Shevuot 48
אֶחָד אוֹמֵר גָּבוֹהַּ שְׁתֵּי מַרְדְּעוֹת וְאֶחָד אוֹמֵר שָׁלֹשׁ – עֵדוּתָן קַיֶּימֶת. אֶחָד אוֹמֵר שָׁלֹשׁ וְאֶחָד אוֹמֵר חָמֵשׁ – עֵדוּתָן בְּטֵלָה, וּמִצְטָרְפִין לְעֵדוּת אַחֶרֶת.
If one witness who came to testify about the new moon says that he saw it two oxgoads high above the horizon, and the other one says it was three oxgoads high, their testimony is valid, as a discrepancy of this type is reasonable. But if one says that he saw the moon three oxgoads above the horizon, and the other one says it was five, their testimony is voided. But despite this, they are not disqualified as witnesses, and either of them may join in another testimony.
מַאי, לָאו לְעֵדוּת מָמוֹן? אָמַר רָבָא: הוּא וְאַחֵר מִצְטָרְפִין לְעֵדוּת אַחֶרֶת שֶׁל רֹאשׁ חֹדֶשׁ; דְּהָוֵי לְהוּ תְּרֵי וְחַד, וְאֵין דְּבָרָיו שֶׁל אֶחָד בִּמְקוֹם שְׁנַיִם.
What, is it not teaching that they each can join with another witness for testimony about monetary matters, even though each of them is suspected of giving false testimony? This contradicts Rav Ḥisda’s opinion. Rava said, explaining how Rav Ḥisda understands this baraita: He, one of the contradictory witnesses, and another witness may combine for another testimony about the new moon, as in doing so, they become two witnesses against one testifying differently; and the statement of one witness has no standing in a place where it is contradicted by two witnesses.
אָמַר לַחֶנְוָנִי ״תֵּן לִי בְּדִינָר פֵּירוֹת״ כּוּ׳. תַּנְיָא, אָמַר רַבִּי יְהוּדָה: אֵימָתַי – בִּזְמַן שֶׁהַפֵּירוֹת צְבוּרִין וּמוּנָּחִין, וּשְׁנֵיהֶן עוֹרְרִין עֲלֵיהֶן; אֲבָל הִפְשִׁילָן בְּקוּפָּתוֹ לַאֲחוֹרָיו – הַמּוֹצִיא מֵחֲבֵרוֹ עָלָיו הָרְאָיָה.
§ The mishna teaches: If one said to a storekeeper: Give me produce valued at a dinar, and he gave him the produce, and subsequently the storekeeper and the customer dispute whether the customer ever paid the storekeeper, the mishna rules that the customer takes an oath that he paid. It is taught in a baraita: Rabbi Yehuda says: When does the customer take this oath? He takes it when the produce is collected and situated in front of them, and the two of them are quarreling about it. But if the customer has it bundled in his basket on his back, the burden of proof rests upon the claimant, i.e., the storekeeper.
אָמַר לַשּׁוּלְחָנִי ״תֵּן לִי״ כּוּ׳. וּצְרִיכָא; דְּאִי אַשְׁמְעִינַן הָא קַמַּיְיתָא – בְּהָךְ קָא אָמְרִי רַבָּנַן, מִשּׁוּם דְּפֵירֵי עֲבִידִי דְּמַרְקְבִי, וְכֵיוָן דְּמַרְקְבִי לָא מְשַׁהוּ לֵיהּ; אֲבָל מָעוֹת דְּלָא מַרְקְבִי – אֵימָא מוֹדֵי לֵיהּ לְרַבִּי יְהוּדָה.
The mishna continues with a similar case: If one said to a money changer: Give me small coins valued at a dinar, and he gave him the coins, and subsequently they dispute whether the customer gave the money changer the dinar, the customer takes an oath that he paid already. The Gemara notes: It is necessary to teach both the case involving the storekeeper and the case involving the money changer, as had it taught us only this first case, one might say that only in that case do the Rabbis say that the customer may take an oath to avoid payment, because produce is prone to spoiling, and since it spoils storekeepers do not retain it but give it to the customer immediately. But with regard to money, which does not spoil, say that they concede to Rabbi Yehuda that a money changer does not give coins to the customer until he has received payment, and the customer does not need to take an oath.
וְאִי אִיתְּמַר בְּהָא – בְּהָא קָאָמַר רַבִּי יְהוּדָה, אֲבָל בְּהָךְ אֵימָא מוֹדֶה לְהוּ לְרַבָּנַן; צְרִיכָא.
And had the ruling been stated only about that case involving the money changer, one might say that only in that case does Rabbi Yehuda say that the customer need not take an oath to avoid payment, but in this case, involving the storekeeper, say he concedes to the Rabbis. Therefore it is necessary to teach this dispute for both cases.
כְּשֵׁם שֶׁאָמְרוּ הַפּוֹגֶמֶת כְּתוּבָּתָהּ [וְכוּ׳], וְכֵן הַיְּתוֹמִין לֹא יִפָּרְעוּ. מִמַּאן? אִילֵימָא מִלֹּוֶה – אֲבוּהוֹן שָׁקֵיל בְּלָא שְׁבוּעָה, וְאִינְהוּ בִּשְׁבוּעָה?! הָכִי קָאָמַר: וְכֵן הַיְּתוֹמִים מִן הַיְּתוֹמִים, לֹא יִפָּרְעוּ אֶלָּא בִּשְׁבוּעָה.
§ The mishna teaches (see 45a): Just like other cases where the Sages said that one takes an oath and receives payment, the mishna teaches: A woman who vitiates her marriage contract, etc. And likewise, orphans may not collect with a promissory note inherited from their father except by taking an oath. The Gemara asks: From whom do they collect a debt by taking an oath? If we say that they collect this way from the borrower, i.e., those who borrowed from their father, that would not make sense. Their father would take payment with the promissory note without taking an oath, and they collect only by means of taking an oath? Don’t orphans have privileged status? Rather, this is what the mishna is saying: And even orphans do not collect with their father’s promissory note from the borrower’s orphans except by means of an oath.
רַב וּשְׁמוּאֵל דְּאָמְרִי תַּרְוַיְיהוּ: לֹא שָׁנוּ אֶלָּא שֶׁמֵּת מַלְוֶה בְּחַיֵּי לֹוֶה; אֲבָל מֵת לֹוֶה בְּחַיֵּי מַלְוֶה – כְּבָר נִתְחַיֵּיב מַלְוֶה לִבְנֵי לֹוֶה שְׁבוּעָה, וְאֵין אָדָם מוֹרִישׁ שְׁבוּעָה לְבָנָיו.
Rav and Shmuel both say that the Sages taught that the lender’s orphans need to take an oath in order to be paid by the borrower’s orphans only when the lender died during the lifetime of the borrower, and the lender’s children had an opportunity to collect directly from the borrower without taking an oath. But if the borrower died during the lifetime of the lender, the lender has already become liable to take an oath to the children of the borrower, since one can collect from orphans only by means of an oath, and a person cannot bequeath an oath, i.e., a debt that requires the taking of an oath in order to be collected, to his children, and no payment is made. The lender’s children cannot take the oath that their father would have taken, that the promissory note has not been paid. The only oath they can take is that their father never told them that it had been paid, and that is insufficient once the father became liable to take an oath.
שַׁלְחוּהָ קַמֵּיהּ דְּרַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר: שְׁבוּעָה זוֹ – מָה טִיבָהּ? שְׁלַח לְהוּ: יוֹרְשִׁין נִשְׁבָּעִין שְׁבוּעַת יוֹרְשִׁין, וְנוֹטְלִין. שַׁלְחוּהָ בִּימֵי רַבִּי אַמֵּי, אָמַר: כּוּלֵּי הַאי שָׁלְחִי לַהּ וְאָזְלִי? אִי אַשְׁכְּחִינַן בַּהּ טַעְמָא, מִי לָא שָׁלְחִינַן לְהוּ?! אֶלָּא אָמַר רַבִּי אַמֵּי: הוֹאִיל וַאֲתָא לְיָדָן, נֵימָא בַּהּ מִילְּתָא:
The Sages sent a question to Rabbi Elazar in Eretz Yisrael: What is the nature of this oath to the orphans of the borrower that it has the capacity to prevent the lender’s children from collecting their father’s debt? Rabbi Elazar sent a reply to them: That is not the correct ruling; rather, the heirs take the heirs’ oath, that they have no knowledge that this promissory note was paid, and collect payment of their claim. They sent the same question again to Eretz Yisrael in the days of Rabbi Ami. He said: They continue to send this question to this extent? If we had found a different explanation, wouldn’t we have sent it to them? Nevertheless, Rabbi Ami said: Since this question came to us, let us say something about it.
עָמַד בַּדִּין וָמֵת – כְּבָר נִתְחַיֵּיב מַלְוֶה לִבְנֵי לֹוֶה שְׁבוּעָה, וְאֵין אָדָם מוֹרִישׁ שְׁבוּעָה לְבָנָיו. לֹא עָמַד בַּדִּין וָמֵת – יוֹרְשִׁין נִשְׁבָּעִין שְׁבוּעַת יוֹרְשִׁין, וְנוֹטְלִין.
If the litigants stood trial and then the lender died before taking an oath, the lender has already become liable to take an oath to the children of the borrower in accordance with the court’s ruling, and a person cannot bequeath an oath to his children, in accordance with the opinion of Rav and Shmuel. If the litigants did not yet stand trial, and the lender died, the lender’s heirs take the heirs’ oath, and collect payment of their claim, as Rabbi Elazar said.
מַתְקֵיף לַהּ רַב נַחְמָן: אַטּוּ בֵּי דִינָא קָא מְחַיְּיבִי לֵיהּ שְׁבוּעָה?! מֵעִידָּנָא דִּשְׁכֵיב לֹוֶה, אִיחַיַּיב לֵיהּ מַלְוֶה לִבְנֵי לֹוֶה שְׁבוּעָה!
Rav Naḥman objects to this: Is that to say that it is the court that renders the lender liable to take an oath? At the moment the borrower died, the lender was liable to take an oath to the children of the borrower.
אֶלָּא אָמַר רַב נַחְמָן: אִי אִיתַהּ לִדְרַב וְדִשְׁמוּאֵל, אִיתַהּ; אִי לֵיתַהּ, לֵיתַהּ. אַלְמָא מְסַפְּקָא לֵיהּ; וְהָאָמַר רַב יוֹסֵף בַּר מִנְיוֹמֵי: עֲבַד רַב נַחְמָן עוֹבָדָא – יַחְלוֹקוּ! לִדְבָרָיו דְּרַבִּי מֵאִיר קָאָמַר, וְלֵיהּ לָא סְבִירָא לֵיהּ.
Rather, Rav Naḥman said: If the ruling of Rav and Shmuel is accepted, it is accepted; and if it is not accepted, it is not. The Gemara asks: Evidently, Rav Naḥman is uncertain whether the ruling of Rav and Shmuel is accepted. But didn’t Rav Yosef bar Minyumi say that Rav Naḥman ruled in an actual case against Rav and Shmuel, ruling that where both litigants are suspect about oaths they divide the disputed amount? The Gemara answers: Rav Naḥman stated his uncertainty with regard to the ruling of Rav and Shmuel, who rule in accordance with the statement of Rabbi Meir that the oath returns to its place, but he himself does not hold accordingly, but rather rules in accordance with the statement of Rabbi Yosei, who says that they divide the claim.
מֵתִיב רַב אוֹשַׁעְיָא: מֵתָה – יוֹרְשֶׁיהָ מַזְכִּירִין אֶת כְּתוּבָּתָהּ עַד עֶשְׂרִים וְחָמֵשׁ שָׁנִים! הָכָא בְּמַאי עָסְקִינַן – שֶׁנִּשְׁבְּעָה וּמֵתָה.
Rav Oshaya raises an objection from a mishna (Ketubot 104a): If a widow died without having received payment of her marriage contract, her heirs, e.g., sons from a previous marriage, may invoke her marriage contract in order to demand payment of it for up to twenty-five years later. Her heirs, who are orphans, can take an oath and collect their claim, even though they are collecting from other orphans, in contradiction to the ruling of Rav and Shmuel. The Gemara answers: Here we are dealing with a situation where the widow took an oath but died before she could collect the payment. When her heirs come to collect, an oath is no longer required.
תָּא שְׁמַע: נָשָׂא רִאשׁוֹנָה וָמֵתָה, נָשָׂא שְׁנִיָּה וּמֵת הוּא – שְׁנִיָּה וְיוֹרְשֶׁיהָ קוֹדְמִין לְיוֹרְשֵׁי הָרִאשׁוֹנָה! הָכָא נָמֵי, שֶׁנִּשְׁבְּעָה וּמֵתָה.
The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a mishna (Ketubot 90a): In a case where he married his first wife and she died, and by the terms of the marriage contract, her sons inherit the sum promised in her marriage contract after the husband dies, if he subsequently married his second wife, and then he died, the second wife and her heirs take precedence over the heirs of the first wife, in collecting payment of her marriage contract. The heirs of the second wife can collect the marriage contract by taking an oath to the heirs of the first wife, stating that they have no knowledge of their mother having received her marriage contract, even though this is an oath bequeathed to them by their mother. This mishna therefore contradicts the ruling of Rav and Shmuel. The Gemara answers: This does not contradict their ruling, because they understand it to also be a situation where the second wife took an oath but died before she collected the payment.
תָּא שְׁמַע: אֲבָל יוֹרְשָׁיו מַשְׁבִּיעִין אוֹתָהּ, וְאֶת יוֹרְשֶׁיהָ, וְאֶת הַבָּאִין בִּרְשׁוּתָהּ!
The Gemara suggests: Come and hear another mishna (Ketubot 86b): If a husband stipulated that when his wife collects payment of her marriage contract he will not impose an oath on her or on her heirs or representatives, he may not impose an oath, but his heirs can administer an oath to her, to her heirs, and to those who come on her authority as representatives. Her heirs take an oath to collect from the husband’s heirs, though they are all orphans. This is contrary to the ruling of Rav and Shmuel, and here it is clear that the wife did not take an oath before she died.
אָמַר רַב שְׁמַעְיָה, לִצְדָדִין קָתָנֵי: אוֹתָהּ – בְּאַלְמָנָה, וְיוֹרְשֶׁיהָ – בִּגְרוּשָׁה.
Rav Shemaya said: The mishna is in accordance with Rav and Shmuel’s ruling because it teaches the administration of an oath disjunctively. The heirs can administer an oath to her when she is receiving payment of her marriage contract as a widow, or they can administer an oath to her heirs when she is a divorcée who died after the divorce and before her husband died. Since she died first, her heirs were not bequeathed an oath to her husband’s heirs.
מֵתִיב רַב נָתָן בַּר הוֹשַׁעְיָא: יָפֶה כֹּחַ הַבֵּן מִכֹּחַ הָאָב –
Rav Natan bar Hoshaya raises an objection from a baraita: Sometimes the power of the son is greater than the power of the father,
שֶׁהַבֵּן גּוֹבֶה בֵּין בִּשְׁבוּעָה וּבֵין שֶׁלֹּא בִּשְׁבוּעָה, וְהָאָב אֵינוֹ גּוֹבֶה אֶלָּא בִּשְׁבוּעָה. הֵיכִי דָּמֵי – דְּמֵת לֹוֶה בְּחַיֵּי מַלְוֶה;
as the son can collect both by taking an oath and without taking an oath, while the father can collect only by taking an oath. What are the circumstances in which this occurs? It is when the borrower died during the life of the lender. The father who is the lender can collect from the borrower’s heirs only if he takes an oath.
וְקָתָנֵי: שֶׁהַבֵּן גּוֹבֶה בֵּין בִּשְׁבוּעָה וּבֵין שֶׁלֹּא בִּשְׁבוּעָה; בִּשְׁבוּעָה – שְׁבוּעַת יוֹרְשִׁין, שֶׁלֹּא בִּשְׁבוּעָה – כְּרַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל!
And it is taught: As the son can collect both by taking an oath and without taking an oath. He collects by taking an oath when he takes the heirs’ oath, that he has no knowledge that his father’s debt was paid, and he collects without taking an oath in accordance with the opinion of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel in the mishna, that when there are witnesses that the father said at the time of his death that a certain promissory note had not been paid, the son collects the debt without taking an oath. In any case, absent testimony to that effect, the father bequeaths the oath to his children and the son can collect by taking an oath, contrary to the ruling of Rav and Shmuel.
אָמַר רַב יוֹסֵף: הָא מַנִּי – בֵּית שַׁמַּאי הִיא, דְּאָמְרִי: שְׁטָר הָעוֹמֵד לִגְבּוֹת – כְּגָבוּי דָּמֵי.
Rav Yosef said in response: In accordance with whose opinion is this baraita? It is in accordance with the opinion of Beit Shammai, who say that a debt recorded in a promissory note that stands to be collected is considered as if it is already collected. Therefore, the father is considered to be already in possession of the loan and bequeaths it to his son. Even though the Sages instituted that the son take an oath to the heirs of the borrower, this is not a case of the son inheriting an oath.
אִיקְּלַע רַב נַחְמָן לְסוּרָא; עוּל לְגַבֵּיהּ רַב חִסְדָּא וְרַבָּה בַּר רַב הוּנָא, אֲמַרוּ לֵיהּ: לֵיתֵי מָר נֶעְקְרַהּ לְהָא דְּרַב וּשְׁמוּאֵל. אֲמַר לְהוּ: אִיכַּפְלִי וַאֲתַאי כֹּל הָנֵי פַּרְסֵי, לְמֶעְקְרַהּ לְהָא דְּרַב וּשְׁמוּאֵל?! אֶלָּא הַבוּ דְלָא לוֹסֵיף עֲלַהּ; כְּגוֹן מַאי דְּאָמַר רַב פָּפָּא: הַפּוֹגֵם אֶת שְׁטָרוֹ וָמֵת – יוֹרְשִׁין נִשְׁבָּעִין שְׁבוּעַת יוֹרְשִׁין, וְנוֹטְלִין.
§ It is related that Rav Naḥman arrived in the city of Sura. Rav Ḥisda and Rabba bar Rav Huna came to see him. They said to him: Let our Master come, and together we will overturn that ruling of Rav and Shmuel. Rav Naḥman said to them: Did I exert myself and come all these parasangs to uproot that ruling of Rav and Shmuel? Rather, let us not extend their ruling by applying it to other situations outside the specific context of when the borrower died during the lifetime of the lender. The Gemara offers an example: This is like what Rav Pappa says: If a creditor vitiates his promissory note, by acknowledging that he has received partial payment and thereby rendering himself liable to take an oath in order to receive the rest, and then he dies, his heirs take the heirs’ oath and collect from the debtor.
הָהוּא דִּשְׁכֵיב, וּשְׁבַק עָרְבָא. סְבַר רַב פָּפָּא לְמֵימָר: הָא נָמֵי – דְּלָא לוֹסֵיף עֲלַהּ הוּא. אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַב הוּנָא בְּרֵיהּ דְּרַב יְהוֹשֻׁעַ לְרַב פָּפָּא: אַטּוּ עָרְבָא לָאו בָּתַר יַתְמֵי אָזֵיל?!
The Gemara relates: There was a certain debtor who died and left a guarantor of his debt, and the orphans of the creditor came to collect from the guarantor. Rav Pappa thought to say: This, too, is a case to which one should not extend Rav and Shmuel’s ruling, as they said only that orphans do not inherit an oath to collect from other orphans, and this should not apply to collecting from a guarantor. Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, said to Rav Pappa: Is that to say that the guarantor will not pursue the orphans and collect from them? Ultimately, collecting from the guarantor is tantamount to collecting from the orphans, and no distinction should be made.
הָהוּא דִּשְׁכֵיב, וּשְׁבַק אַחָא. סָבַר רָמֵי בַּר חָמָא לְמֵימַר: הָא נָמֵי – דְּלָא לוֹסֵיף עֲלַהּ הוּא. אֲמַר לֵיהּ רָבָא: מָה לִי ״שֶׁלֹּא פְּקָדַנִי אַבָּא״, וּמָה לִי ״שֶׁלֹּא פְּקָדַנִי אָחִי״.
The Gemara relates: There was a certain creditor who died and left a brother as his heir, who wanted to collect from the orphans of the debtor. Rami bar Ḥama thought to say that this, too, is a case to which one should not extend Rav and Shmuel’s ruling, since Rav and Shmuel ruled that one does not bequeath an oath to one’s children, and they did not mention a case where the heir is a brother. Rava said to him: What difference does it make to me if the oath taken by the heir is: My father did not inform me that this debt has been paid, and what difference does it make to me if the oath taken is: My brother did not inform me?
אָמַר רַב חָמָא: הַשְׁתָּא דְּלָא אִיתְּמַר הִלְכְתָא לָא כְּרַב וּשְׁמוּאֵל וְלָא כְּרַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר; הַאי דַּיָּינָא דַּעֲבַד כְּרַב וּשְׁמוּאֵל – עֲבַד, דַּעֲבַד כְּרַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר – עֲבַד.
Rav Ḥama says: Now that the halakha was not stated either in accordance with the opinion of Rav and Shmuel or in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar, a judge who rules in accordance with the opinion of Rav and Shmuel has ruled, and his ruling is accepted, and a judge who rules in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar has ruled, and his ruling is accepted.
אָמַר רַב פָּפָּא: הַאי שְׁטָרָא דְּיַתְמֵי – לָא מִקְרָע קָרְעִינַן לֵיהּ, וְלָא אַגְבּוֹיֵי מַגְבִּינַן בֵּיהּ. אַגְבּוֹיֵי לָא מַגְבִּינַן בֵּיהּ – דִּלְמָא סְבִירָא לַן כְּרַב וּשְׁמוּאֵל, וּמִקְרָע לָא קָרְעִינַן לֵיהּ – דְּהַאי דַּיָּינָא דַּעֲבַד כְּרַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר, עֲבַד.
Rav Pappa says: When that promissory note of orphans comes before our court, we do not tear it up, but we also do not collect the debt with it. We do not collect the debt with it, since perhaps we should hold in accordance with the opinion of Rav and Shmuel that orphans cannot collect debts in a case where their father was required to take an oath to collect, as they cannot take the appropriate oath; but we do not tear it up, since a judge who rules in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar has ruled.
הָהוּא דַּיָּינָא דַּעֲבַד כְּרַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר. הֲוָה צוּרְבָּא מֵרַבָּנַן בְּמָתֵיהּ, אֲמַר לֵיהּ: אַיְיתִינָא אִיגַּרְתָּא מִמַּעְרְבָא, דְּלֵית הִלְכְתָא כְּרַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר. אֲמַר לֵיהּ: לְכִי תַּיְיתֵי. אֲתָא לְקַמֵּיהּ דְּרַב חָמָא, אֲמַר לֵיהּ: הַאי דַּיָּינָא דַּעֲבַד כְּרַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר – עֲבַד.
The Gemara relates: There was a certain judge who ruled in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar. There was a Torah scholar in his city. He said to the judge: I will bring a letter from the West, Eretz Yisrael, stating that the halakha is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar. The judge said to him: When you bring such a letter, I will consider it, but for now I stand by my ruling. That Torah scholar came before Rav Ḥama, and Rav Ḥama said to him: A judge who rules in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar has ruled, and his ruling cannot be voided.
וְאֵלּוּ נִשְׁבָּעִין. אַטּוּ בְּשׁוּפְטָנֵי עָסְקִינַן?! הָכִי קָאָמַר: וְאֵלּוּ נִשְׁבָּעִין שֶׁלֹּא בְּטַעֲנַת בָּרִי אֶלָּא בְּטַעֲנַת שֶׁמָּא – הַשּׁוּתָּפִין וְהָאֲרִיסִין.
§ The mishna teaches: And these people are sometimes required to take an oath that they do not owe anything even when there is no explicit claim against them: Partners, sharecroppers, stewards, a woman who does business from home, where she manages the property of orphans, and the member of the household appointed to manage the household’s affairs. The Gemara asks: Is that to say that we are dealing with fools who take an oath even though no claim has been brought against them? The Gemara explains: This is what the mishna is saying: And these people take an oath without it being in response to a definite claim but only to an uncertain claim, i.e., the claimant cannot know with certainty that he is owed money: Partners, sharecroppers, and the others listed in the mishna.
תָּנָא: בֶּן בַּיִת שֶׁאָמְרוּ – לֹא שֶׁנִּכְנָס וְיוֹצֵא בְּרַגְלָיו; אֶלָּא מַכְנִיס לוֹ פּוֹעֲלִין וּמוֹצִיא לוֹ פּוֹעֲלִין, מַכְנִיס לוֹ פֵּירוֹת וּמוֹצִיא לוֹ פֵּירוֹת.
The Sages taught in a baraita (Tosefta, Ketubot 9:3): With regard to the member of the household whom they mentioned in the mishna, this is not referring to one who enters and exits the house on foot as a family friend, but rather to one who engages laborers, and dismisses laborers, gathers produce, and sends out produce in managing the household.
וּמַאי שְׁנָא הָנֵי? מִשּׁוּם דְּמוֹרוּ בֵּהּ הֶתֵּירָא.
The Gemara asks: And what is different about these people listed in the mishna, e.g., partners, such that they are liable to take an oath in response to an uncertain claim? It is because they tend to grant themselves permission to take for themselves from the property for which they are responsible, using as an excuse the effort they invest in their duties.
אָמַר רַב יוֹסֵף בַּר מִנְיוֹמֵי, אָמַר רַב נַחְמָן: וְהוּא שֶׁיֵּשׁ טַעֲנָה בֵּינַיְיהוּ שְׁתֵּי כֶּסֶף.
Rav Yosef bar Minyumi said that Rav Naḥman said: One takes an oath in response to an uncertain claim only when there is a claim between them worth at least two silver ma’a.
כְּמַאן – כִּשְׁמוּאֵל?! וְהָתָנֵי רַבִּי חִיָּיא לְסַיּוֹעֵיהּ לְרַב! אֵימָא כְּפִירַת טַעֲנָה, כְּרַב.
The Gemara asks: In accordance with whose opinion is this ruling? Is it in accordance with that of Shmuel? Shmuel holds that one becomes liable to take an oath after admitting to part of a claim when the value of the entire claim is at least two silver ma’a. Rav holds that the portion one denies he owes must be at least two ma’a (see 39b). But didn’t Rabbi Ḥiyya teach a baraita in support of Rav? The Gemara answers: Say that Rav Naḥman means that the value of the denial of a claim is at least two silver ma’a, in accordance with the opinion of Rav.
חָלְקוּ הַשּׁוּתָּפִין וְהָאֲרִיסִין. אִיבַּעְיָא לְהוּ: מַהוּ לְגַלְגֵּל בִּדְרַבָּנַן?
§ The mishna teaches: Once the partners or the sharecroppers have divided the common property, and each has taken his share, then one side may not require an oath of the other absent a definite claim. A question was raised before the Sages: What is the halakha about extending an oath to an additional situation, in a case where the original oath is by rabbinic law?
תָּא שְׁמַע: לָוָה הֵימֶנּוּ עֶרֶב שְׁבִיעִית, וּלְמוֹצָאֵי שְׁבִיעִית נַעֲשָׂה לוֹ שׁוּתָּף אוֹ אָרִיס – אֵין מְגַלְגְּלִין. טַעְמָא דְּלָוָה הֵימֶנּוּ עֶרֶב שְׁבִיעִית – דַּאֲתַאי שְׁבִיעִית אַפְקַעְתֵּיהּ; הָא שְׁאָר שְׁנֵי שָׁבוּעַ – מְגַלְגְּלִין!
The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a baraita: If one borrowed from another on the eve of, i.e., before, the Sabbatical Year, and upon the conclusion of the Sabbatical Year became his partner or sharecropper, the lender may not extend the partner’s or sharecropper’s oath to an oath about the loan. The Gemara infers: The reason he may not extend the oath is that he borrowed from him on the eve of the Sabbatical Year, so that the Sabbatical Year came and abrogated the loan, rendering the oath irrelevant. Therefore, if he borrowed during the other years of the seven-year Sabbatical cycle, an oath may be extended from the partner’s oath or sharecropper’s oath, which are rabbinic ordinances, to an oath about the loan.
לָא תֵּימָא: הָא שְׁאָר שְׁנֵי שָׁבוּעַ – מְגַלְגְּלִין; אֶלָּא אֵימָא: נַעֲשָׂה לוֹ שׁוּתָּף אוֹ אָרִיס עֶרֶב שְׁבִיעִית, וּלְמוֹצָאֵי שְׁבִיעִית לָוָה הֵימֶנּוּ – מְגַלְגְּלִין.
The Gemara rejects that inference: Do not say: Therefore, if he borrowed during the other years of the Sabbatical cycle, an oath may be extended. Rather, say that one should infer from the baraita that if he became his partner or sharecropper on the eve of the Sabbatical Year, and upon the conclusion of the Sabbatical Year he borrowed from him and incurred an oath by Torah law, that oath may be extended.
הָא בְּהֶדְיָא קָתָנֵי לַהּ: נַעֲשָׂה לוֹ שׁוּתָּף אוֹ אָרִיס עֶרֶב שְׁבִיעִית, וּלְמוֹצָאֵי שְׁבִיעִית לָוָה הֵימֶנּוּ – מְגַלְגְּלִין! שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ: מְגַלְגְּלִין בִּדְרַבָּנַן! שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ.
The Gemara asks: Isn’t that taught explicitly in a baraita? It teaches: If he became his partner or sharecropper on the eve of the Sabbatical Year, and upon the conclusion of the Sabbatical Year he borrowed from him, the oath may be extended. Therefore, the initial inference must be correct. Conclude from it that an oath incurred by rabbinic law may be extended. The Gemara affirms: Conclude from it that this is so.
אָמַר רַב הוּנָא:
Rav Huna says:
