Sotah 6
מִי קָא רָמֵינַן לַהּ עֲלֵיהּ בְּעַל כֻּרְחֵיהּ?
Do we impose on him an obligation to marry her against his will? Unlike levirate marriage, there is no obligation for another man to marry her. Therefore, the verse is not instructing him to do so.
וְאִיכָּא דְּאָמְרִי, אָמַר רַב יוֹסֵף: הַכָּתוּב קְרָאוֹ ״אַחֵר״, שֶׁאֵין בֶּן זוּגוֹ שֶׁל רִאשׁוֹן. שֶׁזֶּה הוֹצִיא רְשָׁעָה מִבֵּיתוֹ, וְזֶה הִכְנִיס רְשָׁעָה לְתוֹךְ בֵּיתוֹ, וְאַתְּ אָמְרַתְּ תִּתְיַבֵּם נָמֵי יַבּוֹמֵי?!
And there are those who say that Rav Yosef said differently: The verse calls a man who marries a woman after she was divorced from her first husband due to suspicion of adultery “another man,” as the verse states: “And she departs out of his house and goes and becomes another man’s wife” (Deuteronomy 24:2). This indicates that one who subsequently marries her is not a peer of her first husband because this one, the first husband, removed an evil woman from his house, and that one brought an evil woman into his house. There is an implied criticism of the second husband in the verse; and yet you say that the verse instructs that she should also enter into levirate marriage.
אֲמַר לֵיהּ אַבָּיֵי: אֶלָּא מֵעַתָּה, נִשֵּׂאת לְאַחֵר וּמֵת בְּלֹא בָּנִים — לֹא תִּתְיַבֵּם, דְּהַכָּתוּב קְרָאוֹ ״אַחֵר״! גַּבֵּיהּ דְּהַאי מִיהָא בְּשֵׁם טוֹב הֲוָה קָיְימָא.
Abaye said to him: If that is so, then if she married another man and he died without children, then she should not enter into levirate marriage with the brother of her second husband even if she did not commit adultery during the second marriage, since the verse calls the second husband “another man,” which excluded the possibility of levirate marriage. Rav Yosef answered Abaye: With regard to that one, i.e., this second husband, at least she remained with a good name. Since she did not engage in illicit behavior during her second marriage, she can enter into levirate marriage with the brother of her second husband.
רָבָא אָמַר, קַל וָחוֹמֶר: אִם נֶאֶסְרָה בַּמּוּתָּר לָהּ — בָּאָסוּר לָהּ לֹא כׇּל שֶׁכֵּן?
Rava says a different reason why a sota cannot enter into levirate marriage: This prohibition can be deduced through an a fortiori inference: If, due to the suspicion of adultery, she becomes forbidden to the one who was previously permitted to her, i.e., her first husband, then with regard to one who was forbidden to her, i.e., the husband’s brother, is it not all the more so that she remains forbidden to him?
אֲמַר לֵיהּ אַבָּיֵי: אֶלָּא מֵעַתָּה, כֹּהֵן גָּדוֹל שֶׁקִּידֵּשׁ אֶת הָאַלְמָנָה וָמֵת, וְיֵשׁ לוֹ אָח כֹּהֵן הֶדְיוֹט, לֹא תִּתְיַבֵּם: אִם נֶאֶסְרָה בַּמּוּתָּר לָהּ — בָּאָסוּר לָהּ לֹא כׇּל שֶׁכֵּן?!
Abaye said to him: If that is so, if this a fortiori reasoning is the basis of the prohibition against her entering into levirate marriage, then in the case of a High Priest who betrothed a widow, which he is prohibited from doing, and he died before the marriage took place, and he has a brother who is a common priest, who is permitted to marry a widow, she should still not be permitted to enter into levirate marriage with him, since the same inference can be stated: If she becomes forbidden to the one who was permitted to her, i.e., her husband the High Priest, who was prohibited from marrying a widow, then with regard to one who was forbidden to her, i.e., his brother, the common priest who wishes to enter into levirate marriage with her, is it not all the more so that she should be forbidden?
נֶאֶסְרָה?! הָא אֲסִירָא וְקָיְימָא! מוּתָּר לָהּ?! אָסוּר לָהּ הוּא!
The Gemara refutes this inference. In the case of the High Priest, can one say: She becomes forbidden? But she was forbidden to him and remains forbidden to him. She did not become forbidden to her husband, the High Priest, due to the marriage. Furthermore, in the case of the High Priest, can one say: Permitted to her? But the High Priest is forbidden to her always. Therefore, the case of the High Priest does not serve as a refutation of the a fortiori inference.
אֶלָּא: אֵשֶׁת כֹּהֵן שֶׁנֶּאֶנְסָה וָמֵת, וְיֵשׁ לוֹ אָח חָלָל — לֹא תִּתְיַבֵּם. אִם נֶאֶסְרָה בַּמּוּתָּר לָהּ — בָּאָסוּר לָהּ לֹא כׇּל שֶׁכֵּן?!
Rather, the refutation is as follows: In the case of a priest’s wife who was raped, who becomes forbidden to her husband, and then her husband dies; and he has a brother who is a priest disqualified due to flawed lineage [ḥalal], who is not bound by the restrictions on marriage given to a priest, then she should not be permitted to enter into levirate marriage with him. If she becomes forbidden to the one who was permitted to her, i.e., her husband the priest, then with regard to one who was forbidden to her, i.e., her brother-in-law, is it not all the more so that she remains forbidden to him?
אוֹנֶס בְּיִשְׂרָאֵל מִישְׁרֵא שְׁרֵי, וְגַבֵּי דְּהַאי מִיהָא לֵיכָּא אִיסּוּרָא.
The Gemara answers: Nevertheless, this a fortiori inference is not applicable here because a raped woman is completely permitted to an Israelite. Therefore, a married woman raped by another man may remain with her Israelite husband. And with regard to this person, i.e., the brother of the deceased, who is a ḥalal, in any event there is no prohibition. The fact that the woman was forbidden to her ḥalal brother-in-law while she was married to her husband is immaterial. This is because, had she been raped while she was married to the ḥalal, it would not render her forbidden to him, as he has the status of an Israelite with regard to marriage. Consequently, this case cannot be compared to the case of the mishna, as a woman who commits adultery is forbidden to any husband, not only a priest.
מַתְנִי׳ וְאֵלּוּ אֲסוּרוֹת מִלֶּאֱכוֹל בִּתְרוּמָה: הָאוֹמֶרֶת ״טְמֵאָה אֲנִי לָךְ״, וְשֶׁבָּאוּ עֵדִים שֶׁהִיא טְמֵאָה, וְהָאוֹמֶרֶת ״אֵינִי שׁוֹתָה״, וְשֶׁבַּעְלָהּ אֵינוֹ רוֹצֶה לְהַשְׁקוֹתָהּ, וְשֶׁבַּעְלָהּ בָּא עָלֶיהָ בַּדֶּרֶךְ.
MISHNA: And these are women who, despite being married to priests, are prohibited from partaking of teruma due to suspicion of adultery: A woman who says to her husband: I am defiled to you, i.e., she admitted to having committed adultery with another man; and in a case where witnesses came forth and testified that she is defiled; and a woman who says after a warning and seclusion: I will not drink the bitter water of a sota; and in a case where her husband does not want to force her to drink the water even after she secluded herself with another man after his warning; and in a case where her husband engaged in sexual intercourse with her on the way to bringing her to the Temple to drink the bitter water, as in such a case the water will not be effective in evaluating whether she was unfaithful, due to the husband’s own prohibited act.
גְּמָ׳ אָמַר רַב עַמְרָם: הָא מִילְּתָא אֲמַר לַן רַב שֵׁשֶׁת, וְאַנְהַר לַן עַיְינִין מִמַּתְנִיתִין: סוֹטָה שֶׁיֵּשׁ לָהּ עֵדִים בִּמְדִינַת הַיָּם — אֵין הַמַּיִם בּוֹדְקִין אוֹתָהּ. מַאי טַעְמָא? דְּאָמַר קְרָא ״וְנִסְתְּרָה וְהִיא נִטְמָאָה וְעֵד אֵין בָּהּ״, דְּלֵיכָּא דְּיָדַע בָּהּ. לְאַפּוֹקֵי הָא, דְּהָא אִיכָּא דְּיָדַע בָּהּ.
GEMARA: Rav Amram says: Rav Sheshet told us this matter, and he enlightened our eyes for us by citing support for his statement from the mishna: In the case of a sota for whom there are witnesses concerning her in a country overseas, who can testify that she engaged in sexual intercourse, the bitter water of a sota does not evaluate whether or not she was unfaithful. Although she committed adultery, the water evaluates her fidelity only when there is no possibility of proving her guilt in court. What is the reason for this? It is as the verse states: “And a man lie with her carnally, and it was hidden from the eyes of her husband, and she was defiled secretly, and there was no witness against her” (Numbers 5:13). This indicates that the bitter water is given only when there is no one who knows about her action, to the exclusion of the case of this woman who is not given the bitter water, as there are those who know about her.
וְאַנְהַר לַן עַיְינִין מִמַּתְנִיתִין, דְּקָתָנֵי: וְשֶׁבָּאוּ לָהּ עֵדִים שֶׁהִיא טְמֵאָה. דַּאֲתוּ עֵדִים אֵימַת? אִי נֵימָא מִקַּמֵּי דְּתִשְׁתֵּי — זוֹנָה הִיא!
And Rav Sheshet enlightened our eyes for us by adducing support for his ruling from the mishna, as it teaches: And where witnesses came forth and testified that she is defiled, this is one of the women who can no longer partake of teruma, Rav Sheshet asks: This is a case where the witnesses came when? If we say that they came before she drank, then what is novel about the fact that it is prohibited for her to partake of teruma? She is a woman who had sexual relations with a man forbidden to her by the Torah [zona], as she is a confirmed adulteress, and it is obviously prohibited for her to partake of teruma.
אֶלָּא לְבָתַר דִּשְׁתַאי. אִי אָמְרַתְּ בִּשְׁלָמָא אֵין הַמַּיִם בּוֹדְקִין אוֹתָהּ — שַׁפִּיר. אֶלָּא אִי אָמְרַתְּ מַיִם בּוֹדְקִין אוֹתָהּ — תִּיגַּלֵּי מִילְּתָא לְמַפְרֵעַ דְּסָהֲדֵי שַׁקָּרֵי נִינְהוּ!
Rav Sheshet answers: Rather, it must be referring to a case where the witnesses testified after she already drank. Granted, if you say that the bitter water of a sota does not evaluate her in a case where there are witnesses elsewhere who can testify with regard to her infidelity, it is well. But if you say that the water evaluates her in a case where there are witnesses elsewhere who can testify with regard to her infidelity, then it should be revealed retroactively that they are false witnesses, as the fact that she survived the drinking of the bitter water would indicate that she never committed adultery.
אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַב יוֹסֵף: לְעוֹלָם אֵימָא לְךָ מַיִם בּוֹדְקִין אוֹתָהּ, וְהָא — אֵימוֹר זְכוּת תּוֹלָה לָהּ.
Rav Yosef said to Rav Sheshet: Actually, I will say to you that the bitter water evaluates her in a case where there are witnesses elsewhere who can testify with regard to her infidelity. Nevertheless, the fact that the woman survived the drinking of the water does not prove her innocence, and one can say that this woman who already drank had merit that delayed the punishment for her. According to some opinions, if an unfaithful woman has certain merits, she will not die immediately upon drinking the water. Therefore, if witnesses were to testify to her infidelity after she drank the water without dying, it is not clear that their testimony is false.
בְּמַאי קָמִיפַּלְגִי — בְּמִתְנַוְּונָה דְּרַבִּי. דִּתְנַן, רַבִּי אוֹמֵר: זְכוּת תּוֹלָה בַּמַּיִם הַמָּרִים, וְאֵינָהּ יוֹלֶדֶת וְאֵינָהּ מַשְׁבַּחַת, אֶלָּא מִתְנַוְּונָה וְהוֹלֶכֶת, לְסוֹף שֶׁהִיא מֵתָה בְּאוֹתָהּ מִיתָה.
The Gemara explains: With regard to what principle do Rav Sheshet and Rav Yosef disagree? With regard to whether she deteriorates [mitnavvena], as explained by Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, as we learned in a mishna (22a): Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: Merit delays punishment with regard to the bitter water of a sota. Even if a woman actually committed adultery, she will not die immediately due to the merit that she has. But she will not give birth, and she will not improve in terms of her physical condition after having drunk the bitter water. Rather, she will progressively deteriorate until she ultimately dies in the same manner of death as suffered by a sota who drank the bitter water without having merit.
רַב שֵׁשֶׁת סָבַר: בֵּין לְרַבִּי וּבֵין לְרַבָּנַן הָוְיָא מִתְנַוְּונָה. וְרַב יוֹסֵף סָבַר: לְרַבִּי הָוְיָא מִתְנַוְּונָה, לְרַבָּנַן לָא הָוְיָא מִתְנַוְּונָה.
Rav Sheshet holds: Both according to the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi and according to the opinion of the Rabbis, who disagree with him, she begins to deteriorate despite her merit. Therefore, if she doesn’t begin to deteriorate immediately, the witnesses who testified subsequent to her drinking must be false witnesses. And Rav Yosef holds: Only according to the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi is it so that she begins to deteriorate when she has merit. According to the opinion of the Rabbis, she does not begins to deteriorate. Therefore, Rav Yosef explains that the mere fact that she survived the drinking of the bitter water and didn’t begin deteriorating does not prove that the testimony was false.
מֵתִיב רַב שִׁימִי בַּר אָשֵׁי, רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן אוֹמֵר: אֵין זְכוּת תּוֹלָה בַּמַּיִם הַמָּרִים. וְאִם אַתָּה אוֹמֵר זְכוּת תּוֹלָה בַּמַּיִם הַמָּרִים — מְדַחֶה אַתָּה אֶת הַמַּיִם בִּפְנֵי כׇּל הַנָּשִׁים הַשּׁוֹתוֹת. וְאַתָּה מוֹצִיא שֵׁם רַע עַל הַטְּהוֹרוֹת שֶׁשָּׁתוּ, וְהֵן אוֹמְרִים: טְמֵאוֹת הָיוּ, אֶלָּא שֶׁתָּלָה לָהֶן זְכוּת.
Rav Shimi bar Ashi raises an objection from the aforementioned mishna (22a), which also teaches that Rabbi Shimon says: Merit does not delay punishment with regard to the bitter water of a sota, and if you say that merit delays punishment with regard to the bitter water, then you push aside the deterrent force of the bitter water before all the women who must drink it, as guilty women will rely on their merit to protect them from the immediate consequences. And furthermore, you defame the untainted women who drank and survived. People will not view this as proof of their innocence, and they will say: They are defiled, but their merit delayed the punishment for them.
וְאִם אִיתָא יֵשׁ לָהּ עֵדִים בִּמְדִינַת הַיָּם נָמֵי: אַתָּה מוֹצִיא שֵׁם רַע עַל הַטְּהוֹרוֹת שֶׁשָּׁתוּ, וְהֵן אוֹמְרִים: טְמֵאוֹת הָיוּ, אֶלָּא שֶׁיֵּשׁ לָהֶן עֵדִים בִּמְדִינַת הַיָּם!
After quoting the statement of Rabbi Shimon, Rav Shimi bar Ashi now explains his objection: And if it is so that the bitter water of a sota does not evaluate the faithfulness of a women about whom there are witnesses in a country overseas, then the same claim can be made as well: You defame the untainted women who drank and survived. People will not view this as proof of their innocence, and they will say: They are defiled, but there are witnesses about them in a country overseas.
לְרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן קָאָמְרַתְּ? לְרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן, מִדִּזְכוּת לָא תָּלְיָא — עֵדִים נָמֵי לָא תָּלוּ.
The Gemara responds: Do you say this according to the opinion of Rabbi Shimon? Indeed, according to Rabbi Shimon, from the same logic that merit does not delay punishment, witnesses in a country overseas do not delay it either, and Rav Sheshet would concede that his statement would not be accepted by Rabbi Shimon.
מֵתִיב רַב: וְאֵלּוּ שֶׁמִּנְחוֹתֵיהֶן נִשְׂרָפוֹת,
Rav raises an objection from the latter clause of the mishna there (22a), which teaches: And these are the sota women whose meal-offerings are burned and not offered on the altar:
הָאוֹמֶרֶת ״טְמֵאָה אֲנִי״, וְשֶׁבָּאוּ לָהּ עֵדִים שֶׁהִיא טְמֵאָה.
One who says: I am defiled, and witnesses came forth and testified with regard to her that she is defiled.
דַּאֲתוֹ עֵדִים אֵימַת? אִילֵּימָא מִקַּמֵּי דְּתִקְדּוֹשׁ — תִּיפּוֹק לְחוּלִּין.
Rav clarifies: In the case where witnesses came forth, when did they come forth? If we say that they came forth before the meal-offering was sanctified, as all meal-offerings become sanctified only when placed in the service vessels used in the Temple service, then the testimony should obviate the need for the sota rite, and the meal-offering should be transferred to non-sacred status, as any meal-offering that was found to be consecrated in error before it was sanctified in a service vessel reverts to non-sacred status. Therefore, Rav infers that the witnesses could not have testified before the offering’s sanctification, or the meal-offering would not be burned.
אֶלָּא לְבָתַר דִּקְדוּשׁ. אִי אָמְרַתְּ בִּשְׁלָמָא מַיִם בּוֹדְקִין אוֹתָהּ — אַלְמָא בַּת מִקְדָּשׁ וּמִקְרָב הִיא, וְכִי קְדוּשׁ מֵעִיקָּרָא — שַׁפִּיר קְדוּשׁ, וּמִשּׁוּם הָכִי מִנְחָתָהּ נִשְׂרֶפֶת.
Rav states his objection: Rather, the witnesses must have come forth after the meal-offering was sanctified. Granted, if you say the bitter water of a sota evaluates whether she was unfaithful in a case where there are witnesses to her infidelity, even if they have not testified, evidently the meal-offering is suitable to be sanctified and sacrificed; and when it was sanctified at the outset, although there were witnesses who could have testified, it was properly sanctified, and due to that reason her meal-offering is burned, because once an offering has been properly sanctified it cannot be transferred to non-sacred status.
אֶלָּא אִי אָמְרַתְּ אֵין הַמַּיִם בּוֹדְקִין אוֹתָהּ, תִּיגַּלֵּי מִילְּתָא לְמַפְרֵעַ דְּכִי קְדוּשׁ מֵעִיקָּרָא — בְּטָעוּת קְדוּשׁ, וְתִיפּוֹק לְחוּלִּין!
But if you say that the bitter water does not evaluate whether she was unfaithful so long as there are witnesses to her infidelity, then once the witnesses come forth, the matter should be revealed retroactively that when the meal-offering was sanctified at the outset, it was sanctified in error. And the meal-offering should therefore be transferred to non-sacred status, not burned.
אָמַר רַב יְהוּדָה מִדִּיסְקַרְתָּא: כְּגוֹן שֶׁזִּינְּתָה בָּעֲזָרָה, דְּכִי קְדוּשׁ מֵעִיקָּרָא — שַׁפִּיר קְדוּשׁ.
Rav Yehuda from Diskarta said, in response, that the mishna concerning meal-offerings is referring to a case where the woman committed adultery in the Temple courtyard after the meal-offering had been sanctified in a service vessel, as at the outset, when the meal-offering was sanctified due to the previous seclusion, it was properly sanctified, as the witnesses were to the infidelity that occurred in the Temple courtyard, not to infidelity during the seclusion.
מַתְקֵיף לַהּ רַב מְשַׁרְשְׁיָא: וַהֲלֹא פִּירְחֵי כְהוּנָּה מְלַוִּין אוֹתָהּ! שֶׁזִּינְּתָה מִפִּירְחֵי כְהוּנָּה עַצְמָן.
Rav Mesharshiyya objects to this explanation: But how can she commit adultery in the Temple courtyard? Don’t young priests [pirḥei kehunna] accompany her to the place where she drinks? The Gemara answers: This is a case where she committed adultery with the young priests themselves.
רַב אָשֵׁי אָמַר: כְּגוֹן שֶׁנִּצְרְכָה לִנְקָבֶיהָ, דְּאַטּוּ פִּירְחֵי כְהוּנָּה בְּכִיפָּה תָּלֵי לַהּ?
Rav Ashi said differently: It is a case where she needed to relieve herself and the accompanying young priest allowed her to go relieve herself in private, and she committed adultery there, for is that to say that the young priests hold her in a cell? Since there are times when she is out of their sight, there remains a possibility that she will commit adultery with others even when accompanied by the young priests.
רַב פָּפָּא אָמַר: לְעוֹלָם כִּדְאָמְרִינַן מֵעִיקָּרָא, וּדְקָאָמְרַתְּ תִּיפּוֹק לְחוּלִּין — מִדְּרַבָּנַן, גְּזֵירָה שֶׁמָּא יֹאמְרוּ: מוֹצִיאִין מִכְּלֵי שָׁרֵת לְחוֹל.
Rav Pappa said differently: Actually, the explanation is as we initially said, that the witnesses testify that she had been defiled during the initial seclusion for which she must drink, and not for adultery committed in the Temple courtyard. And that which you say, that if the bitter water does not evaluate a woman about whom there are witnesses concerning her infidelity, and therefore the offering was sanctified in error and it should be transferred to non-sacred status, you are correct that by Torah law it is non-sacred. However, it is considered sacred by rabbinic law, due to a rabbinic decree, lest people who do not know that the sanctification was done in error will mistakenly say: One can transfer a meal-offering to non-sacred status without it being redeemed even after it had been sanctified in a service vessel.
מֵתִיב רַב מָרִי: נִטְמֵאת מִנְחָתָהּ עַד שֶׁלֹּא קָדְשָׁה בִּכְלִי — הֲרֵי הִיא כְּכׇל הַמְּנָחוֹת, וְתִפָּדֶה. מִשֶּׁקָּדְשָׁה בִּכְלִי — הֲרֵי הִיא כְּכׇל הַמְּנָחוֹת, וְתִשָּׂרֵף.
Rav Mari raises an objection to Rav Pappa’s interpretation from a baraita in the Tosefta (2:4–6) that states: If the meal-offering of a sota became ritually impure, its status is determined by when it became impure. If it became impure before it was sanctified by being placed in a service vessel, it is like all other meal-offerings that became impure prior to sanctification, and it should be redeemed by a replacement offering brought in its stead. If it became impure after it had been sanctified by being placed in a service vessel, it is like all other meal-offerings that became impure after sanctification and must be burned.
קָדַשׁ הַקּוֹמֶץ, וְלֹא הִסְפִּיק לְהַקְרִיבוֹ עַד שֶׁמֵּת הוּא אוֹ עַד שֶׁמֵּתָה הִיא — הֲרֵי הִיא כְּכׇל הַמְּנָחוֹת, וְתִשָּׂרֵף.
The baraita continues: If, after the meal-offering was sanctified by being placed in a service vessel, the priest removed a handful from it to be sacrificed on the altar, and the handful was sanctified by being placed in its own service vessel, but the priest did not manage to sacrifice it before he, the husband, died, or before she, the wife, died, rendering the offering irrelevant, then it is like all other meal-offerings that are invalidated between the removal of the handful and its being sacrificed, and it must be burned.
קָרַב הַקּוֹמֶץ וְלֹא הִסְפִּיק לֶאֱכוֹל שִׁירַיִם עַד שֶׁמֵּת הוּא אוֹ עַד שֶׁמֵּתָה הִיא — הֲרֵי הִיא כְּכׇל הַמְּנָחוֹת, וְתֵאָכֵל. שֶׁעַל הַסָּפֵק בָּאת מִתְּחִילָּה, כִּיפְּרָה סְפֵיקָהּ וְהָלְכָה לָהּ.
The baraita continues: If the handful was sacrificed but the priest did not manage to eat the remainder of the meal-offering before the husband died, or before the wife died, it is like all other meal-offerings that become invalidated after the handful has been sacrificed, and it must be eaten by the priests. The baraita explains why, despite the death of the husband or wife, which renders this meal-offering irrelevant as the woman will not drink the bitter water, the meal-offering still is eaten: Because this meal-offering initially came due to an uncertainty as to whether the woman had been unfaithful, and it atoned for its uncertainty and left, i.e., it fulfilled its purpose of being sacrificed at the time when the husband and wife were still alive, it remains valid afterward as well.
בָּאוּ לָהּ עֵדִים שֶׁהִיא טְמֵאָה — מִנְחָתָהּ נִשְׂרֶפֶת. נִמְצְאוּ עֵדֶיהָ זוֹמְמִין — מִנְחָתָהּ חוּלִּין.
The baraita continues: If witnesses came forth before the handful was offered and testified with regard to her that she is defiled, her meal-offering is burned. If the witnesses who testified about her infidelity are later found to be conspiring, her meal-offering is transferred to non-sacred status. This final clause teaches that if the witnesses to the wife’s infidelity are found to be conspiring witnesses, then the meal-offering is transferred to non-sacred status even after it was already sanctified in a service vessel. This is difficult for Rav Pappa, for he said that in a similar case, where witnesses testified about her infidelity after the offering was sanctified, the Sages decreed that the offering should be burned, in order to prevent people from saying that a meal-offering that has been sanctified in a service vessel may be transferred afterward to non-sacred status.
עֵדִים זוֹמְמִין קָאָמְרַתְּ?! עֵדִים זוֹמְמִין קָלָא אִית לְהוּ.
The Gemara refutes this objection: Do you say that one can question Rav Pappa’s statement from a ruling concerning conspiring witnesses? The cases are not comparable, as conspiring witnesses generate publicity. Since the circumstances of these cases are well publicized, everyone knows that the offering was sanctified in error.
תַּנְיָא כְּווֹתֵיהּ דְּרַב שֵׁשֶׁת, וְלָאו מִטַּעְמֵיהּ.
After attempting to question Rav Sheshet’s novel ruling, that in the case of a sota with regard to whom there are witnesses in a country overseas who can testify that she engaged in sexual intercourse, the bitter water does not evaluate whether she was unfaithful, the Gemara attempts to adduce support for his ruling: It is taught in a baraita in accordance with the opinion of Rav Sheshet, but not due to his reasoning, rather based upon the explication of a verse.
״טְהוֹרָה״ — וְלֹא שֶׁיֵּשׁ לָהּ עֵדִים בִּמְדִינַת הַיָּם.
The baraita expounds several words in the verse concerning a sota who survives the drinking of the bitter water and is found to have been faithful: “And if the woman be not defiled, but be clean [utehora hee], then she shall be cleared and shall conceive seed” (Numbers 5:28). Noting that the phrase “but be clean,” is apparently redundant, the baraita explains: The usage of the word “clean [tehora]” in the verse indicates that only one who survived the drinking of the bitter water due to her fidelity will conceive a child, but this will not happen in a case where she did not die because there are witnesses for her in a country overseas who can testify that she engaged in sexual intercourse.
״וּטְהוֹרָה״ — וְלֹא שֶׁתָּלְתָה לָהּ זְכוּת.
Additionally, from the additional letter vav in the word “utehora,” meaning “but be clean,” another case is excluded. Only one who survived the drinking of the bitter water due to her fidelity will conceive a child, but this will not happen in a case where merit delays punishment for her, and she consequently doesn’t die immediately after drinking the bitter water.
״הִיא״ — וְלֹא שֶׁיִּשְׂאוּ וְיִתְּנוּ בָּהּ מוֹזְרוֹת בַּלְּבָנָה.
The baraita continues: The next word in the verse, “she [hee],” excludes a third case: But not where she, i.e., her infidelity, is discussed by weavers [mozerot] in the moonlight. Women would sit in groups while spinning thread in the moonlight and gossip about the goings-on in the city. If they discuss her having committed adultery, then it is considered public knowledge, and the bitter water would not evaluate her in that case, as evaluation is not needed.
וְרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן, נְהִי דְּוָיו לָא דָּרֵישׁ, וְהָא אִיכָּא
After citing this baraita as proof for the ruling of Rav Sheshet, albeit from a different source, the Gemara questions how Rabbi Shimon could deny the ability of the woman’s merit to delay the sota punishment due to fear that it will discredit the whole sota rite, being that there is another case that prevents the bitter water from evaluating a woman, i.e., where witnesses in a country overseas are able to testify. And Rabbi Shimon, granted that he does not interpret the letter vav, as he holds that its addition is not significant, and therefore he holds that her merit does not delay her punishment, but there is
