Shevuot 36
וּמִנַּיִן לַעֲשׂוֹת אָלָה שֶׁאֵין עִמָּהּ שְׁבוּעָה כְּאָלָה שֶׁיֵּשׁ עִמָּהּ שְׁבוּעָה, וּשְׁבוּעָה שֶׁאֵין עִמָּהּ אָלָה כִּשְׁבוּעָה שֶׁיֵּשׁ עִמָּהּ אָלָה? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״וְשָׁמְעָה קוֹל אָלָה״ – וְשָׁמְעָה אָלָה, וְשָׁמְעָה קוֹל.
And from where is it derived to render an ala with which the word oath is not written like an ala with which the word oath is written and an oath with which the word ala is not written like an oath with which the word ala is written? The verse states: “And he hears the voice of an ala” (Leviticus 5:1). The phrase “the voice of an ala” is unnecessary, as it would have been sufficient to write: And he heard an ala. It is interpreted as though it were written: And he heard an ala and he heard a voice.
אָמַר רַבִּי אֲבָהוּ: מִנַּיִן לְ״אָלָה״ שֶׁהִיא שְׁבוּעָה? שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר: ״וַיָּבֵא אֹתוֹ בְּאָלָה וְגוֹ׳״; וּכְתִיב: ״וְגַם בַּמֶּלֶךְ נְבוּכַדְנֶצַּר מָרָד אֲשֶׁר הִשְׁבִּיעוֹ בֵּאלֹהִים״.
Rabbi Abbahu says: From where is it derived with regard to ala that it is an oath? It is derived as it is stated: “And he took from the seed of the monarchy…and brought it into an ala” (Ezekiel 17:13); and it is stated with regard to Zedekiah, who was from the seed of the monarchy: “And he also rebelled against Nebuchadnezzar who had administered an oath to him by God” (II Chronicles 36:13). This indicates that the ala is an oath.
תָּנָא: ״אָרוּר״ – בּוֹ נִידּוּי, בּוֹ קְלָלָה, בּוֹ שְׁבוּעָה.
§ The Gemara proceeds to define a related term. It is taught with regard to the term arur: There is an element of ostracism within it, there is an element of curse within it, and there is an element of oath within it.
בּוֹ נִידּוּי – דִּכְתִיב: ״אוֹרוּ מֵרוֹז אָמַר מַלְאַךְ ה׳, אֹרוּ אָרוֹר יֹשְׁבֶיהָ״, וְאָמַר עוּלָּא: בְּאַרְבַּע מְאָה שִׁיפּוּרֵי שַׁמְּתֵיהּ בָּרָק לְמֵרוֹז.
The Gemara elaborates: There is an element of ostracism within it, as it is written in the song of Deborah: “Curse [oru] Meroz, said the angel of God; cursed with a curse [oru aror] are its inhabitants” (Judges 5:23). And Ulla says: With blasts from four hundred shofarot, Barak ostracized the city of Meroz, indicating that the term arur has the connotation of ostracism.
בּוֹ קְלָלָה – דִּכְתִיב: ״וְאֵלֶּה יַעַמְדוּ עַל הַקְּלָלָה״, וּכְתִיב: ״אָרוּר הָאִישׁ אֲשֶׁר יַעֲשֶׂה פֶסֶל וְגוֹ׳״.
There is an element of curse within it, as it is written with regard to the ceremony at Mount Gerizim and Mount Ebal: “And these shall stand for the curse” (Deuteronomy 27:13), and it is written: “Cursed [arur] be the man who fashions a graven image, an abomination to the Lord, the work of the hands of the craftsman, and sets it up in secret. And all the people shall answer and say: Amen” (Deuteronomy 27:15).
בּוֹ שְׁבוּעָה – דִּכְתִיב: ״וַיַּשְׁבַּע יְהוֹשֻׁעַ בָּעֵת הַהִיא לֵאמֹר, אָרוּר הָאִישׁ לִפְנֵי ה׳ וְגוֹ׳״. וְדִלְמָא תַּרְתֵּי עֲבַד לְהוּ – אַשְׁבְּעִינְהוּ וְלַיְיטִינְהוֹ?
There is an element of oath within it, as it is written: “And Joshua administered an oath at that time saying: Arur be the man before God who shall arise and rebuild this city, Jericho” (Joshua 6:26). The Gemara challenges: But perhaps Joshua performed two actions to the people; he administered an oath to them and he cursed them, and the term arur relates to the curse, not to the oath.
אֶלָּא מֵהָכָא: ״וְאִישׁ יִשְׂרָאֵל נִגַּשׂ בַּיּוֹם הַהוּא, וַיֹּאֶל שָׁאוּל אֶת הָעָם לֵאמֹר, אָרוּר הָאִישׁ אֲשֶׁר יֹאכַל וְגוֹ׳״, וּכְתִיב: ״וִיהוֹנָתָן לֹא שָׁמַע בְּהַשְׁבִּיעַ אָבִיו אֶת הָעָם״. וְדִלְמָא הָכָא נָמֵי תַּרְתֵּי עֲבַד לְהוּ – אַשְׁבְּעִינְהוּ וְלַיְיטִינְהוֹ?
