bulk of consecrated food liable? The Gemara answers: In order to be liable for eating consecrated food, we require a different measure, an amount worth one peruta. One is not liable for eating an amount worth less than that.
וַהֲרֵי מְפָרֵשׁ! מְפָרֵשׁ נָמֵי כִּבְרִיָּה דָּמֵי.
The Gemara asks: But isn’t one who specifies in his oath that he is prohibited from eating any amount liable for doing so? The Gemara answers: One who specifies that eating any amount is prohibited is indeed comparable to one who eats a whole entity, since he has granted it significance.
וַהֲרֵי עָפָר! אֶלָּא
The Gemara asks: But isn’t there an unresolved question with regard to one who took an oath not to eat and then ate dirt? If, as the Rabbis claim, one is not liable for eating less than a full measure, you could rather
