מנחות קב

מנחות קב

ואי בעי זריק וקתני דאינו מטמא טומאת אוכלין מאי לאו דפיגל בזריקה לא דפיגל בשחיטה

and if he had wanted, he could have sprinkled the blood of these offerings properly? Nevertheless, Rabbi Shimon teaches in the baraita that the meat of an offering that was rendered piggul is not susceptible to the ritual impurity of food. What, is it not referring to a case where he rendered it piggul during the rite of sprinkling? If so, since the offering stood to have its blood sprinkled, it is considered as though it has been sprinkled, and the offering was considered fit for consumption before he rendered it piggul; therefore, it should be susceptible to the impurity of food. The Gemara answers: No, the baraita is referring to a case where he rendered it piggul during the rite of slaughtering, and the blood never stood to be sprinkled.

אבל פיגל בזריקה מאי הכי נמי דמטמא טומאת אוכלין

The Gemara asks: But if he rendered it piggul during the rite of the sprinkling, what is the halakha? Is the halakha that the meat of the offering indeed becomes susceptible to the ritual impurity of food?

אדתני פיגל במנחה מטמא טומאת אוכלין ליפלוג בדידה במה דברים אמורים דפיגל בשחיטה אבל פיגל בזריקה מטמא טומאת אוכלין

The Gemara challenges: If so, rather than continuing and teaching that if he rendered the meal offering piggul it is susceptible to the ritual impurity of food, i.e., instead of contrasting the animal offering case with a case involving an meal offering, let the tanna distinguish within the case of the animal offering itself in the following way: In what case is this statement, that if one renders an offering piggul the meat is not susceptible to the impurity of food, said? It is said in a case where he rendered it piggul during the rite of slaughtering, but if he rendered it piggul during the rite of sprinkling, it is susceptible to the impurity of food.

פיגל במנחה איצטריכא ליה דאף על גב דפיגל בקמיצה דקומץ במנחה כשחיטה דמי אפילו הכי מטמא טומאת אוכלין הואיל והיתה לו שעת הכושר מעיקרו

The Gemara answers: It was necessary for him to contrast it with a case of one who rendered a meal offering piggul in order to teach that even though he already rendered it piggul at the time of the removal of the handful, and the principle is that the removal of the handful of a meal offering is equivalent to the slaughtering of an animal offering, and an offering that was rendered piggul at the time of slaughtering is not susceptible to the impurity of food, even so, the meal offering is susceptible to the ritual impurity of food, since it initially had a time that was fit for consumption, when the flour was not yet consecrated as a meal offering.

אמר רב אשי אמריתה לשמעתא קמיה דרב נחמן אפילו תימא לן ממש ואפילו תימא דפיגל בזריקה

Rav Ashi said: I related this discussion in the presence of Rav Naḥman and explained Rabbi Shimon’s opinion differently: Even if you say that the case in the baraita is one in which the meat was actually left overnight and there was time to sprinkle the blood during the day, and even if you say that he rendered the offering piggul at the time of the sprinkling of the blood rather than during the slaughtering, Rabbi Shimon does not consider those to be cases in which the offering had a time when it was fit for consumption.

דאי בעי פריק אמר אי בעי הוה זריק לא אמרינן

Rabbi Shimon said only that if he had wanted, he would have redeemed it, and therefore an item that stands to be redeemed is treated as if it were already redeemed. Redemption is simple and requires only a verbal statement. According to Rabbi Shimon we do not say that if he had wanted, he would have sprinkled it, i.e., that the sprinkling of the blood and similar actions that stand to take place are treated as having taken place already.

מיתיבי כלל אמר רבי יהושע כל שהיתה לו שעת היתר לכהנים אין מועלין בה וכל שלא היתה לו שעת היתר לכהנים מועלין בה

The Gemara raises an objection to Rav Ashi’s opinion from a mishna (Me’ila 2a): Rabbi Yehoshua states a principle about the misuse of offerings that became disqualified: With regard to any offering that had a time that it was permitted for consumption by the priests before it became disqualified, one is not liable for misusing it, and with regard to any offering that did not have a time that it was permitted for consumption by the priests before it became disqualified, one is liable for misusing it. Misuse of consecrated property applies only to offerings that are considered fully reserved for God. Once the priests are permitted to partake of the offering it is no longer categorized as consecrated property.