Rather, the fact that there is an element of oath in the term arur is derived from here: “And the men of Israel were distressed on that day, and Saul administered an oath [vayyoel] to the people, saying: Arur is the man who eats bread until the evening and I will be avenged on my enemies” (I Samuel 14:24). And it is written: “But Jonathan did not hear when his father administered the oath to the people” (I Samuel 14:27). The Gemara challenges: But perhaps, here too, Saul performed two actions to the people; he administered an oath to them and he cursed them.
מִי כְּתִיב ״וְאָרוּר״?! הַשְׁתָּא דְּאָתֵית לְהָכִי, הָתָם נָמֵי לָא כְּתִיב ״וְאָרוּר״.
The Gemara answers: Is it written in that context ve’arur, with a conjunctional prefix, which would indicate that arur is independent of the oath that was administered? Arur is written without a prefix, indicating that it is an intrinsic part of the oath. The Gemara notes: Now that you have arrived at this insight, there too, in the context of Joshua, ve’arur with a conjunctional prefix is not written, indicating that arur is an intrinsic part of the oath.
אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹסֵי בְּרַבִּי חֲנִינָא: ״אָמֵן״ – בּוֹ שְׁבוּעָה, בּוֹ קַבָּלַת דְּבָרִים, בּוֹ הַאֲמָנַת דְּבָרִים.
§ Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Ḥanina, says with regard to the term amen: There is an element of oath within it, there is an element of acceptance of the statement and agreement within it, and there is an element of confirmation of the statement, i.e., that he believes and prays that the statement will be fulfilled, within it.
בּוֹ שְׁבוּעָה – דִּכְתִיב: ״וְאָמְרָה הָאִשָּׁה אָמֵן אָמֵן״.
The Gemara elaborates: There is an element of oath within it, as it is written: “And the priest shall administer an oath to the woman…and the woman shall say: Amen, amen” (Numbers 5:21–22). “Amen” is the oath that the woman takes.
בּוֹ קַבָּלַת דְּבָרִים – דִּכְתִיב: ״אָרוּר אֲשֶׁר לֹא יָקִים אֶת דִּבְרֵי הַתּוֹרָה הַזֹּאת לַעֲשׂוֹת אוֹתָם, וְאָמַר כׇּל הָעָם אָמֵן״.
There is an element of acceptance of the statement within it, as it is written: “Cursed is he who shall not confirm the matters of this Torah to perform them; and all the people shall say: Amen” (Deuteronomy 27:26), expressing their agreement to fulfill all the matters of the Torah.
בּוֹ הַאֲמָנַת דְּבָרִים – דִּכְתִיב: ״וַיֹּאמֶר יִרְמְיָה [הַנָּבִיא] (אֶל חֲנַנְיָהוּ), אָמֵן כֵּן יַעֲשֶׂה ה׳, יָקֵם ה׳ אֶת דְּבָרֶיךָ״.
There is an element of confirmation of the statement within it, as it is written: “And Jeremiah the prophet said: Amen, may the Lord do so; may the Lord uphold your statement” (Jeremiah 28:6).
אָמַר רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר: ״לָאו״ – שְׁבוּעָה, ״הֵן״ – שְׁבוּעָה. בִּשְׁלָמָא ״לָאו״ שְׁבוּעָה – דִּכְתִיב: ״וְלֹא יִהְיֶה עוֹד הַמַּיִם לְמַבּוּל״, וּכְתִיב: ״כִּי מֵי נֹחַ זֹאת לִי אֲשֶׁר נִשְׁבַּעְתִּי״. אֶלָּא ״הֵן״ שְׁבוּעָה – מְנָא לַן? סְבָרָא הוּא – מִדְּ״לָאו״ שְׁבוּעָה, ״הֵן״ נָמֵי שְׁבוּעָה.
§ Rabbi Elazar says: No, or any negative expression, can be an oath, and yes, or any positive expression, can be an oath. The Gemara notes: Granted that no can be an oath, as it is written: “And the waters shall no more become a flood” (Genesis 9:15). And it is written with regard to that negative commitment: “As this is as the waters of Noah unto Me; as I have taken an oath that the waters of Noah shall no more pass over the earth” (Isaiah 54:9). But from where do we derive the fact that yes can be an oath? The Gemara answers: It is based on logical reasoning; from the fact that no can be an oath, yes too can be an oath.
אָמַר רָבָא: וְהוּא דְּאָמַר ״לָאו״ ״לָאו״ תְּרֵי זִימְנֵי, וְהוּא דְּאָמַר ״הֵן״ ״הֵן״ תְּרֵי זִימְנֵי; דִּכְתִיב: ״וְלֹא יִכָּרֵת כׇּל בָּשָׂר עוֹד מִמֵּי הַמַּבּוּל״, ״וְלֹא יִהְיֶה עוֹד הַמַּיִם לְמַבּוּל״; וּמִדְּ״לָאו״ תְּרֵי זִימְנֵי, ״הֵן״ נָמֵי תְּרֵי זִימְנֵי.
