Shevuot 29
וְאָכַל תְּאֵנִים וְהִפְרִישׁ קׇרְבָּן, וְאַחַר כָּךְ אָכַל עֲנָבִים לְחוֹדַיְיהוּ – הָוְיָא לְהוּ עֲנָבִים חֲצִי שִׁיעוּר, וְאַחֲצִי שִׁיעוּר לָא מִיחַיַּיב קׇרְבָּן. הָכָא נָמֵי, כְּגוֹן דְּאָמַר: ״שְׁבוּעָה שֶׁלֹּא אוֹכַל עֶשֶׂר״, וְחָזַר וְאָמַר: ״שְׁבוּעָה שֶׁלֹּא אוֹכַל תֵּשַׁע״, וְאָכַל תֵּשַׁע וְהִפְרִישׁ קׇרְבָּן, וְאַחַר כָּךְ אָכַל עֲשִׂירִית; הָוְיָא לַהּ עֲשִׂירִית חֲצִי שִׁיעוּר, וְאַחֲצִי שִׁיעוּר לָא מִיחַיַּיב.
and he unwittingly ate figs and set aside an offering for breaking the second oath, and afterward he unwittingly ate grapes alone, he is exempt from liability for breaking the first oath. The grapes are tantamount to a half-measure of his first oath, which was not to eat figs and grapes together, and one is not liable to bring an offering for a half-measure. Here also, where he said: On my oath I will not eat ten, and then said: On my oath I will not eat nine, and he ate nine and set aside an offering for breaking his second oath, and later he ate the tenth, this tenth is tantamount to a half-measure of his first oath, and one is not liable to bring an offering for a half-measure.
מַתְנִי׳ אֵיזוֹ הִיא שְׁבוּעַת שָׁוְא? נִשְׁבַּע לְשַׁנּוֹת אֶת הַיָּדוּעַ לָאָדָם – אָמַר עַל הָעַמּוּד שֶׁל אֶבֶן שֶׁהוּא שֶׁל זָהָב, וְעַל הָאִישׁ שֶׁהוּא אִשָּׁה, וְעַל הָאִשָּׁה שֶׁהִיא אִישׁ;
MISHNA: Which oath is an oath taken in vain, mentioned in the previous mishna (27b)? It is when one takes an oath to deny that which is known to people to be true, for example, one says about a stone column that it is made of gold, or about a man that he is a woman, or about a woman that she is a man.
נִשְׁבַּע עַל דָּבָר שֶׁאִי אֶפְשָׁר לוֹ – ״אִם לֹא רָאִיתִי גָּמָל שֶׁפּוֹרֵחַ בָּאֲוִיר״ וְ״אִם לֹא רָאִיתִי נָחָשׁ כְּקוֹרַת בֵּית הַבַּד״;
Another type of oath taken in vain is when one takes an oath about a matter that is impossible, e.g., if he says: If I did not see a camel flying through the air, or: If I did not see a snake as large as the beam of the olive press.
אָמַר לְעֵדִים: ״בּוֹאוּ וְהַעִידוּנִי״, ״שְׁבוּעָה שֶׁלֹּא נְעִידֶךָ״; נִשְׁבַּע לְבַטֵּל אֶת הַמִּצְוָה – שֶׁלֹּא לַעֲשׂוֹת סוּכָּה וְשֶׁלֹּא לִיטּוֹל לוּלָב וְשֶׁלֹּא לְהַנִּיחַ תְּפִילִּין; זוֹ הִיא שְׁבוּעַת שָׁוְא, שֶׁחַיָּיבִין עַל זְדוֹנָהּ מַכּוֹת וְעַל שִׁגְגָתָהּ פָּטוּר.
In the case of one who said to witnesses: Come and testify for me, and they replied: On our oath we will not testify for you, that is an oath taken in vain, because it involves taking an oath to refrain from performing a mitzva. Other examples of this include an oath not to build a sukka, or not to take a lulav, or not to don phylacteries. This type of oath is an oath taken in vain, for which one is liable to receive lashes if he takes the oath intentionally, and for which he is exempt if he takes it unwittingly.
