Masechet Zevachim
Masechet Zevachim is sponsored by Esther Kremer in loving memory of her father, Manny Gross on his third yahrzeit. “He exemplified a path of holiness and purity, living with kedushah in his everyday life.”
This month’s learning is sponsored by Beth Balkany in honor of their granddaughter, Devorah Chana Serach Eichel. “May she grow up to be a lifelong learner.”
This month’s learning is dedicated in memory of Rabbi Dr. Raymond Harari z”l, on his 1st yahrzeit. As an educator, principal of Yeshiva of Flatbush, and community rabbi, he inspired thousands with his wisdom, warmth, and unwavering commitment to Torah.
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Summary
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Ilfa and Rabbi Yochanan debate whether the disagreement between Rabbi Yehuda and the Rabbis applies only when the two improper thoughts occur in separate sacrificial rites, or even when they occur within the same rite. A difficulty is raised against each one. The one against Rabbi Yochanan is resolved, but the one against Ilfa is left unresolved.
A debate in Masechet Temurah 25b between Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yosi regarding a similar situation is brought as a comparison. Abaye and Rava disagree about their understanding of the debate and whether it is similar to the debate between Rabbi Yehuda and the rabbis in our Mishna.
There is a discussion about the language in the Mishna – is it referring to a case of a thought about “an olive-bulk and an olive-bulk” or “an olive-bulk, an olive-bulk.” What are the ramifications of the different versions? Which is established as the correct version, and how?
Today’s daily daf tools:
Masechet Zevachim
Masechet Zevachim is sponsored by Esther Kremer in loving memory of her father, Manny Gross on his third yahrzeit. “He exemplified a path of holiness and purity, living with kedushah in his everyday life.”
This month’s learning is sponsored by Beth Balkany in honor of their granddaughter, Devorah Chana Serach Eichel. “May she grow up to be a lifelong learner.”
This month’s learning is dedicated in memory of Rabbi Dr. Raymond Harari z”l, on his 1st yahrzeit. As an educator, principal of Yeshiva of Flatbush, and community rabbi, he inspired thousands with his wisdom, warmth, and unwavering commitment to Torah.
Simchat Torah has turned into a complicated day – being both a holiday and a day of remembrance. Today’s daf is dedicated to the memory of those who were tragically murdered two years ago today. May our learning be an aliyah for their neshamot, a tribute to their lives, and a reflection of the strength and resilience of our people in the face of the unimaginable pain we have all experienced since that day.
Zevachim 30
אִין; רֵישָׁא – בִּשְׁתֵּי עֲבוֹדוֹת, סֵיפָא – בֵּין בַּעֲבוֹדָה אַחַת בֵּין בִּשְׁתֵּי עֲבוֹדוֹת.
The Gemara responds: Yes, it can be explained that the first clause is referring to two sacrificial rites, while the latter clause, i.e., the disagreement between Rabbi Yehuda and the Rabbis, applies to both one rite and two rites.
תְּנַן: אָמַר רַבִּי יְהוּדָה, זֶה הַכְּלָל: אִם מַחְשֶׁבֶת הַזְּמַן קָדְמָה לְמַחְשֶׁבֶת הַמָּקוֹם – פִּיגּוּל, וְחַיָּיבִין עָלָיו כָּרֵת. בִּשְׁלָמָא לְרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן – הַיְינוּ דְּקָתָנֵי ״זֶה הַכְּלָל״. אֶלָּא לְאִילְפָא – מַאי ״זֶה הַכְּלָל״? קַשְׁיָא.
The Gemara suggests a proof: We learned in the mishna: Rabbi Yehuda says that this is the principle: If the intent with regard to the time preceded the intent with regard to the area, the offering is piggul and one is liable to receive karet for burning or partaking of it. Granted, according to Rabbi Yoḥanan, who says that the disagreement applies even to one rite, this is the reason that the tanna teaches: This is the principle, indicating that the principle is broad. But according to Ilfa, what is added by the phrase: This is the principle? The Gemara responds: This indeed poses a difficulty to the opinion of Ilfa.
תְּנַן הָתָם: ״הֲרֵי זוֹ תְּמוּרַת עוֹלָה תְּמוּרַת שְׁלָמִים״ – הֲרֵי זוֹ תְּמוּרַת עוֹלָה. דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי מֵאִיר.
§ We learned in a mishna elsewhere (Temura 25b): If one had two animals standing before him, one a burnt offering and one a peace offering, and he said with regard to another non-sacred animal of his: This animal is hereby the substitute of the burnt offering, the substitute of the peace offering, then that animal is the substitute of the burnt offering; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir.
אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹסֵי: אִם לְכָךְ נִתְכַּוֵּון תְּחִילָּה, הוֹאִיל וְאִי אֶפְשָׁר לְהוֹצִיא שְׁתֵּי שֵׁמוֹת כְּאַחַת – דְּבָרָיו קַיָּימִין; וְאִם מִשֶּׁאָמַר ״הֲרֵי זוֹ תְּמוּרַת עוֹלָה״, וְנִמְלַךְ וְאָמַר ״הֲרֵי זוֹ תְּמוּרַת שְׁלָמִים״ – הֲרֵי זוֹ עוֹלָה.
Rabbi Yosei said: If that was his intent from the outset, i.e., his intent was that this animal be the substitute of both a burnt offering and a peace offering, since it is impossible to produce two designations simultaneously and one designation must precede the other, his statement is effective, and the animal is the substitute of both a burnt offering and a peace offering. But if it was only after he said: This animal is hereby the substitute of the burnt offering, that he reconsidered and said: This animal is hereby the substitute of the peace offering, then that animal is the substitute of a burnt offering alone.
אִיבַּעְיָא לְהוּ: ״הֲרֵי זוֹ תְּמוּרַת עוֹלָה וּשְׁלָמִים״, מַהוּ? ״לַחֲצוֹת״, מַהוּ?
A dilemma was raised before the Sages: If one expressed the two intentions simultaneously and said: This is hereby the substitute of a burnt offering and a peace offering, what is the halakha? Additionally, if one specified his intention to split the animal between a burnt offering and a peace offering, but mentioned the burnt offering first, what is the halakha?
אָמַר אַבָּיֵי: בְּהָא וַדַּאי מוֹדֶה רַבִּי מֵאִיר. רָבָא אֲמַר: עֲדַיִין הִיא מַחְלוֹקֶת.
Abaye said: In this case, Rabbi Meir certainly concedes that both types of sanctity apply to the animal. Rava said: It is still a disagreement; Rabbi Meir still holds in this case that since he mentioned the burnt offering first, only that sanctity applies to the animal.
אָמַר רָבָא לְאַבָּיֵי: לְדִידָךְ דְּאָמְרַתְּ בְּהָא וַדַּאי מוֹדֶה רַבִּי מֵאִיר; הֲרֵי שְׁחִיטָה – (דלכי) [דִּכִי] ״לַחֲצוֹת״ דָּמֵי, וּפְלִיגִי!
Rava said to Abaye: According to your opinion, as you say that in this case Rabbi Meir certainly concedes, one may raise an objection from the mishna, which describes a case where one performs slaughter with intent to eat one olive-bulk of the offering beyond its time and one olive-bulk outside its area, which is comparable to a case where one says: To split, since both intentions are held during the singular act of slaughter. And nevertheless, Rabbi Yehuda and the Rabbis disagree, and Rabbi Yehuda, who holds that one attends only to the first statement, renders the animal piggul.
אֲמַר לֵיהּ: מִי סָבְרַתְּ אֵינָהּ לִשְׁחִיטָה אֶלָּא לְבַסּוֹף?! יֶשְׁנָהּ לִשְׁחִיטָה מִתְּחִילָּה וְעַד סוֹף; וּמִשְׁנָתֵינוּ – דְּאָמַר: סִימָן רִאשׁוֹן חוּץ לִזְמַנּוֹ, סִימָן שֵׁנִי חוּץ לִמְקוֹמוֹ.
Abaye said to him: Do you hold that slaughter is considered to have been performed only at its end, such that it takes effect in a single instant? Actually, slaughter is accomplished progressively, from beginning to end, and our mishna is referring to a case where one says: I slaughter the first siman, the gullet or the windpipe, with intent to consume the offering beyond its designated time, and the second siman with intent to consume it outside its designated area.
הֲרֵי קְמִיצָה – (דלכי) [דִּכִי] לַחֲצוֹת דָּמֵי, וּפְלִיגִי!
The Gemara asks: But what about the removal of a handful from a meal offering with intent to eat one olive-bulk beyond its time and one outside of its area, which is comparable to a case where one says: To split, since both intentions are held during the removal, and nevertheless, Rabbi Yehuda and the Rabbis disagree with regard to it in tractate Menaḥot (12a)?
הָתָם נָמֵי – שֶׁהִקְטִיר קוֹמֶץ מִנְחָה חוּץ לִזְמַנּוֹ, קוֹמֶץ לְבוֹנָה חוּץ לִמְקוֹמוֹ.
The Gemara responds: Since the mishna does not state such a dispute explicitly, one can say that their disagreement is not with regard to the removal of the handful but with regard to the burning of the two permitting factors of the meal offering, the handful and the frankincense. Accordingly, there too, the case is such that the priest burned the handful of the meal offering with intent to eat it beyond its designated time, and he burned the handful of frankincense with intent to eat the meal offering outside its designated area.
הֲרֵי קוֹמֶץ דְּמִנְחַת חוֹטֵא – דְּלֵיכָּא לְבוֹנָה בַּהֲדֵיהּ, וּפְלִיגִי!
The Gemara persists: But what about the handful from a meal offering of a sinner, which has no frankincense with it, and still Rabbi Yehuda and the Rabbis disagree?
לָא פְּלִיגִי. אָמַר רַב אָשֵׁי: אִם תִּימְצֵי לוֹמַר פְּלִיגִי, פְּלִיגִי בִּפְסִיעוֹת.
The Gemara responds: In that case they do not disagree. Rav Ashi says: Even if you say that they disagree in that case, one may say that they disagree specifically with regard to a case where the priest had different intentions during his steps toward the altar while holding the handful. Consequently, even this rite is divisible into separate parts.
רַב שִׁימִי בַּר אָשֵׁי מַתְנֵי כִּדְאַבָּיֵי, רַב הוּנָא בַּר נָתָן מַתְנֵי כִּדְרָבָא.
Rav Shimi bar Ashi would teach in accordance with the opinion of Abaye that in a case where one explicitly mentions both intentions at once, Rabbi Meir concedes that both sanctities apply to the animal. Rav Huna bar Natan would teach in accordance with the opinion of Rava that even in such a case, Rabbi Meir considers only the first sanctity mentioned.
כִּי אֲתָא רַב דִּימִי, אֲמַר: רַבִּי מֵאִיר – בְּשִׁיטַת רַבִּי יְהוּדָה אֲמָרָהּ, דְּאָמַר: תְּפוֹס לָשׁוֹן רִאשׁוֹן.
When Rav Dimi came from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia, he said: When Rabbi Meir said that if one says: This animal is hereby the substitute of a burnt offering, the substitute of a peace offering, then the animal is the substitute of a burnt offering, he said this according to the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, who says that in general, the halakha is to attend only to the first statement.
דִּתְנַן: אָמַר רַבִּי יְהוּדָה, זֶה הַכְּלָל: אִם מַחְשֶׁבֶת הַזְּמַן קָדְמָה אֶת מַחְשֶׁבֶת הַמָּקוֹם – פִּיגּוּל, וְחַיָּיבִין עָלָיו כָּרֵת.
As we learned in the mishna: Rabbi Yehuda said that this is the principle: If the intent with regard to the time preceded the intent with regard to the area, the offering is piggul and one is liable to receive karet for burning or partaking of it.
אֲמַר לֵיהּ אַבָּיֵי, וְהָא רַבָּה בַּר בַּר חָנָה אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: כִּי מַגְּעַתְּ לְהוּ רַבִּי מֵאִיר וְרַבִּי יוֹסֵי בַּהֲדֵי הֲדָדֵי, לָא פְּלִיגִי!
Abaye said to Rav Dimi: But doesn’t Rabba bar bar Ḥana say that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: When you consider their opinions, Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yosei do not disagree with one another, i.e., neither holds that one attends only to the first statement?
וְלָא פְּלִיגִי?! וְהָא מִיפְלָג פְּלִיגִי! אֲמַר לֵיהּ: פְּלִיגִי בְּמַאי דִּפְלִיגִי, וְלָא פְּלִיגִי בְּמַאי דְּלָא פְּלִיגִי.
Rav Dimi objected: And is it so that they do not disagree? But don’t they disagree explicitly in the mishna cited earlier? Abaye said to him: They disagree where they disagree, i.e., that specific case, but they do not disagree where they do not disagree, i.e., the underlying principle. Accordingly, one must understand the basis of their dispute in another manner.
דְּאָמַר רַבִּי יִצְחָק בַּר יוֹסֵף אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: הַכֹּל מוֹדִים הֵיכָא דְּאָמַר ״תָּחוּל זוֹ וְאַחַר כָּךְ (אָמַר) תָּחוּל זוֹ״ – דִּבְרֵי הַכֹּל לָא חָיְילָא; ״לֹא תָּחוּל זוֹ אֶלָּא אִם כֵּן חָלָה זוֹ״ – דִּבְרֵי הַכֹּל חָיְילָא;
This is as Rav Yitzḥak bar Yosef says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: All, i.e., Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yosei, concede that in a case where one says: Let this sanctity of a burnt offering take effect and afterward let that sanctity of a peace offering take effect, everyone agrees that the sanctity of a peace offering does not take effect, because the sanctity of the burnt offering took effect first. Likewise, if one said: This sanctity shall not take effect unless that sanctity applies, everyone agrees that the sanctity of a peace offering takes effect as well.
כִּי פְּלִיגִי, דְּאָמַר: ״תְּמוּרַת עוֹלָה תְּמוּרַת שְׁלָמִים״. רַבִּי מֵאִיר סָבַר: מִדַּהֲוָה לֵיהּ לְמֵימַר ״תְּמוּרַת עוֹלָה וּשְׁלָמִים״ וַאֲמַר ״תְּמוּרַת עוֹלָה תְּמוּרַת שְׁלָמִים״ – שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ מִיהְדָּר קָא הָדַר בֵּיהּ.
They disagree with regard to a case where one says: This animal is hereby a substitute for a burnt offering, a substitute for a peace offering. Rabbi Meir holds: Since if he wanted both sanctities to take effect, he should have said: A substitute for a burnt offering and a peace offering, but he said instead: A substitute for a burnt offering, a substitute for a peace offering, learn from his language that he originally intended for it to be a burnt offering, and he then retracted his first intention.
וְרַבִּי יוֹסֵי – אִי אֲמַר: ״תְּמוּרַת עוֹלָה וּשְׁלָמִים״ – הֲוָה אָמֵינָא פַּלְגָא תְּמוּרַת עוֹלָה וּפַלְגָא תְּמוּרַת שְׁלָמִים; לְהָכִי אֲמַר: ״תְּמוּרַת עוֹלָה תְּמוּרַת שְׁלָמִים״ – לְמֵימְרָא דְּכוּלַּהּ עוֹלָה וְכוּלַּהּ שְׁלָמִים הָוְיָא.
And Rabbi Yosei holds that if he had said: A substitute for a burnt offering and a peace offering, I would say that he means that half the animal should be a substitute for a burnt offering and half a substitute for a peace offering. He therefore says: A substitute for a burnt offering, a substitute for a peace offering; that is to say that all of it is a burnt offering and all of it is a peace offering. In any event, according to this explanation, Rabbi Meir does not necessarily hold that one attends only to the first statement.
אֲמַר לֵיהּ: הוּא אָמַר לָא פְּלִיגִי, וַאֲנָא אָמֵינָא פְּלִיגִי.
Rav Dimi said to Abaye: He, Rabba bar bar Ḥana, says that they do not disagree, but I say that they disagree, and Rabbi Meir holds that one attends only to the first statement, in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda in the mishna.
אָמַר עוּלָּא וְאִיתֵּימָא רַב אוֹשַׁעְיָא: אֶפְשָׁר יָדְעִין חַבְרִין בַּבְלָאָה – ״כְּזַיִת״ ״כְּזַיִת״ תְּנַן, אוֹ ״כְּזַיִת״ ״וּכְזַיִת״ תְּנַן?
§ The Gemara returns to discuss the mishna itself: Ulla said, and some say it was Rav Oshaya who said: Perhaps our colleagues, the Babylonians, know whether we learn the language of the improper intention in the mishna as: I hereby slaughter the animal with intent to consume an olive-bulk beyond its designated time, an olive-bulk outside its designated area, or we learn: An olive-bulk beyond its designated time and an olive-bulk outside its designated area?
״כְּזַיִת״ ״כְּזַיִת״ תְּנַן – אֲבָל ״כְּזַיִת״ ״וּכְזַיִת״ דִּבְרֵי הַכֹּל עֵירוּב מַחְשָׁבוֹת הָוֵי; אוֹ דִלְמָא ״כְּזַיִת״ ״וּכְזַיִת״ תְּנַן, דִּלְרַבִּי יְהוּדָה פְּרָטָא הָוֵי – וְכׇל שֶׁכֵּן ״כְּזַיִת״ ״כְּזַיִת״?
The Gemara elaborates: Perhaps we learn: An olive-bulk, an olive-bulk, and it is only in this case that Rabbi Yehuda disagrees with the Rabbis. But if one said: An olive-bulk and an olive-bulk, everyone agrees that it constitutes a combination of intentions, and the animal is not rendered piggul. Or perhaps we learn: An olive-bulk and an olive-bulk, where according to Rabbi Yehuda each term constitutes a separate term despite the use of the conjunction: And, and he holds that one attends only to the first statement, and all the more so if one said: An olive-bulk, an olive-bulk.
תָּא שְׁמַע, דִּבְעָא מִינֵּיהּ לֵוִי מֵרַבִּי: חִישֵּׁב לֶאֱכוֹל כְּזַיִת לְמָחָר בַּחוּץ, מַהוּ? אָמַר לוֹ: זוֹ שְׁאֵילָה! עֵירוּב מַחְשָׁבוֹת הָוֵי.
The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a proof from that dilemma which Levi raised before Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi: If one had intent to consume an olive-bulk the next day outside its designated area, what is the halakha? Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi said to him: This is an excellent question. The answer is that even Rabbi Yehuda concedes that this constitutes a combination of intentions and that the animal is not rendered piggul.
אָמַר לְפָנָיו רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בְּרַבִּי: לֹא מִשְׁנָתֵינוּ הִיא?! לֶאֱכוֹל כְּזַיִת בַּחוּץ כְּזַיִת לְמָחָר; כְּזַיִת לְמָחָר כְּזַיִת בַּחוּץ; כַּחֲצִי זַיִת בַּחוּץ כַּחֲצִי זַיִת לְמָחָר; כַּחֲצִי זַיִת לְמָחָר כַּחֲצִי זַיִת בַּחוּץ – פָּסוּל, וְאֵין בּוֹ כָּרֵת. הָא אִידַּךְ – עֵירוּב מַחְשָׁבוֹת הָוֵי!
Rabbi Shimon, son of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, said before him: How is this an excellent question; is it not our mishna? As we learned in the mishna: If one expressed intent to eat an olive-bulk outside its designated area and an olive-bulk the next day, or an olive-bulk the next day and an olive-bulk outside its designated area, or half an olive-bulk outside its designated area and half an olive-bulk the next day, or half an olive-bulk the next day and half an olive-bulk outside its designated area, the offering is disqualified and there is no liability for karet for burning or partaking of it. Rabbi Yehuda disagrees only with regard to these cases; but in another case, it could easily be inferred that he concedes that it constitutes a combination of intentions.
אֲמַר לֵיהּ: הוּא שָׁאַל בִּי דְּבַר חָכְמָה, וְאַתְּ אָמַרְתָּ מִשְׁנָתֵינוּ?! לְדִידָךְ דְּאַתְנִיתָךְ תַּרְתֵּי – לָא קַשְׁיָא לָךְ;
Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi said to him: Levi asked me a matter of wisdom, and you say our mishna. For you, whom I taught two phrasings of the mishna, both: An olive-bulk, an olive-bulk, and: An olive-bulk and an olive-bulk, the question is not difficult, since my omission of this other case allows you to infer its halakha.
לְדִידֵיהּ דְּלָא אַתְנִיתֵיהּ אֶלָּא חֲדָא, וְשַׁמְעִינְהוּ לְרַבָּנַן דְּקָא גָרְסִי תַּרְתֵּי – וְסָבַר: דִּידִי דַּוְוקָא, וְדִידְהוּ עֵירוּב מַחְשָׁבוֹת הָוֵי? אוֹ דִלְמָא דִּידְהוּ דַּוְוקָא, וּלְדִידִי שַׁיּוֹרֵי שַׁיַּיר לִי; וּמִדְּשַׁיַּיר לִי לְדִידִי הָא – שַׁיַּיר לְהוּ לְדִידְהוּ נָמֵי בְּהָךְ?
For him, whom I taught only one phrasing, and who heard the Rabbis reciting two, the question is excellent, since Levi thought: Perhaps my phrasing is exact, and their additional phrasing constitutes a combination of intentions according to all opinions. Or perhaps their phrasing is exact, and my phrasing omitted this case. And if my phrasing omitted this case, perhaps their phrasing also omitted that other case, even though it is subject to disagreement.
וְהֵי אַתְנְיֵיהּ? אִילֵּימָא ״כְּזַיִת״ ״וּכְזַיִת״ אַתְנְיֵיהּ – הַאי לָאו שִׁיּוּרָא הוּא! אֶלָּא ״כְּזַיִת״ ״כְּזַיִת״ אַתְנְיֵיהּ.
The Gemara asks: And which phrasing did Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi teach Levi? If we say that he taught him: An olive-bulk and an olive-bulk, i.e., that Rabbi Yehuda still holds the terms to be distinct despite the conjunction, this is not an omission, since one can infer a fortiori that the same applies to: An olive-bulk, an olive-bulk. Rather, it must be that he taught him: An olive-bulk, an olive-bulk, so that it was unclear to Levi what the halakha would be if one used the conjunction: And.
וְתִיבְּעֵי לֵיהּ ״כְּזַיִת״ ״וּכְזַיִת״!
The Gemara asks: If so, why did Levi raise the dilemma with regard to the phrasing: The next day outside? Let him raise the dilemma with regard to the phrasing: An olive-bulk and an olive-bulk.
סְבַר: אִיבְעֵי מִינֵּיהּ חֲדָא – דְּשָׁמַעְנָא תַּרְתֵּי. דְּאִי בָּעֵינָא ״כְּזַיִת״ ״וּכְזַיִת״ – הָא נִיחָא אִי אָמַר לִי כְּלָלָא, כׇּל שֶׁכֵּן ״כְּזַיִת לְמָחָר בַּחוּץ״; אֶלָּא אִי אָמַר לִי פְּרָטָא – אַכַּתִּי ״כְּזַיִת לְמָחָר בַּחוּץ״ קָא מִיבַּעְיָא לִי.
The Gemara responds: Levi thought: I will raise one dilemma before him so as to learn two halakhot. As, if I ask only with regard to: An olive-bulk and an olive-bulk, it will work out well if he says to me that Rabbi Yehuda concedes that they constitute one general term, as this would apply all the more so if one said: An olive-bulk the next day outside, which is even more unified. But if he says to me that each term constitutes a separate term according to Rabbi Yehuda, then I will still need to raise the dilemma with regard to the case of: An olive-bulk the next day outside. I will therefore inquire with regard to the latter case.
אִי הָכִי, הַשְׁתָּא נָמֵי – הָתִינַח אִי אָמַר לֵיהּ ״כְּזַיִת לְמָחָר בַּחוּץ״ פְּרָטָא, כׇּל שֶׁכֵּן ״כְּזַיִת״ ״וּכְזַיִת״; אֶלָּא אִי אָמַר לֵיהּ כְּלָלָא, אַכַּתִּי ״כְּזַיִת״ ״וּכְזַיִת״ מִיבְּעֵי לֵיהּ!
The Gemara challenges: If so, now too, it works out well if he says to him that Rabbi Yehuda maintains that the wording: An olive-bulk the next day outside, is constituted of separate terms, as this would apply all the more so if one said: An olive-bulk and an olive-bulk, which is less unified. But if he says to him that it is one general term according to Rabbi Yehuda, then he will still need to raise the dilemma with regard to the case of: An olive-bulk and an olive-bulk.
אִם כֵּן מִרְתָּח רָתַח:
The Gemara responds: If Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi answered in this manner, i.e., that Rabbi Yehuda concedes that: An olive-bulk the next day outside, is considered one term, he would unwittingly provide the answer to the other question as well. As, if Rabbi Yehuda had also conceded with regard to: An olive-bulk and an olive-bulk, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi would become angry with Levi for asking the wrong question and say:
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תמיד רציתי. למדתי גמרא בבית ספר בטורונטו קנדה. עליתי ארצה ולמדתי שזה לא מקובל. הופתעתי.
יצאתי לגימלאות לפני שנתיים וזה מאפשר את המחוייבות לדף יומי.
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Zevachim 30
אִין; רֵישָׁא – בִּשְׁתֵּי עֲבוֹדוֹת, סֵיפָא – בֵּין בַּעֲבוֹדָה אַחַת בֵּין בִּשְׁתֵּי עֲבוֹדוֹת.
The Gemara responds: Yes, it can be explained that the first clause is referring to two sacrificial rites, while the latter clause, i.e., the disagreement between Rabbi Yehuda and the Rabbis, applies to both one rite and two rites.
תְּנַן: אָמַר רַבִּי יְהוּדָה, זֶה הַכְּלָל: אִם מַחְשֶׁבֶת הַזְּמַן קָדְמָה לְמַחְשֶׁבֶת הַמָּקוֹם – פִּיגּוּל, וְחַיָּיבִין עָלָיו כָּרֵת. בִּשְׁלָמָא לְרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן – הַיְינוּ דְּקָתָנֵי ״זֶה הַכְּלָל״. אֶלָּא לְאִילְפָא – מַאי ״זֶה הַכְּלָל״? קַשְׁיָא.
The Gemara suggests a proof: We learned in the mishna: Rabbi Yehuda says that this is the principle: If the intent with regard to the time preceded the intent with regard to the area, the offering is piggul and one is liable to receive karet for burning or partaking of it. Granted, according to Rabbi Yoḥanan, who says that the disagreement applies even to one rite, this is the reason that the tanna teaches: This is the principle, indicating that the principle is broad. But according to Ilfa, what is added by the phrase: This is the principle? The Gemara responds: This indeed poses a difficulty to the opinion of Ilfa.
תְּנַן הָתָם: ״הֲרֵי זוֹ תְּמוּרַת עוֹלָה תְּמוּרַת שְׁלָמִים״ – הֲרֵי זוֹ תְּמוּרַת עוֹלָה. דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי מֵאִיר.
§ We learned in a mishna elsewhere (Temura 25b): If one had two animals standing before him, one a burnt offering and one a peace offering, and he said with regard to another non-sacred animal of his: This animal is hereby the substitute of the burnt offering, the substitute of the peace offering, then that animal is the substitute of the burnt offering; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir.
אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹסֵי: אִם לְכָךְ נִתְכַּוֵּון תְּחִילָּה, הוֹאִיל וְאִי אֶפְשָׁר לְהוֹצִיא שְׁתֵּי שֵׁמוֹת כְּאַחַת – דְּבָרָיו קַיָּימִין; וְאִם מִשֶּׁאָמַר ״הֲרֵי זוֹ תְּמוּרַת עוֹלָה״, וְנִמְלַךְ וְאָמַר ״הֲרֵי זוֹ תְּמוּרַת שְׁלָמִים״ – הֲרֵי זוֹ עוֹלָה.
Rabbi Yosei said: If that was his intent from the outset, i.e., his intent was that this animal be the substitute of both a burnt offering and a peace offering, since it is impossible to produce two designations simultaneously and one designation must precede the other, his statement is effective, and the animal is the substitute of both a burnt offering and a peace offering. But if it was only after he said: This animal is hereby the substitute of the burnt offering, that he reconsidered and said: This animal is hereby the substitute of the peace offering, then that animal is the substitute of a burnt offering alone.
אִיבַּעְיָא לְהוּ: ״הֲרֵי זוֹ תְּמוּרַת עוֹלָה וּשְׁלָמִים״, מַהוּ? ״לַחֲצוֹת״, מַהוּ?
A dilemma was raised before the Sages: If one expressed the two intentions simultaneously and said: This is hereby the substitute of a burnt offering and a peace offering, what is the halakha? Additionally, if one specified his intention to split the animal between a burnt offering and a peace offering, but mentioned the burnt offering first, what is the halakha?
אָמַר אַבָּיֵי: בְּהָא וַדַּאי מוֹדֶה רַבִּי מֵאִיר. רָבָא אֲמַר: עֲדַיִין הִיא מַחְלוֹקֶת.
Abaye said: In this case, Rabbi Meir certainly concedes that both types of sanctity apply to the animal. Rava said: It is still a disagreement; Rabbi Meir still holds in this case that since he mentioned the burnt offering first, only that sanctity applies to the animal.
אָמַר רָבָא לְאַבָּיֵי: לְדִידָךְ דְּאָמְרַתְּ בְּהָא וַדַּאי מוֹדֶה רַבִּי מֵאִיר; הֲרֵי שְׁחִיטָה – (דלכי) [דִּכִי] ״לַחֲצוֹת״ דָּמֵי, וּפְלִיגִי!
Rava said to Abaye: According to your opinion, as you say that in this case Rabbi Meir certainly concedes, one may raise an objection from the mishna, which describes a case where one performs slaughter with intent to eat one olive-bulk of the offering beyond its time and one olive-bulk outside its area, which is comparable to a case where one says: To split, since both intentions are held during the singular act of slaughter. And nevertheless, Rabbi Yehuda and the Rabbis disagree, and Rabbi Yehuda, who holds that one attends only to the first statement, renders the animal piggul.
אֲמַר לֵיהּ: מִי סָבְרַתְּ אֵינָהּ לִשְׁחִיטָה אֶלָּא לְבַסּוֹף?! יֶשְׁנָהּ לִשְׁחִיטָה מִתְּחִילָּה וְעַד סוֹף; וּמִשְׁנָתֵינוּ – דְּאָמַר: סִימָן רִאשׁוֹן חוּץ לִזְמַנּוֹ, סִימָן שֵׁנִי חוּץ לִמְקוֹמוֹ.
Abaye said to him: Do you hold that slaughter is considered to have been performed only at its end, such that it takes effect in a single instant? Actually, slaughter is accomplished progressively, from beginning to end, and our mishna is referring to a case where one says: I slaughter the first siman, the gullet or the windpipe, with intent to consume the offering beyond its designated time, and the second siman with intent to consume it outside its designated area.
הֲרֵי קְמִיצָה – (דלכי) [דִּכִי] לַחֲצוֹת דָּמֵי, וּפְלִיגִי!
The Gemara asks: But what about the removal of a handful from a meal offering with intent to eat one olive-bulk beyond its time and one outside of its area, which is comparable to a case where one says: To split, since both intentions are held during the removal, and nevertheless, Rabbi Yehuda and the Rabbis disagree with regard to it in tractate Menaḥot (12a)?
הָתָם נָמֵי – שֶׁהִקְטִיר קוֹמֶץ מִנְחָה חוּץ לִזְמַנּוֹ, קוֹמֶץ לְבוֹנָה חוּץ לִמְקוֹמוֹ.
The Gemara responds: Since the mishna does not state such a dispute explicitly, one can say that their disagreement is not with regard to the removal of the handful but with regard to the burning of the two permitting factors of the meal offering, the handful and the frankincense. Accordingly, there too, the case is such that the priest burned the handful of the meal offering with intent to eat it beyond its designated time, and he burned the handful of frankincense with intent to eat the meal offering outside its designated area.
הֲרֵי קוֹמֶץ דְּמִנְחַת חוֹטֵא – דְּלֵיכָּא לְבוֹנָה בַּהֲדֵיהּ, וּפְלִיגִי!
The Gemara persists: But what about the handful from a meal offering of a sinner, which has no frankincense with it, and still Rabbi Yehuda and the Rabbis disagree?
לָא פְּלִיגִי. אָמַר רַב אָשֵׁי: אִם תִּימְצֵי לוֹמַר פְּלִיגִי, פְּלִיגִי בִּפְסִיעוֹת.
The Gemara responds: In that case they do not disagree. Rav Ashi says: Even if you say that they disagree in that case, one may say that they disagree specifically with regard to a case where the priest had different intentions during his steps toward the altar while holding the handful. Consequently, even this rite is divisible into separate parts.
רַב שִׁימִי בַּר אָשֵׁי מַתְנֵי כִּדְאַבָּיֵי, רַב הוּנָא בַּר נָתָן מַתְנֵי כִּדְרָבָא.
Rav Shimi bar Ashi would teach in accordance with the opinion of Abaye that in a case where one explicitly mentions both intentions at once, Rabbi Meir concedes that both sanctities apply to the animal. Rav Huna bar Natan would teach in accordance with the opinion of Rava that even in such a case, Rabbi Meir considers only the first sanctity mentioned.
כִּי אֲתָא רַב דִּימִי, אֲמַר: רַבִּי מֵאִיר – בְּשִׁיטַת רַבִּי יְהוּדָה אֲמָרָהּ, דְּאָמַר: תְּפוֹס לָשׁוֹן רִאשׁוֹן.
When Rav Dimi came from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia, he said: When Rabbi Meir said that if one says: This animal is hereby the substitute of a burnt offering, the substitute of a peace offering, then the animal is the substitute of a burnt offering, he said this according to the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, who says that in general, the halakha is to attend only to the first statement.
דִּתְנַן: אָמַר רַבִּי יְהוּדָה, זֶה הַכְּלָל: אִם מַחְשֶׁבֶת הַזְּמַן קָדְמָה אֶת מַחְשֶׁבֶת הַמָּקוֹם – פִּיגּוּל, וְחַיָּיבִין עָלָיו כָּרֵת.
As we learned in the mishna: Rabbi Yehuda said that this is the principle: If the intent with regard to the time preceded the intent with regard to the area, the offering is piggul and one is liable to receive karet for burning or partaking of it.
אֲמַר לֵיהּ אַבָּיֵי, וְהָא רַבָּה בַּר בַּר חָנָה אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: כִּי מַגְּעַתְּ לְהוּ רַבִּי מֵאִיר וְרַבִּי יוֹסֵי בַּהֲדֵי הֲדָדֵי, לָא פְּלִיגִי!
Abaye said to Rav Dimi: But doesn’t Rabba bar bar Ḥana say that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: When you consider their opinions, Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yosei do not disagree with one another, i.e., neither holds that one attends only to the first statement?
וְלָא פְּלִיגִי?! וְהָא מִיפְלָג פְּלִיגִי! אֲמַר לֵיהּ: פְּלִיגִי בְּמַאי דִּפְלִיגִי, וְלָא פְּלִיגִי בְּמַאי דְּלָא פְּלִיגִי.
Rav Dimi objected: And is it so that they do not disagree? But don’t they disagree explicitly in the mishna cited earlier? Abaye said to him: They disagree where they disagree, i.e., that specific case, but they do not disagree where they do not disagree, i.e., the underlying principle. Accordingly, one must understand the basis of their dispute in another manner.
דְּאָמַר רַבִּי יִצְחָק בַּר יוֹסֵף אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: הַכֹּל מוֹדִים הֵיכָא דְּאָמַר ״תָּחוּל זוֹ וְאַחַר כָּךְ (אָמַר) תָּחוּל זוֹ״ – דִּבְרֵי הַכֹּל לָא חָיְילָא; ״לֹא תָּחוּל זוֹ אֶלָּא אִם כֵּן חָלָה זוֹ״ – דִּבְרֵי הַכֹּל חָיְילָא;
This is as Rav Yitzḥak bar Yosef says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: All, i.e., Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yosei, concede that in a case where one says: Let this sanctity of a burnt offering take effect and afterward let that sanctity of a peace offering take effect, everyone agrees that the sanctity of a peace offering does not take effect, because the sanctity of the burnt offering took effect first. Likewise, if one said: This sanctity shall not take effect unless that sanctity applies, everyone agrees that the sanctity of a peace offering takes effect as well.
כִּי פְּלִיגִי, דְּאָמַר: ״תְּמוּרַת עוֹלָה תְּמוּרַת שְׁלָמִים״. רַבִּי מֵאִיר סָבַר: מִדַּהֲוָה לֵיהּ לְמֵימַר ״תְּמוּרַת עוֹלָה וּשְׁלָמִים״ וַאֲמַר ״תְּמוּרַת עוֹלָה תְּמוּרַת שְׁלָמִים״ – שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ מִיהְדָּר קָא הָדַר בֵּיהּ.
They disagree with regard to a case where one says: This animal is hereby a substitute for a burnt offering, a substitute for a peace offering. Rabbi Meir holds: Since if he wanted both sanctities to take effect, he should have said: A substitute for a burnt offering and a peace offering, but he said instead: A substitute for a burnt offering, a substitute for a peace offering, learn from his language that he originally intended for it to be a burnt offering, and he then retracted his first intention.
וְרַבִּי יוֹסֵי – אִי אֲמַר: ״תְּמוּרַת עוֹלָה וּשְׁלָמִים״ – הֲוָה אָמֵינָא פַּלְגָא תְּמוּרַת עוֹלָה וּפַלְגָא תְּמוּרַת שְׁלָמִים; לְהָכִי אֲמַר: ״תְּמוּרַת עוֹלָה תְּמוּרַת שְׁלָמִים״ – לְמֵימְרָא דְּכוּלַּהּ עוֹלָה וְכוּלַּהּ שְׁלָמִים הָוְיָא.
And Rabbi Yosei holds that if he had said: A substitute for a burnt offering and a peace offering, I would say that he means that half the animal should be a substitute for a burnt offering and half a substitute for a peace offering. He therefore says: A substitute for a burnt offering, a substitute for a peace offering; that is to say that all of it is a burnt offering and all of it is a peace offering. In any event, according to this explanation, Rabbi Meir does not necessarily hold that one attends only to the first statement.
אֲמַר לֵיהּ: הוּא אָמַר לָא פְּלִיגִי, וַאֲנָא אָמֵינָא פְּלִיגִי.
Rav Dimi said to Abaye: He, Rabba bar bar Ḥana, says that they do not disagree, but I say that they disagree, and Rabbi Meir holds that one attends only to the first statement, in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda in the mishna.
אָמַר עוּלָּא וְאִיתֵּימָא רַב אוֹשַׁעְיָא: אֶפְשָׁר יָדְעִין חַבְרִין בַּבְלָאָה – ״כְּזַיִת״ ״כְּזַיִת״ תְּנַן, אוֹ ״כְּזַיִת״ ״וּכְזַיִת״ תְּנַן?
§ The Gemara returns to discuss the mishna itself: Ulla said, and some say it was Rav Oshaya who said: Perhaps our colleagues, the Babylonians, know whether we learn the language of the improper intention in the mishna as: I hereby slaughter the animal with intent to consume an olive-bulk beyond its designated time, an olive-bulk outside its designated area, or we learn: An olive-bulk beyond its designated time and an olive-bulk outside its designated area?
״כְּזַיִת״ ״כְּזַיִת״ תְּנַן – אֲבָל ״כְּזַיִת״ ״וּכְזַיִת״ דִּבְרֵי הַכֹּל עֵירוּב מַחְשָׁבוֹת הָוֵי; אוֹ דִלְמָא ״כְּזַיִת״ ״וּכְזַיִת״ תְּנַן, דִּלְרַבִּי יְהוּדָה פְּרָטָא הָוֵי – וְכׇל שֶׁכֵּן ״כְּזַיִת״ ״כְּזַיִת״?
The Gemara elaborates: Perhaps we learn: An olive-bulk, an olive-bulk, and it is only in this case that Rabbi Yehuda disagrees with the Rabbis. But if one said: An olive-bulk and an olive-bulk, everyone agrees that it constitutes a combination of intentions, and the animal is not rendered piggul. Or perhaps we learn: An olive-bulk and an olive-bulk, where according to Rabbi Yehuda each term constitutes a separate term despite the use of the conjunction: And, and he holds that one attends only to the first statement, and all the more so if one said: An olive-bulk, an olive-bulk.
תָּא שְׁמַע, דִּבְעָא מִינֵּיהּ לֵוִי מֵרַבִּי: חִישֵּׁב לֶאֱכוֹל כְּזַיִת לְמָחָר בַּחוּץ, מַהוּ? אָמַר לוֹ: זוֹ שְׁאֵילָה! עֵירוּב מַחְשָׁבוֹת הָוֵי.
The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a proof from that dilemma which Levi raised before Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi: If one had intent to consume an olive-bulk the next day outside its designated area, what is the halakha? Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi said to him: This is an excellent question. The answer is that even Rabbi Yehuda concedes that this constitutes a combination of intentions and that the animal is not rendered piggul.
אָמַר לְפָנָיו רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בְּרַבִּי: לֹא מִשְׁנָתֵינוּ הִיא?! לֶאֱכוֹל כְּזַיִת בַּחוּץ כְּזַיִת לְמָחָר; כְּזַיִת לְמָחָר כְּזַיִת בַּחוּץ; כַּחֲצִי זַיִת בַּחוּץ כַּחֲצִי זַיִת לְמָחָר; כַּחֲצִי זַיִת לְמָחָר כַּחֲצִי זַיִת בַּחוּץ – פָּסוּל, וְאֵין בּוֹ כָּרֵת. הָא אִידַּךְ – עֵירוּב מַחְשָׁבוֹת הָוֵי!
Rabbi Shimon, son of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, said before him: How is this an excellent question; is it not our mishna? As we learned in the mishna: If one expressed intent to eat an olive-bulk outside its designated area and an olive-bulk the next day, or an olive-bulk the next day and an olive-bulk outside its designated area, or half an olive-bulk outside its designated area and half an olive-bulk the next day, or half an olive-bulk the next day and half an olive-bulk outside its designated area, the offering is disqualified and there is no liability for karet for burning or partaking of it. Rabbi Yehuda disagrees only with regard to these cases; but in another case, it could easily be inferred that he concedes that it constitutes a combination of intentions.
אֲמַר לֵיהּ: הוּא שָׁאַל בִּי דְּבַר חָכְמָה, וְאַתְּ אָמַרְתָּ מִשְׁנָתֵינוּ?! לְדִידָךְ דְּאַתְנִיתָךְ תַּרְתֵּי – לָא קַשְׁיָא לָךְ;
Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi said to him: Levi asked me a matter of wisdom, and you say our mishna. For you, whom I taught two phrasings of the mishna, both: An olive-bulk, an olive-bulk, and: An olive-bulk and an olive-bulk, the question is not difficult, since my omission of this other case allows you to infer its halakha.
לְדִידֵיהּ דְּלָא אַתְנִיתֵיהּ אֶלָּא חֲדָא, וְשַׁמְעִינְהוּ לְרַבָּנַן דְּקָא גָרְסִי תַּרְתֵּי – וְסָבַר: דִּידִי דַּוְוקָא, וְדִידְהוּ עֵירוּב מַחְשָׁבוֹת הָוֵי? אוֹ דִלְמָא דִּידְהוּ דַּוְוקָא, וּלְדִידִי שַׁיּוֹרֵי שַׁיַּיר לִי; וּמִדְּשַׁיַּיר לִי לְדִידִי הָא – שַׁיַּיר לְהוּ לְדִידְהוּ נָמֵי בְּהָךְ?
For him, whom I taught only one phrasing, and who heard the Rabbis reciting two, the question is excellent, since Levi thought: Perhaps my phrasing is exact, and their additional phrasing constitutes a combination of intentions according to all opinions. Or perhaps their phrasing is exact, and my phrasing omitted this case. And if my phrasing omitted this case, perhaps their phrasing also omitted that other case, even though it is subject to disagreement.
וְהֵי אַתְנְיֵיהּ? אִילֵּימָא ״כְּזַיִת״ ״וּכְזַיִת״ אַתְנְיֵיהּ – הַאי לָאו שִׁיּוּרָא הוּא! אֶלָּא ״כְּזַיִת״ ״כְּזַיִת״ אַתְנְיֵיהּ.
The Gemara asks: And which phrasing did Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi teach Levi? If we say that he taught him: An olive-bulk and an olive-bulk, i.e., that Rabbi Yehuda still holds the terms to be distinct despite the conjunction, this is not an omission, since one can infer a fortiori that the same applies to: An olive-bulk, an olive-bulk. Rather, it must be that he taught him: An olive-bulk, an olive-bulk, so that it was unclear to Levi what the halakha would be if one used the conjunction: And.
וְתִיבְּעֵי לֵיהּ ״כְּזַיִת״ ״וּכְזַיִת״!
The Gemara asks: If so, why did Levi raise the dilemma with regard to the phrasing: The next day outside? Let him raise the dilemma with regard to the phrasing: An olive-bulk and an olive-bulk.
סְבַר: אִיבְעֵי מִינֵּיהּ חֲדָא – דְּשָׁמַעְנָא תַּרְתֵּי. דְּאִי בָּעֵינָא ״כְּזַיִת״ ״וּכְזַיִת״ – הָא נִיחָא אִי אָמַר לִי כְּלָלָא, כׇּל שֶׁכֵּן ״כְּזַיִת לְמָחָר בַּחוּץ״; אֶלָּא אִי אָמַר לִי פְּרָטָא – אַכַּתִּי ״כְּזַיִת לְמָחָר בַּחוּץ״ קָא מִיבַּעְיָא לִי.
The Gemara responds: Levi thought: I will raise one dilemma before him so as to learn two halakhot. As, if I ask only with regard to: An olive-bulk and an olive-bulk, it will work out well if he says to me that Rabbi Yehuda concedes that they constitute one general term, as this would apply all the more so if one said: An olive-bulk the next day outside, which is even more unified. But if he says to me that each term constitutes a separate term according to Rabbi Yehuda, then I will still need to raise the dilemma with regard to the case of: An olive-bulk the next day outside. I will therefore inquire with regard to the latter case.
אִי הָכִי, הַשְׁתָּא נָמֵי – הָתִינַח אִי אָמַר לֵיהּ ״כְּזַיִת לְמָחָר בַּחוּץ״ פְּרָטָא, כׇּל שֶׁכֵּן ״כְּזַיִת״ ״וּכְזַיִת״; אֶלָּא אִי אָמַר לֵיהּ כְּלָלָא, אַכַּתִּי ״כְּזַיִת״ ״וּכְזַיִת״ מִיבְּעֵי לֵיהּ!
The Gemara challenges: If so, now too, it works out well if he says to him that Rabbi Yehuda maintains that the wording: An olive-bulk the next day outside, is constituted of separate terms, as this would apply all the more so if one said: An olive-bulk and an olive-bulk, which is less unified. But if he says to him that it is one general term according to Rabbi Yehuda, then he will still need to raise the dilemma with regard to the case of: An olive-bulk and an olive-bulk.
אִם כֵּן מִרְתָּח רָתַח:
The Gemara responds: If Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi answered in this manner, i.e., that Rabbi Yehuda concedes that: An olive-bulk the next day outside, is considered one term, he would unwittingly provide the answer to the other question as well. As, if Rabbi Yehuda had also conceded with regard to: An olive-bulk and an olive-bulk, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi would become angry with Levi for asking the wrong question and say:
