גיטין מח

גיטין מח

בִּזְמַן שֶׁהַיּוֹבֵל נוֹהֵג, רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן אָמַר: מֵבִיא וְקוֹרֵא. רֵישׁ לָקִישׁ אָמַר: מֵבִיא וְאֵינוֹ קוֹרֵא.

in the time when the Jubilee Year is practiced, and every sale of land is only for its produce, because the land returns to its original owners in the Jubilee Year, Rabbi Yoḥanan says: The purchaser brings the first fruits and recites the verses. Reish Lakish says: The purchaser brings the first fruits but he does not recite the verses.

רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן אָמַר מֵבִיא וְקוֹרֵא – קִנְיַן פֵּירוֹת כְּקִנְיַן הַגּוּף דָּמֵי. רֵישׁ לָקִישׁ אָמַר מֵבִיא וְאֵינוֹ קוֹרֵא – קִנְיַן פֵּירוֹת לָאו כְּקִנְיַן הַגּוּף דָּמֵי.

The Gemara explains: Rabbi Yoḥanan says that the purchaser brings the first fruits and recites the verses, because he holds that the acquisition of an item for its produce is considered to be like the acquisition of the item itself. Consequently, the one bringing the fruits can truthfully recite: “The land which You, Lord, have given me” (Deuteronomy 26:10). Reish Lakish says that the purchaser brings the first fruits but he does not recite the verses, because he holds that the acquisition of an item for its produce is not considered to be like the acquisition of the item itself.

וּצְרִיכָא. דְּאִי אִיתְּמַר בְּהָהִיא, בְּהָהִיא קָאָמַר רֵישׁ לָקִישׁ, דְּכִי קָא נָחֵית – אַדַּעְתָּא דְפֵירָא קָא נָחֵית; אֲבָל בְּהָךְ – דְּאַדַּעְתָּא דְגוּפֵיהּ קָא נָחֵית, אֵימָא מוֹדֵי לֵיהּ לְרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן.

The Gemara comments: And it is necessary to state the dispute between Rabbi Yoḥanan and Reish Lakish in both cases. Because if it was stated only in that case, with regard to one who acquires a field for its produce, one might say that it is only in that case that Reish Lakish says that he does not recite the verses, since already when he descended to the field, i.e., took possession of the land, he descended with the intention of acquiring only the produce, as stipulated at the time of the sale; but in this case, with regard to one who purchases the field when the Jubilee Year is practiced, when he descended to the field with the intention of acquiring the land itself, say that he concedes to Rabbi Yoḥanan that he recites the verses. Therefore, it is necessary to state explicitly that Reish Lakish holds that he does not recite the verses in this case as well.

וְאִי אִיתְּמַר בְּהָא, בְּהָא קָאָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן, אֲבָל בְּהָךְ אֵימָא מוֹדֵי לֵיהּ לְרֵישׁ לָקִישׁ; צְרִיכָא.

And if it was stated only in this case, with regard to one who purchases the field when the Jubilee Year is practiced, one might say that it is only in this case that Rabbi Yoḥanan says that it is like the acquisition of the item itself and recites the verses, as he purchased the field to fully own it; but in that case, where the sale was only with regard to the produce, say that he concedes to Reish Lakish that he does not recite the verses. Therefore, it is necessary to state the dispute in both cases.

תָּא שְׁמַע: הַקּוֹנֶה אִילָן וְקַרְקָעוֹ – מֵבִיא וְקוֹרֵא! הָכָא בְּמַאי עָסְקִינַן – בִּזְמַן שֶׁאֵין הַיּוֹבֵל נוֹהֵג.

The Gemara offers a proof in support of Rabbi Yoḥanan’s opinion: Come and hear a proof from the mishna (Bikkurim 1:11): One who acquires a tree and its surrounding land brings the first fruits of those trees and recites the verses, even though he is required to return the land in the Jubilee Year. The Gemara responds: With what are we dealing here according to the opinion of Reish Lakish? The mishna is referring to one who acquires a tree and its surrounding land in the time when the Jubilee Year is not practiced, so the acquisition is permanent.