״שְׁבוּעָה שֶׁאוֹכַל כִּכָּר זוֹ״, ״שְׁבוּעָה שֶׁלֹּא אוֹכְלֶנָּה״ – הָרִאשׁוֹנָה שְׁבוּעַת בִּיטּוּי, וְהַשְּׁנִיָּה שְׁבוּעַת שָׁוְא.
If one said: On my oath I will eat this loaf, and later said: On my oath I will not eat it, the first oath is an oath on an utterance, and the second is an oath taken in vain, as he took an oath to perform an action that would violate his previous oath.
אֲכָלָהּ – עָבַר עַל שְׁבוּעַת שָׁוְא. לֹא אֲכָלָהּ – עָבַר עַל שְׁבוּעַת בִּיטּוּי.
If he ate it, he violated the prohibition against taking an oath in vain. If he did not eat it, he violated the prohibition against breaking an oath on an utterance.
גְּמָ׳ אָמַר עוּלָּא: וְהוּא שֶׁנִּיכָּר לִשְׁלֹשָׁה בְּנֵי אָדָם.
GEMARA: With regard to an oath taken in vain that denies that which is known to people, Ulla says: It is considered known to people when it is a fact that is known to three people.
נִשְׁבַּע עַל דָּבָר שֶׁאִי אֶפְשָׁר לוֹ – ״אִם לֹא רָאִיתִי גָּמָל פּוֹרֵחַ בָּאֲוִיר״. ״שְׁבוּעָה שֶׁרָאִיתִי״ לָא קָאָמַר, מַאי ״אִם לֹא רָאִיתִי״? אַבָּיֵי אָמַר: תָּנֵי ״שְׁבוּעָה שֶׁרָאִיתִי״. רָבָא אָמַר: בְּאוֹמֵר ״יֵאָסְרוּ כׇּל פֵּירוֹת שֶׁבְּעוֹלָם עָלַי, אִם לֹא רָאִיתִי גָּמָל פּוֹרֵחַ בָּאֲוִיר״.
§ The mishna describes an oath taken in vain where one takes an oath about a matter that is impossible, e.g., where one says: If I did not see a camel flying through the air. The Gemara points out: The tanna of the mishna did not say: On my oath I saw. What is the meaning of: If I did not see? Abaye said: Emend the language of the mishna and teach: On my oath I saw. Rava said: This is part of a larger statement where one says: Let all the produce in the world be prohibited for me if I did not see a camel flying through the air.
אֲמַר לֵיהּ רָבִינָא לְרַב אָשֵׁי: וְדִלְמָא הַאי גַּבְרָא צִיפּוֹרָא רַבָּא חֲזִי, וְאַסֵּיק לֵיהּ שְׁמָא ״גַּמְלָא״, וְכִי קָא מִשְׁתְּבַע – אַדַּעְתֵּיהּ דִּידֵיהּ אִישְׁתְּבַע?
With regard to the oath: If I did not see a camel flying through the air, Ravina said to Rav Ashi: Perhaps this man who took this oath saw a great bird and named it for himself: Camel, and when he took the oath, he took the oath according to his own understanding.
וְכִי תֵּימָא: בָּתַר פּוּמֵּיהּ אָזְלִינַן, וְלָא אָזְלִינַן בָּתַר דַּעְתֵּיהּ – וְהָא תַּנְיָא: כְּשֶׁמַּשְׁבִּיעִין אוֹתוֹ אוֹמְרִים לוֹ: ״הֱוֵי יוֹדֵעַ, שֶׁלֹּא עַל דַּעְתְּךָ אָנוּ מַשְׁבִּיעִין אוֹתְךָ, אֶלָּא עַל דַּעְתֵּנוּ וְעַל דַּעַת בֵּית דִּין״. מַאי טַעְמָא? לָאו מִשּׁוּם דְּאָמְרִינַן: דִּלְמָא אִיסְקוּנְדְּרֵי יְהַיב לֵיהּ וְאַסֵּיק לְהוּ ״זוּזֵי״, דְּכִי קָא מִשְׁתְּבַע – אַדַּעְתֵּיהּ דִּידֵיהּ קָא מִשְׁתְּבַע?