Rava said: And a negative expression is an oath only in a case where one said no, no, stating the term two times, or it is in a case where one said yes, yes, stating the term two times, as it is written: “All flesh shall not be excised any more by floodwaters” (Genesis 9:11), and it is again written: “And the waters shall no more become a flood” (Genesis 9:15). And from the fact that no is an oath only when stated two times, yes, too, is an oath only when stated two times.
הַמְקַלֵּל בְּכוּלָּן – חַיָּיב, דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי מֵאִיר, וַחֲכָמִים פּוֹטְרִין.
§ The mishna teaches: One who curses God employing any of these names or appellations of God is liable to be executed; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. And the Rabbis deem him exempt.
תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: ״אִישׁ [אִישׁ] כִּי יְקַלֵּל אֱלֹהָיו וְנָשָׂא חֶטְאוֹ״ – מָה תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר? וַהֲלֹא כְּבָר נֶאֱמַר: ״וְנֹקֵב שֵׁם ה׳ מוֹת יוּמָת״! יָכוֹל לֹא יְהֵא חַיָּיב אֶלָּא עַל שֵׁם הַמְיוּחָד בִּלְבַד, מִנַּיִן לְרַבּוֹת אֶת הַכִּינּוּיִין? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״אִישׁ אִישׁ כִּי יְקַלֵּל אֱלֹהָיו וְגוֹ׳״ – מִכׇּל מָקוֹם. דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי מֵאִיר. וַחֲכָמִים אוֹמְרִים: עַל שֵׁם מְיוּחָד בְּמִיתָה, וְעַל הַכִּינּוּיִין בְּאַזְהָרָה.
The Sages taught that it is written: “Each and every man who shall curse his God shall bear his sin” (Leviticus 24:15). Why must the verse state this? Wasn’t it already stated: “And he who blasphemes the name of the Lord shall be put to death” (Leviticus 24:16)? One might have thought that one would be liable only for cursing the ineffable name of God alone. From where is it derived to include liability for one who curses the appellations of God? It is derived as the verse states: “Each and every man who shall curse his God,” indicating that one is liable in any case, even for cursing an appellation. This is the statement of Rabbi Meir. The Rabbis say: For cursing the ineffable name of God, one is liable to be executed with a court-imposed death penalty, as it is stated explicitly in the verse. And for cursing one of the appellations of God, one is liable for violating a prohibition, but he is not liable to be executed.
וְהַמְקַלֵּל אָבִיו וְאִמּוֹ וְכוּ׳. מַאן חֲכָמִים?
The mishna teaches: And one who curses his father and his mother employing any of these names or appellations of God is liable to be executed; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. And the Rabbis deem him exempt. The Gemara asks: Who are the Rabbis whose opinion is cited here?
רַבִּי מְנַחֵם בַּר יוֹסֵי. דְּתַנְיָא: רַבִּי מְנַחֵם בַּר יוֹסֵי אוֹמֵר: ״בְּנׇקְבוֹ שֵׁם יוּמָת״ – מָה תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר ״שֵׁם״? לִימֵּד עַל הַמְקַלֵּל אָבִיו וְאִמּוֹ, שֶׁאֵינוֹ חַיָּיב עַד שֶׁיְּקַלְּלֵם בַּשֵּׁם.
The Gemara answers: It is Rabbi Menaḥem bar Yosei, as it is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Menaḥem bar Yosei says: It is stated with regard to one who blasphemes God: “When he blasphemes a name, he shall be put to death” (Leviticus 24:16). Why must the verse state “a name,” when it is stated at the beginning of the verse: “And he who blasphemes the name of the Lord shall be put to death”? This extraneous word “name” taught with regard to one who curses his father or his mother that he is not liable to be executed through stoning until he curses them in the name of God.
וְהַמְקַלֵּל עַצְמוֹ וַחֲבֵירוֹ כּוּ׳. אָמַר רַבִּי יַנַּאי: וְדִבְרֵי הַכֹּל.
The mishna teaches: One who curses himself or another employing any of these names or appellations of God violates a prohibition. Rabbi Yannai says: And everyone agrees that this is the halakha. Even the Rabbis, who hold that one who blasphemes God or curses his parents is liable only if he employs the Tetragrammaton, agree here that one is liable to receive lashes when he curses employing an appellation.
עַצְמוֹ – דִּכְתִיב: ״רַק הִשָּׁמֶר לְךָ וּשְׁמֹר נַפְשְׁךָ מְאֹד״ – כִּדְרַבִּי אָבִין אָמַר רַבִּי אִילְעָא, דְּאָמַר: כׇּל מָקוֹם שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר ״הִשָּׁמֶר״, ״פֶּן״ וְ״אַל״ – אֵינוֹ אֶלָּא לֹא תַעֲשֶׂה. וַחֲבֵירוֹ – דִּכְתִיב: ״לֹא תְקַלֵּל חֵרֵשׁ״.