ואיזהו שעת היתר לכהנים שלנה ושנטמאת ושיצאה

Rabbi Yehoshua clarifies: And what is a disqualified offering that had a time that it was permitted for consumption by the priests? Examples of such a situation are as follows: When, after the blood was sprinkled, the meat of the offering was left overnight; or when the meat of an offering became ritually impure; or when an offering left the Temple courtyard. One is not liable for misuse in these cases, since the meat of these offerings became permitted to the priests once the blood was sprinkled and only subsequently was it disqualified.

ואיזו היא שלא היתה לו שעת היתר לכהנים שנשחטה חוץ לזמנה וחוץ למקומה ושקבלו פסולין וזרקו את דמה

And what is a disqualified offering that did not have a time that it was permitted for consumption by the priests? Examples of such a situation are as follows: When, at the time that it was slaughtered, he intended to eat it, sprinkle the blood, or burn the sacrificial potions on the altar beyond its designated time or outside its designated area; or when priests who were disqualified for Temple service collected or sprinkled its blood. In these cases, since there was never a time that it was permitted for the priests to consume the meat of the offering, one is liable for the misuse of consecrated property.

קתני מיהא רישא שלנה ושנטמאת ושיצאה מאי לאו לנה ממש והכא דאי בעי הוה זריק הוא וקתני דאין מועלין

The Gemara addresses the objection to Rav Ashi’s opinion: In any event, the first clause teaches that meat of an offering that was left overnight, and meat that became impure, and meat that left the courtyard all had a time when they were permitted to the priests. What, is it not referring to a case where it was actually left overnight, i.e., both the blood and the meat of the offering, and here the case is an instance of: If he had wanted, he could have sprinkled the blood, and for that reason the mishna teaches that one is not liable for misusing it? It is considered as having had a time that it was permitted to the priests since he could have sprinkled the blood during the day, and therefore the offering is treated as if the sprinkling already happened, counter to Rav Ashi’s claim that such reasoning does not apply with regard to the sprinkling of the blood.

לא ראויה לצאת וראויה לטמא וראויה ללין

The Gemara answers: No, the mishna is referring to cases where the meat left the courtyard at a time when it was fit to leave, and the meat became impure when it was fit to become impure, and was left over when it was fit to be left over, i.e., the mishna is discussing cases where these occurred after the blood was sprinkled, rendering the meat fit to be consumed by the priests. For that reason it was not subject to the halakhot of misuse of consecrated property.

אבל לינה ממש מאי הכי נמי דמועלין האי כל שהיה לו שעת היתר לכהנים וכל שלא היתה לו שעת היתר לכהנים

The Gemara again challenges Rav Ashi’s opinion: But according to this, what is the halakha with regard to a case where the whole offering, including the blood, was actually left overnight? Is that indeed a case where one is liable for misusing consecrated property, as the priests never had a time when it was permitted to consume the meat? If so, those statements in the mishna: Any offering that had a time that it was permitted for consumption by the priests, and any offering that did not have a time that it was permitted for consumption by the priests, are imprecise. They indicate that the critical factor is whether the meat had a time that it was potentially permitted, even if it was ultimately disqualified.

כל שיש לו שעת היתר לכהנים אין מועלין בה וכל שאין לה שעת היתר לכהנים מועלין בה מיבעי ליה

Instead, the mishna should have stated: With regard to any offering that has, in actuality, a time that it is permitted for consumption by the priests, one is not liable for misusing it. And, similarly, with regard to any offering that does not have a time that it is permitted for consumption by the priests, one is liable for misusing it.

אלא אמר רב אשי מעילה אטומאה קא רמית

It must be that Rav Ashi concedes that the mishna in Me’ila should be understood to include the case where both the blood and the meat were leftover, and that under such circumstances one is not liable for misuse of the offering due to the fact that once the blood could have been sprinkled, the offering is already considered permitted to the priests. Rav Ashi nevertheless claims that this mishna does not pose a difficulty to his understanding of Rabbi Shimon’s opinion with regard to an offering’s status as susceptible to the impurity of food. Rather, Rav Ashi says: Are you raising a contradiction between the halakhot of misuse of consecrated property and the halakhot of ritual impurity?

מעילה משום קדושה ולאו קדושה היא לבתר דפקעה לה קדושתיה במאי הדרא רכבא לה

These cannot be compared, as liability for misuse of consecrated property is due to the sanctity or lack of sanctity of an item, i.e., on whether it is classified as fully reserved for God. Therefore, after the sanctity of the offering has lapsed, which occurs when the blood is ready to be sprinkled, as at that point it is already regarded as permitted to the priests, how can it return and be inured in it?

טומאה משום אוכלא ולאו (משום) אוכלא היא כל היכא דאי בעי זריק מצי זריק ליה משוי ליה אוכלא ומטמא טומאת אוכלין היכא דאי בעי (מצי) זריק לא מצי זריק לא משוי ליה אוכלא [ולא] מטמא טומאת אוכלין

But with regard to impurity, the offering’s susceptibility to the impurity of food is due to whether it is considered food or not considered food. Therefore, in any case where if he wants to sprinkle the blood he could sprinkle it, it is only in sprinkling the blood that he grants the meat the status of food, and then it is susceptible to the ritual impurity of food. But in a case where if he wants to sprinkle the blood he cannot sprinkle it for some reason, and the offering is subsequently disqualified, he does not grant it the status of food, since it never became permitted to eat and it therefore is not susceptible to the impurity of food.

מיתיבי המביא אשם תלוי ונודע שלא חטא אם עד שלא נשחט נודע לו יצא וירעה בעדר דברי רבי מאיר וחכמים אומרים

The Gemara raises another objection from a mishna (Karetot 23b) to Rav Ashi’s opinion that with regard to susceptibility to the impurity of food, blood that is ready to be sprinkled is not considered as if it were sprinkled: With regard to one who brings a provisional guilt offering to be sacrificed, because he is uncertain as to whether he committed a sin that requires a sin offering (see Leviticus 5:17–19), and later it becomes known to him that he has not sinned, the status of the offering is as follows: If it became known to him that he had not sinned before the offering was slaughtered, the consecrated ram should go out and graze in the flock as a non-sacred animal, as the consecration was performed in error. This is the statement of Rabbi Meir. And the Rabbis say

ירעה עד שיסתאב וימכר ויפלו דמיו לנדבה ר’ אליעזר אומר יקריב שאם אינו בא על חטא זה הרי הוא בא על חטא אחר

it is treated as a guilt offering that was disqualified and it should graze until it becomes blemished, and then it is sold, and its money that is received from the sale is allocated for communal gift offerings. Rabbi Eliezer says: It should be sacrificed in its current state, since if it does not come to atone for this sin, it will come for a different sin, as he certainly committed some sin of which he is unaware.

משנשחט נודע לו הדם ישפך והבשר ישרף

If, after the provisional guilt offering was slaughtered, it became known to him that he had not sinned, the blood collected in a cup to sprinkle on the altar should be spilled into the Temple courtyard drain and the meat should be burned in the place of burning, in accordance with the halakhot of a disqualified offering.

נזרק הדם הבשר יאכל ורבי יוסי אומר אפילו הדם בכוס יזרק והבשר יאכל

If the blood was already sprinkled on the altar when it became known to him that he had not sinned, the meat of the offering is eaten by the priests in the normal manner. And Rabbi Yosei says: Even if he discovered that he had not sinned while the blood was still in the cup, it is sprinkled on the altar and the meat is eaten.

ואמר רבא רבי יוסי בשיטת ר’ שמעון אמר דאמר כל העומד לזרוק כזרוק דמי

And Rava says in explanation of Rabbi Yosei’s opinion: Rabbi Yosei stated this ruling in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, who says that for any blood that stands to be sprinkled on the altar, it is as if it has already been sprinkled. Therefore, once the blood is in the cup and is ready to be sprinkled, the meat is permitted as though the blood already had been sprinkled. This statement contradicts Rav Ashi’s opinion that with regard to the status of the meat as food, an offering whose blood stands to be sprinkled is not necessarily considered as though it has already been sprinkled.

מידי הוא טעמא אמרי במערבא משמיה דרבי יוסי בר חנינא היינו טעמא דר’ יוסי דקסבר כלי שרת מקדשין את הפסולין לכתחילה ליקרב

The Gemara responds: Is that the reason for Rabbi Yosei’s opinion? They say in the West, Eretz Yisrael, in the name of Rabbi Yosei bar Ḥanina, that this is the reasoning of Rabbi Yosei: His reasoning is that he holds that a service vessel sanctifies disqualified offerings to be sacrificed on the altar ab initio, and in this case the blood was already in the service vessel.

אמר ליה רב אשי לרב כהנא מדאמר רבי שמעון כל העומד לזרוק כזרוק דמי כל העומד לשרוף נמי כשרוף דמי נותר ופרה אמאי מטמאין טומאת אוכלין עפרא בעלמא נינהו אמר ליה חיבת הקודש מכשרתן

Rav Ashi said to Rav Kahana: Since Rabbi Shimon said that for any blood that stands to be sprinkled on the altar it is as if it has already been sprinkled, and for any item that stands to be burned it is as if it is already burned, why does he hold, as the Gemara mentioned previously (101b), that meat from an offering that is leftover, and the meat of a red heifer that is not yet burned on its pyre, are both susceptible to the ritual impurity of food, since there was a time that they were fit for consumption by the priests? They are merely dust, as they stand to be burned, and therefore should no longer retain the status of food. Rav Kahana said to Rav Ashi in response: Nevertheless, regard for the sanctity of sacred property renders them susceptible to the impurity of food.

אמר ליה רבינא לרב אשי נהי דמהניא להו חיבת הקודש לאיפסולי דגופיה ליקרויי טמא נמי למימני ביה ראשון ושני

Ravina said to Rav Ashi: Granted that the regard for the sanctity of sacred property is effective in order to disqualify the meat itself if it becomes impure, but is it also considered impure to the extent that one counts first- and second-degree with regard to it, as indicated by the language: Susceptible to the ritual impurity of food? Accordingly, if the meat came into contact with a primary source of impurity, it would have first-degree impurity and it would subsequently transfer second-degree impurity to an item that comes into contact with it.

תפשוט דבעי ריש לקיש צריד של מנחות מונין בו ראשון ושני או אין מונין בו ראשון ושני

If that were the case, one could resolve the dilemma that Reish Lakish raises: With regard to a dry portion of flour taken from one of the meal offerings that has not come into contact with a liquid and is therefore susceptible to impurity due only to regard for its sanctity, does one count first- and second-degree impurity with it, or does one not count first- and second-degree impurity with it? Since Reish Lakish’s inquiry is unresolved, presumably the same uncertainty applies here.

כי מיבעיא ליה לריש לקיש דאורייתא כי קאמרינן דרבנן:

The Gemara responds: When Reish Lakish raises the dilemma, it is with regard to the status of the dry mass of the meal offering by Torah law, as consecrated items are burned only when rendered impure by Torah law. When we said that leftover meat and the meat of the red heifer are susceptible to the impurity of food, we were inquiring about the status of the leftover meat and of the red heifer by rabbinic law, and therefore nothing can be derived from the dilemma raised by Reish Lakish.

מתני׳ האומר הרי עלי במחבת והביא במרחשת במרחשת והביא במחבת מה שהביא הביא וידי חובתו לא יצא

MISHNA: In the case of one who says: It is incumbent upon me to bring a meal offering prepared in a shallow pan, and he brought a meal offering prepared in a deep pan instead; or if he said: It is incumbent upon me to bring a meal offering prepared in a deep pan, and he brought a meal offering prepared in a shallow pan instead, the meal offering that he brought, he brought as a voluntary meal offering, but he has not fulfilled his obligation that he undertook with his vow and he must therefore bring another meal offering.

זו להביא במחבת והביא במרחשת במרחשת והביא במחבת הרי זו פסולה

If he said: This tenth of an ephah of flour is a meal offering to bring in a shallow pan, and he brought it prepared in a deep pan instead; or if he said: This tenth of an ephah of flour is a meal offering to bring in a deep pan, and he brought a meal offering prepared in a shallow pan, this offering is not valid, because he did not fulfill what he had stated concerning that tenth of an ephah of flour.

האומר הרי עלי שני עשרונות להביא בכלי אחד והביא בשני כלים בשני כלים והביא בכלי אחד מה שהביא הביא וידי חובתו לא יצא

In the case of one who says: It is incumbent upon me to bring one meal offering of two tenths of an ephah in one vessel, and he divided it and brought it in two vessels, removing a handful from each; or if he says: It is incumbent upon me to bring two tenths of an ephah for two meal offerings in two vessels, and he brought one meal offering of two tenths of an ephah in one vessel and removed one handful from it, then the meal offering that he brought, he brought as a voluntary meal offering, but he has not fulfilled his obligation.

אלו בכלי אחד והביא בשני כלים בשני כלים והביא בכלי אחד הרי אלו פסולין

If he says: These two tenths of an ephah before me are a meal offering in one vessel, and he divided them and brought them in two vessels, removing a handful from each; or if he says: These tenths of an ephah are two meal offerings in two vessels, and he brought them in one vessel, both of these offerings are not valid, because in both cases he deviated from the number of handfuls that he vowed to remove.

הרי עלי שני עשרונות להביא בכלי אחד והביא בשני כלים אמרו לו בכלי אחד נדרת הקריבן בשני כלים פסולין בכלי אחד כשרין

In the case of one who says: It is incumbent upon me to bring a meal offering of two tenths of an ephah in one vessel, and he divided them and brought them in two vessels, and others said to him: You vowed to bring a meal offering in one vessel, then if he sacrificed the two tenths of an ephah in two vessels they are not valid even as voluntary meal offerings, and he must bring another meal offering to fulfill his obligation. His failure to respond and explain that it was not his intention to fulfill his vow with this offering indicates that he does intend to fulfill his vow with it. Since he deviated from his vow, the offering is not valid. If he sacrificed the two tenths of an ephah in one vessel after he was reminded, it is valid, as he fulfilled his vow.

הרי עלי שני עשרונות להביא בשני כלים והביא בכלי אחד אמרו לו בשני כלים נדרת הקריבן בשני כלים כשרין נתנו לכלי אחד כשתי מנחות שנתערבו:

Likewise, in a case where one says: It is incumbent upon me to bring two meal offerings totaling two tenths of an ephah in two vessels, and he brought it all in one vessel, and others said to him: You vowed to bring meal offerings in two vessels, then if he sacrificed the two tenths of an ephah in two vessels as he had originally vowed, they are valid. If he placed it all in one vessel, its halakhic status is like that of two meal offerings that were intermingled prior to removal of the handfuls. Therefore, if one can remove a handful from each meal offering in and of itself, they are valid. If not, they are not valid, as the Gemara explained on 23a.

גמ׳ וצריכא דאי

GEMARA: The mishna cites cases where one vowed to bring a meal offering prepared in a shallow pan and instead brought one prepared in a deep pan and vice versa, as well as cases where one vowed to bring two tenths of an ephah in one vessel and instead brought them in two vessels and vice versa. In all these cases, the offering is accepted but he has not fulfilled his obligation. The Gemara comments: And it is necessary for the mishna to mention both types of changes from the initial vow.

אשמעינן הך קמייתא משום דאמר במחבת וקא מייתי במרחשת אבל הכא דאידי ואידי במחבת ואידי ואידי במרחשת אימא ידי נדרו נמי יצא

It is necessary because had the tanna taught us only this first case, one might think that perhaps this individual does not fulfill his obligation because he said: In a shallow pan, and he brought it instead in a deep pan. But here, where he changes the number of offerings but both this, the offering specified in his vow, and that, the offering that he actually brought, are in a shallow pan, or both this and that are in a deep pan, I would say that he has indeed fulfilled his vow, as the difference in number of offerings brought is not significant. Therefore, the tanna taught the second case as well, to teach that the change in the number is in fact significant.

ואי אשמעינן הך משום דקא פליג להו אבל התם דלא פליג ביה אימא לא צריכא

And conversely, had the tanna taught us only this case, where there was a discrepancy between the number of offerings he vowed to bring and the number he actually brought, one might think that he does not fulfill his obligation only because he divided the two tenths of an ephah that were supposed to be brought together. But there, where he changed the type of pan but did not divide the flour to be used, I would say that it is not a case where he failed to fulfill his obligation. Therefore, it was necessary for the tanna to teach that where he changes the type of pan, he does not, in fact, fulfill his obligation.

תנו רבנן מה שהביא הביא וידי נדרו לא יצא ר’ שמעון אומר אף ידי נדרו נמי יצא:

§ The Sages taught in a baraita a case similar to that of the mishna: If one brings a meal offering somewhat different from that which he vowed to bring, then the one that he brought, he brought as a voluntary meal offering, but he has not fulfilled his vow. Rabbi Shimon says: He has even fulfilled his vow, as Rabbi Shimon maintains that the type of pan or the number of offerings is not significant.

זו להביא במחבת: והא תניא לא קידשום כלי שרת אמר אביי לא קידשום ליקרב אבל קידשום ליפסל

§ The mishna teaches that if he says: This tenth of an ephah of flour is a meal offering to bring in a shallow pan, and he brought a meal offering prepared in a deep pan instead, it is not valid. The Gemara asks: But isn’t it taught in a baraita that in this case the service vessel does not consecrate the flour, since he brought it in a different service vessel than he had vowed? Therefore, the meal offering is still non-sacred and can be used. The Gemara answers that the baraita should be understood according to that which Abaye says: Under such circumstances, the service vessel does not sanctify them with regard to being sacrificed on the altar, but it does sanctify them in order to become disqualified.

ואמר אביי לא שנו

And Abaye says an additional comment about the previous case: The Sages taught in the mishna that in the case of a change in the type of meal offering, the meal offering not valid