And if you would say that we follow his mouth, i.e., the generally accepted meaning of what one says, and we do not follow his understanding, i.e., his own private meaning, but isn’t it taught otherwise in a baraita: When they administer an oath to him in court, the judges say to him: Know that it is not according to your own understanding that we administer this oath to you, but according to our understanding and according to the understanding of the court? What is the reason they say this? Is it not because we say: Perhaps he gave tokens [iskunderei] to his creditor but he calls them for himself: Dinars, so that when he takes the oath, it is according to his own understanding that he takes the oath. Since, in principle, it is possible for him to take an oath according to his private meaning of the words, the court insists that the oath it administers is to be understood according to the words’ generally accepted meaning.
לָא, הָתָם מִשּׁוּם קַנְיָא דְּרָבָא.
Rav Ashi replies: No, the reason the court admonishes the oath taker is not that the oath can be interpreted according to a private meaning. There, when the court administers an oath, they explain that it is according to their meaning due to deceptions like that of the reed in Rava’s court. In that incident, someone handed his creditor a hollow reed, which he had secretly filled with coins, to hold for him, and proceeded to take an oath that he had given him the money owed to him, whereupon he took back the reed, as the creditor was unaware of its contents. The court admonishes oath takers so that they do not think that they have fulfilled their obligation to take an oath if they engage in such chicanery.
תָּא שְׁמַע: וְכֵן מָצִינוּ כְּשֶׁהִשְׁבִּיעַ מֹשֶׁה אֶת יִשְׂרָאֵל, אָמַר לָהֶן: ״דְּעוּ שֶׁלֹּא עַל דַּעְתְּכֶם אֲנִי מַשְׁבִּיעַ אֶתְכֶם, אֶלָּא עַל דַּעַת הַמָּקוֹם וְעַל דַּעְתִּי״. וְאַמַּאי? לֵימָא לְהוּ: ״קַיִּימוּ מַאי דַּאֲמַר אֱלוֹהַּ״! לָאו מִשּׁוּם דְּמַסְּקִי אַדַּעְתַּיְיהוּ עֲבוֹדָה זָרָה?
The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a baraita: And so we found that when Moses administered an oath to Israel that they would keep the Torah (see Deuteronomy 29:9–12), he said to them: Know that I am not administering this oath according to your understanding but according to the understanding of the Omnipresent and according to my understanding. And why not let him simply say to them: Keep that which God said? Is it not that he insisted on admonishing them because he was concerned lest they direct the oath in their minds to idolatry, saying that they are taking an oath of loyalty to God but privately intending the oath to be for idolatry? This indicates that the content of an oath can be affected by an oath taker’s private meaning.
לָא; מִשּׁוּם דַּעֲבוֹדָה זָרָה נָמֵי אִיקְּרִי ״אֱלוֹהַּ״, דִּכְתִיב: ״אֱלֹהֵי כֶסֶף וֵאלֹהֵי זָהָב״.
The Gemara rejects this: No, Moses explicitly indicated that the oath was according to God’s and his own understanding because idolatry is also referred to with the word: God, as it is written: “You shall not make with Me gods of silver or gods of gold” (Exodus 20:20). Therefore, the generally accepted meaning of the oath is ambiguous.