The Gemara proceeds to cite sources for these prohibitions. The prohibition against cursing oneself is derived as it is written: “Only observe for yourself, and keep your soul diligently” (Deuteronomy 4:9). This is in accordance with that which Rabbi Avin says that Rabbi Ile’a says: Everywhere in the Torah that the terms observe, lest, or do not are stated, it is nothing other than a prohibition. One who curses himself does not keep, i.e., take care of, himself and consequently violates the prohibition. And cursing another is derived as it is written: “Do not curse the deaf” (Leviticus 19:14), which applies to others just as it does to one who is deaf.
״יַכְּךָ ה׳ אֱלֹהִים״, וְכֵן ״יַכְּכָה אֱלֹהִים״ – זוֹ הִיא אָלָה הַכְּתוּבָה בַּתּוֹרָה. יָתֵיב רַב כָּהֲנָא קַמֵּיהּ דְּרַב יְהוּדָה, וְיָתֵיב וְקָאָמַר הָא מַתְנִיתִין כְּדִתְנַן. אֲמַר לֵיהּ: כַּנֵּה.
§ The mishna teaches that if one says: The Lord God shall strike you (see Deuteronomy 28:22), and likewise if one says: God shall strike you if you do not come to testify, that is a curse that is written in the Torah. The Gemara relates: Rav Kahana sat before Rav Yehuda, and he sat and stated the mishna verbatim as we learned it. Rav Yehuda said to him: Employ a euphemism and formulate it in the third person rather than the second person: God shall strike him instead of you, so that it will not sound as though you are cursing your teacher.
יָתֵיב הָהוּא מֵרַבָּנַן קַמֵּיהּ דְּרַב כָּהֲנָא, וְיָתֵיב וְקָאָמַר: ״גַּם אֵל יִתׇּצְךָ לָנֶצַח, יַחְתְּךָ וְיִסָּחֲךָ מֵאֹהֶל, וְשֵׁרֶשְׁךָ מֵאֶרֶץ חַיִּים סֶלָה״. אֲמַר לֵיהּ: כַּנֵּה.
Likewise, the Gemara relates: A certain one of the Sages sat before Rav Kahana, and he sat and said the verse: “God will likewise break you forever; He will take you up and pluck you from the tent, and uproot you from the land of the living, Selah” (Psalms 52:7). Rav Kahana said to him: Employ a euphemism and formulate it in the third person rather than the second person, so that it will not sound as though you are cursing your teacher.
תַּרְתֵּי לְמָה לִי? מַהוּ דְּתֵימָא: הָנֵי מִילֵּי מַתְנִיתִין, אֲבָל בִּקְרָאֵי אֵימָא לָא מְכַנֵּינַן; קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן.
The Gemara asks: Why do I need two incidents to relate the same concept? The Gemara answers: It was necessary to relate the second incident as well. Lest you say that this statement applies only to the mishna, as in the Oral Torah, where the content, not the formulation, is significant, emending the text in the interest of euphemism is permitted; but with regard to verses in the Bible, where the formulation, i.e., each word, is significant, say that we do not employ a euphemism. Therefore, the Gemara teaches us that it is permitted to employ a euphemism even when reciting verses.
״אַל יַכְּךָ״, וִ״יבָרֶכְךָ״, וְ״יֵיטִיב לָךְ״ – רַבִּי מֵאִיר מְחַיֵּיב, וַחֲכָמִים פּוֹטְרִין.
§ The mishna teaches that if one says to the witnesses: God shall not strike you, or: God shall bless you, or: God shall benefit you if you come and testify, Rabbi Meir deems him liable, as one may infer from that statement that if he fails to testify God will strike him, or will not bless or benefit him. And the Rabbis deem him exempt because the curse is not explicitly stated.
וְהָא לֵית לֵיהּ לְרַבִּי מֵאִיר מִכְּלָל לָאו אַתָּה שׁוֹמֵעַ הֵן! אֵיפוֹךְ.
The Gemara asks: But isn’t it so that Rabbi Meir does not accept the principle: From a negative statement you can infer a positive statement, and in an agreement, he requires the parties to explicitly state both the positive and the negative stipulations? The Gemara says: Reverse the attribution of the opinions and say that it is the Rabbis who hold that the witness is liable and it is Rabbi Meir who deems him exempt.
כִּי אֲתָא רַבִּי יִצְחָק, תְּנָא כְּדִתְנַן. אָמַר רַב יוֹסֵף: הַשְׁתָּא דַּאֲנַן תְּנַן הָכִי, וְכִי אֲתָא רַבִּי יִצְחָק תָּנֵי הָכִי, שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ דַּוְקָא תְּנַן.
The Gemara relates: When Rabbi Yitzḥak came from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia, he taught the mishna as we learned it and did not reverse the attribution of the opinions. Rav Yosef said: Now that we have learned the mishna in this formulation, and when he came, Rabbi Yitzḥak taught the mishna in this formulation, conclude from it that the formulation that we learned in the mishna was taught specifically in that manner and that is the correct formulation.
אֶלָּא קַשְׁיָא! כִּי לֵית לֵיהּ – בְּמָמוֹנָא; אֲבָל בְּאִיסּוּרָא אִית לֵיהּ.
The Gemara challenges: But the question remains difficult, as Rabbi Meir does not accept the principle: From a negative statement you can infer a positive statement. The Gemara answers: When Rabbi Meir does not accept that principle, it is only in cases involving monetary matters; but in cases involving ritual matters, e.g., an oath of testimony discussed in the mishna, he accepts the principle, and the witness is liable even in that case.
הֲרֵי סוֹטָה – דְּאִיסּוּרָא הוּא,
The Gemara asks: But sota is a case involving ritual, and not monetary matters, and the verse states only what will befall the sota if she did not commit adultery: “And if you did not go astray to defilement, while under your husband, you shall be absolved [hinnaki]” (Numbers 5:19), and the verse does not state what will befall the woman if she committed adultery.
וְאָמַר רַבִּי תַּנְחוּם בַּר חֲכִינַאי: ״הִנָּקִי״ כְּתִיב; טַעְמָא דִּכְתִיב ״הִנָּקִי״, הָא לָאו הָכִי – מִכְּלַל לָאו אַתָּה שׁוֹמֵעַ הֵן לָא אָמְרִינַן!
A difficulty is raised: According to Rabbi Meir, who does not accept the principle: From a negative statement you can infer a positive statement, both the positive and the negative eventualities should have been written in the verse. And Rabbi Tanḥum bar Ḥakhinai says to resolve the difficulty: Hinnaki is written, meaning: You shall be absolved. But since it is written without the letter yod, it is interpreted as though ḥinnaki is written, meaning: You shall be strangulated, which is the eventuality if she committed adultery. The Gemara concludes: The reason that this verse is not difficult is that hinnaki is written and ḥinnaki is interpreted; but if that were not the case, we do not say: From a negative statement you can infer a positive statement. Apparently, even in ritual matters, Rabbi Meir does not accept the principle.
אֶלָּא אֵיפוֹךְ – אֲפִילּוּ בְּאִיסּוּרָא לֵית לֵיהּ.
Rather, nevertheless, reverse the attribution of the opinions in the mishna and say that Rabbi Meir deems the witness exempt from liability for an oath of testimony, as even in ritual matters, Rabbi Meir does not accept the principle: From a negative statement you can infer a positive statement.
מַתְקֵיף לֵיהּ רָבִינָא: וּבְאִיסּוּרָא לֵית לֵיהּ?! אֶלָּא מֵעַתָּה, שְׁתוּיֵי יַיִן וּפְרוּעֵי רֹאשׁ – דִּבְמִיתָה; הָכִי נָמֵי דְּלֵית לֵיהּ לְרַבִּי מֵאִיר?! וְהָתְנַן: אֵלּוּ שֶׁבְּמִיתָה – שְׁתוּיֵי יַיִן וּפְרוּעֵי רֹאשׁ!
Ravina objects to this: And in ritual matters, does Rabbi Meir not accept the principle? But if that is so, with regard to the halakha that priests who perform the Temple service while intoxicated with wine, and priests who perform the Temple service with overgrown hair on their head, who, based on this principle, are liable to receive death at the hand of Heaven, so too does Rabbi Meir not accept this principle? But didn’t we learn in a baraita: And these are they who are liable to receive death at the hand of Heaven: Priests who perform the Temple service while intoxicated with wine and priests who perform the Temple service with overgrown hair on their head, and Rabbi Meir does not disagree with that ruling?
אֶלָּא לְעוֹלָם תֵּיפוֹךְ; כִּי לֵית לֵיהּ – בְּמָמוֹנָא, בְּאִיסּוּרָא אִית לֵיהּ; וְשָׁאנֵי סוֹטָה דְּאִיסּוּרָא דְּאִית בֵּיהּ מָמוֹנָא הוּא.
Rather, actually reverse the attribution of the opinions in the mishna and say that Rabbi Meir deems the witness exempt from liability for an oath of testimony. When Rabbi Meir does not accept that principle, it is only in cases involving monetary matters; but in cases involving ritual matters, he accepts the principle. That is the reason he does not dispute the halakha in the baraita with regard to a priest intoxicated with wine or with overgrown hair on his head. And the reason that he does not accept the principle: From a negative statement you can infer a positive statement, in the case of sota is that sota is different because it is a ritual matter in which there are ramifications involving monetary matters, i.e., payment of the marriage contract. The same is true with regard to an oath of testimony in the mishna; although it is a ritual matter, it is a ritual matter with ramifications involving monetary matters.
הֲדַרַן עֲלָךְ שְׁבוּעַת הָעֵדוּת
מַתְנִי׳ שְׁבוּעַת הַפִּקָּדוֹן נוֹהֶגֶת בַּאֲנָשִׁים וּבְנָשִׁים, בִּרְחוֹקִים וּבִקְרוֹבִים, בִּכְשֵׁרִים וּבִפְסוּלִים;
MISHNA: One who takes a false oath denying that he is in possession of an item that another deposited with him is liable to return the item with an additional one-fifth of its value and to bring a guilt-offering (see Leviticus 5:20–26). The halakhot of an oath on a deposit apply to men and to women, to non-relatives and to relatives, i.e., even if the owner of the deposit and the purported bailee are related, to those fit to serve as witnesses and to those disqualified from doing so.
בִּפְנֵי בֵּית דִּין וְשֶׁלֹּא בִּפְנֵי בֵּית דִּין – מִפִּי עַצְמוֹ; וּמִפִּי אֲחֵרִים – אֵינוֹ חַיָּיב עַד שֶׁיִּכְפְּרֶנּוּ בְּבֵית דִּין. דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי מֵאִיר.
These halakhot apply when the oath is taken in the presence of a court and when taken not in the presence of a court, as long as the oath is taken on his own, i.e., stated by the defendant himself. But if the oath is administered by others, he is not liable unless he denies the claim in court; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir.
וַחֲכָמִים אוֹמְרִים: בֵּין מִפִּי עַצְמוֹ בֵּין מִפִּי אֲחֵרִים – כֵּיוָן שֶׁכָּפַר בּוֹ חַיָּיב.
And the Rabbis say: Both when the defendant takes an oath on his own and when the oath is administered by others, once he has falsely denied the claim against him, he is liable to bring a guilt-offering and to pay restitution and an additional one-fifth, even if the oath was not administered in the presence of a court.
וְחַיָּיב עַל זְדוֹן הַשְּׁבוּעָה, וְעַל שִׁגְגָתָהּ עִם זְדוֹן הַפִּקָּדוֹן; וְאֵינוֹ חַיָּיב עַל שִׁגְגָתָהּ גְּרֵידְתָּא. וּמָה חַיָּיב עַל זְדוֹנָהּ? אָשָׁם בְּכֶסֶף שְׁקָלִים.
And one is liable to bring an offering for intentionally taking a false oath on a deposit and for unwittingly taking a false oath about the intentional misappropriation of the deposit, i.e., if one knowingly took a false oath but was unaware that he is liable to bring an offering for taking the oath. But he is not liable for unwittingly taking a false oath by itself, where he mistakenly thought that he did not owe anything. And what is he liable for when he intentionally takes a false oath? He must bring a guilt-offering worth at least two silver shekels.
שְׁבוּעַת הַפִּקָּדוֹן כֵּיצַד? אָמַר לוֹ: ״תֵּן לִי פִּקְדוֹנִי שֶׁיֵּשׁ לִי בְּיָדְךָ״, ״שְׁבוּעָה שֶׁאֵין לְךָ בְּיָדִי״; אוֹ שֶׁאָמַר לוֹ: ״אֵין לְךָ בְּיָדִי״, ״מַשְׁבִּיעֲךָ אֲנִי״, וְאָמַר ״אָמֵן״ – הֲרֵי זֶה חַיָּיב.
The mishna continues: What is the case of an oath on a deposit? It is where the claimant said to the defendant: Give me my deposit, which is in your possession, and the defendant replied: On my oath nothing of yours is in my possession; or the defendant said to him: Nothing of yours is in my possession, the claimant responded: I administer an oath to you, and the defendant said: Amen. In either case this defendant is liable to bring a guilt-offering if he lied.
הִשְׁבִּיעַ עָלָיו חָמֵשׁ פְּעָמִים, בֵּין בִּפְנֵי בֵּית דִּין וּבֵין שֶׁלֹּא בִּפְנֵי בֵּית דִּין, וְכָפַר – חַיָּיב עַל כׇּל אַחַת וְאַחַת. אָמַר רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן: מָה טַעַם? מִפְּנֵי שֶׁיָּכוֹל לַחֲזוֹר וּלְהוֹדוֹת.
If the claimant administered an oath to him five times, whether in the presence of a court or not in the presence of a court, and the defendant falsely denied each claim, he is liable to bring a guilt-offering for each and every denial. Rabbi Shimon said: What is the reason? It is due to the fact that he is able to retract and confess after each oath and repay the claimant. Since he did not do so, each oath is considered a separate denial of a monetary claim.
הָיוּ חֲמִשָּׁה תּוֹבְעִים אוֹתוֹ – אָמְרוּ לוֹ: ״תֵּן לָנוּ פִּקָּדוֹן שֶׁיֵּשׁ לָנוּ בְּיָדְךָ״; ״שְׁבוּעָה שֶׁאֵין לָכֶם בְּיָדִי״ – אֵינוֹ חַיָּיב אֶלָּא אַחַת. ״שְׁבוּעָה שֶׁאֵין לְךָ בְּיָדִי, וְלֹא לְךָ וְלֹא לָךְ״ – חַיָּיב עַל כׇּל אַחַת וְאַחַת. רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר אוֹמֵר: עַד שֶׁיֹּאמַר שְׁבוּעָה בָּאַחֲרוֹנָה. רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן אוֹמֵר: עַד שֶׁיֹּאמַר שְׁבוּעָה לְכׇל אֶחָד וְאֶחָד.
If five people were suing him and they said to him: Give us back our deposit that is in your possession, and the defendant says: On my oath nothing of yours is in my possession, he is liable for only one false oath. But if he responds to each claimant: On my oath nothing of yours is in my possession, and nothing of yours, and nothing of yours, he is liable for his oath concerning each and every claim that he denied. Rabbi Eliezer says: He is not liable for his oath concerning each claim unless he says: On my oath, at the end of the denial, i.e., he says: Nothing of yours is in my possession, and nothing of yours, on my oath, so that it is clear that he is taking an oath to each one. Rabbi Shimon says: He is not liable for his oath concerning each claim unless he says: On my oath, to each and every claimant, i.e., he says: On my oath nothing of yours is in my possession, and on my oath nothing of yours, to each claimant separately.
״תֵּן לִי פִּקָּדוֹן וּתְשׂוּמֶת יָד גָּזֵל וַאֲבֵידָה שֶׁיֵּשׁ לִי בְּיָדְךָ״; ״שְׁבוּעָה שֶׁאֵין לְךָ בְּיָדִי״ – אֵינוֹ חַיָּיב אֶלָּא אַחַת, ״שְׁבוּעָה שֶׁאֵין לְךָ בְּיָדִי פִּקָּדוֹן וּתְשׂוּמֶת יָד וְגָזֵל וַאֲבֵידָה״ – חַיָּיב עַל כׇּל אַחַת וְאַחַת.
In a case where the claimant said: Give me back my deposit, and pledge, stolen item, and lost item that are in your possession, and the defendant responds: On my oath nothing of yours is in my possession, he is liable for only one false oath. But if he responds: On my oath I do not have in my possession your deposit, or pledge, stolen item, or lost item, he is liable for his oath concerning each and every claim.
״תֵּן לִי חִטִּין וּשְׂעוֹרִין וְכוּסְּמִין שֶׁיֵּשׁ לִי בְּיָדְךָ״; ״שְׁבוּעָה שֶׁאֵין לְךָ בְּיָדִי״ – אֵינוֹ חַיָּיב אֶלָּא אַחַת, ״שְׁבוּעָה שֶׁאֵין לְךָ בְּיָדִי חִטִּין וּשְׂעוֹרִין וְכוּסְּמִין״ – חַיָּיב עַל כׇּל אַחַת וְאַחַת. רַבִּי מֵאִיר אוֹמֵר: אֲפִילּוּ אָמַר ״חִטָּה וּשְׂעוֹרָה וְכוּסֶּמֶת״ – חַיָּיב עַל כׇּל אַחַת וְאַחַת.
In a case where the claimant said: Give me back my wheat, and barley, and spelt that are in your possession, if the defendant responds: On my oath nothing of yours is in my possession, he is liable for only one false oath. But if he responds: On my oath I do not have in my possession your wheat, barley, or spelt, he is liable for his oath concerning each and every claim. Rabbi Meir says: Even if the defendant says: On my oath I do not have in my possession your grain of wheat, or grain of barley, or grain of spelt, he is liable for his oath concerning each and every claim.
״אָנַסְתָּ וּפִיתִּיתָ אֶת בִּתִּי״, וְהוּא אוֹמֵר: ״לֹא אָנַסְתִּי וְלֹא פִּיתִּיתִי״; ״מַשְׁבִּיעֲךָ אֲנִי״, וְאָמַר: ״אָמֵן״ – חַיָּיב. רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן פּוֹטֵר, שֶׁאֵינוֹ מְשַׁלֵּם קְנָס עַל פִּי עַצְמוֹ. אָמְרוּ לוֹ: אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁאֵינוֹ מְשַׁלֵּם קְנָס עַל פִּי עַצְמוֹ, מְשַׁלֵּם בּשֶׁת וּפְגָם עַל פִּי עַצְמוֹ.
The mishna continues: If one accuses another: You raped or you seduced my daughter, and the other says: I did not rape and I did not seduce your daughter, to which the father replied: I administer an oath to you, and the defendant said: Amen, the defendant is liable to bring a guilt-offering if it is a false oath. Rabbi Shimon deems him exempt, since one does not pay a fine based on his own admission. Had he confessed he would have been exempt from paying the fine; he is therefore not liable for his denial. The Rabbis said to him: Even though he does not pay the fine based on his own admission, he does pay compensation for humiliation and compensation for degradation resulting from her being raped or seduced, which are monetary claims and not fines, based on his own admission. He is therefore liable for a false oath, as he denied a monetary claim.
״גָּנַבְתָּ אֶת שׁוֹרִי״, וְהוּא אוֹמֵר ״לֹא גָּנַבְתִּי״; ״מַשְׁבִּיעֲךָ אֲנִי״, וְאָמַר ״אָמֵן״ – חַיָּיב. ״גָּנַבְתִּי, אֲבָל לֹא טָבַחְתִּי וְלֹא מָכַרְתִּי״; ״מַשְׁבִּיעֲךָ אֲנִי״, וְאָמַר ״אָמֵן״ – פָּטוּר.
Similarly, in a case where one person accuses another: You stole my ox, and the defendant says: I did not steal your ox, if the claimant replied: I administer an oath to you, and the defendant said: Amen, he is liable to pay for the ox due to the theft and to bring a guilt-offering if he lied, since by his oath he is denying that he owes the value of the ox that he would have to pay if he admitted to stealing it. But in a case where the claimant accuses the defendant of stealing the ox and slaughtering or selling it, and the defendant says: I stole the ox, but I did not slaughter or sell it, and this is a lie, if the claimant replied: I administer an oath to you, and he said: Amen, then the defendant is exempt from the fivefold payment for slaughtering or selling another’s ox, since it is a fine.
״הֵמִית שׁוֹרְךָ אֶת שׁוֹרִי״, וְהוּא אוֹמֵר ״לֹא הֵמִית״; ״מַשְׁבִּיעֲךָ אֲנִי״, וְאָמַר ״אָמֵן״ – חַיָּיב. ״הֵמִית שׁוֹרְךָ אֶת עַבְדִּי״, וְהוּא אוֹמֵר ״לֹא הֵמִית״; ״מַשְׁבִּיעֲךָ אֲנִי״, וְאָמַר ״אָמֵן״ – פָּטוּר.
If the claimant says: Your ox killed my ox, and the defendant lies and says: It did not kill your ox, to which the claimant replied: I administer an oath to you, and he said: Amen, then he is liable for his false oath. But if the claimant says: Your ox killed my Canaanite slave and you are therefore liable to pay me a fine of thirty shekels, and he lies and says: It did not kill your slave, to which the claimant replied: I administer an oath to you, and he said: Amen, then he is exempt, because payment for the slave is a fine.
אָמַר לוֹ: ״חָבַלְתָּ בִּי וְעָשִׂיתָ בִּי חַבּוּרָה״, וְהוּא אוֹמֵר: ״לֹא חָבַלְתִּי וְלֹא עָשִׂיתִי בְּךָ חַבּוּרָה״; ״מַשְׁבִּיעֲךָ אֲנִי״, וְאָמַר ״אָמֵן״ – חַיָּיב. אָמַר לוֹ עַבְדּוֹ: ״הִפַּלְתָּ אֶת שִׁינִּי וְסִימִּיתָ אֶת עֵינִי״, וְהוּא אוֹמֵר: ״לֹא הִפַּלְתִּי וְלֹא סִימִּיתִי״; ״מַשְׁבִּיעֲךָ אֲנִי״, וְאָמַר ״אָמֵן״ – פָּטוּר.
If the claimant said to him: You injured me and caused me a wound, and the defendant says: I did not injure you and I did not cause you a wound, to which the claimant replies: I administer an oath to you, and he said: Amen, he is liable. But if one’s Canaanite slave said to him: You knocked out my tooth, or: You blinded my eye, and you are therefore required to emancipate me, and he says: I did not knock out your tooth, or: I did not blind your eye, to which the slave replies: I administer an oath to you, and he said: Amen, he is exempt from bringing a guilt-offering even though he lied, since the obligation to emancipate one’s slave in these cases is a penalty.
זֶה הַכְּלָל: כׇּל הַמְשַׁלֵּם עַל פִּי עַצְמוֹ – חַיָּיב, וְשֶׁאֵינוֹ מְשַׁלֵּם עַל פִּי עַצְמוֹ – פָּטוּר.
This is the principle: For any claim that the defendant would have to pay based on his own admission, he is liable to bring a guilt-offering for taking a false oath concerning that claim. And for any claim that he would not pay based on his own admission but would pay only by the testimony of witnesses, he is exempt from bringing a guilt-offering for taking a false oath concerning that claim.
גְּמָ׳ רַב אַחָא בַּר הוּנָא וְרַב שְׁמוּאֵל בְּרֵיהּ דְּרַבָּה בַּר בַּר חָנָה וְרַב יִצְחָק בְּרֵיהּ דְּרַב יְהוּדָה, תְּנוֹ שְׁבוּעוֹת בֵּי רַבָּה. פְּגַע בְּהוּ רַב כָּהֲנָא, אָמַר
GEMARA: Rav Aḥa bar Huna and Rav Shmuel, son of Rabba bar bar Ḥana, and Rav Yitzḥak, son of Rav Yehuda, studied tractate Shevuot in the study hall of Rabba. Rav Kahana encountered them and inquired with regard to a matter in the mishna. He said