תָּא שְׁמַע: הַקּוֹנֶה שְׁנֵי אִילָנוֹת בְּתוֹךְ שָׂדֵהוּ שֶׁל חֲבֵירוֹ – מֵבִיא וְאֵינוֹ קוֹרֵא. הָא שְׁלֹשָׁה – מֵבִיא וְקוֹרֵא! הָכָא נָמֵי בִּזְמַן שֶׁאֵין הַיּוֹבֵל נוֹהֵג.

The Gemara suggests another proof in support of Rabbi Yoḥanan’s opinion: Come and hear a proof from the mishna (Bikkurim 1:6): One who acquires two trees in another’s field brings the first fruits of those trees but does not recite the verses, as he acquires only the trees but not the land. But if one acquires three trees, he brings the first fruits of those trees and recites the verses, because he also acquires the land surrounding the trees, despite the fact that the land is returned in the Jubilee Year. The Gemara rejects this: Here too, Reish Lakish would explain that the mishna is referring to one who acquires three trees in the time when the Jubilee Year is not practiced.

וְהַשְׁתָּא דְּאָמַר רַב חִסְדָּא: מַחְלוֹקֶת בְּיּוֹבֵל שֵׁנִי, אֲבָל בְּיּוֹבֵל רִאשׁוֹן – דִּבְרֵי הַכֹּל מֵבִיא וְקוֹרֵא, דְּאַכַּתִּי לָא סְמַךְ דַּעְתַּיְיהוּ; לָא קַשְׁיָא: הָא בְּיוֹבֵל רִאשׁוֹן, הָא בְּיוֹבֵל שֵׁנִי.

The Gemara comments: And now that Rav Ḥisda said: The dispute between Rabbi Yoḥanan and Reish Lakish is with regard to land sold during the second Jubilee, after the Jewish people already practiced the Jubilee Year once and people could trust that the land would be returned in the Jubilee Year, but with regard to land sold during the first Jubilee, which was practiced by the Jews immediately following their entry into Eretz Yisrael, everyone agrees that he brings the first fruits and recites the verses, as they did not yet rely on the fact that the fields would be returned, there is no need to claim that according to Reish Lakish these mishnayot are referring to when the Jubilee Year was not practiced. Instead, one could answer that it is not difficult: This, the mishnayot that state that he brings the first fruits and recites the verses, are referring to land sold during the first Jubilee. That, where Reish Lakish rules that he brings the first fruits but does not recite the verses, is referring to land sold during the second Jubilee.

לֵימָא כְּתַנָּאֵי: מִנַּיִן לַלּוֹקֵחַ שָׂדֶה מֵאָבִיו, וְהִקְדִּישָׁהּ, וְאַחַר כָּךְ מֵת אָבִיו – מִנַּיִין שֶׁתְּהֵא לְפָנָיו כִּשְׂדֵה אֲחוּזָּה?

The Gemara suggests: Let us say that the dispute between Rabbi Yoḥanan and Reish Lakish is parallel to a dispute between tanna’im. The halakha is that if one consecrated but did not redeem his ancestral field, and the Temple treasury sold it to another Jew, it becomes the property of the priesthood in the Jubilee Year. However, if one purchases a field from another Jew and consecrates it, it reverts back to the original owner in the Jubilee Year. The baraita taught: From where is it derived that one who purchases a field from his father in the time when the Jubilee Year was practiced and consecrated it, and afterward his father died, from where is it derived that it should be considered before him like an ancestral field, and it does not revert to the son’s ownership in the Jubilee Year?

תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״אִם אֶת שְׂדֵה מִקְנָתוֹ אֲשֶׁר לֹא מִשְּׂדֵה אֲחוּזָּתוֹ״ – שָׂדֶה שֶׁאֵינָהּ רְאוּיָה לִהְיוֹת שְׂדֵה אֲחוּזָּה, יָצְתָה זוֹ שֶׁרְאוּיָה לִהְיוֹת שְׂדֵה אֲחוּזָּה, דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי יְהוּדָה וְרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן.

The baraita continues: The verse states: “And if he sanctify to the Lord a field which he has bought, which is not of the field of his ancestral field” (Leviticus 27:22). The addition of the phrase: “Which is not of the field of his ancestral field,” teaches that the halakha that the field reverts to the original owner applies specifically to a field that is not fit to be an ancestral field, meaning that he would not inherit it in the future. This field, which the son was entitled to inherit after he had consecrated it, is excluded, as it is fit to be an ancestral field, although the son had purchased it. This is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Shimon.

רַבִּי מֵאִיר אוֹמֵר: מִנַּיִין לַלּוֹקֵחַ שָׂדֶה מֵאָבִיו וּמֵת אָבִיו וְאַחַר כָּךְ הִקְדִּישָׁהּ, מִנַּיִין שֶׁתְּהֵא לְפָנָיו כִּשְׂדֵה אֲחוּזָּה? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״אִם אֶת שְׂדֵה מִקְנָתוֹ אֲשֶׁר לֹא מִשְּׂדֵה אֲחוּזָּתוֹ״ – שָׂדֶה שֶׁאֵינָהּ שְׂדֵה אֲחוּזָּה, יָצְתָה זוֹ שֶׁהִיא שְׂדֵה אֲחוּזָּה. וְאִילּוּ לְרַבִּי יְהוּדָה וְרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן, מֵת אָבִיו וְאַחַר כָּךְ הִקְדִּישָׁהּ – לָא צְרִיכָא קְרָא.

The baraita continues: Rabbi Meir says: From where is it derived that one who purchases a field from his father at the time when the Jubilee Year was practiced and his father died, and afterward he consecrated it, from where is it derived that it should be considered before him like an ancestral field, and does not revert to the son in the Jubilee Year? The verse states: “And if he sanctify to the Lord a field which he has bought, which is not of the field of his ancestral field.” The addition of the phrase: “Which is not of the field of his ancestral field,” teaches that the halakha that the field reverts to the original owner applies specifically to a field that is not an ancestral field, meaning that he did not inherit it. This field, which the son inherited before he consecrated it, is excluded, as it is an ancestral field, while according to the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Shimon, a verse is not required to teach that in a case where his father died, and he consecrated it afterward, it is considered an ancestral field, as this is obvious. The Gemara explains why the other tanna’im do not require a verse to teach the halakha in the case discussed by Rabbi Meir:

מַאי, לָאו בְּהָא קָמִיפַּלְגִי? דְּרַבִּי מֵאִיר סָבַר: קִנְיַן פֵּירוֹת כְּקִנְיַן הַגּוּף דָּמֵי, וּבְהָא – בְּמִיתַת אָבִיו הוּא דְּלָא יָרֵית וְלָא מִידֵּי, וְהִלְכָּךְ מֵת אָבִיו וְאַחַר כָּךְ הִקְדִּישָׁהּ – צְרִיךְ קְרָא;

The Gemara clarifies: What, is it not that they disagree about this, as Rabbi Meir holds: The acquisition of an item for its produce is considered to be like the acquisition of the item itself, and in this case, when he purchased the field, i.e., the rights to the produce, from his father before his death, it is the case that he inherits nothing when his father dies, as he had already taken ownership of the field when he purchased it from his father, and nothing changed with his father’s death; and therefore, if his father died and he consecrated it afterward, then a verse is necessary to teach that it is treated like an ancestral field, as one might have thought that the field is his entirely as a result of the purchase, and not because of an ancestral inheritance.

