Masechet Zevachim
Masechet Zevachim is sponsored by Esther Kremer in loving memory of her father, Manny Gross on his third yahrzeit. “He exemplified a path of holiness and purity, living with kedushah in his everyday life.”
Want to dedicate learning? Get started here:
Summary
Seder Kodashim Kit – Order Form
If one takes an animal that was designated for a specific sacrificial purpose and slaughters it with the intention that it be used for a different type of offering (shelo lishma), the sacrifice is not invalidated. It must still be offered according to its original designation. However, it does not fulfill the obligation of the person who brought the sacrifice.
There are exceptions to this rule – cases in which slaughtering with the wrong intent completely disqualifies the offering. The Mishna records four differing opinions regarding these exceptions:
- Tana Kamma holds that a sin offering (chatat) and a Passover offering (korban Pesach) – when brought at the proper time (the afternoon of the 14th of Nissan, or possibly even the morning) – are disqualified if slaughtered with incorrect intent.
- Rabbi Eliezer adds the guilt offering (asham) to the list, arguing that it is similar in nature to the sin offering.
- Yosi ben Honi expands the rule further, stating that any sacrifice slaughtered with the mistaken intent that it be offered as a sin offering or a Passover offering on the 14th of Nissan is disqualified.
- Shimon, brother of Azaria, maintains that if a sacrifice is slaughtered with the intent that it be offered as a higher-level offering than originally designated, it remains valid. However, if the intent is to downgrade it to a lower-level offering, the sacrifice is disqualified. The Mishna provides examples of what constitutes higher and lower offerings.
The Gemara raises a question: Why does the Mishna use the word “ela” (“but”) instead of “ve” (“and”) in the phrase “but [a sacrifice slaughtered with the wrong intent] does not fulfill the owner’s obligation”? The answer given is that although the sacrifice does not fulfill the owner’s obligation, its original sanctity and designation remain intact. Therefore, the remaining sacrificial rites must be performed in accordance with its original purpose. This explanation aligns with a statement made by Rava, and two reasons are offered to support this ruling—one derived from a biblical verse, and the other based on logical reasoning.
A further question arises: If a sacrifice is slaughtered without any specific intent, is that considered “no intent” or does it count as “intent”? Rava infers from the Mishna that such a case is treated as if it were done with intent. However, he notes a contradiction with the laws of lishma regarding a get (divorce document), which must be written specifically for the woman being divorced. Why, then, is the law different in each case?
After addressing this question, the Gemara investigates the sources that underpin Rava’s apparent contradiction: first, that a sacrifice brought without specific intent is still valid; and second, that a get lacking explicit intent is invalid.
Today’s daily daf tools:
Masechet Zevachim
Masechet Zevachim is sponsored by Esther Kremer in loving memory of her father, Manny Gross on his third yahrzeit. “He exemplified a path of holiness and purity, living with kedushah in his everyday life.”
Today’s daf is sponsored by Judi Felber in loving memory of her mother, Yocheved bat Zvi and Sara, on her 4th yahrzeit.
Zevachim 2
מַתְנִי׳ כׇּל הַזְּבָחִים שֶׁנִּזְבְּחוּ שֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁמָן – כְּשֵׁרִים, אֶלָּא שֶׁלֹּא עָלוּ לַבְּעָלִים לְשֵׁם חוֹבָה; חוּץ מִן הַפֶּסַח וְהַחַטָּאת – הַפֶּסַח בִּזְמַנּוֹ, וְהַחַטָּאת בְּכׇל זְמַן.
MISHNA: All slaughtered offerings that were slaughtered not for their own sake, i.e., during the slaughtering the slaughterer’s intent was to sacrifice a different offering, are fit, and one may continue their sacrificial rites and partake of their meat where that applies. But these offerings did not satisfy the obligation of the owner, who is therefore required to bring another offering. This is the halakha with regard to all offerings except for the Paschal offering and the sin offering. In those cases, if the owner sacrificed them not for their own sake, they are unfit. But there is a difference between the two exceptions. The Paschal offering is unfit only when sacrificed not for its sake at its appointed time, on the fourteenth day of Nisan after noon, while the sin offering is unfit any time that it is sacrificed not for its sake.
רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר אוֹמֵר: אַף הָאָשָׁם – הַפֶּסַח בִּזְמַנּוֹ, וְהַחַטָּאת וְהָאָשָׁם בְּכׇל זְמַן. אָמַר רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר: הַחַטָּאת בָּאָה עַל חֵטְא, וְהָאָשָׁם בָּא עַל חֵטְא; מָה חַטָּאת – פְּסוּלָה שֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁמָהּ, אַף הָאָשָׁם – פָּסוּל שֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁמוֹ.
Rabbi Eliezer says: The guilt offering too is unfit when sacrificed not for its sake. According to his opinion, the correct reading of the mishna is: The Paschal offering is unfit only at its appointed time, while the sin offering and the guilt offering are unfit at all times. Rabbi Eliezer said in explanation: The sin offering is brought for performance of a transgression and the guilt offering is brought for performance of a transgression. Just as a sin offering is unfit when sacrificed not for its sake, so too, the guilt offering is unfit when sacrificed not for its sake.
יוֹסֵי בֶּן חוֹנִי אוֹמֵר: הַנִּשְׁחָטִין לְשֵׁם פֶּסַח וּלְשֵׁם חַטָּאת – פְּסוּלִין.
Yosei ben Ḥoni says: Not only are the Paschal offering and the sin offering unfit when slaughtered not for their sake, but also other offerings that are slaughtered for the sake of a Paschal offering and for the sake of a sin offering are unfit.
שִׁמְעוֹן אֲחִי עֲזַרְיָה אוֹמֵר: שְׁחָטָן לְשֵׁם גָּבוֹהַּ מֵהֶן – כְּשֵׁרִין, לְשֵׁם נָמוּךְ מֵהֶן – פְּסוּלִין.
Shimon, brother of Azarya, says that this is the distinction: With regard to all offerings, if one slaughtered them for the sake of an offering whose level of sanctity is greater than theirs, they are fit; if one slaughtered them for the sake of an offering whose level of sanctity is less than theirs, they are unfit.
כֵּיצַד? קָדְשֵׁי קָדָשִׁים שֶׁשְּׁחָטָן לְשֵׁם קֳדָשִׁים קַלִּים – פְּסוּלִין, קֳדָשִׁים קַלִּים שֶׁשְּׁחָטָן לְשֵׁם קׇדְשֵׁי קֳדָשִׁים – כְּשֵׁרִין. הַבְּכוֹר וְהַמַּעֲשֵׂר שֶׁשְּׁחָטָן לְשֵׁם שְׁלָמִים – כְּשֵׁרִין, שְׁלָמִים שֶׁשְּׁחָטָן לְשֵׁם בְּכוֹר וּלְשֵׁם מַעֲשֵׂר – פְּסוּלִין.
How so? Offerings of the most sacred order, e.g., sin offerings and burnt offerings, that one slaughtered for the sake of offerings of lesser sanctity, e.g., peace offerings, are unfit. Offerings of lesser sanctity that one slaughtered for the sake of offerings of the most sacred order are fit. Likewise, there is a distinction between different offerings of lesser sanctity. The firstborn animal and the animal tithe that one slaughtered for the sake of a peace offering are fit, as the sanctity of peace offerings is greater. Peace offerings that one slaughtered for the sake of a firstborn animal or for the sake of an animal tithe are unfit.
גְּמָ׳ לְמָה לִי לְמִיתְנָא ״אֶלָּא שֶׁלֹּא עָלוּ״? לִיתְנֵי ״וְלֹא עָלוּ לַבְּעָלִים לְשֵׁם חוֹבָה״!
GEMARA: The mishna teaches: All slaughtered offerings that were slaughtered not for their sake are fit, but they did not satisfy the obligation of the owner. The Gemara asks: Why do I need the mishna to teach this halakha using the language: But they did not [ella shelo] satisfy the obligation of the owner? Let it teach simply: And they did not [velo] satisfy the obligation of the owner. What does the word: But [ella], add?
הָא קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן: לַבְּעָלִים הוּא דְּלָא עָלוּ לְשֵׁם חוֹבָה – אֲבָל בִּקְדוּשְׁתַּיְיהוּ קָיְימִי, וְאָסוּר לְשַׁנּוֹיֵי בְּהוּ.
The Gemara responds: By adding this word, the mishna teaches us that the only deficiency with regard to these offerings is that they did not satisfy the obligation of the owner, but they retain their sanctity, and it is still prohibited to deviate from the protocol of their sacrificial process, i.e., the remaining rites must be performed with proper intent.
וְכִדְרָבָא, דְּאָמַר רָבָא: עוֹלָה שֶׁשְּׁחָטָהּ שֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁמָהּ – אָסוּר לִזְרוֹק דָּמָהּ שֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁמָהּ.
And this halakha is in accordance with the statement of Rava, as Rava says: With regard to a burnt offering that one slaughtered not for its sake, it is still prohibited to sprinkle its blood on the altar not for its sake.
אִיבָּעֵית אֵימָא סְבָרָא, אִיבָּעֵית אֵימָא קְרָא. אִיבָּעֵית אֵימָא סְבָרָא: מִשּׁוּם דְּשַׁנִּי בַּהּ – כָּל הָנֵי לִישַׁנֵּי בַּהּ וְלֵיזִיל?!
The Gemara adds: If you wish, propose a logical argument to support this statement, and if you wish, cite a verse as proof. The Gemara elaborates: If you wish, propose a logical argument: Just because one deviated from protocol in its sacrifice once, i.e., in its slaughter, could it be that he should continue to deviate from protocol in all the rest of the sacrificial rites? One deviation does not justify additional deviations.
אִיבָּעֵית אֵימָא קְרָא: ״מוֹצָא שְׂפָתֶיךָ תִּשְׁמֹר וְעָשִׂיתָ, כַּאֲשֶׁר נָדַרְתָּ לַה׳ אֱלֹהֶיךָ נְדָבָה וְגוֹ׳״ – הַאי נְדָבָה?!
And if you wish, cite a verse: “That which has gone out of your lips you shall observe and do; according to what you have vowed [nadarta] freely [nedava] to the Lord your God, even that which you have promised with your mouth” (Deuteronomy 23:24). The Gemara interprets the words nadarta and nedava exegetically: Can this verse be referring to a gift offering [nedava]?
נֶדֶר הוּא! אֶלָּא אִם כְּמָה שֶׁנָּדַרְתָּ עָשִׂיתָ – יְהֵא נֶדֶר, וְאִם לֹא – נְדָבָה יְהֵא;
It is already referred to as a vow offering [neder]. Rather, the verse indicates that if you did what you vowed to do, i.e., you sacrificed your vow offering properly, it shall be a satisfactory vow offering; and if you did not sacrifice it properly, it shall be rendered a voluntary gift offering unrelated to the vow, and shall not satisfy the obligation of your vow.
וּנְדָבָה מִי שְׁרֵי לְשַׁנּוֹיֵי בַּהּ?
The Gemara concludes: And is it permitted to deviate from protocol in the sacrifice of a gift offering ab initio? Clearly it is not. Evidently, even if one of the sacrificial rites was performed for the sake of sacrificing a different offering, it is still prohibited to perform any of the other sacrificial rites in the incorrect manner.
אֲמַר לֵיהּ רָבִינָא לָרַב פָּפָּא: לָא הֲוֵית גַּבַּן בְּאוּרְתָּא בִּתְחוּמָא בֵּי חַרְמָךְ – דְּרָמֵי רָבָא מִילֵּי מְעַלְּיָיתָא אַהֲדָדֵי, וְשַׁנִּי לְהוּ.
§ Ravina said to Rav Pappa: Since you were not with us last night within the Shabbat limit of Bei Ḥarmakh, you did not hear that Rava raises a contradiction between two superior mishnaic statements and teaches their resolution.
מַאי מִילֵּי מְעַלְּיָיתָא? תְּנַן: כׇּל הַזְּבָחִים שֶׁנִּזְבְּחוּ שֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁמָן כּוּ׳. טַעְמָא דְּשֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁמָן; הָא סְתָמָא – עָלוּ נָמֵי לַבְּעָלִים לְשֵׁם חוֹבָה; אַלְמָא סְתָמָא נָמֵי כְּלִשְׁמָן דָּמֵי.
What are these superior statements? We learned in the mishna: All slaughtered offerings that were slaughtered not for their sake are fit, but they did not satisfy the obligation of the owner. Rava infers: The reason they do not satisfy the obligation of the owner is specifically that they were slaughtered not for their sake. But if offerings were slaughtered without specification of intent, they, as well, satisfied the obligation of the owner. Apparently, if one performs any action without specification of intent, it is also considered as if he performed it expressly for its sake.
וּרְמִינְהִי: כׇּל הַגֵּט שֶׁנִּכְתַּב שֶׁלֹּא לְשֵׁם אִשָּׁה – פָּסוּל. וּסְתָמָא נָמֵי פָּסוּל!
And Rava raises a contradiction from another mishna (Gittin 24a): Any bill of divorce that was written not for the sake of the woman in question is not valid. And it is derived from the continuation of that mishna that if a bill of divorce was written without specification as to which woman it is referring, it is also not valid.
וְשַׁנִּי: זְבָחִים – בִּסְתָם לִשְׁמָן עוֹמְדִין, אִשָּׁה – בִּסְתָמָא לָאו לְגֵירוּשִׁין עוֹמֶדֶת.
And Rava resolves the contradiction: Ordinary slaughtered offerings stand designated for their own sake. From the time that the offering is consecrated, its presumed end is that it will be slaughtered for the type of offering for which is was consecrated. Therefore, even if the one slaughtering it has no particular intention, it is in effect considered slaughtered for its own sake. By contrast, an ordinary wife does not stand designated for divorce. Therefore, a bill of divorce is never presumed to be referring to a given woman unless it is specified explicitly.
וּזְבָחִים בִּסְתָמָא כְּשֵׁירִין מְנָלַן? אִילֵּימָא מֵהָא דִּתְנַן: כׇּל הַזְּבָחִים שֶׁנִּזְבְּחוּ שֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁמָן כּוּ׳ – וְלָא קָתָנֵי ״שֶׁלֹּא נִזְבְּחוּ לִשְׁמָן״; גַּבֵּי גֵּט נָמֵי, הָקָתָנֵי: כׇּל הַגֵּט שֶׁנִּכְתַּב שֶׁלֹּא לְשֵׁם אִשָּׁה פָּסוּל – וְלָא קָתָנֵי ״שֶׁלֹּא נִכְתַּב לְשֵׁם אִשָּׁה פָּסוּל״!
§ The Gemara asks: And from where do we derive that slaughtered offerings are fit and even satisfy the obligation of the owner if slaughtered without specification? If we say it is from that which we learned in the mishna: All slaughtered offerings that were slaughtered not for their sake are fit, but these offerings did not satisfy the obligation of the owner, and it does not teach this using the language: All slaughtered offerings that were not slaughtered for their sake are fit, but these offerings did not satisfy the obligation of the owner, this cannot be. One cannot infer from this language that slaughter without specification is valid, since the Mishna also teaches with regard to a bill of divorce: Any bill of divorce that was written not for the sake of the woman is not valid, and it does not teach: That was not written for the sake of the woman is not valid, and it is a given that a bill of divorce written without specification is not valid.
אֶלָּא מֵהָא דִּתְנַן: כֵּיצַד לִשְׁמָן וְשֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁמָן? לְשֵׁם פֶּסַח וּלְשֵׁם שְׁלָמִים. טַעְמָא דְּאָמַר לְשֵׁם פֶּסַח וּלְשֵׁם שְׁלָמִים, הָא לְשֵׁם פֶּסַח וּסְתָמָא – כָּשֵׁר; אַלְמָא סְתָמָן כְּלִשְׁמָן דְּמֵי.
Rather, perhaps it is derived from that which we learned in a mishna (13a): How are offerings slaughtered for their sake and then not for their sake? For example, one might slaughter the Paschal offering for the sake of a Paschal offering and then for the sake of a peace offering. The Gemara infers: The reason such an offering is unfit is that he says that he is slaughtering it for the sake of a Paschal offering and then he says that he is slaughtering it for the sake of a peace offering. But if he says that he is slaughtering it for the sake of a Paschal offering, and then slaughters it without specification, it is fit. Apparently, slaughtering an offering without specification is considered as if one slaughtered it for its sake.
דִּילְמָא שָׁאנֵי הָתָם, דְּאָמַר: כׇּל הָעוֹשֶׂה – עַל דַּעַת רִאשׁוֹנָה הוּא עוֹשֶׂה!
The Gemara responds: Perhaps there it is different, as the mishna is saying that anyone who performs an action performs it with his original intent in mind. Therefore, since he specified initially that he was slaughtering the offering for the sake of a Paschal offering, there are no grounds to assume that he then changed his mind. Here, by contrast, he pronounced no initial statement of proper intent.
אֶלָּא מִסֵּיפָא: שֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁמָן וְלִשְׁמָן – לְשֵׁם שְׁלָמִים וּלְשֵׁם פֶּסַח. טַעְמָא דְּאָמַר לְשֵׁם שְׁלָמִים וּלְשֵׁם פֶּסַח, הָא סְתָמָא וּלְשֵׁם פֶּסַח – כָּשֵׁר.
Rather, perhaps this halakha is derived from the latter clause of that mishna: How are offerings slaughtered not for their sake and then for their sake? For example, one might slaughter the Paschal offering for the sake of a peace offering and then for the sake of a Paschal offering. The Gemara infers: The reason it is unfit is that he says he is slaughtering it for the sake of a peace offering and then he says he is slaughtering it for the sake of a Paschal offering. But if he started slaughtering it without specification and then slaughtered it for the sake of a Paschal offering, it is fit. Apparently, if one slaughters an offering without specification it still satisfies the obligation of the owner.
דִּילְמָא שָׁאנֵי הָתָם, דְּאָמַר: יוֹכִיחַ סוֹפוֹ עַל תְּחִילָּתוֹ!
The Gemara responds: Perhaps there it is different, as the mishna is saying that his ultimate intent proves the nature of his original intent. Since his ultimate intent was to sacrifice a Paschal offering, that was presumably his original intent as well. Here, by contrast, there is no ultimate expression of proper intent.
אִי נָמֵי, אַיְּידֵי דִּתְנָא ״לִשְׁמָן וְשֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁמָן״, תְּנָא נָמֵי ״שֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁמָן וְלִשְׁמָן״!
Alternatively, it can be explained that even if one’s ultimate intent is not considered proof of his original intent, the mishna still uses the same term in both clauses to preserve symmetry. Since in the former clause the tanna taught using the language: For their sake and then not for their sake, teaching that original intent is considered proof of ultimate intent, the tanna also taught the second clause using the language: Not for their sake and then for their sake. In any event, there is no proof from that mishna that an offering slaughtered without specification satisfies its owner’s obligation.
אֶלָּא מֵהָא: לְשֵׁם שִׁשָּׁה דְּבָרִים הַזֶּבַח נִזְבָּח – לְשֵׁם זֶבַח, לְשֵׁם זוֹבֵחַ, לְשֵׁם שֵׁם, לְשֵׁם אִשִּׁים, לְשֵׁם רֵיחַ, לְשֵׁם נִיחוֹחַ. וְהַחַטָּאת וְאָשָׁם – לְשֵׁם חֵטְא.
Rather, perhaps this halakha is derived from that mishna (46b), which states: The offering is slaughtered for the sake of six matters: For the sake of the particular offering; for the sake of the one sacrificing the offering, i.e., the owner; for the sake of God; for the sake of consumption by the fires of the altar; for the sake of sacrificing it in a manner that gives an aroma; and for the sake of pleasing God. And the sin offering and a guilt offering are slaughtered for the sake of atonement for the sin.
אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹסֵי: אַף מִי שֶׁלֹּא הָיָה בְּלִבּוֹ לְשֵׁם אַחַת מִכׇּל אֵלּוּ – כָּשֵׁר, שֶׁתְּנַאי בֵּית דִּין הוּא. אַתְנוֹ בֵּית דִּין דְּלָא לֵימָא ״לִשְׁמוֹ״, דִּילְמָא אָתֵי לְמֵימַר ״שֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁמוֹ״.
The mishna on 46b continues: Rabbi Yosei said: Even in the case of one who did not have in mind to slaughter the offering for the sake of any one of these, the offering is fit, since this is a stipulation of the court. The Gemara explains Rabbi Yosei’s opinion: The court stipulated that one should not say that he is slaughtering the offering for its sake, lest he come to say that he is slaughtering it not for its sake. Therefore one should not specify his intent at all.
וְאִי סָלְקָא דַעְתָּךְ סְתָמָא פָּסוּל, קָיְימִי בֵּית דִּין וּמַתְנִי מִילְּתָא דְּמִיפְּסִיל בֵּיהּ?!
The Gemara infers: And if it enters your mind that if one slaughters an offering without specification it is unfit, would the court arise and stipulate a matter that disqualifies the offering? Clearly, an offering slaughtered without specification is fit and satisfies the obligation of the owner.
וְגַבֵּי גֵּט דִּסְתָמָא פָּסוּל – מְנָלַן?
§ The Gemara asks: And with regard to a bill of divorce, from where do we derive that if it is written without specification as to which woman it is referring, it is not valid?
אִילֵּימָא מֵהָא דִּתְנַן: הָיָה עוֹבֵר בַּשּׁוּק, וְשָׁמַע סוֹפְרִים מַקְרִין: ״אִישׁ פְּלוֹנִי גֵּירַשׁ פְּלוֹנִית מִמָּקוֹם פְּלוֹנִי״, וְאָמַר: ״זֶה שְׁמִי וְזֶה שֵׁם אִשְׁתִּי״ – פָּסוּל לְגָרֵשׁ בּוֹ.
If we say it is inferred from that which we learned in a mishna (Gittin 24a): In the case of a man who was passing through the marketplace, and he heard scribes who write bills of divorce dictating to their students: The man so-and-so divorces so-and-so from the place of such and such, and the man said: This is my name and that is the name of my wife, and he desires to use this bill for his divorce, this bill is unfit to divorce his wife with it, that is not a proof.
דִּילְמָא כִּדְרַב פָּפָּא – דְּאָמַר רַב פָּפָּא: הָכָא בְּסוֹפְרִים הָעֲשׂוּיִין לְהִתְלַמֵּד עָסְקִינַן; וְלָא אִיכְּתוּב לְשׁוּם כְּרִיתוּת כְּלָל!
It can be explained: Perhaps the mishna is in accordance with the explanation of Rav Pappa. As Rav Pappa says: Here we are dealing with scribes who are wont to practice writing bills of divorce; and this bill of divorce is a draft and was not written for the sake of severance, i.e., divorce, at all. But if a bill of divorce is written to be used for divorce, perhaps it is fit even if written without specifying the woman in question.
אֶלָּא מֵהָא:
Rather, derive this halakha from the subsequent clause in that mishna:
Today’s daily daf tools:
Delve Deeper
Broaden your understanding of the topics on this daf with classes and podcasts from top women Talmud scholars.
New to Talmud?
Check out our resources designed to help you navigate a page of Talmud – and study at the pace, level and style that fits you.
The Hadran Women’s Tapestry
Meet the diverse women learning Gemara at Hadran and hear their stories.
I am a Reform rabbi and took Talmud courses in rabbinical school, but I knew there was so much more to learn. It felt inauthentic to serve as a rabbi without having read the entire Talmud, so when the opportunity arose to start Daf Yomi in 2020, I dove in! Thanks to Hadran, Daf Yomi has enriched my understanding of rabbinic Judaism and deepened my love of Jewish text & tradition. Todah rabbah!
California, United States
I learned Mishnayot more than twenty years ago and started with Gemara much later in life. Although I never managed to learn Daf Yomi consistently, I am learning since some years Gemara in depth and with much joy. Since last year I am studying at the International Halakha Scholars Program at the WIHL. I often listen to Rabbanit Farbers Gemara shiurim to understand better a specific sugyiah. I am grateful for the help and inspiration!
Berlin, Germany
Inspired by Hadran’s first Siyum ha Shas L’Nashim two years ago, I began daf yomi right after for the next cycle. As to this extraordinary journey together with Hadran..as TS Eliot wrote “We must not cease from exploration and the end of all our exploring will be to arrive where we began and to know the place for the first time.
Jerusalem, Israel
When I began the previous cycle, I promised myself that if I stuck with it, I would reward myself with a trip to Israel. Little did I know that the trip would involve attending the first ever women’s siyum and being inspired by so many learners. I am now over 2 years into my second cycle and being part of this large, diverse, fascinating learning family has enhanced my learning exponentially.
Minnesota, United States
After all the hype on the 2020 siyum I became inspired by a friend to begin learning as the new cycle began.with no background in studying Talmud it was a bit daunting in the beginning. my husband began at the same time so we decided to study on shabbat together. The reaction from my 3 daughters has been fantastic. They are very proud. It’s been a great challenge for my brain which is so healthy!
Modi’in, Israel
What a great experience to learn with Rabbanit Michelle Farber. I began with this cycle in January 2020 and have been comforted by the consistency and energy of this process throughout the isolation period of Covid. Week by week, I feel like I am exploring a treasure chest with sparkling gems and puzzling antiquities. The hunt is exhilarating.
Pennsylvania, United States
In January 2020 on a Shabbaton to Baltimore I heard about the new cycle of Daf Yomi after the siyum celebration in NYC stadium. I started to read “ a daily dose of Talmud “ and really enjoyed it . It led me to google “ do Orthodox women study Talmud? “ and found HADRAN! Since then I listen to the podcast every morning, participate in classes and siyum. I love to learn, this is amazing! Thank you
Atlanta, United States
Raanana, Israel
As Jewish educator and as a woman, I’m mindful that Talmud has been kept from women for many centuries. Now that we are privileged to learn, and learning is so accessible, it’s my intent to complete Daf Yomi. I am so excited to keep learning with my Hadran community.
Denver, United States
When I started studying Hebrew at Brown University’s Hillel, I had no idea that almost 38 years later, I’m doing Daf Yomi. My Shabbat haburah is led by Rabbanit Leah Sarna. The women are a hoot. I’m tracking the completion of each tractate by reading Ilana Kurshan’s memoir, If All the Seas Were Ink.
Pennsylvania, United States
Minnesota, United States
Philadelphia, United States
In early 2020, I began the process of a stem cell transplant. The required extreme isolation forced me to leave work and normal life but gave me time to delve into Jewish text study. I did not feel isolated. I began Daf Yomi at the start of this cycle, with family members joining me online from my hospital room. I’ve used my newly granted time to to engage, grow and connect through this learning.
Worcester, United States
I never thought I’d be able to do Daf Yomi till I saw the video of Hadran’s Siyum HaShas. Now, 2 years later, I’m about to participate in Siyum Seder Mo’ed with my Hadran community. It has been an incredible privilege to learn with Rabbanit Michelle and to get to know so many caring, talented and knowledgeable women. I look forward with great anticipation and excitement to learning Seder Nashim.
Karmiel, Israel
Last cycle, I listened to parts of various מסכתות. When the הדרן סיום was advertised, I listened to Michelle on נידה. I knew that בע”ה with the next cycle I was in (ב”נ). As I entered the סיום (early), I saw the signs and was overcome with emotion. I was randomly seated in the front row, and I cried many times that night. My choice to learn דף יומי was affirmed. It is one of the best I have made!
אפרת, Israel
I started at the beginning of this cycle. No 1 reason, but here’s 5.
In 2019 I read about the upcoming siyum hashas.
There was a sermon at shul about how anyone can learn Talmud.
Talmud references come up when I am studying. I wanted to know more.
Yentl was on telly. Not a great movie but it’s about studying Talmud.
I went to the Hadran website: A new cycle is starting. I’m gonna do this
Cambridge, United Kingdom
I started learning at the start of this cycle, and quickly fell in love. It has become such an important part of my day, enriching every part of my life.
Toronto, Canada
Studying has changed my life view on הלכה and יהדות and time. It has taught me bonudaries of the human nature and honesty of our sages in their discourse to try and build a nation of caring people .
Kfar Saba, Israel
I’ve been learning since January 2020, and in June I started drawing a phrase from each daf. Sometimes it’s easy (e.g. plants), sometimes it’s very hard (e.g. korbanot), and sometimes it’s loads of fun (e.g. bird racing) to find something to draw. I upload my pictures from each masechet to #DafYomiArt. I am enjoying every step of the journey.
Ashdod, Israel
In January 2020, my teaching partner at IDC suggested we do daf yomi. Thanks to her challenge, I started learning daily from Rabbanit Michelle. It’s a joy to be part of the Hadran community. (It’s also a tikkun: in 7th grade, my best friend and I tied for first place in a citywide gemara exam, but we weren’t invited to the celebration because girls weren’t supposed to be learning gemara).
Jerusalem, Israel
Zevachim 2
מַתְנִי׳ כׇּל הַזְּבָחִים שֶׁנִּזְבְּחוּ שֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁמָן – כְּשֵׁרִים, אֶלָּא שֶׁלֹּא עָלוּ לַבְּעָלִים לְשֵׁם חוֹבָה; חוּץ מִן הַפֶּסַח וְהַחַטָּאת – הַפֶּסַח בִּזְמַנּוֹ, וְהַחַטָּאת בְּכׇל זְמַן.
MISHNA: All slaughtered offerings that were slaughtered not for their own sake, i.e., during the slaughtering the slaughterer’s intent was to sacrifice a different offering, are fit, and one may continue their sacrificial rites and partake of their meat where that applies. But these offerings did not satisfy the obligation of the owner, who is therefore required to bring another offering. This is the halakha with regard to all offerings except for the Paschal offering and the sin offering. In those cases, if the owner sacrificed them not for their own sake, they are unfit. But there is a difference between the two exceptions. The Paschal offering is unfit only when sacrificed not for its sake at its appointed time, on the fourteenth day of Nisan after noon, while the sin offering is unfit any time that it is sacrificed not for its sake.
רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר אוֹמֵר: אַף הָאָשָׁם – הַפֶּסַח בִּזְמַנּוֹ, וְהַחַטָּאת וְהָאָשָׁם בְּכׇל זְמַן. אָמַר רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר: הַחַטָּאת בָּאָה עַל חֵטְא, וְהָאָשָׁם בָּא עַל חֵטְא; מָה חַטָּאת – פְּסוּלָה שֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁמָהּ, אַף הָאָשָׁם – פָּסוּל שֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁמוֹ.
Rabbi Eliezer says: The guilt offering too is unfit when sacrificed not for its sake. According to his opinion, the correct reading of the mishna is: The Paschal offering is unfit only at its appointed time, while the sin offering and the guilt offering are unfit at all times. Rabbi Eliezer said in explanation: The sin offering is brought for performance of a transgression and the guilt offering is brought for performance of a transgression. Just as a sin offering is unfit when sacrificed not for its sake, so too, the guilt offering is unfit when sacrificed not for its sake.
יוֹסֵי בֶּן חוֹנִי אוֹמֵר: הַנִּשְׁחָטִין לְשֵׁם פֶּסַח וּלְשֵׁם חַטָּאת – פְּסוּלִין.
Yosei ben Ḥoni says: Not only are the Paschal offering and the sin offering unfit when slaughtered not for their sake, but also other offerings that are slaughtered for the sake of a Paschal offering and for the sake of a sin offering are unfit.
שִׁמְעוֹן אֲחִי עֲזַרְיָה אוֹמֵר: שְׁחָטָן לְשֵׁם גָּבוֹהַּ מֵהֶן – כְּשֵׁרִין, לְשֵׁם נָמוּךְ מֵהֶן – פְּסוּלִין.
Shimon, brother of Azarya, says that this is the distinction: With regard to all offerings, if one slaughtered them for the sake of an offering whose level of sanctity is greater than theirs, they are fit; if one slaughtered them for the sake of an offering whose level of sanctity is less than theirs, they are unfit.
כֵּיצַד? קָדְשֵׁי קָדָשִׁים שֶׁשְּׁחָטָן לְשֵׁם קֳדָשִׁים קַלִּים – פְּסוּלִין, קֳדָשִׁים קַלִּים שֶׁשְּׁחָטָן לְשֵׁם קׇדְשֵׁי קֳדָשִׁים – כְּשֵׁרִין. הַבְּכוֹר וְהַמַּעֲשֵׂר שֶׁשְּׁחָטָן לְשֵׁם שְׁלָמִים – כְּשֵׁרִין, שְׁלָמִים שֶׁשְּׁחָטָן לְשֵׁם בְּכוֹר וּלְשֵׁם מַעֲשֵׂר – פְּסוּלִין.
How so? Offerings of the most sacred order, e.g., sin offerings and burnt offerings, that one slaughtered for the sake of offerings of lesser sanctity, e.g., peace offerings, are unfit. Offerings of lesser sanctity that one slaughtered for the sake of offerings of the most sacred order are fit. Likewise, there is a distinction between different offerings of lesser sanctity. The firstborn animal and the animal tithe that one slaughtered for the sake of a peace offering are fit, as the sanctity of peace offerings is greater. Peace offerings that one slaughtered for the sake of a firstborn animal or for the sake of an animal tithe are unfit.
גְּמָ׳ לְמָה לִי לְמִיתְנָא ״אֶלָּא שֶׁלֹּא עָלוּ״? לִיתְנֵי ״וְלֹא עָלוּ לַבְּעָלִים לְשֵׁם חוֹבָה״!
GEMARA: The mishna teaches: All slaughtered offerings that were slaughtered not for their sake are fit, but they did not satisfy the obligation of the owner. The Gemara asks: Why do I need the mishna to teach this halakha using the language: But they did not [ella shelo] satisfy the obligation of the owner? Let it teach simply: And they did not [velo] satisfy the obligation of the owner. What does the word: But [ella], add?
הָא קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן: לַבְּעָלִים הוּא דְּלָא עָלוּ לְשֵׁם חוֹבָה – אֲבָל בִּקְדוּשְׁתַּיְיהוּ קָיְימִי, וְאָסוּר לְשַׁנּוֹיֵי בְּהוּ.
The Gemara responds: By adding this word, the mishna teaches us that the only deficiency with regard to these offerings is that they did not satisfy the obligation of the owner, but they retain their sanctity, and it is still prohibited to deviate from the protocol of their sacrificial process, i.e., the remaining rites must be performed with proper intent.
וְכִדְרָבָא, דְּאָמַר רָבָא: עוֹלָה שֶׁשְּׁחָטָהּ שֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁמָהּ – אָסוּר לִזְרוֹק דָּמָהּ שֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁמָהּ.
And this halakha is in accordance with the statement of Rava, as Rava says: With regard to a burnt offering that one slaughtered not for its sake, it is still prohibited to sprinkle its blood on the altar not for its sake.
אִיבָּעֵית אֵימָא סְבָרָא, אִיבָּעֵית אֵימָא קְרָא. אִיבָּעֵית אֵימָא סְבָרָא: מִשּׁוּם דְּשַׁנִּי בַּהּ – כָּל הָנֵי לִישַׁנֵּי בַּהּ וְלֵיזִיל?!
The Gemara adds: If you wish, propose a logical argument to support this statement, and if you wish, cite a verse as proof. The Gemara elaborates: If you wish, propose a logical argument: Just because one deviated from protocol in its sacrifice once, i.e., in its slaughter, could it be that he should continue to deviate from protocol in all the rest of the sacrificial rites? One deviation does not justify additional deviations.
אִיבָּעֵית אֵימָא קְרָא: ״מוֹצָא שְׂפָתֶיךָ תִּשְׁמֹר וְעָשִׂיתָ, כַּאֲשֶׁר נָדַרְתָּ לַה׳ אֱלֹהֶיךָ נְדָבָה וְגוֹ׳״ – הַאי נְדָבָה?!
And if you wish, cite a verse: “That which has gone out of your lips you shall observe and do; according to what you have vowed [nadarta] freely [nedava] to the Lord your God, even that which you have promised with your mouth” (Deuteronomy 23:24). The Gemara interprets the words nadarta and nedava exegetically: Can this verse be referring to a gift offering [nedava]?
נֶדֶר הוּא! אֶלָּא אִם כְּמָה שֶׁנָּדַרְתָּ עָשִׂיתָ – יְהֵא נֶדֶר, וְאִם לֹא – נְדָבָה יְהֵא;
It is already referred to as a vow offering [neder]. Rather, the verse indicates that if you did what you vowed to do, i.e., you sacrificed your vow offering properly, it shall be a satisfactory vow offering; and if you did not sacrifice it properly, it shall be rendered a voluntary gift offering unrelated to the vow, and shall not satisfy the obligation of your vow.
וּנְדָבָה מִי שְׁרֵי לְשַׁנּוֹיֵי בַּהּ?
The Gemara concludes: And is it permitted to deviate from protocol in the sacrifice of a gift offering ab initio? Clearly it is not. Evidently, even if one of the sacrificial rites was performed for the sake of sacrificing a different offering, it is still prohibited to perform any of the other sacrificial rites in the incorrect manner.
אֲמַר לֵיהּ רָבִינָא לָרַב פָּפָּא: לָא הֲוֵית גַּבַּן בְּאוּרְתָּא בִּתְחוּמָא בֵּי חַרְמָךְ – דְּרָמֵי רָבָא מִילֵּי מְעַלְּיָיתָא אַהֲדָדֵי, וְשַׁנִּי לְהוּ.
§ Ravina said to Rav Pappa: Since you were not with us last night within the Shabbat limit of Bei Ḥarmakh, you did not hear that Rava raises a contradiction between two superior mishnaic statements and teaches their resolution.
מַאי מִילֵּי מְעַלְּיָיתָא? תְּנַן: כׇּל הַזְּבָחִים שֶׁנִּזְבְּחוּ שֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁמָן כּוּ׳. טַעְמָא דְּשֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁמָן; הָא סְתָמָא – עָלוּ נָמֵי לַבְּעָלִים לְשֵׁם חוֹבָה; אַלְמָא סְתָמָא נָמֵי כְּלִשְׁמָן דָּמֵי.
What are these superior statements? We learned in the mishna: All slaughtered offerings that were slaughtered not for their sake are fit, but they did not satisfy the obligation of the owner. Rava infers: The reason they do not satisfy the obligation of the owner is specifically that they were slaughtered not for their sake. But if offerings were slaughtered without specification of intent, they, as well, satisfied the obligation of the owner. Apparently, if one performs any action without specification of intent, it is also considered as if he performed it expressly for its sake.
וּרְמִינְהִי: כׇּל הַגֵּט שֶׁנִּכְתַּב שֶׁלֹּא לְשֵׁם אִשָּׁה – פָּסוּל. וּסְתָמָא נָמֵי פָּסוּל!
And Rava raises a contradiction from another mishna (Gittin 24a): Any bill of divorce that was written not for the sake of the woman in question is not valid. And it is derived from the continuation of that mishna that if a bill of divorce was written without specification as to which woman it is referring, it is also not valid.
וְשַׁנִּי: זְבָחִים – בִּסְתָם לִשְׁמָן עוֹמְדִין, אִשָּׁה – בִּסְתָמָא לָאו לְגֵירוּשִׁין עוֹמֶדֶת.
And Rava resolves the contradiction: Ordinary slaughtered offerings stand designated for their own sake. From the time that the offering is consecrated, its presumed end is that it will be slaughtered for the type of offering for which is was consecrated. Therefore, even if the one slaughtering it has no particular intention, it is in effect considered slaughtered for its own sake. By contrast, an ordinary wife does not stand designated for divorce. Therefore, a bill of divorce is never presumed to be referring to a given woman unless it is specified explicitly.
וּזְבָחִים בִּסְתָמָא כְּשֵׁירִין מְנָלַן? אִילֵּימָא מֵהָא דִּתְנַן: כׇּל הַזְּבָחִים שֶׁנִּזְבְּחוּ שֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁמָן כּוּ׳ – וְלָא קָתָנֵי ״שֶׁלֹּא נִזְבְּחוּ לִשְׁמָן״; גַּבֵּי גֵּט נָמֵי, הָקָתָנֵי: כׇּל הַגֵּט שֶׁנִּכְתַּב שֶׁלֹּא לְשֵׁם אִשָּׁה פָּסוּל – וְלָא קָתָנֵי ״שֶׁלֹּא נִכְתַּב לְשֵׁם אִשָּׁה פָּסוּל״!
§ The Gemara asks: And from where do we derive that slaughtered offerings are fit and even satisfy the obligation of the owner if slaughtered without specification? If we say it is from that which we learned in the mishna: All slaughtered offerings that were slaughtered not for their sake are fit, but these offerings did not satisfy the obligation of the owner, and it does not teach this using the language: All slaughtered offerings that were not slaughtered for their sake are fit, but these offerings did not satisfy the obligation of the owner, this cannot be. One cannot infer from this language that slaughter without specification is valid, since the Mishna also teaches with regard to a bill of divorce: Any bill of divorce that was written not for the sake of the woman is not valid, and it does not teach: That was not written for the sake of the woman is not valid, and it is a given that a bill of divorce written without specification is not valid.
אֶלָּא מֵהָא דִּתְנַן: כֵּיצַד לִשְׁמָן וְשֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁמָן? לְשֵׁם פֶּסַח וּלְשֵׁם שְׁלָמִים. טַעְמָא דְּאָמַר לְשֵׁם פֶּסַח וּלְשֵׁם שְׁלָמִים, הָא לְשֵׁם פֶּסַח וּסְתָמָא – כָּשֵׁר; אַלְמָא סְתָמָן כְּלִשְׁמָן דְּמֵי.
Rather, perhaps it is derived from that which we learned in a mishna (13a): How are offerings slaughtered for their sake and then not for their sake? For example, one might slaughter the Paschal offering for the sake of a Paschal offering and then for the sake of a peace offering. The Gemara infers: The reason such an offering is unfit is that he says that he is slaughtering it for the sake of a Paschal offering and then he says that he is slaughtering it for the sake of a peace offering. But if he says that he is slaughtering it for the sake of a Paschal offering, and then slaughters it without specification, it is fit. Apparently, slaughtering an offering without specification is considered as if one slaughtered it for its sake.
דִּילְמָא שָׁאנֵי הָתָם, דְּאָמַר: כׇּל הָעוֹשֶׂה – עַל דַּעַת רִאשׁוֹנָה הוּא עוֹשֶׂה!
The Gemara responds: Perhaps there it is different, as the mishna is saying that anyone who performs an action performs it with his original intent in mind. Therefore, since he specified initially that he was slaughtering the offering for the sake of a Paschal offering, there are no grounds to assume that he then changed his mind. Here, by contrast, he pronounced no initial statement of proper intent.
אֶלָּא מִסֵּיפָא: שֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁמָן וְלִשְׁמָן – לְשֵׁם שְׁלָמִים וּלְשֵׁם פֶּסַח. טַעְמָא דְּאָמַר לְשֵׁם שְׁלָמִים וּלְשֵׁם פֶּסַח, הָא סְתָמָא וּלְשֵׁם פֶּסַח – כָּשֵׁר.
Rather, perhaps this halakha is derived from the latter clause of that mishna: How are offerings slaughtered not for their sake and then for their sake? For example, one might slaughter the Paschal offering for the sake of a peace offering and then for the sake of a Paschal offering. The Gemara infers: The reason it is unfit is that he says he is slaughtering it for the sake of a peace offering and then he says he is slaughtering it for the sake of a Paschal offering. But if he started slaughtering it without specification and then slaughtered it for the sake of a Paschal offering, it is fit. Apparently, if one slaughters an offering without specification it still satisfies the obligation of the owner.
דִּילְמָא שָׁאנֵי הָתָם, דְּאָמַר: יוֹכִיחַ סוֹפוֹ עַל תְּחִילָּתוֹ!
The Gemara responds: Perhaps there it is different, as the mishna is saying that his ultimate intent proves the nature of his original intent. Since his ultimate intent was to sacrifice a Paschal offering, that was presumably his original intent as well. Here, by contrast, there is no ultimate expression of proper intent.
אִי נָמֵי, אַיְּידֵי דִּתְנָא ״לִשְׁמָן וְשֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁמָן״, תְּנָא נָמֵי ״שֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁמָן וְלִשְׁמָן״!
Alternatively, it can be explained that even if one’s ultimate intent is not considered proof of his original intent, the mishna still uses the same term in both clauses to preserve symmetry. Since in the former clause the tanna taught using the language: For their sake and then not for their sake, teaching that original intent is considered proof of ultimate intent, the tanna also taught the second clause using the language: Not for their sake and then for their sake. In any event, there is no proof from that mishna that an offering slaughtered without specification satisfies its owner’s obligation.
אֶלָּא מֵהָא: לְשֵׁם שִׁשָּׁה דְּבָרִים הַזֶּבַח נִזְבָּח – לְשֵׁם זֶבַח, לְשֵׁם זוֹבֵחַ, לְשֵׁם שֵׁם, לְשֵׁם אִשִּׁים, לְשֵׁם רֵיחַ, לְשֵׁם נִיחוֹחַ. וְהַחַטָּאת וְאָשָׁם – לְשֵׁם חֵטְא.
Rather, perhaps this halakha is derived from that mishna (46b), which states: The offering is slaughtered for the sake of six matters: For the sake of the particular offering; for the sake of the one sacrificing the offering, i.e., the owner; for the sake of God; for the sake of consumption by the fires of the altar; for the sake of sacrificing it in a manner that gives an aroma; and for the sake of pleasing God. And the sin offering and a guilt offering are slaughtered for the sake of atonement for the sin.
אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹסֵי: אַף מִי שֶׁלֹּא הָיָה בְּלִבּוֹ לְשֵׁם אַחַת מִכׇּל אֵלּוּ – כָּשֵׁר, שֶׁתְּנַאי בֵּית דִּין הוּא. אַתְנוֹ בֵּית דִּין דְּלָא לֵימָא ״לִשְׁמוֹ״, דִּילְמָא אָתֵי לְמֵימַר ״שֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁמוֹ״.
The mishna on 46b continues: Rabbi Yosei said: Even in the case of one who did not have in mind to slaughter the offering for the sake of any one of these, the offering is fit, since this is a stipulation of the court. The Gemara explains Rabbi Yosei’s opinion: The court stipulated that one should not say that he is slaughtering the offering for its sake, lest he come to say that he is slaughtering it not for its sake. Therefore one should not specify his intent at all.
וְאִי סָלְקָא דַעְתָּךְ סְתָמָא פָּסוּל, קָיְימִי בֵּית דִּין וּמַתְנִי מִילְּתָא דְּמִיפְּסִיל בֵּיהּ?!
The Gemara infers: And if it enters your mind that if one slaughters an offering without specification it is unfit, would the court arise and stipulate a matter that disqualifies the offering? Clearly, an offering slaughtered without specification is fit and satisfies the obligation of the owner.
וְגַבֵּי גֵּט דִּסְתָמָא פָּסוּל – מְנָלַן?
§ The Gemara asks: And with regard to a bill of divorce, from where do we derive that if it is written without specification as to which woman it is referring, it is not valid?
אִילֵּימָא מֵהָא דִּתְנַן: הָיָה עוֹבֵר בַּשּׁוּק, וְשָׁמַע סוֹפְרִים מַקְרִין: ״אִישׁ פְּלוֹנִי גֵּירַשׁ פְּלוֹנִית מִמָּקוֹם פְּלוֹנִי״, וְאָמַר: ״זֶה שְׁמִי וְזֶה שֵׁם אִשְׁתִּי״ – פָּסוּל לְגָרֵשׁ בּוֹ.
If we say it is inferred from that which we learned in a mishna (Gittin 24a): In the case of a man who was passing through the marketplace, and he heard scribes who write bills of divorce dictating to their students: The man so-and-so divorces so-and-so from the place of such and such, and the man said: This is my name and that is the name of my wife, and he desires to use this bill for his divorce, this bill is unfit to divorce his wife with it, that is not a proof.
דִּילְמָא כִּדְרַב פָּפָּא – דְּאָמַר רַב פָּפָּא: הָכָא בְּסוֹפְרִים הָעֲשׂוּיִין לְהִתְלַמֵּד עָסְקִינַן; וְלָא אִיכְּתוּב לְשׁוּם כְּרִיתוּת כְּלָל!
It can be explained: Perhaps the mishna is in accordance with the explanation of Rav Pappa. As Rav Pappa says: Here we are dealing with scribes who are wont to practice writing bills of divorce; and this bill of divorce is a draft and was not written for the sake of severance, i.e., divorce, at all. But if a bill of divorce is written to be used for divorce, perhaps it is fit even if written without specifying the woman in question.
אֶלָּא מֵהָא:
Rather, derive this halakha from the subsequent clause in that mishna:
