בבא בתרא יג

בבא בתרא יג

חַד גִּיסָא נִגְרָא וְחַד גִּיסָא נַהֲרָא – פָּלְגִין לַהּ בְּקַרְנָא זוֹל.

If there is a water channel on one side of the field and a river on the other side, the field is divided diagonally [bekarna zol] between the two brothers, so that they each receive land adjoining both the river and the water channel.

וְלֹא אֶת הַטְּרַקְלִין כּוּ׳. אֵין בָּהֶן כְּדַי לָזֶה וּכְדֵי לָזֶה, מַהוּ? רַב יְהוּדָה אָמַר: אִית דִּינָא דְּ״גוּד, אוֹ אֶגּוּד״. רַב נַחְמָן אָמַר: לֵית דִּינָא דְּ״גוּד, אוֹ אֶגּוּד״.

§ The mishna teaches that a hall, a drawing room, and the like should not be divided unless the two parties will be able to use their respective portions in the same manner that they had previously used them. The Gemara asks: What is the halakha if there is not enough for this one and that one? What is to be done if one of the parties wishes to dissolve the partnership? Rav Yehuda said: There is a halakha of: Either you set a price or I will set a price. That is to say, one party can say to the other: Set a price you are willing to pay for my share, and I will sell my share to you or purchase your share from you at that price. Rav Naḥman said: There is no halakha of: Either you set a price or I will set a price; rather, the partnership continues.

אֲמַר לֵיהּ רָבָא לְרַב נַחְמָן: לְדִידָךְ דְּאָמְרַתְּ לֵית דִּינָא דְּ״גוּד אוֹ אֶגּוּד״, בְּכוֹר וּפָשׁוּט שֶׁהִנִּיחַ לָהֶן אֲבִיהֶן עֶבֶד וּבְהֵמָה טְמֵאָה, כֵּיצַד עוֹשִׂין? אֲמַר לֵיהּ, שֶׁאֲנִי אוֹמֵר: עוֹבֵד לָזֶה יוֹם אֶחָד, וְלָזֶה שְׁנֵי יָמִים.

Rava said to Rav Naḥman: According to you who say that there is no halakha of: Either you set a price or I will set a price, what should they do if there was a firstborn son and an ordinary brother whose father left them a slave and a non-kosher animal as an inheritance? How are they to be divided? Rav Naḥman said to him: I say that they work for this one, the ordinary brother, one day, and for the other one, the firstborn, two days.

מֵיתִיבִי: מִי שֶׁחֶצְיוֹ עֶבֶד וְחֶצְיוֹ בֶּן חוֹרִין – עוֹבֵד אֶת רַבּוֹ יוֹם אֶחָד, וְאֶת עַצְמוֹ יוֹם אֶחָד; דִּבְרֵי בֵּית הִלֵּל. בֵּית שַׁמַּאי אוֹמְרִים: תִּקַּנְתֶּם אֶת רַבּוֹ; אֶת עַצְמוֹ לֹא תִּקַּנְתֶּם! לִישָּׂא שִׁפְחָה – אֵינוֹ יָכוֹל, לִישָּׂא בַּת חוֹרִין – אֵינוֹ יָכוֹל; יִבָּטֵל?! וַהֲלֹא לֹא נִבְרָא הָעוֹלָם אֶלָּא לִפְרִיָּה וּרְבִיָּה, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר: ״לֹא תֹהוּ בְרָאָהּ, לָשֶׁבֶת יְצָרָהּ״!

The Gemara raises an objection to Rav Yehuda’s approach from what is taught in a mishna (Gittin 41a): One who is half-slave half-freeman, e.g., a slave who had been jointly owned by two people, one of whom emancipated him, serves his master one day and himself one day; this is the statement of Beit Hillel. Beit Shammai say: You have remedied the situation of his master, who benefits fully from all his rights to the slave, but you have not remedied his own situation. He cannot marry a maidservant, since half of him is free, and a free Jew may not marry a Canaanite maidservant. He is also not able to marry a free woman, since half of him is a slave, and a Jewish woman may not marry a Canaanite slave. And if you say he should be idle and not marry, but is it not true that the world was created only for procreation, as it is stated: “He did not create it to be a waste; He formed it to be inhabited” (Isaiah 45:18)?

אֶלָּא כּוֹפִין אֶת רַבּוֹ – וְעוֹשִׂין אוֹתוֹ בֶּן חוֹרִין, וְכוֹתְבִין שְׁטָר עַל חֲצִי דָּמָיו. וְחָזְרוּ בֵּית הִלֵּל לְהוֹרוֹת כְּדִבְרֵי בֵּית שַׁמַּאי!

Rather, the court forces his master to make him a freeman by emancipating the half that he owns, and the court writes a bill in which the slave accepts responsibility to pay half his value to his master. This was the original version of the mishna. The ultimate version of the mishna records the retraction of Beit Hillel: And Beit Hillel retracted its opinion and ruled in accordance with the statement of Beit Shammai. This indicates that it is only in this case, where there is the particular consideration of procreation, that the court compels one of the parties to forfeit his portion and dissolve the partnership. But in other cases there is no halakha of: Either you set a price or I will set a price.

שָׁאנֵי הָכָא, דְּ״אֶגּוּד״ אִיכָּא, ״גּוּד״ לֵיכָּא.

The Gemara answers: It is different here, because the slave can say: I will set a price, but he is not able to say: You set a price. In other words, the slave cannot offer to sell himself, because his Jewish side precludes him from selling himself as a Canaanite slave. Therefore, the court would not be able force the master to sell his share, were it not for the consideration of procreation. By contrast, in a situation where either side can buy or sell, one partner can compel the other to either buy his portion or sell his portion to him.

תָּא שְׁמַע: שְׁנֵי אַחִין – אֶחָד עָנִי וְאֶחָד עָשִׁיר, וְהִנִּיחַ לָהֶן אֲבִיהֶן מֶרְחָץ וּבֵית הַבַּד; עֲשָׂאָן לְשָׂכָר – הַשָּׂכָר לָאֶמְצַע; עֲשָׂאָן לְעַצְמוֹ – הֲרֵי עָשִׁיר אוֹמֵר לֶעָנִי:

The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a proof from what is taught in a mishna (172a): In a case where there are two brothers, one poor and one rich, and their father left them a bathhouse or an olive press as an inheritance, if the father had built these facilities for profit, i.e., to charge others for using them, the profit that accrues after the father’s death is shared equally by the two brothers. If the father had built them for himself and for the members of his household to use, the poor brother, who has little use for these amenities, cannot force the rich brother to convert the facilities to commercial use; rather, the rich brother can say to the poor brother:

״קַח לְךָ עֲבָדִים וְיִרְחֲצוּ בַּמֶּרְחָץ״, ״קַח לְךָ זֵיתִים, וּבֹא וַעֲשֵׂה בְּבֵית הַבַּד״! הָתָם נָמֵי, ״גּוּד״ אִיכָּא, ״אֶגּוּד״ לֵיכָּא.

Go take servants for yourself, and they will bathe in the bathhouse. Or he can say: Go take olives for yourself and come and transform them into oil in the olive press. Evidently, the poor brother cannot say to him: Buy my share. The Gemara rejects this proof: There too the poor brother can say: You set a price and buy my share, as the rich brother has the means to buy his poor brother’s portion; but he is not able to say: Or else I will set a price and buy your share, as the poor brother does not have the money to buy his brother out.

תָּא שְׁמַע: כׇּל שֶׁאִילּוּ יֵחָלֵק וּשְׁמוֹ עָלָיו – חוֹלְקִין, אִם לָאו – מַעֲלִין אוֹתוֹ בְּדָמִים! תַּנָּאֵי הִיא – דְּתַנְיָא: ״טוֹל אַתָּה שִׁיעוּר, וַאֲנִי פָּחוֹת״ – שׁוֹמְעִין לוֹ. רַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל אוֹמֵר: אֵין שׁוֹמְעִין לוֹ.

The Gemara further proposes: Come and hear a proof from what is taught in a baraita: Anything which, even after it is divided, each of the parts retains the name of the original item, may be divided. And if the parts will not retain the original name, the item should not be divided, but rather its monetary value is assessed, because one of the joint owners can say to the other: Either you set a price and buy it from me, or I will set a price and buy it from you. The Gemara explains: Actually, this matter is a dispute between tanna’im, as it is taught in a baraita: If a courtyard or the like was not large enough to warrant division into two, and one of the co-owners said to the other: You take a minimum measure of the courtyard, e.g., four cubits, and I will take less, the court listens to him. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: They do not listen to him.

הֵיכִי דָמֵי? אִילֵּימָא כִּדְתָנֵי – מַאי טַעְמָא דְּרַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל? אֶלָּא לָאו חַסּוֹרֵי מְחַסְּרָא, וְהָכִי קָאָמַר: ״טוֹל אַתָּה שִׁיעוּר וַאֲנִי פָּחוֹת״ – שׁוֹמְעִין לוֹ. וְ״גוּד אוֹ אֶגּוּד״ – נָמֵי שׁוֹמְעִין לוֹ. וַאֲתָא רַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל לְמֵימַר: אֵין שׁוֹמְעִין לוֹ?

The Gemara clarifies the baraita: What are the circumstances of the case under discussion? If we say it is exactly as it is taught, what is Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel’s reasoning? Why does he rule that the court ignores the party who is prepared to settle for less? Rather, is it not that the baraita is incomplete and this is what it is saying: If one of the co-owners said to the other: You take a minimum measure of the courtyard, and I will take less, all agree that the court listens to him. And the tanna of the baraita adds: And if one says: Either you set a price and buy it from me, or I will set a price and buy it from you, they also listen to him. And Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel comes to say: In the first case the court does listen to him, but they do not listen to him when he says: Either you set a price or I will set a price. Accordingly, this issue is the subject of a tannaitic dispute.

לָא, לְעוֹלָם כִּדְקָתָנֵי; וּדְקָאָמְרַתְּ: מַאי טַעְמָא דְּרַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל? מִשּׁוּם דְּאָמַר לֵיהּ: אִי בִּדְמֵי – לֵית לִי דְּמֵי לְמִיתַּן לָךְ; בְּמַתָּנָה – לָא נִיחָא לִי, דִּכְתִיב: ״וְשׂוֹנֵא מַתָּנֹת יִחְיֶה״.

The Gemara rejects this interpretation of the baraita: No, the baraita should actually be understood exactly as it is taught. And with regard to what you said: What is Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel’s reasoning? Why can’t one of the parties say that they should divide the property and he will settle for less? It is because the second one can say to him: If you want me to compensate you with money for the difference between my share and your share, I have no money to give you. And if you wish to give it to me as a gift, I am not at ease with that, as it is written: “But he who hates gifts shall live” (Proverbs 15:27). The baraita indicates that there is a halakha of: Either you set a price or I will set a price, in accordance with the opinion of Rav Yehuda.

אֲמַר לֵיהּ אַבָּיֵי לְרַב יוֹסֵף: הָא דְּרַב יְהוּדָה – דִּשְׁמוּאֵל הִיא, דִּתְנַן: וְכִתְבֵי הַקּוֹדֶשׁ, אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁשְּׁנֵיהֶם רוֹצִים – לֹא יַחְלוֹקוּ. וְאָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל: לֹא שָׁנוּ אֶלָּא בְּכֶרֶךְ אֶחָד, אֲבָל בִּשְׁנֵי כְּרִיכוֹת – חוֹלְקִין. וְאִי סָלְקָא דַעְתָּךְ לֵית דִּינָא דְּ״גוּד״ אוֹ ״אֶגּוּד״, מַאי אִירְיָא בְּכֶרֶךְ אֶחָד? אֲפִילּוּ בִּשְׁנֵי כְּרִיכִין נָמֵי!

As a continuation of this discussion, Abaye said to Rav Yosef: That statement of Rav Yehuda is actually the opinion of Shmuel, his teacher, as we learned in the mishna (11a): But in the case of sacred writings, i.e., a scroll of any of the twenty-four books of the Bible, that were inherited by two people, they may not divide them, even if both of them wish to do so, because it would be a show of disrespect to cut the scroll in half. And Shmuel said: They taught that sacred writings should not be divided only if they are contained in one scroll; but when they are contained in two scrolls, they may be divided. And if it should enter your mind to say that there is no halakha of: Either you set a price or I will set a price, why does the halakha apply specifically to one scroll? Even if the sacred writings were contained in two scrolls, they should also not divide them, since the respective parts will not be even and one of the recipients will have to compensate the other.

תַּרְגְּמָא רַב שַׁלְמָן – בְּשֶׁשְּׁנֵיהֶן רוֹצִין.

Rav Shalman interpreted the mishna: It is referring to a case where they both want to divide the sacred writings; therefore, Shmuel said that they may do so when they are contained in two scrolls. But if just one of them wishes to divide them, there is no proof that he can compel the other one to accept the division.

אָמַר אַמֵּימָר, הִלְכְתָא: אִית דִּינָא דְּ״גוּד״ אוֹ ״אֶגּוּד״. אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַב אָשֵׁי לְאַמֵּימָר: הָא דְּרַב נַחְמָן, מַאי? אֲמַר לֵיהּ: לָא שְׁמִיעָא לִי; כְּלוֹמַר, לָא סְבִירָא לִי. וְלָא?! וְהָא רָבִין בַּר חִינָּנָא וְרַב דִּימִי בַּר חִינָּנָא שְׁבַק לְהוּ אֲבוּהּ תַּרְתֵּי אַמְהָתָא, חֲדָא יָדְעָא אָפְיָא וּבַשּׁוֹלֵי, וַחֲדָא יָדְעָא פִּילְכָּא וְנַוְולָא; וַאֲתוֹ לְקַמֵּיהּ דְּרָבָא, וַאֲמַר לְהוּ: לֵית דִּינָא דְּ״גוּד״ אוֹ ״אֶגּוּד״!

Ameimar said: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rav Yehuda that there is a halakha of: Either you set a price or I will set a price. Rav Ashi said to Ameimar: What about that statement of Rav Naḥman, who disagrees with Rav Yehuda and says that there is no such halakha? Ameimar said to him: I do not know of it, that is to say, I do not maintain this opinion. The Gemara asks: And is the halakha not in accordance with the opinion of Rav Naḥman? But it happened that the father of Ravin bar Ḥinnana and Rav Dimi bar Ḥinnana died and left them two maidservants, one of whom knew how to bake and to cook, and the other of whom knew how to spin and to weave. One of the brothers suggested that each of them take one of the maidservants entirely for himself and forfeit his rights to the other maidservant. They came before Rava and he said to them: There is no halakha of: Either you set a price or I will set a price.

שָׁאנֵי הָתָם – דִּלְמַר מִיבְּעֵי לֵיהּ תַּרְוַיְיהוּ, וּלְמָר מִיבְּעֵי לֵיהּ תַּרְוַיְיהוּ; כִּי קָאָמַר לֵיהּ: שְׁקוֹל אַתְּ חֲדָא וַאֲנָא חֲדָא – לָאו ״גּוּד״ אוֹ ״אֶגּוּד״ הוּא. וְכִי לָא מָצֵי לְמֵימַר הָכִי?! וְהָא כִּתְבֵי הַקֹּדֶשׁ, דְּתַרְוַיְיהוּ מִיבְּעֵי לְהוּ, וְאָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל: לֹא שָׁנוּ אֶלָּא בְּכֶרֶךְ אֶחָד, אֲבָל בִּשְׁנֵי כְּרִיכִין – חוֹלְקִין! הָא תַּרְגְּמָא רַב שַׁלְמָן בְּשֶׁרָצוּ.

The Gemara answers: It is different there, since this master wanted both of them and the other master wanted both of them. Therefore, when one of the brothers said to the other: You take one and I will take the other one, it is not a case of: Either you set a price or I will set a price. The Gemara asks: And can we not say so? But there is the case of sacred writings, which both of them presumably want, and Shmuel said: They taught that sacred writings should not be divided only if they are contained in one scroll; but when they are contained in two scrolls, they may be divided. The Gemara answers: Rav Shalman interpreted the mishna: It is referring to a case where they both want to divide the sacred writings, and in such a case they may divide them, provided that they are in two scrolls.

תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: מַדְבִּיק אָדָם תּוֹרָה נְבִיאִים וּכְתוּבִים כְּאֶחָד, דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי מֵאִיר. רַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר: תּוֹרָה בִּפְנֵי עַצְמָהּ, נְבִיאִים בִּפְנֵי עַצְמָן, וּכְתוּבִים בִּפְנֵי עַצְמָן. וַחֲכָמִים אוֹמְרִים: כׇּל אֶחָד וְאֶחָד בִּפְנֵי עַצְמוֹ.

§ The Gemara now begins a general discussion about sacred writings. The Sages taught: A person may attach the Torah, the Prophets, and the Writings together as one scroll; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Yehuda says: The Torah should be a scroll by itself, the books of the Prophets a scroll by themselves, and the books of the Writings a scroll by themselves. And the Sages say: Each one of the books of the Prophets and the Writings should be a scroll by itself.

וְאָמַר רַבִּי יְהוּדָה: מַעֲשֶׂה בְּבַיְתוֹס בֶּן זוֹנִין, שֶׁהָיוּ לוֹ שְׁמֹנָה נְבִיאִים מְדוּבָּקִין כְּאֶחָד, עַל פִּי רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר בֶּן עֲזַרְיָה. וְיֵשׁ אוֹמְרִים: לֹא הָיוּ לוֹ אֶלָּא אֶחָד אֶחָד בִּפְנֵי עַצְמוֹ. אָמַר רַבִּי: מַעֲשֶׂה וְהֵבִיאוּ לְפָנֵינוּ תּוֹרָה נְבִיאִים וּכְתוּבִים מְדוּבָּקִים כְּאֶחָד, וְהִכְשַׁרְנוּם.

And Rabbi Yehuda said: There was an incident involving Baitos ben Zunin, who had eight books of the Prophets attached together as one scroll, and he did this with the approval of Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya. And others say that each and every one of the books was a scroll by itself, in accordance with the opinion of the Sages. Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi said: There was an incident where they brought before us the Torah, the Prophets, and the Writings attached together as one scroll and we ruled in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir and deemed them fit.

בֵּין חוּמָּשׁ לְחוּמָּשׁ שֶׁל תּוֹרָה – אַרְבָּעָה שִׁיטִין; וְכֵן בֵּין כׇּל נָבִיא לְנָבִיא. וּבְנָבִיא שֶׁל שְׁנֵים עָשָׂר – שָׁלֹשׁ שִׁיטִין. וּמְסַיֵּים מִלְּמַטָּה, וּמַתְחִיל מִלְּמַעְלָה.

The Gemara states: When different books are included in the same scroll, four empty lines of space should be left between each book of the Torah, and similarly between one book of the Prophets and another. But between each of the books of the Twelve Prophets only three empty lines should be left, because they are considered one book. And the scribe may finish a book at the bottom of one column and begin the next book at the top of the next column without leaving any empty space in between.

תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: הָרוֹצֶה לְדַבֵּק תּוֹרָה נְבִיאִים וּכְתוּבִים כְּאֶחָד – מְדַבֵּק; וְעוֹשֶׂה בְּרֹאשׁוֹ כְּדֵי לָגוֹל עַמּוּד, וּבְסוֹפוֹ כְּדֵי לָגוֹל הֶיקֵּף; וּמְסַיֵּים מִלְּמַטָּה וּמַתְחִיל מִלְּמַעְלָה;

The Sages taught in a baraita: One who wishes to attach the Torah, the Prophets, and the Writings together as one scroll may attach them. He should leave enough empty parchment at the beginning of the scroll for winding around the pole to which the beginning of the scroll is fastened. And at the end of the scroll he should leave enough empty parchment for winding around the entire circumference of the rolled-up scroll. And he may finish a book at the bottom of one column and begin the next book at the top of the next column without leaving any empty space between them.