רַבִּי יְהוּדָה וְרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן סָבְרִי: קִנְיַן פֵּירוֹת לָאו כְּקִנְיַן הַגּוּף דָּמֵי, וּבְהָא – בְּמִיתַת אָבִיו הַשְׁתָּא הוּא דְּקָא יָרֵית, וְהִלְכָּךְ מֵת אָבִיו וְאַחַר כָּךְ הִקְדִּישָׁהּ – לָא צְרִיכָא קְרָא; וְכִי אִיצְטְרִיךְ קְרָא – לְהִקְדִּישָׁהּ וְאַחַר כָּךְ מֵת אָבִיו הוּא דְּאִיצְטְרִיךְ.

While Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Shimon hold that the acquisition of an item for its produce is not considered to be like the acquisition of the item itself, and in this case, when he had purchased the field from his father before his father died, with the death of his father he now inherits the field as well, since until now he owned only the rights to the produce; and therefore if his father died and he consecrated the field afterward, a verse is not necessary to teach that it is an ancestral field, as it is obvious that he now owns it due to his inheritance. And when a verse was necessary, it is for a case where he consecrated the field and his father died afterward that it was necessary.

אָמַר רַב נַחְמָן בַּר יִצְחָק: לְעוֹלָם אֵימָא לָךְ, בְּעָלְמָא קָסָבְרִי רַבִּי יְהוּדָה וְרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן קִנְיַן פֵּירוֹת כְּקִנְיַן הַגּוּף דָּמֵי. וְהָכָא, רַבִּי יְהוּדָה וְרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן קְרָא אַשְׁכַּחוּ וּדְרוּשׁ – לִכְתּוֹב רַחֲמָנָא ״אִם אֶת שְׂדֵה מִקְנָתוֹ אֲשֶׁר לֹא אֲחוּזָּתוֹ״; מַאי ״מִשְּׂדֵה אֲחוּזָּתוֹ״? שָׂדֶה שֶׁאֵינָהּ רְאוּיָה לִהְיוֹת שְׂדֵה אֲחוּזָּה – יָצְתָה זוֹ, שֶׁרְאוּיָה לִהְיוֹת שְׂדֵה אֲחוּזָּה.

The Gemara rejects this explanation of the dispute. Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said: Actually, I could say to you that in general Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Shimon hold that the acquisition of an item for its produce is considered to be like the acquisition of the item itself, and they agree that the verse is necessary to teach the halakha concerning a case where he consecrated the field after his father’s death. And here, Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Shimon found another element of the verse and they expounded it. They maintain that if the verse is teaching the halakha only in the case where he consecrated the field after his father’s death, then let the Merciful One write in the Torah: And if he sanctify to the Lord a field which he has bought, which is not his ancestral field. What is the meaning of the expression: “Of his ancestral field” (Leviticus 27:22)? This emphasizes: A field that is not fit to be an ancestral field, meaning that he would not inherit it in the future. This field, which the son was entitled to inherit after he had consecrated it, is excluded, as it is fit to be an ancestral field, although the son had purchased it.

אָמַר רַב יוֹסֵף: אִי לָאו דְּאָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן קִנְיַן פֵּירוֹת כְּקִנְיַן הַגּוּף דָּמֵי, לֹא מָצָא יָדָיו וְרַגְלָיו בְּבֵית הַמִּדְרָשׁ. דְּאָמַר רַבִּי אַסִּי אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: הָאַחִין שֶׁחָלְקוּ – לָקוֹחוֹת הֵן, וּמַחְזִירִין זֶה לָזֶה בְּיוֹבֵל;

Rav Yosef said: If not for the fact that Rabbi Yoḥanan said that the acquisition of an item for its produce is considered to be like the acquisition of the item itself, he would not find his hands or his feet in the study hall, i.e., there would be a contradiction between Rabbi Yoḥanan’s statements. As Rav Asi says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: Brothers who divided property received as an inheritance are considered to be purchasers from one another, and as purchasers of land they must return the portions to each other in the Jubilee Year, at which point they may redistribute the property.

וְאִי סָלְקָא דַעְתָּךְ לָאו כְּקִנְיַן הַגּוּף דָּמֵי, לָא מַשְׁכַּחַתְּ דְּמַיְיתֵי בִּיכּוּרִים אֶלָּא חַד בַּר חַד עַד יְהוֹשֻׁעַ בִּן נוּן!

And if it enters your mind to say that the legal status of the acquisition of an item for its produce is not like that of the acquisition of the item itself, then according to Rabbi Yoḥanan’s opinion you will find that one brings first fruits by Torah law only when he is an only child the son of an only child, and so forth, dating back to the time of Joshua, son of Nun. Only in such a case does the child fully inherit the land. In any other case, the children inherit only the rights to the produce, as they must return the actual land to each other in the Jubilee Year, and would not be able to recite the verses connected with the first fruits, since they could not refer to the land that the Lord has given them. Since Rabbi Yoḥanan holds that the acquisition of an item for its produce is considered to be like the acquisition of the item itself, anyone who inherits land may recite the verses.

אָמַר רָבָא: קְרָא וּמַתְנִיתָא מְסַיְּיעִי לֵיהּ לְרֵישׁ לָקִישׁ. קְרָא –

Rava said: A verse and a baraita support the opinion of Reish Lakish. A verse, as it is written:

״בְּמִסְפַּר שְׁנֵי תְבוּאוֹת יִמְכׇּר לָךְ״.

“According to the number of years of the crops he shall sell to you” (Leviticus 25:15), meaning that it is not the field itself that is sold, but rather, what is sold is the right to consume the produce for a specific number of years.

מַתְנִיתָא – דְּתַנְיָא: בְּכוֹר נוֹטֵל פִּי שְׁנַיִם בְּשָׂדֶה הַחוֹזֶרֶת לְאָבִיו בְּיוֹבֵל.

A baraita supports the opinion of Reish Lakish, as it is taught: A firstborn son takes a double portion in a field that returns to his father in the Jubilee Year, i.e., a field that his father sold, and he subsequently died, and the field therefore returns to his sons in the Jubilee Year. The halakha is that a firstborn son receives a double portion only of property that the father possessed at the time of his death, but not of property that was due to the father. If the acquisition of the produce is considered to be like the acquisition of the item itself, then the field the father sold would not be considered to have been in his possession at the time of his death.

אָמַר אַבָּיֵי, נָקְטִינַן: בַּעַל בְּנִכְסֵי אִשְׁתּוֹ צָרִיךְ הַרְשָׁאָה.

Abaye said: We have a tradition that a husband requires authorization with regard to his wife’s property, meaning that if there is a legal dispute between the husband and another person with regard to the usufruct property the husband received from his wife, he requires authorization from his wife that he may act on her behalf in order to present himself in court as a litigant. If he does not receive such authorization, the other litigant has the right to claim that he is not legally answerable to the husband, and may insist that the wife come before the court herself. This indicates that the acquisition of the produce is not considered to be like the acquisition of the item itself, and therefore the husband is not the owner of the property.

וְלָא אֲמַרַן אֶלָּא דְּלָא נָחֵית אַפֵּירֵי, אֲבָל נָחֵית אַפֵּירֵי, מִיגּוֹ דְּמִשְׁתַּעֵי דִּינָא אַפֵּירֵי – מִשְׁתַּעֵי דִּינָא אַגּוּפָא.

The Gemara explains: And we said this halakha only when the other litigant did not go down to court with a claim concerning the produce, and the case addresses only the ownership of the land itself. But if he went down to court with a claim concerning the produce, with regard to which the husband is definitely the interested party, then since the husband speaks in front of the court about the law concerning the produce, he also speaks in front of the court about the law concerning the land itself, and therefore he does not require authorization from his wife.

הֲדַרַן עֲלָךְ הַשּׁוֹלֵחַ

הַנִּיזָּקִין שָׁמִין לָהֶן בְּעִידִּית, וּבַעַל חוֹב בְּבֵינוֹנִית, וּכְתוּבַּת אִשָּׁה בְּזִיבּוּרִית. רַבִּי מֵאִיר אוֹמֵר: אַף כְּתוּבַּת אִשָּׁה בְּבֵינוֹנִית.

MISHNA: The court appraises land of superior quality [iddit] for payment to injured parties. And a creditor collects his debt from the debtor’s intermediate-quality land. And payment of a woman’s marriage contract is collected from her husband’s inferior-quality land. Rabbi Meir says: Payment of a woman’s marriage contract is also collected from intermediate-quality land.

אֵין נִפְרָעִין מִנְּכָסִים מְשׁוּעְבָּדִים בִּמְקוֹם שֶׁיֵּשׁ נְכָסִים בְּנֵי חוֹרִין, וַאֲפִילּוּ הֵן זִיבּוּרִית.

Payment of a debt or other obligation is not collected from liened property that has been sold to a third party when the debtor still has unsold property, even when this unsold property is inferior-quality land. The creditor cannot collect his debt from liened property that the debtor has sold to another person as long as the debtor is still in possession of other property, even if the remaining assets are inferior to those to which the creditor would otherwise have been entitled.

אֵין נִפְרָעִין מִנִּכְסֵי יְתוֹמִין אֶלָּא מִן הַזִּיבּוּרִית.

If one who owed money died and his children inherited his property, the father’s debt can be collected from the property of the orphans only from inferior-quality land.

אֵין מוֹצִיאִין לַאֲכִילַת פֵּירוֹת, וְלִשְׁבַח קַרְקָעוֹת,

The court does not appropriate liened property that has been sold to a third party for the consumption of produce or for the enhanced value of land. If one appropriated a field and sold it, and the buyer worked the land, enhanced it, and grew produce on it, and then the initial owner from whom the field had been stolen took back the land and the produce from the buyer, compensating him only for his expenses, then the buyer may go back to the seller, i.e., the robber, and collect his losses. He can collect the purchase price of the field even from property that the robber sold to another person. By contrast, the value of the produce and the enhancement in the value of the field, which resulted from his actions, may be collected only from the robber’s unsold property.

וְלִמְזוֹן הָאִשָּׁה וְהַבָּנוֹת – מִנְּכָסִים מְשׁוּעְבָּדִין, מִפְּנֵי תִּיקּוּן הָעוֹלָם.

And similarly, payment for the sustenance of a man’s wife and daughters cannot be collected from his liened property. One of the stipulations included in a marriage contract is that after the husband dies, his widow and daughters are entitled to sustenance from his estate. This sustenance cannot be collected from the husband’s liened property that has been sold to another person, but only from his unsold property inherited by his heirs. All of these enactments were made for the betterment of the world.

וְהַמּוֹצֵא מְצִיאָה – לֹא יִשָּׁבַע, מִפְּנֵי תִּיקּוּן הָעוֹלָם.

And it was further instituted that one who finds a lost item and returns it to its rightful owner is not required to take an oath that he did not keep any part of the lost item for himself. This ordinance was also instituted for the betterment of the world.

גְּמָ׳ מִפְּנֵי תִּיקּוּן הָעוֹלָם?! דְּאוֹרָיְיתָא הִיא, דִּכְתִיב: ״מֵיטַב שָׂדֵהוּ וּמֵיטַב כַּרְמוֹ יְשַׁלֵּם״!

GEMARA: When the mishna says: For the betterment of the world, it seems to be referring to all of the cases in the mishna. The Gemara therefore asks: The first clause of the mishna states that compensation for damage is collected from superior-quality land. Is this ordinance also only for the betterment of the world? This is by Torah law, as it is written with regard to one who damages another person’s property: “Of the best of his own field, and of the best of his own vineyard, shall he pay” (Exodus 22:4).

אָמַר אַבָּיֵי: לָא צְרִיכָא אֶלָּא לְרַבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל, דְּאָמַר מִדְּאוֹרָיְיתָא בִּדְנִיזָּק שָׁיְימִינַן; קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן מִפְּנֵי תִּיקּוּן הָעוֹלָם שָׁיְימִינַן בִּדְמַזִּיק.

Abaye said: This statement is necessary only according to Rabbi Yishmael, who said that by Torah law we appraise the property of the injured party, i.e., the injured party can collect payment only from property equal in quality to the best of his own, even if the one who caused the damage owns property of higher quality. Therefore, the tanna of the mishna teaches us that for the betterment of the world we appraise the property of the one who caused the damage.

מַאי רַבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל? דְּתַנְיָא: ״מֵיטַב שָׂדֵהוּ וּמֵיטַב כַּרְמוֹ יְשַׁלֵּם״ – מֵיטַב שָׂדֵהוּ שֶׁל נִיזָּק, וּמֵיטַב כַּרְמוֹ שֶׁל נִיזָּק, דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל. רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא אוֹמֵר: לֹא בָּא הַכָּתוּב אֶלָּא לַגְבּוֹת לַנִּיזָּקִין מִן הָעִידִּית, וְקַל וָחוֹמֶר לַהֶקְדֵּשׁ.

The Gemara asks: What is this statement of Rabbi Yishmael alluded to by Abaye? It is as it is taught in a baraita: The verse: “Of the best of his own field, and of the best of his own vineyard, shall he pay,” teaches that the appraisal is of the best quality of the field of the injured party and of the best quality of the vineyard of the injured party. This is the statement of Rabbi Yishmael. Rabbi Akiva says: The verse comes only to allow injured parties to collect compensation from superior-quality land belonging to the one who caused the damage, in the event that he has no money or movable property. And by means of an a fortiori inference one can derive that the Temple treasury collects from superior-quality land.

וּלְרַבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל, אָכַל שְׁמֵנָה – מְשַׁלֵּם שְׁמֵנָה; אָכַל כְּחוּשָׁה – מְשַׁלֵּם שְׁמֵנָה?! אָמַר רַב אִידִי בַּר אָבִין: הָכָא בְּמַאי עָסְקִינַן – כְּגוֹן שֶׁאָכְלָה עֲרוּגָה בֵּין הָעֲרוּגוֹת, וְלָא יָדְעִינַן אִי כְּחוּשָׁה אָכַל אִי שְׁמֵנָה אָכַל, דִּמְשַׁלֵּם לֵיהּ מִמֵּיטַב.

The Gemara asks: And according to the opinion of Rabbi Yishmael, if one’s animal ate from a rich garden bed, it is understandable that he must pay the injured party the value of a rich garden bed. But if it ate from a poor garden bed, is it reasonable that he pays the value of a rich garden bed? Rav Idi bar Avin said: With what are we dealing here? We are dealing with a case where the animal that caused the damage ate from one garden bed among other garden beds, and we do not know whether it ate from a poor one or it ate from a rich one. In such a case, the animal’s owner pays the injured party the value of the latter’s best quality property.

אָמַר רָבָא: אִילּוּ יָדְעִינַן דִּכְחוּשָׁה אָכַל – מְשַׁלֵּם כְּחוּשָׁה; הַשְׁתָּא דְּלָא יָדְעִינַן – מְשַׁלֵּם שְׁמֵנָה?! הַמּוֹצִיא מֵחֲבֵרוֹ עָלָיו הָרְאָיָה! אֶלָּא אָמַר רַב אַחָא בַּר יַעֲקֹב:

Rava raised a question and said: If we would know that the animal ate from a poor garden bed, its owner would have to pay only the value of a poor garden bed. Now that we do not know from which garden bed it ate, is it reasonable that he should have to pay the value of a rich garden bed? There is a principle governing monetary disputes that the burden of proof falls on the claimant. Therefore, so long as the injured party cannot prove that the animal ate from the rich garden bed, he should not be entitled to collect the value of such a garden bed. Rather, Rav Aḥa bar Ya’akov said: