כתובות קה

כתובות קה

תִּשָּׁבַע בַּסּוֹף, וְלֹא תִּשָּׁבַע בַּתְּחִלָּה. נֶחְלְקוּ עָלָיו בְּנֵי כֹּהֲנִים גְּדוֹלִים, וְאָמְרוּ: תִּשָּׁבַע בַּתְּחִלָּה וּבַסּוֹף. אָמַר רַבִּי דּוֹסָא בֶּן הַרְכִּינָס כְּדִבְרֵיהֶם. אָמַר רַבָּן יוֹחָנָן בֶּן זַכַּאי: יָפֶה אָמַר חָנָן, לֹא תִּשָּׁבַע אֶלָּא בַּסּוֹף.

She takes an oath at the end of their marriage, i.e., when she learns that her husband died. The oath is to the effect that he did not leave her any funds when he departed overseas, as she is claiming full payment of her marriage contract. And she does not take an oath at the outset of his trip overseas, when she demands support soon after his departure. The sons of High Priests disagreed with Ḥanan’s opinion and said: She takes an oath both at the outset and at the end. Rabbi Dosa ben Harkinas said: The halakha is in accordance with their statement, i.e., that of the sons of the High Priests. Rabban Yoḥanan ben Zakkai said that Ḥanan spoke well: She takes an oath only at the end.

גְּמָ׳ וּרְמִינְהִי: שְׁלֹשָׁה דַּיָּינֵי גְזֵילוֹת הָיוּ בִּירוּשָׁלַיִם: אַדְמוֹן בֶּן גַּדַּאי, וְחָנָן הַמִּצְרִי, וְחָנָן בֶּן אֲבִישָׁלוֹם. קַשְׁיָא תְּלָת אַתְּרֵין, קַשְׁיָא גְּזֵירוֹת אַגְּזֵילוֹת!

GEMARA: The mishna states that there were two judges who issued decrees [gezeirot] in Jerusalem. And the Gemara raises a contradiction from the following baraita: There were three judges who adjudicated cases of theft [gezeilot] in Jerusalem: Admon ben Gaddai, Ḥanan the Egyptian, and Ḥanan ben Avishalom. The fact that the baraita mentions three judges is difficult, as the mishna includes only two; and the fact that the judges are described in the mishna as those who issue decrees is also difficult as they are described in the baraita as judges who adjudicate cases of theft.

בִּשְׁלָמָא תְּלָת אַתְּרֵין לָא קַשְׁיָא: דַּחֲשִׁיב לֵיהּ — קָתָנֵי, דְּלָא חֲשִׁיב לֵיהּ — לָא קָתָנֵי. אֶלָּא גְּזֵירוֹת אַגְּזֵילוֹת קַשְׁיָא!

The Gemara continues: Granted, the contradiction between the statement that there were three judges and the statement that there were two is not difficult, as those who are important to him the tanna teaches in the mishna, and those who are not important to him the tanna does not teach in the mishna. Although there were other judges, the tanna mentioned only those pertinent to the topic at hand. However, the contradiction between the ruling that refers to decrees and the ruling that refers to theft is difficult.

אָמַר רַב נַחְמָן בַּר יִצְחָק: שֶׁהָיוּ גּוֹזְרִין גְּזֵירוֹת עַל גְּזֵילוֹת. כִּדְתַנְיָא: קִיטְּמָה נְטִיעָה, רַבִּי יוֹסֵי אוֹמֵר: גּוֹזְרֵי גְזֵירוֹת שֶׁבִּירוּשָׁלַיִם אוֹמְרִים: נְטִיעָה בַּת שְׁנָתָהּ — שְׁתֵּי כֶסֶף, בַּת שְׁתֵּי שָׁנִים — אַרְבַּע כֶּסֶף.

Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said: There is no contradiction, as they would issue decrees concerning matters of theft, as it is taught in a baraita: With regard to an animal that severed a young plant in the field of another, Rabbi Yosei says that those who issue decrees in Jerusalem said: For a plant one year old, the animal’s owner must pay two silver pieces; for a plant two years old, he pays four silver pieces.

וּרְמִינְהִי, שְׁלֹשָׁה דַּיָּינֵי גְזֵירוֹת הָיוּ בִּירוּשָׁלַיִם: אַדְמוֹן וְחָנָן וְנַחוּם! אָמַר רַב פָּפָּא: מַאן תְּנָא נַחוּם — רַבִּי נָתָן הִיא. דְּתַנְיָא, רַבִּי נָתָן אוֹמֵר: אַף נַחוּם הַמָּדִי מִגּוֹזְרֵי גְזֵירוֹת שֶׁבִּירוּשָׁלַיִם הָיָה, וְלֹא הוֹדוּ לוֹ חֲכָמִים.

The Gemara raises a contradiction between the baraita cited above and another baraita: There were three prominent judges who issued decrees in Jerusalem: Admon, Ḥanan, and Naḥum. In the previous baraita, Naḥum was not listed. Rav Pappa said: Who is the tanna who taught that the third judge was Naḥum? It is Rabbi Natan, as it is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Natan says: Naḥum HaMadi was also among those who would issue decrees in Jerusalem, but the Sages did not agree with his opinion.

וְתוּ לֵיכָּא? וְהָאָמַר רַבִּי פִּנְחָס אָמַר רַבִּי אוֹשַׁעְיָא: שְׁלֹשׁ מֵאוֹת וְתִשְׁעִים וְאַרְבָּעָה בָּתֵּי דִינִין הָיוּ בִּירוּשָׁלַיִם, כְּנֶגְדָּן בָּתֵּי כְנֵסִיּוֹת, וּכְנֶגְדָּן בָּתֵּי מִדְרָשׁוֹת, וּכְנֶגְדָּן בָּתֵּי סוֹפְרִים! דַּיָּינִין טוּבָא הֲווֹ, וְכִי קָאָמְרִינַן — אַגּוֹזְרֵי גְזֵירוֹת קָאָמְרִינַן.

The Gemara asks: And were there no more judges? Didn’t Rabbi Pineḥas say that Rabbi Oshaya said: There were 394 courts in Jerusalem, and a comparable number of synagogues, and a comparable number of study halls, and a comparable number of houses of teachers of schoolchildren. The Gemara answers: There were many judges, but when we say that there were a small number, it is specifically concerning those who issue decrees that we say so.

אָמַר רַב יְהוּדָה אָמַר רַב אַסִּי: גּוֹזְרֵי גְזֵירוֹת שֶׁבִּירוּשָׁלַיִם הָיוּ נוֹטְלִין שְׂכָרָן תִּשְׁעִים וָתֵשַׁע מָנֶה מִתְּרוּמַת הַלִּשְׁכָּה, לֹא רָצוּ — מוֹסִיפִין לָהֶם. לֹא רָצוּ? אַטּוּ בְּרַשִּׁיעֵי עָסְקִינַן? אֶלָּא: לֹא סָפְקוּ, אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁלֹּא רָצוּ — מוֹסִיפִין עֲלֵיהֶן.

§ Rav Yehuda said that Rav Asi said: Those who issue decrees in Jerusalem would take their wages, ninety-nine maneh, equal to 9,900 dinars per year, from the collection of the Temple treasury chamber. If they did not wish to do so, one adds to their wages. The Gemara asks: What is the meaning of the phrase: If they did not wish to do so? Does this mean that if they desired higher wages, they were paid more? Is that to say that we are dealing with wicked people who demand wages beyond what they need? Rather, on the contrary, Rav Asi said that if their wages were insufficient for their needs, then even if they did not wish to receive higher wages, one adds to their wages so that they may devote themselves to their communal service.

קַרְנָא הֲוָה שָׁקֵיל אִיסְתֵּירָא מִזַּכַּאי וְאִיסְתֵּירָא מֵחַיָּיב, וְדָאֵין לְהוּ דִּינָא. וְהֵיכִי עָבֵיד הָכִי? וְהָכְתִיב: ״וְשׁוֹחַד לֹא תִקָּח״!

The Gemara relates: The Sage Karna would take an istera, a small coin, from the innocent party, and an istera from the guilty party, i.e., he would charge both parties that came to him for judgment, and then he would judge their case. The Gemara asks: But how could he do so? Isn’t it written: “And you shall take no bribe” (Exodus 23:8), which indicates that a judge may not take money from either of the two litigants?

וְכִי תֵּימָא הָנֵי מִילֵּי הֵיכָא דְּלָא שָׁקֵיל מִתַּרְוַיְיהוּ דִּלְמָא אָתֵי לְאַצְלוֹיֵי דִּינָא, קַרְנָא כֵּיוָן דְּשָׁקֵיל מִתַּרְוַיְיהוּ — לָא אָתֵי לְאַצְלוֹיֵי דִּינָא, וְכִי לָא אָתֵי לְאַצְלוֹיֵי דִּינָא מִי שְׁרֵי?

And if you say that this prohibition against taking a bribe applies only when a judge does not take from both parties, as there is a concern that perhaps he may come to pervert the judgment in favor of the party that gave him the bribe, whereas in the case of Karna, since he took from both parties he will not come to pervert the judgment, who says that the verse is referring only to those circumstances? Is it permitted to take a bribe even in a case when one will not pervert the judgment?

וְהָתַנְיָא: ״וְשׁוֹחַד לֹא תִקָּח״ מָה תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר? אִם לְלַמֵּד שֶׁלֹּא לְזַכּוֹת אֶת הַחַיָּיב וְשֶׁלֹּא לְחַיֵּיב אֶת הַזַּכַּאי — הֲרֵי כְּבָר נֶאֱמַר ״לֹא תַטֶּה מִשְׁפָּט״, אֶלָּא אֲפִילּוּ לְזַכּוֹת אֶת הַזַּכַּאי וּלְחַיֵּיב אֶת הַחַיָּיב אָמְרָה תּוֹרָה ״וְשׁוֹחַד לֹא תִקָּח״!

But isn’t it taught in a baraita: “And you shall take no bribe” (Exodus 23:8); what is the meaning when the verse states this? If it comes to teach that one should not acquit the guilty and one should not convict the innocent due to a bribe, it is already stated: “You shall not wrest judgment” (Deuteronomy 16:19). Rather, this verse teaches that even if the purpose of the bribe is to ensure that one acquit the innocent and convict the guilty, the Torah nevertheless says: “And you shall take no bribe.” This indicates that it is prohibited for a judge to receive anything from the litigants, even if there is no concern at all that justice will be perverted.

הָנֵי מִילֵּי הֵיכָא דְּשָׁקֵיל בְּתוֹרַת שׁוֹחַד, קַרְנָא בְּתוֹרַת אַגְרָא הֲוָה שָׁקֵיל. וּבְתוֹרַת אַגְרָא מִי שְׁרֵי? וְהָתְנַן: הַנּוֹטֵל שָׂכָר לָדוּן — דִּינָיו בְּטֵלִין! הָנֵי מִילֵּי אֲגַר דִּינָא, קַרְנָא אֲגַר בְּטֵילָא הֲוָה שָׁקֵיל.

The Gemara answers: This applies only when one takes the money in the form of a bribe, even if he does not intend to pervert the judgment, whereas Karna took the money in the form of a salary, not a bribe. The Gemara asks: But is it permitted to take money from litigants in the form of a salary? Didn’t we learn in a mishna (Kiddushin 58b): With regard to one who takes a salary to judge cases, his judgments are void? The Gemara answers: This applies only when he took money as his compensation for judging the case, whereas Karna accepted the money as compensation for unemployment, i.e., as he could not engage in his usual work while dealing with the case, he would take compensation for this unemployment.

וַאֲגַר בְּטֵילָא מִי שְׁרֵי? וְהָתַנְיָא: מְכוֹעָר הַדַּיָּין שֶׁנּוֹטֵל שָׂכָר לָדוּן, אֶלָּא שֶׁדִּינוֹ דִּין. הֵיכִי דָּמֵי? אִילֵּימָא אֲגַר דִּינָא, דִּינוֹ דִּין? וְהָתַנְיָא: הַנּוֹטֵל שָׂכָר לָדוּן — דִּינָיו בְּטֵילִין! אֶלָּא אֲגַר בְּטֵילָא, וְקָתָנֵי: מְכוֹעָר הַדַּיָּין!

The Gemara asks: And is it permitted to take money as compensation for unemployment? Isn’t it taught in a baraita: Ugly is the judge who takes a salary to judge cases; however, his judgments are valid judgments? The Gemara clarifies: What are the circumstances of this baraita? If we say that it is referring to one who accepted money as his compensation for judging, are his judgments valid judgments? But didn’t we learn in a mishna (Kiddushin 58b): With regard to one who takes a salary to judge cases, his judgments are void? Rather, it must certainly be referring to a situation where he takes money as compensation for unemployment, and yet the baraita teaches: Ugly is the judge.

הָנֵי מִילֵּי בְּטֵילָא דְּלָא מוֹכְחָא. קַרְנָא בְּטֵילָא דְמוֹכְחָא הֲוָה שָׁקֵיל, דַּהֲוָה תָּהֵי בְּאַמְבָּרָא דְחַמְרָא וְיָהֲבִי לֵיהּ זוּזָא.

The Gemara answers: This statement that the judge is ugly applies only when the fact that he is taking a salary for his unemployment is not evident, as he was not engaged in some other type of work at the time. Karna, however, would take money for his unemployment when it was evident that he was taking time off work to judge the case, as he was examining people’s wine stores [ambara] to see which casks would last and which were going sour, and they would pay him one dinar as a salary. Consequently, when Karna paused from his work to deal with a case, it was clear that he was losing money.

כִּי הָא דְּרַב הוּנָא כִּי הֲוָה אָתֵי דִּינָא לְקַמֵּיהּ, אֲמַר לְהוּ: הַבוּ לִי גַּבְרָא דְּדָלֵי לִי בַּחֲרִיקַאי וְאֵידוּן לְכוּ דִּינָא.

This resembles an incident involving Rav Huna. When people would come for judgment before him, he would say to them: As I am unable to take time off from my work, give me a man who can draw water for me, to irrigate the fields in my place, and I will judge your case.

אָמַר רַבִּי אֲבָהוּ: בֹּא וּרְאֵה כַּמָּה סְמוּיוֹת עֵינֵיהֶן שֶׁל מְקַבְּלֵי שׁוֹחַד. אָדָם חָשׁ בְּעֵינָיו, נוֹתֵן מָמוֹן לָרוֹפֵא — סָפֵק מִתְרַפֵּא סָפֵק אֵינוֹ מִתְרַפֵּא. וְהֵן נוֹטְלִין שָׁוֶה פְּרוּטָה וּמְסַמִּין עֵינֵיהֶן, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר: ״כִּי הַשּׁוֹחַד יְעַוֵּר פִּקְחִים״.

Rabbi Abbahu said: Come and see how blind are the eyes of those who accept bribes, and how they ruin themselves. If a person has pain in his eyes, he gives a doctor money, and even then it is uncertain whether he will be healed or whether he will not be healed. And yet those judges take the value of a peruta, a small amount of money as a bribe, and actively blind their eyes, as it is stated: “For a bribe blinds those who have sight” (Exodus 23:8).

תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: ״כִּי הַשּׁוֹחַד יְעַוֵּר עֵינֵי חֲכָמִים״, קַל וָחוֹמֶר לַטִּפְּשִׁין. ״וִיסַלֵּף דִּבְרֵי צַדִּיקִים״, קַל וָחוֹמֶר לָרְשָׁעִים. מִידֵּי טִפְּשִׁים וּרְשָׁעִים בְּנֵי דִינָא נִינְהוּ? אֶלָּא הָכִי קָאָמַר: ״כִּי הַשּׁוֹחַד יְעַוֵּר עֵינֵי חֲכָמִים״, אֲפִילּוּ חָכָם גָּדוֹל וְלוֹקֵחַ שׁוֹחַד — אֵינוֹ נִפְטָר מִן הָעוֹלָם בְּלֹא סַמְיוּת הַלֵּב. ״וִיסַלֵּף דִּבְרֵי צַדִּיקִים״,

The Sages taught: “For a bribe blinds the eyes of the wise” (Deuteronomy 16:19); a fortiori it will certainly blind the eyes of fools. “And perverts the words of the righteous” (Deuteronomy 16:19); a fortiori it will certainly pervert the statements of the wicked. The Gemara asks: Are fools and the wicked suitable for judgment, i.e., to be appointed as judges? Rather, this is what the tanna of the baraita said: “For a bribe blinds the eyes of the wise”; even if he were very wise but he took a bribe, he will not leave this world without suffering blindness of the heart, i.e., he will eventually turn foolish. “And perverts the words of the righteous”;

אֲפִילּוּ צַדִּיק גָּמוּר וְלוֹקֵחַ שׁוֹחַד — אֵינוֹ נִפְטָר מִן הָעוֹלָם בְּלֹא טֵירוּף דַּעַת.

even if he is completely righteous but he took a bribe, he will not leave this world without becoming demented.

כִּי אֲתָא רַב דִּימִי אֲמַר: דָּרֵשׁ רַב נַחְמָן בַּר כֹּהֵן, מַאי דִּכְתִיב ״מֶלֶךְ בְּמִשְׁפָּט יַעֲמִיד אָרֶץ וְאִישׁ תְּרוּמוֹת יֶהֶרְסֶנָּה״ — אִם דּוֹמֶה דַּיָּין לְמֶלֶךְ, שֶׁאֵינוֹ צָרִיךְ לִכְלוּם — ״יַעֲמִיד אָרֶץ״. וְאִם דּוֹמֶה לְכֹהֵן שֶׁמְּחַזֵּר עַל הַגֳּרָנוֹת — ״יֶהֶרְסֶנָּה״.

When Rav Dimi came from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia, he said that Rav Naḥman bar Kohen interpreted a verse homiletically as follows. What is the meaning of that which is written: “The king by justice establishes the land, but he who exacts gifts [terumot] overthrows it” (Proverbs 29:4)? If a judge is like a king, in that he does not need anything and is not dependent on anyone, he establishes the land, i.e., he can serve as a judge. But if he is like a priest, who seeks out his terumot from various granaries, as he is dependent on others, he overthrows the land.

אָמַר רַבָּה בַּר רַב שֵׁילָא: הַאי דַּיָּינָא דְּשָׁאֵיל שְׁאֵילְתָא — פָּסוּל לְמֵידַן דִּינָא. וְלָא אֲמַרַן אֶלָּא דְּלֵית לֵיהּ לְאוֹשׁוֹלֵי, אֲבָל אִית לֵיהּ לְאוֹשׁוֹלֵי — לֵית לַן בַּהּ.

§ Rabba bar Rav Sheila said: This judge who borrows items from others is disqualified from rendering judgment because it is as though he accepts a salary. And we said this only in a case where he does not have articles to lend out to others but is constantly borrowing without lending objects in turn. However, if he has items to lend out to others, we have no problem with it.

אִינִי? וְהָא רָבָא שָׁאֵיל שְׁאֵילְתָא מִדְּבֵי בַּר מָרִיּוֹן אַף עַל גַּב דְּלָא שָׁיְילִי מִינֵּיהּ? הָתָם לְאַחְשׁוֹבִינְהוּ הוּא דְּבָעֵי.

The Gemara asks: Is that so? But Rava would borrow items from the house of bar Maryon even though they would not borrow from him. The Gemara answers: There, he wanted to cause them to be considered more important in the community. Rava was very wealthy and did not need to borrow for his own benefit. On the contrary, by borrowing from the house of bar Maryon he raised their standing in the community.

אָמַר רָבָא: מַאי טַעְמָא דְּשׁוּחְדָּא? כֵּיוָן דְּקַבֵּיל לֵיהּ שׁוּחְדָּא מִינֵּיהּ, אִיקָּרְבָא לֵיהּ דַּעְתֵּיהּ לְגַבֵּיהּ וְהָוֵי כְּגוּפֵיהּ, וְאֵין אָדָם רוֹאֶה חוֹבָה לְעַצְמוֹ. מַאי ״שׁוֹחַד״ — שֶׁהוּא חַד. אָמַר רַב פָּפָּא: לָא לֵידוּן אִינִישׁ דִּינָא לְמַאן דְּרָחֵים לֵיהּ, וְלָא לְמַאן דְּסָנֵי לֵיהּ. דְּרָחֵים לֵיהּ — לָא חָזֵי לֵיהּ חוֹבָה, דְּסָנֵי לֵיהּ — לָא חָזֵי לֵיהּ זְכוּתָא.

Rava said: What is the reason for the prohibition against taking a bribe? Once a judge accepts a bribe from one party, his thoughts draw closer to him and he becomes like his own self, and a person does not find fault in himself. The Gemara notes that the term itself alludes to this idea: What is the meaning of shoḥad, bribe? It can be read as: Shehu ḥad, as he is one, i.e., at one mind with the litigant. Rav Pappa said: A person should not judge a case involving one whom he loves, nor involving one whom he hates. He should not judge one whom he loves, as he will not find any fault in him, while with regard to one whom he hates, he will not find any merit in him.

אָמַר אַבָּיֵי: הַאי צוּרְבָּא מֵרַבָּנַן דִּמְרַחֲמִין לֵיהּ בְּנֵי מָתָא — לָאו מִשּׁוּם דִּמְעַלֵּי טְפֵי, אֶלָּא מִשּׁוּם דְּלָא מוֹכַח לְהוּ בְּמִילֵּי דִּשְׁמַיָּא.

Abaye said: With regard to this Torah scholar who is beloved by the residents of his town, it is not because he is a superior Sage than others; rather, it is because he does not reprove them in Heavenly matters. He is beloved because he is not strict with them with regard to the observance of mitzvot.

אָמַר רָבָא, מֵרֵישׁ הֲוָה אָמֵינָא: הָנֵי בְּנֵי מָחוֹזָא כּוּלְּהוּ רָחֲמוּ לִי. כֵּיוָן דַּהֲוַאי דַּיָּינָא, אָמֵינָא: מִינַּיְיהוּ סָנוּ לִי וּמִינַּיְיהוּ רָחֲמוּ לִי. כֵּיוָן דַּחֲזַאי דְּמַאן דְּמִיחַיַּיב (לֵיהּ) הָאִידָּנָא קָא זָכֵי לִמְחַר, אָמֵינָא: אִם מִרְחָם — כּוּלְּהוּ רָחֲמוּ לִי, אִי מִסְנוֹ — כּוּלְּהוּ סָנוּ לִי.

Rava said: At first I would say that all these residents of Meḥoza love me; however, once I became a judge I said that some of them hate me and some of them love me, as I assumed that their feelings toward me depended on the success of their case. When I saw that the one I declared guilty today would be found innocent the following day, I realized that my rulings do not determine their attitudes, and therefore I said: If they love, then they all love me, and if they hate, then they all hate me, regardless of what happens in the courtroom.

תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: ״וְשׁוֹחַד לֹא תִקָּח״, אֵינוֹ צָרִיךְ לוֹמַר שׁוֹחַד מָמוֹן, אֶלָּא אֲפִילּוּ שׁוֹחַד דְּבָרִים נָמֵי אָסוּר, מִדְּלָא כְּתִיב ״בֶּצַע לֹא תִקָּח״. הֵיכִי דָּמֵי שׁוֹחַד דְּבָרִים?

§ The Sages taught: “And you shall take no bribe” (Exodus 23:8). It is not necessary to say that this includes bribery by means of money; however, even verbal bribery, assisting by means of speech, is also prohibited. The halakha that a bribe is not necessarily monetary is derived from the fact that it is not written: And you shall take no profit. The Gemara asks: What are the circumstances of bribing with words?

כִּי הָא דִּשְׁמוּאֵל הֲוָה עָבַר בְּמַבָּרָא, אֲתָא הָהוּא גַּבְרָא יָהֵיב לֵיהּ יְדֵיהּ, אֲמַר לֵיהּ: מַאי עֲבִידְתָּיךְ? אֲמַר לֵיהּ: דִּינָא אִית לִי. אֲמַר לֵיהּ: פְּסִילְנָא לָךְ לְדִינָא.

The Gemara explains: This can be demonstrated by that episode involving Shmuel, who was once crossing a river on a narrow ferry. A certain man came along and gave him a hand to help him out of the ferryboat. Shmuel said to him: What are you doing in this place? The man said to him: I have a case to present before you for judgment. Shmuel said to him: I am disqualified from presiding over your case, as you did me a favor. Although no money changed hands, a bond was formed between the pair.

אַמֵּימָר הֲוָה יָתֵיב וְקָא דָאֵין דִּינָא. פְּרַח גַּדְפָּא אַרֵישֵׁיהּ, אֲתָא הָהוּא גַּבְרָא שַׁקְלֵיהּ. אֲמַר לֵיהּ: מַאי עֲבִידְתָּיךְ? אֲמַר לֵיהּ: דִּינָא אִית לִי. אֲמַר לֵיהּ: פְּסִילְנָא לָךְ לְדִינָא. מָר עוּקְבָא הֲוָה שְׁדֵי רוּקָּא קַמֵּיהּ, אֲתָא הָהוּא גַּבְרָא כַּסְּיֵיהּ, אֲמַר לֵיהּ: מַאי עֲבִידְתָּיךְ? אֲמַר לֵיהּ: דִּינָא אִית לִי. אֲמַר לֵיהּ: פְּסִילְנָא לָךְ לְדִינָא.

The Gemara relates a similar story. Ameimar was sitting and judging a case when a feather floated and landed on his head. A certain man came by and removed it from his head. Ameimar said to him: What are you doing here? He said to him: I have a case to present before you. Ameimar said to him: I am disqualified from presiding over your case, due to the favor you performed for me. The Gemara likewise relates: There was spittle lying before Mar Ukva. A certain man came by and covered it. He said to him: What are you doing here? He said to him: I have a case to present before you. Mar Ukva said to him: I am disqualified from presiding over your case.

רַבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל בְּרַבִּי יוֹסֵי הֲוָה רְגִיל אֲרִיסֵיהּ דַּהֲוָה מַיְיתֵי לֵיהּ כׇּל מַעֲלֵי שַׁבְּתָא כַּנְתָּא דְפֵירֵי. יוֹמָא חַד אַיְיתִי לֵיהּ בְּחַמְשָׁה בְּשַׁבְּתָא. אֲמַר לֵיהּ: מַאי שְׁנָא הָאִידָּנָא? אֲמַר לֵיהּ: דִּינָא אִית לִי, וְאָמֵינָא, אַגַּב אוֹרְחִי אַיְיתֵי לֵיהּ לְמָר. לָא קַבֵּיל מִינֵּיהּ. אֲמַר לֵיהּ: פְּסִילְנָא לָךְ לְדִינָא.

The Gemara cites another incident. The sharecropper of Rabbi Yishmael, son of Rabbi Yosei, was accustomed to bringing him a basket [kanta] full of fruits every Shabbat eve. One day, he brought him the basket on a Thursday. Rabbi Yishmael said to him: What is different that you came early now, this week? The sharecropper said to him: I have a case to present before you, and I said to myself that along my way I will bring to the Master the basket of fruits, as in any case I am coming on Thursday, the day the courts are in session. Rabbi Yishmael did not accept the basket of fruits from him, and he said to him: I am disqualified from presiding over your case.

אוֹתֵיב זוּזָא דְרַבָּנַן וְקָדָיְינִין לֵיהּ. בַּהֲדֵי דְּקָאָזֵיל וְאָתֵי אֲמַר: אִי בָּעֵי — טָעֵין הָכִי, וְאִי בָּעֵי — טָעֵין הָכִי. אָמַר: תִּיפַּח נַפְשָׁם שֶׁל מְקַבְּלֵי שׁוֹחַד! וּמָה אֲנִי שֶׁלֹּא נָטַלְתִּי, וְאִם נָטַלְתִּי — שֶׁלִּי נָטַלְתִּי, כָּךְ, מְקַבְּלֵי שׁוֹחַד — עַל אַחַת כַּמָּה וְכַמָּה.

Rabbi Yishmael seated a pair of rabbinic scholars and they judged the sharecropper’s case. As Rabbi Yishmael was coming and going, he said to himself: If he wants, he could claim this, and if he wants, he could claim that, i.e., he kept thinking of all the ways in which the litigant who brought him the fruits could win his case. He said to himself: Blast the souls of those who accept bribes. If I, who did not accept anything, and if I had accepted, I would have accepted my own property, as it is my sharecropper and the fruits legally belong to me, am nevertheless in this state of mind due to the proposed gift, all the more so are those who actually accept bribes inevitably biased in favor of the one who bribed them.

רַבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל בַּר אֱלִישָׁע אַיְיתִי לֵיהּ הַהוּא גַּבְרָא רֵאשִׁית הַגֵּז. אֲמַר לֵיהּ: מֵהֵיכָא אַתְּ? אֲמַר לֵיהּ: מִדּוּךְ פְּלָן. וּמֵהָתָם לְהָכָא לָא הֲוָה כֹּהֵן לְמִיתְּבָא לֵיהּ? אֲמַר לֵיהּ: דִּינָא אִית לִי, וְאָמֵינָא, אַגַּב אוֹרְחַאי אַיְיתֵי לֵיהּ לְמָר. אֲמַר לֵיהּ: פְּסִילְנָא לָךְ לְדִינָא, לָא קַבֵּיל מִינֵּיהּ.

The Gemara likewise relates with regard to Rabbi Yishmael bar Elisha, who was a priest, that a certain man once brought him the first shearing. Rabbi Yishmael said to him: From where are you? The man said to him: I am from such and such a place. Rabbi Yishmael said to him: And from there to here was there no priest to whom you could give the first shearing? He said to him: I have a case to present before you, and I said to myself that along my way I will bring to the Master the first shearing. Rabbi Yishmael said to him: I am disqualified from presiding over your case, and he would not accept the first shearing from him.

אוֹתֵיב לֵיהּ זוּגָא דְרַבָּנַן וְקָדָיְינִי לֵיהּ. בַּהֲדֵי דְּקָאָזֵיל וְאָתֵי, אֲמַר: אִי בָּעֵי טָעֵין הָכִי, וְאִי בָּעֵי טָעֵין הָכִי. אָמַר: תִּיפַּח נַפְשָׁם שֶׁל מְקַבְּלֵי שׁוֹחַד! וּמָה אֲנִי שֶׁלֹּא נָטַלְתִּי, וְאִם נָטַלְתִּי — שֶׁלִּי נָטַלְתִּי, כָּךְ, מְקַבְּלֵי שׁוֹחַד — עַל אַחַת כַּמָּה וְכַמָּה.

Rabbi Yishmael bar Elisha seated a pair of rabbinic scholars and they judged his case. As Rabbi Yishmael was coming and going, he said to himself: If he wants, he could claim this, and if he wants, he could claim that. He said to himself: Blast the souls of those who accept bribes. If I, who did not accept anything, and if I had accepted, I would have accepted my own property, as I am a priest and am entitled to receive the first shearing, am nevertheless in this state of mind, all the more so are those who accept bribes.

רַב עָנָן אַיְיתִי לֵיהּ הַהוּא גַּבְרָא כַּנְתָּא דְגִילְדָּנֵי דְּבֵי גִילֵי. אֲמַר לֵיהּ: מַאי עֲבִידְתָּיךְ? אֲמַר לֵיהּ: דִּינָא אִית לִי. לָא קַבֵּיל מִינֵּיהּ. אֲמַר לֵיהּ: פְּסִילְנָא לָךְ לְדִינָא.

The Gemara relates: There was a certain man who once brought to Rav Anan a basket of small fish [gildanei devei gilei]. He said to him: What are you doing here? The man said to him: I have a case to present before you. Rav Anan would not accept the basket from him, and he said to him: I am disqualified from presiding over your case, due to your actions.

אֲמַר לֵיהּ: דִּינָא דְּמָר לָא בָּעֵינָא, קַבּוֹלֵי לְקַבֵּיל מָר דְּלָא לִמְנְעַן מָר מֵאַקְרוֹבֵי בִּכּוּרִים. דְּתַנְיָא: ״וְאִישׁ בָּא מִבַּעַל שָׁלִישָׁה וַיָּבֵא לְאִישׁ הָאֱלֹהִים לֶחֶם בִּכּוּרִים עֶשְׂרִים לֶחֶם שְׂעוֹרִים וְכַרְמֶל בְּצִקְלוֹנוֹ״. וְכִי אֱלִישָׁע אוֹכֵל בִּכּוּרִים הֲוָה? אֶלָּא לוֹמַר לָךְ: כׇּל הַמֵּבִיא דּוֹרוֹן לְתַלְמִיד חָכָם — כְּאִילּוּ מַקְרִיב בִּכּוּרִים.

The man said to him: I do not need the Master’s judgment. However, let the Master accept my gift anyway, so that the Master does not prevent me from presenting first fruits. What does the mitzva of first fruits have to with this situation? As it is taught in a baraita: “And there came a man came from Ba’al Shalisha, and he brought the man of God bread of the first fruits, twenty loaves of barley and fresh ears of corn in his sack” (II Kings 4:42). But did Elisha, the recipient of these gifts, eat first fruits? After all, he was not a priest. Rather, this verse comes to tell you: Whoever brings a gift to a Torah scholar, it is as though he has presented first fruits. This visitor to Rav Anan wished to fulfill this mitzva.

אֲמַר לֵיהּ: קַבּוֹלֵי לָא בָּעֵינַן דְּאֵיקַבֵּיל, הַשְׁתָּא דְּאָמְרַתְּ לִי טַעְמָא, מְקַבֵּילְנָא. שַׁדְּרֵיהּ לְקַמֵּיהּ דְּרַב נַחְמָן, שְׁלַח לֵיהּ: נִידַיְּינֵיהּ מָר לְהַאי גַּבְרָא, דַּאֲנָא עָנָן פְּסִילְנָא לֵיהּ לְדִינָא. אָמַר: מִדִּשְׁלַח לִי הָכִי, שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ קָרִיבֵיהּ הוּא. הֲוָה קָאֵים דִּינָא דְיַתְמֵי קַמֵּיהּ, אֲמַר:

Rav Anan said to him: I do not want to take it from you, but now that you have explained to me the reason that you wish to give it to me I will accept it from you. Rav Anan sent the man to Rav Naḥman, and he also sent him a letter: Let the Master judge this man’s case because I, Anan, am disqualified from judging his cases. Rav Naḥman said to himself: From the fact that he sent me this letter, I can conclude from here that the reason he is disqualified from judging the case is because he is his relative. At that time, a case involving orphans was being heard before Rav Naḥman. He said: