בבא קמא סב

בבא קמא סב

בַּמֶּה דְּבָרִים אֲמוּרִים – בְּמַדְלִיק בְּתוֹךְ שֶׁלּוֹ וְהָלְכָה וְדָלְקָה בְּתוֹךְ שֶׁל חֲבֵירוֹ, אֲבָל מַדְלִיק בְּתוֹךְ שֶׁל חֲבֵירוֹ – דִּבְרֵי הַכֹּל מְשַׁלֵּם כׇּל מַה שֶּׁהָיָה בְּתוֹכוֹ.

In what case is this statement said? It is in a case where one kindled a fire on his premises and the fire spread and burned items in premises belonging to another. But with regard to one who kindles a fire on premises belonging to another that destroys a stack of wheat, all agree that he pays compensation for everything that was inside the stack.

וּמוֹדֶה רַבִּי יְהוּדָה לַחֲכָמִים בְּמַשְׁאִיל מָקוֹם לַחֲבֵירוֹ לְהַגְדִּישׁ גָּדִישׁ, וְהִגְדִּישׁ וְהִטְמִין, שֶׁאֵין מְשַׁלֵּם אֶלָּא דְּמֵי גָדִישׁ בִּלְבָד. לְהַגְדִּישׁ חִטִּין וְהִגְדִּישׁ שְׂעוֹרִין; שְׂעוֹרִין וְהִגְדִּישׁ חִטִּין; חִטִּין וְחִיפָּן בִּשְׂעוֹרִין; שְׂעוֹרִין וְחִיפָּן בְּחִטִּים – שֶׁאֵינוֹ מְשַׁלֵּם אֶלָּא דְּמֵי שְׂעוֹרִין בִּלְבָד.

And Rabbi Yehuda concedes to the Rabbis that in a case where one lends space to another in his field to stack grain, and this person stacked grain in the field and concealed items inside the stack, if the owner of the field causes the stack to be burned down, he pays compensation for the stack alone, since the other person did not have permission to conceal items inside his stack. Similarly, if one received permission to stack wheat in the field of another and he stacked barley; or conversely, if he received permission to stack barley and he stacked wheat; or similarly, if he stacked wheat and covered the stack with barley, or stacked barley and covered the stack with wheat, in all these cases, Rabbi Yehuda concedes that he pays compensation for the barley alone, which is less than the value of wheat.

אָמַר רָבָא: הַנּוֹתֵן דִּינַר זָהָב לְאִשָּׁה, וְאָמַר לָהּ: ״הִזָּהֲרִי בּוֹ, שֶׁל כֶּסֶף הוּא״; הִזִּיקַתּוּ – מְשַׁלֶּמֶת דִּינַר זָהָב, מִשּׁוּם דְּאָמַר לַהּ: מַאי הֲוָה לִיךְ גַּבֵּיהּ דְּאַזַּקְתֵּיהּ. פָּשְׁעָה בּוֹ – מְשַׁלֶּמֶת שֶׁל כֶּסֶף, דְּאָמְרָה לֵיהּ: נְטִירוּתָא דְכַסְפָּא קַבֵּילִי עֲלַי, נְטִירוּתָא דְּדַהֲבָא לָא קַבֵּילִי עֲלַי.

§ Rava says: With regard to one who gives a gold dinar to a woman for safekeeping and says to her: Be careful with this dinar because it is made of silver, if she herself damaged the dinar, she must pay compensation for the value of a gold dinar. This is because he can say to her: What business did you have damaging it? If she was negligent and it was lost or stolen, she pays as compensation only the value of a silver dinar, since she can say to him: I undertook to safeguard only a silver dinar, but I did not undertake to safeguard a gold dinar.

אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַב מָרְדֳּכַי לְרַב אָשֵׁי: אַתּוּן – בִּדְרָבָא מַתְנִיתוּ לַהּ; אֲנַן – מִמַּתְנִיתָא פְּשִׁיטָא לַן: חִטִּין וְחִיפָּן בִּשְׂעוֹרִין, שְׂעוֹרִין וְחִיפָּן בְּחִטִּין – אֵינוֹ מְשַׁלֵּם אֶלָּא דְּמֵי שְׂעוֹרִין בִּלְבָד. אַלְמָא אֲמַר לֵיהּ: ״נְטִירוּתָא דִשְׂעָרֵי קַבֵּילִי עֲלַי״, הָכָא נָמֵי אֲמַרָה לֵיהּ: ״נְטִירוּתָא דְּדַהֲבָא לָא קַבֵּילִי עֲלַי״.

Rav Mordekhai said to Rav Ashi: You teach this halakha as a statement of Rava, but for us this halakha is obvious from the baraita that taught: If one stacked wheat and covered the stack with barley, or stacked barley and covered the stack with wheat, the one responsible for the fire pays compensation for the barley alone. Evidently, the one who kindled the fire can say to the owner of the stack: I undertook to safeguard a stack of barley but not a stack of wheat. Here too, in the case of a golden dinar presented as a silver dinar, the woman can say to him: I did not undertake to safeguard a gold dinar.

אָמַר רַב: שְׁמַעִית מִילְּתָא לְרַבִּי יְהוּדָה, וְלָא יָדַעְנָא מַאי הִיא. אָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל: וְלָא יָדַע אַבָּא מַאי שְׁמִיעַ לֵיהּ? לְרַבִּי יְהוּדָה, דִּמְחַיֵּיב עַל נִזְקֵי טָמוּן בָּאֵשׁ – עָשׂוּ תַּקָּנַת נִגְזָל בְּאִשּׁוֹ.

§ Rav said: I heard a halakhic matter in connection with Rabbi Yehuda’s opinion in the mishna but I do not know what it is. Shmuel said: And does Abba, which was Rav’s name, really not know what he heard? This is the statement that he heard: According to the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, who deems one liable for concealed articles damaged by a fire, the Sages applied the ordinance of a robbery victim to one whose concealed items are damaged by his fire. Just as the Sages instituted an ordinance that a robbery victim can take an oath as to what was stolen from him and the robber must repay him accordingly, similarly, according to Rabbi Yehuda the owner of the stack can take an oath that certain items were inside the stack, and the one responsible for the fire must pay compensation for them.

בָּעֵי אַמֵּימָר: עָשׂוּ תַּקָּנַת נִגְזָל בְּמָסוֹר, אוֹ לָא? אַלִּיבָּא דְּמַאן דְּאָמַר לָא דָּיְינִינַן דִּינָא דִגְרָמֵי – לָא תִּבְּעֵי לָךְ, דְּמָסוֹרוֹת נָמֵי לָא דָּיְינִינַן;

Ameimar asks: Did they apply this ordinance of a robbery victim in the case of an informer who causes another person’s property to be confiscated by the gentile authorities, or not? The question is clarified: According to the opinion of the one who says that we do not judge cases of liability for damage caused by indirect action, do not ask the question, as according to that opinion we also do not judge cases of liability for informers who cause indirect damage.

אֶלָּא כִּי תִּבְּעֵי לָךְ, אַלִּיבָּא דְּמַאן דְּאָמַר דָּיְינִינַן דִּינָא דִגְרָמֵי – עָשׂוּ תַּקָּנַת נִגְזָל בְּמָסוֹר, דְּמִשְׁתְּבַע וְשָׁקֵיל, אוֹ לָא? תֵּיקוּ.

Rather, when you ask this question, it is in accordance with the opinion of the one who said that we judge cases of liability for damage caused by indirect action, and the question is: Did the Sages apply the ordinance of a robbery victim to one whose items were taken due to an informer, meaning that the victim can take an oath to support his claim with regard to what was taken and take this amount in compensation, or not? No conclusion was reached about this, and the dilemma shall stand unresolved.

הָהוּא גַּבְרָא דִּבְטַשׁ בְּכַסְפְּתָא דְחַבְרֵיהּ, שַׁדְיַיהּ בְּנַהֲרָא. אֲתָא מָרֵיהּ וְאָמַר: הָכִי וְהָכִי הֲוָה לִי בְּגַוַּהּ. יָתֵיב רַב אָשֵׁי וְקָא מְעַיֵּין בֵּיהּ: כִּי הַאי גַוְונָא מַאי?

An incident was related about a certain man who kicked a safe belonging to another, sending it flying into the river. The owner of the safe came to court and said: I had such and such inside it. Rav Ashi sat and was investigating the question: In a case like this, what is the halakha? Does the court believe the claimant or not?

אֲמַר לֵיהּ רָבִינָא לְרַב אַחָא בְּרֵיהּ דְּרָבָא, וְאָמְרִי לַהּ רַב אַחָא בְּרֵיהּ דְּרָבָא לְרַב אָשֵׁי: לָאו הַיְינוּ מַתְנִיתִין? דִּתְנַן: וּמוֹדִים חֲכָמִים לְרַבִּי יְהוּדָה בְּמַדְלִיק אֶת הַבִּירָה, שֶׁמְּשַׁלֵּם כׇּל מַה שֶּׁבְּתוֹכוֹ; שֶׁכֵּן דֶּרֶךְ בְּנֵי אָדָם לְהַנִּיחַ בַּבָּתִּים.

Ravina said to Rav Aḥa, son of Rava, and some say that Rav Aḥa, son of Rava, said to Rav Ashi: Is this not identical to the case of the mishna, as we learned in the mishna: And the Rabbis concede to Rabbi Yehuda that if one sets fire to a building, he pays compensation for everything that was burned inside it, since it is the normal way of people to place items in houses? Similarly, it is the normal way of people to place money in a safe, and the court should rely on the claim of the victim.

אֲמַר לֵיהּ: אִי דְּקָא טָעֵין זוּזֵי – הָכָא נָמֵי, הָכָא בְּמַאי עָסְקִינַן – דְּקָא טָעֵין מַרְגָּנִיתָא. מַאי? מִי מַנְּחִי אִינָשֵׁי מַרְגָּנִיתָא בְּכַסְפְּתָא, אוֹ לָא? תֵּיקוּ.

Rav Ashi said to him: If the claimant were to claim that there were coins in the safe, this ruling would apply here also. But with what are we dealing here? We are dealing with a case where the claimant claims that there was a pearl [marganita] in the safe. What is the halakha? Do people typically place pearls in a safe, in which case he should be believed, or not? The dilemma shall stand unresolved.

אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַב יֵימַר לְרַב אָשֵׁי: טָעֵין כָּסָא דְכַסְפָּא בְּבִירָה, מַאי? אֲמַר לֵיהּ: (חָזֵינָא) [חָזֵינַן], אִי אִינִישׁ אֲמִיד הוּא – דְּאִית לֵיהּ כָּסָא דְכַסְפָּא, אִי נָמֵי אִינִישׁ מְהֵימְנָא הוּא – דְּמַפְקְדִי אִינָשֵׁי גַּבֵּיהּ; מִשְׁתְּבַע וְשָׁקֵיל. וְאִי לָא, לָאו כֹּל כְּמִינֵּיהּ.

Rav Yeimar said to Rav Ashi: If the one whose home was burned by the fire were to claim that he had, among other items, a silver goblet in the building, what is the halakha? Is he believed or not? Rav Ashi said to him: We view his situation. If he is a wealthy person, who would typically have a silver goblet, or alternatively, if he is a trustworthy person with whom people entrust valuable items, he can take an oath that this is what he had and take compensation according to his claim. But if he is not such a person, it is not in his power to be believed in such a claim.

אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַב אַדָּא בְּרֵיהּ דְּרַב אַוְיָא לְרַב אָשֵׁי: מָה בֵּין גַּזְלָן לְחַמְסָן? אֲמַר לֵיהּ: חַמְסָן – יָהֵיב דְּמֵי, גַּזְלָן – לָא יָהֵיב דְּמֵי.

§ Rav Adda, son of Rav Avya, said to Rav Ashi: Concerning two terms used to describe those who take another’s property against his will, a gazlan and a ḥamsan, what is the difference between them? Rav Ashi said to him: A ḥamsan gives money for the article that he takes from its owner, albeit against the owner’s will, whereas a gazlan does not give money.

אֲמַר לֵיהּ: אִי יָהֵיב דְּמֵי – חַמְסָן קָרֵית לֵיהּ?! וְהָאָמַר רַב הוּנָא: תְּלוּהּ וְזַבֵּין – זְבִינֵיהּ זְבִינֵי! לָא קַשְׁיָא, הָא דְּאָמַר ״רוֹצֶה אֲנִי״, הָא דְּלָא אָמַר ״רוֹצֶה אֲנִי״.

Rav Adda was puzzled by this response and said to him: If he gives money, do you still call him a ḥamsan? Since he pays money for it, he acquires it lawfully, despite the fact that its owner did not sell it voluntarily. But doesn’t Rav Huna say: If one was strung up so that another could coerce him to sell a certain item, and he sold it, his sale is a valid sale. This indicates that a sale under duress is considered a valid sale. Rav Ashi answered: This is not difficult. This case, where the sale under duress is legally considered to be a sale, is referring to a case where he eventually says: I want to sell the item, despite having been forced. By contrast, in that case, where the sale is invalid, he did not say: I want to sell the item.

מַתְנִי׳ גֵּץ שֶׁיָּצָא מִתַּחַת הַפַּטִּישׁ וְהִזִּיק – חַיָּיב.

MISHNA: In the case of a spark that emerged from under the hammer of a blacksmith and started a fire, causing damage, the blacksmith is liable for the damage caused.

גָּמָל שֶׁהָיָה טָעוּן פִּשְׁתָּן, וְעָבַר בִּרְשׁוּת הָרַבִּים, וְנִכְנְסָה פִּשְׁתָּנוֹ לְתוֹךְ הַחֲנוּת וְדָלְקָה בְּנֵרוֹ שֶׁל חֶנְוָנִי, וְהִדְלִיק אֶת הַבִּירָה – בַּעַל גָּמָל חַיָּיב. הִנִּיחַ חֶנְוָנִי נֵרוֹ מִבַּחוּץ – הַחֶנְוָנִי חַיָּיב. רַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר: בְּנֵר חֲנוּכָּה – פָּטוּר.

In the case of a camel that was laden with flax and was passing through the public domain, and its flax extended into a store and the flax caught fire from a lamp in the store belonging to the storekeeper, and as a result of the burning flax the camel set fire to the building together with all its contents, the owner of the camel is liable. But if the storekeeper placed his lamp outside, thereby causing the flax on the camel to catch fire, and consequently the building was set on fire, the storekeeper is liable. Rabbi Yehuda says: In a case where the lamp placed outside was a Hanukkah lamp, the storekeeper is exempt, since it is a mitzva for a Hanukkah lamp to be placed outside.

גְּמָ׳ אָמַר רָבִינָא מִשְּׁמֵיהּ דְּרָבָא: שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ מִדְּרַבִּי יְהוּדָה, נֵר חֲנוּכָּה – מִצְוָה לְהַנִּיחָהּ בְּתוֹךְ עֲשָׂרָה. דְּאִי סָלְקָא דַּעְתָּךְ לְמַעְלָה מֵעֲשָׂרָה, אַמַּאי אָמַר רַבִּי יְהוּדָה: נֵר חֲנוּכָּה פָּטוּר? לֵימָא לֵיהּ: הֲוָה לֵיהּ לְאַנּוֹחַהּ לְמַעְלָה מִגָּמָל וְרוֹכְבוֹ! אֶלָּא לָאו שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ: מִצְוָה לְהַנִּיחָהּ בְּתוֹךְ עֲשָׂרָה?

GEMARA: Ravina said in the name of Rava: Conclude from Rabbi Yehuda’s statement that the mitzva is to place the Hanukkah lamp within a height of ten handbreadths from the ground as, if it enters your mind to say that the mitzva can also be fulfilled by placing it above ten handbreadths, why did Rabbi Yehuda say that in the case of a Hanukkah lamp placed outside, the storekeeper is exempt? Let the owner of the camel say to the storekeeper: You should have placed the lamp above the height of a camel and its rider so that the flax would not catch fire. Rather, must one not conclude from here that Rabbi Yehuda’s opinion is that the mitzva is to place it within ten handbreadths of the ground and not higher?

אָמְרִי: לָא; לְעוֹלָם אֵימָא לָךְ אֲפִילּוּ לְמַעְלָה מֵעֲשָׂרָה, מַאי אָמְרַתְּ – אִבְּעִי לָךְ לְאַנּוֹחַהּ לְמַעְלָה מִגָּמָל וְרוֹכְבוֹ? כֵּיוָן דִּבְמִצְוָה קָא עָסֵיק, כּוּלֵּי הַאי לָא אַטְרְחוּהּ רַבָּנַן.

The Sages say in response: No, there is no proof from here. Actually, I could say to you that one may place a Hanukkah lamp even above a height of ten handbreadths, and as for what you said, that the owner of the camel can claim: You should have placed the lamp above the height of a camel and its rider, in response to this one can say: Since the store owner is performing a mitzva by placing his Hanukkah lamp outside, the Sages did not trouble him to such an extent to have him place his lamp at a height that would be inconvenient for him to reach.

אָמַר רַב כָּהֲנָא, דָּרֵשׁ רַב נָתָן בַּר מִנְיוֹמֵי מִשְּׁמֵיהּ דְּרַבִּי תַּנְחוּם: נֵר חֲנוּכָּה שֶׁהִנִּיחָהּ לְמַעְלָה מֵעֶשְׂרִים אַמָּה – פְּסוּלָה, כְּסוּכָּה וּכְמָבוֹי.

Further on the subject of the height of a Hanukkah lamp, Rav Kahana says that Rav Natan bar Minyumi taught in the name of Rabbi Tanḥum: A Hanukkah lamp that is placed higher than twenty cubits from the ground is unfit to be used for the mitzva, since people do not generally look up to such a height, and the main purpose of the Hanukkah lamp is for it to be seen by others. In this regard, the halakha of the height of a Hanukkah lamp is like the halakha of the height of a sukka and the halakha of the height of a cross beam at the entrance to an alleyway, which are unfit for their respective purposes if they are higher than twenty cubits.

הֲדַרַן עֲלָךְ הַכּוֹנֵס.

מַתְנִי׳ מְרוּבָּה מִדַּת תַּשְׁלוּמֵי כֶפֶל מִמִּדַּת תַּשְׁלוּמֵי אַרְבָּעָה וַחֲמִשָּׁה. שֶׁמִּדַּת תַּשְׁלוּמֵי כֶפֶל נוֹהֶגֶת בֵּין בְּדָבָר שֶׁיֵּשׁ בּוֹ רוּחַ חַיִּים וּבֵין בְּדָבָר שֶׁאֵין בּוֹ רוּחַ חַיִּים, וּמִדַּת תַּשְׁלוּמֵי אַרְבָּעָה וַחֲמִשָּׁה אֵינָהּ נוֹהֶגֶת אֶלָּא בְּשׁוֹר וָשֶׂה בִּלְבַד – שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר: ״כִּי יִגְנֹב אִישׁ שׁוֹר אוֹ שֶׂה וּטְבָחוֹ אוֹ מְכָרוֹ וְגוֹ׳״.

MISHNA: The principle of double payment applies more broadly than the principle of fourfold or fivefold payment, as the principle of double payment applies both to the theft of something that is alive and to the theft of something that is not alive, but the principle of fourfold or fivefold payment applies only to the theft of an ox or a sheep, as it is stated: “If a man steal an ox or a sheep, and slaughter it or sell it, he shall pay five oxen for an ox and four sheep for a sheep” (Exodus 21:37).

אֵין הַגּוֹנֵב אַחַר הַגַּנָּב מְשַׁלֵּם תַּשְׁלוּמֵי כֶפֶל, וְלֹא הַטּוֹבֵחַ וְלֹא הַמּוֹכֵר אַחַר הַגַּנָּב מְשַׁלֵּם תַּשְׁלוּמֵי אַרְבָּעָה וַחֲמִשָּׁה.

Having stated a limitation to the halakha of fourfold and fivefold payment, the mishna mentions a further limitation, which applies to all three types of payments. One who steals an item after a thief has already stolen it, i.e., one who steals a stolen item, does not pay the double payment to the thief or to the prior owner, nor does one who slaughters or sells an ox or a sheep after a thief has already stolen it pay the fourfold or fivefold payment. Rather, he pays only the principal, i.e., the value of the item he stole.