וְלֵימָא לְהוּ: ״קַיִּימוּ תּוֹרָה״! חֲדָא תּוֹרָה. וְלֵימָא: ״קַיִּימוּ שְׁתֵּי תּוֹרוֹת״! ״תּוֹרַת חַטָּאת״ ״תּוֹרַת אָשָׁם״. ״קַיִּימוּ כׇּל הַתּוֹרָה כּוּלָּהּ״! עֲבוֹדָה זָרָה, דְּאָמַר מָר: חֲמוּרָה עֲבוֹדָה זָרָה, שֶׁכׇּל הַכּוֹפֵר בָּהּ כְּמוֹדֶה בְּכׇל הַתּוֹרָה כּוּלָּהּ.
The Gemara suggests: If private meanings do not affect the content of an oath, let Moses merely say to them: Keep the Torah. The Gemara explains: They could then have taken an oath to keep only one Torah, either the Written or the Oral Torah. The Gemara suggests: And let him say: Keep two Torahs. The Gemara explains: The word: Torah, also has a narrower meaning of a set of halakhic procedures. The Jewish people could then have limited the oath to the law of [torat] the sin-offering or the law of [torat] the guilt-offering. The Gemara suggests: Let Moses administer an oath to keep the entire Torah. The Gemara replies: That could have been understood as referring only to the prohibition of idolatry, as the Master says: The prohibition of idolatry is so severe that with regard to one who denies idol worship, it is as if he affirms the entire Torah.
וְלֵימָא לְהוּ: ״קַיִּימוּ מִצְוָה״! חֲדָא מִצְוָה. ״קַיִּימוּ מִצְוֹת!״ תַּרְתֵּי. ״כׇּל הַמִּצְוֹת כּוּלָּן״! מִצְוַת צִיצִית, דְּאָמַר מָר: שְׁקוּלָה מִצְוַת צִיצִית כְּנֶגֶד כׇּל הַמִּצְוֹת כּוּלָּן.
The Gemara suggests: And let him say to them: Keep the mitzva, i.e., that which you are commanded. The Gemara replies: That could have been understood as referring to only one mitzva. The Gemara suggests: Let him say: Keep mitzvot, i.e., in the plural. The Gemara replies: That could be understood as referring to only two mitzvot. The Gemara suggests: Let him say: All the mitzvot in their entirety. The Gemara replies: That could be understood as referring to the mitzva of ritual fringes, as the Master says: The mitzva of ritual fringes is equivalent to all the other mitzvot.
וְלֵימָא לְהוּ: ״קַיִּימוּ שֵׁשׁ מֵאוֹת וּשְׁלֹשׁ עֶשְׂרֵה מִצְוֹת״! וּלְטַעֲמֵיךְ, לֵימָא לְהוּ: ״עַל דַּעְתִּי״; ״עַל דַּעַת הַמָּקוֹם״ לְמָה לִי?
The Gemara suggests: And let him say to them: Keep 613 mitzvot. The Gemara replies: And according to your reasoning, let him simply say: Take the oath according to my understanding. Why do I need for him to say: According to the understanding of the Omnipresent?
אֶלָּא כִּי הֵיכִי דְּלָא תִּהְוֵי הֲפָרָה לִשְׁבוּעֲתַיְיהוּ.
Rather, Moses administered the oath in this manner so that there would not be any possibility of the nullification of their oath. An oath taken with public consent cannot be dissolved. In this case, Moses and God constitute the public that gives its consent to the oath administered to the people. This was the reason for Moses’ insistence that the oath was taken according to his and God’s awareness; it was not because there was a possibility that the people could take the oath according to a private meaning.
וְ״אִם לֹא רָאִיתִי נָחָשׁ כְּקוֹרַת בֵּית הַבַּד״. וְלָא?! וְהָא הַהוּא דַּהֲוָה בִּשְׁנֵי שַׁבּוּר מַלְכָּא, הֲוָה חַד דְּאַחְזֵיק תְּלֵיסַר אוּרָוָותָא תִּיבְנָא!
§ The mishna teaches with regard to an oath about a matter that is impossible, e.g., If I did not see a camel flying through the air, or: If I did not see a snake as large as the beam of the olive press. The Gemara asks: And are there no snakes that large? But wasn’t there a certain snake during the years of the reign of King Shapur, one snake that could contain, i.e., swallow, thirteen stables of straw?
אָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל: בְּטָרוּף. כּוּלְּהוּ נָמֵי מִיטְרָף טְרִיפִין! בְּשֶׁגַּבּוֹ טָרוּף.
Shmuel said: The size of the snake is not the subject of the analogy. The oath is referring to a snake that was flat [taruf ] like the beam of an olive press. The Gemara asks: Aren’t they all flat? The Gemara explains: Snakes’ undersides are flat. This oath is referring to a snake whose back is flat.
״שְׁבוּעָה שֶׁאוֹכַל כִּכָּר זוֹ״, ״שְׁבוּעָה שֶׁלֹּא אוֹכְלֶנָּה״ כּוּ׳. הַשְׁתָּא מִשּׁוּם שְׁבוּעַת בִּיטּוּי מִיחַיַּיב, מִשּׁוּם שְׁבוּעַת שָׁוְא לָא מִיחַיַּיב?! הֲרֵי יָצְתָה שְׁבוּעָה לַשָּׁוְא!
§ The mishna teaches: If one said: On my oath I will eat this loaf, and later said: On my oath I will not eat it, the first oath is an oath on an utterance, and the second is an oath taken in vain. If he ate the loaf, he violated the prohibition against taking an oath in vain. If he did not eat it, he violated the prohibition against breaking an oath on an utterance. The Gemara asks: Now, if he did not eat it, he is liable because he violated his oath on an utterance. Is he not also liable for an oath taken in vain? An oath was issued in vain when he took the oath not to eat the loaf, as this required a violation of the oath he had taken to eat it.
אָמַר רַבִּי יִרְמְיָה, תָּנֵי: אַף עַל שְׁבוּעַת בִּיטּוּי.
Rabbi Yirmeya said: Teach the mishna with this emendation: If he did not eat it, he also violated the prohibition against breaking an oath on an utterance.
מַתְנִי׳ שְׁבוּעַת בִּיטּוּי נוֹהֶגֶת בַּאֲנָשִׁים וּבְנָשִׁים, בִּקְרוֹבִים וּבִרְחוֹקִים, בִּכְשֵׁרִין וּבִפְסוּלִין, בִּפְנֵי בֵּית דִּין וְשֶׁלֹּא בִּפְנֵי בֵּית דִּין – מִפִּי עַצְמוֹ. וְחַיָּיבִין עַל זְדוֹנָהּ מַכּוֹת, וְעַל שִׁגְגָתָהּ קׇרְבָּן עוֹלֶה וְיוֹרֵד.
MISHNA: As opposed to the halakhot of an oath of testimony, which will be discussed in the following chapter, the halakhot of an oath on an utterance apply to men and to women, to relatives and to non-relatives, to those who are fit to testify and to those who are disqualified, whether the oath is taken in the presence of a court or not in the presence of a court, i.e., when one takes an oath on his own, at his own initiative. And for violating an oath intentionally one is liable to receive lashes, and for doing so unwittingly he is liable to bring a sliding-scale offering.
שְׁבוּעַת שָׁוְא נוֹהֶגֶת בַּאֲנָשִׁים וּבְנָשִׁים, בִּרְחוֹקִים וּבִקְרוֹבִים, בִּכְשֵׁרִין וּבִפְסוּלִין, בִּפְנֵי בֵּית דִּין וְשֶׁלֹּא בִּפְנֵי בֵּית דִּין – וּמִפִּי עַצְמוֹ. וְחַיָּיבִין עַל זְדוֹנָהּ מַכּוֹת, וְעַל שִׁגְגָתָהּ פָּטוּר.
Liability for an oath taken in vain applies to men and to women, to relatives and to non-relatives, to those who are fit to bear witness and to those who are disqualified, whether the oath is taken in the presence of a court or not in the presence of a court, and also when one takes an oath on his own. And for violating an oath intentionally one is liable to receive lashes, and for doing so unwittingly he is exempt.
אַחַת זוֹ וְאַחַת זוֹ, הַמּוּשְׁבָּע מִפִּי אֲחֵרִים חַיָּיב – ״אִם לֹא אָכַלְתִּי הַיּוֹם״ וְ״לֹא הִנַּחְתִּי תְּפִלִּין הַיּוֹם״; ״מַשְׁבִּיעֲךָ אֲנִי״, וְאָמַר ״אָמֵן״ – חַיָּיב.
With regard to both this, an oath on an utterance, and that, an oath taken in vain, even if he is administered the oath by others, he is liable. For example, if one said: If I did not eat today, or: I did not don phylacteries today, and another said to him: I administer an oath to you that your statement is true, and the former said: Amen, he is liable if the statement was false.
גְּמָ׳ אָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל: כׇּל הָעוֹנֶה ״אָמֵן״ אַחַר שְׁבוּעָה – כְּמוֹצִיא שְׁבוּעָה בְּפִיו דָּמֵי, דִּכְתִיב: ״וְאָמְרָה הָאִשָּׁה אָמֵן אָמֵן״.
GEMARA: Shmuel says: Anyone who answers amen after being administered an oath is like one who expresses an oath with his own mouth, as it is written in the context of the oath administered to a sota, a woman suspected by her husband of having been unfaithful: “And the woman shall say: Amen, amen” (Numbers 5:22).
אָמַר רַב פָּפָּא מִשְּׁמֵיהּ דְּרָבָא: מַתְנִיתִין וּבָרָיְיתָא נָמֵי דַּיְקָא, דְּקָתָנֵי: שְׁבוּעַת הָעֵדוּת נוֹהֶגֶת בַּאֲנָשִׁים וְלֹא בְּנָשִׁים, בִּרְחוֹקִים וְלֹא בִּקְרוֹבִים, בִּכְשֵׁרִין וְלֹא בִּפְסוּלִין; וְאֵינָהּ נוֹהֶגֶת אֶלָּא בִּרְאוּיִן לְהָעִיד, וּבִפְנֵי בֵּית דִּין וְשֶׁלֹּא בִּפְנֵי בֵּית דִּין – מִפִּי עַצְמוֹ; וּמִפִּי אֲחֵרִים אֵינָן חַיָּיבִין, עַד שֶׁיִּכְפְּרוּ בָּהֶן בְּבֵית דִּין. דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי מֵאִיר.
Rav Pappa said in the name of Rava: An inference from the mishna and a baraita also support this when they are read precisely, as it is taught in the mishna (30a): The oath of testimony is practiced with regard to men but not with regard to women; with regard to non-relatives of the litigants, but not with regard to relatives; with regard to those fit to testify but not with regard to those unfit to testify due to a transgression that they performed. And the oath of testimony is practiced only with regard to those fit to testify. And this oath applies both in the presence of a court and not in the presence of a court, i.e., when the witness takes the oath on his own that he has no knowledge of the matter. But if an oath is administered to the witnesses by others, they are not liable until they deny knowledge of the matter in court and take an oath to that effect; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir.
וְתַנְיָא בְּבָרַיְיתָא: שְׁבוּעַת הָעֵדוּת כֵּיצַד? אָמַר לְעֵדִים: ״בּוֹאוּ וְהַעִידוּנִי״; ״שְׁבוּעָה שֶׁאֵין אָנוּ יוֹדְעִין לְךָ עֵדוּת״, אוֹ שֶׁאָמְרוּ: ״אֵין אָנוּ יוֹדְעִין לָךְ עֵדוּת״; ״מַשְׁבִּיעַ אֲנִי עֲלֵיכֶם״, וְאָמְרוּ (לוֹ) ״אָמֵן״ – בֵּין בִּפְנֵי בֵּית דִּין בֵּין שֶׁלֹּא בִּפְנֵי בֵּית דִּין, בֵּין מִפִּי עַצְמוֹ בֵּין מִפִּי אֲחֵרִים, כֵּיוָן שֶׁכָּפְרוּ בָּהֶם – חַיָּיבִין. דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי מֵאִיר.
Before stating the inference from the mishna, Rav Pappa cites the baraita. And it is taught in a baraita: With regard to an oath of testimony, how is one liable to bring a sliding-scale offering? A person said to witnesses: Come and testify for me. They replied: On our oath we do not know any testimony that concerns you, i.e., we have no knowledge of the matter. Alternatively, they said: We do not know any testimony that concerns you, and he said to them: I administer an oath to you, and they said to him: Amen. Whether this oath was taken in the presence of a court or whether it was not in the presence of a court, whether it was taken by each witness by himself or whether it was administered by others, once they denied knowing testimony that they in fact knew, they are liable; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir.
קַשְׁיָין אַהֲדָדֵי! אֶלָּא לָאו שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ: הָא דְּעָנָה ״אָמֵן״, הָא דְּלָא עָנָה ״אָמֵן״? שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ.
Rav Pappa asks: Aren’t the mishna and the baraita difficult, as they contradict each other? According to the mishna one is liable when the oath is administered by others only if it takes place in the presence of a court, while according to the baraita one is liable even not in the presence of a court. Rather, isn’t it correct to conclude from it that this statement in the baraita, where he is liable even not in the presence of a court, is referring to one who answered amen to the administered oath. That statement in the mishna is referring to one who did not answer amen and is therefore liable only in the presence of a court? The Gemara affirms: Conclude from it that it is so.
אָמַר רָבִינָא מִשְּׁמֵיהּ דְּרָבָא: מַתְנִיתִין דְּהָכָא נָמֵי דַּיְקָא – דְּקָא תָּנֵי: ״שְׁבוּעַת בִּיטּוּי נוֹהֶגֶת בַּאֲנָשִׁים וּבְנָשִׁים, בִּרְחוֹקִים וּבִקְרוֹבִים, בִּכְשֵׁרִין וּבִפְסוּלִין, בִּפְנֵי בֵּית דִּין וְשֶׁלֹּא בִּפְנֵי בֵּית דִּין – מִפִּי עַצְמוֹ אִין, מִפִּי אֲחֵרִים לָא; וְקָתָנֵי סֵיפָא: ״זֶה וָזֶה מוּשְׁבָּע מִפִּי אֲחֵרִים – חַיָּיב״.
Ravina said in the name of Rava: The mishna that is here (29b) also may be read precisely to support this point. As it is taught in the mishna: The halakhot of an oath on an utterance apply to men and to women, to relatives and to non-relatives, to those who are fit to testify and to those who are disqualified, whether the oath is taken in the presence of a court or not in the presence of a court, i.e., when one takes an oath on his own, at his own initiative. Ravina states his inference: On his own, yes, but administered by others, no. And it is taught in the last clause of the mishna: With regard to this, an oath on an utterance, and that, an oath taken in vain, even if he is administered the oath by others, he is liable.
קַשְׁיָין אַהֲדָדֵי! אֶלָּא לָאו שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ: הָא דְּעָנָה ״אָמֵן״, הָא דְּלָא עָנָה ״אָמֵן״?
These statements in the mishna are difficult, as they contradict each other. Rather, isn’t it correct to conclude from it that this latter clause of the mishna is referring to one who answered amen to the administered oath. That former clause is referring to one who did not answer amen and is therefore liable only in the presence of a court.
וְאֶלָּא שְׁמוּאֵל – מַאי קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן? דּוּקְיָא דְּמַתְנִיתִין קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן.
The Gemara asks: But since his statement can be derived from tannaitic sources, what is Shmuel teaching us? The Gemara answers: He is teaching us the precise reading of the mishna. Since that halakha is not stated explicitly in the mishna, Shmuel saw fit to state it.
הֲדַרַן עֲלָךְ שְׁבוּעוֹת שְׁתַּיִם