גְּמָ׳ וְאִילּוּ ״מִדַּת תַּשְׁלוּמֵי כֶפֶל נוֹהֶגֶת בֵּין בְּגַנָּב בֵּין בְּטוֹעֵן טַעֲנַת גַּנָּב, וּמִדַּת תַּשְׁלוּמֵי אַרְבָּעָה וַחֲמִשָּׁה אֵינָהּ נוֹהֶגֶת אֶלָּא בְּגַנָּב בִּלְבַד״ – לָא קָתָנֵי.

GEMARA: The mishna teaches one particular difference between double payment and fourfold or fivefold payment, while it does not teach this difference between them: The principle of double payment applies both in the case of a thief and in the case of a bailee who falsely states the claim that a thief stole the deposit entrusted to him and who takes an oath to that effect. But the principle of fourfold or fivefold payment applies only in the case of a thief, not in the case of one who falsely claims that a deposit was stolen.

מְסַיַּיע לֵיהּ לְרַבִּי חִיָּיא בַּר אַבָּא, דְּאָמַר רַבִּי חִיָּיא בַּר אַבָּא אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: הַטּוֹעֵן טַעֲנַת גַּנָּב בְּפִקָּדוֹן – מְשַׁלֵּם תַּשְׁלוּמֵי כֶפֶל. טָבַח וּמָכַר – מְשַׁלֵּם תַּשְׁלוּמֵי אַרְבָּעָה וַחֲמִשָּׁה.

The fact that the mishna does not teach the latter distinction supports the opinion of Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba, as Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: In the case of one who falsely states the claim that a thief stole a deposit from him, and it is discovered that he himself is the thief, he pays double payment. And if the stolen item is an ox or sheep and he slaughtered or sold it, he pays the fourfold or fivefold payment. According to Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba, there is no difference between the applications of double payment and fourfold or fivefold payment in this case.

אִיכָּא דְאָמְרִי: לֵימָא מְסַיַּיע לֵיהּ לְרַבִּי חִיָּיא בַּר אַבָּא – דְּאָמַר רַבִּי חִיָּיא בַּר אַבָּא אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: הַטּוֹעֵן טַעֲנַת גַּנָּב בְּפִקָּדוֹן – מְשַׁלֵּם תַּשְׁלוּמֵי כֶפֶל. טָבַח וּמָכַר – מְשַׁלֵּם תַּשְׁלוּמֵי אַרְבָּעָה וַחֲמִשָּׁה?

There are those who say a different version of this discussion: Let us say that the mishna supports the opinion of Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba, as Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: In the case of one who falsely states the claim that a thief stole a deposit from him, and it is discovered that he himself is the thief, he pays double payment. And if the stolen item is an ox or sheep, and he slaughtered or sold it, he pays the fourfold or fivefold payment.

מִי קָתָנֵי: ״אֵין בֵּין״?! ״מְרוּבָּה״ קָתָנֵי – תְּנָא וְשַׁיַּיר.

The Gemara rejects the inference: Does the mishna teach that there is no difference between double payment and fourfold or fivefold payment except for the one mentioned in the mishna? It teaches merely that the principle of double payment applies more broadly than the principle of fourfold or fivefold payment, and it provides an example of this statement. This does not mean that this is the only difference, and it is possible that the tanna taught this one case and omitted others.

שֶׁמִּדַּת תַּשְׁלוּמֵי כֶפֶל נוֹהֶגֶת כּוּ׳. מְנָא הָנֵי מִילֵּי דְּתָנוּ רַבָּנַן: ״עַל כׇּל דְּבַר פֶּשַׁע״ – כָּלַל, ״עַל שׁוֹר, עַל חֲמוֹר, עַל שֶׂה וְעַל שַׂלְמָה״ – פָּרַט, ״עַל כׇּל אֲבֵדָה״ – חָזַר וְכָלַל;

§ The mishna teaches that the principle of double payment applies both to the theft of something that is alive and to the theft of something that is not alive. The Gemara asks: From where are these matters derived? It is as the Sages taught in a baraita with regard to the verse that discusses double payment: “For any matter of trespass, whether it be for an ox, for a donkey, for a sheep, for a garment, or for any manner of lost thing about which one shall say: This is it, the claims of both of them shall come before the judges, the one whom the judges convict shall pay double to his neighbor” (Exodus 22:8). “For any matter of trespass” is a generalization; “whether it be for an ox, for a donkey, for a sheep, for a garment” is a detail. And when the verse states: “Or for any manner of lost thing,” it then generalizes again.

כְּלָל וּפְרָט וּכְלָל – אִי אַתָּה דָן אֶלָּא כְּעֵין הַפְּרָט; מָה הַפְּרָט מְפוֹרָשׁ – דָּבָר הַמִּטַּלְטֵל וְגוּפוֹ מָמוֹן, אַף כֹּל דָּבָר הַמִּטַּלְטֵל וְגוּפוֹ מָמוֹן.

Consequently, this verse contains a generalization, and a detail, and a generalization, and one of the thirteen rules of exegesis states that in such a case you may deduce that the verse is referring only to items similar to the detail. Therefore, just as each of the items mentioned in the detail is clearly defined as an item that is movable property and has intrinsic monetary value, so too double payment is practiced with regard to any item that is movable property and has intrinsic monetary value.

יָצְאוּ קַרְקָעוֹת – שֶׁאֵינָן מִטַּלְטְלִין; יָצְאוּ עֲבָדִים – שֶׁהוּקְּשׁוּ לְקַרְקָעוֹת; יָצְאוּ שְׁטָרוֹת – שֶׁאַף עַל פִּי שֶׁמִּטַּלְטְלִין, אֵין גּוּפָן מָמוֹן; יָצָא הֶקְדֵּשׁ – ״רֵעֵהוּ״ כְּתִיב.

Land is excluded, as it is not movable property. Canaanite slaves are excluded, as they are compared to land in many areas of halakha. Financial documents are excluded, as, although they are movable property, they do not have intrinsic monetary value. The value of the material on which the document is written is negligible; documents are valuable only because they serve as proof for monetary claims. Finally, consecrated property is excluded because it is written in the verse that the one found liable shall pay double to “his neighbor,” i.e., to another person, rather than to the Temple treasury.

אִי, מָה הַפְּרָט מְפוֹרָשׁ – דָּבָר שֶׁנִּבְלָתוֹ מְטַמְּאָ[ה] בְּמַגָּע וּבְמַשָּׂא, אַף כֹּל דָּבָר שֶׁנִּבְלָתוֹ מְטַמְּאָ[ה] בְּמַגָּע וּבְמַשָּׂא, אֲבָל עוֹפוֹת לָא!

The Gemara asks: If the halakha of double payment is limited to cases similar to the details mentioned in the verse, it should also be derived that just as each of the items mentioned in the detail is clearly defined as an item whose carcass transmits impurity through contact and carrying, so too any item whose carcass transmits impurity through contact and carrying it is subject to double payment. But birds, whose carcasses do not transmit impurity through contact or carrying, should not be subject to double payment.

וּמִי מָצֵית אָמְרַתְּ הָכִי? וְהָא ״שַׂלְמָה״ כְּתִיב! אָמְרִי: אֲנַן בְּבַעֲלֵי חַיִּים קָאָמְרִינַן; אֵימָא בְּבַעֲלֵי חַיִּים, דָּבָר שֶׁנִּבְלָתוֹ מְטַמְּאָ[ה] בְּמַגָּע וּבְמַשָּׂא – אִין, דָּבָר שֶׁאֵין נִבְלָתוֹ מְטַמְּאָ[ה] בְּמַגָּע וּבְמַשָּׂא – לָא,

The Gemara objects to the question: But how can you say this? But isn’t “garment” written in the list of specified items (Exodus 22:8)? It is impossible to speak of the impurity of carcasses with regard to clothing. The Gemara responds: Say, in response to this objection: We are speaking specifically of animals, and this is the question that was asked: Why not say that with regard to animals, an animal whose carcass transmits impurity through contact and carrying, yes, it is subject to double payment, whereas an animal whose carcass does not transmit impurity through contact and carrying, such as a bird, no, a thief would not pay double payment for stealing it?